

## **Report, 2012 Fulton County Elections**

This Report concerns three investigations into violations of Title 21 of Georgia law and rules of the State Election Board.

State Election Board Cases

### **SEB 2012-156 (2012 General Election)**

**Respondents: Sharon Mitchell and Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections**

### **SEB 2012-56 (2012 Primary Election)**

**Respondents: Sam Westmoreland and Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections**

### **SEB 2011-110 (no specific election)**

**Respondent: Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration**

Report Date

November 26, 2013

By

Chris Harvey, Chief Investigator, Georgia Secretary of State's Office

On January 31, 2013, the Georgia State Election Board (SEB) will convene an investigative hearing on three election investigations involving significant allegations of violating election laws and SEB Rules in Fulton County. Two of the cases (SEB 2012-56 and SEB 2012-156) deal with specific elections: the 2012 General Primary and the 2012 General Election. SEB 2011-110 deals with voter registration and residency issues, and while not necessarily specific to an election, the issue of accurate and timely voter registration played a role in the aforementioned elections.

### **SEB 2012-156 General Election**

The vast majority of complaints in this election were tied to voters having to vote provisional ballots after being told that their names did not appear on the ExpressPoll. There appear to be a number of issues that started with problems in the voter registration process in Fulton County. Voter registration applications were being entered into the voter registration system until the day before the election, which was ten days after the final list of voters were entered into the ExpressPoll system. These problems were aggravated by a poorly executed and inconsistent procedure for properly handling and documenting provisional ballots.

#### **Voter Registration**



Proper Procedure: When a voter submits a voter registration application (or a change to an existing voter registration such as a new address or name change) the information is manually entered into the computer voter registration database. This database normally receives a lot of new applications and alterations in the weeks leading up to the registration deadline (October 9, 2012 for this General Election.) Fulton County, as did most other counties, received a large number of these applications in the weeks before the General Election, and they struggled and ultimately failed to enter all of the data by the deadlines they faced. When all of the applications are entered into the system, the system produces a complete Electors List for each precinct, naming all qualified voters. The system which handles the Electors List and contains all of the registered voters on election day (or during early voting) is commonly referred to as “ExpressPoll” (which is actually the name of the computers which allow voters to be “checked in” and have a voting access card created for them to vote on the voting machine (DRE.)

Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) Election Center handles the “loading” of all of the information from the voter registration system onto the actual ExpressPoll machines that are used at each precinct to identify voters and allow voter access cards to be created for them. In order to allow the counties to set up their election systems, KSU “closes” the information that will be loaded onto the ExpressPoll machines at the end of the day on the second Thursday prior to the Election Day. Any voter registration information that is added to the statewide voter registration system by any county *after* the close of that Thursday, will still be eligible to vote (assuming the registration application was received by the earlier October deadline) but those voters names (or new information) will only appear on a printed “supplemental list” that should be sent to every precinct.

For example, if my first-ever voter registration application was processed on October 30, 2012, and I went to my polling place to vote, I would be told by the poll worker, “You are not showing up in our system.” The poll worker should then check the printed “supplemental list” of voters where my name should appear. At that point, that I was present and showed proper ID would be noted on the list, and the poll worker should create a voter access card for me on the ExpressPoll machine, and I should vote on the DRE just as if I had been in ExpressPoll for years. If a voter did not appear on either the ExpressPoll or supplemental list, and the voter declared that they believed they had registered in time to vote, they should be given a provisional (paper) ballot on which to vote. Provisional ballots will be addressed in detail later in this report.

Therefore, it should be clear that the timely entrance of data into the voter registration system can keep the “supplemental list” to a minimum and keep the poll workers working at maximum efficiency by relying primarily on ExpressPoll (which is where the vast majority of the voters should be found.) In some counties, there are no supplemental lists on election day because all of the qualified voter registration applications were entered into the voter registration system by October 25, 2012. Failure to meet these data-entry deadlines caused cascading problems on election day.

Fulton County received a large number of voter registration applications, and was unable to enter the applications by the time the ExpressPoll records were finalized and loaded into the ExpressPolls. Fulton County failed to follow previous practices of supplementing data entry workers to keep up with the demands of the incoming registrations. KSU even gave Fulton County one extra day, until the end of October 26<sup>th</sup>, to enter information that would go into ExpressPoll. Fulton County was entering voter registrations into the system as late as the day before the election. This fact required the use of a “supplemental list” of voters who should have been allowed to vote on a DRE just like any other voter. Fulton County reported that their “supplemental list” contained approximately 6,000 voters. This is a very unusually high number of voters on a supplemental list.

Fulton County has claimed that the Secretary of State's Office was responsible for the late receipt of the voter registration applications, but the Secretary of State has multiple witnesses who will testify that the voter registration applications were made available to Fulton County as soon as they came into the office.

In post-election surveys completed by Fulton County election workers, there were many mentions of inadequate staffing to process the incoming voter registration applications. Ralph Jones admitted that the office also stopped processing changes in address requests in favor of adding new voter registration applicants. There was a particularly damning survey response which revealed,

***"Visiting Fulton County Registration and Election Officials couldn't obtain clear verification of the staffing and heavy workload requirements because voter's registration cards were moved from the sign-out location and placed around the office so no one would be able to identify the workload. Cards were hidden at employee work stations."***

Poll managers reportedly received their documents and election items the evening of Sunday, November 4, 2012. Due to an oversight in the Fulton County Voter Registration Office approximately 300 voters were added to the supplemental list during the day, Monday, November 5, 2012, after the first Supplemental List had already been given to the poll managers, so, at least, those 300 new voters would not appear on ExpressPoll or on a printed Supplemental List of voters if *any* of those 300 voters attempted to vote. Fulton County was distributing supplemental lists on Election Day, however, it is unknown if the lists were additional voters, replacement lists, lists that were never delivered, and/or some or all of the above. There were reports of poll managers either not getting any supplemental list, not knowing they got the supplemental list, not knowing what to do with the supplemental list they got, or not getting updated supplemental lists. Sandy Springs Precinct 22 did not have a copy of any supplemental list until after 11:00 AM on Election Day after over 800 people voted. Fulton County has acknowledged that two precincts did not receive the supplemental lists until almost noon on election day.

Approximately **1,100** voters, whose registration records were either entered or changed *after* October 26, voted provisional ballots that were accepted by Fulton County. Many of these voters should have appeared on the printed supplemental list and should have voted on DREs (the exceptions would be voters on the supplemental list who were voting out of their assigned precinct.)

**Potential Violations:**

O.C.G.A 21-2-226-Determining Eligibility of Voters

O.C.G.A. 21-2-227-Furnish List of Electors for Elections

O.C.G.A. 21-2-228-Examination of Elector' Qualifications

Problems at Precincts on Election Day

The Secretary of State's Office received approximately 150 complaints regarding Fulton County's performance on Election Day. Some of these complaints were regarding issues that were not necessarily the fault of Fulton County Election Officials, such as inconvenient polling place locations, and frustrated poll workers. Most of the complaints, however, came from voters who were either not allowed to vote

at all, or were required to vote provisionally even though they knew, and in some cases had documentation, that they were properly registered to vote.

Here is a sampling of the complaints

- Address on driver's license differed from registration address, so voter could not vote
- Voter had requested an absentee ballot, which voter denied, and voter was forced to vote provisional
- Excessively long lines and waits (in excess of three and four hours) due to difficulties in getting voters the voter access cards because the voters could not be found in ExpressPoll or supplemental list
- Elector not in the system, cannot vote
- Provisional ballots denied to voters who requested them for various reasons
- Voter had already voted, which voter denied (sometime provisional offered, but other times not)
- Lines with waits of over two hours saw many voters leave without voting
- Illegal campaigning in a polling place
- Slow procedure to create Voter Access Cards even though there were plenty of DREs
- Precincts ran out of supplies including provisional ballots
- Some waits for provisional ballots were in excess of four hours, and even then, small numbers of provisional ballots were delivered after that extended wait
- Some poll workers suggested that voters go to other precincts to try to find provisional ballots
- Polling places were unorganized and directionless
- Polling places did not open in time
- The advocacy group, Election Protection itself gathered and reported to the Secretary of State's Office more than twenty complaints, including four affidavits that were almost exclusively reports of declared registered voters not being allowed to vote on DREs, and, in most cases, experiencing hours of waiting time for provisional ballots
- In addition, after Election Day, several poll managers sent complaints about problems with getting provisional ballots and communicating with the Fulton Election Office downtown

Investigators from the Secretary of State's Office visited several precincts on Election Day and reported some dire conditions, particularly at Venetian Hills Precinct. There they saw the poll manager on the phone practically the entire time, voters wandering in the enclosed space, voters waiting hours to get provisional ballots, and voters being told they should try other precincts in the hopes of getting a provisional ballot somewhere else.

**Potential Violations:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-413 Conduct of voters, campaigners

O.C.G.A. 21-2-418 Provisional ballots

O.C.G.A. 21-2-596 Failure to perform duty

O.C.G.A. 21-2-591 Allowing unlawful assistance to voters

O.C.G.A. 21-2-403 Time for opening of polls

### Registered Voters Having to Vote Provisional Ballots

**3,732** Fulton County voters who voted provisional ballots on Election Day were in the ExpressPoll System by October 26, 2012. There are only a few legitimate reasons for a registered voter in ExpressPoll to vote a provisional ballot:

- Voter is voting out of precinct
- Voter does not have valid identification
- Voter cannot be found in ExpressPoll by poll worker

However, untrained or unequipped poll workers who did not have access to, or full knowledge of working an ExpressPoll or printed Supplemental List, would have to choose between allowing a voter to vote provisionally, and not letting the person vote at all.

Below is a summary of Fulton County Provisional Ballot Reporting:

<u>Reason for Prov. Ballot</u>	<u># P.B. voted</u>	<u># P.B. accepted</u>
Wrong Precinct/Not on List	9429	5101
No ID	72	0
Other Reasons	84	3
Total	<b>9585</b> (FC report to SOS lists <b>9575</b> )	5104

Fulton County accounted for 54% of provisional ballots cast in the entire state  
(DeKalb, Gwinnet, Chatham, and Muscogee Counties combined issued 2,879 provisional ballots)

3,732 voters were in ExpressPoll and 1,100 voters who voted provisionally were, or should have been, on the printed Supplemental List. These two numbers account for 4,832 voters who should have voted on a DRE on Election Day. This would have cut the number of provisional ballots by almost 50%.

A caveat to the 3,732 voters is that if a voter went to a precinct other than where they were registered and assigned, they could have:

1. Been directed to their proper precinct (if sufficient time allowed for the travel)  
Or,
2. Voted a provisional ballot at the wrong precinct

Fulton County apparently had inconsistent practices in handling voters at wrong precincts, and the workers were ultimately trained that, "When in doubt, give a provisional ballot." Some voters too seem to have become accustomed to such treatment and arrived at precincts knowing they were not registered there, but expecting a provisional ballot for the sake of convenience.

Lastly, reports show that of the 5079 records that Fulton County reported as accepted provisional ballots, **95** of those registration numbers **also** had voter access cards created for those registration numbers in ExpressPoll. This might indicate that the "registration number/voter" voted on a DRE and provisionally, and both votes were counted.

### Provisional Ballot Problems

Approximately 9,575 voters voted provisional ballots in Fulton County, which accounted for 54% of the total provisional ballots cast in the entire state. Nowhere, however, do the numbers and lists of names

and accepted and rejected ballots add up. Fulton County election officials were simply not prepared to handle the demand and backlog of unprocessed voter registration applications (which Fulton County created) for provisional ballots at the polling places. There appeared to be little to no consistency in the proper handling of provisional ballots. The failure by Fulton County to properly follow documentation and handling requirements in place to ensure the security and integrity of the provisional ballots made verifying provisional ballots with much certainty almost impossible.

Poll managers and workers did not follow state law or SEB Rules when handling and documenting provisional ballots. There was a very weak supply chain to deliver new provisional ballots to precincts, and the communication system between poll workers and election officials left much to be desired. Laws and SEB rules regarding the handling and documenting of provisional ballots were violated or ignored on a massive scale:

- There was insufficient dissemination about the system in place to allow voters to check the status of their provisional ballot
- One person appeared to vote *seven* provisional ballots at the same precinct, and *all seven ballots were marked as accepted*. Fulton County claims to have identified who these voters were, however, with no other identification on the provisional ballot envelopes, there no way to tell if that is true, and is frankly, rather unlikely.
- Some voters were denied provisional ballots, even after requesting one
- Provisional ballots were not kept in secure locations during validation (the status of the chain of custody for the provisional ballots is unknown)
- Fulton County could not even produce all of the provisional ballot envelopes that they appeared to have received
- There was no uniform recording of the *reasons* for rejecting provisional ballots
- Documents recording provisional ballot appear to be **created and altered** by someone after the documents were submitted by poll officials
- Provisional Ballot recap sheets were often done improperly, incompletely, or not at all
- Voters were listed as having provisional ballots accepted when they did not vote provisional ballots
- Voters were not notified until January 9, 2013 (66 days after the election) that their provisional ballots were rejected
- More than 1,000 of these *mailed notices* had no address for the elector, so there is no way that the notices *could have gotten to the electors*
- Many provisional ballot *rejections* appear to be recorded without a way to determine why a ballot was rejected, and inform the voter of the same
- The total number of voted provisional ballots differs from source to source
- Many provisional ballot recap sheets do not correlate to the statement of votes cast on the official results
- Fulton County has not reported how many provisional ballots had to be duplicated (all out of precincts provisional ballots)
- It is unknown how many voter registration applications were completed when voters were issued provisional ballots, but a review of specific complainants shows that at least 20 provisional voters were not given voter registration applications
- Printed instructions for checking the status of one's provisional ballot were not available for every provisional ballot issued

- As recently as September and October of 2012, Pamela Coman, Election Training Director for Fulton County asked for and received clarification about provisional ballots because she was preparing to begin the online training from the training staff at the Secretary of State's Office
- The heavy reliance on provisional ballots on Election Day set the stage for failures in the verification of provisional ballots in the days after the election. As woeful as was the requirement that so many voters had to cast provisional ballots in the first place, the more striking failure was Fulton County's inability to execute the acceptance and rejection of absentee ballots with anything resembling accuracy or reliable documentation
- More than 1000 rejection letters were mailed to voters with incomplete mailing addresses, and could not have been delivered
- Fulton County failed to notify provisional voter who voted out of precinct that their ballot had been duplicated and counted

#### Detailed Examination of Ten Precincts' Provisional Ballots

Investigators from the Secretary of State's Office examined only ten precincts' handling of provisional ballots in great detail, and what they discovered was a lack of consistency or much of anything that could even be described as a "system," that yielded inaccuracy after inaccuracy in the proper documentation of provisional ballots. Not *one* of the ten precincts and county officials could even account for the proper *number* of provisional ballots. The details from each of the ten precincts are included in the exhibits in this packet, but below is a chart that shows the errors and wide-ranging inconsistencies with provisional ballots.

Following the chart is a point-by-point analysis of the provisional ballots from each of the ten precincts examined in detail.

### Fulton County Provisional Analysis

Precinct	# on Prov. Numbered List of Voters	Prov. Ballots Marked As Listed on Prov. Recap Sheet	No Prov. Numbered List of Voters and Ballots Cast on Recap Sheet Match	# of Provisional Voter Certificates Provided by Fulton County	Total Prov. Envelopes Provided by Fulton County for Inspection	Accepted/Rejected Prec. Envelopes Provided by Fulton County	# Voters Whose Prov. Ballot Should Have Been Accepted/SOS Analysis	# Voters Whose Prov. Ballot Should Have Been Rejected/SOS Analysis	# Voters Eligible to Vote on DRE Unit	# Voters Whose Registration was Added After Supp. List Generated	# Voters Voting Out of Precinct	DRE and Express Poll Recap Sheets
01A							46	26	19	15	11	Blank
025							17	30	8	13	10	More voters marked than recorded on DRE
02F1/02F2							90	23	13	28	23	Provisional ballots listed as supplemental voters
048							56	13	18	4	11	Complete
06H							2	Unknown	3	0	0	More voter certificates than votes on DRE
110							17	18	5	4	28	Not Completed
04W							116	110	27	0	80	More votes on DRE than voter certificates
0222							24	13	6	0	0	Complete
5514							9	0	0	0	0	Complete
3A							57	71	17	6	25	One more voter marked than reported on DRE
<b>Totals</b>	<b>913</b>	<b>789</b>		<b>765</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>1078</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>216</b>	

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Eligible to Vote DRE - 134

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Who Registered Timely but were Added After Supplemental Generated - 83

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Registered at Other Fulton County Precincts - 256

Cells in green reflect accurate precinct provisional reporting or complete production of all provisional ballot certificates and envelopes to SOS staff for review  
Cells in red reflect inaccurate provisional reporting or minimal production of provisional ballot certificates and envelopes provided to SOS staff for review

Page 1

## Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 01A

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- A provisional ballot recap sheet was not completed for the precinct
- 158 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters. All names were written in red ink in what appeared to be the same handwriting.

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for only 42 of the 158 names on the numbered list.
- 1 voter certificate was completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 41 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 136 provisional ballots were accepted and 22 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

- 28 Rejected
- 3 were voted by persons registered in other counties.

- 23 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 2 were voted by persons in delete status.

46 Accepted

- 35 were registered in precinct 01A.
- 12 of the 35 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 15 of the 35 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 7 of the 35 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 1 voter had previously requested an absentee ballot
- 11 were registered in other Fulton County precincts

#### Additional Observations

- One voter was listed as a non-citizen. It is unknown if the voter returned to Fulton County after the election with proof of citizenship.
- 4 of the voters were listed on the numbered list 2 times.
- 5 ballots were accepted from voters who were also given credit for voting on a DRE unit. Accepted ballot envelopes were provided for these individuals.
- One person listed had two registration records in the registration system.
- 3 voters could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.
- 70 voters were listed on the provisional numbered list of voters and they were also given credit for voting in the registration system by voting on a DRE unit. Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for any of these individuals.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 58 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 47 accepted and 11 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 02F1\02F2**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 83 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 83 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 83 of the names on the numbered The provisional section of the voter certificates was not completed on any of the certificates.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis



- According to the provisional numbered list, 60 provisional ballots were accepted and 23 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system was reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 23 Rejected

- 13 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 9 were not found in the voter registration system
- 1 was voted by a person marked as a non-citizen.

#### 59 Accepted

- 36 were registered in precinct 02F/02F1.
- 6 of the 36 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 7 of the 36 voters were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 23 of the 36 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 23 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 72 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 56 accepted and 16 rejected.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for 11 voters.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 02S**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 84 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 79 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 40 of the names on the numbered.
- The provisional section was completed by the voter and poll worker on 1 voter certificate.
- The provisional section was completed by the poll worker only on 28 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was not completed on 11 of the voter certificates provided.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 31 provisional ballots were accepted and 48 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 34 Rejected

- 17 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 11 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 6 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 32 Accepted

- 17 were registered in precinct 02S.
- 3 of the 17 voters were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 13 of the 17 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 1 of the 17 had previously requested an absentee ballot..
- 15 were registered at other Fulton County precincts

#### Additional Comments

- One ballot was listed as rejected and the provisional list was marked that the voter could not be found. The voter information from the voter certificate was compared to the voter registration system. A record was found for a Fulton County voter with the same name and address. The date of birth on the voter certificate was not valid and could not be compared to the voter record. It appears should have been duplicated to the voter's precinct and accepted. A provisional ballot envelope for the voter was not provided.
- One ballot was listed as rejected on the provisional list; however, the voter was listed on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct. The voter certificate was marked accepted. A provisional ballot envelope for the voter was not provided.
- 9 of the voters could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the voter registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 45 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 30 accepted and 15 rejected.
- One provisional ballot was accepted for voter who was marked as having voted during the early voting period.
- One ballot was rejected because the voter was listed as registered in Gwinnett County. Review of the voter registration system indicated there were 2 registration numbers for the same person. The Fulton County record appeared to occur after the Gwinnett record and should have replaced the Gwinnett record. The registration in Fulton County was on the supplemental list. It appears the ballot should have been accepted.
- Two accepted provisional ballot envelopes were provided for voters that were not listed on the provisional numbered list of voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 03A**

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 132 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 134 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters
- 53 names were written in red ink which appears to be the same ink used for marking whether the ballot was accepted or rejected. The names are written in the same handwriting and appear to be listed in reverse alphabetical order.

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 132 of the names on the numbered list.
- 17 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 73 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section
- 42 voter certificates were not copied to include the back side

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 59 provisional ballots were accepted and 75 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 71 Rejected

- 37 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 30 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 4 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 55 Accepted

- 23 were registered in precinct 03A.
- 15 of the 23 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 6 of the 23 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 2 of the 23 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 32 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

### Additional Comments

- 1 voter could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.

### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 128 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 56 accepted and 72 rejected.
- 2 ballots were rejected because the voters were not registered in Fulton County. The registrations were found in the registration system as being received by the deadline but they were not entered until December. The ballots should have been accepted.

- One ballot was accepted for a voter in which the registration system indicated she voted during the early voting period.
- 2 ballots were accepted for voters who could not be found in the registration system. It is unclear what steps Fulton County took to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot should have been accepted.
- One ballot was accepted for a voter who provided a Florida address on the voter certificate and no date of birth. There was no identifying information on the voter certificate to verify the voter's eligibility.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 04B**

### **Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters**

- 110 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 110 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

### **Voter Certificates**

- Voter certificates were provided for 109 of the names on the numbered list.
- 8 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 6 voter certificates were completed by the voter only on the provisional section
- 95 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

### **Provisional Ballot Analysis**

According to the provisional numbered list, 55 provisional ballots were accepted and 55 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### **53 Rejected**

- 14 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 36 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 3 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### **56 Accepted**

- 42 were registered in precinct 04B.
- 26 of the 42 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 4 of the 41 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 5 of the 42 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 6 of the 42 were in "Verify" status. These voters should have listed on Express Poll and the voter should have been able to vote on a DRE unit.
- 1 of the 42 was in "Pending" status reason type "A". This voter was included in the "pending" voters with questionable addresses.
- 1 voter was marked as a non-citizen

- 13 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- One was listed as rejected; however, the voter was found in the registration system. No ballot envelope was provided for the voter.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 103 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 52 accepted and 51 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 04W**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 249 provisional ballots issued on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 232 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters.

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 227 of the names on the numbered list.
- 15 voter certificates were completed by the voter only on the provisional section
- 50 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 157 voter certificates were completed by the voter and poll officer on the provisional section
- 36 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section
- One voter certificate did include the backside.
- 32 voter certificates were provided for persons not on the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 129 provisional ballots were accepted and 102 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

##### 110 Rejected

- 45 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 62 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 3 were voted by persons in delete status.

116 Accepted

- 36 were registered in precinct 04W.
- 20 of the 36 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 9 of the 36 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 4 of the 36 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 3 of the 36 were in “Verify” status. These voters should have been listed on Express Poll and the voter should have been able to vote on a DRE unit.
- 80 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- 3 voters have two registration records in the registration system.
- One voter had no precinct assigned to the registration record.
- 2 of the voters were listed on the numbered list 2 times.
- 1 voter could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 159 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 80 accepted and 79 rejected.
- 2 ballots were accepted from voters who could not be found in the system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter’s registration and whether the ballot counted.
- One ballot was rejected from a voter who submitted a change of address prior to the deadline but it was not entered until December. The voter requested an absentee ballot and it is unclear if the ballot was returned to the previous county of residence. A rejected provisional ballot envelope was provided.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 06H**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 5 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 5 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 1 of the names on the provisional numbered list.
- The back of the voter certificate was not provided.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 1 provisional ballot was accepted and 4 were rejected.

#### 4 Rejected

- Voter certificates were not provided for the rejected voters. Investigators could not determine in the registration system why the provisional ballot was rejected. This was due to not having identifying information other than the name of the voter and there being multiple records in the registration system for the name on the provisional list of voters.
- The reason the provisional ballot was rejected was not marked on the provisional numbered list of voters.

#### 1 Accepted

- The voter was registered in 06H. The voter was also listed on the supplemental list of voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 1 provisional ballot envelope was provided by Fulton County for review. The ballot envelope was marked accepted and was the same name listed as the ballot marked accepted on the provisional numbered list of voters.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the persons marked rejected on the provisional numbered list of voters.

## Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 11G

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 65 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 59 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 65 of the names on the numbered list.
- 9 voter certificates were provided for persons not listed on the provisional list of voter.
- 3 voter certificates were completed by the voter and poll officer on the provisional section
- 1 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 52 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

The numbered list of provisional voters was not marked as whether a voter's ballot was accepted or rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 16 Rejected

- 5 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 6 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 5 were voted by persons in delete status.

37 Accepted

- 9 were registered in precinct 11G.
- 3 of the 9 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 4 of the 9 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 2 of the 9 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 28 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

Additional Comments

- 2 voters could not be identified due to the voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the voter registration system.
- 1 could not be located in the registration system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot counted.
- On ballot was listed as rejected; however the voter's registration was reviewed and indicated they had submitted their registration by the deadline but it was not added to the registration system until December. It is unknown if the ballot was accepted because a provisional ballot envelope was not provided.

Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 15 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 9 accepted and 6 rejected.
- A ballot was accepted for a voter whose registration record indicated they were given credit for voting on a DRE unit.  
One ballot was rejected; however, a registration record was found for the voter. According to the registration system the voter's registration application was received by the deadline but was not entered until December 2012. The ballot should have been accepted.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct SS14**

Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 15 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 20 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters
- Names 16 through 20 are written in red ink which appears to be the same ink used for marking whether the ballot was accepted or rejected.

Voter Certificates



- Voter certificates were provided for 19 of the names on the numbered list.
- 12 voter certificates were completed on the provisional section by the voter and poll officer
- 4 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only
- 2 voter certificates were not completed by the voter
- 1 voter certificate was not completed

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 14 provisional ballots were accepted and 6 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system was reviewed for all voters and the following was determined

##### 6 Rejected

- 5 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 1 was voted by a person marked as a non-citizen.

##### 9 Accepted

- 5 were registered in precinct SS14. All 5 voters were listed on the supplemental list of voters.
- 3 were registered in other Fulton County precincts.
- Registration information was reviewed and revealed 5 of the 8 provisional voters registered at other precincts were given credit for voting by the Express Poll. This would indicate they voted on DRE units at their registered precinct.
- 1 could not be located in the registration system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot counted.

#### Additional Comments

- Review of the voters whose names were written in red indicated they had voted on a DRE unit at the precinct they were registered at. The voters were contacted and all stated they originally went to precinct SS14 and were told they were registered at other precincts. The voters said they went the precinct they were told to vote at and voted on the DRE units. None of the persons written in red ink said they voted a provisional or paper ballot at precinct SS14. Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 15 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 9 accepted and 6 rejected.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the persons whose names were added in red ink to the provisional list of voters.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Statement of Votes Cast

- According to the Statement of Votes Cast report, 1 provisional ballot was counted for precinct SS14. There were 5 provisional ballots listed on the numbered list of voters for precinct SS14 that should have been counted.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct SS22**

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 46 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 46 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for all 46 names on the provisional numbered list of voters.
- The provisional section was completed by the voter and poll worker on 3 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was completed by the poll worker only on 39 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was not completed on 4 of the voter certificates provided.

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 24 provisional ballots were accepted and 22 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 19 Rejected

- 6 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 9 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 4 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 24 Accepted

- 15 were registered in precinct SS22.
- 4 of the 15 voters were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 2 of the 15 voters were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 9 of the 15 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 8 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- Three ballots were listed as rejected; however, the voters' registration was found in the registration system. Two voters were registered at different precincts. These ballots should have been duplicated and accepted. One voter was added to the registration system after the Express Poll and supplemental lists were generated. This ballot should have been accepted. Ballot envelopes were not provided for any of these voters. Two voters received credit for voting, one voter did not.

- One ballot was accepted for a voter that did not provided identification at the poll location. A report previously by Fulton County indicated no who voted a provisional ballot because they did not have ID returned to Fulton County with ID prior to the close of business the Friday following the elections.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 41 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 20 accepted and 21 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Potential Violations for Provisional Ballots:

O.C.G.A. 21-2-587(3) and (4) Frauds by poll officers  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-562(a)(1) and (a)(2) Fraudulent entries  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(a) Provisional ballots-allowing to be cast  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(c) Provisional ballots-provisional voter registration application  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(f) Give written information to provisional voters  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(b) Securing provisional ballots  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(d)(1) Notify rejected provisional voters in writing  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(d)(2) Notify voters who voted out of precinct in writing  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(3) Providing adequate provisional ballots to precincts  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(a) Checking master list of electors before voting provisional  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(b) Checking with Registrar before voting provisionally  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(c) Adding verified voters to precinct (using supplemental list)  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(d) Sending to proper precinct  
 SEB 183-1-12.064(f) Completing provisional ballot certificate  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(i) Completing complete ballot and paperwork  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(j) Verifying paperwork is correct  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(7) Providing paperwork to provisional voter  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(9) Accounting for all provisional ballots and other documentation  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(10) Securing provisional ballots  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(12)(b) Duplicating provisional ballots  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(13)(a) Notifying rejected provisional voters  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(13)(b) Notifying voters who voted in wrong precinct in writing

#### Errors on Recap and Statement of Votes Cast

Of the 247 DRE and ExpressPoll Recap sheets submitted by Fulton County, there were 109 precincts forms that contained errors, omissions, and/or inaccuracies.

Common discrepancies included:

- DRE Recap sheets were not totaled
- The number of “voters marked” listed on the ExpressPoll Recap did not match the numbered list of voters pulled from the ExpressPoll
- Explanations for mis-matching numbers was not provided

- ExpressPoll count and DRE count of voters differed
- Recap sheets were not properly signed by all parties (managers)
- Provisional voters were listed as supplemental voters on the ExpressPoll recap sheet

The attached table identifies 19 of the worst examples of inaccurate reporting:

### Absentee Ballot System Execution Questions

There were three reports where voters (Katrina Keuller, Rodney Hovater, and Paula Hovater) reported they received more than one absentee ballot packages when they made their absentee ballot requests. These voters turned their additional ballots over to SOS investigators.

The following complaint, from a voter who is temporarily in New York appears to expose numerous flaws in the system and/or the execution of the system for requesting an absentee ballot in the general election (emphasis added C.H. :)

Sent: Sunday, December 09, 2012 11:53 PM  
To: Office of Secretary of State  
Subject: Web E-Mail From Rollie O. Buchanan

Question / Comment: Mr. Kemp,

The local, state and national elections of November 6, 2012 have passed. However I am submitting this complaint regarding my experience with absentee voting through Fulton County, which ultimately prevented me from voting due to no fault of my own.

Wednesday, October 3

I mailed my application for an official absentee ballot.

Approximately a week later, a colleague that submitted his after I did, indicated he had received and submitted his absentee ballot via Cobb County within a 10 day period. This seemed odd and caused me to question the status of my absentee ballot.

**Thursday, October 18**

I prepared a second application for mailing. However I wanted to talk with someone in the Fulton County office to ensure I was following the directions correctly, to ensure my opportunity to vote.

**Friday, October 19**

I called the general number and was transferred to a woman who checked my records. I indicated an application had been mail approximately three (3) week earlier, etc. She indicated there was no record of receipt of the absentee application, but to speed up the process, I could fax my second application instead of mailing it.

Given this information, I faxed it at 4:17 pm EST (as indicated by FAX confirmation) to 404.730.8839. My belief was that the absentee ballot would be in the mail by Monday or Tuesday, October 22 or 23, with arrival to my residence by Saturday, October 26, at the latest.

Nothing arrived on October 26, 28 or 29.

**Tuesday, October 30**

I called the main Fulton County office number and was transferred to a "Marcia", who served as coordinator for some aspect of the unit. I informed her that the FAX had been sent on October 19 but nothing had been received, even though I had a confirmation of delivery by fax. Marcia indicated that I re-fax the form again. I told her I would within the hour and she gave me her direct line if I had any problems.

At 12:50 pm EST I re-faxed the application for an absentee ballot. I called her four (4) times that afternoon leaving messages and a number for a return phone call to confirm receipt of the document and mailing of the absentee ballot. I received no return phone call for the remainder of the day.

**Wednesday, October 31**

I called 1-2 more times first thing in the morning and left additional messages. At approximately 3:15 pm EST, "Marcia" returned my call.

While talking with her, **she indicated the faxes from October 30, 2012 had not been pulled up, but that she would do it while I was on the phone. I sat on the phone listening while she pulled it up, confirmed that it had been received and processed it for 5-10 minutes. Keep in mind this only happened while I was on the phone, after a previous conversation and several messages on October 30 and 31. "Marcia" indicated it was processed and would go out right away.**

Given the lateness of the day, I anticipated it would go out either later on October 31 or on November 1, with an arrival on November 3 or 6, at the latest.

When the ballot did not arrive on November 3, I began making plans to leave work early, to get home in time to fill it out and pay (at my expense) for overnight delivery to ensure its arrival by noon on November 6.

**Monday, November 5**

I rushed home early, through rush hour traffic with the idea that I would have to vote and get it to the post office before 5:00 pm EST to ensure pick-up for overnight delivery to Fulton County Election office.

***To my extreme disappointment, there was no ballot in the mailbox. I cannot express how disappointed I was; particularly after I did everything I could in a timely manner, yet the ball kept being dropped in Fulton County.***

This meant I would have no opportunity to vote after spending over a month with one (1) mailing, two (2) faxes and numerous conversations and messages with staff, particularly the one in charge of this process, "Marcia".

**Tuesday, November 6**

Out of disappointment and frustration, I contacted your office to express my frustration and asked if there was anything I could do.

I was informed that I was not the only one that had called and complained about this particular office and its handling of absentee ballot applications. I was then directed to this page to submit a complaint.

Later the same evening, I pulled my mail around 10:00 pm EST to find an absentee ballot. This reminded me of my earlier frustration. ***However what I found more upsetting was that after the fax was processed on October 31 while I was on the phone, according to the metered postmark, the absentee ballot was not mailed until November 2, This was a full two (2) days after my conversation with "Marcia".***

I did a search on the internet and found that this office has been under "investigation" for a number of reasons within the past few months. To find this out was rather disheartening, given that my opportunity to vote had been lost in what appeared to be their inability to perform their important duties for the public they serve.

I am asking that my case be investigated with some sort of resolution that is communicated back to me.

The problems illustrated in this complaint indicate a series of apparently admitted failures on Fulton County's Election staff to process absentee ballot applications efficiently. It took Herculean efforts for this voter to even get his ballot to him too late for him to vote the ballot. How many other voters, whose applications were not pulled from the FAX line, did not get their absentee ballots?

Another voter, this time overseas, requested his absentee ballot early. Here is his story (C.H. emails condensed and edited for spelling :)

Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2013 4:31 PM  
To: Office of Secretary of State  
Subject: Web E-Mail from John L. Turbiville

Question / Comment: I would like to add my protest concerning the functioning of the Fulton County Voter Registration Office. I requested officially many months ago an absentee ballot, based on my former address in Atlanta (my last U.S. address before moving to Europe); with no response I sent an e-mail; still no response, I telephoned the office, and I was promised that the ballot would be sent. Still nothing. So, about 2 weeks before the Nov 6 election, I sent in a "Federal Write-in Ballot". Last week, I received a notice that my ballot was not counted because it arrived too late.

I first sent in the form for registration for absentee voting in February 2012, to confirm my previous registration (I have voted in Federal elections several times by absentee, always using my last U.S. address 28-28th St NW, Atlanta 30309).

In September, I believe, I sent an email to the office requesting my status, with no reply. In October I telephoned the office and the representative assured me that all was in order for my ballot. But the ballot was never received, and about two weeks before the Nov. election, I sent in the Federal write-in ballot. So I was surprised when the notice came that this was received in early January, too late to be counted. I have always found that mail in general between France and the U.S. is delivered within one week.

I found one name with who I was in contact at the Fulton County office; it was [brianna.alexander@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:brianna.alexander@fultoncountyga.gov)

By telephone she told me that my registration was valid and that I would receive an absentee ballot, but it never happened.

Fulton County reported that the absentee ballot FAX line was checked every hour, but this does not appear to be accurate based on these complaints.

There were approximately twenty-three complaints about voters having problems getting or returning absentee ballots.

#### **Potential Violations in Absentee Ballot Problems:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-381(b)(2)(A) Mailing absentee ballots failures (multiple times)

#### Election Training

Pamela Coman, Training Director for Fulton County Elections Office provided copies of training manuals and an explanation of the requirements for training.

She said that each poll worker get four hours of training (two hours online and two hours in person.)

Ms. Coman asked for and received specific answers from the Secretary of State's Office shortly before the General Election, and Ms. Coman said that she specifically trained the poll workers in all areas regarding provisional ballots and specifically with regards to provisional ballots and voter who were not found in ExpressPoll (checking the supplemental list.)

#### Pending Status Voters

As a result of letters sent to approximately 1,100 voters in June 2012 (the subject of SEB 2011-110), voters who were suspected of not having homes at addresses where they were registered had their voter registration status changed without any due process. These voters were expected to arrive at the polls and prove their residential address to the satisfaction of poll workers. If they were able to do so, they would be allowed to vote on DRE, and their status changed. If they were not able to provide proof, they would have to vote a provisional ballot.

On November 2, 2012, Sharon Mitchell informed the Secretary of State's Office, which had questioned the changing of voter status without due process, that Fulton County would not place such voters in "P" status.

Sharon Mitchell told investigators that all voters who had been placed in "Pending" status by Fulton County on October 26, 2012 had been restored to their regular voter registration status, prior to Election Day, but 626 voters *still* showed to be in status "Pending" as late as December 2012.

No voters were impacted as a result of a "P Status," and, therefore, there appears to be no violation.

#### Interview with Election Officials

On December 14, 2012, SOS Investigations staff interviewed Sharon Mitchell, Dwight Brower, Ralph Jones, and Pamela Coman in the presence of their attorney, David Walbert. The interview last approximately 1 ¾ hours and it covered a wide-ranging list of topics. The goal was to get a general picture of the events in the election and determine where the investigation needed to be focused. The overall tone of the election officials was that there were a few problems, mostly at the precinct level, but nothing systematic, major, or dramatic happened.

Condensed List of Violations in Fulton SEB 2012-156 [*italics indicate broad charges that may be applied to one or more situations*]

- 21-2-224(f) the official list of electors eligible to vote in any primary or election shall be prepared and completed at least five calendar day prior to the date of the primary of election in which the list is to be used. 734 voters
- 21-2-224(g) providing complete elector lists  
**[TWO PRECINCTS AFFECTED]**
- 21-2-226(a) It shall be the duty of the county board of registrars to determine the eligibility of each person applying to register to vote in such county.
- [21-2-226(b) *upon finding an elector eligible to vote in the county, the county board of registrars shall have the duty of determining and placing the elector in the proper districts*]

- 21-2-418(b) failure of the poll officials to ensure provisional voters completed a provisional ballot voting certificate which included information about the place, manner, and approximate date on which the person registered to vote. AT LEAST 600 VOTERS
- Rule 183-1-12-.06(4)(i) upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form. AT LEAST 199 VOTERS
- 21-2-224 All persons whose names appear on the list of electors placed in the possession of the managers in each precinct and no others, except as otherwise provided in this article, shall be allowed to deposit their ballots according to law at the precinct in which they are registered. AT LEAST 215 VOTERS
- 21-2-418(b) the Fulton County Board of Registrars failed to make a good faith estimate to determine whether the persons casting the provisional ballots were entitled to vote AT LEAST 24 VOTERS  
**[24 VOTERS BALLOTS WERE REJECTED WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED]** 21-2-590(3) refuses to permit any duly registered and qualified person to vote at any primary or election, with the knowledge that such person is entitled to vote
- Rule 183-1-12-.06(4)(i) Before issuing the outer envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style on the outer envelope. AT LEAST 450 VOTERS
- 21-2-419(d)(1) the board of registrars shall notify in writing those persons whose provisional ballots were not counted that their ballots were not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the persons timely registered to vote or other proper reason. AT LEAST 1200 VOTERS
- 21-2-418(b) such person voting a provisional ballot shall complete an official voter registration form SEVERAL THOUSAND VOTERS

### SEB 2012-56 July 31, 2012 General Primary Election

The July 31, 2012 General Primary in Fulton County was beset with numerous problems, some of which were systemic, and some were less systemic, but all were serious and problematic for Fulton County.

#### Districting and Ballot Errors

There were multiple areas in Fulton County where, upon redistricting the voters following the census, problems arose on Election Day.

In House District 62, an entire street, Chicory Cove, was incorrectly placed in House District 64.

In the Sandy Springs area there were approximately 350 people who were incorrectly listed as being in Senate District **56**, when they should have been listed as being in Senate District **6**. When redistricting was done, a number of addresses were not changed, causing those residents to appear to live in districts that offered candidates on the ballot that were not candidates for their residential district.

The Lang Carson Precinct (05A) (100 Flat Shoals Ave), experienced a similar problem. This precinct was a combined precinct for House Districts 58 and 59; however, every voter who appeared to vote was given a ballot that only applied to residents of HR 58. Many voters noticed this early in the day, and the Secretary of State's office started receiving numerous calls and emails. Poll managers seemed incapable of solving the problem and multiple people made calls to Fulton County Election Officials to try to get a person on the scene that could solve the problem. The response of the Fulton County Election Officials to calls for assistance was delayed and woeful. At 9:30, Fulton election officials told the poll workers how to create ballots for HD 59, but the poll workers had no way of knowing which district the voter lived in, unless the voter knew, and further, had no way to verify if the voter's declaration of House District was accurate. The workers were promised a map by 12:00 pm, but it was not until approximately 3:45 PM that an election official arrived with a map that was large enough to allow poll workers to determine which ballot a voter was supposed to get, based on their address. A volunteer who was at the precinct was able to identify at least 16 voters who got and voted the wrong ballot, and reported that there were more people with whom she did not speak. There is no way to determine how many voters either got the wrong ballot or were not able to vote because poll workers could not create proper cards until approximately 9:30 AM.

On Election Day, Sam Westmoreland when asked about the problem at the Lang Carson Precinct told a candidate that two streets not being districted properly caused the problem, although he could not identify *which* two streets were involved. In an interview with Fulton County election officials in December 2012, Dwight Brower said that, "about ten" streets were not properly districted and that was the cause of the problem. It is unknown how many voters cast their ballots in a race that was not for their district. An investigator from the Secretary of State's Office was at the precinct shortly after the problem was reported, and he described a citizen with a map trying to help determine to which districts voters' addresses corresponded. The delayed and inadequate response to the critical situation of voters not being able to cast the proper ballot on Election Day was notable.

It was also reported that House District 25 had districting errors as well. HD 25 is made up of precincts JC04 and JC03. The unopposed candidate received 293 votes in JC04 and 3 votes in JC14 (which was not near his district).

**Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-226 Duty to place elector in proper district (multiple violations)

O.C.G.A. 21-2-596 Failure to perform duty

Dual Database of Voters

Once Fulton County realized that their districts were not correct, they made the choice to employ a "dual database" for the election. This essentially "froze" the election up to that point, during advanced voting, and then redistricted voters who had not yet voted. Of course, the redistricting was not done properly at that time either as was evidenced by the previous portion of this report. The problem with a dual database is that, while it seems like a quick solution at the time, creating a dual database creates two complete, separate sets of election results that must be manually calculated and entered into the



GEMS server. While this sounds simple, it is not as simple as adding two numbers and getting the total (*before* plus *after*=total.) There are thousands of individual results that must be entered, and thousands of computations to be done, and the entry can only be done on a single GEMS server, by one person at a time.

Fulton County displayed results in a way that was confusing to the public. They initially showed only the Election Day database (database #2) as their final results. Then, when they completed their second database, they displayed the *combined total* as being only database #1. At least one candidate thought that this was a manipulation of votes by Fulton County.

#### Delays in Counting Votes and not certifying the Election in Time

Largely as a result of working with a dual-database in the Primary Election, Fulton County was not able to complete the tabulation and certification of the election results by the deadline required by the law. Fulton County certified their results approximately one hour after the deadline (Monday, August 6, 2012 at 5:00 pm.)

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-493(k) Failing to certifying election by 5:00 PM on the Monday after the election

#### Absentee Ballot Complaints

Glenda Heyer, when requesting an absentee ballot for her son, *got the wrong absentee ballot three times* (two Republican and one non-Partisan.) Her son was not able to vote.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-384(2)

#### Early Opening and Tabulating of Absentee Ballots

Fulton County started opening and tabulating absentee ballots on Monday, July 30, 2012, a full 24 hours before the code allows early opening and counting. People involved were not sequestered Monday, except during working hours.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(G)(3) Early opening and tabulation of absentee ballots

#### Not Getting Ballot of Choice

Wheat Street Towers Precinct, at least two voters were told that they must either pick Republican or Democrat ballots, and could not get a non-partisan ballot. Voters had no choice but to pick what was offered to them.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A 21-2-431(a) Not getting proper ballot

SEB Rule 183-1-12(4)(b) Not getting appropriate ballot

#### Polls Not Opening on Time

James Orange Park Precinct was not open until approximately 7:30 AM; however, the cause was that the site key-holder had car trouble. At least one voter had to leave before the precinct opened and could not vote.

#### Poll Closing Prematurely

East Point Library-A voter arrived at 6:55 PM, and was told the polls were closed. The voter started back to her car. Apparently, the voters were able to convince poll workers that it was 6:55 PM, and they opened the doors, but by the time the complaining voter got back to the door, she was told that now the polls were closed, even though she had been in line with the other voters disputing the closing time.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-403 Polls closing before 7:00 PM

#### Outrageous Results

Precinct 1C2 showed 233 ballots cast with a turn-out of 23,300%. This was as a result of a redistricting error that placed all of the voters in one precinct in the same district when they should have been distributed among two districts. This was a reporting error, which may have impacted the credibility of the reporting, but did not affect any results.

#### DRE Malfunctioning and Manager Casting Voter's Ballot

Mr. John Mattox, who voted at 10M (Tennis Center), reported that his ballot, as reflected by the DRE did not show him, having selected a candidate for sheriff, when he said he previously selected a candidate. He called a poll worker to his station, and she reviewed his ballot and he tried again. He selected his candidate, but when the DRE got to the summary page which showed which candidates he selected, there was no "x" on the sheriff candidate. He said the poll manager cast his ballot by pressing the button herself, and told him he was done. He was dismayed that the DRE unit was left in use.

Subsequent investigation determined that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a violation of election law.

### **Violations SEB2012-056 Fulton County Primary Election**

**Allegation:** 60 voters were assigned the incorrect precinct during the July 31, 2012 Primary Election

- **Violation 21-2-226(b)** upon finding an elector eligible to vote in the county, the county board of registrars shall have the duty of determining and placing the elector in the proper districts and precinct.

**Allegation:** Fulton County Elections failed to certify the July 31, 2012 Primary Election by the deadline – Election results were certified at 6:30 pm, Monday November 12, 2012; 1 ½ hours after the deadline

- **Violation 21-2-493(k)** returns shall be certified by the superintendent not later than 5:00 pm on the Monday following the date on which such election was held.

**Allegation:** Fulton County opened absentee ballots the Monday prior to the July 31, 2012 Election – absentee ballots were opened and scanned on the Monday prior to the election

- **Violation 21-2-386(a)(3)** a county, at his or her discretion, after 7:00 am on the day of the primary, election, or runoff open the inner envelopes.
- **21-2-386(a)(5)** no absentee ballots shall be tabulated before 7:00 am on the day of a primary, election, or runoff.

### **SEB 2011-110 Demolished Residences**

This case involves a complaint that was brought by a complainant who reported that there were at least 1,300 people registered to vote in Fulton County, however, the homes where these registered voters claimed residency, no longer existed. The complainant provided specific names and addresses along with photographs that apparently showed that listed addresses contained only empty lots with no structures. Preliminary investigation indicated that many of the addresses referred by the complainant did appear to show vacant lots while voters still used that address as a registered address for voting. There was concern that people who might have moved out of their districts were still registered to vote and were voting in Fulton County Elections.

A previous SEB case (2009-62) investigated allegations that voters had done just that in the 2009 City of Atlanta Municipal Election.

Examination of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-218 indicated that while this situation was odd on its face, the registration of a voter who moves his residence is affected differently depending on whether the voter leaves the district, or municipality, county, or state. Paragraph (d) states that a voter who moves to a different address within the county or municipality, but fails to notify the registrar by the fifth Monday before an election, “shall vote in the precinct of such elector’s former residence for such election...” Then, paragraph (e) of this code section states a voter, “who moves from one county or municipality to another after the fifth Monday prior to a primary or election may vote in the county or municipality or precinct in which such elector is registered to vote.”

It was also unknown when these electors moved and/or if they moved to a different county or municipality. It was also unknown if the voters intended to return to these addresses and were living temporarily at another location, while intending to retain their residency as allowed under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-217(a)(2).

In May, 2012 I met personally with Fulton County Elections Director, Samuel Westmoreland, in Savannah to discuss this issue with him. At the time, I believed that Fulton County was not aware of the allegation or set of circumstances. I gave Mr. Westmoreland a very brief synopsis of the allegations. I was surprised to hear him respond that his office was already aware of the situation and that they were already working on it. He then volunteered that he had found [paraphrased] “elements in the office that were corrupt and/or covering the situation up.” I told him that I was very interested in working with him and Fulton County in addressing the issues. Mr. Westmoreland then said that he would rather not discuss the matter further in public (we were in the lobby of the hotel where the SEB Meeting was taking place). I offered to come to his office the following week, and he immediately said that he did want me there, but he would come to my office instead. After not hearing from him during the following

week, I called him, and he made another cryptic comment along the lines of, "People in my office don't want this dealt with." I told him that he could not mention knowledge of corruption and cover-up, and then simply drop the matter. He said that he would meet with me, "off campus" at a Starbucks, and that he would call me to arrange the meeting. I did not receive return calls, nor hear from Mr. Westmoreland again.

[At this point, this case connects to the November General Election]

In June, 2012, Fulton County sent approximately 2,400 letters to voters. The letters were challenges to each registered voters registration status. A hearing date was set for June 14, 2012. Fulton County officials believed these voters did not have homes where they were registered to vote. What Fulton County officials did not know was that some of the addresses had been rebuilt and occupied and/or were never razed in the first place. The AJC did a story about voters who were informed that they did not live where they were registered when; in fact they did live where they were registered to vote. Fulton County sent out another letter to the 2,400 voters and essentially dropped the matter, for the time being. Fulton County has not formally challenged these voters as far as we know.

At some point shortly before the November 6, 2012 General Election, Fulton County decided to place approximately 1,100 registered voters, who were suspected of not having homes at their registered addresses, in a voter registrations status of "P" (for Pending.) It was Fulton County's intent to use this to identify such voters and require them to complete a change of address form. It is unknown whether the plan was to allow the voters to vote on a DRE, provisionally, or at all, however, an email from Sharon Mitchell to Linda Ford suggests that the plan was to not allow these voters to vote on a DRE, since their names, apparently, would not appear on the ExpressPoll in this "P" status. In an interview with Sharon Mitchell in December 2012, Ms. Mitchell said that no voters were actually ever placed in a "P" status. Sharon Mitchell intended the "P" to be a "flag" for election officials to clarify residential address, however, a "P" status would have prevented the voter's name from appearing on the ExpressPoll and there is a very high probability that they would not be allowed to vote on a DRE. There were 636 voters in "P" status in Fulton County on Election Day, November 6, 2012.

It does not appear the Fulton County has decided if or how to handle these registered voters, though there was a mention of holding hearings on the voters.

It is also unknown if there was some person or persons in the Fulton County Election Office who was attempting to either keep people as registered voter while having knowledge that they might be ineligible, or oppositely, trying to interfere with the rights of registered voters.

### Conclusions

These multiple failures seem to be linked to poor planning, insufficient training, poor communication, and poor decision-making.

Perhaps most troubling is the apparent utter disregard for the security and integrity of practically the entirety of the provisional ballot process.

Almost 10,000 votes were essentially un-documented or under-documented and under-secured.

The lack of accountability with provisional ballots calls every provisional ballot into question, and at approximately 9,600 ballots, that is not an insignificant number of votes.

It is not a far leap to move from incompetence to genuine election fraud when lists of voters are being altered, and fictitious reports of counting ballots are made, and documentation is so haphazard that seven provisional ballots that appear to be from the same voter are accepted.

It should be noted that even a cursory exploration of other election documents from the 2012 General Election (DRE Recap sheets, supplemental voter lists, and provisional ballot documents, to name a few) show a similar pattern of incompleteness, inaccuracy. Were an exhaustive, point-by-point examination of every precinct be made, the numbers of violations would likely increase exponentially.

## **Report, 2012 Fulton County Elections**

This Report concerns three investigations into violations of Title 21 of Georgia law and rules of the State Election Board.

State Election Board Cases

### **SEB 2012-156 (2012 General Election)**

**Respondents: Sharon Mitchell and Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections**

### **SEB 2012-56 (2012 Primary Election)**

**Respondents: Sam Westmoreland and Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections**

### **SEB 2011-110 (no specific election)**

**Respondent: Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration**

Report Date

November 26, 2013

By

Chris Harvey, Chief Investigator, Georgia Secretary of State's Office

On January 31, 2013, the Georgia State Election Board (SEB) will convene an investigative hearing on three election investigations involving significant allegations of violating election laws and SEB Rules in Fulton County. Two of the cases (SEB 2012-56 and SEB 2012-156) deal with specific elections: the 2012 General Primary and the 2012 General Election. SEB 2011-110 deals with voter registration and residency issues, and while not necessarily specific to an election, the issue of accurate and timely voter registration played a role in the aforementioned elections.

### **SEB 2012-156 General Election**

The vast majority of complaints in this election were tied to voters having to vote provisional ballots after being told that their names did not appear on the ExpressPoll. There appear to be a number of issues that started with problems in the voter registration process in Fulton County. Voter registration applications were being entered into the voter registration system until the day before the election, which was ten days after the final list of voters were entered into the ExpressPoll system. These problems were aggravated by a poorly executed and inconsistent procedure for properly handling and documenting provisional ballots.

#### **Voter Registration**

Proper Procedure: When a voter submits a voter registration application (or a change to an existing voter registration such as a new address or name change) the information is manually entered into the computer voter registration database. This database normally receives a lot of new applications and alterations in the weeks leading up to the registration deadline (October 9, 2012 for this General Election.) Fulton County, as did most other counties, received a large number of these applications in the weeks before the General Election, and they struggled and ultimately failed to enter all of the data by the deadlines they faced. When all of the applications are entered into the system, the system produces a complete Electors List for each precinct, naming all qualified voters. The system which handles the Electors List and contains all of the registered voters on election day (or during early voting) is commonly referred to as “ExpressPoll” (which is actually the name of the computers which allow voters to be “checked in” and have a voting access card created for them to vote on the voting machine (DRE.)

Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) Election Center handles the “loading” of all of the information from the voter registration system onto the actual ExpressPoll machines that are used at each precinct to identify voters and allow voter access cards to be created for them. In order to allow the counties to set up their election systems, KSU “closes” the information that will be loaded onto the ExpressPoll machines at the end of the day on the second Thursday prior to the Election Day. Any voter registration information that is added to the statewide voter registration system by any county *after* the close of that Thursday, will still be eligible to vote (assuming the registration application was received by the earlier October deadline) but those voters names (or new information) will only appear on a printed “supplemental list” that should be sent to every precinct.

For example, if my first-ever voter registration application was processed on October 30, 2012, and I went to my polling place to vote, I would be told by the poll worker, “You are not showing up in our system.” The poll worker should then check the printed “supplemental list” of voters where my name should appear. At that point, that I was present and showed proper ID would be noted on the list, and the poll worker should create a voter access card for me on the ExpressPoll machine, and I should vote on the DRE just as if I had been in ExpressPoll for years. If a voter did not appear on either the ExpressPoll or supplemental list, and the voter declared that they believed they had registered in time to vote, they should be given a provisional (paper) ballot on which to vote. Provisional ballots will be addressed in detail later in this report.

Therefore, it should be clear that the timely entrance of data into the voter registration system can keep the “supplemental list” to a minimum and keep the poll workers working at maximum efficiency by relying primarily on ExpressPoll (which is where the vast majority of the voters should be found.) In some counties, there are no supplemental lists on election day because all of the qualified voter registration applications were entered into the voter registration system by October 25, 2012. Failure to meet these data-entry deadlines caused cascading problems on election day.

Fulton County received a large number of voter registration applications, and was unable to enter the applications by the time the ExpressPoll records were finalized and loaded into the ExpressPolls. Fulton County failed to follow previous practices of supplementing data entry workers to keep up with the demands of the incoming registrations. KSU even gave Fulton County one extra day, until the end of October 26<sup>th</sup>, to enter information that would go into ExpressPoll. Fulton County was entering voter registrations into the system as late as the day before the election. This fact required the use of a “supplemental list” of voters who should have been allowed to vote on a DRE just like any other voter. Fulton County reported that their “supplemental list” contained approximately 6,000 voters. This is a very unusually high number of voters on a supplemental list.

Fulton County has claimed that the Secretary of State's Office was responsible for the late receipt of the voter registration applications, but the Secretary of State has multiple witnesses who will testify that the voter registration applications were made available to Fulton County as soon as they came into the office.

In post-election surveys completed by Fulton County election workers, there were many mentions of inadequate staffing to process the incoming voter registration applications. Ralph Jones admitted that the office also stopped processing changes in address requests in favor of adding new voter registration applicants. There was a particularly damning survey response which revealed,

***"Visiting Fulton County Registration and Election Officials couldn't obtain clear verification of the staffing and heavy workload requirements because voter's registration cards were moved from the sign-out location and placed around the office so no one would be able to identify the workload. Cards were hidden at employee work stations."***

Poll managers reportedly received their documents and election items the evening of Sunday, November 4, 2012. Due to an oversight in the Fulton County Voter Registration Office approximately 300 voters were added to the supplemental list during the day, Monday, November 5, 2012, after the first Supplemental List had already been given to the poll managers, so, at least, those 300 new voters would not appear on ExpressPoll or on a printed Supplemental List of voters if *any* of those 300 voters attempted to vote. Fulton County was distributing supplemental lists on Election Day, however, it is unknown if the lists were additional voters, replacement lists, lists that were never delivered, and/or some or all of the above. There were reports of poll managers either not getting any supplemental list, not knowing they got the supplemental list, not knowing what to do with the supplemental list they got, or not getting updated supplemental lists. Sandy Springs Precinct 22 did not have a copy of any supplemental list until after 11:00 AM on Election Day after over 800 people voted. Fulton County has acknowledged that two precincts did not receive the supplemental lists until almost noon on election day.

Approximately **1,100** voters, whose registration records were either entered or changed *after* October 26, voted provisional ballots that were accepted by Fulton County. Many of these voters should have appeared on the printed supplemental list and should have voted on DREs (the exceptions would be voters on the supplemental list who were voting out of their assigned precinct.)

**Potential Violations:**

O.C.G.A 21-2-226-Determining Eligibility of Voters

O.C.G.A. 21-2-227-Furnish List of Electors for Elections

O.C.G.A. 21-2-228-Examination of Elector' Qualifications

Problems at Precincts on Election Day

The Secretary of State's Office received approximately 150 complaints regarding Fulton County's performance on Election Day. Some of these complaints were regarding issues that were not necessarily the fault of Fulton County Election Officials, such as inconvenient polling place locations, and frustrated poll workers. Most of the complaints, however, came from voters who were either not allowed to vote



at all, or were required to vote provisionally even though they knew, and in some cases had documentation, that they were properly registered to vote.

Here is a sampling of the complaints

- Address on driver's license differed from registration address, so voter could not vote
- Voter had requested an absentee ballot, which voter denied, and voter was forced to vote provisional
- Excessively long lines and waits (in excess of three and four hours) due to difficulties in getting voters the voter access cards because the voters could not be found in ExpressPoll or supplemental list
- Elector not in the system, cannot vote
- Provisional ballots denied to voters who requested them for various reasons
- Voter had already voted, which voter denied (sometime provisional offered, but other times not)
- Lines with waits of over two hours saw many voters leave without voting
- Illegal campaigning in a polling place
- Slow procedure to create Voter Access Cards even though there were plenty of DREs
- Precincts ran out of supplies including provisional ballots
- Some waits for provisional ballots were in excess of four hours, and even then, small numbers of provisional ballots were delivered after that extended wait
- Some poll workers suggested that voters go to other precincts to try to find provisional ballots
- Polling places were unorganized and directionless
- Polling places did not open in time
- The advocacy group, Election Protection itself gathered and reported to the Secretary of State's Office more than twenty complaints, including four affidavits that were almost exclusively reports of declared registered voters not being allowed to vote on DREs, and, in most cases, experiencing hours of waiting time for provisional ballots
- In addition, after Election Day, several poll managers sent complaints about problems with getting provisional ballots and communicating with the Fulton Election Office downtown

Investigators from the Secretary of State's Office visited several precincts on Election Day and reported some dire conditions, particularly at Venetian Hills Precinct. There they saw the poll manager on the phone practically the entire time, voters wandering in the enclosed space, voters waiting hours to get provisional ballots, and voters being told they should try other precincts in the hopes of getting a provisional ballot somewhere else.

**Potential Violations:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-413 Conduct of voters, campaigners

O.C.G.A. 21-2-418 Provisional ballots

O.C.G.A. 21-2-596 Failure to perform duty

O.C.G.A. 21-2-591 Allowing unlawful assistance to voters

O.C.G.A. 21-2-403 Time for opening of polls

### Registered Voters Having to Vote Provisional Ballots

**3,732** Fulton County voters who voted provisional ballots on Election Day were in the ExpressPoll System by October 26, 2012. There are only a few legitimate reasons for a registered voter in ExpressPoll to vote a provisional ballot:

- Voter is voting out of precinct
- Voter does not have valid identification
- Voter cannot be found in ExpressPoll by poll worker

However, untrained or unequipped poll workers who did not have access to, or full knowledge of working an ExpressPoll or printed Supplemental List, would have to choose between allowing a voter to vote provisionally, and not letting the person vote at all.

Below is a summary of Fulton County Provisional Ballot Reporting:

<u>Reason for Prov. Ballot</u>	<u># P.B. voted</u>	<u># P.B. accepted</u>
Wrong Precinct/Not on List	9429	5101
No ID	72	0
Other Reasons	84	3
Total	<b>9585</b> (FC report to SOS lists <b>9575</b> )	5104

Fulton County accounted for 54% of provisional ballots cast in the entire state  
(DeKalb, Gwinnet, Chatham, and Muscogee Counties combined issued 2,879 provisional ballots)

3,732 voters were in ExpressPoll and 1,100 voters who voted provisionally were, or should have been, on the printed Supplemental List. These two numbers account for 4,832 voters who should have voted on a DRE on Election Day. This would have cut the number of provisional ballots by almost 50%.

A caveat to the 3,732 voters is that if a voter went to a precinct other than where they were registered and assigned, they could have:

1. Been directed to their proper precinct (if sufficient time allowed for the travel)  
Or,
2. Voted a provisional ballot at the wrong precinct

Fulton County apparently had inconsistent practices in handling voters at wrong precincts, and the workers were ultimately trained that, "When in doubt, give a provisional ballot." Some voters too seem to have become accustomed to such treatment and arrived at precincts knowing they were not registered there, but expecting a provisional ballot for the sake of convenience.

Lastly, reports show that of the 5079 records that Fulton County reported as accepted provisional ballots, **95** of those registration numbers **also** had voter access cards created for those registration numbers in ExpressPoll. This might indicate that the "registration number/voter" voted on a DRE and provisionally, and both votes were counted.

### Provisional Ballot Problems

Approximately 9,575 voters voted provisional ballots in Fulton County, which accounted for 54% of the total provisional ballots cast in the entire state. Nowhere, however, do the numbers and lists of names

and accepted and rejected ballots add up. Fulton County election officials were simply not prepared to handle the demand and backlog of unprocessed voter registration applications (which Fulton County created) for provisional ballots at the polling places. There appeared to be little to no consistency in the proper handling of provisional ballots. The failure by Fulton County to properly follow documentation and handling requirements in place to ensure the security and integrity of the provisional ballots made verifying provisional ballots with much certainty almost impossible.

Poll managers and workers did not follow state law or SEB Rules when handling and documenting provisional ballots. There was a very weak supply chain to deliver new provisional ballots to precincts, and the communication system between poll workers and election officials left much to be desired. Laws and SEB rules regarding the handling and documenting of provisional ballots were violated or ignored on a massive scale:

- There was insufficient dissemination about the system in place to allow voters to check the status of their provisional ballot
- One person appeared to vote *seven* provisional ballots at the same precinct, and *all seven ballots were marked as accepted*. Fulton County claims to have identified who these voters were, however, with no other identification on the provisional ballot envelopes, there no way to tell if that is true, and is frankly, rather unlikely.
- Some voters were denied provisional ballots, even after requesting one
- Provisional ballots were not kept in secure locations during validation (the status of the chain of custody for the provisional ballots is unknown)
- Fulton County could not even produce all of the provisional ballot envelopes that they appeared to have received
- There was no uniform recording of the *reasons* for rejecting provisional ballots
- Documents recording provisional ballot appear to be **created and altered** by someone after the documents were submitted by poll officials
- Provisional Ballot recap sheets were often done improperly, incompletely, or not at all
- Voters were listed as having provisional ballots accepted when they did not vote provisional ballots
- Voters were not notified until January 9, 2013 (66 days after the election) that their provisional ballots were rejected
- More than 1,000 of these *mailed notices* had no address for the elector, so there is no way that the notices *could have gotten to the electors*
- Many provisional ballot *rejections* appear to be recorded without a way to determine why a ballot was rejected, and inform the voter of the same
- The total number of voted provisional ballots differs from source to source
- Many provisional ballot recap sheets do not correlate to the statement of votes cast on the official results
- Fulton County has not reported how many provisional ballots had to be duplicated (all out of precincts provisional ballots)
- It is unknown how many voter registration applications were completed when voters were issued provisional ballots, but a review of specific complainants shows that at least 20 provisional voters were not given voter registration applications
- Printed instructions for checking the status of one's provisional ballot were not available for every provisional ballot issued

- As recently as September and October of 2012, Pamela Coman, Election Training Director for Fulton County asked for and received clarification about provisional ballots because she was preparing to begin the online training from the training staff at the Secretary of State's Office
- The heavy reliance on provisional ballots on Election Day set the stage for failures in the verification of provisional ballots in the days after the election. As woeful as was the requirement that so many voters had to cast provisional ballots in the first place, the more striking failure was Fulton County's inability to execute the acceptance and rejection of absentee ballots with anything resembling accuracy or reliable documentation
- More than 1000 rejection letters were mailed to voters with incomplete mailing addresses, and could not have been delivered
- Fulton County failed to notify provisional voter who voted out of precinct that their ballot had been duplicated and counted

#### Detailed Examination of Ten Precincts' Provisional Ballots

Investigators from the Secretary of State's Office examined only ten precincts' handling of provisional ballots in great detail, and what they discovered was a lack of consistency or much of anything that could even be described as a "system," that yielded inaccuracy after inaccuracy in the proper documentation of provisional ballots. Not *one* of the ten precincts and county officials could even account for the proper *number* of provisional ballots. The details from each of the ten precincts are included in the exhibits in this packet, but below is a chart that shows the errors and wide-ranging inconsistencies with provisional ballots.

Following the chart is a point-by-point analysis of the provisional ballots from each of the ten precincts examined in detail.

### Fulton County Provisional Analysis

Precinct	# on Prov. Numbered List of Voters	Prov. Ballots Marked As Listed on Prov. Recap Sheet	No Prov. Numbered List of Voters and Ballots Cast on Recap Sheet Match	# of Provisional Voter Certificates Provided by Fulton County	Total Prov. Envelopes Provided by Fulton County for Inspection	Accepted/Rejected Prec. Envelopes Provided by Fulton County	# Voters Whose Prov. Ballot Should Have Been Accepted/SOS Analysis	# Voters Whose Prov. Ballot Should Have Been Rejected/SOS Analysis	# Voters Eligible to Vote on DRE Unit	# Voters Whose Registration was Added After Supp. List Generated	# Voters Voting Out of Precinct	DRE and Express Poll Recap Sheets
01A							46	26	19	15	11	Blank
025							17	30	8	13	10	More voters marked than recorded on DRE
02F1/02F2							90	23	13	28	23	Provisional ballots listed as supplemental voters
048							56	13	18	4	11	Complete
06H							7	Unknown	3	0	0	More voter certificates than votes on DRE
110							17	18	5	4	28	Not Completed
04W							116	110	27	0	80	More votes on DRE than voter certificates
0224							24	13	6	0	0	Complete
5514							9	0	0	0	0	Complete
3A							57	71	17	6	25	One more voter marked than reported on DRE
<b>Totals</b>	<b>913</b>	<b>789</b>		<b>765</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>1078</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>216</b>	

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Eligible to Vote DRE - 134

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Who Registered Timely but were Added After Supplemental Generated - 83

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Registered at Other Fulton County Precincts - 256

Cells in green reflect accurate precinct provisional reporting or complete production of all provisional ballot certificates and envelopes to SOS staff for review  
Cells in red reflect inaccurate provisional reporting or minimal production of provisional ballot certificates and envelopes provided to SOS staff for review

Page 1

## Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 01A

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- A provisional ballot recap sheet was not completed for the precinct
- 158 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters. All names were written in red ink in what appeared to be the same handwriting.

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for only 42 of the 158 names on the numbered list.
- 1 voter certificate was completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 41 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 136 provisional ballots were accepted and 22 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

- 28 Rejected
- 3 were voted by persons registered in other counties.

- 23 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 2 were voted by persons in delete status.

46 Accepted

- 35 were registered in precinct 01A.
- 12 of the 35 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 15 of the 35 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 7 of the 35 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 1 voter had previously requested an absentee ballot
- 11 were registered in other Fulton County precincts

#### Additional Observations

- One voter was listed as a non-citizen. It is unknown if the voter returned to Fulton County after the election with proof of citizenship.
- 4 of the voters were listed on the numbered list 2 times.
- 5 ballots were accepted from voters who were also given credit for voting on a DRE unit. Accepted ballot envelopes were provided for these individuals.
- One person listed had two registration records in the registration system.
- 3 voters could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.
- 70 voters were listed on the provisional numbered list of voters and they were also given credit for voting in the registration system by voting on a DRE unit. Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for any of these individuals.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 58 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 47 accepted and 11 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 02F1\02F2**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 83 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 83 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 83 of the names on the numbered The provisional section of the voter certificates was not completed on any of the certificates.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 60 provisional ballots were accepted and 23 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system was reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 23 Rejected

- 13 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 9 were not found in the voter registration system
- 1 was voted by a person marked as a non-citizen.

#### 59 Accepted

- 36 were registered in precinct 02F/02F1.
- 6 of the 36 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 7 of the 36 voters were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 23 of the 36 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 23 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 72 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 56 accepted and 16 rejected.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for 11 voters.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 02S**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 84 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 79 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 40 of the names on the numbered.
- The provisional section was completed by the voter and poll worker on 1 voter certificate.
- The provisional section was completed by the poll worker only on 28 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was not completed on 11 of the voter certificates provided.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 31 provisional ballots were accepted and 48 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 34 Rejected

- 17 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 11 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 6 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 32 Accepted

- 17 were registered in precinct 02S.
- 3 of the 17 voters were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 13 of the 17 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 1 of the 17 had previously requested an absentee ballot..
- 15 were registered at other Fulton County precincts

#### Additional Comments

- One ballot was listed as rejected and the provisional list was marked that the voter could not be found. The voter information from the voter certificate was compared to the voter registration system. A record was found for a Fulton County voter with the same name and address. The date of birth on the voter certificate was not valid and could not be compared to the voter record. It appears should have been duplicated to the voter's precinct and accepted. A provisional ballot envelope for the voter was not provided.
- One ballot was listed as rejected on the provisional list; however, the voter was listed on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct. The voter certificate was marked accepted. A provisional ballot envelope for the voter was not provided.
- 9 of the voters could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the voter registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 45 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 30 accepted and 15 rejected.
- One provisional ballot was accepted for voter who was marked as having voted during the early voting period.
- One ballot was rejected because the voter was listed as registered in Gwinnett County. Review of the voter registration system indicated there were 2 registration numbers for the same person. The Fulton County record appeared to occur after the Gwinnett record and should have replaced the Gwinnett record. The registration in Fulton County was on the supplemental list. It appears the ballot should have been accepted.
- Two accepted provisional ballot envelopes were provided for voters that were not listed on the provisional numbered list of voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 03A**



#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 132 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 134 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters
- 53 names were written in red ink which appears to be the same ink used for marking whether the ballot was accepted or rejected. The names are written in the same handwriting and appear to be listed in reverse alphabetical order.

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 132 of the names on the numbered list.
- 17 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 73 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section
- 42 voter certificates were not copied to include the back side

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 59 provisional ballots were accepted and 75 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

##### 71 Rejected

- 37 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 30 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 4 were voted by persons in delete status.

##### 55 Accepted

- 23 were registered in precinct 03A.
- 15 of the 23 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 6 of the 23 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 2 of the 23 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 32 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- 1 voter could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 128 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 56 accepted and 72 rejected.
- 2 ballots were rejected because the voters were not registered in Fulton County. The registrations were found in the registration system as being received by the deadline but they were not entered until December. The ballots should have been accepted.

- One ballot was accepted for a voter in which the registration system indicated she voted during the early voting period.
- 2 ballots were accepted for voters who could not be found in the registration system. It is unclear what steps Fulton County took to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot should have been accepted.
- One ballot was accepted for a voter who provided a Florida address on the voter certificate and no date of birth. There was no identifying information on the voter certificate to verify the voter's eligibility.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 04B**

### **Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters**

- 110 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 110 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

### **Voter Certificates**

- Voter certificates were provided for 109 of the names on the numbered list.
- 8 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 6 voter certificates were completed by the voter only on the provisional section
- 95 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

### **Provisional Ballot Analysis**

According to the provisional numbered list, 55 provisional ballots were accepted and 55 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### **53 Rejected**

- 14 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 36 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 3 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### **56 Accepted**

- 42 were registered in precinct 04B.
- 26 of the 42 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 4 of the 41 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 5 of the 42 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 6 of the 42 were in "Verify" status. These voters should have listed on Express Poll and the voter should have been able to vote on a DRE unit.
- 1 of the 42 was in "Pending" status reason type "A". This voter was included in the "pending" voters with questionable addresses.
- 1 voter was marked as a non-citizen

- 13 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- One was listed as rejected; however, the voter was found in the registration system. No ballot envelope was provided for the voter.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 103 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 52 accepted and 51 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 04W**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 249 provisional ballots issued on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 232 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters.

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 227 of the names on the numbered list.
- 15 voter certificates were completed by the voter only on the provisional section
- 50 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 157 voter certificates were completed by the voter and poll officer on the provisional section
- 36 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section
- One voter certificate did include the backside.
- 32 voter certificates were provided for persons not on the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 129 provisional ballots were accepted and 102 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 110 Rejected

- 45 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 62 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 3 were voted by persons in delete status.

116 Accepted

- 36 were registered in precinct 04W.
- 20 of the 36 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 9 of the 36 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 4 of the 36 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 3 of the 36 were in “Verify” status. These voters should have been listed on Express Poll and the voter should have been able to vote on a DRE unit.
- 80 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- 3 voters have two registration records in the registration system.
- One voter had no precinct assigned to the registration record.
- 2 of the voters were listed on the numbered list 2 times.
- 1 voter could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 159 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 80 accepted and 79 rejected.
- 2 ballots were accepted from voters who could not be found in the system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter’s registration and whether the ballot counted.
- One ballot was rejected from a voter who submitted a change of address prior to the deadline but it was not entered until December. The voter requested an absentee ballot and it is unclear if the ballot was returned to the previous county of residence. A rejected provisional ballot envelope was provided.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 06H**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 5 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 5 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 1 of the names on the provisional numbered list.
- The back of the voter certificate was not provided.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 1 provisional ballot was accepted and 4 were rejected.

#### 4 Rejected

- Voter certificates were not provided for the rejected voters. Investigators could not determine in the registration system why the provisional ballot was rejected. This was due to not having identifying information other than the name of the voter and there being multiple records in the registration system for the name on the provisional list of voters.
- The reason the provisional ballot was rejected was not marked on the provisional numbered list of voters.

#### 1 Accepted

- The voter was registered in 06H. The voter was also listed on the supplemental list of voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 1 provisional ballot envelope was provided by Fulton County for review. The ballot envelope was marked accepted and was the same name listed as the ballot marked accepted on the provisional numbered list of voters.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the persons marked rejected on the provisional numbered list of voters.

## Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 11G

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 65 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 59 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 65 of the names on the numbered list.
- 9 voter certificates were provided for persons not listed on the provisional list of voter.
- 3 voter certificates were completed by the voter and poll officer on the provisional section
- 1 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 52 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

The numbered list of provisional voters was not marked as whether a voter's ballot was accepted or rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 16 Rejected

- 5 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 6 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 5 were voted by persons in delete status.

37 Accepted

- 9 were registered in precinct 11G.
- 3 of the 9 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 4 of the 9 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 2 of the 9 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 28 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

Additional Comments

- 2 voters could not be identified due to the voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the voter registration system.
- 1 could not be located in the registration system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot counted.
- On ballot was listed as rejected; however the voter's registration was reviewed and indicated they had submitted their registration by the deadline but it was not added to the registration system until December. It is unknown if the ballot was accepted because a provisional ballot envelope was not provided.

Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 15 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 9 accepted and 6 rejected.
- A ballot was accepted for a voter whose registration record indicated they were given credit for voting on a DRE unit.  
One ballot was rejected; however, a registration record was found for the voter. According to the registration system the voter's registration application was received by the deadline but was not entered until December 2012. The ballot should have been accepted.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct SS14**

Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 15 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 20 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters
- Names 16 through 20 are written in red ink which appears to be the same ink used for marking whether the ballot was accepted or rejected.

Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 19 of the names on the numbered list.
- 12 voter certificates were completed on the provisional section by the voter and poll officer
- 4 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only
- 2 voter certificates were not completed by the voter
- 1 voter certificate was not completed

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 14 provisional ballots were accepted and 6 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system was reviewed for all voters and the following was determined

##### 6 Rejected

- 5 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 1 was voted by a person marked as a non-citizen.

##### 9 Accepted

- 5 were registered in precinct SS14. All 5 voters were listed on the supplemental list of voters.
- 3 were registered in other Fulton County precincts.
- Registration information was reviewed and revealed 5 of the 8 provisional voters registered at other precincts were given credit for voting by the Express Poll. This would indicate they voted on DRE units at their registered precinct.
- 1 could not be located in the registration system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot counted.

#### Additional Comments

- Review of the voters whose names were written in red indicated they had voted on a DRE unit at the precinct they were registered at. The voters were contacted and all stated they originally went to precinct SS14 and were told they were registered at other precincts. The voters said they went the precinct they were told to vote at and voted on the DRE units. None of the persons written in red ink said they voted a provisional or paper ballot at precinct SS14. Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 15 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 9 accepted and 6 rejected.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the persons whose names were added in red ink to the provisional list of voters.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Statement of Votes Cast

- According to the Statement of Votes Cast report, 1 provisional ballot was counted for precinct SS14. There were 5 provisional ballots listed on the numbered list of voters for precinct SS14 that should have been counted.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct SS22**

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 46 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 46 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for all 46 names on the provisional numbered list of voters.
- The provisional section was completed by the voter and poll worker on 3 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was completed by the poll worker only on 39 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was not completed on 4 of the voter certificates provided.

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 24 provisional ballots were accepted and 22 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 19 Rejected

- 6 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 9 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 4 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 24 Accepted

- 15 were registered in precinct SS22.
- 4 of the 15 voters were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 2 of the 15 voters were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 9 of the 15 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 8 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- Three ballots were listed as rejected; however, the voters' registration was found in the registration system. Two voters were registered at different precincts. These ballots should have been duplicated and accepted. One voter was added to the registration system after the Express Poll and supplemental lists were generated. This ballot should have been accepted. Ballot envelopes were not provided for any of these voters. Two voters received credit for voting, one voter did not.



- One ballot was accepted for a voter that did not provided identification at the poll location. A report previously by Fulton County indicated no who voted a provisional ballot because they did not have ID returned to Fulton County with ID prior to the close of business the Friday following the elections.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 41 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 20 accepted and 21 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Potential Violations for Provisional Ballots:

O.C.G.A. 21-2-587(3) and (4) Frauds by poll officers  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-562(a)(1) and (a)(2) Fraudulent entries  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(a) Provisional ballots-allowing to be cast  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(c) Provisional ballots-provisional voter registration application  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(f) Give written information to provisional voters  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(b) Securing provisional ballots  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(d)(1) Notify rejected provisional voters in writing  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(d)(2) Notify voters who voted out of precinct in writing  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(3) Providing adequate provisional ballots to precincts  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(a) Checking master list of electors before voting provisional  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(b) Checking with Registrar before voting provisionally  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(c) Adding verified voters to precinct (using supplemental list)  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(d) Sending to proper precinct  
 SEB 183-1-12.064(f) Completing provisional ballot certificate  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(i) Completing complete ballot and paperwork  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(j) Verifying paperwork is correct  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(7) Providing paperwork to provisional voter  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(9) Accounting for all provisional ballots and other documentation  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(10) Securing provisional ballots  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(12)(b) Duplicating provisional ballots  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(13)(a) Notifying rejected provisional voters  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(13)(b) Notifying voters who voted in wrong precinct in writing

#### Errors on Recap and Statement of Votes Cast

Of the 247 DRE and ExpressPoll Recap sheets submitted by Fulton County, there were 109 precincts forms that contained errors, omissions, and/or inaccuracies.

Common discrepancies included:

- DRE Recap sheets were not totaled
- The number of “voters marked” listed on the ExpressPoll Recap did not match the numbered list of voters pulled from the ExpressPoll
- Explanations for mis-matching numbers was not provided

- ExpressPoll count and DRE count of voters differed
- Recap sheets were not properly signed by all parties (managers)
- Provisional voters were listed as supplemental voters on the ExpressPoll recap sheet

The attached table identifies 19 of the worst examples of inaccurate reporting:

### Absentee Ballot System Execution Questions

There were three reports where voters (Katrina Keuller, Rodney Hovater, and Paula Hovater) reported they received more than one absentee ballot packages when they made their absentee ballot requests. These voters turned their additional ballots over to SOS investigators.

The following complaint, from a voter who is temporarily in New York appears to expose numerous flaws in the system and/or the execution of the system for requesting an absentee ballot in the general election (emphasis added C.H. :)

Sent: Sunday, December 09, 2012 11:53 PM  
To: Office of Secretary of State  
Subject: Web E-Mail From Rollie O. Buchanan

Question / Comment: Mr. Kemp,

The local, state and national elections of November 6, 2012 have passed. However I am submitting this complaint regarding my experience with absentee voting through Fulton County, which ultimately prevented me from voting due to no fault of my own.

Wednesday, October 3

I mailed my application for an official absentee ballot.

Approximately a week later, a colleague that submitted his after I did, indicated he had received and submitted his absentee ballot via Cobb County within a 10 day period. This seemed odd and caused me to question the status of my absentee ballot.

**Thursday, October 18**

I prepared a second application for mailing. However I wanted to talk with someone in the Fulton County office to ensure I was following the directions correctly, to ensure my opportunity to vote.

**Friday, October 19**

I called the general number and was transferred to a woman who checked my records. I indicated an application had been mail approximately three (3) week earlier, etc. She indicated there was no record of receipt of the absentee application, but to speed up the process, I could fax my second application instead of mailing it.

Given this information, I faxed it at 4:17 pm EST (as indicated by FAX confirmation) to 404.730.8839. My belief was that the absentee ballot would be in the mail by Monday or Tuesday, October 22 or 23, with arrival to my residence by Saturday, October 26, at the latest.

Nothing arrived on October 26, 28 or 29.

**Tuesday, October 30**

I called the main Fulton County office number and was transferred to a "Marcia", who served as coordinator for some aspect of the unit. I informed her that the FAX had been sent on October 19 but nothing had been received, even though I had a confirmation of delivery by fax.

Marcia indicated that I re-fax the form again. I told her I would within the hour and she gave me her direct line if I had any problems.

At 12:50 pm EST I re-faxed the application for an absentee ballot. I called her four (4) times that afternoon leaving messages and a number for a return phone call to confirm receipt of the document and mailing of the absentee ballot. I received no return phone call for the remainder of the day.

**Wednesday, October 31**

I called 1-2 more times first thing in the morning and left additional messages. At approximately 3:15 pm EST, "Marcia" returned my call.

While talking with her, **she indicated the faxes from October 30, 2012 had not been pulled up, but that she would do it while I was on the phone. I sat on the phone listening while she pulled it up, confirmed that it had been received and processed it for 5-10 minutes. Keep in mind this only happened while I was on the phone, after a previous conversation and several messages on October 30 and 31. "Marcia" indicated it was processed and would go out right away.**

Given the lateness of the day, I anticipated it would go out either later on October 31 or on November 1, with an arrival on November 3 or 6, at the latest.

When the ballot did not arrive on November 3, I began making plans to leave work early, to get home in time to fill it out and pay (at my expense) for overnight delivery to ensure its arrival by noon on November 6.

**Monday, November 5**

I rushed home early, through rush hour traffic with the idea that I would have to vote and get it to the post office before 5:00 pm EST to ensure pick-up for overnight delivery to Fulton County Election office.

***To my extreme disappointment, there was no ballot in the mailbox. I cannot express how disappointed I was; particularly after I did everything I could in a timely manner, yet the ball kept being dropped in Fulton County.***

This meant I would have no opportunity to vote after spending over a month with one (1) mailing, two (2) faxes and numerous conversations and messages with staff, particularly the one in charge of this process, "Marcia".

**Tuesday, November 6**

Out of disappointment and frustration, I contacted your office to express my frustration and asked if there was anything I could do.

I was informed that I was not the only one that had called and complained about this particular office and its handling of absentee ballot applications. I was then directed to this page to submit a complaint.

Later the same evening, I pulled my mail around 10:00 pm EST to find an absentee ballot. This reminded me of my earlier frustration. ***However what I found more upsetting was that after the fax was processed on October 31 while I was on the phone, according to the metered postmark, the absentee ballot was not mailed until November 2, This was a full two (2) days after my conversation with "Marcia".***

I did a search on the internet and found that this office has been under "investigation" for a number of reasons within the past few months. To find this out was rather disheartening, given that my opportunity to vote had been lost in what appeared to be their inability to perform their important duties for the public they serve.

I am asking that my case be investigated with some sort of resolution that is communicated back to me.

The problems illustrated in this complaint indicate a series of apparently admitted failures on Fulton County's Election staff to process absentee ballot applications efficiently. It took Herculean efforts for this voter to even get his ballot to him too late for him to vote the ballot. How many other voters, whose applications were not pulled from the FAX line, did not get their absentee ballots?

Another voter, this time overseas, requested his absentee ballot early. Here is his story (C.H. emails condensed and edited for spelling :)

Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2013 4:31 PM  
To: Office of Secretary of State  
Subject: Web E-Mail from John L. Turbiville

Question / Comment: I would like to add my protest concerning the functioning of the Fulton County Voter Registration Office. I requested officially many months ago an absentee ballot, based on my former address in Atlanta (my last U.S. address before moving to Europe); with no response I sent an e-mail; still no response, I telephoned the office, and I was promised that the ballot would be sent. Still nothing. So, about 2 weeks before the Nov 6 election, I sent in a "Federal Write-in Ballot". Last week, I received a notice that my ballot was not counted because it arrived too late.

I first sent in the form for registration for absentee voting in February 2012, to confirm my previous registration (I have voted in Federal elections several times by absentee, always using my last U.S. address 28-28th St NW, Atlanta 30309).

In September, I believe, I sent an email to the office requesting my status, with no reply. In October I telephoned the office and the representative assured me that all was in order for my ballot. But the ballot was never received, and about two weeks before the Nov. election, I sent in the Federal write-in ballot. So I was surprised when the notice came that this was received in early January, too late to be counted. I have always found that mail in general between France and the U.S. is delivered within one week.

I found one name with who I was in contact at the Fulton County office; it was [brianna.alexander@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:brianna.alexander@fultoncountyga.gov)

By telephone she told me that my registration was valid and that I would receive an absentee ballot, but it never happened.

Fulton County reported that the absentee ballot FAX line was checked every hour, but this does not appear to be accurate based on these complaints.

There were approximately twenty-three complaints about voters having problems getting or returning absentee ballots.

#### **Potential Violations in Absentee Ballot Problems:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-381(b)(2)(A) Mailing absentee ballots failures (multiple times)

#### Election Training

Pamela Coman, Training Director for Fulton County Elections Office provided copies of training manuals and an explanation of the requirements for training.

She said that each poll worker get four hours of training (two hours online and two hours in person.)

Ms. Coman asked for and received specific answers from the Secretary of State's Office shortly before the General Election, and Ms. Coman said that she specifically trained the poll workers in all areas regarding provisional ballots and specifically with regards to provisional ballots and voter who were not found in ExpressPoll (checking the supplemental list.)

#### Pending Status Voters

As a result of letters sent to approximately 1,100 voters in June 2012 (the subject of SEB 2011-110), voters who were suspected of not having homes at addresses where they were registered had their voter registration status changed without any due process. These voters were expected to arrive at the polls and prove their residential address to the satisfaction of poll workers. If they were able to do so, they would be allowed to vote on DRE, and their status changed. If they were not able to provide proof, they would have to vote a provisional ballot.

On November 2, 2012, Sharon Mitchell informed the Secretary of State's Office, which had questioned the changing of voter status without due process, that Fulton County would not place such voters in "P" status.

Sharon Mitchell told investigators that all voters who had been placed in "Pending" status by Fulton County on October 26, 2012 had been restored to their regular voter registration status, prior to Election Day, but 626 voters *still* showed to be in status "Pending" as late as December 2012.

No voters were impacted as a result of a "P Status," and, therefore, there appears to be no violation.

#### Interview with Election Officials

On December 14, 2012, SOS Investigations staff interviewed Sharon Mitchell, Dwight Brower, Ralph Jones, and Pamela Coman in the presence of their attorney, David Walbert. The interview last approximately 1 ¾ hours and it covered a wide-ranging list of topics. The goal was to get a general picture of the events in the election and determine where the investigation needed to be focused. The overall tone of the election officials was that there were a few problems, mostly at the precinct level, but nothing systematic, major, or dramatic happened.

Condensed List of Violations in Fulton SEB 2012-156 [*italics indicate broad charges that may be applied to one or more situations*]

- 21-2-224(f) the official list of electors eligible to vote in any primary or election shall be prepared and completed at least five calendar day prior to the date of the primary of election in which the list is to be used. 734 voters
- 21-2-224(g) providing complete elector lists  
**[TWO PRECINCTS AFFECTED]**
- 21-2-226(a) It shall be the duty of the county board of registrars to determine the eligibility of each person applying to register to vote in such county.
- [21-2-226(b) *upon finding an elector eligible to vote in the county, the county board of registrars shall have the duty of determining and placing the elector in the proper districts*]

- 21-2-418(b) failure of the poll officials to ensure provisional voters completed a provisional ballot voting certificate which included information about the place, manner, and approximate date on which the person registered to vote. AT LEAST 600 VOTERS
- Rule 183-1-12-.06(4)(i) upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form. AT LEAST 199 VOTERS
- 21-2-224 All persons whose names appear on the list of electors placed in the possession of the managers in each precinct and no others, except as otherwise provided in this article, shall be allowed to deposit their ballots according to law at the precinct in which they are registered. AT LEAST 215 VOTERS
- 21-2-418(b) the Fulton County Board of Registrars failed to make a good faith estimate to determine whether the persons casting the provisional ballots were entitled to vote AT LEAST 24 VOTERS  
**[24 VOTERS BALLOTS WERE REJECTED WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED]** 21-2-590(3) refuses to permit any duly registered and qualified person to vote at any primary or election, with the knowledge that such person is entitled to vote
- Rule 183-1-12-.06(4)(i) Before issuing the outer envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style on the outer envelope. AT LEAST 450 VOTERS
- 21-2-419(d)(1) the board of registrars shall notify in writing those persons whose provisional ballots were not counted that their ballots were not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the persons timely registered to vote or other proper reason. AT LEAST 1200 VOTERS
- 21-2-418(b) such person voting a provisional ballot shall complete an official voter registration form SEVERAL THOUSAND VOTERS

### SEB 2012-56 July 31, 2012 General Primary Election

The July 31, 2012 General Primary in Fulton County was beset with numerous problems, some of which were systemic, and some were less systemic, but all were serious and problematic for Fulton County.

#### Districting and Ballot Errors

There were multiple areas in Fulton County where, upon redistricting the voters following the census, problems arose on Election Day.

In House District 62, an entire street, Chicory Cove, was incorrectly placed in House District 64.

In the Sandy Springs area there were approximately 350 people who were incorrectly listed as being in Senate District **56**, when they should have been listed as being in Senate District **6**. When redistricting was done, a number of addresses were not changed, causing those residents to appear to live in districts that offered candidates on the ballot that were not candidates for their residential district.

The Lang Carson Precinct (05A) (100 Flat Shoals Ave), experienced a similar problem. This precinct was a combined precinct for House Districts 58 and 59; however, every voter who appeared to vote was given a ballot that only applied to residents of HR 58. Many voters noticed this early in the day, and the Secretary of State's office started receiving numerous calls and emails. Poll managers seemed incapable of solving the problem and multiple people made calls to Fulton County Election Officials to try to get a person on the scene that could solve the problem. The response of the Fulton County Election Officials to calls for assistance was delayed and woeful. At 9:30, Fulton election officials told the poll workers how to create ballots for HD 59, but the poll workers had no way of knowing which district the voter lived in, unless the voter knew, and further, had no way to verify if the voter's declaration of House District was accurate. The workers were promised a map by 12:00 pm, but it was not until approximately 3:45 PM that an election official arrived with a map that was large enough to allow poll workers to determine which ballot a voter was supposed to get, based on their address. A volunteer who was at the precinct was able to identify at least 16 voters who got and voted the wrong ballot, and reported that there were more people with whom she did not speak. There is no way to determine how many voters either got the wrong ballot or were not able to vote because poll workers could not create proper cards until approximately 9:30 AM.

On Election Day, Sam Westmoreland when asked about the problem at the Lang Carson Precinct told a candidate that two streets not being districted properly caused the problem, although he could not identify *which* two streets were involved. In an interview with Fulton County election officials in December 2012, Dwight Brower said that, "about ten" streets were not properly districted and that was the cause of the problem. It is unknown how many voters cast their ballots in a race that was not for their district. An investigator from the Secretary of State's Office was at the precinct shortly after the problem was reported, and he described a citizen with a map trying to help determine to which districts voters' addresses corresponded. The delayed and inadequate response to the critical situation of voters not being able to cast the proper ballot on Election Day was notable.

It was also reported that House District 25 had districting errors as well. HD 25 is made up of precincts JC04 and JC03. The unopposed candidate received 293 votes in JC04 and 3 votes in JC14 (which was not near his district).

**Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-226 Duty to place elector in proper district (multiple violations)

O.C.G.A. 21-2-596 Failure to perform duty

Dual Database of Voters

Once Fulton County realized that their districts were not correct, they made the choice to employ a "dual database" for the election. This essentially "froze" the election up to that point, during advanced voting, and then redistricted voters who had not yet voted. Of course, the redistricting was not done properly at that time either as was evidenced by the previous portion of this report. The problem with a dual database is that, while it seems like a quick solution at the time, creating a dual database creates two complete, separate sets of election results that must be manually calculated and entered into the

GEMS server. While this sounds simple, it is not as simple as adding two numbers and getting the total (*before* plus *after*=total.) There are thousands of individual results that must be entered, and thousands of computations to be done, and the entry can only be done on a single GEMS server, by one person at a time.

Fulton County displayed results in a way that was confusing to the public. They initially showed only the Election Day database (database #2) as their final results. Then, when they completed their second database, they displayed the *combined total* as being only database #1. At least one candidate thought that this was a manipulation of votes by Fulton County.

#### Delays in Counting Votes and not certifying the Election in Time

Largely as a result of working with a dual-database in the Primary Election, Fulton County was not able to complete the tabulation and certification of the election results by the deadline required by the law. Fulton County certified their results approximately one hour after the deadline (Monday, August 6, 2012 at 5:00 pm.)

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-493(k) Failing to certifying election by 5:00 PM on the Monday after the election

#### Absentee Ballot Complaints

Glenda Heyer, when requesting an absentee ballot for her son, *got the wrong absentee ballot three times* (two Republican and one non-Partisan.) Her son was not able to vote.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-384(2)

#### Early Opening and Tabulating of Absentee Ballots

Fulton County started opening and tabulating absentee ballots on Monday, July 30, 2012, a full 24 hours before the code allows early opening and counting. People involved were not sequestered Monday, except during working hours.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(G)(3) Early opening and tabulation of absentee ballots

#### Not Getting Ballot of Choice

Wheat Street Towers Precinct, at least two voters were told that they must either pick Republican or Democrat ballots, and could not get a non-partisan ballot. Voters had no choice but to pick what was offered to them.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A 21-2-431(a) Not getting proper ballot

SEB Rule 183-1-12(4)(b) Not getting appropriate ballot

#### Polls Not Opening on Time

James Orange Park Precinct was not open until approximately 7:30 AM; however, the cause was that the site key-holder had car trouble. At least one voter had to leave before the precinct opened and could not vote.

#### Poll Closing Prematurely

East Point Library-A voter arrived at 6:55 PM, and was told the polls were closed. The voter started back to her car. Apparently, the voters were able to convince poll workers that it was 6:55 PM, and they opened the doors, but by the time the complaining voter got back to the door, she was told that now the polls were closed, even though she had been in line with the other voters disputing the closing time.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-403 Polls closing before 7:00 PM

#### Outrageous Results

Precinct 1C2 showed 233 ballots cast with a turn-out of 23,300%. This was as a result of a redistricting error that placed all of the voters in one precinct in the same district when they should have been distributed among two districts. This was a reporting error, which may have impacted the credibility of the reporting, but did not affect any results.

#### DRE Malfunctioning and Manager Casting Voter's Ballot

Mr. John Mattox, who voted at 10M (Tennis Center), reported that his ballot, as reflected by the DRE did not show him, having selected a candidate for sheriff, when he said he previously selected a candidate. He called a poll worker to his station, and she reviewed his ballot and he tried again. He selected his candidate, but when the DRE got to the summary page which showed which candidates he selected, there was no "x" on the sheriff candidate. He said the poll manager cast his ballot by pressing the button herself, and told him he was done. He was dismayed that the DRE unit was left in use.

Subsequent investigation determined that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a violation of election law.

### **Violations SEB2012-056 Fulton County Primary Election**

**Allegation:** 60 voters were assigned the incorrect precinct during the July 31, 2012 Primary Election

- **Violation 21-2-226(b)** upon finding an elector eligible to vote in the county, the county board of registrars shall have the duty of determining and placing the elector in the proper districts and precinct.

**Allegation:** Fulton County Elections failed to certify the July 31, 2012 Primary Election by the deadline – Election results were certified at 6:30 pm, Monday November 12, 2012; 1 ½ hours after the deadline

- **Violation 21-2-493(k)** returns shall be certified by the superintendent not later than 5:00 pm on the Monday following the date on which such election was held.

**Allegation:** Fulton County opened absentee ballots the Monday prior to the July 31, 2012 Election – absentee ballots were opened and scanned on the Monday prior to the election



- **Violation 21-2-386(a)(3)** a county, at his or her discretion, after 7:00 am on the day of the primary, election, or runoff open the inner envelopes.
- **21-2-386(a)(5)** no absentee ballots shall be tabulated before 7:00 am on the day of a primary, election, or runoff.

### **SEB 2011-110 Demolished Residences**

This case involves a complaint that was brought by a complainant who reported that there were at least 1,300 people registered to vote in Fulton County, however, the homes where these registered voters claimed residency, no longer existed. The complainant provided specific names and addresses along with photographs that apparently showed that listed addresses contained only empty lots with no structures. Preliminary investigation indicated that many of the addresses referred by the complainant did appear to show vacant lots while voters still used that address as a registered address for voting. There was concern that people who might have moved out of their districts were still registered to vote and were voting in Fulton County Elections.

A previous SEB case (2009-62) investigated allegations that voters had done just that in the 2009 City of Atlanta Municipal Election.

Examination of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-218 indicated that while this situation was odd on its face, the registration of a voter who moves his residence is affected differently depending on whether the voter leaves the district, or municipality, county, or state. Paragraph (d) states that a voter who moves to a different address within the county or municipality, but fails to notify the registrar by the fifth Monday before an election, “shall vote in the precinct of such elector’s former residence for such election...” Then, paragraph (e) of this code section states a voter, “who moves from one county or municipality to another after the fifth Monday prior to a primary or election may vote in the county or municipality or precinct in which such elector is registered to vote.”

It was also unknown when these electors moved and/or if they moved to a different county or municipality. It was also unknown if the voters intended to return to these addresses and were living temporarily at another location, while intending to retain their residency as allowed under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-217(a)(2).

In May, 2012 I met personally with Fulton County Elections Director, Samuel Westmoreland, in Savannah to discuss this issue with him. At the time, I believed that Fulton County was not aware of the allegation or set of circumstances. I gave Mr. Westmoreland a very brief synopsis of the allegations. I was surprised to hear him respond that his office was already aware of the situation and that they were already working on it. He then volunteered that he had found [paraphrased] “elements in the office that were corrupt and/or covering the situation up.” I told him that I was very interested in working with him and Fulton County in addressing the issues. Mr. Westmoreland then said that he would rather not discuss the matter further in public (we were in the lobby of the hotel where the SEB Meeting was taking place). I offered to come to his office the following week, and he immediately said that he did want me there, but he would come to my office instead. After not hearing from him during the following

week, I called him, and he made another cryptic comment along the lines of, "People in my office don't want this dealt with." I told him that he could not mention knowledge of corruption and cover-up, and then simply drop the matter. He said that he would meet with me, "off campus" at a Starbucks, and that he would call me to arrange the meeting. I did not receive return calls, nor hear from Mr. Westmoreland again.

[At this point, this case connects to the November General Election]

In June, 2012, Fulton County sent approximately 2,400 letters to voters. The letters were challenges to each registered voters registration status. A hearing date was set for June 14, 2012. Fulton County officials believed these voters did not have homes where they were registered to vote. What Fulton County officials did not know was that some of the addresses had been rebuilt and occupied and/or were never razed in the first place. The AJC did a story about voters who were informed that they did not live where they were registered when; in fact they did live where they were registered to vote. Fulton County sent out another letter to the 2,400 voters and essentially dropped the matter, for the time being. Fulton County has not formally challenged these voters as far as we know.

At some point shortly before the November 6, 2012 General Election, Fulton County decided to place approximately 1,100 registered voters, who were suspected of not having homes at their registered addresses, in a voter registrations status of "P" (for Pending.) It was Fulton County's intent to use this to identify such voters and require them to complete a change of address form. It is unknown whether the plan was to allow the voters to vote on a DRE, provisionally, or at all, however, an email from Sharon Mitchell to Linda Ford suggests that the plan was to not allow these voters to vote on a DRE, since their names, apparently, would not appear on the ExpressPoll in this "P" status. In an interview with Sharon Mitchell in December 2012, Ms. Mitchell said that no voters were actually ever placed in a "P" status. Sharon Mitchell intended the "P" to be a "flag" for election officials to clarify residential address, however, a "P" status would have prevented the voter's name from appearing on the ExpressPoll and there is a very high probability that they would not be allowed to vote on a DRE. There were 636 voters in "P" status in Fulton County on Election Day, November 6, 2012.

It does not appear the Fulton County has decided if or how to handle these registered voters, though there was a mention of holding hearings on the voters.

It is also unknown if there was some person or persons in the Fulton County Election Office who was attempting to either keep people as registered voter while having knowledge that they might be ineligible, or oppositely, trying to interfere with the rights of registered voters.

### Conclusions

These multiple failures seem to be linked to poor planning, insufficient training, poor communication, and poor decision-making.

Perhaps most troubling is the apparent utter disregard for the security and integrity of practically the entirety of the provisional ballot process.

Almost 10,000 votes were essentially un-documented or under-documented and under-secured.

The lack of accountability with provisional ballots calls every provisional ballot into question, and at approximately 9,600 ballots, that is not an insignificant number of votes.

It is not a far leap to move from incompetence to genuine election fraud when lists of voters are being altered, and fictitious reports of counting ballots are made, and documentation is so haphazard that seven provisional ballots that appear to be from the same voter are accepted.

It should be noted that even a cursory exploration of other election documents from the 2012 General Election (DRE Recap sheets, supplemental voter lists, and provisional ballot documents, to name a few) show a similar pattern of incompleteness, inaccuracy. Were an exhaustive, point-by-point examination of every precinct be made, the numbers of violations would likely increase exponentially.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of RPF2920 Unknown <rpf2920@officedepot.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 07, 2017 4:03 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Subject:** GA SOB Books  
**Attachments:** GA SOB Books

Sender: [melinda.liggett@officedepot.com](mailto:melinda.liggett@officedepot.com)

On-Behalf-Of: [rpf2920@officedepot.com](mailto:rpf2920@officedepot.com)

Subject: GA SOB Books

Message-Id: <CAMRKpymJ1SMWe+wiZWn-w5bu80EkfkNDAX3qGQWyxCK53-DV=g@mail.gmail.com>

Recipient: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** [REDACTED]@officedepot.com on behalf of RPF2920 Unknown <rpf2920@officedepot.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 07, 2017 4:02 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Subject:** GA SOB Books  
**Attachments:** GA SOS SEB RULE BOOK REVISED 4.17.pdf

Rachell,

Steve suggested I communicate with you directly regarding the new typeset of the GA SOS SEB Rule Book. It is attached to this email.

I have a few questions to ask you. If you could please call me at your convenience after reviewing the book.

Mindy

*This email was sent from a group mailbox. Please REPLY so that [RPF2920@officedepot.com](mailto:RPF2920@officedepot.com) is included in your reply.*

Customer Service Representative

Georgia Field Support Regional Print Center | Office Depot, Inc.  
1595 Heraeus Blvd. Dock 72 | Buford, Georgia 30518  
[Tel:855-302-8773](tel:855-302-8773) | [Fax: 561-438-8185](tel:561-438-8185) | [RPF2920@officedepot.com](mailto:RPF2920@officedepot.com)



**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2013**

**Brian P. Kemp  
Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

<b>183-2-4</b>	REPEALED	57
<b>183-2-5</b>	REPEALED	59
<b>183-2-6</b>	REPEALED	61
<b>183-2-7</b>	REPEALED	63
<b>183-2-8</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-9</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-10</b>	BALLOTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-11</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
<b>183-2-12</b>	REPEALED	75
<b>183-2-13</b>	REPEALED	77
<b>183-2-14</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-15</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-16</b>	PENALTIES	RESERVED



**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Ride covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections”, 183-31-1 entitled “Voting Machines”, 183-31-2 entitled “Vote Recorders”, 183-32 entitled “Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections”, and 183-33 entitled “Absentee Voting” have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled “Dates of Primaries and Elections” has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed. Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled “Ballots” has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-.10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003. Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02, voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled “Penalties” has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended, Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled “Georgia Voter Identification Card” has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled “Preliminary Provisions” has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled “Nomination of Candidates” has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed, and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-1-.01</b>	<b>Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules</b>	<b>183-1-1-.02</b>	<b>Review of Initial Decisions</b>
--------------------	--	--------------------	------------------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;



(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2006; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1-.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-8-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-8-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**188-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.**

(1) The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

## 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) “Voter registration programs” means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

**(4) Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.



(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-91. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(0) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

### **(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. §21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2008. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

#### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.



(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems

appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted, F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, “Are you a citizen of the United States of America?”, the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering “Yes” or “No” to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing “X” in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the “Yes” box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked “No”, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration” adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors**

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01     Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATGION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-10-.01   Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
Union, or Other Financial Institution  
May Certify Error in Returning Check**

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-6, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted, F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

(1) A candidate's name shall include a family surname and a given or first name, middle name, or nickname, or an abbreviated version of such given or first name or middle name or appropriate initials such as "Bob" for "Robert", "Jim" for "James", "Wm." for "William", or "S." for "Samuel".

(2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the election superintendent.

(3) An abbreviated name or nickname shall always appear set off within quotation marks and immediately before the last name. Periods shall follow all abbreviations or initials. Additional qualifiers following the last name, such as "Jr" or "III" shall not be separated from the last name by a comma and shall be followed by a period.

(4) A candidate's name shall always appear in the following form: given or first name or initial, if desired by the candidate; middle name or names or initials, if desired by the candidate; nickname, if desired by the candidate; and last or surname in full. All names shall be in substantially the following form: John Lincoln "Jack" Doe; or J. Lincoln "Jack" Doe; or J. L. "Jack" Doe Jr.; or any of the above combinations without the intervening nickname.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.  
**History.** Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and refer-endums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Voting Machines” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled “Conduct of Elections” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) “Assist”, “assisted”, “assisting”, or “assistance” means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2- 379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2- 587, 21-2-590, 21-2-591, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or dosing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service



until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.

5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained “or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2-379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such



audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(a) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is



resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the

polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, the poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed, The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated re-turns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls, for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.



(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two

representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

#### (8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. P. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968, **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2D05. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. History. Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. B, 1960; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the pre-cinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then re-tire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot



envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter

re-gistration form. It also shall not be necessary to obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall ver-ify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the bal-lot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for pro-visional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the Style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and entitled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be verified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an appropriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as “Not Counted” and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter’s certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person’s voter registration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the person that his or her name will be added to the elector’s list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1966; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 8, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

## **183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.**

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the



official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1976. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled “Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 20, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1967; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible” adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Pol Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Official Observers at Polling Places” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marketing” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; off. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent” adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.**

The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words “Official Poll Watcher,” the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge” adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>180-1-14-.01</b>	<b>Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols</b>	<b>188-1-14-.07</b>	<b>Spoiled Ballot Definition</b>
<b>183.1-14-.02</b>	<b>Use of DBS Units for Absentee Balloting</b>	<b>183-1-14-.06</b>	<b>Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots</b>
<b>183-1-14-.03</b>	<b>Provisional Absentee Ballots</b>	<b>188*1-14-.09</b>	<b>Voted Absentee Ballots</b>
<b>183-1-14-.04</b>	<b>Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots</b>	<b>183-1-14-.10</b>	<b>Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens</b>
<b>183-1-14-.05</b>	<b>State Write-In Absentee Ballot</b>	<b>183-1-14-.11</b>	<b>Mailing and Issuance of Ballots</b>
<b>183-1-14-.06</b>	<b>Spoiled Absentee Ballots</b>		

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols.** Registrars shall either by use of color or symbols on the return absentee ballot envelope (the one on which the oath appears) designate under which category an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols; D (physically disabled, unable to see or mark the ballot); E (seventy-five years of age or older); MOS (military, overseas); MST (military, stateside); OSP (overseas, permanent resi-dent who may vote for federal offices only); OST (overseas, tempo-rary resident); and AV (person voting absentee in person without providing reason pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-380(b)), To facilitate counting, a symbol designating the absentee elector's precinct, and in the case of a primary or primary runoff, a symbol designating the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting shall also be noted on the envelope containing the oath. The following symbols shall also be used as appropriate: PR (provisional ballot); IR (person who registered to vote for the first time by mail and has not provided the identification provided by law); and EH (ballot cast during poll hours extended by court order).

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. Amended: F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

- (1) Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A, Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars,

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath



document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for inperson absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the

discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and re-rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has in-itiated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligi-ble to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR," In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the num-bered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. NOT. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended, Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 1S3-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes, One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-In Absentee Ballot" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval (\_\_\_). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing “Spoiled” across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

“I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.”

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Spoiled Absentee Ballots” adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) “Spoiled ballot” includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;



2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;
3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;
4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;
5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;
6. that was issued in error by the election official; or
7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; off. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, country, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by

federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-S82, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14.11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 10, 2011.

### **Rule 183-1-14.12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

**Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14.12**

**Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.**

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15  
RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an “X”, a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Definition of Vote” adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**  
Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

**(3) Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar’s primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter



Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter

registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(l) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
- (iii) Voter Registration Application;
- (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
- (v) Naturalization documentation;
- (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
- (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
- (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
- (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
- (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
- (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
- (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;  
or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-4</b>	REPEALED	57
<b>183-2-5</b>	REPEALED	59
<b>183-2-6</b>	REPEALED	61
<b>183-2-7</b>	REPEALED	63
<b>183-2-8</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-9</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-10</b>	BALLOTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-11</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
<b>183-2-12</b>	REPEALED	75
<b>183-2-13</b>	REPEALED	77
<b>183-2-14</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-15</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-16</b>	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oaths of Poll Officers" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02, F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled “Calls for Primaries and Elections” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-11  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
**to**  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. Ga, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

**183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-S1. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

## **183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec, 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 81, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-3). **History.** Original Rule entitled “Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov, 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verifications of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	---

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**



1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the

intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the Voting Systems Standards published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

(e) **Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is identical to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compilers) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-388, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adapted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted, F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

690-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and



(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2- 50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and

(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002” adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Friday, April 14, 2017 2:45 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** SEB Rulebook  
**Attachments:** SEB Rulebook

Sender: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

Subject: SEB Rulebook

Message-Id: <[15d9b601d3ab4ca39ee24b7a95a2048f@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us](mailto:15d9b601d3ab4ca39ee24b7a95a2048f@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us)>

To: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Friday, April 14, 2017 2:45 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** SEB Rulebook  
**Attachments:** GA SOS SEB RULE BOOK REVISED 4.17.pdf; 183-1-14-.12 F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.docx; SEB Rule Change.pdf

Kevin :  
Attached is the SEB rulebook and the updates to proof.

Thank you for your help.

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*

**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2013**

**Brian P. Kemp  
Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

<b>183-2-4</b>	REPEALED		57
<b>183-2-5</b>	REPEALED		59
<b>183-2-6</b>	REPEALED		61
<b>183-2-7</b>	REPEALED		63
<b>183-2-8</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED	
<b>183-2-9</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED	
<b>183-2-10</b>	BALLOTS	RESERVED	
<b>183-2-11</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS		71
<b>183-2-12</b>	REPEALED		75
<b>183-2-13</b>	REPEALED		77
<b>183-2-14</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED	
<b>183-2-15</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED	
<b>183-2-16</b>	PENALTIES	RESERVED	

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11



## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Ride covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections”, 183-31-1 entitled “Voting Machines”, 183-31-2 entitled “Vote Recorders”, 183-32 entitled “Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections”, and 183-33 entitled “Absentee Voting” have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled “Dates of Primaries and Elections” has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed. Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled “Ballots” has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-.10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003. Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02, voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled “Penalties” has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended, Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled “Georgia Voter Identification Card” has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled “Preliminary Provisions” has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled “Nomination of Candidates” has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed, and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-1-.01</b>	<b>Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules</b>	<b>183-1-1-.02</b>	<b>Review of Initial Decisions</b>
--------------------	--	--------------------	------------------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;

(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2006; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1-.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-.01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-8-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-8-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**188-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.**

(1) The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

## 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) “Voter registration programs” means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

(4) **Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.

(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-91. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.



**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(0) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

### **(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. §21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2008. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

#### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.

(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems



appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted, F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, “Are you a citizen of the United States of America?”, the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering “Yes” or “No” to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing “X” in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the “Yes” box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked “No”, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration” adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors**

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01     Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATGION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-10-.01    Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
Union, or Other Financial Institution  
May Certify Error in Returning Check**

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-6, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted, F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

- (1) A candidate's name shall include a family surname and a given or first name, middle name, or nickname, or an abbreviated version of such given or first name or middle name or appropriate initials such as "Bob" for "Robert", "Jim" for "James", "Wm." for "William", or "S." for "Samuel".
- (2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the election superintendent.

(3) An abbreviated name or nickname shall always appear set off within quotation marks and immediately before the last name. Periods shall follow all abbreviations or initials. Additional qualifiers following the last name, such as "Jr" or "III" shall not be separated from the last name by a comma and shall be followed by a period.

(4) A candidate's name shall always appear in the following form: given or first name or initial, if desired by the candidate; middle name or names or initials, if desired by the candidate; nickname, if desired by the candidate; and last or surname in full. All names shall be in substantially the following form: John Lincoln "Jack" Doe; or J. Lincoln "Jack" Doe; or J. L. "Jack" Doe Jr.; or any of the above combinations without the intervening nickname.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.  
**History.** Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and refer-endums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Voting Machines” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled “Conduct of Elections” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) “Assist”, “assisted”, “assisting”, or “assistance” means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2- 379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2- 587, 21-2-590, 21-2-591, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or dosing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service

until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.



5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained “or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2-379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such

audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.



In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(a) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is

resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the



polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, the poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed, The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated re-turns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls, for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.

(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two



representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

#### (8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. P. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968, **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2D05. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. History. Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. B, 1960; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the pre-cinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then re-tire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot

envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter



re-gistration form. It also shall not be necessary to obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall ver-ify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the bal-lot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for pro-visional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the Style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and entitled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be verified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an appropriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as “Not Counted” and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter registration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the person that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1966; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 8, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

## 183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the

official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1976. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled “Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 20, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1967; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible” adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Pol Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Official Observers at Polling Places” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marketing” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; off. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent” adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.**

The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words “Official Poll Watcher,” the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge” adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-14-.01	Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols	188-1-14-.07	Spoiled Ballot Definition
183.1-14-.02	Use of DBS Units for Absentee Balloting	183-1-14-.06	Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.03	Provisional Absentee Ballots	188*1-14-.09	Voted Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.04	Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.10	Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens
183-1-14-.05	State Write-In Absentee Ballot		
183-1-14-.06	Spoiled Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.11	Mailing and Issuance of Ballots

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols.**

Registrars shall either by use of color or symbols on the return absentee ballot envelope (the one on which the oath appears) designate under which category an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols; D (physically disabled, unable to see or mark the ballot); E (seventy-five years of age or older); MOS (military, overseas); MST (military, stateside); OSP (overseas, permanent resi-dent who may vote for federal offices only); OST (overseas, tempo-rary resident); and AV (person voting absentee in person without providing reason pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-380(b)), To facilitate counting, a symbol designating the absentee elector's precinct, and in the case of a primary or primary runoff, a symbol designating the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting shall also be noted on the envelope containing the oath. The following symbols shall also be used as appropriate: PR (provisional ballot); IR (person who registered to vote for the first time by mail and has not provided the identification provided by law); and EH (ballot cast during poll hours extended by court order).

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. Amended: F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

- (1) Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A, Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars,

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath

document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for inperson absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the



discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and re-rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has in-iti-ated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligi-ble to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR," In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the num-bered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. NOT. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended, Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 1S3-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes, One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-In Absentee Ballot" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval (\_\_\_). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing “Spoiled” across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

“I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.”

Authority O.C.G.A Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Spoiled Absentee Ballots” adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) “Spoiled ballot” includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;

2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;
3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;
4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;
5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;
6. that was issued in error by the election official; or
7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; off. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2- 382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, country, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by



federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-S82, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14.11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 10, 2011.

### **Rule 183-1-14.12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

**Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14.12**

**Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.**

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15  
RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an “X”, a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Definition of Vote” adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**  
Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

**(3) Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar’s primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter

Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter



registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(l) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
- (iii) Voter Registration Application;
- (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
- (v) Naturalization documentation;
- (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
- (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
- (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
- (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
- (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
- (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
- (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;  
or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-4</b>	REPEALED	57
<b>183-2-5</b>	REPEALED	59
<b>183-2-6</b>	REPEALED	61
<b>183-2-7</b>	REPEALED	63
<b>183-2-8</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-9</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-10</b>	BALLOTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-11</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
<b>183-2-12</b>	REPEALED	75
<b>183-2-13</b>	REPEALED	77
<b>183-2-14</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-15</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-16</b>	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oaths of Poll Officers” adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02, F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled “Calls for Primaries and Elections” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-11  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
**to**  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. Ga, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

**183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-S1. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

## **183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec, 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 81, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-3). **History.** Original Rule entitled “Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov, 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verifications of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	---

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**

1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the



intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the Voting Systems Standards published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

(e) **Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is identical to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compilers) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-388, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adapted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted, F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

690-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and

(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2- 50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and



(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002” adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

**Rule 183-1-14-.12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

**Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14-.12**

**Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.**

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

## Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 183-1-11-.02 Apperance of Candidate's Name on Ballot

Georgia Administrative Code

Department 183. STATE ELECTION BOARD

Chapter 183-1. GEORGIA ELECTION CODE

Subject 183-1-11. BALLOTS

*Current through Rules filed through January 26, 2017*

### ★ Rule 183-1-11-.02. Apperance of Candidate's Name on Ballot

- (1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least one of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly known in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule.
- (2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.
- (3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct

Copyright © 2017 Lawriter LLC. All rights reserved. | Email Us | 844-838-0769 | Live Chat

listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

- (4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate. Upon a determination that the requested name does not comply with this Rule, the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

**Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-11-.02**

**Authority:** O.C.G.A. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

**Amended:** F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014.

---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:57 AM  
**To:** Lewis, Russell; Watson, Frances  
**Subject:** FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

-----Original Message-----

From: Hillman, Shari On Behalf Of SOS Contact  
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:44 AM  
To: Simmons, Jessica <[jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
Subject: FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

-----Original Message-----

From: [SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov) [<mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov>]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:43 AM  
To: SOS Contact <[soscontact@sos.ga.gov](mailto:soscontact@sos.ga.gov)>  
Subject: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

Name: Amanda Andrzejewski  
Phone: [REDACTED]  
Address: 4030 Jenkins Court  
City: Alpharetta  
State: GA  
Zip Code: 30009  
E-mail: [REDACTED][@comcast.net](mailto:[REDACTED]@comcast.net)

Question / Comment: Tried to Vote today at the Alpharetta Library where I have voted for 12 years and just voted in the recent presidential election at that location with no issues. Was told today I was not allowed to vote there - I was told 4 different places to vote (with no addresses). I was told had a voted yesterday I could have voted at the Alpharetta library. No one could accurately confirm where I could vote with exact addresses or which of the 4 locations. I received no information since the presidential election that my voter location was changed. Left the voting location and called the Fulton County Voter phone number to see if I could determine where to vote. Was told that I was not registered to vote and they could not find a record of me. I have lived at the same address for 12 years - voted in multiple elections and served on jury duty a good number of times at the state and county level. There has been no change in my voter information for 12 years. Asked to be reconnected to someone else whom can help me. The person informed me that my last name was misspelled. Although my husband's was not. I was given a polling place that I have NEVER used in 12 years to vote that is backwards from my house and crosses 4 different schools - so basically impossible for me to go vote and not be late for work since it was now 7:45am. So they changed the spelling of my name. I feel that by changing my polling location and then not providing me the correct information of where to vote and telling me I am not registered - that you are making it very difficult for me to VOTE in this election. Multiple people at the polling place were told their polling place had been changed - when they had voted at that location in the past. This election is not valid if you do not provide ample information to a voter of where they are able to vote. Seems real deceptive to change this at the last minute. Very disappointed - that we pay taxes, serve on juries, (including my husband served on a capital murder case sequestered for 2 months) and yet I am treated in this manner when I am trying to exercise my right to vote. If I do not

vote today - because I cannot make it in time to the poll then at least you know why I no longer have confidence in the voting process. Sadly disappointed.

---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:57 AM  
**To:** Jones, Ralph  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver; Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: [SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov) [mailto:[SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov)]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:43 AM  
To: SOS Contact <[soscontact@sos.ga.gov](mailto:soscontact@sos.ga.gov)>  
Subject: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

Name: Amanda Andrzejewski  
Phone: [REDACTED]  
Address: 4030 Jenkins Court  
City: Alpharetta  
State: GA  
Zip Code: 30009  
E-mail: [REDACTED][@comcast.net](mailto:[REDACTED]@comcast.net)

Question / Comment: Tried to Vote today at the Alpharetta Library where I have voted for 12 years and just voted in the recent presidential election at that location with no issues. Was told today I was not allowed to vote there - I was told 4 different places to vote (with no addresses). I was told had a voted yesterday I could have voted at the Alpharetta library. No one could accurately confirm where I could vote with exact addresses or which of the 4 locations. I received no information since the presidential election that my voter location was changed. Left the voting location and called the Fulton County Voter phone number to see if I could determine where to vote. Was told that I was not registered to vote and they could not find a record of me. I have lived at the same address for 12 years - voted in multiple elections and served on jury duty a good number of times at the state and county level. There has been no change in my voter information for 12 years. Asked to be reconnected to someone else whom can help me. The person informed me that my last name was misspelled. Although my husband's was not. I was given a polling place that I have NEVER used in 12 years to vote that is backwards from my house and crosses 4 different schools - so basically impossible for me to go vote and not be late for work since it was now 7:45am. So they changed the spelling of my name. I feel that by changing my polling location and then not providing me the correct information of where to vote and telling me I am not registered - that you are making it very difficult for me to VOTE in this election. Multiple people at the polling place were told their polling place had been changed - when they had voted at that location in the past. This election is not valid if you do not provide ample information to a voter of where they are able to vote. Seems real deceptive to change this at the last minute. Very disappointed - that we pay taxes, serve on juries, (including my husband served on a capital murder case sequestered for 2 months) and yet I am treated in this manner when I am trying to exercise my right to vote. If I do not vote today - because I cannot make it in time to the poll then at least you know why I no longer have confidence in the voting process. Sadly disappointed.

---

**From:** Hillman, Shari on behalf of SOS Contact  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:44 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Subject:** FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

-----Original Message-----

From: [SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov) [mailto:[SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov)]  
Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:43 AM  
To: SOS Contact <[soscontact@sos.ga.gov](mailto:soscontact@sos.ga.gov)>  
Subject: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

Name: Amanda Andrzejewski  
Phone: [REDACTED]  
Address: 4030 Jenkins Court  
City: Alpharetta  
State: GA  
Zip Code: 30009  
E-mail: [REDACTED][@comcast.net](mailto:[REDACTED]@comcast.net)

Question / Comment: Tried to Vote today at the Alpharetta Library where I have voted for 12 years and just voted in the recent presidential election at that location with no issues. Was told today I was not allowed to vote there - I was told 4 different places to vote (with no addresses). I was told had a voted yesterday I could have voted at the Alpharetta library. No one could accurately confirm where I could vote with exact addresses or which of the 4 locations. I received no information since the presidential election that my voter location was changed. Left the voting location and called the Fulton County Voter phone number to see if I could determine where to vote. Was told that I was not registered to vote and they could not find a record of me. I have lived at the same address for 12 years - voted in multiple elections and served on jury duty a good number of times at the state and county level. There has been no change in my voter information for 12 years. Asked to be reconnected to someone else whom can help me. The person informed me that my last name was misspelled. Although my husband's was not. I was given a polling place that I have NEVER used in 12 years to vote that is backwards from my house and crosses 4 different schools - so basically impossible for me to go vote and not be late for work since it was now 7:45am. So they changed the spelling of my name. I feel that by changing my polling location and then not providing me the correct information of where to vote and telling me I am not registered - that you are making it very difficult for me to VOTE in this election. Multiple people at the polling place were told their polling place had been changed - when they had voted at that location in the past. This election is not valid if you do not provide ample information to a voter of where they are able to vote. Seems real deceptive to change this at the last minute. Very disappointed - that we pay taxes, serve on juries, (including my husband served on a capital murder case sequestered for 2 months) and yet I am treated in this manner when I am trying to exercise my right to vote. If I do not vote today - because I cannot make it in time to the poll then at least you know why I no longer have confidence in the voting process. Sadly disappointed.



---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:56 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@comcast.net  
**Subject:** RE: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

Ms. Andrzejewski,

Thank you for contacting the Secretary of State's Office. Your polling place is:

ALPHARETTA CRABAPPLE GOVT CNTR  
12624 BROADWELL ROAD  
ALPHARETTA, GA 30004 - 6633

I am also going to follow up with the Fulton County Elections Office to find out why you did not receive a precinct card notifying you that your polling place changed.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Jessica

--

Jessica Monk Simmons  
Assistant Director of Elections  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
2 MLK Jr. Dr. SE | Suite 802 West | Atlanta, Georgia 30334  
(404) 656-7610

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov) [<mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:43 AM  
**To:** SOS Contact <[soscontact@sos.ga.gov](mailto:soscontact@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

**Name:** Amanda Andrzejewski  
**Phone:** [REDACTED]  
**Address:** 4030 Jenkins Court  
**City:** Alpharetta  
**State:** GA  
**Zip Code:** 30009  
**E-mail:** [REDACTED]@comcast.net

Question / Comment: Tried to Vote today at the Alpharetta Library where I have voted for 12 years and just voted in the recent presidential election at that location with no issues. Was told today I was not allowed to vote there - I was told 4 different places to vote (with no addresses). I was told had I voted yesterday I could have voted at the Alpharetta library. No one could accurately confirm where I could vote with exact addresses or which of the 4 locations. I received no information since the presidential election that my voter location was changed. Left the voting location and called the Fulton County Voter phone number to see if I could determine where to vote. Was told that I was not registered to vote and they could not find a record of me. I have lived at the same address for 12 years - voted in multiple elections and served on jury duty a good number of times at the state and county level. There has been no change in my voter information for 12 years. Asked to be reconnected to someone else whom can help me. The person informed me that my last name was misspelled. Although my husband's was not. I was given a polling place that I have NEVER used in 12 years to vote that is backwards from my house and crosses 4 different schools - so basically impossible for me to go vote and not be late for work since it was now 7:45am. So they changed the spelling of my name. I feel that by changing my polling location and then not providing me the correct information of where to vote and telling me I am not registered - that you are making it very difficult for me to VOTE in this election. Multiple people at the polling place were told their polling place had been changed - when they had voted at that location in the past. This election is not valid if you do not provide ample information to a voter of where they are able to vote. Seems real deceptive to change this at the last minute. Very disappointed - that we pay taxes, serve on juries, (including my husband served on a capital murder case sequestered for 2 months) and yet I am treated in this manner when I am trying to exercise my right to vote. If I do not vote today - because I cannot make it in time to the poll then at least you know why I no longer have confidence in the voting process. Sadly disappointed.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:57 AM  
**To:** Jones, Ralph  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver; Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski  
**Attachments:** FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

Sender: [jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)  
Subject: FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski  
Message-Id: <[e57a211734aa4f32bb0ba6d096c415c0@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us](mailto:e57a211734aa4f32bb0ba6d096c415c0@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us)>  
To: [Ralph.Jones@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Ralph.Jones@fultoncountyga.gov)  
Cc: [aharris@sos.ga.gov](mailto:aharris@sos.ga.gov)  
Cc: [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:57 AM  
**To:** Jones, Ralph  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver; Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** FW: Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

FYI

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov) [<mailto:SOSContactAlerts@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 18, 2017 8:43 AM  
**To:** SOS Contact <[soscontact@sos.ga.gov](mailto:soscontact@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Web E-Mail From Amanda Andrzejewski

**Name:** Amanda Andrzejewski  
**Phone:** [REDACTED]  
**Address:** 4030 Jenkins Court  
**City:** Alpharetta  
**State:** GA  
**Zip Code:** 30009  
**E-mail:** [REDACTED][@comcast.net](mailto:[REDACTED]@comcast.net)

Question / Comment: Tried to Vote today at the Alpharetta Library where I have voted for 12 years and just voted in the recent presidential election at that location with no issues. Was told today I was not allowed to vote there - I was told 4 different places to vote (with no addresses). I was told had a voted yesterday I could have voted at the Alpharetta library. No one could accurately confirm where I could vote with exact addresses or which of the 4 locations. I received no information since the presidential election that my voter location was changed. Left the voting location and called the Fulton County Voter phone number to see if I could determine where to vote. Was told that I was not registered to vote and they could not find a record of me. I have lived at the same address for 12 years - voted in multiple elections and served on jury duty a good number of times at the state and county level. There has been no change in my voter information for 12 years. Asked to be reconnected to someone else whom can help me. The person informed me that my last name was misspelled. Although my husband's was not. I was given a polling place that I have NEVER used in 12 years to vote that is backwards from my house and crosses 4 different schools - so basically impossible for me to go vote and not be late for work since it was now 7:45am. So they changed the spelling of my name. I feel that by changing my polling location and then not providing me the correct information of where to vote and telling me I am not registered - that you are making it very difficult for me to VOTE in this election. Multiple people at the polling place were told their polling place had been changed - when they had voted at that location in the past. This election is not valid if you do not provide ample information to a voter of where they are able to vote. Seems real deceptive to change this at the last minute. Very disappointed - that we pay taxes, serve on juries, (including my husband served on a capital murder case sequestered for 2 months) and yet I am treated in this manner when I am trying to exercise my right to vote. If I do not vote today - because I cannot make it in time to the poll then at least you know why I no longer have confidence in the voting process. Sadly disappointed.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Monday, May 08, 2017 3:51 PM  
**To:** Johnson, Melody

Sender: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

Subject:

Message-Id: <[0b7f77bd8dff41f8b449299b2f2be590@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us](mailto:0b7f77bd8dff41f8b449299b2f2be590@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us)>

To: [mjohnson@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mjohnson@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Monday, May 08, 2017 3:51 PM  
**To:** Johnson, Melody  
**Attachments:** GA SOS SEB RULE BOOK REV. B 4.25.17.pdf

From the print vendor. I am also forwarding to you two changes to check.

Thanks.

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*

**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2013**

**Brian P. Kemp  
Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	5
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	15
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	17
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	19
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	23
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	25
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	27
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	31
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	33
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	37
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	45
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	47
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS      RESERVED	



<b>183-2-4</b>	REPEALED	57
<b>183-2-5</b>	REPEALED	59
<b>183-2-6</b>	REPEALED	61
<b>183-2-7</b>	REPEALED	63
<b>183-2-8</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-9</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-10</b>	BALLOTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-11</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
<b>183-2-12</b>	REPEALED	75
<b>183-2-13</b>	REPEALED	77
<b>183-2-14</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-15</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-16</b>	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Ride covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections”, 183-31-1 entitled “Voting Machines”, 183-31-2 entitled “Vote Recorders”, 183-32 entitled “Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections”, and 183-33 entitled “Absentee Voting” have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled “Dates of Primaries and Elections” has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed. Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled “Ballots” has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-.10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003. Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02, voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled “Penalties” has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended, Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled “Georgia Voter Identification Card” has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled “Preliminary Provisions” has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled “Nomination of Candidates” has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed, and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-1-.01</b>	<b>Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules</b>	<b>183-1-1-.02</b>	<b>Review of Initial Decisions</b>
--------------------	--	--------------------	------------------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;

(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2006; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1-.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-.01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-8-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-8-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**188-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.**

(1) The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

## 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) “Voter registration programs” means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

(4) **Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,



statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.

(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-91. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(0) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

### **(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. §21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2008. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### 183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the



State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.

(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems

appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted, F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.



(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, “Are you a citizen of the United States of America?”, the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering “Yes” or “No” to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing “X” in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the “Yes” box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked “No”, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration” adopted. F. Dec, 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors**

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01     Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-10-.01    Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
Union, or Other Financial Institution  
May Certify Error in Returning Check**

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-6, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted, F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

(1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least on of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly know in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule

(2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.

(3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and

punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25).

Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and comma necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

(4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

**Cite as** Ga. Comp. R. 183-1-11-.02

**Authority** O.C.G.A. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

**Amended:** F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and refer-endums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Conduct of Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) "Assist", "assisted", "assisting", or "assistance" means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2- 379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2- 587, 21-2-590, 21-2-591, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,



voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or dosing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service

until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.

5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained “or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2-379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.



7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such

audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(a) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.



(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is

resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the

polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, the poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed, The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and



consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated re-turns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls, for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.

(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two

representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

#### (8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. P. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968, **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2D05. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. History. Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. B, 1960; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the pre-cinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,



the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then re-tire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot

envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter

re-gistration form. It also shall not be necessary to obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall ver-ify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the bal-lot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for pro-visional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the Style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and entitled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be verified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an appropriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as “Not Counted” and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter registration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the person that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1966; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 8, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

## 183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each



ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the

official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1976. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled “Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 20, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1967; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible” adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Pol Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Official Observers at Polling Places” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking” adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent” adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.**

The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words “Official Poll Watcher,” the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge” adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>180-1-14-.01</b>	<b>Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols</b>	<b>188-1-14-.07</b>	<b>Spoiled Ballot Definition</b>
<b>183.1-14-.02</b>	<b>Use of DBS Units for Absentee Balloting</b>	<b>183-1-14-.06</b>	<b>Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots</b>
<b>183-1-14-.03</b>	<b>Provisional Absentee Ballots</b>	<b>188*1-14-.09</b>	<b>Voted Absentee Ballots</b>
<b>183-1-14-.04</b>	<b>Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots</b>	<b>183-1-14-.10</b>	<b>Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens</b>
<b>183-1-14-.05</b>	<b>State Write-In Absentee Ballot</b>	<b>183-1-14-.11</b>	<b>Mailing and Issuance of Ballots</b>
<b>183-1-14-.06</b>	<b>Spoiled Absentee Ballots</b>		

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols.**

Registrars shall either by use of color or symbols on the return absentee ballot envelope (the one on which the oath appears) designate under which category an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols; D (physically disabled, unable to see or mark the ballot); E (seventy-five years of age or older); MOS (military, overseas); MST (military, stateside); OSP (overseas, permanent resi-dent who may vote for federal offices only); OST (overseas, tempo-rary resident); and AV (person voting absentee in person without providing reason pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-380(b)), To facilitate counting, a symbol designating the absentee elector's precinct, and in the case of a primary or primary runoff, a symbol designating the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting shall also be noted on the envelope containing the oath. The following symbols shall also be used as appropriate: PR (provisional ballot); IR (person who registered to vote for the first time by mail and has not provided the identification provided by law); and EH (ballot cast during poll hours extended by court order).

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. Amended: F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

- (1) Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A., Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars,

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number



on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath

document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for inperson absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the

discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and re-rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has in-iti-ated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligi-ble to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR," In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the num-bered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. NOT. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended, Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 1S3-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes, One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-In Absentee Ballot" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or



election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval (\_\_\_). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing “Spoiled” across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

“I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.”

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Spoiled Absentee Ballots” adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) “Spoiled ballot” includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;

2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;
3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;
4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;
5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;
6. that was issued in error by the election official; or
7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; off. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and
2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, country, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by

federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-S82, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 10, 2011.

### **183-1-14-12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

**Authority:** O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15  
RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an “X”, a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Definition of Vote” adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**  
Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

**(3) Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar's primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter

Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter

registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(l) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
- (iii) Voter Registration Application;
- (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
- (v) Naturalization documentation;
- (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
- (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
- (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
- (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
- (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
- (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
- (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;  
or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-4</b>	REPEALED	57
<b>183-2-5</b>	REPEALED	59
<b>183-2-6</b>	REPEALED	61
<b>183-2-7</b>	REPEALED	63
<b>183-2-8</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-9</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
<b>183-2-10</b>	BALLOTS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-11</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
<b>183-2-12</b>	REPEALED	75
<b>183-2-13</b>	REPEALED	77
<b>183-2-14</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-15</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-2-16</b>	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oaths of Poll Officers” adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02, F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled “Calls for Primaries and Elections” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-11  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
**to**  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Voting Machines” adopted. F. Aug Ga, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

**183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Vote Recorders” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Certification of Program Instructions” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-S1. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

## **183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec, 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 81, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-3). **History.** Original Rule entitled “Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols” adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov, 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11



**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verifications of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	---

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**

1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the

intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the Voting Systems Standards published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

**(e) Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is identical to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compilers) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-388, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adapted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted, F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.



**RULES OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

690-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and

(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2- 50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and

(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002" adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

---

**From:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2017 3:36 PM  
**To:** Huster Phyllis  
**Subject:** RE: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster  
**Attachments:** December\_17,\_2013\_Transcript.pdf; 12-17-2013\_Special\_Called\_Agenda\_BK.pdf; December\_17,\_2013\_Meeting\_Minutes.pdf; 12-17-13\_Summary.pdf; Fulton 2012 SEB Report.pdf; Investigation Report 2012-156.pdf

Here are the two Reports, Transcript, Minutes, Summary and Agenda for the December 17, 2013 special called meeting to address SEB Cases 2011-110, 2012-56, and 2012-156 involving Fulton County that resulted in the large fine. Redactions were made in the Investigation Report to remove cell phone numbers pursuant to OCGA Section 50-18-72(a)(20)(A).

Kevin Rayburn  
Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division  
Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE  
Suite 802 West Tower  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334  
404.656.2871 (main)  
404.654.6004 (direct)  
Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Huster Phyllis [mailto:████████@deblume.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1:10 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

yes just the reports for now and I'll let you know, if there were any transcripts or more specifically deposition in electronic form that will help as well, especially as regard Mr. Richard Barron.

Phyllis

On August 29, 2017 at 10:02 AM "Rayburn, Kevin" <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

Regarding the Fulton case, are you interest in only the case file reports on the matter that was presented to the SEB, or are you wanting all materials? I can get you the reports very easily; all materials will be a much different matter. I looked yesterday and it is the equivalent to maybe 6 boxes of paper. If you are willing, I could send the reports and you can review them and decide if that is sufficient for your needs.

Thanks,

Kevin Rayburn

Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE

Suite 802 West Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

404.656.2871 (main)

404.654.6004 (direct)

Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Rayburn, Kevin

**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2017 12:58 PM

**To:** 'Huster Phyllis' <[REDACTED]@deblume.com>

**Subject:** RE: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

One check will be fine. Payable to "Georgia Secretary of State".

Kevin Rayburn

Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE

Suite 802 West Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

404.656.2871 (main)

404.654.6004 (direct)

Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Huster Phyllis [mailto:██████████@deblume.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 29, 2017 12:04 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

Kevin:

Thanks for the update, I will consider the first Open Rec completed and await amount on the new request and send you one check or do you prefer 2 and make it out to GA SOS Office?

I appreciate all your time and effort, you are truly appreciated!

Phyllis

On August 29, 2017 at 5:35 AM "Rayburn, Kevin" <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

So you are aware, I have not yet found a dominion contract and everyone I have talked to here doesn't think we ever contracted with them. Let me know if you have specific information otherwise, but I don't think we ever contracted with Dominion. Regarding third party technology escrow, you can see from the Diebold contract there was an addendum attachment for an escrow contract that was not filled out or completed. So far I have not found a completed escrow contract but I'll keep looking. I'll provide you later today an estimate on your second request involving ES&S and the Fulton Case Files.

Kevin Rayburn

Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE

Suite 802 West Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

404.656.2871 (main)

404.654.6004 (direct)

Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Huster Phyllis [[mailto:\[REDACTED\]@deblume.com](mailto:[REDACTED]@deblume.com)]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 28, 2017 6:35 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

This is sooo great thank you Kevin, I expected it should be redacted..

Phyllis

On August 28, 2017 at 3:26 PM "Rayburn, Kevin"  
<[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

Ms. Huster,

I am going to send several emails containing all of the Diebold Contracts. Redactions were made pursuant to OCGA 50-18-72(a)(20)(A) to remove confidential banking information and redactions were made pursuant to OCGA 50-18-72(a)(25)(A) to remove confidential information that disclosure would compromise security such as passwords. There is a main contract, and 7 amendments. The main contract is split into 3 parts in order to be emailed (size was too big as one file).

Kevin Rayburn

Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE

Suite 802 West Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

404.656.2871 (main)

404.654.6004 (direct)

Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Huster Phyllis [[mailto:\[REDACTED\]@deblume.com](mailto:[REDACTED]@deblume.com)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 23, 2017 4:37 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

Hello Kevin:

I spoke with John in your office today and he was kind enough to let me know that you were out of town so that makes sense.. I left a message that what you attached below was only the KSU contract and I'm still waiting for the Dominion/Diebold and if you have one ES&S contract. Just an FYI...

Thanks,

Phyllis

On August 11, 2017 at 2:08 PM "Rayburn, Kevin"  
<[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

I've have located the Diebold and KSU contacts. Diebold is scanned in and I'm currently working on KSU. I am still attempting to locate any contracts regarding Dominion and any technology escrow services.

I review all records before they go out in an open records request for anything confidential under OCGA 50-18-72. On a request like this, things I am looking for as confidential include for example banking information and protected personal information (OCGA 50-18-72(a)(20)(A)), certain information the disclosure of which would compromise election security (OCGA 50-18-72(a)(25)(A)), and certain trade secrets (OCGA 50-18-72(a)(32)).



Attached please find the most recently executed KSU contract.

Kevin Rayburn

Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE

Suite 802 West Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30334

404.656.2871 (main)

404.654.6004 (direct)

Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Huster Phyllis [[mailto:\[REDACTED\]@deblume.com](mailto:[REDACTED]@deblume.com)]  
**Sent:** Friday, August 11, 2017 2:22 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Fwd: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

Dear Kevin:

It's been 10 days since we chatted about my open records request, can you give me a status of the request?

Phyllis

[REDACTED] is my #

----- Original Message -----

From: Huster Phyllis <[\[REDACTED\]@deblume.com](mailto:[REDACTED]@deblume.com)>  
To: "Rayburn, Kevin" <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>  
Cc: GARLAND FAVORITO  
<[\[REDACTED\]@msn.com](mailto:[REDACTED]@msn.com)>, [\[REDACTED\]@gmail.com](mailto:[REDACTED]@gmail.com)

Date: July 19, 2017 at 4:02 PM  
Subject: RE: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

Hi Kevin:

I agree in principle to pay the fee- how do I get you payment- is there an electronic way I can pay?? Also, I wonder why you would need to redact any aspect of the contract? I requested the Diebold contract back in 2005 and Cliff Tatum who held your role previously gave me a copy of the full contract without redactions.. so I expect that redactions are not necessary with the contract part of my request....

Phyllis

On July 19, 2017 at 3:43 PM "Rayburn, Kevin"  
<[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

Ms. Huster,

Please find attached the initial response letter to your open records request.

Sincerely,

Kevin Rayburn  
Assistant General Counsel, State Elections Division  
Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
2 MLK Jr. Drive, SE  
Suite 802 West Tower  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334  
404.656.2871 (main)  
404.654.6004 (direct)  
Email: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

-----Original Message-----

From: [ElectionsWebMailAlerts@sos.ga.gov](mailto:ElectionsWebMailAlerts@sos.ga.gov)  
[<mailto:ElectionsWebMailAlerts@sos.ga.gov>]  
Sent: Friday, July 14, 2017 5:54 PM  
To: ElectionsWebE-mails <[ElectionsWebE-mails@sos.ga.gov](mailto:ElectionsWebE-mails@sos.ga.gov)>  
Subject: Web E-Mail [Elections] From Phyllis Huster

Name: Phyllis Huster  
Phone: [REDACTED]  
Address: 3040 17th Ave. W, 129  
City: Seattle  
State: WA  
Zip Code: 98119  
E-mail: [REDACTED]@deblume.com

Question / Comment:  
Phyllis Huster 7/14/17  
3040 17th Ave. W #129  
Seattle, WA 98119

Secretary of State â Elections  
Brian KempâTs Office  
Open Records Custodian  
214 State Capitol  
Atlanta, GA 30334

Dear Custodian of Records:

Under the Georgia Open Records Act Â§ 50.18.70 et seq., I am requesting an opportunity to obtain copies of public records as follows:

- a. A copy of the Signed Dominion Voting Contract with Georgia including all addendums and SOWs â Statement of work
- b. A copy of all contracts signed with Kennesaw State University â Center for Elections for any aspects of Georgia elections.
- c. All contracts with Technology escrow services such as DSI Technology Escrow Services, Inc.
- d. Any contracts signed with Diebold Election Systems, Inc. or RFPs whether current or signed anytime after 2000.

If there are any fees for searching or copying these records, please inform me of the cost. However, I would also like to request a waiver of all fees in that the disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest and will contribute significantly to the publicâTs understanding of how Georgia Elections are run by 3rd party vendors. I am a citizen who is genuinely entitled to this information. This information is not being sought for commercial purposes.

The Georgia Open Records Act requires a response time within three business days. If access to the records I am requesting will take longer than three

days, please contact me with information about when I might expect copies. I prefer copies sent by:

1. email to [REDACTED]@deblume.com or
2. Fax # 1.866.563.9212

If you deny any or all of this request, please cite each specific exemption you feel justifies the refusal to release the information and notify me of the appeal procedures available to me under the law.

Thank-you for your timely response to my request,

Phyllis Huster, Ladies of Liberty

[REDACTED]

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
STATE OF GEORGIA

IN THE MATTER OF:

STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING

GEORGIA STATE CAPITOL BUILDING  
ROOM 341  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30334

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2013  
9:00 A.M.

PRESIDING OFFICER: BRIAN P. KEMP  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
STATE OF GEORGIA

---

*DEBRA MONTGOMERY  
HAPPY FACES COURT REPORTING  
POST OFFICE BOX 1063  
TUCKER, GEORGIA 30085  
(770) 414-9071*

APPEARANCES:

Brian P. Kemp, Secretary Of State, State of Georgia

David J. Worley, Member, State Election Board

Tex McIver, Member, State Election Board

Rebecca Sullivan, Member, State Election Board

ALSO PRESENT:

Chris Harvey, Esquire

David Walbert, Esquire

Russ Willard, Esquire

- - -

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

[sic]	--	Exactly as spoken.
(phonetic)	--	Exact spelling unknown.
--	--	(Dash) Interruption in speech.
. . .	--	(Ellipsis) Indicates halting speech, unfinished sentence, or omission of word(s).
Uh-huh	--	Affirmative response.
Uh-uh	--	Negative response.

Quoted material is typed as spoken.

9:00 a.m.

## PROCEEDINGS

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Okay. Welcome again, everyone to the special call State Election Board meeting, Tuesday, December 17<sup>th</sup>, 9 a.m. I want to go ahead and call the meeting to order.

We think Mr. McIver is en route. So we'll go ahead and get started today. We'll bow our heads – briefly for the invocation and then we'll say the Pledge and then we'll get started.

- - -

## INVOCATION

- - -

## PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

- - -

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Just a couple of quick announcements, Mr. Simpson is not with us today. He had some back surgery so we certainly wish him well with his recovery and look forward to having him back soon. Also, I just want to remind everybody, as I often do, this is a probable cause hearing. Basically, what we're here today to do is to determine if there is enough evidence for the board to take certain actions with the different cases that are before us like being referred to the attorney general's office or send them back for further investigation or dismissing the case altogether.

With that being said, the way this is going to work today is, we're going to let Mr. Harvey present the different cases before us one at a time. Once he goes through that we'll then allow the election board members to ask questions of him and then once we're finished with that we'll let Mr. Walbert, the attorney for Fulton County, give a presentation or make remarks or be able to address the board however he sees fit. And then, we'll also see if there's anyone who would like to make a public comment involved with these cases. So with that Mr. Harvey, I'm going to let you present to us SEB Case No. 2012 No. 156 which is the 2012 General Election case for Fulton County.

**MR. HARVEY:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary, members of the board. This election drew a large amount of scrutiny. It's -- everybody knows that elections are about accountability. Accountability for elected officials and also the accountability of people performing the elections to make sure the results are properly and accurately reported. On November 6, 2012, Fulton County held a general election that included the offices of the President, members of Congress,

and other officials and there were significant problems with the election. What I've got on the screen now is the left side is stacks of provisional ballots and on the right side is a copy of a certification that was submitted by Fulton County in which they say that a true and accurate count of votes cast is represented therein. I think by the end of the presentation there will be reason to believe that that might be called into question.

There are five key areas that I want to discuss on the November 6th general election. They involve pre-election failures, absentee ballot problems, problems at polling places, problems with provisional voting, and problems with provisional tabulation and notification of voters. The pre-election failures begin in the days, weeks, and months prior to the election. One of the most important jobs of election officials prior to election is making sure that election --voter registration applications get processed by the deadline. In this case, the deadline for registering to vote in this election in Georgia was October 9<sup>th</sup>. And there's always a flood of voter registration applications in the days, weeks, and months leading up to the election.

Fulton County, as we were shown, was unable to complete the task of properly entering all those registration applications. These include new voters, voters who were changing addresses, voters who were changing names, voters who had additional information, whether they lacked sufficient ID, or they asked questions of the citizenship status. There were thousands and thousands of these applications that came to Fulton County. In the past, Fulton County had brought in additional data processors to meet this need. In this case, Fulton County did not. There ended up being a significant problem as a result. When they failed to update the voter registration system, they ended up with a huge supplemental list that I'll talk about in a little bit more detail that included over 6000 voters who were not included in the ExpressPoll.

When it came to Election Day Fulton County also failed to prepare precincts with the number of provisional ballots and paperwork and they demonstrated that poll workers were inadequately trained and largely unprepared to deal with a lot of the challenges that they would count. In the electors list, when most people go to vote and they show their identification they're pulled up on a machine that is called an ExpressPoll. And that ExpressPoll contains all the registered voters within a county each; county has their own list. That's important because if somebody is not on that list, according to the poll worker sitting there, they're not eligible to vote and secondary steps have to be taken. In order to complete the ExpressPoll, the information has to be entered in the system, in this case by October 26, 2012. After October 26, any additional entries would not be in the ExpressPoll system and would have to go on the supplemental list. Supplemental list are usually quite small.

In this case, Fulton County had over 6000 voters that were on the provisional -- I'm sorry, that were on the supplemental list. That list was closed on Saturday, November 1<sup>st</sup>. In addition, on Sunday and Monday, days prior to the election, an additional over 300 voters were then added after the supplemental list was posted so those voters were essentially invisible to election officials. They were not going to be able to ExpressPoll and they were not going to be on the supplemental list that poll workers would look for to find voters who were not on the ExpressPoll. There were another 412 voters that were entered after the supplemental list was printed.



And on November 5<sup>th</sup>, this is a copy of an email I sent to Secretary Kemp and the elections director. I sent investigators to Fulton County to check on the – we had gotten a large number of complaints regarding people not showing up as being registered to vote in Fulton County. I sent two investigators over to Fulton County to check with the elections director, Sharon Mitchell, to see if they had solved the problem. Ms. Mitchell informed the investigators that everything was taken care of, everything had been entered. There were a few extra that they had found on Monday, but everything was going to be fine. That ended up not being correct.

This is the short summary of the people that were added after the close of the ExpressPoll: Seventy-three of those people voted. Eleven of those 73 that voted provisional ballots were rejected by Fulton County even though they were properly registered. And this will come up a little bit more when we get into the provisional ballot tabulation system. But these are 11 voters who were entered late into the system by Fulton County and then when they were offered a provisional ballot and voted it when Fulton County went to check on it and Fulton County again said, oh, you're not in the system your ballot is rejected. So these are 11 voters who were not – whose vote did not count.

Fulton County conducted an internal survey, internal audit, into their practices and one of the more telling responses came here from an election official who said, visiting Fulton County, registration elections officials could not obtain clear verification of the staffing and heavy workload requirements because voters registration cards were moved from the sign out location and placed around the office so no one would be able to identify the workload. Cards were hidden at employee work stations, thousands of voter registration cards were not entered into the system or addresses updated and that's from a Fulton County poll worker.

Ralph Jones in Fulton County election office admitted that in the pressure before the election that they stopped entering address changes in the voter registration system, which again, caused a voter who had moved and presumably changed their address to go to the wrong voter precinct attempt to vote and be told that they weren't on the list and either be forced to go somewhere else or vote a provisional ballot. And in a lot of cases people would be in line for several hours getting to the ExpressPoll to be told, oh, you're not registered to vote. You either have to go to a different precinct or you have to go to a provisional ballot.

There was some debate back and forth as to whether or not the Fulton County was largely responsible for the failures to enter the information in the voter registration system or whether not it was the result of errors or delays from the Secretary Of State's office. And what we determined was that the Secretary Of State's office had a system where they had to call Fulton County and in several cases Fulton County would normally come and pick up two boxes of voter registration applications in the days before the cutoff. There were some days when no Fulton County staff responded to pick up those registration applications. There were times when Fulton County said they would only take two even when there were more boxes.

The Secretary Of State's office had an all hands on deck pressed right before the deadline were everybody in the office including upper-level managers and staff were clearing these voter registration applications and sorting them to get to the counties. The evidence is that Fulton County can't really lay the blame for the late registration on the Secretary Of State's office.

There's a 145 report, I cannot profess to say I know exactly what 145 is, but it's a report that summarizes all the data entry that's done by the counties in the days -- you can pick any timeframe. In the days before the election, these show the last time that entries were made. So you can see starting the 26<sup>th</sup> and going through the 5th there were three days when entries were made after 10 p.m., but there were several days where entries were made one, three, and several at the normal closing time.

So the idea that there was some type of huge push doesn't appear to be substantiated by the 145 report. The total 145 report, and this where I'm going to compare Dekalb County to Fulton County, from October 1st until November 1st, 2012, Dekalb County processed 278,190 entries into their VR system. And they did that with 34 workers. And this is everything from absentee ballot applications to new voters to change of address forms to missing ID. This is basic total entry into the voter registration system. Dekalb County did 278,190 in 30 days or between October and November. Fulton County did just slightly more in that same time period with a hundred workers. Fulton County completed 284,317 entries and they still did not complete the entries into the VR system.

I mentioned this before, the most obvious reason why the VR systems is not updated appears to be -- this was reported by Gary Smith, who was the election consultant Fulton County hired to evaluate their elections, he mentioned this and this was also the most constant and consistent complaint that poll workers had in this internal poll I mentioned, was that Fulton County did not supplement their office with temporary workers.

In terms of failing to prepare precincts and poll workers, there was no specific increase in the number of provisional ballots that were distributed after it would've been known that they were going to have a huge supplemental list. They did not identify precincts that might have problems and give them additional provisional ballots. There was no communication with poll workers about this huge supplemental list that was coming. It ended up that almost 2500 provisional ballots had to be printed and distributed on Election Day.

The communication system, which had been billed as state-of-the-art and which may have been state-of-the-art, was ineffective and failed miserably on Election Day. And that's based on reports from poll workers, monitors we had on the ground, and a lot of people. The communications system simply did not work. There are some reports that it was untested before it was put into place. And lastly, poll workers seemed remarkably ill-trained to handle supplemental lists and provisional ballots. Sir?

**SECRETARY KEMP:** I just would like the record to show that Mr. McIver has arrived.

**MR. MCIVER:** Mr. Secretary, my apologies.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** No, no, not a problem. Go ahead Mr. Harvey

**MR. HARVEY:** When you're dealing with 10,000 provisional ballots, which is a huge increase and wouldn't normally happen, many poll workers simply didn't have the experience to deal with that certainly in those numbers and in some cases not at all. And lastly, there were at least

two precincts where the supplemental list was not provided to the poll workers. And this would be devastating to poll workers when you have the VR system and the ExpressPoll that is missing over 6,000 names on it. To not have a supplemental list to go to as your backup list proved pretty damaging to lease two precincts in Fulton County.

As far as absentee ballot problems go, they were relatively small compared to previous elections and in light of everything else that happened. We did get approximately 22 complaints received, most of the ballots didn't arrive, and the ballots arrived late or on Election Day. We had three cases where more than one ballot was sent to individual voters. And we had reports of ballots that were mailed back in plenty of time but were not received and accredited by Fulton County. This is -- again, part of the survey from a poll worker in Fulton County -- it's difficult to read but it says under What did not go well?, on the date that all ballots were to mail out for applications received prior to that date, all ballots did not go out within the two day period.

Once the volume picked up and Advance Voting began, efficiency declined because staff was pulled to work Advance Voting. In addition, there was a lack of communication between the application processing team and the mailing team. This resulted in the entry of absentee ballot issues being late or not entered at all, in violation of state law.

And again, we found that was true although to a much smaller extent than we received in other cases in Fulton County. These are three copies of the second absentee ballot that was sent to three voters in Fulton County. The Hovaters, Mr. and Mrs. Hovater, each received two ballots and Ms. Keuller received two ballots. They both returned -- all three people returned their unvoted second absentee ballots to the Secretary Of State's office. But it's not known if there were others that were mailed out and not returned or voted or what happened to any of them. I mentioned this at the January 31st hearing and I'll just sort of put it into the record again.

Rollie Buchanan, it's a case where he requested an absentee ballot in early October and he did a remarkable job of documenting the steps he took and the conversations he had and the documentation with Fulton County election officials to try to get an absentee ballot mailed to I believe is was New York. And it ended up after repeated phone calls and repeated faxing of applications and repeated assurances that things would happen his ballot arrived actually on Election Day in New York and was unable to be voted and cast by him even though he took extraordinary steps. And again, somebody that has taken extraordinary steps with an absentee ballot and still not getting it is certainly problematic as far as absentee ballots go.

Moving on to the problems at polling places: I've got three complaints that are fairly typical. We received over 120 different complaints about polling places. And again, without reading every single word of all these complaints they're essentially in the record. This gentleman, Mr. Hamby, was lamenting the fact that his 18-year-old son, who was looking forward to his first time voting, was not able to vote. The poll worker shook her head and apologized as this was becoming a frequent occurrence at her polling place. He says how he's really sad how this young man was excited to take part in the American dream and was declined because of the gross mismanagement and complete inaptness of Fulton County.

This is a complaint from Rebecca Roesener who was complaining -- her complaint ends up being

a sort of impression as we'll see later in this report. She reports that she moved to Georgia from across the country. Imagine my frustration when arriving at my polling place I was told multiple times that under no uncertain terms that I would not be allowed to vote even though I was at the proper polling location and had register to vote before the cut-off time. Only when I insisted that I be allowed to speak to the polling judge was I allowed to vote using a provisional ballot. At that point, it was clearly pointed out to me that if Fulton County did not bother to find out if I was a registered voter, they can choose to not count my ballot. I am a registered voter, and yet I was told I am not. If Fulton County can't figure out if I am register in the four weeks between when I registered and the election, how are they planning to do that in the three days following the election?

And the third is from Molly Jones: I moved to Midtown from Fairburn about 3 years ago and have changed my address. My polling place was Grady High School. When I arrived to vote there, they told me that I had to vote in Fairburn. I was not given a provisional ballot and was not allowed to vote. And this is – these next two slides, and you can't read them, but they are in the PowerPoint as the record and they're a little bit more legible. I can certainly make them more legible. These are some of the complaints that we received about polling places. And they contain complaints for everything from long lines to not being allowed to vote provisionally, to machines not working, poll workers not understanding how to work the equipment, waited an hour and a half to get the provisional ballot.

So you can see we were inundated with complaints about polling place problems on the Election Day. And then, sort of a summary of the problems at the polls, you had over 5,000 properly registered voters who had to vote provisional ballots. And this will speak somewhat, I believe, to the performance of the poll workers, 3,732 voters who cast provisional ballots were in the ExpressPoll who should have voted on DRE. It's baffling how that many people who were in the ExpressPoll system were not able to vote on the DRE. Now, you could argue that if every single one of those people went to the wrong precinct they may have voted a provisional ballot. I don't think the evidence would support that at all. Whether the poll workers didn't know how to look people up there's really no explanation why that number of voters would not be allowed to vote on DRE and would have to vote provisional ballots.

In addition, there were about 1100 voters who were on the supplemental list should have been allowed to vote on the DRE but had to vote provisional ballots. There were several precincts that ran out of provisional ballots and caused delays of hours, in some cases, before provisional ballots could be brought to them. If you recall back in January I read some affidavits from people who waited hours and had to make three and sometimes four trips back to polling places to see if more provisional ballots had been delivered, in some cases, having to go after the closing of the polls. As I mentioned, Fulton County printed almost 2500 provisional ballots. The last batch was printed at almost 6:30 p.m. and was delivered after 7 p.m. Of course, people that were in line to vote were still able to vote, but one has to wonder how many people would've made multiple trips back to a polling place after being told there are no provisional ballots to be cast.

There didn't appear to be any coherent or effective plan to deliver or stock the provisional ballots

as they began to run out. Our office contacted Fulton County officials early in the day after we started getting multiple reports that there were an usually high number of provisional ballots and precincts that were running out of ballots. There didn't seem to be much of a plan for delivering those provisional ballots. Poll managers reported spending hours on the telephone trying to get assistance, which often never materialized. And some voters were simply told they would not be able to vote at all because they weren't on the list.

ExpressPoll recapping and DRE recap problems, part of the accounting process at the end of the night with voting is that you have the ExpressPoll which would indicate how many voter cards were created which should indicate the number of people who voted or at least were issued a ballot. The DRE should show the number of votes that were cast on a specific machine or on all the machines in the precinct and those numbers should add up. If there are one or two exceptions it could be accounted for.

Of the 247 recap sheets provided to the Secretary Of State's office, 138 of them appear to be accurate, but 109 of them had errors, omissions, or other problems. This chart highlights some of the worst problems, some of the most disparity in the DRE and ExpressPoll Recap sheets. And if you look at the -- the two arrows show the difference in what the DRE and the statements of votes cast and the ExpressPoll show with these 18 or 19 precincts you end up with a difference of almost 2,000 those between what the ExpressPoll says and with the DRE Recap sheets said. In some cases, recap sheets were not filled out properly. In some cases, they were completed. But again, you've got a massive problem, I think, with accountability trying to reconcile systems.

With regard to provisional ballot problems and this is the largest area of concern in this election I believe. How many people voted provisionally in Fulton County? I'm not confident that anybody would ever be able to answer that question with much precision at all. I'm not sure how well you would be able to ballpark it. Fulton County had approximately 95 - 9600 provisional ballots that were cast on Election Day. Of that, Fulton County reported that almost 2500 were out of precinct provisional ballots. And out of precinct provisional ballots is if I were registered in the Sandy Springs precinct and instead I went a Midtown precinct and it was late they would let me vote a provisional ballot in Midtown because I wouldn't able to get to my precinct is Sandy Springs.

The fact that there were 2442 may not be as obvious as it would appear because remember the voter registration system had not been updated and addresses had not been changed so even if all 2442 voters did go to the wrong precinct, it's not clear that it would've been their fault and it's not clear that all of those voters actually went to the wrong precinct. But anyway, these provisional ballots accounted for about 54 percent of all the provisional ballots cast in the state in that election. And as the board members know, that voting a provisional ballot is sort of a "vote of last resort." It's the last attempt to protect somebody's right to vote if they believe their properly registered. The problem on the backside of that is it becomes incredibly intensive both during the vote casting process and on the backend when it comes to the documentation and the security and the counting and the verification of those ballots.

So as soon as somebody issues -- decides a provisional ballot must be issued they start a chain of

paper and human accountability that goes through several iterations. And if any one of those steps is omitted or failed you can come up with some significant problems. This chart represents different numbers of provisional ballots that were reported. Now granted, some of the early columns were estimates that were given either to the media or the Secretary Of State's office, but the final number appears to be about 9,585 although the report that was given to the Secretary Of State's office said 9,575. It appears they did the math wrong and were off by 10.

You'll see, and I'll point out several times, nowhere in any of this accounting do provisional ballots add up with voters with provisional voter certificates, with the envelopes themselves, with the list of voters, with people getting credit for voting, for people having their provisional votes rejected. And just to quickly run through so that everybody understands how significant this process is, I want to just very quickly go through what a poll worker is supposed to do with a provisional vote. He supposed to have the voter complete a voter's certificate, check the voter's ID, they then enter the voter's name on a list of provisional voters, the poll worker enters the voter's name, precinct and the other data on the outer envelope and they provide the ballot and two envelopes to the voter. The voter then returns it to the poll worker who verifies the information is complete, marks the reason for the provisional ballot, directs voter to deposit the ballot, then takes the voter's certificate and voter registration application puts those together and puts them off to the side.

So you can see that that so far is a fairly -- already it's a document intensive procedure, accounting procedure. The provisional ballot documentation process was practically and largely ignored by many poll workers of Fulton County. I'll go into each of these in a little bit more detail but I just want to get them out there. First, the provisional voter's certificates were often not completed properly if they were completed all. Many provisional ballot envelopes were not properly marked or documented. The lists of provisional voters were often not completed properly, if at all. Many voters were not given voter registration applications as is required in most cases when somebody goes to file a provisional ballot. And all provisional voters were not given information about checking their ballot status after the election.

Completing a provisional voter's certificate is important in determining why a voter is voting provisionally. There are several reasons why somebody might want to vote provisionally. This is what a provisional voter's certificate looks like. You see on the left is the front side and the right is the backside. The front is properly filled out by this voter. You'll notice on the back and this is the actual certificate not just a blank one, none of the information on the back is completed in terms of why this person is indicating why they believe they are eligible to vote and what the poll officer's marking as to the type of provisional voter.

In Precinct 03A, there were 91 certificates that were just like this completed on the front but no indication whatsoever on the back. Like I said, there were 91 provisional voter certificates and most errors were failing to designate why a voter was voting provisionally. All this stuff comes back to the verification processes. Its information, it's not just there because somebody thought it would be a good idea to put in there. There were poll workers that had difficulty accepting and documenting ballot envelopes. There were many poll workers that did not know how to process, secure, and accept provisional ballot envelopes. We mentioned this at the January hearing about

six Bridget Jackson ballots that were accepted by the poll workers.

The reason it's so important for the provisional ballot envelopes to be properly documented is that once they're voted the ballots themselves should be secured in a container until the time that the decision is made whether it should be accepted or rejected. Once the list of accepted ballots is determined then the worker is to go and pull every one of those envelopes that has the accepted person on it and they open it and they count that ballot. When these ballots are put away properly and you get a list of the names of the people that are supposed to vote there's no way to go back and determine who these people are if their names are not properly documented on the ballot envelope. Fulton County explained it was determined that this was an error on the part of the poll worker.

There did not appear to be anything nefarious about it, but you'll notice even as the poll worker improperly put her name rather than the voters name on it, in several cases she failed to complete the provisional code as to why, first of all, what type of election it was and the provisional code. In this case, you'll see the one on the right 90003 she's marked Democrat for some reason. In the general primary that should never be marked. There were several times were she marked some but she didn't mark others and it's just an indication of poor ballot security in this case.

Provisional ballot recaps polls, and this is something that we talked about at the January meeting as well, the recap sheet errors are – again, it's even probably more important for the provisional ballots the documentation be done properly because there is no digital company there's no digital fall back where you can go to ExpressPoll or you can go to DRE and say we definitely have an X number of votes cast on this machine. With provisional ballots you're dealing with people, you're dealing with paper, and dealing with things that can be accidentally destroyed, intentionally destroyed, accidentally altered, intentionally altered, and it became clear that a lot of people simply did not know how to complete recap sheets.

This is an example, again, of what we used in January. This shows Precinct 11G and you'll see that there's no serialization for provisional ballots. There are 59 names on a list where there's absolutely no accounting for how many ballots they started out with, how many were cast, how many were unused. The list of voters on the right again has no ballot style that was issued and no indication as to whether or not ballots were accepted or rejected. You'll notice here the poll worker said that they had to bring some more ballots but there's no indication of how many extra ballots were brought, what happened to the extra ballots were they accounted for, were they destroyed, were they voted, were they transferred to somebody else, there's simply no answer to that.

And this is Precinct 01A provisional recap sheet you can see is completely blank. That's as much documentation that was done in Precinct 018A for the recap sheets. And as you'll see, Precinct 01A had, depending on how you do the math, over a hundred provisional ballots were cast. Again, no indication on any of this stuff, how many did they start with, how many were voted, how many were returned? And then the list of provisional voters, as I mentioned before every voter that votes a provisional ballot was supposed to be added manually to a list. And that list is what's used to document the acceptance or the rejection it's what's supposed to be used to document the acceptance or the rejection of the ballots. The list of provisional voters, again,

many were incomplete, they were incorrect, they were missing, some didn't exist at all, and some were severely undocumented. This again is Precinct 03A, and the list of provisional voters on the left appears to have been done properly at the precinct and you'll see the notations accepted/rejected. You also see the precincts that the voter was voting in, is written in red. And on the right, is a second part of the list that was obviously created after the election for what reason we're not sure, it shows acceptance or rejection of these provisional ballots. In those cases, it doesn't show when they were accepted and what precinct they were voting in. Did the poll manager start doing it properly and then stop, was the one on the right labeling correctly, who completed it, we simply don't know.

This is a random list of provisional voters. There was a stack, a fairly large stack of lists that were just like this. Notice there's no indication whatsoever of what precinct it was, what time it was voted, anything even frankly what election it was. We presume it was from the general election because it was with all the others from the general election, but if you look at this briefly you'll see that it appears that it was worked properly; however, you've got five voters where there's no indication if ballots were accepted or rejected. And in this case, all five of these voters had registered prior to the deadline. None of them received credit for voting and Fulton County did not provide provisional ballot envelopes for these five voters.

You'll notice at the bottom left where it says rejected ballot Gheorghe, Sima or Sima Gheorghe, has a provisional ballot rejected but he was registered prior to the October deadline. We've got voters that were not given credit for voting though the ballots were marked as accepted. So again, you get back to the question, how many people voted, whose votes counted? It's very difficult to understand; very difficult to determine.

More provisional ballot problems at the polls, a lot of poll workers did not provide the required documentation with provisional ballots. When somebody votes a provisional ballot because they are not on the list, they are required to be given a voter registration application. And anyone who votes provisional ballot is required to be given written documentation that explains how they can check on the progress of the ballot. We had many reports of people that didn't receive any voter's registration application for the provisional ballots. I think if you recall back in January the question was raised, how many voter registration applications they have received since the election? They weren't sure.

Fulton County subsequently reported that their provisional voter registration applications got commingled with the regular voter registration applications so they really couldn't say how many provisional voter registration applications came in. But just by example, these are 22 people that we spoke with in the course the investigation who voted a provisional ballot and we just asked them, hey, did you get the voter registration application when you voted a provisional ballot? All 22 of these people did not get voter registration applications. And one of the problems with that is that if these people were, in fact, not registered to vote they're still not registered to vote. That was the reason for issuing the voter registration application because for whatever reason it didn't get entered, it was lost or it was destroyed, it was incorrectly coded now they at least, if they didn't get a vote this election, they'll be registered to vote in the next one.



If you'll notice, based on the registration date entry which is the second last column on the right, all of these people were entered right before the election so it's unlikely that they would have shown up on the ExpressPoll which would indicate that they should assume to have not been registered and should have been given a voter registration application. And we had cases where people assumed they'd been denied the opportunity to even vote a provisional ballot. In some cases, it was because there were simply no provisional ballots to offer them. But in some cases, we had voters who actually asked to vote provisional ballots and were simply told they could not and they left without voting a provisional ballot.

We get to provisional ballot verification process; all provisional ballots have to be determined by 5 o'clock on the Friday after the election. Fulton County didn't even start verifying their 9,575 provisional ballots until Thursday after the election so they lost an entire day of verification. The law actually allows election officials to pick up provisional ballots from the precinct while the polls are still open so that they can start the verification process. And again, when provisional ballots were provisioned by the lawmakers they envisioned one or two people voting provisional ballots had to be checked. They weren't thinking 10,000 people voting provisional ballots in the largest county in the state.

So if they started Thursday morning that gave them 41 hours to validate 9,575 provisional ballots. If they took three and a half minutes per ballot verification, which I think is a pretty conservative estimate, it would have taken 443 hours to complete the process. Fulton officials did not work around the clock, although, they did work some late shifts. Ralph Jones further testified that in addition to one person checking basically we had two people check every provisional vote. So you can take all of those numbers and double them because according to election officials they had every provisional ballot checked by at least two people.

In order to check – just briefly going through the process, they would check the “Go” screen, which was in the VR system that would show whether or not somebody was registered, show where they were registered, when they were registered. If somebody showed up on the “Go” screen they would be approved if they were registered in time, their provisional ballot would be approved and would be moved to the side to be counted. If it was not in the “Go” system the next step would be to go to the unprocessed voter registration applications that had come in that were in boxes and go through each of those to try to find if the person's voter registration application came in late. Lastly, they would check the Department of Driver Services website to determine if somebody registered to vote. So you can see as a three and a half minute per ballot twice that seems a very conservative estimate, and we'll see that there are significant failures with provisional ballot verification.

We had provisional ballots that were rejected for people who registered to vote. In the case of the McGlashans, this was a husband-and-wife who registered at the same time at the same address. They both went to vote at their designated precinct. Mr. McGlashan was allowed to vote Mrs. McGlashan was not. Mr. McGlashan's ballot was accepted Mrs. McGlashan's ballot was not. You also had voters who had provisional ballots accepted even though they weren't registered to vote and I've got some slides that will indicate that. The provisional ballots were not secured during the tabulation process.

When I went over to the Fulton County elections office the day after the election, there were provisional ballot envelopes that were scattered through cubicles, there were 2 or 3 rooms where the ballots were being evaluated, they were at computer stations with individuals handling them, writing on them, marking on them, they were then returned to a central room. So the ballots themselves, which were required to be kept basically under lock-and-key during the verification process, were simply not done at all. Fulton County could not even produce physical evidence that everybody listed as voting provisionally cast a ballot.

I'll get into the 10th Precinct provisional ballot analysis but there were hundreds and hundreds of people that were listed as having voted a provisional ballot but when we asked to see the envelope the person cast Fulton County was not able to present us the envelope and/or the voter's certificate the person would have marked. There were voters that were shown to have voted provisional ballots who never cast provisional ballots. We found 95 names that were listed as having cast provisional ballots and voting on DRE so the concern there was the voter casting two ballots, and that could conceivably happen. What we found when we talked to as many of the 95 as we could, most of those people only voted on DRE. Most of them did not cast a provisional ballot and they did not have a provisional ballot certificate. How they ended up on the list of accepted provisional ballots is a mystery. And this is just documentation on Mrs. McGlashan this is her email explaining her attempts to voting and having been rejected. And on the right is a letter of rejection saying that Fulton County was not able to determine that she was properly registered when in fact she was.

These are people from Precinct 01A whose names were on the list of accepted provisional ballots who don't care to be in the voter registration system. How these people had ballots accepted is a mystery, as well? There didn't appear to be any type of system for the recording acceptance or rejection of a provisional ballot. If you recall on those provisional voter lists some of them indicated if the ballots were accepted or rejected others were completely blank. The envelopes themselves were marked accepted or rejected and as you recall in January Ms. Mitchell testified that that was the ultimate answer as to whether or not a ballot was accepted or rejected. You go to the ballot envelope itself rather than the lists. So how they were able to put together a list of all the provisional ballots that were accepted or rejected is mysterious and is probably why there are so many errors because there was not a single system that was used.

Fulton County didn't follow their own policies regarding handling provisional ballots and the chain of custody that Fulton County had in place on paper was virtually ignored. And this is the 10th Precinct provisional ballot analysis. We showed you this in January, and again, if you go down the columns to the left, if you just take these 10 precincts and take the numbers of list provisional voters the total was 911. If you take the list on the recap sheet it's 789. If you take the provisional voter certificates that Fulton County was able to produce it's 755. If you take the actual provisional ballot envelopes that Fulton County was able to produce you get 649. So almost a 300 voter discrepancy between what's on the list of voters, what's on the recap sheet, and what they were able to actually show us? Here's an envelope that was cast by Joe Lector that shows they voted a provisional ballot.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Mr. Harvey, just a quick question. Up to this point you've basically been talking about countywide numbers for the election, correct?

**MR. HARVEY:** Yes.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** And then on this provisional ballot your investigators just did 10 precincts out of 300?

**MR. HARVEY:** Yes, sir. Out of 342 I believe. So yeah, these numbers are just for 10 precincts that we highlighted. Certainly, not every precinct was problematic but there were more precincts than this that had similar problems. You can see, just in here you've got a 300 number difference between what's from the beginning to end the highest possible to lowest possible. If you'll also recall in January the poll managers that were subpoenaed to testify in front of the State's Election Board said that none of these poll managers were questioned by election officials when they turned their documents in. They were not asked to account for not having a recap sheet, for not having the same number of provisional ballots that they had listed, for having missing information, nobody was challenged or questioned. And the question is where are all the documents?

You then get into the notification of provisional voter's ballot rejection. The law requires that if a provisional voter's ballot is rejected for any reason that they be notified by US mail of the reason for the rejection. Fulton County provided 4,681 letters of rejection that they sent to provisional ballot voters. The 34 of them had no reason for why the ballots were rejected. Thirty-five of the letters had no city, state, or zip code on the address. 11,154 letters had no mailing address at all. And you'll see this is one where there's no reason for the rejection that would normally be up there; there were 34 of those. Thirty-five of these simply had a street name without any city or zip code. And then, over 1100 of these that were sent out had simply the voters name and had no address at all. There was absolutely no way this letter could've gotten to the voter.

The theory as to why there's no additional information is because the provisional voter certificates were not filled out completely in a lot of these cases and the only way you would get the voters name and address is from a provisional voter certificate. If those are not properly filled out and/or retained and/or used to document the ballots you would end up with the situation that you have here where there is absolutely no way that letter is getting to the voter. Now, if you go, and this is a little more specific than I mentioned before, if you go by the provisional ballots or the voter lists Fulton County is missing 267. If you go to the recap sheets of just these ten precincts Fulton County is missing 131 provisional ballots. If you go according to the number of voter certificates Fulton County is missing 203 provisional ballots. And again, just out of those ten precincts.

This is a document that was presented in January that caused a lot of concern. This is the SS14 where you had voters that were added to the list of provisional voters after it was turned in, in red ink and they were all accepted. If you call, in January when asked about why this was done or what would account for this, the election officials didn't have any explanation. They also didn't have an explanation when we asked them in December about this same issue. It turns out that

apparently, again, apparently these five voters went to the wrong precinct and they may have filled out a voters certificate but they never cast a provisional ballot and the reconciliation process back at the election office somebody thought, well, we need to add these voters. We've got a voter certificate I assume they cast a ballot and so they were added to the list. And then when somebody looked them up to see if their vote should have counted they would've seen, hey, they're in the system we would accept their ballot. So their ballots were accepted when, in fact, they really weren't cast so they didn't vote two ballots. There again, on the left they have -- this is from the list of provisional ballots that were accepted from Fulton County and then the numbered of list of voters from Precinct 7A. And you'll see that Ms. Bradshaw is listed on both lists as are the other four voters that were in SS14.

And again, the concern that there was some type of nefarious activity, I think, is larger than -- I don't believe there's an indication that somebody was intentionally trying to make it appear that somebody was voting twice, but again, unless you go through every single one of these names there's really no way you can determine how many voters cast ballots and why they ended up on one list or another. Of the letters that were provided there were no letters that were sent out of 45, again, that's just out of the ten precincts, 45 Out Of Precinct voters who had their provisional ballots duplicated. And again, if somebody votes out of precinct and they're properly registered their ballot has to be taken and it has to be duplicated down to the point where they're no longer eligible to vote for a candidate. So in this case it was the presidential election.

If I voted in Buckhead and I live in Sandy Springs they would accept my vote for President, Congress, and possibly for County Commissioner, but once it got down to the very local election if I was in a different school board district then if what was available in Buckhead they would not count that. So my ballot would only be completed down to the most common candidate or the most common issue. Forty-five voters were in this position out of these 10 precincts and there were no letters that were sent to them; none indicating that the ballot had been duplicated. Again, this gets back to the other thing about all the red writing and there was a lot of concern about that at the January election.

The standard practice of the election officials explained to the -- when they met at the Fulton County commissioners, I think the next day or maybe two days after the meeting with the State Election Board, they explained, oh, this is very common, we use the red ink so it won't be confused with what happens at the precinct. If you recall, they weren't able to say anything like that on the day that they met with the State Election Board. And frankly, the provisional ballot system was in such a wreck that red writing and trying to manipulate something in the provisional ballot system had been just about all but impossible.

When we get to the list of violations we were able to determine in this case, in Fulton County, we've got I think four pages. I'm not going to go through each of them individually unless somebody would like me to. They range from the registration issues, to the provisional ballot issues, security of provisional ballots, SEB rules regarding documentation of provisional ballots. And again, I'll be happy to go over them if somebody wanted me to but I think that would be pretty time intensive. And at this point, that concludes the presentation of SEB 2012-156.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Thank you, Mr. Harvey. We're now going to take some questions from

the board for Mr. Harvey and then we'll give Mr. Walbert an opportunity to address the board and make remarks. Three quick questions that I have, it appears to me that we've had people that were disenfranchised that never even got a vote that were not properly registered even though they made the deadline. Would you agree with that?

**MR. HARVEY:** Yes, sir.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** It also appears that we have the disenfranchised that actually voted but then their ballot or vote was rejected?

**MR. HARVEY:** Yes, sir. That's correct too.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** And then, we had people that it appears voted that should not have voted.

**MR. HARVEY:** They're at least recorded as having voted. But then again, in some of these cases peoples name would be on the list of ballots that were accepted and then there's no envelope for them. So whether they actually cast ballots or not we don't know but there are certainly people that are listed as having credit or whose ballots were accepted who were not registered to vote.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** So I guess this is a little in-line with one of the last points you made about the provisional ballots that they were out of precinct and they were not duplicated. Potentially, you could have people that were voting in some of the more local races like the school board or county commission seats because they were voting out of precinct they could have been voting in the wrong election.

**MR. HARVEY:** They could have. I want to just clarify a little bit. Whether all these were duplicated properly we don't know. We do know that, the point I made at the end, was that they were not properly notified that their ballots had been duplicated. That's presuming that they were properly duplicated. That's assuming they were properly duplicated.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Any other questions from the board for Mr. Harvey? Mr. Walbert.

**MR. WALBERT:** My name is David Walbert. I represent the respondents to some extent in this case. Just to be clear, I don't represent, if there is personal individual cases against the ex-Sam Westmoreland or Ms. Mitchell, I'm here on behalf of the County and I represent them in an official capacity who would be their successor now at this time. My address is Parks Chesin and Walbert, 75 14th Street Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia 30309. And I appreciate the opportunity to respond, the members of the board and Mr. Secretary. I want to say just a few general things here; make a few different points.

Number one, I think it's important to keep in mind that we have never actually, until we got the report from Mr. Harvey dated February 26<sup>th</sup>, that's the first time we've gotten a written specification of allegations against the Fulton County Board with all this almost a year going on at this point. I think one of Mr. Harvey's last points I was disappointed in was his comment that at the January 31st hearing at which time we had been given zero prior notice of what the

allegations would be. That was a matter that Mr. Harvey didn't show at that time and I'm not belittling that but that was all without any notice about what the allegations were. And he sits there and says today Mr. Jones I think it was said that he used red ink on something several days after but didn't offer that at the time of the January 31st hearing. If we put this in context remember that that was a probable cause hearing. There was no evidence given by our side on that, no response of evidence and we had no prior notice at all of what the questions or allegations were. So I think that needs to be put in context.

There are many things in Mr. Harvey's allegations that we would take issue with. In saying that, I don't mean to sit here and say that the Fulton County elections were handled entirely appropriate at that time. But let's do keep in mind several things I think that are most important which is, what happens going forward? Fulton County Board of Elections had gone through some tremendous problems with leadership; we agree to that. I think you all know the history of Mr. Westmoreland how he ended up becoming the chairperson of the board. He was in over his head and that's reflected in the lack of leadership and the changes administratively he implemented like many of the actual problems that occurred since that time.

And then Ms. Mitchell was the interim head or interim director of the department waiting until there was a new permanent director that was hired. And there has been a complete wholesale change in the board itself. They've got four new appointees and chairperson here Mary Carole Cooney who is here today is fantastic in terms of her knowledge, her dedication, and her leadership. Ms. Cooney, I think most of you know, is very experienced, very well-respected attorney and been with the City of Atlanta for years and has been in her own practice subsequent to that point in time. Under her leadership, they have hired just in the last few months a new director of the Atlanta -- executive director of the Fulton County Department of Registration Elections Mr. Rick Barron who was in Austin, Texas prior to that time after a comprehensive and intensive nationwide search for someone who could lead the Department of Elections and get rid of some of the problems it has had in the past.

So on the one hand, we're very much focused on dealing with the future and doing as good a job as is possible. Looking back to these other matters, I think it is appropriate that this be referred to the attorney general because the gulf of factored perception of what happened is so great that I think in that context of hearings, unfortunately, is the only way to kind of shake this down to the kind of -- what really were problems that need to be addressed retrospectively. Just to give you a couple of examples: Mr. Harvey talks about provisional ballots and the number of provisional ballots and that being such a great problem in Fulton County.

There were a large number of provisional ballots in Fulton County which was not at all inconsistent with what is seen in other counties of that size around the nation. And I think you all have at this point a response that we did to the January 31st hearing that we did in March and provided that initially to Mr. Harvey and I understood it didn't get to the board so I sent copies to the board itself. One of the things that we point out in there is very, very important, I think it was glossed over by Mr. Harvey, is what federal law says about provisional ballots. Yes, Fulton County is liberal, for a lack of a different term, in the provision of provisional ballots in these elections and it's our view that we're following a clear explicit mandate of federal law. And it's

says that, and I'm quoting, "in the election for federal office a person must be permitted to cast a -- must be permitted to cast a provisional ballot if his or her name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place." So as we read that and that's Section 1542 of 42 USC that law as we read it specifically demands that the County give a provisional ballot to a voter whose voting out of precinct. The State Election Board -- the state law is a little different than that and the State Election Board is different from that. It's more restrictive and it's like Mr. Harvey said in his report. And as he says in here -- and he dances around this issue and doesn't come to grips with it and it's critical to resolve this question of the number of provisional voters, which way Fulton County needs to go. And again, I think the federal law is pretty clear on this but that's something that needs to be resolved because as their current practice is it's going to continue to have a lot of provisional ballots.

It's going to continue to have that if Fulton County continues to do what it historically has, which if you read federal law that seems to be what they need to be doing. Mr. Harvey says, well, you know, you could, and this is more consistent with the state rule, one could have directed people to come to the wrong precinct to go to another precinct. That's really what I recall an exact language in the state rule is required. It would seem to be a direct conflict with what the "must language" of the federal statute. Point being, why there's so many provisional ballots is not because of incompetence or so something like that the vast number of them are because of people and they do have a traditional expectation to be able to vote out of precinct in Fulton County because they have and that does seem to be mandated. If that gets stopped and that's another question that's a legal issue but that's something that needs to be addressed and that goes more to the heart of provisional ballots than anything else that's been said.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Mr. Walbert, let me ask you a question about that because if you're stating federal law then you're also saying that Fulton would be in violation of that federal law because there are a lot of people that didn't get provisional ballots that tried to go vote.

**MR. WALBERT:** Well, that would be a -- we're going to have the hearing, because that's where we take great issue. I think another problem, Mr. Secretary, is you know one of the things we get is 150 anonymous complaints about the people saying this or that and the ones that we finally get out who it is and we can track it down, you know, it's out of 375,000 voters 150 people are making different complaints about not having been given a voter registration or being offered that and so on.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** You know, you use the word incompetence but, you know, wouldn't you agree that when you don't properly get people registered to vote and they're not in the system correctly whether on the electronic poll or on the paper list and even if they are the paper list doesn't get to the precinct then you get into the part where you're talking about federal law and getting provisional ballots out. The point is that should have never happened to start with and I personally talked to people that tried to vote in the primary election in July that never got registered and they finally gave up and called the Secretary Of State's office and after four calls we finally got the child registered and she got to vote in the general election. I mean, that's where our frustration comes from and that's completely documented. I if you want to dispute that we're glad to see any documentation that you have.

**MR. WALBERT:** Here's what is completely documented is that Fulton County received from the Secretary Of State's office 3,849 applications after the close of the ExpressPolls. That's a fact. So when we talk about we're going out at registration and who got it wrong -- Mr. Harvey says 40 temporary workers were hired by Fulton County and unless I'm having a hearing problem I thought he just said that there were no extra people brought in and that was the problem. In fact, it was 40 temporary people brought in solely to be processing these applications. And almost 4,000 were received from the Secretary's office after the close of the ExpressPoll, which is of course, weeks after the deadline for registering, but they had either got to one of the legally enabled agencies that could take them and they were slow getting them to your office or they were at your office.

As Mr. Harvey said, "all hands on deck" were trying to get those processed in the Secretary Of State's office. They would be there for weeks at times before they got from the Secretary Of State's office to Fulton County. That's what caused 3,849 of them to get there actually after the time then they could have possibly -- even if we put them in instantaneously and 3849 of them ended up too late to even get in the ExpressPoll. So there's problem's all -- I hear the allegations and I think there's two sides to these stories. And I think that's one of the problems about getting all of these things resolved.

I think that's why, unfortunately -- because really, our goal here, and I think Mr. McIver's suggestion was the best thing happened in the January 31st hearing and that is, let's come up with a -- I want to hear a creative solution because the issue here is to make this as good as possible going forward, we're all for that. And we, of course, explored that. I still hope that that will be the outcome of going forward here. We have totally new leadership and we have real professional leadership on the Fulton County Board. We don't want to gloss over what's happened in the past nor do we want to get accused of things that are one side of the story. That's the problem we're having at this point. And I think with the attorney general it's the place to maybe dig into some of the facts more.

There are two sides and some of them are right some of them are wrong, whatever, everybody would be focused I think on what's the best way at going forward. I think that is everybody's interest. So that's really -- I don't want to go through all the litany of accusations and so on and talk about the response. You do have my response from the January 31<sup>st</sup> hearing and I appreciate you all taking that into consideration. But we are in agreement, and I don't know if this my motion, but we are in agreement with the -- being referred to the attorney general so that there can be further investigation of the facts and hearings as necessary or propose resolutions of the entire matter however that falls.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Any other questions for Mr. Walbert? Mr. Worley.

**MR. WORLEY:** Mr. Walbert, Mr. Harvey indicated in his presentation that there were various numbers, what was the actual number of provisional ballots cast in Fulton County in the general election in 2012? Which is the correct number in your opinion?

**MR. WALBERT:** I thought it was 9575. He said there was a mistake in the arithmetic. I'm not aware of that. And let's be clear, Mr. Worley, about cast, some people use cast meaning



accepted as opposed to filled out. We're talking about filled out.

**MR. WORLEY**: Yes, I meant filled out. How many were filled out in the 2008 general election?

**MR. WALBERT**: That would have been radically different. I don't know that offhand.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Does anybody from the elections division staff happen to know that number?

(Let the record reflect, there was no response.)

**MR. WALBERT**: One thing I might add, Mr. Worley, I think Mr. Harvey is right that on occasion the reasons for acceptance or rejection of the provisional ballot is not written on the ballot envelope and the reason for that is the primary system for recording that data it's all computerized. When a person does it it's entered into the computer. So it's not like there's no record of that, it's just that it's not duplicated hand written on the thing. Rural counties often just write it and they do it by hand. That's not what you do in a county of this size. And so all those entries and that data is there. So it's not like that data doesn't exist.

**MR. WORLEY**: I have another question. You indicated there had been some personnel changes in the election's office; could you go into that in a little more detail?

**MR. WALBERT**: Yes. More specifically, again, it was a very intensive nationwide search for an executive director with professional leadership abilities and experience in election management with no ax to grind and no agendas and so on. And that was extended out through the very intensive efforts of Ms. Cooney and the other people on the board but Ms. Cooney in particular and advertisement was done nationwide. A number of people were interviewed in June I believe it was. Mr. Rick Barron from Austin, Texas was hired to be the new executive director. He has moved here with his family to Atlanta from Austin and he is the head that we are very optimistic that will be what it needs.

**MR. WORLEY**: Has Mr. Baron made any personnel changes in the office?

**MR. WALBERT**: I don't want to answer that question, Mr. Worley. I think this would be me speaking way out of school but --

**MR. WORLEY**: Is Ms. Mitchell still there?

**MR. WALBERT**: Oh, I'm sorry, Ms. Mitchell is not there.

**MR. WORLEY**: Do you know of any other people who --

**MR. WALBERT**: I don't. I can't say that's accurate. I do think, in all fairness, there needs to be a better system of determining who are poll managers and some sense of greater control of that to make sure that the best possible people are available. And Fulton County, you know, has got financial constraints and so on maybe worse than other people because it's got some special laws and so on. I do think that focusing on and I think Mr. Harvey and I would agree on some

things probably more than one would think from me sitting here throwing trash at him this morning but I think that getting -- making a real effort to get good poll managers is very important.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Mr. McIver.

**MR. MCIVER:** Mr. Walbert, can you identify for me, who in here is from Fulton County?

**MR. WALBERT:** The chairperson of the board, Ms. Mary Carole Cooney and I don't know -- and this individual here.

**COMMISSIONER HOUSEMAN:** Commissioner Houseman.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Commissioner Liz Houseman. Welcome to you both.

**MR. MCIVER:** Mr. Barron's not here?

**MR. WALBERT:** No. He asked whether he needed to be here and I said I thought this would be a matter that would be referred. You know, he will certainly see all this. When we get a transcript and he's read the transcript of January. I assure you, his being here is not a lack of interest. Hopefully he's gotten -- it's not that at all.

**MR. MCIVER:** Well, you anticipated my question. Should we draw any inference from that --

**MR. WALBERT:** You should criticize the --

**MR. MCIVER:** -- other than the Commissioner and the Chair seems to be a lack of interest from the staff --

**MR. WALBERT:** You should criticize his lawyer if you're going to criticize someone, Mr. McIver. I didn't see a value of his being here as opposed to something else. Not that this is irrelevant, I actually thought this was going to be a -- I didn't realize we were going to go into this kind of presentation. I actually thought the hearing was going to be something where we would agree it would be referred to the attorney general for further hearing is what I thought. I didn't realize that Mr. Harvey would be getting into this kind of presentation. We will get from Mr. Harvey his slides and I think there's a transcript so I'm sure he would have given -- it did turn out to be substantive in that regard. Mr. Barron will most surely be involved.

**MR. MCIVER:** So we shouldn't draw an inference?

**MR. WALBERT:** No. The only inference you could draw really would be criticizing his lawyer.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Well, let me just say this for the record. Despite some of the issues, in my opinion anyway, I think we have and continue to have in Fulton County past Mr. Barron has shown a lot of good initiatives through the last election process here in the last few months in working with our office so we're certainly embracing that. And my goal and this Board's to, like Mr. Walbert said, is to have well run elections in Fulton County. But I will caveat that with, you

know, I still remain deeply concerned about what happened. This problem, it seems to recycle every few years and that's, I think, unacceptable in my opinion especially when you're having people that are disenfranchised during the elections process and you're seeing the systematic problems in one county in the state and nowhere else -- you know the rest of the 150 cases. And I think that's what we've got to reach a conclusion so we don't have to deal with this again in the future and that's certainly my goal. Are there any other questions for Mr. Walbert? All right, do we have anyone else that wishes to speak on this matter? Commissioner Houseman, did you want to speak?

**COMMISSIONER HOUSEMAN:** I would like to say that I do have a staff attorney here from Fulton County.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Let the record show that there is also a staff attorney from Fulton County in the room with Commissioner Houseman. All right, anyone else wishes to speak on this matter? Ms. Ford, if you don't mind I'd like for you to address the board just on exactly how the voter registration process works leading up to the election and what we were doing and what your staff is doing and what our past practice in getting voter registrations to Fulton County and how they are getting them from us just so we're clear on that matter.

**MS. FORD:** Linda Ford, 323 8<sup>th</sup> Street NE Unit 6, Atlanta, Georgia 30309. Our office receives voter registration forms into our mailroom. And it is as has been stated in the weeks and particularly the days before the general election we get thousands of those applications in for every county in the state. We date stamp those so that if an application for example is mailed on the Monday of the voter registration deadline, which I believe was October 9<sup>th</sup> for the general election, if it is date stamped any time up until that Friday coming into our mailroom then that voter registration application is deemed when the County receives it eligible to be registered to vote if it does not have a postmark on it. And so that way we're given -- we're airing on the side of the voter. Because you'd be surprised how many voter registration applications we receive that are not postmarked for whatever reason. And so that way it relieves any doubt when the County gets that.

And then of course, we are also receiving in the mail during that whole week voter registration applications that were mailed on the voter registration deadline, which was October 9<sup>th</sup> of this case. So those are all shipped out to the counties. Every day we get trays and trays of mail and during that week and the week preceding we ask investigators, we ask people from the front office, we have people come up from Macon to go through those applications to make sure they're date stamped, sort them into the counties, and then they're mailed out to the counties. So there is no sorting into a specific county and holding that county. They're all sorted and they're all going out.

For Fulton County, we had an arrangement because, of course, they're only two blocks down the street, where somebody from Fulton County would come every day and pick up those voter registration applications. And that way they don't have to be mailed two blocks down the street and that seemed to have worked out very well. Leading up to the voter registration deadline we did have some issues. Some days they would not come and we had to reach out to Fulton County to ask them to send someone and also some days they would come and not pick up all of

the voter registration applications in which case we call Fulton County and reported that to them. And that was what I believe you heard Mr. Harvey speaking to.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Any questions for Ms. Ford? Okay, anyone else wishing to speak on this matter?

**MR. HARVEY:** Yes, Mr. Secretary. If I could just clarify two things that are in response to what Mr. Walbert said: One, as far as the provisional ballots go, I don't think that anything I said was necessarily designed to indicate that Fulton County should not issue the provisional ballots. It was unfortunate that the voter registration system caused that to happen but if Fulton County issued 50,000 provisional ballots they're obligated to account for every single one. And I think in my opinion that's the bigger concern not the issuing of provisional ballots but the lack of documentation and security.

And the second, Mr. Walbert mentioned 3,000 voter registration applications were sent after the deadline, it was practice that our office continued to send voter registration applications to the counties even after the deadline. And these could have been some that came in a week before the election. We had a continuous stream so if any county received a voter registration application say the week before the election it would be up to them to determine if they want triage or do they want -- you know we're not going to touch these until after the election because we know these people won't be registered.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** And they shouldn't be registered because they didn't --

**MR. HARVEY:** Correct. The other practice could be that we would just hold everything that came in and then unleash on them after the election but we don't do that. We keep a steady stream of voter registration applications coming through the days leading up to the election. I don't know, specifically, the 3,000 he spoke about, but yes, it would be an accurate statement to say we continue to send voter registration applications after the deadline but they may well be not suitable for registration.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Anyone else wishing to speak? This is the last call on this particular case, 2012 No. 156. If not, do we have a motion? Any discussion with the board?

**MR. WORLEY:** I make a motion. Mr. Secretary, I make a motion that we refer Case No. SEB 2012-156 to the attorney general's office.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** We have a motion from Mr. Worley do we have a second?

**MR. MCIVER:** Second.

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Second from Mr. McIver. Any other discussions?

**MR. WILLARD:** Mr. Chairman, can the record reflect which respondents the board is finding probable cause against to refer over to our office?

**SECRETARY KEMP:** Mr. Harvey, do you have any suggestions on that?

**MR. HARVEY**: In this case we've got Sharon Mitchell who was the acting election superintendent at the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections is the only respondents.

**MR. WILLARD**: So I would amend my motion to reflect that we're referring that case and those two respondents to the attorney general's office.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Okay, and Mr. McIver do you want to second that amended motion?

**MR. MCIVER**: Yes, sir.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: He does. We have a motion and a second to refer the AG's office. Any other discussion amongst the board? Hearing none, all in favor signify by saying, aye.

(Let the record reflect that the vote was aye unanimously.)

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All oppose; same sign. The motion will carry and we have referred that case. Mr. Harvey, we also got SEB Case No. 2012 No. 56, with issues that were dealt with in the primary election. Mr. Walbert, do you want us to present the case or do you have a preference?

**MR. WALBERT**: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I had the impression from talking to Mr. Harvey that there was on that he was recommending further action and one of them not.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: That's correct. I think the next case dealing with the 2011 case was the recommendation from Mr. Harvey to dismiss. We can certainly do that. I just want to handle this.

**MR. WALBERT**: No problem. We're happy with taking his report and if he wants to put the slides in as part of the complaint if you will and I will deal with that after the referral.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All right. Let me just call for the record so we can properly do this. Let me just call the next Case SEB No. 2012 No. 56 which is the 2012 primary election case against Fulton County. Mr. Walbert, the County's attorney, has agreed that he will be all right with us referring the case to the AG's office. Was there anyone here that wanted to speak in regard to this case? Did any of the board members have an issue with us doing that without hearing a report? Mr. Harvey, do you need the name of the respondents?

**MR. HARVEY**: In this case, it would be Sam Westmoreland is the elections superintendent and the board.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Do we have a motion?

**MR. WORLEY**: Mr. Secretary, can we make a motion to accept the PowerPoint presentation and print a copy and send it to the board on SEB 2012-156.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Well, we can. Is that a motion?

**MR. WORLEY**: Yes.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All right. Mr. Worley makes a motion to accept the investigative

report, the PowerPoint, and make it part of what we will be taking action on, do we have a second?

**MR. MCIVER**: Second.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Mr. McIver seconds. Any other discussions? Hearing none, all in favor signify by saying, aye. All oppose; same sign. That motion carries and we have accepted the report. Now, we're ready for a motion on SEB Case No. 56.

(Let the record reflect that the vote was aye unanimously.)

**MR. MCIVER**: I motion to bond over Case No. 56.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All right, Mr. McIver has a motion to bond over 2012 No. 56 SEB case with Sam Westmoreland and Fulton County Elections as respondents.

**MR. WORLEY**: I second.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: We have a second. Any other discussion? Hearing none, all in favor signify by saying, aye.

(Let the record reflect that the vote was aye unanimously.)

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All oppose; same sign. That motion carries and we have referred that case. The last case on our agenda today is SEB Case No. 2011 No. 110. I'll just call that case. Real quickly, Mr. Harvey, if you would just give us a brief description.

**MR. HARVEY**: Yes, sir. This case involved allegations or concerns that Fulton County former residence of public housing facilities in Fulton County where the facilities had been demolished and people were still registered to vote at those addresses. A previous SEB case in 2009 from a complaint indicated that almost nobody falsely or improperly voted from those addresses. In this case, there was no election at hand. The concern was that there were thousands of people registered at addresses that didn't even exist anymore. That becomes a problem from a voter registration status point of view.

The only way to change somebody's voter registration is to delete them or alter them for a legal reason. Death, felony conviction, somebody rescinding their voter registration, the way the law is written in Georgia with regards to residents, it gives a very wide latitude to voters to move and that plan on returning. There's simply no indication that anybody that was registered in Fulton County had done anything wrong in terms of either voting from where they shouldn't have or anything else. It's possible that any summer all of those voters may have intended to return back to the location after it was rebuilt.

It sort of became a controversy when Mr. Westmoreland sent about 2400 letters to voters saying that they were going to be challenged because they didn't live where they registered. Fulton County backed off of that. They didn't challenge any voters. And then shortly before the general election, Ms. Mitchell decided she replace these voters in a pending status and require them to show proof of residency before they were allowed to vote in the general election.

After receiving some encouragement from our office they checked with their attorneys before they took such a step Fulton County decided not to take that step. So there were no voters that were in any way changed or affected or disenfranchised. There was no violation. Fulton County would have to deal with these questionable voters like any other voters. There simply doesn't appear to be any violation of state election law and I recommend this case be dismissed.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Any questions for Mr. Harvey? Hearing none, anyone else wishing to speak on this matter? Okay, last call. Hearing none, do we have a motion on SEB Case No. 2011 No. 110? The recommendation is to dismiss. Any thoughts you want to share with us, Mr. McIver?

**MR. MCIVER**: I'm perplexed, sir, that's all. Inaudible.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Anything else, Mr. Harvey?

**MR. HARVEY**: No, sir.

**MR. WORLEY**: I'll make a motion that we accept Mr. Harvey's recommendation to dismiss.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: We've got a motion to dismiss? Do we have a second? I'll second. All in favor -- or any other discussions? Hearing none, all in favor signify by saying, aye.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All oppose; same sign.

**MR. MCIVER**: Aye.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: That motion carries 3 to 1 so that case has been dismissed. I believe that takes care of all of our business here today unless the board members have any other comments. I believe this will be our last meeting before Christmas and the holidays so I wish everybody the best this season and safe travels. We'll see you in the New Year. Thank you very much. I guess we need a motion to adjourn.

**MR. MCIVER**: I so move.

**MR. WORLEY**: I second.

**SECRETARY KEMP**: Mr. McIver moves that we adjourn and Mr. Worley seconds. Any discussion? Hearing none, all in favor signify by saying, aye.

(Let the record reflect that the vote was aye unanimously.)

**SECRETARY KEMP**: All oppose; same sign. That motion carries. Everybody have a great day.

(Whereupon, the proceedings ended at 10:35 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE


STATE OF GEORGIA        )

COUNTY OF COBB         )

I, Debra Montgomery, Certified Court Reporter,  
certify that the foregoing transcript is a true,  
correct and complete record of the said proceedings;  
that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or  
counsel of any of the parties; nor financially  
interested in the action.

This certificate is expressly withdrawn and  
denied upon disassembly and/or photocopying of the  
foregoing transcript, or any portion thereof, unless  
such disassembly or photocopying is done by the  
undersigned Certified Court Reporter and original  
signature and official seal is attached hereto.

WITNESS my hand and seal at Marietta, Cobb  
County, Georgia is the *7<sup>th</sup>* day of *January*, 2014.

  
Debra Montgomery  
Certificate No. 2838





## The Office of Secretary of State

**Brian P. Kemp**  
SECRETARY OF STATE

**Linda Ford**  
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS

**AGENDA  
SPECIAL CALLED  
STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING  
State Capitol Building  
Room 341  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
Tuesday, December 17, 2013 – 9:00 a.m.**

### **I. CALL TO ORDER**

Invocation and Pledge of Allegiance

### **II. INVESTIGATION REPORT (C. Harvey)**

#### **PROCESS OF MEETING:**

#### **Chris Harvey to present on SEB Case No. 2012-156 (2012 General Election)**

- a) State Election Board can then ask questions in regards to the report; Chris Harvey may then field those questions.
- b) Mr. Waldrup is allowed to then give the response on behalf of Fulton County.
- c) Public response allowed by gallery and attendants.

#### **Chris Harvey to present on SEB Case No. 2012-56 (2012 Primary Election) found on page 24**

- a) State Election Board can then ask questions in regards to the report; Chris Harvey may then field those questions.
- b) Mr. Waldrup is allowed to then give the response on behalf of Fulton County.
- c) Public response allowed by gallery and attendants.

#### **Chris Harvey to present on SEB Case No. 2011-110 (no specific election) found on page 24**

- a) State Election Board can then ask questions in regards to the report; Chris Harvey may then field those questions.
- b) Mr. Waldrup is allowed to then give the response on behalf of Fulton County.
- c) Public response allowed by gallery and attendants.

**MINUTES**  
**STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING**  
**State Capitol Building**  
**Room 341**  
**Atlanta, Georgia 30334**  
**Tuesday, December 17, 2013 – 9:00 AM**

Due notice having been given for the State Election Board Meeting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq.

**MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE**

Brian P. Kemp, Chairman  
Rebecca Sullivan  
Tex McIver  
David Worley

**I. CALL TO ORDER**

Chairman Kemp called the State Election Board (SEB) Meeting to order at approximately 9:04 a.m. A quorum was established with the following board members in attendance: Chairman Kemp, David Worley and Rebecca Sullivan. Tex McIver was late due to a scheduling issue and was in the area and would arrive shortly. Chairman Kemp led everyone in the Invocation and Pledge of Allegiance.

Chairman Kemp called for the next order of business: Public Comment

**II. PUBLIC COMMENTS**

There were no public speakers.

Chairman Kemp preceded to the next portion the meeting. He laid out the framework of this particular meeting; allowing Chris Harvey to present his information and then Fulton County's attorney would be able to address the Board. He invited Inspector Chris Harvey to begin the Investigation Report on Fulton County.

Ted McIver arrived to the meeting at 9:18 a.m.

**III. INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (C. Harvey)**

**Fulton County Report:**

**A. SEB Case No. 2012-156 (2012 General Election)** – Chris Harvey presented this case via Power Point presentation. Lengthy violations were presented. Chris Harvey recommended that this case be bound to the Attorney General's office.

Public speakers included; David F. Walbert, attorney for Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration and Linda Ford, Elections Director for the Secretary of State's office.

David Worley made a motion to bind the case to the Attorney General's office, Tex McIver seconded; the motion passed 4-0.

# State Election Board Minutes

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Page 2 of 2

- B. SEB Case No. 2012-56 (2012 Primary Election)** – Chris Harvey presented this case and recommended the case be bound over to the Attorney General’s office. David Worley made a motion to accept Chris Harvey’s entire presentation, Tex McIver seconded; the motion passed 4-0 to accept Chris Harvey’s presentation.

Public speakers included; David F. Walbert, attorney for Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration.

Tex McIver made a motion to bind the case to the Attorney General’s office, Rebecca Sullivan seconded; the motion passed 4-0.

- C. SEB Case No. 2011-110** – Chris Harvey presented this case and recommended the case be dismissed.

Public speakers included; David F. Walbert, attorney for Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration.

David Worley made a motion to dismiss the case, Chairman Kemp seconded; the motion passed 3-1 with Tex McIver voting in opposition.

## IV. ADJOURNMENT

Chairman Kemp commended the Board, staff and investigators for their work. Personally welcomed members of Fulton County for attendance.

Tex McIver made a motion to adjourn the meeting, David Worley seconded; the motion passed unanimously, 4 - 0. Being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at approximately 10:35 a.m.

## STATE ELECTION BOARD

**APPROVED BY:**

\_\_\_\_\_

**DATE:**

\_\_\_\_\_

**SUMMARY**  
**STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING**  
**State Capital Building**  
**Room 341**  
**Atlanta, Georgia 30334**  
**Tuesday, December 17, 2013 – 9:00 a.m.**

1. Chairman Kemp called the State Election Board (SEB) Meeting to order at approximately 9:04 a.m. A quorum was established with the following board members in attendance: Chairman Kemp, David Worley and Rebecca Sullivan. Tex McIver was late due to a scheduling issue and was in the area and would arrive shortly.
2. Chairman Kemp everyone in the Invocation and Pledge of Allegiance.
3. Chairman Kemp called for the next order of business: Public Comment.  
There were no public speakers.
4. Chairman Kemp preceded to the next portion the meeting. He laid out the framework of this particular meeting; allowing Chris Harvey to present his information and then Fulton County's attorney would be able to address the Board. He invited Inspector Chris Harvey to begin the Investigation Report on Fulton County.
5. Tex McIver arrived to the meeting at 9:18 a.m.

Fulton County Report:

- a. **SEB Case No. 2012-156 (2012 General Election)** – Chris Harvey presented this case via Power Point presentation. Lengthy violations were presented. Chris Harvey recommended that this case be bound to the Attorney General's office.

Public speakers included; David F.Walbert, attorney for Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration and Linda Ford, Elections Director for the Secretary of State's office.

David Worley made a motion to bind the case to the Attorney General's office, Tex McIver seconded; the motion passed 4-0.

- b. **SEB Case No. 2012-56 (2012 Primary Election)** – Chris Harvey presented this case and recommended the case be bound over to the Attorney General's office. David Worley made a motion to accept Chris Harvey's entire presentation, Tex McIver seconded; the motion passed 4-0 to accept Chris Harvey's presentation.

Public speakers included; David F.Walbert, attorney for Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration.

Tex McIver made a motion to bind the case to the Attorney General's office, Rebecca Sullivan seconded; the motion passed 4-0.

- c. **SEB Case No. 2011-110** – Chris Harvey presented this case and recommended the case be dismissed.

Public speakers included; David F.Walbert, attorney for Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration.

David Worley made a motion to dismiss the case, Chairman Kemp seconded; the motion passed 3-1 with Tex McIver voting in opposition.

6. Chairman Kemp commended the Board, staff and investigators for their work. Personally welcomed members of Fulton County for attendance.
7. Tex McIver made a motion to adjourn the meeting, David Worley seconded; the motion passed unanimously, 4 - 0. Being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at approximately 10:35 a.m.

## **Report, 2012 Fulton County Elections**

This Report concerns three investigations into violations of Title 21 of Georgia law and rules of the State Election Board.

State Election Board Cases

### **SEB 2012-156 (2012 General Election)**

**Respondents: Sharon Mitchell and Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections**

### **SEB 2012-56 (2012 Primary Election)**

**Respondents: Sam Westmoreland and Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections**

### **SEB 2011-110 (no specific election)**

**Respondent: Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration**

Report Date

November 26, 2013

By

Chris Harvey, Chief Investigator, Georgia Secretary of State's Office

On January 31, 2013, the Georgia State Election Board (SEB) will convene an investigative hearing on three election investigations involving significant allegations of violating election laws and SEB Rules in Fulton County. Two of the cases (SEB 2012-56 and SEB 2012-156) deal with specific elections: the 2012 General Primary and the 2012 General Election. SEB 2011-110 deals with voter registration and residency issues, and while not necessarily specific to an election, the issue of accurate and timely voter registration played a role in the aforementioned elections.

### **SEB 2012-156 General Election**

The vast majority of complaints in this election were tied to voters having to vote provisional ballots after being told that their names did not appear on the ExpressPoll. There appear to be a number of issues that started with problems in the voter registration process in Fulton County. Voter registration applications were being entered into the voter registration system until the day before the election, which was ten days after the final list of voters were entered into the ExpressPoll system. These problems were aggravated by a poorly executed and inconsistent procedure for properly handling and documenting provisional ballots.

#### **Voter Registration**

Proper Procedure: When a voter submits a voter registration application (or a change to an existing voter registration such as a new address or name change) the information is manually entered into the computer voter registration database. This database normally receives a lot of new applications and alterations in the weeks leading up to the registration deadline (October 9, 2012 for this General Election.) Fulton County, as did most other counties, received a large number of these applications in the weeks before the General Election, and they struggled and ultimately failed to enter all of the data by the deadlines they faced. When all of the applications are entered into the system, the system produces a complete Electors List for each precinct, naming all qualified voters. The system which handles the Electors List and contains all of the registered voters on election day (or during early voting) is commonly referred to as “ExpressPoll” (which is actually the name of the computers which allow voters to be “checked in” and have a voting access card created for them to vote on the voting machine (DRE.)

Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) Election Center handles the “loading” of all of the information from the voter registration system onto the actual ExpressPoll machines that are used at each precinct to identify voters and allow voter access cards to be created for them. In order to allow the counties to set up their election systems, KSU “closes” the information that will be loaded onto the ExpressPoll machines at the end of the day on the second Thursday prior to the Election Day. Any voter registration information that is added to the statewide voter registration system by any county *after* the close of that Thursday, will still be eligible to vote (assuming the registration application was received by the earlier October deadline) but those voters names (or new information) will only appear on a printed “supplemental list” that should be sent to every precinct.

For example, if my first-ever voter registration application was processed on October 30, 2012, and I went to my polling place to vote, I would be told by the poll worker, “You are not showing up in our system.” The poll worker should then check the printed “supplemental list” of voters where my name should appear. At that point, that I was present and showed proper ID would be noted on the list, and the poll worker should create a voter access card for me on the ExpressPoll machine, and I should vote on the DRE just as if I had been in ExpressPoll for years. If a voter did not appear on either the ExpressPoll or supplemental list, and the voter declared that they believed they had registered in time to vote, they should be given a provisional (paper) ballot on which to vote. Provisional ballots will be addressed in detail later in this report.

Therefore, it should be clear that the timely entrance of data into the voter registration system can keep the “supplemental list” to a minimum and keep the poll workers working at maximum efficiency by relying primarily on ExpressPoll (which is where the vast majority of the voters should be found.) In some counties, there are no supplemental lists on election day because all of the qualified voter registration applications were entered into the voter registration system by October 25, 2012. Failure to meet these data-entry deadlines caused cascading problems on election day.

Fulton County received a large number of voter registration applications, and was unable to enter the applications by the time the ExpressPoll records were finalized and loaded into the ExpressPolls. Fulton County failed to follow previous practices of supplementing data entry workers to keep up with the demands of the incoming registrations. KSU even gave Fulton County one extra day, until the end of October 26<sup>th</sup>, to enter information that would go into ExpressPoll. Fulton County was entering voter registrations into the system as late as the day before the election. This fact required the use of a “supplemental list” of voters who should have been allowed to vote on a DRE just like any other voter. Fulton County reported that their “supplemental list” contained approximately 6,000 voters. This is a very unusually high number of voters on a supplemental list.

Fulton County has claimed that the Secretary of State's Office was responsible for the late receipt of the voter registration applications, but the Secretary of State has multiple witnesses who will testify that the voter registration applications were made available to Fulton County as soon as they came into the office.

In post-election surveys completed by Fulton County election workers, there were many mentions of inadequate staffing to process the incoming voter registration applications. Ralph Jones admitted that the office also stopped processing changes in address requests in favor of adding new voter registration applicants. There was a particularly damning survey response which revealed,

***"Visiting Fulton County Registration and Election Officials couldn't obtain clear verification of the staffing and heavy workload requirements because voter's registration cards were moved from the sign-out location and placed around the office so no one would be able to identify the workload. Cards were hidden at employee work stations."***

Poll managers reportedly received their documents and election items the evening of Sunday, November 4, 2012. Due to an oversight in the Fulton County Voter Registration Office approximately 300 voters were added to the supplemental list during the day, Monday, November 5, 2012, after the first Supplemental List had already been given to the poll managers, so, at least, those 300 new voters would not appear on ExpressPoll or on a printed Supplemental List of voters if *any* of those 300 voters attempted to vote. Fulton County was distributing supplemental lists on Election Day, however, it is unknown if the lists were additional voters, replacement lists, lists that were never delivered, and/or some or all of the above. There were reports of poll managers either not getting any supplemental list, not knowing they got the supplemental list, not knowing what to do with the supplemental list they got, or not getting updated supplemental lists. Sandy Springs Precinct 22 did not have a copy of any supplemental list until after 11:00 AM on Election Day after over 800 people voted. Fulton County has acknowledged that two precincts did not receive the supplemental lists until almost noon on election day.

Approximately **1,100** voters, whose registration records were either entered or changed *after* October 26, voted provisional ballots that were accepted by Fulton County. Many of these voters should have appeared on the printed supplemental list and should have voted on DREs (the exceptions would be voters on the supplemental list who were voting out of their assigned precinct.)

**Potential Violations:**

O.C.G.A 21-2-226-Determining Eligibility of Voters

O.C.G.A. 21-2-227-Furnish List of Electors for Elections

O.C.G.A. 21-2-228-Examination of Elector' Qualifications

Problems at Precincts on Election Day

The Secretary of State's Office received approximately 150 complaints regarding Fulton County's performance on Election Day. Some of these complaints were regarding issues that were not necessarily the fault of Fulton County Election Officials, such as inconvenient polling place locations, and frustrated poll workers. Most of the complaints, however, came from voters who were either not allowed to vote

at all, or were required to vote provisionally even though they knew, and in some cases had documentation, that they were properly registered to vote.

Here is a sampling of the complaints

- Address on driver's license differed from registration address, so voter could not vote
- Voter had requested an absentee ballot, which voter denied, and voter was forced to vote provisional
- Excessively long lines and waits (in excess of three and four hours) due to difficulties in getting voters the voter access cards because the voters could not be found in ExpressPoll or supplemental list
- Elector not in the system, cannot vote
- Provisional ballots denied to voters who requested them for various reasons
- Voter had already voted, which voter denied (sometime provisional offered, but other times not)
- Lines with waits of over two hours saw many voters leave without voting
- Illegal campaigning in a polling place
- Slow procedure to create Voter Access Cards even though there were plenty of DREs
- Precincts ran out of supplies including provisional ballots
- Some waits for provisional ballots were in excess of four hours, and even then, small numbers of provisional ballots were delivered after that extended wait
- Some poll workers suggested that voters go to other precincts to try to find provisional ballots
- Polling places were unorganized and directionless
- Polling places did not open in time
- The advocacy group, Election Protection itself gathered and reported to the Secretary of State's Office more than twenty complaints, including four affidavits that were almost exclusively reports of declared registered voters not being allowed to vote on DREs, and, in most cases, experiencing hours of waiting time for provisional ballots
- In addition, after Election Day, several poll managers sent complaints about problems with getting provisional ballots and communicating with the Fulton Election Office downtown

Investigators from the Secretary of State's Office visited several precincts on Election Day and reported some dire conditions, particularly at Venetian Hills Precinct. There they saw the poll manager on the phone practically the entire time, voters wandering in the enclosed space, voters waiting hours to get provisional ballots, and voters being told they should try other precincts in the hopes of getting a provisional ballot somewhere else.

**Potential Violations:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-413 Conduct of voters, campaigners

O.C.G.A. 21-2-418 Provisional ballots

O.C.G.A. 21-2-596 Failure to perform duty

O.C.G.A. 21-2-591 Allowing unlawful assistance to voters

O.C.G.A. 21-2-403 Time for opening of polls



### Registered Voters Having to Vote Provisional Ballots

**3,732** Fulton County voters who voted provisional ballots on Election Day were in the ExpressPoll System by October 26, 2012. There are only a few legitimate reasons for a registered voter in ExpressPoll to vote a provisional ballot:

- Voter is voting out of precinct
- Voter does not have valid identification
- Voter cannot be found in ExpressPoll by poll worker

However, untrained or unequipped poll workers who did not have access to, or full knowledge of working an ExpressPoll or printed Supplemental List, would have to choose between allowing a voter to vote provisionally, and not letting the person vote at all.

Below is a summary of Fulton County Provisional Ballot Reporting:

<u>Reason for Prov. Ballot</u>	<u># P.B. voted</u>	<u># P.B. accepted</u>
Wrong Precinct/Not on List	9429	5101
No ID	72	0
Other Reasons	84	3
Total	<b>9585</b> (FC report to SOS lists <b>9575</b> )	5104

Fulton County accounted for 54% of provisional ballots cast in the entire state  
(DeKalb, Gwinnet, Chatham, and Muscogee Counties combined issued 2,879 provisional ballots)

3,732 voters were in ExpressPoll and 1,100 voters who voted provisionally were, or should have been, on the printed Supplemental List. These two numbers account for 4,832 voters who should have voted on a DRE on Election Day. This would have cut the number of provisional ballots by almost 50%.

A caveat to the 3,732 voters is that if a voter went to a precinct other than where they were registered and assigned, they could have:

1. Been directed to their proper precinct (if sufficient time allowed for the travel)  
Or,
2. Voted a provisional ballot at the wrong precinct

Fulton County apparently had inconsistent practices in handling voters at wrong precincts, and the workers were ultimately trained that, "When in doubt, give a provisional ballot." Some voters too seem to have become accustomed to such treatment and arrived at precincts knowing they were not registered there, but expecting a provisional ballot for the sake of convenience.

Lastly, reports show that of the 5079 records that Fulton County reported as accepted provisional ballots, **95** of those registration numbers **also** had voter access cards created for those registration numbers in ExpressPoll. This might indicate that the "registration number/voter" voted on a DRE and provisionally, and both votes were counted.

### Provisional Ballot Problems

Approximately 9,575 voters voted provisional ballots in Fulton County, which accounted for 54% of the total provisional ballots cast in the entire state. Nowhere, however, do the numbers and lists of names

and accepted and rejected ballots add up. Fulton County election officials were simply not prepared to handle the demand and backlog of unprocessed voter registration applications (which Fulton County created) for provisional ballots at the polling places. There appeared to be little to no consistency in the proper handling of provisional ballots. The failure by Fulton County to properly follow documentation and handling requirements in place to ensure the security and integrity of the provisional ballots made verifying provisional ballots with much certainty almost impossible.

Poll managers and workers did not follow state law or SEB Rules when handling and documenting provisional ballots. There was a very weak supply chain to deliver new provisional ballots to precincts, and the communication system between poll workers and election officials left much to be desired. Laws and SEB rules regarding the handling and documenting of provisional ballots were violated or ignored on a massive scale:

- There was insufficient dissemination about the system in place to allow voters to check the status of their provisional ballot
- One person appeared to vote *seven* provisional ballots at the same precinct, and *all seven ballots were marked as accepted*. Fulton County claims to have identified who these voters were, however, with no other identification on the provisional ballot envelopes, there no way to tell if that is true, and is frankly, rather unlikely.
- Some voters were denied provisional ballots, even after requesting one
- Provisional ballots were not kept in secure locations during validation (the status of the chain of custody for the provisional ballots is unknown)
- Fulton County could not even produce all of the provisional ballot envelopes that they appeared to have received
- There was no uniform recording of the *reasons* for rejecting provisional ballots
- Documents recording provisional ballot appear to be **created and altered** by someone after the documents were submitted by poll officials
- Provisional Ballot recap sheets were often done improperly, incompletely, or not at all
- Voters were listed as having provisional ballots accepted when they did not vote provisional ballots
- Voters were not notified until January 9, 2013 (66 days after the election) that their provisional ballots were rejected
- More than 1,000 of these *mailed notices* had no address for the elector, so there is no way that the notices *could have gotten to the electors*
- Many provisional ballot *rejections* appear to be recorded without a way to determine why a ballot was rejected, and inform the voter of the same
- The total number of voted provisional ballots differs from source to source
- Many provisional ballot recap sheets do not correlate to the statement of votes cast on the official results
- Fulton County has not reported how many provisional ballots had to be duplicated (all out of precincts provisional ballots)
- It is unknown how many voter registration applications were completed when voters were issued provisional ballots, but a review of specific complainants shows that at least 20 provisional voters were not given voter registration applications
- Printed instructions for checking the status of one's provisional ballot were not available for every provisional ballot issued

- As recently as September and October of 2012, Pamela Coman, Election Training Director for Fulton County asked for and received clarification about provisional ballots because she was preparing to begin the online training from the training staff at the Secretary of State's Office
- The heavy reliance on provisional ballots on Election Day set the stage for failures in the verification of provisional ballots in the days after the election. As woeful as was the requirement that so many voters had to cast provisional ballots in the first place, the more striking failure was Fulton County's inability to execute the acceptance and rejection of absentee ballots with anything resembling accuracy or reliable documentation
- More than 1000 rejection letters were mailed to voters with incomplete mailing addresses, and could not have been delivered
- Fulton County failed to notify provisional voter who voted out of precinct that their ballot had been duplicated and counted

#### Detailed Examination of Ten Precincts' Provisional Ballots

Investigators from the Secretary of State's Office examined only ten precincts' handling of provisional ballots in great detail, and what they discovered was a lack of consistency or much of anything that could even be described as a "system," that yielded inaccuracy after inaccuracy in the proper documentation of provisional ballots. Not *one* of the ten precincts and county officials could even account for the proper *number* of provisional ballots. The details from each of the ten precincts are included in the exhibits in this packet, but below is a chart that shows the errors and wide-ranging inconsistencies with provisional ballots.

Following the chart is a point-by-point analysis of the provisional ballots from each of the ten precincts examined in detail.

### Fulton County Provisional Analysis

Precinct	# on Prov. Numbered List of Voters	Prov. Ballots Marked As Listed on Prov. Recap Sheet	No. Prov. Numbered List of Voters and Ballots Cast on Recap Sheet Match	# of Provisional Voter Certificates Provided by Fulton County	Total Prov. Envelopes Provided by Fulton County for Inspection	Accepted/Rejected Prec. Envelopes Provided by Fulton County	# Voters Whose Prov. Ballot Should Have Been Accepted/SOS Analysis	# Voters Whose Prov. Ballot Should Have Been Rejected/SOS Analysis	# Voters Eligible to Vote on DRE Unit	# Voters Whose Registration was Added After Supp. List Generated	# Voters Voting Out of Precinct	DRE and Express Poll Recap Sheets
01A							46	26	19	15	11	Blank
025							17	30	8	13	10	More voters marked than recorded on DRE
02F1/02F2							90	23	13	28	23	Provisional ballots listed as supplemental voters
048							56	13	18	4	11	Complete
06H							2	Unknown	3	0	0	More voter certificates than votes on DRE
110							17	18	5	4	28	Not Completed
04W							116	110	27	0	80	More votes on DRE than voter certificates
0224							24	13	6	0	0	Complete
5514							0	0	0	0	0	Complete
3A							57	71	17	6	25	One voter marked than reported on DRE
<b>Totals</b>	<b>913</b>	<b>789</b>		<b>765</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>1078</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>216</b>	

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Eligible to Vote DRE - 134

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Who Registered Timely but were Added After Supplemental Generated - 83

Total Number Provisionals Cast By Persons Registered at Other Fulton County Precincts - 256

Cells in green reflect accurate precinct provisional reporting or complete production of all provisional ballot certificates and envelopes to SOS staff for review  
Cells in red reflect inaccurate provisional reporting or minimal production of provisional ballot certificates and envelopes provided to SOS staff for review

Page 1

## Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 01A

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- A provisional ballot recap sheet was not completed for the precinct
- 158 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters. All names were written in red ink in what appeared to be the same handwriting.

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for only 42 of the 158 names on the numbered list.
- 1 voter certificate was completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 41 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 136 provisional ballots were accepted and 22 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

- 28 Rejected
- 3 were voted by persons registered in other counties.

- 23 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 2 were voted by persons in delete status.

46 Accepted

- 35 were registered in precinct 01A.
- 12 of the 35 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 15 of the 35 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 7 of the 35 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 1 voter had previously requested an absentee ballot
- 11 were registered in other Fulton County precincts

#### Additional Observations

- One voter was listed as a non-citizen. It is unknown if the voter returned to Fulton County after the election with proof of citizenship.
- 4 of the voters were listed on the numbered list 2 times.
- 5 ballots were accepted from voters who were also given credit for voting on a DRE unit. Accepted ballot envelopes were provided for these individuals.
- One person listed had two registration records in the registration system.
- 3 voters could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.
- 70 voters were listed on the provisional numbered list of voters and they were also given credit for voting in the registration system by voting on a DRE unit. Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for any of these individuals.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 58 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 47 accepted and 11 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 02F1\02F2**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 83 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 83 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 83 of the names on the numbered The provisional section of the voter certificates was not completed on any of the certificates.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 60 provisional ballots were accepted and 23 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system was reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 23 Rejected

- 13 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 9 were not found in the voter registration system
- 1 was voted by a person marked as a non-citizen.

#### 59 Accepted

- 36 were registered in precinct 02F/02F1.
- 6 of the 36 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 7 of the 36 voters were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 23 of the 36 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 23 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 72 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 56 accepted and 16 rejected.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for 11 voters.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 02S**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 84 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 79 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 40 of the names on the numbered.
- The provisional section was completed by the voter and poll worker on 1 voter certificate.
- The provisional section was completed by the poll worker only on 28 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was not completed on 11 of the voter certificates provided.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 31 provisional ballots were accepted and 48 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 34 Rejected

- 17 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 11 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 6 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 32 Accepted

- 17 were registered in precinct 02S.
- 3 of the 17 voters were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 13 of the 17 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 1 of the 17 had previously requested an absentee ballot..
- 15 were registered at other Fulton County precincts

#### Additional Comments

- One ballot was listed as rejected and the provisional list was marked that the voter could not be found. The voter information from the voter certificate was compared to the voter registration system. A record was found for a Fulton County voter with the same name and address. The date of birth on the voter certificate was not valid and could not be compared to the voter record. It appears should have been duplicated to the voter's precinct and accepted. A provisional ballot envelope for the voter was not provided.
- One ballot was listed as rejected on the provisional list; however, the voter was listed on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct. The voter certificate was marked accepted. A provisional ballot envelope for the voter was not provided.
- 9 of the voters could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the voter registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 45 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 30 accepted and 15 rejected.
- One provisional ballot was accepted for voter who was marked as having voted during the early voting period.
- One ballot was rejected because the voter was listed as registered in Gwinnett County. Review of the voter registration system indicated there were 2 registration numbers for the same person. The Fulton County record appeared to occur after the Gwinnett record and should have replaced the Gwinnett record. The registration in Fulton County was on the supplemental list. It appears the ballot should have been accepted.
- Two accepted provisional ballot envelopes were provided for voters that were not listed on the provisional numbered list of voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 03A**

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 132 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 134 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters
- 53 names were written in red ink which appears to be the same ink used for marking whether the ballot was accepted or rejected. The names are written in the same handwriting and appear to be listed in reverse alphabetical order.

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 132 of the names on the numbered list.
- 17 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 73 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section
- 42 voter certificates were not copied to include the back side

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 59 provisional ballots were accepted and 75 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 71 Rejected

- 37 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 30 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 4 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 55 Accepted

- 23 were registered in precinct 03A.
- 15 of the 23 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 6 of the 23 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 2 of the 23 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 32 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

### Additional Comments

- 1 voter could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.

### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 128 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 56 accepted and 72 rejected.
- 2 ballots were rejected because the voters were not registered in Fulton County. The registrations were found in the registration system as being received by the deadline but they were not entered until December. The ballots should have been accepted.



- One ballot was accepted for a voter in which the registration system indicated she voted during the early voting period.
- 2 ballots were accepted for voters who could not be found in the registration system. It is unclear what steps Fulton County took to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot should have been accepted.
- One ballot was accepted for a voter who provided a Florida address on the voter certificate and no date of birth. There was no identifying information on the voter certificate to verify the voter's eligibility.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 04B**

### **Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters**

- 110 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 110 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

### **Voter Certificates**

- Voter certificates were provided for 109 of the names on the numbered list.
- 8 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 6 voter certificates were completed by the voter only on the provisional section
- 95 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

### **Provisional Ballot Analysis**

According to the provisional numbered list, 55 provisional ballots were accepted and 55 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### **53 Rejected**

- 14 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 36 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 3 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### **56 Accepted**

- 42 were registered in precinct 04B.
- 26 of the 42 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 4 of the 41 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 5 of the 42 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 6 of the 42 were in "Verify" status. These voters should have listed on Express Poll and the voter should have been able to vote on a DRE unit.
- 1 of the 42 was in "Pending" status reason type "A". This voter was included in the "pending" voters with questionable addresses.
- 1 voter was marked as a non-citizen

- 13 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- One was listed as rejected; however, the voter was found in the registration system. No ballot envelope was provided for the voter.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 103 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 52 accepted and 51 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 04W**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 249 provisional ballots issued on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 232 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters.

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 227 of the names on the numbered list.
- 15 voter certificates were completed by the voter only on the provisional section
- 50 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 157 voter certificates were completed by the voter and poll officer on the provisional section
- 36 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section
- One voter certificate did include the backside.
- 32 voter certificates were provided for persons not on the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

According to the provisional numbered list, 129 provisional ballots were accepted and 102 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 110 Rejected

- 45 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 62 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 3 were voted by persons in delete status.

116 Accepted

- 36 were registered in precinct 04W.
- 20 of the 36 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 9 of the 36 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 4 of the 36 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 3 of the 36 were in “Verify” status. These voters should have been listed on Express Poll and the voter should have been able to vote on a DRE unit.
- 80 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- 3 voters have two registration records in the registration system.
- One voter had no precinct assigned to the registration record.
- 2 of the voters were listed on the numbered list 2 times.
- 1 voter could not be identified due to a voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the registration system.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 159 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 80 accepted and 79 rejected.
- 2 ballots were accepted from voters who could not be found in the system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter’s registration and whether the ballot counted.
- One ballot was rejected from a voter who submitted a change of address prior to the deadline but it was not entered until December. The voter requested an absentee ballot and it is unclear if the ballot was returned to the previous county of residence. A rejected provisional ballot envelope was provided.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 06H**

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 5 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 5 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 1 of the names on the provisional numbered list.
- The back of the voter certificate was not provided.

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 1 provisional ballot was accepted and 4 were rejected.

#### 4 Rejected

- Voter certificates were not provided for the rejected voters. Investigators could not determine in the registration system why the provisional ballot was rejected. This was due to not having identifying information other than the name of the voter and there being multiple records in the registration system for the name on the provisional list of voters.
- The reason the provisional ballot was rejected was not marked on the provisional numbered list of voters.

#### 1 Accepted

- The voter was registered in 06H. The voter was also listed on the supplemental list of voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 1 provisional ballot envelope was provided by Fulton County for review. The ballot envelope was marked accepted and was the same name listed as the ballot marked accepted on the provisional numbered list of voters.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the persons marked rejected on the provisional numbered list of voters.

## Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct 11G

#### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 65 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 59 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

#### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 65 of the names on the numbered list.
- 9 voter certificates were provided for persons not listed on the provisional list of voter.
- 3 voter certificates were completed by the voter and poll officer on the provisional section
- 1 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only on the provisional section
- 52 of the voter certificates were not completed on the provisional section

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

The numbered list of provisional voters was not marked as whether a voter's ballot was accepted or rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 16 Rejected

- 5 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 6 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 5 were voted by persons in delete status.

37 Accepted

- 9 were registered in precinct 11G.
- 3 of the 9 were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 4 of the 9 were entered after the Express Poll and supplements lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 2 of the 9 were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 28 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

Additional Comments

- 2 voters could not be identified due to the voter certificate not being provided and multiple records were found in the voter registration system.
- 1 could not be located in the registration system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot counted.
- On ballot was listed as rejected; however the voter's registration was reviewed and indicated they had submitted their registration by the deadline but it was not added to the registration system until December. It is unknown if the ballot was accepted because a provisional ballot envelope was not provided.

Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 15 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 9 accepted and 6 rejected.
- A ballot was accepted for a voter whose registration record indicated they were given credit for voting on a DRE unit.  
One ballot was rejected; however, a registration record was found for the voter. According to the registration system the voter's registration application was received by the deadline but was not entered until December 2012. The ballot should have been accepted.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct SS14**

Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 15 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 20 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters
- Names 16 through 20 are written in red ink which appears to be the same ink used for marking whether the ballot was accepted or rejected.

Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for 19 of the names on the numbered list.
- 12 voter certificates were completed on the provisional section by the voter and poll officer
- 4 voter certificates were completed by poll officer only
- 2 voter certificates were not completed by the voter
- 1 voter certificate was not completed

#### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 14 provisional ballots were accepted and 6 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system was reviewed for all voters and the following was determined

##### 6 Rejected

- 5 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 1 was voted by a person marked as a non-citizen.

##### 9 Accepted

- 5 were registered in precinct SS14. All 5 voters were listed on the supplemental list of voters.
- 3 were registered in other Fulton County precincts.
- Registration information was reviewed and revealed 5 of the 8 provisional voters registered at other precincts were given credit for voting by the Express Poll. This would indicate they voted on DRE units at their registered precinct.
- 1 could not be located in the registration system. It is unclear what Fulton County used to verify the voter's registration and whether the ballot counted.

#### Additional Comments

- Review of the voters whose names were written in red indicated they had voted on a DRE unit at the precinct they were registered at. The voters were contacted and all stated they originally went to precinct SS14 and were told they were registered at other precincts. The voters said they went the precinct they were told to vote at and voted on the DRE units. None of the persons written in red ink said they voted a provisional or paper ballot at precinct SS14. Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the voters.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 15 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 9 accepted and 6 rejected.
- Provisional ballot envelopes were not provided for the persons whose names were added in red ink to the provisional list of voters.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Statement of Votes Cast

- According to the Statement of Votes Cast report, 1 provisional ballot was counted for precinct SS14. There were 5 provisional ballots listed on the numbered list of voters for precinct SS14 that should have been counted.

## **Recap and Provisional Analysis for Precinct SS22**

### Provisional Recap and Provisional Numbered List of Voters

- 46 provisional ballots issued listed on the Provisional Ballot Recap Sheet
- 46 names listed on the Numbered List of Provisional Voters

### Voter Certificates

- Voter certificates were provided for all 46 names on the provisional numbered list of voters.
- The provisional section was completed by the voter and poll worker on 3 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was completed by the poll worker only on 39 voter certificates.
- The provisional section was not completed on 4 of the voter certificates provided.

### Provisional Ballot Analysis

- According to the provisional numbered list, 24 provisional ballots were accepted and 22 were rejected. The voter certificates and voter registration system were reviewed for all voters and the following was determined:

#### 19 Rejected

- 6 were voted by persons registered in other counties.
- 9 were not found in the voter registration system.
- 4 were voted by persons in delete status.

#### 24 Accepted

- 15 were registered in precinct SS22.
- 4 of the 15 voters were found on the supplemental list of voters for the precinct.
- 2 of the 15 voters were listed in the Express Poll used on Election Day.
- 9 of the 15 voters were entered after the Express Poll and supplement lists were generated. These voters were not available at the precinct.
- 8 voters were registered in other Fulton County precincts.

#### Additional Comments

- Three ballots were listed as rejected; however, the voters' registration was found in the registration system. Two voters were registered at different precincts. These ballots should have been duplicated and accepted. One voter was added to the registration system after the Express Poll and supplemental lists were generated. This ballot should have been accepted. Ballot envelopes were not provided for any of these voters. Two voters received credit for voting, one voter did not.

- One ballot was accepted for a voter that did not provided identification at the poll location. A report previously by Fulton County indicated no who voted a provisional ballot because they did not have ID returned to Fulton County with ID prior to the close of business the Friday following the elections.

#### Provisional Ballot Envelopes

- 41 provisional ballot envelopes were provided by Fulton County for review. 20 accepted and 21 rejected.
- Review of the envelopes indicated the ballots that were accepted and rejected were marked the same as the numbered list of provisional voters.

#### Potential Violations for Provisional Ballots:

O.C.G.A. 21-2-587(3) and (4) Frauds by poll officers  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-562(a)(1) and (a)(2) Fraudulent entries  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(a) Provisional ballots-allowing to be cast  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(c) Provisional ballots-provisional voter registration application  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-418(f) Give written information to provisional voters  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(b) Securing provisional ballots  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(d)(1) Notify rejected provisional voters in writing  
 O.C.G.A. 21-2-419(d)(2) Notify voters who voted out of precinct in writing  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(3) Providing adequate provisional ballots to precincts  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(a) Checking master list of electors before voting provisional  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(b) Checking with Registrar before voting provisionally  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(c) Adding verified voters to precinct (using supplemental list)  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(d) Sending to proper precinct  
 SEB 183-1-12.064(f) Completing provisional ballot certificate  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(i) Completing complete ballot and paperwork  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(4)(j) Verifying paperwork is correct  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(7) Providing paperwork to provisional voter  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(9) Accounting for all provisional ballots and other documentation  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(10) Securing provisional ballots  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(12)(b) Duplicating provisional ballots  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(13)(a) Notifying rejected provisional voters  
 SEB 183-1-12.06(13)(b) Notifying voters who voted in wrong precinct in writing

#### Errors on Recap and Statement of Votes Cast

Of the 247 DRE and ExpressPoll Recap sheets submitted by Fulton County, there were 109 precincts forms that contained errors, omissions, and/or inaccuracies.

Common discrepancies included:

- DRE Recap sheets were not totaled
- The number of “voters marked” listed on the ExpressPoll Recap did not match the numbered list of voters pulled from the ExpressPoll
- Explanations for mis-matching numbers was not provided



- ExpressPoll count and DRE count of voters differed
- Recap sheets were not properly signed by all parties (managers)
- Provisional voters were listed as supplemental voters on the ExpressPoll recap sheet

The attached table identifies 19 of the worst examples of inaccurate reporting:

### Absentee Ballot System Execution Questions

There were three reports where voters (Katrina Keuller, Rodney Hovater, and Paula Hovater) reported they received more than one absentee ballot packages when they made their absentee ballot requests. These voters turned their additional ballots over to SOS investigators.

The following complaint, from a voter who is temporarily in New York appears to expose numerous flaws in the system and/or the execution of the system for requesting an absentee ballot in the general election (emphasis added C.H. :)

Sent: Sunday, December 09, 2012 11:53 PM  
To: Office of Secretary of State  
Subject: Web E-Mail From Rollie O. Buchanan

Question / Comment: Mr. Kemp,

The local, state and national elections of November 6, 2012 have passed. However I am submitting this complaint regarding my experience with absentee voting through Fulton County, which ultimately prevented me from voting due to no fault of my own.

Wednesday, October 3

I mailed my application for an official absentee ballot.

Approximately a week later, a colleague that submitted his after I did, indicated he had received and submitted his absentee ballot via Cobb County within a 10 day period. This seemed odd and caused me to question the status of my absentee ballot.

**Thursday, October 18**

I prepared a second application for mailing. However I wanted to talk with someone in the Fulton County office to ensure I was following the directions correctly, to ensure my opportunity to vote.

**Friday, October 19**

I called the general number and was transferred to a woman who checked my records. I indicated an application had been mail approximately three (3) week earlier, etc. She indicated there was no record of receipt of the absentee application, but to speed up the process, I could fax my second application instead of mailing it.

Given this information, I faxed it at 4:17 pm EST (as indicated by FAX confirmation) to 404.730.8839. My belief was that the absentee ballot would be in the mail by Monday or Tuesday, October 22 or 23, with arrival to my residence by Saturday, October 26, at the latest.

Nothing arrived on October 26, 28 or 29.

**Tuesday, October 30**

I called the main Fulton County office number and was transferred to a "Marcia", who served as coordinator for some aspect of the unit. I informed her that the FAX had been sent on October 19 but nothing had been received, even though I had a confirmation of delivery by fax. Marcia indicated that I re-fax the form again. I told her I would within the hour and she gave me her direct line if I had any problems.

At 12:50 pm EST I re-faxed the application for an absentee ballot. I called her four (4) times that afternoon leaving messages and a number for a return phone call to confirm receipt of the document and mailing of the absentee ballot. I received no return phone call for the remainder of the day.

**Wednesday, October 31**

I called 1-2 more times first thing in the morning and left additional messages. At approximately 3:15 pm EST, "Marcia" returned my call.

While talking with her, **she indicated the faxes from October 30, 2012 had not been pulled up, but that she would do it while I was on the phone. I sat on the phone listening while she pulled it up, confirmed that it had been received and processed it for 5-10 minutes. Keep in mind this only happened while I was on the phone, after a previous conversation and several messages on October 30 and 31. "Marcia" indicated it was processed and would go out right away.**

Given the lateness of the day, I anticipated it would go out either later on October 31 or on November 1, with an arrival on November 3 or 6, at the latest.

When the ballot did not arrive on November 3, I began making plans to leave work early, to get home in time to fill it out and pay (at my expense) for overnight delivery to ensure its arrival by noon on November 6.

**Monday, November 5**

I rushed home early, through rush hour traffic with the idea that I would have to vote and get it to the post office before 5:00 pm EST to ensure pick-up for overnight delivery to Fulton County Election office.

***To my extreme disappointment, there was no ballot in the mailbox. I cannot express how disappointed I was; particularly after I did everything I could in a timely manner, yet the ball kept being dropped in Fulton County.***

This meant I would have no opportunity to vote after spending over a month with one (1) mailing, two (2) faxes and numerous conversations and messages with staff, particularly the one in charge of this process, "Marcia".

**Tuesday, November 6**

Out of disappointment and frustration, I contacted your office to express my frustration and asked if there was anything I could do.

I was informed that I was not the only one that had called and complained about this particular office and its handling of absentee ballot applications. I was then directed to this page to submit a complaint.

Later the same evening, I pulled my mail around 10:00 pm EST to find an absentee ballot. This reminded me of my earlier frustration. ***However what I found more upsetting was that after the fax was processed on October 31 while I was on the phone, according to the metered postmark, the absentee ballot was not mailed until November 2, This was a full two (2) days after my conversation with "Marcia".***

I did a search on the internet and found that this office has been under "investigation" for a number of reasons within the past few months. To find this out was rather disheartening, given that my opportunity to vote had been lost in what appeared to be their inability to perform their important duties for the public they serve.

I am asking that my case be investigated with some sort of resolution that is communicated back to me.

The problems illustrated in this complaint indicate a series of apparently admitted failures on Fulton County's Election staff to process absentee ballot applications efficiently. It took Herculean efforts for this voter to even get his ballot to him too late for him to vote the ballot. How many other voters, whose applications were not pulled from the FAX line, did not get their absentee ballots?

Another voter, this time overseas, requested his absentee ballot early. Here is his story (C.H. emails condensed and edited for spelling :)

Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2013 4:31 PM  
To: Office of Secretary of State  
Subject: Web E-Mail from John L. Turbiville

Question / Comment: I would like to add my protest concerning the functioning of the Fulton County Voter Registration Office. I requested officially many months ago an absentee ballot, based on my former address in Atlanta (my last U.S. address before moving to Europe); with no response I sent an e-mail; still no response, I telephoned the office, and I was promised that the ballot would be sent. Still nothing. So, about 2 weeks before the Nov 6 election, I sent in a "Federal Write-in Ballot". Last week, I received a notice that my ballot was not counted because it arrived too late.

I first sent in the form for registration for absentee voting in February 2012, to confirm my previous registration (I have voted in Federal elections several times by absentee, always using my last U.S. address 28-28th St NW, Atlanta 30309).

In September, I believe, I sent an email to the office requesting my status, with no reply. In October I telephoned the office and the representative assured me that all was in order for my ballot. But the ballot was never received, and about two weeks before the Nov. election, I sent in the Federal write-in ballot. So I was surprised when the notice came that this was received in early January, too late to be counted. I have always found that mail in general between France and the U.S. is delivered within one week.

I found one name with who I was in contact at the Fulton County office; it was [brianna.alexander@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:brianna.alexander@fultoncountyga.gov)

By telephone she told me that my registration was valid and that I would receive an absentee ballot, but it never happened.

Fulton County reported that the absentee ballot FAX line was checked every hour, but this does not appear to be accurate based on these complaints.

There were approximately twenty-three complaints about voters having problems getting or returning absentee ballots.

#### **Potential Violations in Absentee Ballot Problems:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-381(b)(2)(A) Mailing absentee ballots failures (multiple times)

#### Election Training

Pamela Coman, Training Director for Fulton County Elections Office provided copies of training manuals and an explanation of the requirements for training.

She said that each poll worker get four hours of training (two hours online and two hours in person.)

Ms. Coman asked for and received specific answers from the Secretary of State's Office shortly before the General Election, and Ms. Coman said that she specifically trained the poll workers in all areas regarding provisional ballots and specifically with regards to provisional ballots and voter who were not found in ExpressPoll (checking the supplemental list.)

#### Pending Status Voters

As a result of letters sent to approximately 1,100 voters in June 2012 (the subject of SEB 2011-110), voters who were suspected of not having homes at addresses where they were registered had their voter registration status changed without any due process. These voters were expected to arrive at the polls and prove their residential address to the satisfaction of poll workers. If they were able to do so, they would be allowed to vote on DRE, and their status changed. If they were not able to provide proof, they would have to vote a provisional ballot.

On November 2, 2012, Sharon Mitchell informed the Secretary of State's Office, which had questioned the changing of voter status without due process, that Fulton County would not place such voters in "P" status.

Sharon Mitchell told investigators that all voters who had been placed in "Pending" status by Fulton County on October 26, 2012 had been restored to their regular voter registration status, prior to Election Day, but 626 voters *still* showed to be in status "Pending" as late as December 2012.

No voters were impacted as a result of a "P Status," and, therefore, there appears to be no violation.

#### Interview with Election Officials

On December 14, 2012, SOS Investigations staff interviewed Sharon Mitchell, Dwight Brower, Ralph Jones, and Pamela Coman in the presence of their attorney, David Walbert. The interview last approximately 1 ¾ hours and it covered a wide-ranging list of topics. The goal was to get a general picture of the events in the election and determine where the investigation needed to be focused. The overall tone of the election officials was that there were a few problems, mostly at the precinct level, but nothing systematic, major, or dramatic happened.

Condensed List of Violations in Fulton SEB 2012-156 [*italics indicate broad charges that may be applied to one or more situations*]

- 21-2-224(f) the official list of electors eligible to vote in any primary or election shall be prepared and completed at least five calendar day prior to the date of the primary of election in which the list is to be used. 734 voters
- 21-2-224(g) providing complete elector lists  
**[TWO PRECINCTS AFFECTED]**
- 21-2-226(a) It shall be the duty of the county board of registrars to determine the eligibility of each person applying to register to vote in such county.
- [21-2-226(b) *upon finding an elector eligible to vote in the county, the county board of registrars shall have the duty of determining and placing the elector in the proper districts*]

- 21-2-418(b) failure of the poll officials to ensure provisional voters completed a provisional ballot voting certificate which included information about the place, manner, and approximate date on which the person registered to vote. AT LEAST 600 VOTERS
- Rule 183-1-12-.06(4)(i) upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form. AT LEAST 199 VOTERS
- 21-2-224 All persons whose names appear on the list of electors placed in the possession of the managers in each precinct and no others, except as otherwise provided in this article, shall be allowed to deposit their ballots according to law at the precinct in which they are registered. AT LEAST 215 VOTERS
- 21-2-418(b) the Fulton County Board of Registrars failed to make a good faith estimate to determine whether the persons casting the provisional ballots were entitled to vote AT LEAST 24 VOTERS  
**[24 VOTERS BALLOTS WERE REJECTED WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED]** 21-2-590(3) refuses to permit any duly registered and qualified person to vote at any primary or election, with the knowledge that such person is entitled to vote
- Rule 183-1-12-.06(4)(i) Before issuing the outer envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style on the outer envelope. AT LEAST 450 VOTERS
- 21-2-419(d)(1) the board of registrars shall notify in writing those persons whose provisional ballots were not counted that their ballots were not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the persons timely registered to vote or other proper reason. AT LEAST 1200 VOTERS
- 21-2-418(b) such person voting a provisional ballot shall complete an official voter registration form SEVERAL THOUSAND VOTERS

### **SEB 2012-56 July 31, 2012 General Primary Election**

The July 31, 2012 General Primary in Fulton County was beset with numerous problems, some of which were systemic, and some were less systemic, but all were serious and problematic for Fulton County.

#### Districting and Ballot Errors

There were multiple areas in Fulton County where, upon redistricting the voters following the census, problems arose on Election Day.

In House District 62, an entire street, Chicory Cove, was incorrectly placed in House District 64.

In the Sandy Springs area there were approximately 350 people who were incorrectly listed as being in Senate District **56**, when they should have been listed as being in Senate District **6**. When redistricting was done, a number of addresses were not changed, causing those residents to appear to live in districts that offered candidates on the ballot that were not candidates for their residential district.

The Lang Carson Precinct (05A) (100 Flat Shoals Ave), experienced a similar problem. This precinct was a combined precinct for House Districts 58 and 59; however, every voter who appeared to vote was given a ballot that only applied to residents of HR 58. Many voters noticed this early in the day, and the Secretary of State's office started receiving numerous calls and emails. Poll managers seemed incapable of solving the problem and multiple people made calls to Fulton County Election Officials to try to get a person on the scene that could solve the problem. The response of the Fulton County Election Officials to calls for assistance was delayed and woeful. At 9:30, Fulton election officials told the poll workers how to create ballots for HD 59, but the poll workers had no way of knowing which district the voter lived in, unless the voter knew, and further, had no way to verify if the voter's declaration of House District was accurate. The workers were promised a map by 12:00 pm, but it was not until approximately 3:45 PM that an election official arrived with a map that was large enough to allow poll workers to determine which ballot a voter was supposed to get, based on their address. A volunteer who was at the precinct was able to identify at least 16 voters who got and voted the wrong ballot, and reported that there were more people with whom she did not speak. There is no way to determine how many voters either got the wrong ballot or were not able to vote because poll workers could not create proper cards until approximately 9:30 AM.

On Election Day, Sam Westmoreland when asked about the problem at the Lang Carson Precinct told a candidate that two streets not being districted properly caused the problem, although he could not identify *which* two streets were involved. In an interview with Fulton County election officials in December 2012, Dwight Brower said that, "about ten" streets were not properly districted and that was the cause of the problem. It is unknown how many voters cast their ballots in a race that was not for their district. An investigator from the Secretary of State's Office was at the precinct shortly after the problem was reported, and he described a citizen with a map trying to help determine to which districts voters' addresses corresponded. The delayed and inadequate response to the critical situation of voters not being able to cast the proper ballot on Election Day was notable.

It was also reported that House District 25 had districting errors as well. HD 25 is made up of precincts JC04 and JC03. The unopposed candidate received 293 votes in JC04 and 3 votes in JC14 (which was not near his district).

**Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-226 Duty to place elector in proper district (multiple violations)

O.C.G.A. 21-2-596 Failure to perform duty

Dual Database of Voters

Once Fulton County realized that their districts were not correct, they made the choice to employ a "dual database" for the election. This essentially "froze" the election up to that point, during advanced voting, and then redistricted voters who had not yet voted. Of course, the redistricting was not done properly at that time either as was evidenced by the previous portion of this report. The problem with a dual database is that, while it seems like a quick solution at the time, creating a dual database creates two complete, separate sets of election results that must be manually calculated and entered into the

GEMS server. While this sounds simple, it is not as simple as adding two numbers and getting the total (*before* plus *after*=total.) There are thousands of individual results that must be entered, and thousands of computations to be done, and the entry can only be done on a single GEMS server, by one person at a time.

Fulton County displayed results in a way that was confusing to the public. They initially showed only the Election Day database (database #2) as their final results. Then, when they completed their second database, they displayed the *combined total* as being only database #1. At least one candidate thought that this was a manipulation of votes by Fulton County.

#### Delays in Counting Votes and not certifying the Election in Time

Largely as a result of working with a dual-database in the Primary Election, Fulton County was not able to complete the tabulation and certification of the election results by the deadline required by the law. Fulton County certified their results approximately one hour after the deadline (Monday, August 6, 2012 at 5:00 pm.)

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-493(k) Failing to certifying election by 5:00 PM on the Monday after the election

#### Absentee Ballot Complaints

Glenda Heyer, when requesting an absentee ballot for her son, *got the wrong absentee ballot three times* (two Republican and one non-Partisan.) Her son was not able to vote.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-384(2)

#### Early Opening and Tabulating of Absentee Ballots

Fulton County started opening and tabulating absentee ballots on Monday, July 30, 2012, a full 24 hours before the code allows early opening and counting. People involved were not sequestered Monday, except during working hours.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-386(G)(3) Early opening and tabulation of absentee ballots

#### Not Getting Ballot of Choice

Wheat Street Towers Precinct, at least two voters were told that they must either pick Republican or Democrat ballots, and could not get a non-partisan ballot. Voters had no choice but to pick what was offered to them.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A 21-2-431(a) Not getting proper ballot

SEB Rule 183-1-12(4)(b) Not getting appropriate ballot

#### Polls Not Opening on Time

James Orange Park Precinct was not open until approximately 7:30 AM; however, the cause was that the site key-holder had car trouble. At least one voter had to leave before the precinct opened and could not vote.

#### Poll Closing Prematurely

East Point Library-A voter arrived at 6:55 PM, and was told the polls were closed. The voter started back to her car. Apparently, the voters were able to convince poll workers that it was 6:55 PM, and they opened the doors, but by the time the complaining voter got back to the door, she was told that now the polls were closed, even though she had been in line with the other voters disputing the closing time.

#### **Potential Violation:**

O.C.G.A. 21-2-403 Polls closing before 7:00 PM

#### Outrageous Results

Precinct 1C2 showed 233 ballots cast with a turn-out of 23,300%. This was as a result of a redistricting error that placed all of the voters in one precinct in the same district when they should have been distributed among two districts. This was a reporting error, which may have impacted the credibility of the reporting, but did not affect any results.

#### DRE Malfunctioning and Manager Casting Voter's Ballot

Mr. John Mattox, who voted at 10M (Tennis Center), reported that his ballot, as reflected by the DRE did not show him, having selected a candidate for sheriff, when he said he previously selected a candidate. He called a poll worker to his station, and she reviewed his ballot and he tried again. He selected his candidate, but when the DRE got to the summary page which showed which candidates he selected, there was no "x" on the sheriff candidate. He said the poll manager cast his ballot by pressing the button herself, and told him he was done. He was dismayed that the DRE unit was left in use.

Subsequent investigation determined that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a violation of election law.

### **Violations SEB2012-056 Fulton County Primary Election**

**Allegation:** 60 voters were assigned the incorrect precinct during the July 31, 2012 Primary Election

- **Violation 21-2-226(b)** upon finding an elector eligible to vote in the county, the county board of registrars shall have the duty of determining and placing the elector in the proper districts and precinct.

**Allegation:** Fulton County Elections failed to certify the July 31, 2012 Primary Election by the deadline – Election results were certified at 6:30 pm, Monday November 12, 2012; 1 ½ hours after the deadline

- **Violation 21-2-493(k)** returns shall be certified by the superintendent not later than 5:00 pm on the Monday following the date on which such election was held.

**Allegation:** Fulton County opened absentee ballots the Monday prior to the July 31, 2012 Election – absentee ballots were opened and scanned on the Monday prior to the election

- **Violation 21-2-386(a)(3)** a county, at his or her discretion, after 7:00 am on the day of the primary, election, or runoff open the inner envelopes.
- **21-2-386(a)(5)** no absentee ballots shall be tabulated before 7:00 am on the day of a primary, election, or runoff.

### **SEB 2011-110 Demolished Residences**

This case involves a complaint that was brought by a complainant who reported that there were at least 1,300 people registered to vote in Fulton County, however, the homes where these registered voters claimed residency, no longer existed. The complainant provided specific names and addresses along with photographs that apparently showed that listed addresses contained only empty lots with no structures. Preliminary investigation indicated that many of the addresses referred by the complainant did appear to show vacant lots while voters still used that address as a registered address for voting. There was concern that people who might have moved out of their districts were still registered to vote and were voting in Fulton County Elections.

A previous SEB case (2009-62) investigated allegations that voters had done just that in the 2009 City of Atlanta Municipal Election.

Examination of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-218 indicated that while this situation was odd on its face, the registration of a voter who moves his residence is affected differently depending on whether the voter leaves the district, or municipality, county, or state. Paragraph (d) states that a voter who moves to a different address within the county or municipality, but fails to notify the registrar by the fifth Monday before an election, “shall vote in the precinct of such elector’s former residence for such election...” Then, paragraph (e) of this code section states a voter, “who moves from one county or municipality to another after the fifth Monday prior to a primary or election may vote in the county or municipality or precinct in which such elector is registered to vote.”

It was also unknown when these electors moved and/or if they moved to a different county or municipality. It was also unknown if the voters intended to return to these addresses and were living temporarily at another location, while intending to retain their residency as allowed under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-217(a)(2).

In May, 2012 I met personally with Fulton County Elections Director, Samuel Westmoreland, in Savannah to discuss this issue with him. At the time, I believed that Fulton County was not aware of the allegation or set of circumstances. I gave Mr. Westmoreland a very brief synopsis of the allegations. I was surprised to hear him respond that his office was already aware of the situation and that they were already working on it. He then volunteered that he had found [paraphrased] “elements in the office that were corrupt and/or covering the situation up.” I told him that I was very interested in working with him and Fulton County in addressing the issues. Mr. Westmoreland then said that he would rather not discuss the matter further in public (we were in the lobby of the hotel where the SEB Meeting was taking place). I offered to come to his office the following week, and he immediately said that he did want me there, but he would come to my office instead. After not hearing from him during the following



week, I called him, and he made another cryptic comment along the lines of, "People in my office don't want this dealt with." I told him that he could not mention knowledge of corruption and cover-up, and then simply drop the matter. He said that he would meet with me, "off campus" at a Starbucks, and that he would call me to arrange the meeting. I did not receive return calls, nor hear from Mr. Westmoreland again.

[At this point, this case connects to the November General Election]

In June, 2012, Fulton County sent approximately 2,400 letters to voters. The letters were challenges to each registered voters registration status. A hearing date was set for June 14, 2012. Fulton County officials believed these voters did not have homes where they were registered to vote. What Fulton County officials did not know was that some of the addresses had been rebuilt and occupied and/or were never razed in the first place. The AJC did a story about voters who were informed that they did not live where they were registered when; in fact they did live where they were registered to vote. Fulton County sent out another letter to the 2,400 voters and essentially dropped the matter, for the time being. Fulton County has not formally challenged these voters as far as we know.

At some point shortly before the November 6, 2012 General Election, Fulton County decided to place approximately 1,100 registered voters, who were suspected of not having homes at their registered addresses, in a voter registrations status of "P" (for Pending.) It was Fulton County's intent to use this to identify such voters and require them to complete a change of address form. It is unknown whether the plan was to allow the voters to vote on a DRE, provisionally, or at all, however, an email from Sharon Mitchell to Linda Ford suggests that the plan was to not allow these voters to vote on a DRE, since their names, apparently, would not appear on the ExpressPoll in this "P" status. In an interview with Sharon Mitchell in December 2012, Ms. Mitchell said that no voters were actually ever placed in a "P" status. Sharon Mitchell intended the "P" to be a "flag" for election officials to clarify residential address, however, a "P" status would have prevented the voter's name from appearing on the ExpressPoll and there is a very high probability that they would not be allowed to vote on a DRE. There were 636 voters in "P" status in Fulton County on Election Day, November 6, 2012.

It does not appear the Fulton County has decided if or how to handle these registered voters, though there was a mention of holding hearings on the voters.

It is also unknown if there was some person or persons in the Fulton County Election Office who was attempting to either keep people as registered voter while having knowledge that they might be ineligible, or oppositely, trying to interfere with the rights of registered voters.

### Conclusions

These multiple failures seem to be linked to poor planning, insufficient training, poor communication, and poor decision-making.

Perhaps most troubling is the apparent utter disregard for the security and integrity of practically the entirety of the provisional ballot process.

Almost 10,000 votes were essentially un-documented or under-documented and under-secured.

The lack of accountability with provisional ballots calls every provisional ballot into question, and at approximately 9,600 ballots, that is not an insignificant number of votes.

It is not a far leap to move from incompetence to genuine election fraud when lists of voters are being altered, and fictitious reports of counting ballots are made, and documentation is so haphazard that seven provisional ballots that appear to be from the same voter are accepted.

It should be noted that even a cursory exploration of other election documents from the 2012 General Election (DRE Recap sheets, supplemental voter lists, and provisional ballot documents, to name a few) show a similar pattern of incompleteness, inaccuracy. Were an exhaustive, point-by-point examination of every precinct be made, the numbers of violations would likely increase exponentially.



## INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

### SUMMARY

---

CASE NAME: Fulton County Recovered Nov. 2012 Documents  
SEB CASE #: 2012-0000156  
INVESTIGATOR: Frances Watson  
DATE OF REPORT: January 27, 2014

---

#### **COMPLAINT:**

On January 21, 2014 the Secretary of State Investigations Division received notification that election documents had been located by employees at a business in Fulton County.

#### **COUNTY AND ELECTION INVOLVED:**

Fulton County, Fulton County Special Election held July 31, 2012

#### **JURISDICTION/VENUE:**

Jurisdiction will be with the State Election Board, Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia.  
Venue on any criminal prosecution will lie in Fulton County, Georgia

#### **ELECTION STAFF:**

Combined Board of Elections and Registration

#### **ELECTION CERTIFICATION:**

Dwight Brower 04/10/2006  
Shauna Dozier 06/14/2011

## **RESPONDENT(S):**

Dwight Brower Chief of Elections and Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections  
130 Peachtree St  
Suite 2186  
Atlanta, GA 30303  
(404) 612-7020 (Phone) (404) 730-7024 (Fax)

## **FINDING(S):**

The investigation reveals that Fulton County did rent a vehicle for the November 06, 2012 election. The vehicle was rented from 10/26/2012 -11/12/2012. There was a box of documents clearly marked as election documents left inside the rental vehicle when it was returned to the rental company. The rental company advised they contacted the person listed on the rental contract and notified them of the documents when they were located. The documents were never picked up. The rental company notified the Secretary of State's Office about the documents on January 21, 2014. The box was immediately retrieved and inventoried. There was an assortment of documents located inside the box. Including at least 268 voter registration applications. Many of the applications contained complete social security numbers, names, addresses, and date of births.

A complete inventory of the documents was completed and a spreadsheet included in the case file. It was determined that sufficient evidence exist to support violations of Georgia O.C.G.A. 21-2-40, O.C.G.A. 21-2-225 (a), and SEB rule 183-1-6.01 (01).

## **POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS:**

### **Georgia O.C.G.A 21-2-40 (268 violations)**

There is evidence to suggest that Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration did not fulfill their duty to enter the 268 Voter Registration Applications completed on November 06, 2012 at the polling place in violation of stated duties in Georgia O.C.G.A 21-2-40. The listed documents were left in a box unsecured in a vehicle after the close of the polls and not secured properly or turned over to the Board of Elections and Registration.

### **Georgia O.C.G.A. 21-2-225 (a) (268 violations)**

There is evidence that Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration failed to fulfill their duties in securing the 268 Voter Registration Cards/Applications in accordance with Georgia O.C.G.A. 21-2-225(a). The listed documents were left in a box unsecured in a vehicle, and not turned over to the Board of Elections and Registration. The documents were not kept confidential or secured.

### **SEB RULE 183-1-6.01(1) Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications (268 violations)**

There is evidence that Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration failed to fulfill their duties in receiving and processing the voter applications in accordance with subsection (c) of

O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224. Fulton County failed to receive, date stamp 268 voter registration applications dated November 06, 2012 and left in a rental vehicle, unsecured.



## INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

### REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

---

CASE NAME: Fulton County Recovered Nov. 2012 Documents

SEB CASE #: 2012-000156

INVESTIGATOR: Frances Watson

DATE OF REPORT: January 27, 2014

---

#### **COMPLAINT:**

On January 21, 2014 the Secretary of State Investigations Division received notification that election documents had been located by employees at a business in Fulton County.

#### **ELECTION INVOLVED:**

Fulton County, Fulton County Special Election held July 31, 2012

#### **JURISDICTION/VENUE:**

Jurisdiction will be with the State Election Board, Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia.  
Venue on any criminal prosecution will lie in Fulton County, Georgia

#### **ELECTION STAFF:**

Combined Board of Elections and Registration

#### **ELECTION CERTIFICATION:**

Dwight Brower 04/10/2006  
Shauna Dozier 06/14/2011

**COMPLAINANT:**

Georgia Secretary of State's Office

**RESPONDENT:**

Dwight Brower Chief of Elections and Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections  
130 Peachtree St  
Suite 2186  
Atlanta, GA 30303  
(404) 612-7020 (Phone) (404) 730-7024 (Fax)

**INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY:**

On January 21, 2014 at approximately Chief Harvey received information that election documents had been left in a rental truck after the November 2012 election. The vehicle had been rented by Fulton County. Chief Harvey requested Investigator Watson to respond to an address at 5909 Peachtree Dunwoody Road to pick up the box of election documents. Investigator Watson arrived at approximately 11:08 a.m. and received a box with a white sheet of paper taped to the outside with typed "CHANGE OF ADDRESS VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATIONS ENVELOPE #10 PROVISIONAL BALLOT STUBBS, SPOILED 7 CANCELLED BALLOTS (BALLOTS NOT CAST) ENVELOPE #11", displayed. Investigator Watson took a photograph of the box, (Exhibit #2). Investigator Watson completed an inventory of the documents inside the box and completed a spreadsheet listing the types and quantities of documents (Exhibit #3).

Investigator Watson then scanned and printed the Voter Registration Applications and turned the originals over to Chief Harvey on January 22, 2014. The printed copies were returned to the box inside a manila envelope marked as copies. Investigator Watson then checked the Absentee Ballots to make sure that the listed voters had voted on a DRE on Nov. 06, 2012, All but 2 Absentee Ballots that had voter information listed were accounted for as having voted on a DRE. The two remaining Absentee Ballots that had been completed belonged to Doris B Anderson and Ebony D. Harrold II.

Investigator Watson contacted Doris Anderson and Ebony Harrold on January 23, 2014. Doris Anderson advised that she did not remember what she did with the Absentee Ballot (Exhibit #5). Ebony Harrold advised that she had voted on a DRE in Atlanta and had dropped the Absentee Ballot in a bag at the precinct. Doris Anderson and Ebony Harrold II do not show as having voted in the November 06, 2012 election (Exhibit #4). Doris Anderson does not believe that she turned the Absentee Ballot in. Ebony Harrold was under the impression that she voted in the November 06, 2012 election.

On January 27, 2014 Investigator Watson received an email regarding the rental of the vehicle by Fulton County Elections on 10/26/2012-11/12/2012 (Exhibit #6).

**FINDINGS:**

The investigation reveals that election documents including:

- provisional issuance records
- unvoted provisional ballots
- provisional ballot stubbs,
- blank voter certificates,
- affidavits,
- unvoted absentee ballots
- voter registration applications completed and blank
- Absentee ballots
- spoiled absentee ballots
- deceased list
- precinct card
- voted ballot
- provisional ballot recap sheet
- absentee ballot canceled
- oaths
- pieces of torn up voter certificates
- absentee ballot envelope completed
- voter registration change of address
- election official name tag (blank),

were within the box. See spreadsheet for specifics of quantity of each document (Exhibit #3)

### **POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS:**

#### **Georgia O.C.G.A 21-2-40 (268 violations)**

There is evidence to suggest that Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration did not fulfill their duty to enter the 268 Voter Registration Applications completed on November 06, 2012 at the polling place in violation of stated duties in Georgia O.C.G.A 21-2-40. The listed documents were left in a box unsecured in a vehicle after the close of the polls and not secured properly or turned over to the Board of Elections and Registration.

#### **Georgia O.C.G.A. 21-2-225 (a) (268 violations)**

There is evidence that Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration failed to fulfill their duties in securing the 268 Voter Registration Cards/Applications in accordance with Georgia O.C.G.A. 21-2-225(a). The listed documents were left in a box unsecured in a vehicle, and not turned over to the Board of Elections and Registration. The documents were not kept confidential or secured.

#### **SEB RULE 183-1-6.01(1) Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications (268 violations)**

There is evidence that Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration failed to fulfill their duties in receiving and processing the voter applications in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section



21-2-224. Fulton County failed to receive, date stamp 268 voter registration applications dated November 06, 2012 and left in a rental vehicle, unsecured.

**EXHIBITS**

1. Witness List
2. Photograph of box
3. Inventory of box
4. MOI Ebony Harrold II
5. MOI Doris Anderson
6. Copy of email regarding Fulton County Board of Elections rental of vehicle



## INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

### WITNESS LIST

---

**Case Number:** 2012-000156  
**Case Name:** Fulton County Recovered Documents Nov. 2012  
**Investigator:** Frances Watson  
**Date of Report:** January 27, 2014

---

Fulton County Board of Elections and Registration  
And Dwight Brower Chief of Elections  
130 Peachtree Street  
Suite 2186  
Atlanta, GA. 30303  
404-612-7020  
505-730-7024 (Fax)

Frances Watson  
Investigator  
Secretary of State  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive  
Suite 820 West Tower  
Atlanta, GA. 30334  
404-657-1855


Exhibit # 1

**CHANGE OF ADDRESS  
VOTER REGISTRATION  
APPLICATIONS**

**ENVELOPE #10**

**PROVISIONAL BALLOT STUBS,  
VOIDED & CANCELLED BALLOTS  
(BALLOTS NOT CAST)**

**ENVELOPE # 11**



**Inventory of documents inside each envelope**

	06D/ 07K1/		01A		07J/													
Precinct	09A	06E	07K2	06S	09F	5of5	03T	02D	02A	05A2	05A1	07D	04W	08L	04A	07N	01R	10I
Prov. B. issuance records	3																	
Unvoted Prov Ballots	8																	
Prov. Ballot Stubbs	52																	3
Blank Voter Cert.'s	3																	
Completed Voter Cert.s	49				1													
Affidavits				3							1	3						
Unvoted A.B.				1			2	2				1						
V. Reg. App (completed)					40		12		5	1	3			18	2	42		
Absentee Ballots					11										3			
Spoiled A.Ballots								1										2
Deceased List									1									
Precinct Card															1			
Voted Ballot											1				1			
Prov. Ballot Recap sheet																1		
A.B. "Canceled"																	1	
Oaths																		
Blank VRAs					yes													
Pieces of torn up V. Cert.'s	yes																	
A.B. envelope completed																		
/oter R. Change of add.																		
lection Official Name Tag Blank																		

**Inventory of Box turned in on January 21, 2014**

- 1 Manila envelope marked #11- Provisional Ballot Stubs-Spoiled & Canceled (not cast) ballots  
Precinct 09A Date of election November 06, 2012
- 2 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 06D & 06E
- 3 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 07K1 & 07K2
- 4 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 06S
- 5 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 09F
- 6 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 01A
- 7 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 03T
- 8 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 02D
- 9 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 02A
- 10 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 05A2
- 11 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 05A1
- 12 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 07D
- 13 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 04W
- 14 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 08L
- 15 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 04A
- 16 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 07J & 07N
- 17 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 10M
- 18 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 01R
- 19 Manila envelope marked #11- Provisional Ballot Stubs-Spoiled & Canceled (not cast) ballots  
Precinct 10M
- 20 Manila envelope marked #8 Oath of Managers- Oath of clerks-Affidavits  
Precinct 10M
- 21 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 10L
- 22 Manila envelope marked #11- Provisional Ballot Stubs-Spoiled & Canceled (not cast) ballots  
Precinct 01P
- 23 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters

**Exhibit # 3**

Precinct 01J

- 24 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 10C
- 25 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 03S & 10F
- 26 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 06J
- 27 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 04E
- 28 Manila envelope marked #10-Voter registration applications-Canceled absentee ballots-Numbered list of deceased voters  
Precinct 02X

Loose items-in box

- 1 A.B. envelope "Stewart Earl (Kincaid?)
- 2 A.B. envelope (completed) "Void" Sandy Freda Pon
- 3 A.B. envelope (unopened) Ruth Eleanor Renner (Void)
- 3 A.B. envelope (completed) Doris B. Anderson (not voided)
- 4 A.B. unmarked and unidentified in white envelope only
- 5 Voter cert. Yolanda Santoso (address on rear)
- 6 Voter cert. "spoiled" Kelli Dicristina
- 7 Numbered list of deceased voters 07B/07C (one name)
- 8 Voter reg. change of address Thomas, Mark
- 9 Voter reg. change of address Stinson, Marvin
- 10 Voter reg. Change of address Baugh, Richard
- 11 Voter reg. Change of address Jones, Jeffrey
- 12 Voter reg. Don, Lisa (DeKalb address)
- 13 Voter reg. Thomas, Sadiki
- 14 Voter reg. Change of address Anderson, Dondre
- 15 Voter reg. Change of address Ames, Bill
- 16 Unvoted (loose) Absentee Ballot
- 17 Unvoted Absentee Ballot in white envelope with "Void" on unsealed envelope
- 18 Absentee Ballot unopened Jeanele R. Beskin "Void"
- 19 Absentee Ballot opened, unvoted for Linda Miller Dekle "Void" on envelope
- 20 Absentee Ballot unopened Mora Bon Hostetter (Not marked)
- 21 Voter reg. Van Leeunen (Sealed)
- 22 Precinct card Jay L. Williams
- 23 Absentee Ballot, unopened, but with #s written on ballot Andy Latimore
- 24 Absentee Ballot unopened "Spoiled" Faith Latasha Selkirk
- 25 Absentee Ballot opened, voted, "Spoiled" Clifton Amar Salaam
- 26 Voter cert. "Prov" Sharon Corett
- 27 Voter cert "Spoiled" Jonathan Toribo
- 28 Voter cert "Void" Lacaontiss Huskins
- 29 Voter cert "Provisional ?" James Scott Davis
- 30 Voter cert "Spoiled absentee ballot" Andy Kirk Latimore
- 31 Election Official name tag 'blank'
- 32 Voter cert "Spoiled mail in A.B." Carolyn James
- 33 Voter cert "A.B. issue not received spoil?" Sharon Pabian Bradley

34 Voter cert "Spoiled" Mary A. Cronley

Exhibit # 3



## INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

### Memorandum of Interview

---

**Case Number:** SEB 2012-156

**Case Name:** Fulton County Recovered Nov. 2102 Documents

**Person Interviewed:** Ebony D. Harrold II

**Date of Interview:** January 23, 2014 (Via Phone)

---

On January 23, 2014 at 10:45 a.m. Investigator Watson contacted Ebony D. Harrold II at 229-██████. Investigator Watson asked Ebony Harrold if she recalled requesting an Absentee Ballot for the November 2012 Presidential Election. Ebony stated that she request one and took it with her to a voting precinct in Atlanta. She completed a white sheet of paper, voted on a machine, and dropped the Absentee Ballot in a bag. Ebony could not recall the location or the name of the precinct. Ebony believed it was called The White House School precinct and that Martin Luther King had voted at that precinct.

Ebony D. Harrold II  
4310 Notting Hill Dr. SW  
Atlanta, GA. 30331  
229-██████

Page 1 of 1  
Inv. Frances Watson

Exhibit # 4





## INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

### Memorandum of Interview

---

**Case Number:** SEB 2012-156

**Case Name:** Fulton County Recovered Nov. 2102 Documents

**Person Interviewed:** Doris B. Anderson

**Date of Interview:** January 23, 2014 (Via Phone)

---

On January 23, 2014 at 10:35 a.m. Investigator Watson contacted Doris B. Anderson at 404-████████. Investigator Watson asked Doris Anderson if she recalled requesting an Absentee Ballot for the November 2012 Presidential Election. Doris stated that she did remember requesting one. Doris stated that she did not go to a precinct and does not know where her precinct is. In 2012 Doris had just lost her husband who had passed away. She had sold her house in Florida and moved to Georgia. Doris stated that she did not recall what she did with the Absentee Ballot.

Doris B. Anderson  
3747 Peachtree Road N.E. Apt 416  
Atlanta, GA. 30319  
404-████████

Page 1 of 1  
Inv. Frances Watson

Exhibit # 6

## **Watson, Frances**

---

**From:** Mills, Jeffrey S <Jeffrey.S.Mills@ehi.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, January 27, 2014 10:37 AM  
**To:** Watson, Frances  
**Subject:** RE: Election materials

Ms. Watson,

Here is what I have been able to find so far. There were three rentals in the last half of 2012 to Fulton County Elections.

1<sup>st</sup> rental 6/4/2012 – 7/4/2012 Nadine Fulton County Elections

2<sup>nd</sup> rental 7/4/2012 – 8/3/2012 Nadine Fulton County Elections (This was a re-write of the ticket which we do at the 30 day mark)

3<sup>rd</sup> rental 10/26/12 – 11/12/2012 Elections Fulton County

The branch manager that was at that store is no longer with the company. The Group Manager recalls that one of our employees that cleans the cars returning from rent found the box and turned it over to the manager. The manager contacted the number for the Fulton County Elections that was listed on the contract. I have not tried to reach out to the employee that left the company at this time. According to the group manager, their main point of contact was Nadine and a part time employee that works during elections. I have not been able to track down who they specifically talked to when reporting the box of envelopes.

Let me know if you have further questions.

Thank you.

Jeff

**ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS**

### **Jeff Mills**

Vice President of Finance

770-821-0399 office

770-821-0002 direct

404-375-6498 cell

800-727-0837 fax

[jeffrey.s.mills@ehi.com](mailto:jeffrey.s.mills@ehi.com)

### **Operating**

**Alamo** **Enterprise** **National**

Group Headquarters

5909 Peachtree Dunwoody Road

Atlanta, GA 30328

770-821-0002

[enterpriseholdings.com](http://enterpriseholdings.com)

**Exhibit #** 6

---

**From:** Gov. Deal's Communications Office  
**Sent:** Monday, October 16, 2017 8:42 AM  
**To:** Gov. Deal's Communications Office  
**Subject:** News Clips 10/16

**Daily News Clips**  
**Gov. Nathan Deal**  
**Monday, October 16**

**Good Morning!**

**ND**

1. AJC: [Georgia governor heads to France, Italy for weeklong trade mission](#)
2. WSB: [This is how Georgia became a leader in feature film production](#)
3. Columbus CEO: [State of the Georgia Ports: Surge of Private Investments, Record Cargo Volumes](#)
4. AJC: [Georgia close to picking school turnaround chief](#)
5. WJCL: [Funeral services Sunday for fallen Lyons soldier](#)
6. AJC: [Finances force some Georgia school systems to still furlough teachers](#)
7. AJC: [Donald Trump in our midst: Do you ignore, join or oppose him?](#)
8. Daily Report: [Gov. Deal Proclaims Dispute Resolution Week](#)

**GA News**

1. GeorgiaTrend: [The Future Is Here](#)
2. Rome News-Tribune: [Quick Start: A major key to Georgia's manufacturing sector successes](#)
3. Atlanta Business Chronicle: [Study-abroad programs ready technical college students to work at foreign-owned companies in Georgia](#)
4. Atlanta Business Chronicle: [Focused recruitment led to global manufacturing cluster in Cartersville-Bartow](#)
5. Saporta Report: [Metro traffic congestion to be eased as seaport cargo shifts from truck to rail](#)
6. Athens Banner-Herald: [Construction begins on new distribution facility for ALDI in Jackson County](#)
7. AJC: [IRS suspends Equifax contract, cites 'new information'](#)
8. Atlanta Business Chronicle: [US banks to introduce new anti-fraud measures after Equifax hack](#)

**GA Politics**

1. Georgia Health News: [Trump's latest move shakes ACA, but effect was foreseen in Georgia](#)
2. AJC: [Gerrymandering is unseemly, not illegal](#)
3. AJC: [First test starts Monday for new paper-ballot machines in Georgia](#)
4. AJC: [Atlanta mayor race moves into final sprint](#)
5. AJC: [Feds: Ga. foreclosure program soaked up admin fees and failed needy](#)
6. WABE: [Georgia's Blueberry Farmers Seek Better NAFTA Deal](#)
7. Atlanta Business Chronicle: [Atlanta Confederate monuments review committee named](#)
8. Statesboro Herald: [Kemp advocates cap on state spending](#)

**ND**

**1. AJC**

**Georgia governor heads to France, Italy for weeklong trade mission**

**By Greg Bluestein**  
**Monday, October 16**

Gov. Nathan Deal is in Europe this week for a weeklong trade mission to drum up more business in Italy and France.

The governor departed for Paris on Saturday with several economic development aides and will head to northern Italy on Tuesday. He will meet with several businesses that already have operations in Georgia, such as Luxottica and Pirelli, and sit down with potential prospects.

The trips include a Wednesday reception hosted by the U.S. consul general in Milan and a Thursday event held by the Trentino Manufacturing Industry Organization to try to build inroads into a northern Italy region that's a relatively new market.

State officials see Italy as a solid trade partner with potential to grow. The state shipped about \$530 million worth of goods to Italy in 2016 and imported about \$1.7 billion in products in 2016. At least 66 Italian firms are operating in Georgia, employing about 700 people.

The governor, nearing his final year in office, has gone on a range of economic development trips during his two terms. His stops include missions to Brazil, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Korea and Panama.

Pat Wilson, his economic development commissioner, said the in-person visits send a "strong signal that we are open for business."

"A handshake and a face-to-face conversation is an extremely valuable business development tool," he said.

## **2. WSB**

### **This is how Georgia became a leader in feature film production** **Saturday, October 14**

Atlanta, with its fast-growing film industry, has been called the Hollywood of the South. A 2016 study shows that maybe Hollywood should be called the Atlanta of the West.

The study found that Georgia has the most feature films in production, making the Peach State the new film capital of the world, ahead of California, New York and Louisiana, according to Project Casting's reporting.

From Atlanta to Savannah, Columbus to Rome, Georgia hosted primary production for 17 of the 100 top-grossing domestic feature films released in 2016, according to an expansive study by LA Film.

California hosted 12, finishing fourth behind the United Kingdom and Canada.

Georgia more than doubled its 2015 total of eight, and hosted almost three times as many productions as fifth place New York and Louisiana.

### **Aggressive legislation put Georgia on top**

The No. 1 ranking is the most recent success in the state's years-long efforts to attract showbiz dollars. Tax policies targeting the entertainment industry have made Georgia a financially attractive location for feature film production.

In 2008, a new law gave a 30 percent tax break to productions filmed in Georgia—and that was enough to entice Hollywood producers to make the big move to the Deep South. Eight years later, the dream of Georgia having the most feature films in production had become a reality.

Big-time films like "The Hunger Games" and "Divergent," along with AMC's smash-hit TV drama, "The Walking Dead" have helped boost Georgia's reputation among producers, according to Project Casting.

In October 2017, 48 TV shows and movies were filming in Georgia, the website reported. Among them, Kevin Hart returns to Atlanta to shoot his new comedy "Night School," which is about a group of adults attending night school to pass a GED exam. The Marvel connection continues to bring Georgia more feature film production, this time filming "Ant-Man and the Wasp" starring Paul Rudd and Evangeline Lilly.

### **Georgia's film industry by the numbers**

The bold move of 2008 has never failed to see more return than money spent on taxpayer investment, and the numbers have grown steadily. The first year, the tax breaks amounted to \$260.4 million, but the economic impact was almost twice that at almost \$465 million.

The next year, the impact topped \$1 billion, and by 2015, the investment of \$1.7 billion brought in \$6 billion, according to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

It's only the beginning, said Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal.

"The film industry has created a home in Georgia, and I am committed to retaining this relationship by constructing a strong, film-ready workforce that will continue to help the industry thrive."

### **3. Columbus CEO**

#### **State of the Georgia Ports: Surge of Private Investments, Record Cargo Volumes Monday, October 16**

During his annual State of the Port Address, Georgia Ports Authority Executive Director Griff Lynch announced record cargo volumes, infrastructure development and two new customers bringing a combined 1 million square feet of additional distribution center space to Savannah.

"We're expanding on all fronts," Lynch said. "We're adding market share through organic growth and the addition of new accounts, and we're building the new infrastructure necessary to continue processing this cargo with world-class efficiency."

Georgia Gov. Nathan Deal, who attended the event hosted by the Savannah Propeller Club, credited the Authority Board and the GPA team for achieving growth of 8.3 percent in total tonnage across all terminals during Fiscal Year 2017, and doing it safely and without congestion. Savannah handled 3.85 million twenty-foot equivalent units, and Brunswick moved 607,000 auto and machinery units. No other port in the Southeast recorded greater volumes for these commodities.

"Our ports' outstanding FY17 performance highlights the value these assets bring to economic development throughout Georgia," Deal said. "Growing capabilities in Savannah and Brunswick support the expansion of manufacturing and distribution, and the jobs these private developments provide for our citizens."

GPA Board Chairman Jimmy Allgood said the success of Georgia's thriving logistics industry is due to a unified vision of the state's future.

"Like most enterprises, it starts from the top, with Governor Deal, who has been a tireless champion of our ports and logistics networks," Allgood said. "Both the Governor's and the Legislature's support of port deepening and transportation projects have helped make Savannah and Brunswick what they are today. None of this would have been possible without GPA's leadership team and 1,200 employees whose dedication to superior service is second to none."

During his presentation, Lynch announced two major e-commerce developments. Noble House, a national furniture supplier, will build a 630,000 square-foot facility to serve the eastern half of the U.S., while home accessories company Best Choice will build 345,000 square feet. These announcements are in addition to 3 million square feet of distribution center space completed within the last year, and 5.2 million square feet currently under construction. Including Thursday's announcements, this new activity will bring Savannah's industrial inventory to more than 57 million square feet, of which less than 2 percent is currently available.

"Today's announcements are the result of the strong collaboration of Georgia's entire maritime community, including GPA, the International Longshoremen's Association, stevedores, motor carriers, rail and third-party service providers," Lynch said. "We thank Noble House and Best Choice and the many other business leaders who have selected Georgia and the Georgia Ports this year. E-commerce is a growing opportunity for Georgia as companies take advantage of cost savings related to landing cargo closer to population centers in the Eastern U.S."

Port-related e-commerce announcements from FY2017 include an 846,000 square-foot distribution center for Wayfair, which will add 150 jobs; and a 753,000 square-foot facility for Tory Burch, bringing another 150 jobs to Georgia.

Lynch outlined plans to accommodate record growth and expand new markets. Those plans include:

**A \$128 million Mega-Rail Project.** Additional track on terminal will allow the GPA to better handle 10,000-foot long unit trains. More efficient rail offerings will position Savannah to rapidly increase service to an arc of inland markets, from Atlanta to Memphis, St. Louis, Chicago and the Ohio Valley.

Construction is expected to begin in the first quarter of Calendar Year 2018. Completion is expected at the end of 2020.

**Growing Savannah's crane fleet.** The Port of Savannah has 10 Super Post-Panamax ship-to-shore cranes on order, for a total of 36 cranes. Four will arrive in 2018, and the final six by 2020. Having 36 cranes on dock will allow Garden City Terminal to move 1,300 containers per hour on and off vessels.

**The Appalachian Regional Port.** The GPA broke ground on this inland rail yard in Chatsworth, Ga., in FY2017. Its completion in the fall of 2018 will cut Atlanta truck traffic by 50,000 trips per year, and expand GPA's reach into Tennessee, Northeast Alabama and parts of Kentucky.

**Adding capacity for motor carriers.** The GPA will expand its current gate structure by adding six truck lanes, giving Garden City Terminal a total of 54 lanes, a 12.5 percent increase.

**Statewide logistics expansion.** Off-terminal, the state of Georgia is investing \$10 billion over 10 years into freight mobility. The plan will create dedicated truck lanes, alleviate traffic and improve safety across the state. Within five years, the state will deliver the Brampton Road Connector, linking Garden City Terminal to I-516, and extend the Jimmy Deloach Parkway from I-95 to I-16. This will form a complete cargo beltway for motor carriers between the port and the interstate system.

The Savannah Harbor Expansion Project. Overseen by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the project will deepen the outer harbor to 49 feet at low tide (56 feet at high tide), and the inner harbor to 47 feet (54 feet at high tide). SHEP is 35 percent complete, with a finish date in late 2020. It will allow the largest vessels calling on the Port of Savannah to take on heavier loads and to transit the river without having to wait for high tide. Since the opening of the expanded Panama Canal at the start of FY2017, the percentage of the fleet calling on Savannah that are neo-Panamax vessels has grown from 42 percent to 60 percent.

#### **4. AJC**

##### **Georgia close to picking school turnaround chief**

**By Ty Tagami**

**Friday, October 13**

A search committee has winnowed a list of candidates to lead Georgia's school turnaround effort, and the state education board will interview the finalists Tuesday.

The Education Turnaround Advisory Council has been meeting since June, soon after it was established under a new state law for improving low-performing schools.

Members conducted telephone and Skype interviews to reduce the list of 58 applicants. The finalists -- their names are not yet public -- will meet with the state school board at the Georgia Department of Education offices in downtown Atlanta at 8:45 a.m.

One of the advisory council members, Jimmy Stokes, said he was pleased with both the process and the people selected.

"They're very well qualified," said Stokes, the executive director of the Georgia Association of Educational Leaders, which represents school administrators. The three to be interviewed Tuesday have experience with statewide school turnaround efforts, he said. He wouldn't name them but said none is currently employed in Georgia.

Stokes said all the finalists are also "very nurturing, down to earth people." Diplomacy will be key, given the delicate task at hand: the Chief Turnaround Officer will have to rely on collaboration with local school districts and the Georgia Department of Education, since she or he will have a relatively small staff. The state has set aside \$1 million in the budget to fund the office, with \$1.25 million more expected to come from a grant program.

There's opportunity for ill will: school districts targeted by the new chief will be compelled by the Georgia Board of Education to improve their schools or face consequences, such as loss of control; and the Georgia Department of Education will be expected to collaborate though it lost its bid to direct the project.

The state agency's leader, Superintendent Richard Woods, tussled with Gov. Nathan Deal for control over the turnaround effort, and lost. The Georgia General Assembly put the turnaround chief under the authority of the state school board, which is appointed by the governor.

#### **5. WJCL**

##### **Funeral services Sunday for fallen Lyons soldier**

**Sunday, October 15**

A Toombs County soldier killed in an attack will be remembered with funeral services this weekend.

Staff Sgt. Dustin M. Wright, 29, was among four Green Berets killed in an attack on October 4 in southwest Niger. The Department of Defense said the men came under hostile fire while on a reconnaissance patrol.

His funeral is Sunday at Booster Stadium in Lyons.

Georgia Governor Nathan Deal ordered flags to fly at half-staff Friday as a show of respect for the memory and sacrifice of Wright.

Also killed in the attack were: Staff Sgt. Bryan C. Black, 35, Puyallup, Washington, Staff Sgt. Jeremiah W. Johnson, 39, Springboro, Ohio, and Sgt. La David T. Johnson, 25, Miami Gardens, Florida.

All four were assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

## **6. AJC**

### **Finances force some Georgia school systems to still furlough teachers**

**By James Salzer**

**Sunday, October 15**

Gov. Nathan Deal and lawmakers were unhappy last year when only 40 percent of Georgia school districts gave teachers the salary hikes the General Assembly promised.

This year most gave at least the 2 percent increase approved by lawmakers, according to a state Department of Education survey obtained by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. But the survey found something else: Eight years after the Great Recession ended, a few rural school districts still have to furlough staffers to keep their doors open.

That surprised House Appropriations Chairman Terry England, R-Auburn, who has sought to get financial help to rural districts in the past.

“Part of it is that their property tax revenues have not caught up with pre-recession levels,” England said. “There is very little happening in any of those (communities) that will turn that around.”

The desperate plight of small-town hospitals has been well documented in recent years, but rural school districts have long faced some of the same challenges: a shrinking or stagnant population and small commercial base, which in turn means property tax revenue to supplement state funding is hard to come by.

On top of that, state budgets have included, for more than a decade, “austerity cuts,” reductions in what the funding formula says districts are supposed to receive to educate children. Deal and lawmakers have whittled down what had been an annual cut of about \$1 billion to \$166 million in recent years.

But those “austerity cuts,” which grew during the Great Recession, are one of the reasons many districts say they diverted teacher raise money in the past for other things, such as reducing furloughs or adding back instruction days to shortened school years.

Politically, lawmakers want to be able to brag about giving teachers raises, particularly when they put hundreds of millions of dollars into the budget for that purpose. Besides cost-of-living raises funded by the state, many educators also get longevity increases for teaching another year.



Until this year, Deal and legislators had given local school boards the flexibility to decide how to spend the money for cost-of-living raises. Many chose to use it to get them back to where they were before the recession or for one-time bonuses to teachers that wouldn't obligate them to pay the same amount the next year.

This year, Deal and lawmakers all but mandated 2 percent pay raises, and the Education Department survey showed only three districts and a handful of state charter schools didn't give any pay hikes. A few others gave teachers one-time bonuses, such as Cobb County, where the school board approved 1.1 percent awards.

Deal expected every district to comply with the General Assembly's wishes.

"It's disappointing to see certain school systems did not pass on raises clearly intended for pay raises," said his spokeswoman, Jen Ryan.

One of the districts listed as giving no raises was the Chattooga County School District.

However, Chattooga Superintendent Jimmy Lenderman said the survey was wrong, and his teachers got the state raise.

Two others on the list, Calhoun County Schools in southwest Georgia and Dublin City Schools, are both facing financial issues. Dublin officials have been trying to whittle away at a sizable deficit.

Calhoun officials said in the survey that they saw a \$234,000 cut this year in state funding meant to aid districts with low property wealth.

Calhoun was also one of the district that reported having furloughs — seven days' worth this school year. Attempts to reach officials in the district were unsuccessful.

Furloughs of teachers and school staff were common from 2009 to 2012 as the state tried to dig its way out of the Great Recession. The downturn brought a major decline in state tax revenue, and lawmakers cut school funding to balance the budget.

The Education Department report said 11 school districts had furloughs in fiscal 2017, which ended June 30. Five districts planned furloughs this year, although one has since decided against them.

The Meriwether County School System, southwest of Atlanta, reported that its staffers will take five furlough days without pay this year.

Tim Dixon, the district's superintendent of schools, said the system has been working to get out of debt. When he arrived two years ago, district staffers had to take off 10 days a year without pay. By next year he's hoping the furloughs will be eliminated.

"We are like many other small districts," Dixon said. "We are losing what little industry we have and our enrollment continues to decline."

Despite that, Dixon said the local school board "felt compelled" to give teachers raises.

"Like teachers in other districts, our folks work hard and we did not feel like five furloughs on top of no pay raise was fair to our folks," he said. "I have never been a fan of balancing the budget on the backs of our teachers and staff."

England, the lawmaker, said the Education Department survey showed most districts got the message members

of the General Assembly intended to send: Pay raise money should go for pay raises.

Angela Palm of the Georgia School Boards Associations touted it as a sign that most districts have stabilized financially enough to give raises.

But she added: “For all the reasons you see in other reports, many rural districts are struggling financially because their community is struggling. Hopefully the focus being put on rural issues will help us find new or better ways to address these problems.”

The House and Senate both have committees traveling across the state studying the problems of rural Georgia, and they expect to make recommendations before the General Assembly reconvenes in January.

John Palmer, a Cobb County educator and spokesman for the teacher group TRAGIC, said the financial “shell games” of state leaders — touting pay raises while maintaining “austerity cuts” — hasn’t helped the situation.

“Those districts who have been able to absorb the cuts locally are keeping their heads above water, but districts without a strong commercial tax base are still struggling to keep their doors open,” Palmer said. “The austerity cuts and continual shifting of costs to local districts are creating a two-tiered system of education in Georgia.

“All of Georgia’s students deserve a quality education, not just the ones who live in districts who can raise their own local taxes to cover the lack of state funding for schools.”

## **7. AJC**

### **Donald Trump in our midst: Do you ignore, join or oppose him?**

**By Jim Galloway**

**Friday, October 13**

Donald Trump hasn’t set foot in Atlanta since April, but the president’s insatiable appetite for attention has done what PlayStation hasn’t. At least not yet.

Via Twitter and actual policy, Trump has become a virtual reality in our midst, roiling not just Georgia politics, but the state’s business climate as well.

Decisions abound: Do you engage or avoid, join or oppose? Recent days have brought three case studies to the foreground.

We begin with Ed Bastian, CEO of Delta Air Lines. Last December, Bastian pronounced himself “very encouraged” by Trump’s emphasis on fair trade. Delta has long pointed at airlines in the Middle East, complaining that government subsidies, and in some cases outright ownership, pose an unfair advantage.

After a White House visit in February, Bastian declared himself still satisfied with the administration’s attitude “on issues important to Delta, our employees and our customers.” Early this month, the Delta CEO praised the White House’s tax reform proposal, sight unseen.

And then.

Last week, Delta found itself on the wrong side of Trump’s “America First” theory of economics. The airline has negotiated to purchase to purchase 75 jets from Bombardier, a Canadian aircraft manufacturer.

The Boeing Co., an American firm, has accused Bombardier of “dumping” its aircraft on the U.S. market. And

Delta's jets now might carry a tariff of nearly 300 percent, courtesy of Trump and the U.S. Commerce Department.

Suddenly, a \$25 million jet could cost the corporate giant \$100 million. Multiply that times 75, and soon you're talking real money. As in \$5 billion and more.

"We will not pay those tariffs, and that is very clear," Bastian said Tuesday. "We intend to take the aircraft. I can't tell you how it's going to eventually work out."

As Delta's relationship with Trump has taken a turn, so has Bastian's language.

Only a day earlier, the CEO addressed the Hispanic Corporate Council of Atlanta, emphasizing the 49 percent stake that Delta now has in Aeromexico. Bastian never mentioned Trump. Just his wall.

"I don't know what they're going to do with the wall they keep talking about, but we're going to fly over that damn thing, whatever it is," Bastian said Monday.

"There's a lot of anxiety, a lot of fear that cuts into the heart of who we are as a society. It's caused a lot of people to wonder what's going on and where are we going," he said.

Case No. 2 involves Councilwoman Mary Norwood. The Atlanta race for mayor is formally nonpartisan. That said, the Atlanta voters who live in Fulton County, arguably more conservative as a group than those who live in DeKalb, gave Democrat Hillary Clinton 86 percent of their votes last November, to 16 percent for Trump.

Clinton won every ward in the city, including GOP-dominated District 8.

Norwood may be the frontrunner in polls, but her lead is slipping. The Democratic Party of Georgia is already attempting to wrap Norwood in Republican cellophane, as it did eight years ago. Should she make it to the run-off, Norwood must know that her rival will try to drape Trump around her neck, too.

And so it was a surprise to see video of a Monday forum in which Norwood bobbled a simple question: What do you think about Donald Trump?

"We have a president," she said on a second try, careful not to mention names, and indulging in relaxed syntax. "I am telling you that I do not support those policies. I am saying to this audience that I do not support any policies that are bigotry, that are racism, that are in any way related to --"

The crowd cut her off.

Fortunately, forums in the Atlanta race for mayor aren't hard to come by. On Thursday morning, in a debate hosted by the Atlanta Press Club, Norwood first made sure to say that she voted for Clinton last November. Then she expressed disappointment with Trump, though not by name.

"The first year in office has been disappointing to many citizens in this country. The policies that have come out of this administration have not been policies, for the most part, that I have agreed with at all," she said. "But I will say this -- I will work closely to get the right policies for Atlanta."

In Case No. 3, we have Lt. Gov. Casey Cagle and a dog that hasn't barked. Not yet.

Cagle, one of several Republicans in the 2018 hunt for governor, would no doubt argue that he's a strong and faithful supporter of President Trump. But last month, Alabama taught us that this is not necessarily enough.

U.S. Sen. Luther Strange, an incumbent Republican in good standing with both Trump and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., was soundly defeated by twice-ousted Supreme Court jurist Roy Moore in the Alabama GOP primary runoff.

Steve Bannon, the former White House strategist who helped orchestrate Moore's victory, now stalks the land — promising a nationwide pitchfork revolution within the Republican party. On Trump's behalf.

This week, the Cagle campaign made public an internal poll that it bought and paid for. We don't normally put much stock in such things, but the survey of 600 GOP primary voters, conducted Sept. 28 to Oct. 1, helps explain why beads of sweat aren't popping out on the lieutenant governor's forehead.

Trump scored extremely well, but so did Gov. Nathan Deal. As did Cagle, who was first elected lieutenant governor in 2006. A large majority say the state is on the "right track."

In other words, at least according to the Cagle campaign, Breitbart fever has yet to infect Georgia.

And none of Cagle's rivals — Secretary of State Brian Kemp, state Sen. Michael Williams of Cumming, former state senator Hunter Hill of Atlanta, and Clay Tippins of Cobb County — have so far consolidated the pitchfork vote.

But it's still early. By the time a June runoff rolls around, this race, too, is likely to be as volatile as Donald Trump's Twitter account.

Perhaps, in part, because of Donald Trump's Twitter account.

## **8. Daily Report**

### **Gov. Deal Proclaims Dispute Resolution Week**

**By Katheryn Tucker**

**Friday, October 13**

Gov. Nathan Deal—lawyer, former juvenile court judge, father of a superior court judge and leader of a nationally known criminal justice reform effort—is encouraging litigants to settle their differences outside the courthouse.

The Judicial Council of Georgia announced Friday that Deal signed a proclamation recognizing Oct. 15-21, 2017, as "Dispute Resolution Week" in Georgia.

The council explained in a news release that Dispute Resolution Week supports the education of judges, members of the bar, and the public in finding "durable solutions to resolve disputes outside of a courtroom by utilizing mediation, arbitration, and other restorative processes."

The week is intended to empower individuals, families, communities, organizations and businesses to find common ground through collaborative problem solving, the council said. The Georgia Commission on Dispute Resolution, State Bar of Georgia Dispute Resolution Section, and Georgia Office of Dispute Resolution will be working together to promote these values and advocate for champions in the field of dispute resolution, the release said.

## **GA News**

### **1. GeorgiaTrend**

#### **The Future Is Here**

**By Susan Percy**

**Monday, October 16**

Technology has changed Georgia's multi-billion-dollar manufacturing industry dramatically. For workers with the right skills, job opportunities have never been better.

Jason Moss says the very word "manufacturing" makes a lot of people think of Lucy and Ethel in the candy factory, the classic I Love Lucy scene. "They think of it as a production-line-only job. That's far from the truth," says Moss, who is founder and CEO of the Georgia Manufacturing Alliance.

Funny as that scene is, the old black-and-white image of TV comics stuffing chocolates in their mouths to keep up with a fast-moving conveyor belt doesn't begin to reflect the reality of advanced manufacturing in Georgia and the sophisticated technology it uses. Truth is, unskilled work and workers are rapidly disappearing.

"Technical advances are helping companies automate processes to be more efficient and to utilize less human capital and to be more exact in their processes," says Tom Croteau, deputy commissioner for global commerce at the Georgia Department of Economic Development (GDEcD).

These changes, which have occurred over the last few years – spurred by the recession and the loss of factories to places where labor is cheaper – are helping revive the manufacturing industry even as they are creating a huge demand for the skilled labor needed to make the advanced processes work.

"The perception people have of manufacturing has not caught up with reality," says Brian Cooksey, director of operations training and development for Shaw Industries, the carpet and flooring manufacturer based in Dalton. "They still think these are dirty jobs in dark plants – but the reality is that you are using your mind as much if not more than your muscles. Our plants are clean and bright – you're engaging, you're problem solving, you're thinking on the fly, collaborating with others. These are really good jobs with lots of growth opportunities."

### **By the Numbers**

Today Georgia has more than 10,000 manufacturing facilities employing upwards of 360,000 workers; the industry makes up more than 11 percent of the state's economy. The figures include traditional – there is still some of that around – and advanced manufacturing. Total manufacturing output for 2015 was \$54.8 billion, and manufactured goods accounted for 91 percent of Georgia's total exports in 2016.

"I don't believe there are many operations that are left today that are not employing automation and technology," says Croteau. "We've become such a global economy that you just can't survive if you are not efficient with your processes."

"An infusion of technology and the idea of advanced manufacturing are really offering the opportunity to bring all kinds of manufacturing back to Georgia, from apparel to flooring to wood industries," he says.

A new 74,000-square-foot adidas SPEED FACTORY, which will use robots to manufacture running shoes, is set to open in Cherokee County before the end of the year.

Advanced techniques are in play across the manufacturing spectrum; the automotive industry is usually the one that comes to mind first. The Kia plant in West Point, which relies heavily on robotics, has the capacity to

produce 360,000 cars every year.

But even older, more traditionally human-labor-intensive industries have adopted technology, Croteau points out. In agriculture, crop irrigation techniques rely on satellite imagery, remote programming and in-ground sensors. And the timber industry: “These days when trees come in,” he says, “they are scanned optically and measured out with lasers to provide the equipment with what the optimal cut will be. They know exactly how many cuts they can get out of that tree.”

## **Cause and Effect**

So exactly what turned manufacturing into advanced manufacturing?

“Hard times,” Croteau says. “I would say somewhere in early- to mid-2002, we were going through a phase where a lot of jobs were going offshore. We were losing a lot of jobs to Mexico, to China, to other places. Then we went into the recession years – 2008 to 2012. That all caused companies to need to be leaner and more efficient to compete with offshore manufacturing.”

He references Cooper Tires, the Albany plant that closed in 2008. “Because they were using traditional manufacturing methods, they were being beaten out by some of the new tire manufacturers using more advanced methods. We now have multiple tire manufacturers here in Georgia using advanced manufacturing: Pirelli in Rome, Toyo in Bartow, Kumho in Macon. Sentury, a Chinese tire maker, is coming to LaGrange with a \$530-million investment and over 1,000 jobs.”

West Georgia Technical College’s Steve Cromer, senior director of advanced manufacturing, credits consumer demand for high-quality goods at lower costs for boosting advanced manufacturing.

“The only way to drive costs down and improve quality is to make it an automated process,” he says, “because machines do the job perfectly every time. They don’t show up late for work, they run 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Companies have been replacing non-skilled labor with machines. That’s been the trend for the past 15 or 18 years, and it’s going to only increase going forward.”

## **Revivals**

Advanced manufacturing techniques have been a real boon for flooring, which endured some tough times.

“Our industry certainly was faced with some challenges,” says Shaw’s Cooksey. “Not only was the industry hit by the recession and decreases in housing, but at the same time was facing some shifts in consumer preferences. It used to be carpet was the main type of flooring that was in demand, then [it] shifted to more hard-surface products. A lot of things were happening at the same time.

“As technology has advanced and is more available, it really gave our company an opportunity to look at where we were, where we needed to be. We’ve invested billions of dollars back into our business over the last five to eight years,” he says. “Almost every plant has new technology that really covers the gamut – how we deal with raw material processing, how we produce a product, how we handle the finished inventory – every aspect of our business, even transportation.”

When Standard Textile made the decision four years ago to bring its manufacturing operations back to the U.S., all the efforts started at its plant in Thomaston, says Gary Heiman, president and CEO. The plant opened in April 2015 and employs about 200 people to make bed and bath products, including all towels used by the Marriott hotel chain in North America. The company is headquartered in Cincinnati.

“The major inhibiting factor in the U.S. is the cost of labor,” Heiman says, “with all that includes – healthcare, and so on and so forth.

“We committed ourselves to invest heavily in using the Internet of Things, digitally moving information back and forth from plant to management, creating dashboards, having all our machines with sensors on them so our machines could speak to management, and so management could speak back.”

By design, this eliminated a lot of manual labor. “You don’t have to have tens and tens of people dealing with quality control and quality assurance and many, many other factors where you’re using the human eye,” he says.

“We committed to bring manufacturing back to the U.S. and to significantly collapse the supply chain – so from fiber to yarn to fabric to finishing, it’s all done right here,” he says. “We’ve been able to do things better, faster, more efficiently and with far more creativity in this way.”

### **Keeping it Up**

The same factors that made Georgia a good place for traditional manufacturing work for advanced manufacturing operations: favorable business climate, business-savvy state leadership, great location and a logistical system that makes it easy to import raw materials and export finished goods.

“We are known as a pro-business state, a right-to-work state, which is very important,” says Croteau, “a state that has great talent coming out of its universities and the technical college system, with what is widely known as the best worker training program in the U.S. – Quick Start.”

For international companies, he says, the diversity in and around the city of Atlanta adds an extra level of comfort.

All good, of course. But the reality is there is a real shortage of skilled workers to fill the new jobs that are opening up.

The manufacturing alliance’s Moss recalls a recent conversation with a home goods manufacturer in North Georgia who told him he has four machines he can’t run because he doesn’t have enough people. “I need workers today,” the man told him. “I’ll pay them X amount if they show up every day and pass the drug test. I’ll train them on everything else, and they can have a life-long career. I need people.”

Lots of folks are working to help fill that demand, especially Georgia’s technical college system, the economic development department, the manufacturing industry itself and individual companies.

“We’ve got to have a workforce,” says Shaw’s Cooksey. “What we’ve seen work here in Dalton and the northwest Georgia area is really having those collaborative partnerships with business and industry at the table – your K-12 institutions, your post- secondary partners, your chamber of commerce, your city and county government all being together.”

“Going forward,” Croteau says, “we need to continue to recognize where the gaps are, where private industry is having trouble identifying qualified job candidates or workers to be sure we’re putting emphasis on educating people with that type of training to meet that demand.”

### **Educating a Workforce**

Gains in manufacturing efficiencies have made training and re-training even more crucial for companies that

need employees to work with the new processes and for workers who can no longer get by without skills.

In the new world of advanced manufacturing, non-skilled positions are rapidly disappearing, says Steve Cromer, senior director of advanced manufacturing at West Georgia Technical College.

“Go on a factory floor today,” he says, “and there may be 500 employees. Go back in five years, and they’ll be doing more operations at a faster pace and higher quality and maybe have 150 or 200 less positions,” because non-skilled jobs will be automated.

West Georgia’s training focus is precision manufacturing, which supports manufacturers in the region, including but not limited to automotive. “Anything in the production facility that moves product from one point to another in automated fashion without a human interaction is what we’re training the students to work on,” he says.

The college has three different locations – LaGrange, Coweta and Carrollton – where the classes are taught. The placement record for students who graduate, he says, is 100 percent.

Kathryn Hornsby, assistant commissioner for technical education for the Technical College System of Georgia, says, “All 22 colleges offer some form of manufacturing [training], whether it be degree, diploma or certification.”

More than 1,800 students are enrolled each year in those programs; nine within the system have a special advanced manufacturing focus, like West Georgia’s. Georgia Piedmont Technical College is set to open a new advanced manufacturing lab in November at its Newton campus.

The technical college system operates Georgia’s top-rated Quick Start program, which helps new or expanding operations train their workers to companies’ specific needs. And Hornsby says the system is putting a great deal of effort into apprenticeship programs and working with students in the Move On When Ready program, which allows them to earn college credits while they are still in high school.

“Training beyond high school is crucial,” Hornsby says. “The day when you could only have a high school diploma is over.” – Susan Percy

## **2. Rome News-Tribune**

### **Quick Start: A major key to Georgia’s manufacturing sector successes**

**By Doug Walker**

**Sunday, October 15**

Georgia Quick Start, a division of the Technical College System of Georgia, has once again been voted the number one workforce training program in the U.S. for the eighth consecutive year, according to a survey conducted by “Area Development” magazine, a trade publication for professional site locators.

Quick Start is a customized program, with experts who are able to develop and implement innovative training programs for workers across a broad spectrum of applications from bio-engineering to advanced manufacturing, even food and beverage jobs.

“Quick Start is one of the major economic development incentives for attracting new jobs to Georgia,” said TCSG Commissioner Gretchen Corbin in a press release. Prior to assuming the reins of the TCSG, Corbin had been deputy commissioner of the Georgia Department of Economic Development. “In Georgia a huge percentage of the companies the State of Georgia is working with to grow, or locate, receive Quick Start



Assistance.”

“It is a very important incentive, an important tool in the kit for us to market,” said Rome Floyd Chamber President Al Hodge. “It relates to the priority that companies are placing on education and the workforce. That’s so important to employers and site selection consultants and the rest of the network.”

“I’ll call it a secret weapon but it’s really not a secret, they keep getting all these wonderful accolades,” said Melinda Lemmon, director of the office of economic development for Cartersville and Bartow County. “Other states try to emulate what they do, but not nearly with the same success of the Georgia Quick Start program.”

Lemmon said the program is incredibly valuable not only for industrial recruitment but for retention and expansion of existing industries.

Quick Start is more than what the traditional Technical College System of Georgia would offer, such as forklift training or management programs where the curriculum is already designed. “This is customized,” Lemmon said. “The services are available at no cost to companies who are expanding or adding new jobs in Georgia.”

The September 2017 issue of the magazine reports Quick Start has handled more than 6,500 projects, training more than 1 million employees, and has been the “deciding factor” for many companies choosing Georgia.

“Our team works diligently to stay current with all the latest advanced manufacturing techniques, and approaches every project, large or small, with the same level of professionalism and quality,” said Jackie Rohosky, assistant commissioner for Economic Development Programs at TCSG and head of Quick Start in a press release. “And, it’s rewarding to see our efforts recognized.”

Commissioner Corbin said in the event a new company brings proprietary technology to the market, if the Quick Start program doesn’t have in-house expertise, they will contract with a company that can provide that expertise on the equipment, such as a specific manufacturer.

Georgia Northwestern Technical College President Pete McDonald said the re-training aspect of the program for existing industries’ expansion is a particularly critical component of the program. F&P Georgia has had four or five expansions since their start-up in 2002, and each of those times they have taken advantage of Quick Start, McDonald said.

“They may have brought in a different kind of technology and some of the existing employees had to be retrained to adapt to the new processes they are using.”

“We have an excellent track record with the customized employment through Quick Start and the technical college system,” Hodge said.

“Quick Start is what sealed the deal,” said Jim Hawk, president of Toyo Tire North America in White.

Asked if Quick Start had not been available would Rome and Floyd County have missed out on any prospects, Hodge said, “Perhaps. I do know that it certainly has been an important part of the package that is offered to companies.”

Corbin’s office in Atlanta provided data indicating that at least 18 companies in Floyd County have taken advantage of the Quick Start training program. F&P Georgia, Pirelli, Suzuki, Neaton and Kellogg’s have all used Quick Start training on more than one occasion.

In Bartow County, 32 companies have taken advantage of the program. Gerdau Ameristeel and Toyo Tire have

used it on multiple occasions.

No one in the immediate mid-Coosa Valley area surrounding Rome has used the program more often than HON Industries in Cedartown. HON has taken advantage of Quick Start training 11 times.

Beyond the assistance in recruiting new companies, or facilitating the expansion of existing companies, Commissioner Corbin said when she talks with managers who used Quick Start, “They tell us they knew Quick Start was going to be important, but that they never could have guessed how important it was going to be. Most importantly, all of their employees were ready for the job beginning day one.”

In the same survey, Georgia was recognized by professional site locators as the best state in the country for doing business. It marks the fourth time Georgia has netted the ranking. The state was praised for having the most cooperative and responsive government, speed of permitting and the most professional statewide economic development organization.

### **3. Atlanta Business Chronicle**

#### **Study-abroad programs ready technical college students to work at foreign-owned companies in Georgia**

**By Janet Jones Kendall**

**Sunday, October 15**

Six years ago, the Technical College System of Georgia set out to make study abroad opportunities as familiar to its students as they are to those at four-year institutions.

“The Technical College System of Georgia recognizes that adding an international dimension to the faculty and student experience in strategic industry sectors, identified by the Governor’s High Demand Career Initiative as critical to the state’s economic growth, greatly enhances the global skills of Georgia workers,” said Gretchen Corbin, technical college system commissioner.

Now, two-thirds of the system’s colleges are collaborating globally to increase workforce support for companies from the state’s top investing countries.

The Technical College System of Georgia (TCSG) is the winner of the 2017 Georgia International Award for International Education Program. The Georgia International Awards are presented by Atlanta Business Chronicle in partnership with the Georgia Department of Economic Development and the World Trade Center — Atlanta.

“The greatest strength the Technical College System of Georgia holds for international business is the workforce we train,” said Ian Bond, the executive director of the International Center at TCSG, who Corbin credits with spearheading the effort. “Whether it’s companies operating in Georgia, expanding here or locating here, we have the ability to connect them with the workers they need. Our international program is focused on anticipating their needs.”

This year, 80 students and 15 faculty members have participated in learning abroad programs, which is more than double the 30 students and five instructors who did so in 2016.

Bond cites TCSG’s partnership with Kia Motors Manufacturing Georgia Inc. as one big success story.

“The Kia Georgia Training Center, built and operated by our Quick Start economic development arm, and the company’s continued partnership with West Georgia Technical College, preceded much of what we do today and taught us a lot about what international companies need in terms of workforce,” Bond said.

There are other examples, including North Georgia Tech and Chattahoochee Tech participating this year in a student exchange with Ireland's Waterford Institute of Technology, which is known for its engineering and precision manufacturing school. Lanier Tech undertook a Customized Educational Programs Abroad-Europe study tour focusing on German manufacturing and automotive industries.

Central Georgia Tech, Southeastern Tech and Georgia Northwestern Tech students studied international business and humanities and computer and information systems at Robert Gordon University in Scotland.

To support the energy industry, students at Augusta Tech have partnered with the U.K. National College for Nuclear at Lakes College, West Cumbria, United Kingdom, through online collaborations.

"All of our colleges are involved in training for international companies, and we will continue to grow and expand that ability to support the governor, the Georgia Department of Economic Development and the Georgia communities who recruit companies to the state," Bond said.

Alvetta Peterman Thomas, president of Southern Crescent Technical College in Griffin, credited Bond with the technical college system's rapid growth in the area of international education in the last six years.

"His experience and ability to navigate the international landscape have created enormous opportunities and partnerships for all involved," Thomas said.

#### **4. Atlanta Business Chronicle**

##### **Focused recruitment led to global manufacturing cluster in Cartersville-Bartow**

**By Janet Jones Kendall**

**Sunday, October 15**

Toyo Tire. Beauflor. voestalpine. And, as of 2008, Anheuser-Busch/InBev.

These companies are just a few from the roster of 35 manufacturers from 18 different countries that call Cartersville and Bartow County home today.

International business was one of the keys to the area's recovery from the economic downturn. For example, Anheuser-Busch, which has operated a plant in the community since 1993 and is one of the largest employers in the state, became an international business in 2008 when it was purchased by Belgian and Brazilian brewing giant InBev. It continues to be a driver of the local economy in direct and indirect ways.

Knowing good international relations could produce major economic results, leaders at the Cartersville-Bartow Department of Economic Development worked to grow their global manufacturing sector. That led to the opening of voestalpine Automotive Components Cartersville Inc., a subsidiary of Austrian manufacturing giant voestalpine AG. The \$70 million facility will employ 220 people by next year.

This is partly why Cartersville-Bartow County's economic development team won the 2017 Georgia International Award for International Community. The Georgia International Awards are presented by Atlanta Business Chronicle in partnership with the Georgia Department of Economic Development and the World Trade Center — Atlanta.

"Cartersville and Bartow (County) have been effective in attracting international business for many reasons," Cartersville Mayor Matt Santini said. "The (Bartow-Cartersville Joint Development Authority, which oversees the economic development department) staff has worked closely with the state in identifying industries and

companies that would be a good fit for our workforce. Our community has invested time and money in developing Highland 75 Industrial Park. Most importantly, I believe that current and previous leadership in Cartersville and Bartow County have created and maintained an atmosphere that is conducive to success.”

The proof? Cartersville-Bartow is home to 35 international manufacturers from 18 different countries.

“International aspects of our organization are important because we value diversity for the strength it brings to our community,” said Melinda Lemmon, executive director of the Cartersville-Bartow County Department of Economic Development.

County Commissioner Steve Taylor credited Lemmon and her staff for much of the area’s growth.

“Their willingness to travel to a company’s facilities allows them to more clearly understand that company’s needs so they are able to fit them to the perfect location,” Taylor said. “They’re not only committed to capturing new businesses and industry, but they’re also committed to our existing companies, those that have been with us for many years, like Shaw Industries, Toyo Tire and Anheuser-Busch.”

Cartersville-Bartow purchased and developed more than 700 acres in the county to create the Highland 75 Industrial Park. The area is easily accessible from Atlanta and Chattanooga, Tenn., via Interstate 75, and also offers 12,000-acre Lake Allatoona.

The international businesses in Cartersville-Bartow also help each other. Anheuser-Busch InBev has opened up close to 1,000 acres the company owns between the existing plant and Cassville-White Road for potential use as a mega-industrial park. It sold more than 150 acres to the JDA to be used to recruit Beauflor, an international manufacturer of vinyl flooring.

Hard work goes into the achievements, Santini said.

“We have had legal counsel working on memos of understanding while on vacation abroad,” he said. “We have left conferences early to meet with potential clients. The JDA works closely with local leadership to make sure we are keeping the process moving as quickly as our clients need. This didn’t happen overnight. ”

## **5. Saporta Report**

### **Metro traffic congestion to be eased as seaport cargo shifts from truck to rail**

**By David Pendered**

**Friday, October 13**

Metro Atlanta commuters can find solace in a factoid nestled in a report released Thursday by the Georgia Ports Authority. Some 50,000 trucks a year are to be removed from the region’s highways once an inland port served by rail opens next year in Chatsworth, officials say.

The number of truck trips that are eliminated is likely to rise in the future.

The inland cargo transfer yard that’s to open in 2018 is poised to help handle increasing amounts of cargo that’s to be diverted from highways to the CSX railroad. This will become more significant as the amount of cargo increases as Savannah handles the huge container ships built to use the expanded Panama Canal.

Savannah’s reach as a seaport could extend into the Mississippi Valley, according to some forecasts. Such a service district likely would spur big increases in the number of imported containers and those headed for export.

This increased reliance on rail addresses concerns raised in the past by board members of GRTA. GRTA is the state agency that advises on mobility and air quality in metro Atlanta. GRTA also advises on the Xpress commuter buses that serve 12 metro counties.

In particular, GRTA board member J.T. Williams has raised the issue that highways in metro Atlanta likely are to become more burdened as the port spurs an uptick in truck movements. The additional vehicles could worsen mobility and air quality.

If the inland port takes just 50,000 trucks a year off the roads, an average of 137 trucks a day that won't be passing through metro Atlanta on I-285 and the I-75 corridor, according to a quick calculation of the port's figures. The number presumes trucks travel each day of the year.

The actual number of trucks that are diverted could be significantly higher.

That's because shippers sometimes have to send a truck into metro Atlanta to retrieve a container to carry the cargo. Sometimes shippers have to send a truck all the way to the Savannah port to retrieve a container.

In each situation, a truck passes through the region to pick up a container; the truck passes through the region to deliver the container; the truck passes through a third time en route to the seaport.

The Georgia Ports Authority broke ground this year on the Appalachian Regional Port, in Chatsworth. Chatsworth is in Murray County, about 15 miles east of Dalton.

Here are highlights of the Georgia Ports Authority forecast about the Dalton cargo handling facility. The facility:

- "Expands GPA's reach into Tennessee, Northeast Alabama and parts of Kentucky.
- "Will cut Atlanta truck traffic by 50,000 trips per year;
- "Each container moved by the Appalachian Regional Port will offset 355 truck miles, reducing 8 million miles in the first year;
- "Trucks will travel shorter distances and make less frequent trips, while still providing a vital gateway for U.S. manufacturers in global markets."

A sister facility in Cordele is providing similar relief for roadways in South Georgia. Port officials on Friday released a report that shows shippers are using it to reach markets from South Georgia to the Florida Panhandle, Alabama and Mississippi.

The Cordele facility is served by two short lines that travel to and from the port in Savannah, Heart of Georgia and Georgia Central. The facility is owned by the Crisp County Development Authority.

The facility handled a total of nearly 30,000 containers in the fiscal year that ended June 30, according to the report. The cargo includes 10,000 containers headed to Savannah for export, and 8,300 containers that were imported via the port.

## **6. Athens Banner-Herald**

### **Construction begins on new distribution facility for ALDI in Jackson County**

**Saturday, October 14**

A M King, a design and construction firm, has announced its third project for discount grocer ALDI at the distribution site near Jefferson.

The new cold storage distribution center will boost the company's existing perishables space, providing the ability to offer a larger selection of products and is expected to spur overall company growth, according to a news release from A M King.

Construction is scheduled to conclude by May 2018.

A M King will build the 55,000-square feet of perishable expansion and renovate 100,000-square-feet of existing perishable areas.

The project will also include renovation of the employee welfare areas and adding docks on the backside of the Dry Warehouse for special buy items.

*"The owner has requested that we fast track this project to meet required product release dates," said Carl Morse, A M King senior project manager. "We are also focusing on a major interior renovation, specifically in the perishable area, that will house ALDI's expanding line of products."*

## **7. AJC**

### **IRS suspends Equifax contract, cites 'new information'**

**By Michael E. Kanell**

**Friday, October 13**

The Internal Revenue Service has suspended its \$7.25 million contract with Atlanta-based Equifax, the agency announced Friday.

The decision came a day after the company was forced to shut down one of its customer service web sites, a page that had been manipulated by hackers who had apparently placed malicious software on the site.

That hijacking was acknowledged by Equifax after the misuse of the site was reported by tech magazine Ars Technica.

The IRS, no-bid contract was granted to Equifax, "to provide fraud prevention and taxpayer identification services." The deal was roundly criticized, since it came in the wake of disclosure of the breach in which hackers gained access to information about 145 million people.

According to a statement issued by Equifax Friday afternoon the IRS had notified the company of the suspension.

"We remain confident that we are the best party to perform the services required in this contract," the statement said. "We are engaging IRS officials to review the facts and clarify available options."

The IRS had awarded the contract to Equifax in late September, the same week that the company's former chief executive was testifying before Congress about the massive data breach suffered by the company.

That decision had been harshly criticized in Congress. IRS officials faced tough questions about the deal in early October during hearings before a U.S. House Ways and Means subcommittee.

For example, Rep. Jackie Walorski (R-Indiana) called the contract award "an abject failure."

Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Oregon) tweeted: “Have the people who awarded this contract been living under a rock for the last month??”

On Friday, the IRS described the suspension as temporary and said the action was taken “following new information available today.”

“During this suspension, the IRS will continue its review of Equifax systems and security,” the IRS said.

The agency said it does not believe that any data shared by the IRS with Equifax had been compromised. The suspension was taken as “a precautionary step as the IRS continues its review,” the agency said.

Losing the contract does only modest financial damage to the \$3.14 billion-a-year company, but it adds to the public relations beating that the company has been taking — just this week.

On Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal reported that data for 10.9 million driver’s licenses was including in the huge breach the company announced last month. Then came the tampering with the firm’s customer service web site.

The company said Thursday that the problems with that site had involved a “third party” and did not give hackers any information held by Equifax. However, the danger, experts said, was that the software tricked visitors into providing data thinking they were giving it to Equifax.

With the contract’s suspension, taxpayers cannot open new “Secure Access” accounts at the IRS, accounts that offer a variety of online tools to help a taxpayer prepare for filing taxes. However, existing accounts are apparently not affected.

## **8. Atlanta Business Chronicle**

### **US banks to introduce new anti-fraud measures after Equifax hack**

**By Alistair Gray**

**Monday, October 16**

US banks are stepping up anti-fraud controls after the data breach at credit checking group Equifax put about half the country’s population at risk of identity theft.

Executives at banks including Citigroup and Wells Fargo said customers would face new checks because of the increased risk of identity fraud, a problem that already costs an estimated \$16bn a year in the US.

While many companies from Yahoo to Deloitte have been targeted in cyber raids, the attack on Equifax earlier this year is particularly worrying for banks both because of its scale and the type of information that was compromised.

Hackers stole records on as many as 146m Americans, including personal details such as social security numbers that consumer finance companies typically use to verify customers.

"You've got to put on some additional screening to make sure that you really are dealing with the person who they purport to be," said John Gerspach, chief financial officer at Citigroup.

"We've got other techniques, and other questions we can ask that are not part of the database that's been breached."

Companies that provide alternative authentication technology said banks were taking more interest as a direct result of the Equifax breach.

"A lot the banks are saying it's a lightbulb moment for them," said Vijay Balasubramanian, co-founder of Pindrop, which analyses voices to prevent phone fraud. "If you look at the information that got out, it's everything banks use to identify you."

John Shrewsberry, chief financial officer at Wells Fargo, said "there will have to be incremental precautions" following the Equifax data loss. He added that the additional steps could "mean a little bit more inconvenience" for legitimate consumers.

Financial security professionals said it was particularly tricky for banks to confirm the identities of prospective customers applying for new accounts. Techniques to verify existing ones, such as "two-step authentication", were also vulnerable in part because fraudsters can claim to have forgotten the passwords or lost the devices.

"That can all be bypassed by providing information such as birthday and social security number," said Alex Heid, chief research officer at SecurityScorecard. "That's where the core of the problem is."

Banks are starting to gather more sophisticated data on how consumers interact with their devices - typing speed, force or accuracy, for example - to learn user behaviour and spot fraudsters.

Analysts have been quizzing banks about the impact of the Equifax hack on banks' bottom lines as more consumers order credit freezes on their accounts, preventing companies checking financial histories.

However, executives said not enough individuals had put the restrictions in place to have much of an impact.

"While the number of locks and freezes has grown a lot [after the Equifax hack], it is still a relatively small percentage of the overall credit population," said Citigroup's Mr Gerspach. "So it really hasn't had a significant impact as yet on our ability to acquire customers."

Identity fraudsters stole \$16bn from 15.4m victims in the US last year, \$2m more than 2015, according to a study by Javelin Strategy & Research.

## **GA Politics**

### **1. Georgia Health News**

**Trump's latest move shakes ACA, but effect was foreseen in Georgia**

**By Andy Miller**

**Friday, October 13**

On one level, the White House's pledge late Thursday to stop cost-sharing payments to health insurers under the Affordable Care Act won't make a major difference in Georgia.

That's because three of the four health insurers offering coverage on the state exchange have already factored in the likely elimination of the payments in their huge 2018 premium increases.

The ACA created the exchanges to help people without job-based or government insurance to buy affordable coverage. The cost-sharing subsidies that will be eliminated have been going to insurers, which use them to lower the out-of-pocket costs, such as deductibles and copays, for lower-income exchange customers.



The three insurers already had raised exchange premiums in Georgia by more than 50 percent — above their initial rate requests — due to an assumption that the federal payments would stop coming in.

Media reports say Georgia's premium hikes in the exchange are the largest in the country.

The fourth exchange insurer, Kaiser Permanente, told GHN on Friday that it was evaluating the situation in the wake of the administration's decision.

But on the heels of his executive order to ease rules on association health plans and short-term policies, Trump has shown that he's willing to make a variety of moves to unravel the ACA as much as he can, after Republicans in Congress failed to repeal it, as they had long pledged.

Trump went on Twitter to urge Democrats to make a deal: "The Democrats ObamaCare is imploding," he wrote. "Massive subsidy payments to their pet insurance companies has stopped. Dems should call me to fix!"

Some Democrats have expressed a willingness to make changes to the ACA, often called Obamacare, but they have balked at broad revisions backed by Republicans, or anything equivalent to repeal.

### **Rough times on the exchanges**

Across Georgia and the nation, individuals and families needing exchange coverage were already lined up for spikes in their premiums.

Experts pointed out, though, that as premiums soar in the exchanges, 85 percent of Georgians getting that coverage will also see their subsidies rise to cushion that blow.

"The net premium stays the same" for those getting subsidies (with incomes from 100 percent to 400 percent of the federal poverty level), said Russ Childers, a health insurance agent based in Americus.

But Childers said Friday that if the Trump administration had promised to pay the insurers the cost-sharing money, rather than forcing them to shoulder the cost of subsidies, consumers could have seen either lower premiums or possible rebates.

Childers said the individual insurance market was already broken before the ACA was passed in 2010. "In general, we just traded old problems for new problems," he said.

With the new decision on payments, the insurance companies may still be able to drop out of the exchange for 2018, Childers said.

"I think the message is, everybody is really frustrated with the way things are."

In a fundamental way, the government decision to end the cost-sharing reductions to insurers won't save money, experts said.

The higher premiums will replace the payments to insurers, noted Bill Custer, a health insurance expert with Georgia State University. Taxpayers will pay by funding higher individual subsidies that accompany the rate hikes, he said.

The other 15 percent on the exchanges, who do not get individual subsidies, are the ones facing real sticker shock on premiums. "They're going to buy less coverage," Custer said. "When the price goes up, people will buy less coverage."

Insurers still must keep the lower deductibles and copays for many of the exchange customers, as required by the ACA.

The annual cost to the government of the insurer payments is currently about \$7 billion.

With the administration moves, Custer said, the individual market will be less attractive to insurers.” The net effect in the long term will be less choice and less coverage, he added.

“The vision of the ACA is to make a competitive insurance market. The Trump administration has moved in the opposite direction.”

Kaiser was the only exchange insurer in Georgia to have a rate hike approved that was less than 50 percent. The nonprofit’s increase was set at 30 percent.

The state department of insurance said Kaiser would need to work with federal health officials to examine its options. “We have completed our review,” said Glenn Allen, a spokesman for the agency.

Open enrollment for the ACA begins Nov. 1. Almost 500,000 Georgians signed up for coverage for this year.

“Already this year, insurers in Georgia requested premium increases of over 50% based largely on the looming threat that the cost-sharing reduction payments would be terminated,” said Beth Stephens of Georgia Watch, an advocacy group. The ending of insurer payments, she said, “could result in an exodus of insurers from the market and jeopardize the availability of affordable health insurance for many Georgians.”

### **More changes ahead?**

Congress can appropriate the funds needed to keep the payments in place, Stephens said. “We will continue to urge bipartisan solutions that will stabilize the marketplaces.”

State Rep. Sharon Cooper (R-Marietta), chair of the House Health and Human Services Committee, told GHN at a conference Friday that “Obamacare is failing,” noting the high deductibles that many consumers have in exchange coverage.

Cooper said moving health care decision-making to the states may help improve the insurance situation. “I believe that states can come up with a solution that is tailored for their citizens,” she said.

Several states are in the process of requesting “waivers” from the federal government to alter the federal insurance requirements under the ACA.

“We are at a crisis situation,” said Kelly McCutchen of the Georgia Public Policy Foundation, a proponent of a waiver approach, at a conference his group sponsored Friday. As a state, he said, “we’ve got to do something.”

The president’s action is likely to trigger a lawsuit from state attorneys general, who contend the subsidies to insurers are fully authorized by federal law, and say the president’s position is reckless, the Associated Press reported.

“We are prepared to sue,” said California Attorney General Xavier Becerra. “We’ve taken the Trump administration to court before and won.”

Some leading GOP lawmakers have called for continuation of the payments to insurers, at least temporarily, so

constituents can maintain access to health insurance. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee Chairman Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) is working on such legislation with Democratic Sen. Patty Murray of Washington state, the AP noted.

The administration's moves came just hours after it ordered a loosening of the rules on association health plans and short-term health policies.

Trump said these would give consumers more insurance options.

Critics have warned, though, that such actions could attract the healthiest customers to the newly structured plans through lower premiums and stripped-down coverage, and thus destabilize the more regulated health plans.

These new health plans could avoid some currently enforced requirements of the ACA, critics say.

The Trump administration also has reduced support for the ACA in other ways, including by shortening the enrollment period for the exchanges, and by cutting funding for efforts to reach potential exchange customers and sign them up.

And the administration has hinted that it may stop enforcing the tax penalty for those who do not obtain health coverage. This could effectively nullify the insurance mandate that is a pillar of the entire health law.

## **2. AJC**

### **Gerrymandering is unseemly, not illegal**

**By Kyle Wingfield**

**Friday, October 13**

Gerrymandering is ugly business; there's no getting around that. The question pending at the U.S. Supreme Court, and in two federal lawsuits filed in Georgia, is whether judges can impose a remedy that, to borrow from James Madison, is not worse than the disease.

As things stand, it doesn't appear so.

Let's start with the Georgia cases. Plaintiffs say the state House district map, which the GOP-controlled General Assembly redrew in 2015, violates the Voting Rights Act. While they claim racial discrimination, it's plain they are motivated by partisanship.

The 2015 bill altered 17 House districts, including a pair in Gwinnett and Henry counties where GOP incumbents narrowly won re-election in 2014. Bill sponsors say they were acting on requests from lawmakers in both parties. Plaintiffs say the bill weakened minority voting strength.

But their exact language, as reported in an AJC news article about the second suit, which was filed Oct. 3, drags partisanship into the mix. The bill, the plaintiffs say, "specifically targets districts where white Republicans have become increasingly vulnerable to challenge by African-American Democratic candidates, moving voters in and out of House districts based on their race so as to shore up the incumbent Republicans' prospects in future elections."

To the extent impure motives may have been at play, the operative words are not "white" and "African-American," but "Republicans" and "Democratic." It may be a shame "white" and "Republicans" are (in the aggregate) political synonyms in Georgia, as are "African-American" and "Democratic." But it doesn't violate

the Voting Rights Act.

That brings us to partisanship, and a case out of Wisconsin that coincidentally was argued Oct. 3 should be instructive about the Georgia map's fate.

An issue in the Wisconsin case is the idea gerrymandering is not only unseemly but quantifiable — and thus subject to the kind of legal test courts use to evaluate legislative behavior.

The Wisconsin plaintiffs claim gerrymandering can be measured by an “efficiency gap,” which purports to tell us if the number of seats a party wins is justified by the total votes cast for the party.

The gap is expressed as a percentage: e.g., a party might win 10 percent more seats than its vote count suggests was fair.

The problems with this approach are manifold. The standard the Wisconsin plaintiffs propose, barring maps with efficiency gaps of more than 7 percent, would implicate between one-third and one-half of all state legislative maps drawn in the past 45 years. Unelected judges would be embarking on a massive intervention into a legislative process.

As the defendants point out, even the state's map from the 2000s would have failed the 7 percent test in three straight elections — and it was drawn not by legislators, but by judges.

Which vote count should be used? Many state legislators go unchallenged, and not always because of gerrymandering; often, the other party knows it has no chance even in a fairly drawn district. Such races skew the vote totals. Should we use statewide results instead? Which ones? In Georgia last year, Republicans won 51 percent in the presidential election, 55 percent in a Senate race, and 67 percent in a Public Service Commission race. Which is their “real” level of support?

Ultimately, the most honest observation about gerrymandering echoes U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's famous remark about obscenity in the 1964 *Jacobellis v. Ohio* case: “I know it when I see it.” That didn't suffice as a legal standard for barring obscenity. It's no more workable for gerrymandering.

### **3. AJC**

#### **First test starts Monday for new paper-ballot machines in Georgia**

**By Kristina Torres**

**Sunday, October 15**

A crucial test for the future of Georgia elections begins Monday when early voting opens across the state ahead of the Nov. 7 local and special elections.

Voters in Conyers will begin casting paper ballots along with new voting and tabulating machines as they decide on a new mayor and two City Council seats.

The pilot program comes as advocates have sued to force the state to dump its aging all-electronic system amid fears of hacking and security breaches.

And it could pave the way for the first elections system reboot in Georgia since 2002.

“Everything is still on track and we are ready to go,” said Cynthia Welch, the elections supervisor for Rockdale County, which is running the Conyers election.

Welch and her team have spent the past several weeks demonstrating the system, including to other local elections officials as well as lawmakers.

That excitement, however, is tempered by the fact that the program for now is a one-off effort meant to demonstrate how Georgia could get past its current system, which was considered state-of-the-art when it was adopted 15 years ago but is now universally acknowledged by experts to be vulnerable to security risks and buggy software.

Experts also recommend some kind of paper trail as a way to ensure accuracy of the tally. In Georgia, meanwhile, there's currently no paper record for most ballots cast in elections.

Any decision would likely be a three- to four-year proposition for the state and, depending on the type of system officials pick, could cost more than \$100 million. Cheaper options are available, but the state's leaders all need to agree on what they want.

### **Early voting in Georgia**

Be sure to check with your local elections office to confirm where to go cast an early ballot, since early voting locations are not the same as regular neighborhood polling places.

The municipalities are only opening select sites during the early voting period, which for many may only be the main county elections office.

Any registered voter can vote early.

Use the Secretary of State Office's online "my voter page" website ([www.mvp.sos.ga.gov/MVP/mvp.do](http://www.mvp.sos.ga.gov/MVP/mvp.do)) to find a sample ballot or specific early voting location.

You can also call your local elections office to find early voting locations or look for the "advance voting info" link under the elections tab of the Secretary of State Office's website ([www.sos.ga.gov](http://www.sos.ga.gov)).

Don't forget to bring photo identification, which can include a Georgia driver's license, even if it's expired; a state-issued voter identification card; a valid U.S. passport; or a valid U.S. military photo ID.

No "ballot selfies" are allowed at the polls, so wait to snap a photo until you're outside. It is illegal in Georgia to take pictures of a ballot or voting equipment, but the Secretary of State Office has said it has seen voters in previous elections post "ballot selfies" on social media — something that could get you in trouble with the law.

Information about local elections and your "My Voter Page" can also be found on the free "GA SOS" app for your smartphone via iTunes or Google Play for Android.

## **4. AJC**

### **Atlanta mayor race moves into final sprint**

**By Greg Bluestein and J. Scott Trubey**

**Sunday, October 15**

The race for Atlanta mayor enters an unpredictable new phase Monday with the start of early voting framing a make-or-break dash to November for the crowded field of contenders.

The airwaves will soon crackle with more ads. Mailboxes in Atlanta will get more stuffed with flyers, households with landlines more inundated with robocalls. And the candidates competing to succeed a term-limited Kasim Reed will be under more pressure to step up their games or pay the price.

“Now is the time they’ve got to make their moves,” said Mark Rountree, a pollster with Landmark Communications. “This is when they have to shake up the field.”

There are already signs that the Nov. 7 contest between a dozen candidates is starting to crystallize.

Councilwoman Mary Norwood has been atop the polls for months, seeming like a sure lock for a spot in a likely December runoff among the top two finishers. But sustained attacks from her rivals, including the Democratic Party of Georgia and Reed, could be taking a toll as she’s dropped from the high 20s to the low 20s since March.

At the same time, Councilwoman Keisha Lance Bottoms has emerged from the pack, pulling to within a few percentage points of Norwood last week in a Landmark poll commissioned by Channel 2 Action News. Bolstered by Reed’s endorsement, Bottoms is hoping to consolidate the splintered African-American vote over the next three weeks.

Also within striking distance is former Atlanta Chief Operating Officer Peter Aman, who is polling in the double-digits and aims to gain more ground by eating into Norwood’s base on Atlanta’s Northside.

Several other high-profile candidates are still in the chase, including ex-Fulton Commission Chairman John Eaves, former state Sen. Vincent Fort, City Councilman Kwanza Hall, City Council President Ceasar Mitchell and ex-Atlanta Council President Cathy Woolard.

In the final stretch, they’re quickly emptying campaign coffers stuffed with hundreds of thousands of dollars they raised for this very purpose. Many have telegraphed their final moves; at last week’s Atlanta Press Club debate, four contenders leveled bruising attacks at Bottoms. Meanwhile, Aman ripped into his favorite target, Norwood.

The trailing candidates are quick to offer a cautionary reminder that Atlanta mayoral contests can shift in a flash. After all, Reed was polling in the single-digits less than two months before the 2009 vote. He went on to win a runoff against Norwood by about 700 votes.

### **The real work**

Beyond the dizzying miasma of competing strategies — and each campaign is quick to tout its own tantalizing path to victory — the real work over the next weeks will play out in call centers and neighborhoods where candidates and their volunteers make personal contact with voters.

The door-to-door plodding and phone bank pizza parties are the backbones of painstaking efforts to target likely voters and then make sure they get to the polls. Woolard calls her field operation the “secret sauce” of her campaign, which she said has planned 200 house parties through Election Day — including some Sundays featuring three or four in one day.

“What we do, and what a lot of candidates don’t have the discipline to do, is focus on the ground game, knocking on doors, making phone calls,” she said.

It’s in this hunt where candidates with the most passionate supporters hope to flex their muscles. Fort’s populist

campaign hinges on volunteers inspired by his endorsement from Vermont U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders and the dozens of unions who have pledged to mobilize new voters.

“We have at this point hundreds and hundreds of people who have pledged to volunteer, but we need more,” Fort told supporters at a recent campaign rally. “We need more people on the phones, we need more people knocking on doors and we need people to canvass. And we sure enough need money.”

As essential as it is, the field operations can also be highly embarrassing. Aman was forced to fire a paid canvasser who was caught on tape falsely telling a Woolard supporter she is preparing to support his campaign. Aman apologized to Woolard; her campaign posted a video of the incident on its website under the headline “Shameless.”

## **Long memories**

In Norwood’s camp, stinging memories of her narrow defeat to Reed eight years ago are used to galvanize her supporters in this contest.

“She lost by only 700 votes in 2009. We’re not going to let that happen again,” said Paul Gerdish, the president of the International Association of Fire Fighters Local 134. “We believe we can be a difference maker in this race.”

Anti-Norwood forces are mobilizing, too. The Democratic Party of Georgia launched a full-scale online attack against “Mary the Republican,” casting her as a far-right conservative. And Bottoms rolled out a 60-second campaign ad to magnify the Democratic assault on Norwood. In it, Reed warns of a “Republican takeover of City Hall” if Bottoms fails.

Norwood, a self-described independent, responded to the attacks by publishing on her website a list of prominent Democratic supporters.

Even as Bottoms ratchets up the rhetoric, she’s facing more attacks from rivals gunning for the No. 2 spot. At last week’s debate, she was targeted with questions about her water bills, campaign donations she returned from a contractor whose office was raided by the FBI and her job on the Atlanta-Fulton County Recreation Authority.

“Strategically, you now have two front-runners. And if you’re not one of those two, you have to knock them off that perch,” said Rountree, the pollster.

“They’ve been in the marathon stage,” he added. “Now they’re about to move to the sprint stage.”

## **5. AJC**

**Feds: Ga. foreclosure program soaked up admin fees and failed needy**

**By Willoughby Mariano**

**Friday, October 13**

A state-run program to save struggling homeowners from foreclosure was so mismanaged that it has awarded only a portion of the \$370 million that it was supposed to give to Georgia residents, according to an audit released Friday by a federal watchdog agency.

The Department of Community Affairs (DCA) was warned by federal watchdogs 25 times in five years that its HomeSafe Georgia program failed to help residents quickly enough. Even so, the department “slow walked” the aid, paying itself \$32 million in administrative fees as it turned down worthy applicants, the report by the Office

of the Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program states.

This inaction helped slow the state's housing market recovery after the Great Recession, it said.

Other states have already spent all of their assistance funds. The report singled out problems in the Atlanta area, where DCA turned down 6,200 Clayton, DeKalb and Fulton county applicants.

U.S. Rep. John Lewis, who requested the audit, called the results "a shame and a disgrace."

"We have all of these dollars that have not been spent in metro Atlanta, in DeKalb and Clayton and Fulton counties," Lewis said. "We can do better."

Department of Community Affairs spokeswoman MaryBrown Sandys defended HomeSafe, saying it spent taxpayer funds responsibly and improved its services over time. Clayton, DeKalb and Fulton counties comprised nearly 39 percent of the funds even though they comprise only 20 percent of the state's population, she said.

"At the end of the day, we have met the program's goal of preserving home ownership while also being responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars," Sandys said.

The audit states that the program has spent less than half of its funds. Figures provided by DCA show the program has spent or committed three fourths of its funding as of Thursday.

Hank Johnson, D-Lithonia, also requested the audit. Overall, HomeSafe turned away two thirds of its applicants, one of the highest rejection rates among state programs nationwide, the audit said.

### **Georgians fell through the cracks**

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Hardest Hit Fund, which funds the HomeSafe program, was created in 2010 to help homeowners during the deep real estate downturn of the Great Recession.

Metro Atlanta experienced some of the worst of the nationwide mortgage meltdown. Some 30 percent of the mortgages in Clayton County remain underwater, eight years after the recession officially ended, according to a July report by online real estate data firm Zillow.

The state program in Georgia originally estimated it would assist more some 9,000 homeowners in its first year. Instead, it took six years for HomeSafe to reach that number, the report states.

At first, HomeSafe would only accept homeowners who were unemployed or underemployed and not more than six months behind on their payments, said Atlanta Legal Aid Society Senior Attorney Kristen Tullos. This let many Georgians fall through the cracks who would have been eligible for assistance had they lived in other states, the report said.

Elected officials and homeowner advocates have raised concerns for years. Lewis expressed concerns that the requirements were too restrictive in 2011, the report states. The Treasury Department asked DCA to revise its requirements in 2012, while Legal Aid and other groups wrote formal letters suggesting improvements.

The program required applicants to obtain special documentation from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service and their mortgage companies within 30 days, which was too little time for those bureaucracies to respond, the report said. It also gave homeowners little guidance on how to complete its confusing application process.



“The alarm was sounded, analyses were done,” said former State Sen. Vincent Fort, who pushed for program reforms. “There are so many Georgians out here who needed help, and for them to be put in this position is just an outrage.”

### **Problems persist**

The Department has since extended the six-month limit to twelve months and broadened other eligibility requirements, Tullos said, but serious problems continue.

The website contained inaccurate information that could lead an eligible applicant to believe they’d be rejected, Tullos said, and Special Inspector General Christy Goldsmith Romero said she recently had trouble getting it to work.

The HomeSafe’s customer service line sometimes hangs up on callers, Tullos said.

“The improvements fall under the category of ‘too little, too late’,” Tullos said.

Goldsmith Romero said there’s still time for DCA officials to improve the program and help thousands of Georgians. Some \$164 million in funds have yet to be distributed by the 2021 deadline, the report states.

“I would hope they would not look at it defensively, but instead say, ‘Now’s the time, things have to change’,” Goldsmith Romero said. The report singled out problems in the Atlanta area, where DCA turned down 6,200 Clayton, DeKalb and Fulton county applicants, the report states.

## **6. WABE**

### **Georgia’s Blueberry Farmers Seek Better NAFTA Deal**

**By Tasnim Shamma**

**Friday, October 13**

This week, leaders from the U.S., Mexico and Canada are meeting in Arlington, Va., to talk about reworking NAFTA.

It’s the fourth round of negotiations and was extended an additional two days through Tuesday, Oct. 17 to discuss more than two dozen negotiation topics, agriculture is expected to be among them.

### **NAFTA**

President Donald Trump has called NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was first enforced in 1994, “the worst trade deal ever made.” By 2008, tariffs, duties and quantitative restrictions, except for a few agricultural products traded with Canada, were eliminated.

Charles Shapiro is president of the World Affairs Council of Atlanta, a retired State department official and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. He’s also a non-tenured faculty member at Georgia State University. Shapiro calls himself a “free trader.”

“[NAFTA] is out of date and it does need to be modernized, but it’s good for the United States, good for Mexico and good for Canada,” Shapiro said. “NAFTA’s a package deal. All three countries give a little bit, get a little bit. It’s a huge negotiation across the whole range of goods and services that each of the three countries exports and imports.”

## **Exports To Mexico**

Mexico was the United States' second largest export market for goods in 2016. Last year, the U.S. exported \$18 billion worth of agricultural products to Mexico.

Shapiro said abrogating the agricultural portion of NAFTA, would mean returning to cost-prohibitive tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico.

## **Southern Blueberries**

NAFTA works well because countries have different climates and growing seasons so all countries involved can benefit with access to fruits and vegetables all year. But, the berry season in the South overlaps with Mexico's berry season.

This has led to stiff competition from Mexico, which has cheaper labor and production costs. Georgia's blueberry farmers said they're looking for a better NAFTA deal.

Renée Allen at the University of Georgia works with blueberry farmers statewide.

"Growers are being forced to take less and less money for their crop. And the farmers are having difficulty recouping their cost, much less making a profit for their livelihood for their families," Allen said. "I think the concern is that ultimately these types of imports during our market window, could potentially put the U.S. farmer out of business."

She said the farmers don't know what the solution is, but "some sort of volume control" could help the situation.

Brandon Wade is the plant manager for Alma Nursery and Berry Farms. The city of Alma in Bacon County is considered Georgia's blueberry capital, about four hours south of Atlanta.

"I don't think [potential tariffs on foreign berries] would be productive for the entire country necessarily," Wade said. "It might gain us a little bit in the blueberry industry, but end up losing actual dollars to our economy."

Wade is also president of the Georgia Blueberry Growers Association. He said the group does not yet have an official position on the NAFTA negotiations.

## **Negotiations**

Farmers don't agree on exactly whether to impose tariffs or enforce quotas to prevent what they consider "illegal dumping" from Mexico.

"The hardest stuff you always keep to the last round of negotiations," Shapiro said. "In each of these rounds, some stuff is resolved and the hardest stuff doesn't get resolved 'til the very end. So it's very difficult early on in negotiations."

He noted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, which had its final negotiation meeting in Atlanta in October 2015, involved 15 meetings. The TPP involves 12 countries that border the Pacific Ocean. The United States withdrew from the TPP in January.

## **7. Atlanta Business Chronicle**

### **Atlanta Confederate monuments review committee named**

**Friday, October 13**

An 11-member advisory committee named Friday will review street names and public monuments in the city of Atlanta linked to the Confederacy and recommend whether they should be kept or removed.

Mayor Kasim Reed appointed six members of the committee, and the Atlanta City Council passed a resolution naming the other five.

Street names and monuments across the South honoring the Confederacy or Confederate political and military leaders have been under fire since August, when violence broke out in Charlottesville, Va., during a demonstration by white supremacists protesting the city's plan to remove a statue honoring Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee. One person was killed and another injured when a man crashed his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators.

"The tragic events in Charlottesville, Va., brought renewed attention to Confederate markers and street names around the country, with many elected officials, clergy and members of the public calling for their removal," Reed said. "To ensure that we approach this in a thoughtful manner, and that we include community input in the process, my administration and the Atlanta City Council worked to assemble a group of advisors to consider each marker."

The committee will hold its first meeting Oct. 18 at Atlanta City Hall.

#### **The members of the panel include:**

- Douglas Blackmon, senior fellow and director of public programs, University of Virginia's Miller Center
- Regina Brewer, preservation consultant
- Sonji Jacobs Dade, senior director of corporate affairs, Cox Enterprises
- Larry Gellerstedt, CEO, Cousins Properties
- Nina Gentry, owner, Gentry Planning Services
- Sheffield Hale, president and CEO, Atlanta History Center
- Martha Porter Hall, community advocate
- Derrick Kayongo, CEO, Center for Civil and Human Rights
- Dan Moore, founder, APEX Museum
- Brenda Muhammad, executive director, Atlanta Victim Assistance
- Shelley Rose, senior associate director, Southeast Region, Anti-Defamation League

## **8. Statesboro Herald**

### **Kemp advocates cap on state spending**

**By Al Hackle**

**Friday, October 13**

As a step toward cutting taxes, Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp proposes to put a cap on state spending, adjusted to population growth and inflation, if he is elected governor.

The spending cap and advocacy for high-speed internet in rural parts of the state were two relatively specific ideas Kemp shared in remarks to the Statesboro Board of Realtors earlier this week. He talked in more general terms about regulatory reform and support for small businesses. But the first element in Kemp's four-point campaign, he said, is making Georgia the leading state for small businesses.

Gov. Nathan Deal “has done a great job of getting us to the point of being the number-one state in the country in which to do business, but I feel like we need to build off of that foundation and really go down to helping the small-business people,” Kemp said.

In his second plank, which he described as “fundamentally reforming state government,” Kemp proposes two initiatives, which he said are based on things he accomplished in the Secretary of State’s Office.

“One is implementing a state spending cap where we tie our spending to population and inflation so we’re not overspending in our budgets, we continue to conserve,” Kemp told the local real estate professionals.

“Governor Deal has done a great job of getting us a really good rainy-day fund so we can protect our triple-A bond rating, but now that we have that, if we continue to budget conservatively, we can bank that money and then return it to you all, the taxpayers,” he said.

Exactly how the spending cap would work remains to be fleshed out, Kemp acknowledged in a follow-up interview.

“Well, we’re actually working on the details of that right now, but it will be a simple formula where it’s based on population and inflation, so you set a rate that you’re going to follow every year, so if the population goes up a certain amount, inflation goes up, then that will set your spending levels for that year,” he said.

The cap would include an override provision for responding to a crisis, but the override would require a vote by a substantial majority in the Legislature, he said.

Kemp proposes this flexible spending cap as the first step to a broad-based tax cut.

“The last several years everybody talks about taxes, there’s a lot of people talking about taxes in the governor’s race, and the only people that have gotten tax breaks are people that have a lobbyist or they’re a special interest group,” he said. “Well, to me you all are my special interest group. I want to help every taxpayer. That’s why I want to start with the spending cap.”

## **Regulatory reform**

The other tack in Kemp’s broader reform plank is a focus on simplifying regulations.

“And that’s really what we’ve done in the Secretary of State’s Office,” he said. “When the budget got tough, we reduced our budget by 25 percent. We had to use technology to make things more efficient where we could literally do more with less.”

Kemp has overseen technological improvements such as simplified online filing of corporate certification renewals. In another change, professional licenses, previously all laminated and mailed, are now in a digital format. Licensees can print these out for themselves or order a formal mailed copy for a higher fee. His agency set up a “Cut red tape” website for suggestions.

The 25 percent spending reduction came during state austerity measures earlier in his tenure. Some of the funding has been restored, but the agency’s spending remains well below where it started, he said.

Kemp is in the third year of his second four-year elected term as secretary of state, after being appointed in early 2010 to complete a term.

As governor, his approach to regulatory reform would be to have “a good group of business people, not bureaucrats” study each agency, but also to get suggestions from the agencies themselves, Kemp said.

### **Rural internet**

He described his third campaign plank as “moving our state forward and really focusing on strengthening rural Georgia.”

Expansion of high-speed internet in rural areas “can help with innovation on the family farm or agribusiness ..., with rural health care when you think about telemedicine and other ways that we can be more efficient and cut costs, and certainly with education,” Kemp said.

He described his fourth plank as “fighting for working Georgians” instead of “the special interests, the politically correct, those that are here illegally.”

“And that’s nothing against any of those people. It’s just, I’m going to be for you,” Kemp said.

His campaign website associates this “Put Georgia First” element with defunding “sanctuary cities and campuses” and stopping “taxpayer funded subsidies for illegal immigrants.” He wasn’t interviewed about this aspect, but Georgia already has laws, passed in 2009 and 2016, prohibiting cities from serving as sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, and a 2017 law attempts to bar colleges from becoming sanctuary campuses.

In the interview Kemp also answered questions about changes in Georgia’s handling of elections, under his purview as secretary of state, and the possibility of replacing voting equipment statewide.

Kemp, 53, describes himself as a lifelong small business owner. He previously owned a real estate investment company in Athens and still owns rental properties and other businesses. He served in the state Senate for four years before becoming secretary of state.

He is one of at least five announced candidates for the Republican nomination for governor heading toward the May 22 party primaries. Others are Lt. Gov. Casey Cagle, former state Sen. Hunter Hill, businessman and former Navy SEAL Clay Tippins and state Sen. Michael Williams.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 29, 2017 11:32 AM  
**To:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Subject:** Re: Election night results

It's state law — O.C.G.A. 21-2-386 — that they have to wait until Election Day.

State Election Board rules specify how the cards must be transported and uploaded. It is referenced in rule 183-1-12-.02.

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 29, 2017, at 10:55 AM, Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)> wrote:

Candice,  
I have a few follow-up questions:  
Why can't counties begin tabulating mail (or early votes) before Election Day? Is that written in state law?  
Why must each card from each voting machine be transported and uploaded individually on election night? Is that in state law or in a regulation?  
Thanks again.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese  
Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/marknieseAJC/>

-----Original Message-----

From: Broce, Candice [<mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov>]  
Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2017 10:07 AM  
To: Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
Subject: Election night results

Mark,

Excuse any formatting issues with this email. I'm typing it out on my work phone, and it can get weird.

Counties can begin tabulating mail ballots at 7 AM on Election Day in a quarantined and sequestered area so long as notice is given to the state. Some counties take advantage of this capability; others use their resources to get the polls up and running and start mail ballot tabulation later in the day.

Counties can phone in election results to election offices now. However, this process is not a mechanism to upload the results to Georgia's Election Night Reporting (ENR) system visible to

the public. It must be done electronically from a central location in each of the counties.

Security of election results remains our top priority. Each card from each voting machine must be transported and uploaded individually each election night. As many of the larger counties provide many polling places, this physical transporting of the memory cards is sometimes a long process. We are always willing to consult with counties to improve the efficiency of this process, which may be done through training and practice, but the essential mechanics will not change while we use our current voting system.

We are constantly working to see what technology is available with our partners in the counties and the General Assembly to see if any statutory changes could be made to improve the process. In the Secretary of State's office, our goal will always be secure, accessible, and fair elections.

Shortly, I'll be sending over final upload times from the metro counties to our election night reporting website from the past year or so. The bottom line is that we can only publish results to our website when we get them from the counties.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Candice

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2017 11:30 AM  
**To:** Hamilton, Erica  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver; Michael Barnes; Marry Ann Conner  
**Subject:** FW: transfer of units

Erica,  
Please see the email below.

Michael has asked that you retrieve the DREs from Fannin County and sequester them until they can be acceptance-tested, which will be easier to do in Atlanta.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Michael Barnes [<mailto:mbarne28@kennesaw.edu>]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2017 10:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver  
**Subject:** RE: transfer of units

Chris,

Would you mind instructing Dekalb to go ahead and travel to Fannin and pick up the transferring units? We can then travel to Dekalb and test the units in the Dekalb warehouse. I suspect we won't try to test these units until I get setup in our new operation after the first of the year.

Thanks,  
Michael

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [<mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 06, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** Michael Barnes <[mbarne28@kennesaw.edu](mailto:mbarne28@kennesaw.edu)>  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver <[aharris@sos.ga.gov](mailto:aharris@sos.ga.gov)>; Marry Ann Conner <[maconner@fannincountyga.org](mailto:maconner@fannincountyga.org)>  
**Subject:** transfer of units

Michael,  
Attached are more pieces of equipment to be transferred/acceptance-tested.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE



---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2017 11:30 AM  
**To:** Hamilton, Erica  
**Cc:** Axiver Harris (aharris@sos.ga.gov); Michael Barnes; Marry Ann Conner  
**Subject:** FW: transfer of units

Erica,  
Please see the email below.

Michael has asked that you retrieve the DREs from Fannin County and sequester them until they can be acceptance-tested, which will be easier to do in Atlanta.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Michael Barnes [<mailto:mbarne28@kennesaw.edu>]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2017 10:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver  
**Subject:** RE: transfer of units

Chris,

Would you mind instructing Dekalb to go ahead and travel to Fannin and pick up the transferring units? We can then travel to Dekalb and test the units in the Dekalb warehouse. I suspect we won't try to test these units until I get setup in our new operation after the first of the year.

Thanks,  
Michael

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [<mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 06, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** Michael Barnes <[mbarne28@kennesaw.edu](mailto:mbarne28@kennesaw.edu)>  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver <[aharris@sos.ga.gov](mailto:aharris@sos.ga.gov)>; Marry Ann Conner <[maconner@fannincountyga.org](mailto:maconner@fannincountyga.org)>  
**Subject:** transfer of units

Michael,  
Attached are more pieces of equipment to be transferred/acceptance-tested.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Hamilton, Erica <ehamilton@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 09, 2018 12:16 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver; Michael Barnes; Marry Ann Conner  
**Subject:** RE: transfer of units

Chris,  
We have received the machines from Fannin.

Kindest Regards,

Erica Hamilton  
Director  
DeKalb County Registration & Elections  
4380 Memorial Drive, Ste 300  
Decatur, GA 30032  
Office: 404-298-4040 Fax: 404-298-4038  
E-mail: [ehamilton@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:ehamilton@dekalbcountyga.gov)  
[www.dekalbvotes.com](http://www.dekalbvotes.com)



---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [<mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2017 11:30 AM  
**To:** Hamilton, Erica  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver; Michael Barnes; Marry Ann Conner  
**Subject:** FW: transfer of units

Erica,  
Please see the email below.

Michael has asked that you retrieve the DREs from Fannin County and sequester them until they can be acceptance-tested, which will be easier to do in Atlanta.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Michael Barnes [<mailto:mbarne28@kennesaw.edu>]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 08, 2017 10:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris <[wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver <[aharris@sos.ga.gov](mailto:aharris@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: transfer of units

Chris,

Would you mind instructing Dekalb to go ahead and travel to Fannin and pick up the transferring units? We can then travel to Dekalb and test the units in the Dekalb warehouse. I suspect we won't try to test these units until I get setup in our new operation after the first of the year.

Thanks,  
Michael

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [<mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 06, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** Michael Barnes <[mbarne28@kennesaw.edu](mailto:mbarne28@kennesaw.edu)>  
**Cc:** Harris, Axiver <[aharris@sos.ga.gov](mailto:aharris@sos.ga.gov)>; Marry Ann Conner <[maconner@fannincountyga.org](mailto:maconner@fannincountyga.org)>  
**Subject:** transfer of units

Michael,  
Attached are more pieces of equipment to be transferred/acceptance-tested.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE



# DeKalb County

GA00759264

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Print Proof <PrintProof@morebizz.net>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 02, 2018 1:41 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Cc:** Charity Cirillo  
**Subject:** PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1  
**Attachments:** PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Sender: [PrintProof@morebizz.net](mailto:PrintProof@morebizz.net)

Subject: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Message-Id: <[DM5PR1201MB2554180038B4BA7E19E433FCB4F90@DM5PR1201MB2554.namprd12.prod.outlook.com](mailto:DM5PR1201MB2554180038B4BA7E19E433FCB4F90@DM5PR1201MB2554.namprd12.prod.outlook.com)>

Recipient: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Print Proof <PrintProof@morebizz.net>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 02, 2018 1:41 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Cc:** Charity Cirillo  
**Subject:** PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1  
**Attachments:** 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Perfect Bound Cover - PROOF.PDF; 48740 - 193841 - Proof Approval\_Peachtree\_08-17.pdf; 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Interior Pages - PROOF.PDF

Hi Rachel,

Attached is the first digital proof for the SEB rulebook. After reviewing the supplied file, it appears the content changes were already done.

I did swap out the seal on the cover with a higher resolution image seal and I think there might be a typo in the table of contents. If you look above the page number listings, it says "Pate" instead of Page. I have not yet corrected as I wanted to make sure it was an error before proceeding with the correction.

Let us know if additional corrections are needed or if the order is approved for production. We will await your feedback and place the order on hold in the meantime.

Many thanks,



**Pre-Press Department**

Phone: 770.225.5828 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

This email was sent for proof approval of a product. The attached file(s) are being furnished for you to check typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors, as well as mistakes in layout/ formatting. Although every effort has been made to see that the product is correct, More Business Solutions will not assume responsibility in the case of errors in printed materials that were not explicitly stated or marked for correction on the proof approval form. To ensure the highest degree of accuracy in your finished product, we recommend printing a copy of your proof to size and reviewing before submitting approval.

By Signing the Proof Approval form or replying to this email, you accept responsibility for any errors discovered after printing. You agree to pay, in full, the costs incurred with this job. You also understand that a delay in proof approval can result in extension of due date and therefore a delay in product productions or delivery. We will accept written approvals only - you can reply back to this email or submit a scanned proof approval form.

Thank you and we appreciate your business and feedback.

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Friday, January 26, 2018 2:52 PM

**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** FW: SEB rulebook

Hi Charity-

I am back to work and wanted to follow up on the rulebook. I would like to go ahead and continue with the process of getting the rulebook printed.

Thanks.

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell

**Sent:** Friday, November 17, 2017 3:17 PM

**To:** 'Charity Cirillo' <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Hi Charity-

We would like to go ahead with the order. I do have some changes that someone has submitted. We plan to proof the book before the final printing of it.

Thanks for your help.

Typo in header of pdf page 38/book page 23. Currently says "NOMINATGION OF CANDIDATES"

183-1-11-.01 The authority has a typo. It is missing the closed quotation mark that is in yellow below:

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

183-1-11-.02 They didn't replace the old rule with the newly adopted rule...

Typo: Comma after History should be a period. off. should be eff.

183-1-13-.02 Repealed.

Authority 1064 Ga. Election Code, as amended. History, Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marketing" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. Repealed: F. Oct. 20, 1975; off. Nov. 9, 1975.

For 183-1-14-.12, Remove the word Rule. Improve formatting, put a new line after bold title and the first sentence. Put a new line after 2nd sentence and the set apart "1.". Put a new line after the set apart "1." and the set apart "2." Remove the language "Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14-.12" have the authority and history section the same font and style as other rules.

Rule 183-1-14-.12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.  
Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14-.12  
Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.  
History: Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 08, 2017 10:09 AM

**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning Rachell –

Here is the specs and the quote requested. Please let me know if we are approved to move forward with the file you provided us.

Final size: 6 x 9

Binding: Perfect Bind

Cover – 67# Grey Vellum, single sided, black ink on front cover only, all other covers blank

Text – 132 pages, double sided on 20# White Text, all black and white

Hardcopy proof

Delivery to Warehouse in Hapeville

Qty: 1500

Total: \$4,818.00

Thanks again!

-Charity

---

**Charity Cirillo**

Account Manager

Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners

[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 08, 2017 9:18 AM

**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning-

I can't remember if I have asked this- could I please get a quote before the book is printed?

Thank you.



---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 10:42 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Sherrine Henry <[SherrineHenry@MoreBizz.net](mailto:SherrineHenry@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning Sherrine –

Can you send a courier to pick up 1 book from Rachell today on the sweep. She is located at Secretary of State office.  
Thanks!

-Charity



**Charity Cirillo**  
Account Manager  
Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 10:40 AM  
**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Sure, I will have the book at our front desk.

---


**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 10:38 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Great. Thanks Rachell!

Is it possible to pick up the actual book? I can send a courier this afternoon.

Please let me know.

-Charity



**Charity Cirillo**  
Account Manager  
Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 9:45 AM  
**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning-

I have such lofty goals before an election day. This was one of them. I have attached the book and I have answered as many of your questions as I can below in red. The original file cannot be found.

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 25, 2017 11:47 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning Rachell –

All the specs such as:

Are we scanning the hardcopy or do you have electronic files?- I only have the pdf. I can send you the actual book if that would help.

What is the final size of the book?

What is cover stock run on?

What is text stock run on?- regular copy paper

Bound – as in perfect bound like paperback book that you would buy at a book store?-like a paperback

Does it run black ink only or color ink?- black ink

How many pages are there (not sheets, impressions)?

Does it print double sided or single sided?-double sided

What quantity would you like printed?-1500


Do you need to see a hardcopy proof or is a pdf proof acceptable?-hard copy

Is this delivering back to you or is there another delivery location, if so, what is the address?- we have a warehouse in Hapeville or we can pick up

Is this something we can do in standard turn time or is there certain date we have to hit? (this one may be depending on the quantity and complexity of the job if we can meet the deadline)- Mid January if possible, if not February would be fine.

I hope that helps!

-Charity



**Charity Cirillo**  
Account Manager  
Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 25, 2017 11:42 AM  
**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** SEB rulebook

Good Morning-


Eleanor has sent me to you about a soft bound book that we need updated and printed. What information do you need?

Thanks for your help.

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*



**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2013**

**Brian P. Kemp  
Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# PROOF APPROVAL

## PLEASE REVIEW THOROUGHLY. FINAL APPROVAL FOR PRINT.

This proof is furnished for you to check for typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors or mistakes in layout. Although every effort has been made to see that it is correct, More Business Solutions will not assume responsibility in case of errors in printed materials that were not marked on this proof. To ensure the highest degree of accuracy in your finished product, we recommend printing a copy of your proof to size and reviewing before submitting approval.

5875 Peachtree Industrial Blvd.

Suite 260

Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30092

Tel: 770.225.0321

Fax: 770.578.0143

Email: [printproof@morebizz.net](mailto:printproof@morebizz.net)

Date: 02/02/2018

Proof Version #: 1.0

Client: SOG - Sec. of State

Project: SEB Rule Book

Wo#: 48740-193741

This form must be completed and returned to More Business Solutions before production will begin!

- ☐ **OK, AS IS, NO CORRECTIONS**
- ☐ **CHANGES REQUIRED WITH NEW PROOF**
- ☐ **PROOF WAIVED**

I choose not to receive a proof.  
Any corrections and reprints will be done at customer's expense.

*Up to two digital proofs are included in the price of our services; additional proofs will incur charges at our standard or contract (if eligible) desktop publishing rates, billed in 15 minute increments. Please review proofs carefully to eliminate additional charges.*

I have reviewed the proof and I accept responsibility for any errors discovered after printing. I agree to pay in full the costs incurred with this job. I understand that a delay in proof approval can result in extension of due date and therefore a delay in product production or delivery.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

If you reply by email to approve a proof, the email will be accepted as a digital signature; the same terms and conditions listed on this proof approval form apply.

### CLIENT CHANGES/COMMENTS:

---



---



---



---



---

We work hard to produce quality printed materials that meet your needs. It is vital that you check your proofs thoroughly. By correcting mistakes now, you will prevent the additional cost of having to rerun the job. At More Business Solutions, we feel that our success goes in hand with your success. If you have any questions, just call us. We will be happy to provide the information you need.

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED



**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Ride covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections", 183-31-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-31-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-32 entitled "Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-33 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled "Dates of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed. Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled "Ballots" has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-.10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003. Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02, voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled "Penalties" has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended, Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled "Preliminary Provisions" has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled "Nomination of Candidates" has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed, and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	5
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	15
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	17
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	19
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	23
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	25
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	27
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	31
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	33
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	37
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	45
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	47

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-1-.01	Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules	183-1-1-.02	Review of Initial Decisions
-------------	---	-------------	-----------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;



(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2006; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1-.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-.01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-8-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-8-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**188-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.**

(1) The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) "Voter registration programs" means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

**(4) Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

#### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.



(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-91. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(0) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

**(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. §21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2008. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) "Accessible" shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) "Disabled" shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) "Elderly" shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) "Polling place" means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) "Registration place" shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.



(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems

appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted. F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6-.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, "Are you a citizen of the United States of America?", the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering "Yes" or "No" to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing "X" in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the "Yes" box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked "No", the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01**      **Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-10-.01    Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
                    Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
                    Union, or Other Financial Institution  
                    May Certify Error in Returning Check

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-6, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

(1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least one of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly known in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule

(2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.

(3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and

punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25).

Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and comma necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

(4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

Cite as Ga. Comp. R. 183-1-11-.02

Authority O.C.G.A. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

History. Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

Ammended: F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014

RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE

CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

180-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and refer-endums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Conduct of Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) "Assist", "assisted", "assisting", or "assistance" means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2- 379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2- 587, 21-2-590, 21-2-591, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or dosing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service



until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.

5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained "or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200 \_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2- 379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such



audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(a) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is



resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the

polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, the poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated re-turns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls, for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.



(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two

representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

#### (8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. P. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-.03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. History. Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. B, 1960; eff. Aug. 24, 1963. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the pre-cinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then re-tire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot



envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter

re-gistration form. It also shall not be necessary to obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall ver-ify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the bal-lot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for pro-visional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the Style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and en-titled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be ver-ified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an ap-propriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as "Not Counted" and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the Bame manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter regis-tration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the per-son that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1966; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 8, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

### **183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.**

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the



official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1976. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 20, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1967; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Official Observers at Polling Places" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.** The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words "Official Poll Watcher," the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted, F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-14-.01	Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols	188-1-14-.07	Spoiled Ballot Definition
183-1-14-.02	Use of DBS Units for Absentee Balloting	183-1-14-.06	Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.03	Provisional Absentee Ballots	188*1-14-.09	Voted Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.04	Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.10	Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens
183-1-14-.05	State Write-In Absentee Ballot	183-1-14-.11	Mailing and Issuance of Ballots
183-1-14-.06	Spoiled Absentee Ballots		

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols.** Registrars shall either by use of color or symbols on the return absentee ballot envelope (the one on which the oath appears) designate under which category an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols; D (physically disabled, unable to see or mark the ballot); E (seventy-five years of age or older); MOS (military, overseas); MST (military, stateside); OSP (overseas, permanent resi-dent who may vote for federal offices only); OST (overseas, tempo-rary resident); and AV (person voting absentee in person without providing reason pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-380(b)). To facilitate counting, a symbol designating the absentee elector's precinct, and in the case of a primary or primary runoff, a symbol designating the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting shall also be noted on the envelope containing the oath. The following symbols shall also be used as appropriate: PR (provisional ballot); IR (person who registered to vote for the first time by mail and has not provided the identification provided by law); and EH (ballot cast during poll hours extended by court order).

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted, F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

(1) Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A., Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars.

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath



document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for inperson absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the

discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has initiated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR." In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the numbered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. NOT. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended, Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 1S3-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes. One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-in Absentee Ballot" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval ( ) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval ( ) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval ( ). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law."

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) "Spoiled ballot" includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;



2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;

3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;

4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;

5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;

6. that was issued in error by the election official; or

7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; off. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2- 382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, country, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by

federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-382, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14--10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 10, 2011.

### **183-1-14-12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15**

**RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an "X", a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Definition of Vote" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.** Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

(3) **Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar's primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter



Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter

registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(l) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
- (iii) Voter Registration Application;
- (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
- (v) Naturalization documentation;
- (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
- (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
- (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
- (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
- (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
- (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
- (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;  
or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
183-2-1	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
183-2-2	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
183-2-3	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oaths of Poll Officers" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02, F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Calls for Primaries and Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

## **CHAPTER 183-2-11 VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
**to**  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. Ga, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

**183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-3). **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov, 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
  
CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verifications of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	---

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

- 1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
  
- 2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
  
- 3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
  
- 4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**



1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the

intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the *Voting Systems Standards* published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

**(e) Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is identical to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compilers) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-388, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1-.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted. F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

690-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and



(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2- 50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and

(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-59.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002" adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 07, 2018 8:42 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** SEB Rulebook  
**Attachments:** SEB Rulebook

Sender: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

Subject: SEB Rulebook

Message-Id: <00f5fe9c81ac4635b5d7d79990f1b0df@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us>

To: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

To: [jhead@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jhead@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 07, 2018 8:42 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** SEB Rulebook  
**Attachments:** 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Perfect Bound Cover - PROOF2.pdf; 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Interior Pages - PROOF2.pdf; 48740 - 193841 - Proof Approval\_Peachtree\_08-17.pdf


Good Morning-

Attached are the proofs to the SEB Rulebook. The three rule changes are to 183-1-13-.02, 183-1-13-.06, 183-1-14-.01. I have proofed the changes a few times and would like another person to take a look in case I missed anything.

Thanks.

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*

**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2018**

**Brian P. Kemp  
Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11



## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Ride covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections", 183-31-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-31-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-32 entitled "Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-33 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled "Dates of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed. Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled "Ballots" has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-.10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003. Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02, voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled "Penalties" has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended, Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled "Preliminary Provisions" has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled "Nomination of Candidates" has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed, and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	5
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	15
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	17
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	19
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	23
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	25
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	27
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	31
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	33
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	37
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	45
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	47

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-1-.01	Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules	183-1-1-.02	Review of Initial Decisions
-------------	---	-------------	-----------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;

(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2006; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1-.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-8-04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-8-05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**188-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.**

(1) The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

## 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) "Voter registration programs" means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

**(4) Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

#### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.

(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-91. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.



**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(0) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

**(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. §21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2008. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.

(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems



appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted. F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6-.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, "Are you a citizen of the United States of America?", the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering "Yes" or "No" to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing "X" in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the "Yes" box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked "No", the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01**      **Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-10-.01    Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
                    Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
                    Union, or Other Financial Institution  
                    May Certify Error in Returning Check

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-6, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

- (1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least one of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly known in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule.
- (2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.

- (3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and

and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

(4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate. Upon a determination that the requested name does not comply with this Rule, the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

Authority O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

Cite as Ga. Comp. R. 183-1-11-.02

Authority O.C.G.A. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325. History.

Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

Amended: F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014

RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE

CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

180-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and refer-endums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Conduct of Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) "Assist", "assisted", "assisting", or "assistance" means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2- 379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2- 587, 21-2-590, 21-2-591, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or dosing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service

until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.



5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained "or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200 \_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2- 379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such

audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.



In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(a) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is

resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the



polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, the poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated re-turns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls, for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.

(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two



representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

#### (8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. P. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-.03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. History. Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. B, 1960; eff. Aug. 24, 1963. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the pre-cinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then re-tire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot

envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter



re-gistration form. It also shall not be necessary to obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall ver-ify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the bal-lot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for pro-visional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the Style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and en-titled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be ver-ified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an ap-propriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as "Not Counted" and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the Bame manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter regis-tration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the per-son that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1966; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 8, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

### **183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.**

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of all such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the

official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1976. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 20, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1967; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Official Observers at Polling Places" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.** The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words "Official Poll Watcher," the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.06 Poll Watchers for Advance Voting.**

For the purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(a)(2) and (b)(3)(A), a political party, a political body, or independent or non-partisan candidate may designate, or a candidate may submit to a political party, a different poll observer or set of poll observers for each day of advance voting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31, 21-2-408.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-14-.01	Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols	188-1-14-.07	Spoiled Ballot Definition
183-1-14-.02	Use of DBS Units for Absentee Balloting	183-1-14-.06	Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.03	Provisional Absentee Ballots	188*1-14-.09	Voted Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.04	Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.10	Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens
183-1-14-.05	State Write-In Absentee Ballot		
183-1-14-.06	Spoiled Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.11	Mailing and Issuance of Ballots

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope; Definition of Advanced Age; Use of Symbols**

(1) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), "advanced age" shall mean any elector who is 65 years of age or older at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(2) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), an elector meets the criteria of "disability" when the elector (a) has a physical disability and (b) informs the registrar of his or her status as disabled at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(3) Registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall, in a visible and legible manner, note symbols on the return absentee ballot oath envelope to designate the category under which an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols include:

- E - Elderly or of advanced age (65 years of age or older),
- D - Disabled physically,
- MOS - Military overseas,
- MST - Military stateside,
- OST- Overseas temporary,
- OSP - Overseas permanent resident,
- NR - No reason is provided.

To facilitate ballot tabulation, registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall note on the face of the absentee oath envelope the absentee elector's precinct and, in the case of a primary or primary runoff, the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting and "MIDR" if the voter is voting for the first time pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(c).

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

184-Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A., Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars.

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath

document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for inperson absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the



discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has initiated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR." In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the numbered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. NOT. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended, Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 1S3-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes. One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-in Absentee Ballot" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval (\_\_\_) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval (\_\_\_). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law."

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) "Spoiled ballot" includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;

2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;

3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;

4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;

5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;

6. that was issued in error by the election official; or

7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; off. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2- 382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, country, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by



federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-382, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14--10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 10, 2011.

### **183-1-14-12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15  
RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an "X", a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Definition of Vote" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-20-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.** Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

(3) **Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar's primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter

Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter



registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(l) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
- (iii) Voter Registration Application;
- (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
- (v) Naturalization documentation;
- (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
- (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
- (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
- (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
- (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
- (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
- (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;  
or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
183-2-1	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
183-2-2	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
183-2-3	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oaths of Poll Officers" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02, F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Calls for Primaries and Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

## **CHAPTER 183-2-11 VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
to  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. Ga, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

**183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003,

**183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-3). **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2008.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verifications of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	---

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.

2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.

3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.

4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**

1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the



intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the *Voting Systems Standards* published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

**(e) Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is identical to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compilers) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-388, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1-.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted. F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

690-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and

(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2- 50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and



(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-59.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002" adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

# PROOF APPROVAL

## PLEASE REVIEW THOROUGHLY. FINAL APPROVAL FOR PRINT.

This proof is furnished for you to check for typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors or mistakes in layout. Although every effort has been made to see that it is correct, More Business Solutions will not assume responsibility in case of errors in printed materials that were not marked on this proof. To ensure the highest degree of accuracy in your finished product, we recommend printing a copy of your proof to size and reviewing before submitting approval.

5875 Peachtree Industrial Blvd.

Suite 260

Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30092

Tel: 770.225.0321

Fax: 770.578.0143

Email: [printproof@morebizz.net](mailto:printproof@morebizz.net)

Date: 02/05/2018

Proof Version #: 2.0

Client: SOG - Sec. of State

Project: SEB Rule Book

Wo#: 48740-193741

This form must be completed and returned to More Business Solutions before production will begin!

- ☐ **OK, AS IS, NO CORRECTIONS**
- ☐ **CHANGES REQUIRED WITH NEW PROOF**
- ☐ **PROOF WAIVED**

I choose not to receive a proof.  
Any corrections and reprints will be done at customer's expense.

*Up to two digital proofs are included in the price of our services; additional proofs will incur charges at our standard or contract (if eligible) desktop publishing rates, billed in 15 minute increments. Please review proofs carefully to eliminate additional charges.*

I have reviewed the proof and I accept responsibility for any errors discovered after printing. I agree to pay in full the costs incurred with this job. I understand that a delay in proof approval can result in extension of due date and therefore a delay in product production or delivery.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

If you reply by email to approve a proof, the email will be accepted as a digital signature; the same terms and conditions listed on this proof approval form apply.

**CLIENT CHANGES/COMMENTS:**


---



---



---



---



---

We work hard to produce quality printed materials that meet your needs. It is vital that you check your proofs thoroughly. By correcting mistakes now, you will prevent the additional cost of having to rerun the job. At More Business Solutions, we feel that our success goes in hand with your success. If you have any questions, just call us. We will be happy to provide the information you need.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Charity Cirillo <CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 13, 2018 9:40 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell; Print Proof  
**Subject:** FW: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1  
**Attachments:** FW: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Sender: [CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)

Subject: FW: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Message-Id: <[SN1PR12MB0750A05D5C12DA586A3E3494B7F60@SN1PR12MB0750.namprd12.prod.outlook.com](mailto:SN1PR12MB0750A05D5C12DA586A3E3494B7F60@SN1PR12MB0750.namprd12.prod.outlook.com)>

Recipient: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo <CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 13, 2018 9:39 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell; Print Proof  
**Subject:** FW: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1  
**Attachments:** 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Perfect Bound Cover - PROOF2.pdf; 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Interior Pages - PROOF2.pdf; 48740 - 193841 - Proof Approval\_Peachtree\_08-17.pdf

Good Morning Rachell –

See attached and below. Just wanted to touch base with you. Please let us know if you have edits or if we can move forward with the order.

Thanks!

-Charity



**Charity Cirillo**  
Account Manager  
Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

---

**From:** Print Proof  
**Sent:** Monday, February 05, 2018 3:58 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell ; Print Proof  
**Cc:** Charity Cirillo  
**Subject:** RE: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Hi Rachel,

Attached is the revised proof for review. Let us know if additional corrections are needed before we proceed to the printed proof. We will await your feedback and place the order on hold in the meantime.

Many thanks,



**Pre-Press Department**  
Phone: 770.225.5828 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

This email was sent for proof approval of a product. The attached file(s) are being furnished for you to check typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors, as well as mistakes in layout/ formatting. Although every effort has been made to see that the product is correct, More Business Solutions will not assume responsibility in the case of errors in printed materials that were not explicitly stated or marked for correction on the proof approval form. To ensure the highest degree of accuracy in your finished product, we recommend printing a copy of your proof to size and reviewing before submitting approval.

By Signing the Proof Approval form or replying to this email, you accept responsibility for any errors discovered after printing. You agree to pay, in full, the costs incurred with this job. You also understand that a delay in proof approval can result in extension of due date and therefore a delay in product productions or delivery. We will accept written approvals only - you can reply back to this email or submit a scanned proof approval form.

Thank you and we appreciate your business and feedback.

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2018 11:31 AM  
**To:** Print Proof <[PrintProof@morebizz.net](mailto:PrintProof@morebizz.net)>  
**Subject:** RE: PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Good Morning-

Yes, Pate needs to be change to Page. On the cover 2013 needs to be changed to 2018.

Attached are changes.

Attachment 183-1-11-.02- please use to replace sections 1-4 of the this rule.

Attachment 183-1-13-.06 please add after 183-1-13.05

Attachment 183-1-14-.01- please use to replace the current rule.

Thanks for your help.

---

**From:** Print Proof [<mailto:PrintProof@morebizz.net>]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 02, 2018 1:41 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** PROOF: SEB Rulebook - Order 48740-193741 PROOF1

Hi Rachel,

Attached is the first digital proof for the SEB rulebook. After reviewing the supplied file, it appears the content changes were already done.

I did swap out the seal on the cover with a higher resolution image seal and I think there might be a typo in the table of contents. If you look above the page number listings, it says "Pate" instead of Page. I have not yet corrected as I wanted to make sure it was an error before proceeding with the correction.

Let us know if additional corrections are needed or if the order is approved for production. We will await your feedback and place the order on hold in the meantime.

Many thanks,



---

**Pre-Press Department**

Phone: 770.225.5828 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

This email was sent for proof approval of a product. The attached file(s) are being furnished for you to check typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors, as well as mistakes in layout/ formatting. Although every effort has been made to see that the product is correct, More Business Solutions will not assume responsibility in the case of errors in printed materials that were not explicitly stated or marked for correction on the proof approval form. To ensure the highest degree of accuracy in your finished product, we recommend printing a copy of your proof to size and reviewing before submitting approval.

By Signing the Proof Approval form or replying to this email, you accept responsibility for any errors discovered after printing. You agree to pay, in full, the costs incurred with this job. You also understand that a delay in proof approval can result in extension of due date and therefore a delay in product productions or delivery. We will accept written approvals only - you can reply back to this email or submit a scanned proof approval form.

Thank you and we appreciate your business and feedback.

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]

**Sent:** Friday, January 26, 2018 2:52 PM

**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** FW: SEB rulebook

Hi Charity-

I am back to work and wanted to follow up on the rulebook. I would like to go ahead and continue with the process of getting the rulebook printed.

Thanks.

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell

**Sent:** Friday, November 17, 2017 3:17 PM

**To:** 'Charity Cirillo' <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Hi Charity-

We would like to go ahead with the order. I do have some changes that someone has submitted. We plan to proof the book before the final printing of it.

Thanks for your help.

Typo in header of pdf page 38/book page 23. Currently says "NOMINATGION OF CANDIDATES"

183-1-11-.01 The authority has a typo. It is missing the closed quotation mark that is in yellow below:

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

183-1-11-.02 They didn't replace the old rule with the newly adopted rule...

Typo: Comma after History should be a period. off. should be eff.

183-1-13-.02 Repealed.

Authority 1064 Ga. Election Code, as amended. History, Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marketing" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. Repealed: F. Oct. 20, 1975; off. Nov. 9, 1975.

For 183-1-14-.12, Remove the word Rule. Improve formatting, put a new line after bold title and the first sentence. Put a new line after 2nd sentence and the set apart "1.". Put a new line after the set apart "1." and the set apart "2." Remove the language "Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14-.12" have the authority and history section the same font and style as other rules.

Rule 183-1-14-.12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.

2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

Cite as Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 183-1-14-.12

Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

History. Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 08, 2017 10:09 AM

**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning Rachell –

Here is the specs and the quote requested. Please let me know if we are approved to move forward with the file you provided us.

Final size: 6 x 9

Binding: Perfect Bind

Cover – 67# Grey Vellum, single sided, black ink on front cover only, all other covers blank

Text – 132 pages, double sided on 20# White Text, all black and white

Hardcopy proof

Delivery to Warehouse in Hapeville

Qty: 1500

Total: \$4,818.00

Thanks again!

-Charity



**Charity Cirillo**

Account Manager

Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 08, 2017 9:18 AM

**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning-

I can't remember if I have asked this- could I please get a quote before the book is printed?

Thank you.

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 10:42 AM

**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>


**Cc:** Sherrine Henry <[SherrineHenry@MoreBizz.net](mailto:SherrineHenry@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning Sherrine –

Can you send a courier to pick up 1 book from Rachell today on the sweep. She is located at Secretary of State office.  
Thanks!

-Charity



**Charity Cirillo**

Account Manager

Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More



---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 10:40 AM  
**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Sure, I will have the book at our front desk.

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 10:38 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Great. Thanks Rachell!

Is it possible to pick up the actual book? I can send a courier this afternoon.

Please let me know.

-Charity

---

	<p><b>Charity Cirillo</b> Account Manager Phone: 770.225.5836   Peachtree Corners <a href="http://morebizz.net">morebizz.net</a></p>
--	--

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 07, 2017 9:45 AM  
**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning-

I have such lofty goals before an election day. This was one of them. I have attached the book and I have answered as many of your questions as I can below in red. The original file cannot be found.

---

**From:** Charity Cirillo [<mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net>]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 25, 2017 11:47 AM  
**To:** Simmons, Rachell <[rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: SEB rulebook

Good Morning Rachell –

All the specs such as:

Are we scanning the hardcopy or do you have electronic files?- I only have the pdf. I can send you the actual book if that would help.

What is the final size of the book?

What is cover stock run on?

What is text stock run on?- regular copy paper

Bound – as in perfect bound like paperback book that you would buy at a book store?-like a paperback

Does it run black ink only or color ink?- black ink

How many pages are there (not sheets, impressions)?

Does it print double sided or single sided?-double sided

What quantity would you like printed?-1500


Do you need to see a hardcopy proof or is a pdf proof acceptable?-hard copy

Is this delivering back to you or is there another delivery location, if so, what is the address?- we have a warehouse in Hapeville or we can pick up

Is this something we can do in standard turn time or is there certain date we have to hit? (this one may be depending on the quantity and complexity of the job if we can meet the deadline)- Mid January if possible, if not February would be fine.

I hope that helps!

-Charity



---

**Charity Cirillo**  
Account Manager  
Phone: 770.225.5836 | Peachtree Corners  
[morebizz.net](http://morebizz.net)

---

Print • Copy • Large Format • On-Site Solutions & More

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell [<mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov>]

**Sent:** Wednesday, October 25, 2017 11:42 AM

**To:** Charity Cirillo <[CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net](mailto:CharityCirillo@MoreBizz.net)>

**Subject:** SEB rulebook

Good Morning-


Eleanor has sent me to you about a soft bound book that we need updated and printed. What information do you need?

Thanks for your help.

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*



**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2018**

**Brian P. Kemp  
Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Ride covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries



and Elections", 183-31-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-31-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-32 entitled "Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-33 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled "Dates of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed. Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled "Ballots" has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-.10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003. Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02, voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled "Penalties" has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended, Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled "Preliminary Provisions" has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled "Nomination of Candidates" has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed, and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	5
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	15
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	17
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	19
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	23
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	25
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	27
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	31
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	33
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	37
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	45
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	47

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-1-.01	Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules	183-1-1-.02	Review of Initial Decisions
-------------	---	-------------	-----------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;

(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2006; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1-.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-.01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-8-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-8-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**188-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.**

(1) The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board



of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

## 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) “Voter registration programs” means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

**(4) Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

#### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.

(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-91. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(0) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg et seq., or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;



5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

**(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. §21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2008. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.

(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems

appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted. F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6-.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.



(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, "Are you a citizen of the United States of America?", the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering "Yes" or "No" to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing "X" in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the "Yes" box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked "No", the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sees. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01**      **Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-10-.01    **Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
Union, or Other Financial Institution  
May Certify Error in Returning Check**

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-6, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

- (1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least one of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly known in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule.
- (2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.

- (3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and

and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

(4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate. Upon a determination that the requested name does not comply with this Rule, the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

Authority O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

Cite as Ga. Comp. R. 183-1-11-.02

Authority O.C.G.A. 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325. History.

Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010.

Amended: F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

## **CHAPTER 183-1-12 VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and refer-endums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Conduct of Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) "Assist", "assisted", "assisting", or "assistance" means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2- 379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2- 587, 21-2-590, 21-2-591, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or dosing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service

until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.

5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained "or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have



access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200 \_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2- 379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such

audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(a) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used



to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is

resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the

polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling



place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, the poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated re-turns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls, for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.

(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two

representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

#### (8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.



(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. P. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-.03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. History. Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. B, 1960; eff. Aug. 24, 1963. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the pre-cinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. §21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then re-tire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot

envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter

re-gistration form. It also shall not be necessary to obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall ver-ify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the bal-lot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for pro-visional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on



how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the Style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and entitled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be verified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an appropriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as "Not Counted" and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter registration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the person that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1966; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 8, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted, F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

### **183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.**

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the

official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1976. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 20, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1967; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Official Observers at Polling Places" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.** The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words "Official Poll Watcher," the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.06 Poll Watchers for Advance Voting.**

For the purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(a)(2) and (b)(3)(A), a political party, a political body, or independent or non-partisan candidate may designate, or a candidate may submit to a political party, a different poll observer or set of poll observers for each day of advance voting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31, 21-2-408.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

180-1-14-.01	Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols	188-1-14-.07	Spoiled Ballot Definition
183.1-14-.02	Use of DBS Units for Absentee Balloting	183-1-14-.06	Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.03	Provisional Absentee Ballots	188*1-14-.09	Voted Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.04	Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.10	Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens
183-1-14-.05	State Write-In Absentee Ballot	183-1-14-.11	Mailing and Issuance of Ballots
183-1-14-.06	Spoiled Absentee Ballots		

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope; Definition of Advanced Age; Use of Symbols**

(1) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), "advanced age" shall mean any elector who is 65 years of age or older at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(2) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), an elector meets the criteria of "disability" when the elector (a) has a physical disability and (b) informs the registrar of his or her status as disabled at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(3) Registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall, in a visible and legible manner, note symbols on the return absentee ballot oath envelope to designate the category under which an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols include:

- E - Elderly or of advanced age (65 years of age or older),
- D - Disabled physically,
- MOS - Military overseas,
- MST - Military stateside,
- OST- Overseas temporary,
- OSP - Overseas permanent resident,
- NR - No reason is provided.

To facilitate ballot tabulation, registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall note on the face of the absentee oath envelope the absentee elector's precinct and, in the case of a primary or primary runoff, the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting and "MIDR" if the voter is voting for the first time pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(c).

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

184-Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A., Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars.

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath

document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for inperson absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the

discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in



numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has initiated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR." In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the numbered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. NOT. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended, Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 1S3-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes. One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-in Absentee Ballot" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval ( ) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval ( ) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval ( ). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law."

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) "Spoiled ballot" includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;

2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;

3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;

4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;

5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;

6. that was issued in error by the election official; or

7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; off. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2- 382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, country, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by

federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-382, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14--10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county



or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 10, 2011.

### **183-1-14-12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot**

The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

Authority: O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15  
RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an "X", a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Definition of Vote" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

(3) **Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar's primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter

Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter

registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(l) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;



- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
- (iii) Voter Registration Application;
- (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
- (v) Naturalization documentation;
- (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
- (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
- (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
- (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
- (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
- (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
- (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
- (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;  
or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
183-2-1	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
183-2-2	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
183-2-3	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oaths of Poll Officers" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02, F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Calls for Primaries and Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**



# RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE

## CHAPTER 183-2-11 VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines  
183-2-11-.02  
to  
183-2-11-.01 Repealed

#### **183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. Ga, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

#### **183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-3). **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2008; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
  
CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verifications of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	---

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

- 1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
  
- 2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
  
- 3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
  
- 4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**

1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the

intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the *Voting Systems Standards* published by the EAC.



**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

**(e) Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is identical to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compilers) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-388, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1-.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted. F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

690-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and

(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2- 50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and

(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-59.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002" adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.



# PROOF APPROVAL

## PLEASE REVIEW THOROUGHLY. FINAL APPROVAL FOR PRINT.

This proof is furnished for you to check for typographical, spelling, and grammatical errors or mistakes in layout. Although every effort has been made to see that it is correct, More Business Solutions will not assume responsibility in case of errors in printed materials that were not marked on this proof. To ensure the highest degree of accuracy in your finished product, we recommend printing a copy of your proof to size and reviewing before submitting approval.

5875 Peachtree Industrial Blvd.

Suite 260

Peachtree Corners, Georgia 30092

Tel: 770.225.0321

Fax: 770.578.0143

Email: [printproof@morebizz.net](mailto:printproof@morebizz.net)

Date: 02/05/2018

Proof Version #: 2.0

Client: SOG - Sec. of State

Project: SEB Rule Book

Wo#: 48740-193741

This form must be completed and returned to More Business Solutions before production will begin!

- ☐ **OK, AS IS, NO CORRECTIONS**
- ☐ **CHANGES REQUIRED WITH NEW PROOF**
- ☐ **PROOF WAIVED**

I choose not to receive a proof.  
Any corrections and reprints will be done at customer's expense.

*Up to two digital proofs are included in the price of our services; additional proofs will incur charges at our standard or contract (if eligible) desktop publishing rates, billed in 15 minute increments. Please review proofs carefully to eliminate additional charges.*

I have reviewed the proof and I accept responsibility for any errors discovered after printing. I agree to pay in full the costs incurred with this job. I understand that a delay in proof approval can result in extension of due date and therefore a delay in product production or delivery.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

If you reply by email to approve a proof, the email will be accepted as a digital signature; the same terms and conditions listed on this proof approval form apply.

**CLIENT CHANGES/COMMENTS:**


---



---



---



---



---

We work hard to produce quality printed materials that meet your needs. It is vital that you check your proofs thoroughly. By correcting mistakes now, you will prevent the additional cost of having to rerun the job. At More Business Solutions, we feel that our success goes in hand with your success. If you have any questions, just call us. We will be happy to provide the information you need.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Rayburn, Kevin  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2018 4:22 PM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** FW: SEB Proof  
**Attachments:** FW: SEB Proof

Sender: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

Subject: FW: SEB Proof

Message-Id: <0d512a09b55544788898636225c62838@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us>

To: [jhead@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jhead@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2018 4:22 PM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** FW: SEB Proof  
**Attachments:** 48740 - 193841 - SOG - SEB Rule Book - Interior Pages - PROOF3.pdf

Kevin Rayburn  
Assistant Elections Director and Deputy General Counsel

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
404.656.2871 (main)  
404.654.6004 (direct)

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Friday, February 16, 2018 4:01 PM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** SEB Proof

Good Afternoon-

Attached is the latest proof for the SEB rulebook. Enjoy.

Have a good weekend.

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections", 183-31-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-31-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-32 entitled "Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-33 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled "Dates of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed.

Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled "Ballots" has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-. 10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.



Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003.

Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02), voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled "Penalties" has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled "Preliminary Provisions" has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled "Nomination of Candidates" has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been amended. Filed November 10, 2014; effective November 30, 2014.

Rule 183-1-14-.12 has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2015; effective January 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
183-1-1	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	5
183-1-2	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
183-1-3	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
183-1-4	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
183-1-5	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
183-1-6	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	15
183-1-7	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	17
183-1-8	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	19
183-1-9	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-1-10	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	23
183-1-11	BALLOTS	25
183-1-12	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	27
183-1-13	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	31
183-1-14	ABSENTEE VOTING	33
183-1-15	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	37
183-1-16	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
183-1-17	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-1-18	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
183-1-19	PENALTIES	45
183-1-20	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	47

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-1-.01	Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules	183-1-1-.02	Review of Initial Decisions
-------------	---	-------------	-----------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;

(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-.01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-6-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-6-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**183-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.(1)**

The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.



(c) “Voter registration programs” means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

**(4) Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

#### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.

(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-6-.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg *et seq.*, or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

**(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**



(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

#### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.

(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems

appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted. F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6-.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted. F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, "Are you a citizen of the United States of America?", the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering "Yes" or "No" to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing "X" in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the "Yes" box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked "No", the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-7-.01      Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01     Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-10-.01    Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
                    Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
                    Union, or Other Financial Institution  
                    May Certify Error in Returning Check

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-5, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-11-.01</b>	<b>Ballot Secrecy</b>	<b>183-1-11-.02</b>	<b>Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot</b>
---------------------	-----------------------	---------------------	---

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

- (1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least one of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly known in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule.
- (2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.

- (3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and

and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

(4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate. Upon a determination that the requested name does not comply with this Rule, the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

Authority O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

**Cite as Ga. Comp. R. 183-1-11-02**

Authority O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010. **Amended:** F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and referendums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Conduct of Elections" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) "Assist", "assisted", "assisting", or "assistance" means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2-379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2-587, 21-2-590, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or closing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service

until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.

5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting



equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200 \_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2-379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such

audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such



records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is

resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the

polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.



(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet or the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.

(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two

representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

(8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-.03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.



Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot

envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter registration form. It also shall not be necessary to

obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the ballot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the



provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and entitled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be verified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an appropriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as "Not Counted" and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter registration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the person that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

### **183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.**

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of all such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the

official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT  
OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Official Observers at Polling Places" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.** The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words "Official Poll Watcher," the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.06 Poll Watchers for Advance Voting.**

For the purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(a)(2) and (b)(3)(A), a political party, a political body, or independent or non-partisan candidate may designate, or a candidate may submit to a political party, a different poll observer or set of poll observers for each day of advance voting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31, 21-2-408.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-14-.01	Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols	188-1-14-.07	Spoiled Ballot Definition
183-1-14-.02	Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting	183-1-14-.06	Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.03	Provisional Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.09	Voted Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.04	Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.10	Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens
183-1-14-.05	State Write-In Absentee Ballot	183-1-14-.11	Mailing and Issuance of Ballots
183-1-14-.06	Spoiled Absentee Ballots		

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope; Definition of Advanced Age; Use of Symbols**

(1) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), "advanced age" shall mean any elector who is 65 years of age or older at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(2) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), an elector meets the criteria of "disability" when the elector (a) has a physical disability and (b) informs the registrar of his or her status as disabled at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(3) Registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall, in a visible and legible manner, note symbols on the return absentee ballot oath envelope to designate the category under which an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols include:

- E - Elderly or of advanced age (65 years of age or older),
- D - Disabled physically,
- MOS - Military overseas,
- MST - Military stateside,
- OST- Overseas temporary,
- OSP - Overseas permanent resident,
- NR - No reason is provided.

To facilitate ballot tabulation, registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall note on the face of the absentee oath envelope the absentee elector's precinct and, in the case of a primary or primary runoff, the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting and "MIDR" if the voter is voting for the first time pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(c).

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

(1) Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars.

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath

document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for in-person absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the

discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has initiated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR." In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the numbered list of regular absentee voters.



(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended. Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 183-1-14-0.5-.04, F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted, F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes. One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-in Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval ( ☐ ) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval ( ☐ ) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval ( ☐ ). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law."

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Absentee Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) "Spoiled ballot" includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;

2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;

3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;

4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;

5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;

6. that was issued in error by the election official; or

7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, county, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by

federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-382, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted, F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted, F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-.10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-386. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

**183-1-14-12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot.** The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

Authority: O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-15  
RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed**

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote**

**183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483 (g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an "X", a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Definition of Vote" adopted, F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE

CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card**

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.** Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

**(3) Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar's primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter

Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter

registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
  - (iii) Voter Registration Application;
  - (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
  - (v) Naturalization documentation;
  - (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
  - (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
  - (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
  - (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
  - (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
  - (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
  - (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
  - (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
  - (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;
- or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under



O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
183-2-1	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
183-2-2	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
183-2-3	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oaths of Poll Officers" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973, **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Oath of Registration Officers” adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled “Proper Identification for Registration” adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINCTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-7-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-7-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Calls for Primaries and Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

## **CHAPTER 183-2-11 VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
to  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

#### **183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

#### **183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**183-2-11-.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION  
  
CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verification of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	--

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**

1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the

intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the Voting Systems Standards published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of



the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

**(e) Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is *identical* to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compiler) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-368, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed.** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1-.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted. F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE ELECTIONS  
DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS  
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and

(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2-50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and

(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-59.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002" adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

---

**From:** Bryan, Bennett D <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 05, 2018 12:46 PM  
**To:** John Salter; Germany, Ryan  
**Subject:** Re:

My phone number is +1 [REDACTED]. Could your investigator give me a call. My message says I'm already away but I'm actually leaving tomorrow.

Bennett D. Bryan  
Senior Assistant County Attorney

---

**From:** John Salter  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 5, 2018 12:40:13 PM  
**To:** Ryan Germany  
**Cc:** Bryan, Bennett D  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re:  
Ryan, looks like your investigator may want to contact Erica.  
John

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Bryan, Bennett D" <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
Date: May 5, 2018 at 12:31:23 PM EDT  
To: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
Subject: Re:

Can the investigator meet Erica this afternoon to watch her sequester the machines?

Bennett D. Bryan  
Senior Assistant County Attorney

---

From: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
Sent: Saturday, May 5, 2018 12:28:12 PM  
To: Bryan, Bennett D  
Subject:

FYI, SOS has an investigator being tasked with this. Know you are out of the country. Sorry for the timing.  
Cheers,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.  
Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it



promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.  
**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.**  
Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Bryan, Bennett D <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 05, 2018 12:46 PM  
**To:** John Salter; Germany, Ryan  
**Subject:** Re:

My phone number is +1 [REDACTED]. Could your investigator give me a call. My message says I'm already away but I'm actually leaving tomorrow.

Bennett D. Bryan  
Senior Assistant County Attorney

---

**From:** John Salter  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 5, 2018 12:40:13 PM  
**To:** Ryan Germany  
**Cc:** Bryan, Bennett D  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re:  
Ryan, looks like your investigator may want to contact Erica.  
John

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Bryan, Bennett D" <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
Date: May 5, 2018 at 12:31:23 PM EDT  
To: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
Subject: Re:

Can the investigator meet Erica this afternoon to watch her sequester the machines?

Bennett D. Bryan  
Senior Assistant County Attorney

---

From: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
Sent: Saturday, May 5, 2018 12:28:12 PM  
To: Bryan, Bennett D  
Subject:

FYI, SOS has an investigator being tasked with this. Know you are out of the country. Sorry for the timing.  
Cheers,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.  
Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it

promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.  
**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.**  
Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Bryan, Bennett D <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 05, 2018 12:46 PM  
**To:** John Salter; Germany, Ryan  
**Subject:** Re:  
**Attachments:** Re:

Sender: [benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov)

Subject: Re:

Message-Id: <CY1PR09MB03454CA9E95A8D622E19F270BC850@CY1PR09MB0345.namprd09.prod.outlook.com>

Recipient: [rgermany@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rgermany@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Bryan, Bennett D <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 05, 2018 12:46 PM  
**To:** John Salter; Germany, Ryan  
**Subject:** Re:

My phone number is +1 [REDACTED]. Could your investigator give me a call. My message says I'm already away but I'm actually leaving tomorrow.

Bennett D. Bryan  
Senior Assistant County Attorney

---

**From:** John Salter  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 5, 2018 12:40:13 PM  
**To:** Ryan Germany  
**Cc:** Bryan, Bennett D  
**Subject:** Fwd: Re:  
Ryan, looks like your investigator may want to contact Erica.  
John

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Bryan, Bennett D" <benbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>  
Date: May 5, 2018 at 12:31:23 PM EDT  
To: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
Subject: Re:

Can the investigator meet Erica this afternoon to watch her sequester the machines?

Bennett D. Bryan  
Senior Assistant County Attorney

---

From: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
Sent: Saturday, May 5, 2018 12:28:12 PM  
To: Bryan, Bennett D  
Subject:

FYI, SOS has an investigator being tasked with this. Know you are out of the country. Sorry for the timing.  
Cheers,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION. Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it

promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.  
**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.**  
Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Head, Jansen  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 19, 2018 3:37 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@mail.mil  
**Cc:** Kinnemore, Lisa  
**Subject:** Georgia Elections 2018

Dear Master Sgt. George Harvey,

Thank you for contacting our office and taking the time to speak with us regarding voting options in the July 24<sup>th</sup> General Primary Runoff and the November 6<sup>th</sup> General Election. I have summarized our conversation below:

**Tuesday, July 24<sup>th</sup> - General Primary Runoff**

- Voting in person:
  - Advance in-person voting begins on Tuesday, July 2<sup>nd</sup> and ends on Friday, July 20<sup>th</sup>.
  - To find out where you can vote early during this time, you can visit the Secretary of State's "My Voter Page" website at <https://www.mvp.sos.ga.gov/MVP/mvp.do>.
    - § You will need to login with your first initial, last name, county residence, and date of birth.
    - § Locations and hours for early voting are located on the link "Click Here for Early Voting Locations and Times" in the upper right box titled "Polling Place for State, County, and Municipal Elections".
- Voting by absentee
  - If you are not able to vote in person prior to your departure, you can submit a "**Federal Post Card Application**" (FPCA) and request to receive an absentee ballot either by mail to your temporary (overseas address) or "electronically."
  - In Section 6 of that application, indicate if you would like an absentee ballot only for the July 24<sup>th</sup> Runoff, both July 24<sup>th</sup> runoff and November 6<sup>th</sup> Election, OR you can leave it blank if you will be overseas through the end of next year. If you leave that section 6 blank, you will receive absentee ballots for all primaries, elections, and runoffs for the next two elections cycles (years).
  - Whether you receive your absentee ballot by mail or electronically, you will need to return the ballot by mail.

**Tuesday, November 6, 2018 – General Election**

- Voting by absentee
  - If you wish to vote absentee in both the July 24<sup>th</sup> Runoff and the November 6<sup>th</sup> election, then you can indicate that in Section 6 stating that you only want absentee ballots for these two elections. Or, if only the November 6<sup>th</sup> election, then you can indicate that in Section 6 as well.

The **Federal Post Card Application (FPCA)** is available on the Secretary of State's website here:

[http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/military\\_and\\_overseas\\_voting2](http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/military_and_overseas_voting2). I was hesitant to attach it to this email because sometimes ".mil" email addresses will block my emails with attachments or will automatically strip the attachments from the email. If you would like for me to email you that form, please let me know and I will give it a try.

I know this is a lot of information, but I hope this was helpful. If you or others at RAFB have specific questions or need additional assistance with anything, please feel free to contact us directly. I have copied Lisa Kinnemore who is our military liaison and recently joined our team in the elections division. My direct line is 404-654-6019 and her direct line is 404-654-6044. We will be happy to help.

Sincerely,

Jansen Head  
Elections Attorney  
Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp



June 30, 2018

**VIA: E-MAIL**

Roy E. Barnes, Esq. (Roy@barneslawgroup.com)  
John F. Salter, Esq. (John@barneslawgroup.com)  
Barnes Law Group, LLC  
31 Atlanta Street  
Marietta, GA 30060

Re: *Curling, et al. v. Kemp, et al.*, No. 17-CV-02989-AT (N.D. Ga.)

Dear Governor Barnes and Mr. Salter:

I am writing to alert you that we will be requesting the following electronic election records as soon as discovery opens. The records, documents, ESI, data, and materials listed below should be preserved for discovery purposes. We understand that there is shared custodianship of some of the records and equipment and are therefore also copying election officials of Habersham and Hall Counties to ensure that records are diligently preserved. We are calling upon you as counsel for the State Defendants to give close and scrupulous attention to the preservation of these records.

Please inform the appropriate election officials who are custodians of the referenced state equipment and records that these records must be preserved without alteration:

1. Hall County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DREs used in the May 22, 2018 primary election in precinct 10 (Candler).
2. Hall County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DREs used in the May 22, 2018 primary election for which machine results tapes and/or DRE machine memory cards did not report results on all races on the ballot.
3. Memory cards of ExpressPoll units used in the Hall County Candler precinct (precinct 10) in the May 22, 2018 primary election.
4. Machine results tapes from all Hall County precincts from the May 22, 2018 election.

5. All voter access cards and supervisor cards used in Candler precinct during the May 22, 2018 election.
6. All supervisor access cards used in all polling places on election day (May 22, 2018) in Hall County.
7. Habersham County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DRE's used in the May 22, 2018 primary election.
8. Habersham County ExpressPoll unit memory cards used in all precincts and polling place locations during the May 22, 2018 primary election.
9. All correspondence and communications related to the conduct and subsequent investigation and review of the May 22, 2018 primary election. (Hall County and Habersham County and SOS Kemp office.)

Our interest in these records derives from serious discrepancies in both of these counties, recently brought to our attention. The details of significant incorrect ballot issuance and disenfranchisement of voters in Habersham County are well known through the currently pending election contest in Fulton County Superior Court. We have recently learned that in Hall County at least one machine failed to report the results of several races, and reported one candidate as both a Republican and a Democrat.

The results tape also appears to reflect a loss of ballots during the counting process. A copy of one such tape is attached hereto for your convenient reference. We are concerned about the systemic problems that exist as a result of the voting system design flaws and the compromise of the system components and data during the KSU data breaches. Forensic discovery efforts will be required when discovery opens and it is therefore imperative that electronic records be diligently maintained without further alteration.

# ICHTER DAVIS LLC

Cary Ichter, Partner  
cichter@ichterdavis.com  
404.869.5243 direct  
04.769.1353 cell

Thank you for your assistance in securing these records. Please let me know whether you have questions or wish to discuss.

Sincerely,

Cary Ichter

cc: Bruce P. Brown, Esq.  
Robert A. McGuire, III, Esq.  
William Brent Ney, Esq.  
Marilyn R. Marks  
David D. Cross, Esq.  
Halsey G. Knapp, Jr., Esq.  
Daniel White, Esq.  
Adam M. Sparks, Esq.  
Jon Carlin, Esq.  
Jane P. Bentrrott, Esq.  
A. Miriyala, Esq.  
Catherine L. Chapple, Esq. Jane P. Bentrrott  
Ms. Lori Wurtz (Director of Hall County Elections) [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org)  
Laurel Ellison (Elections Director Habersham County)  
[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

June 30, 2018

**VIA: E-MAIL**

Roy E. Barnes, Esq. (Roy@barneslawgroup.com)  
John F. Salter, Esq. (John@barneslawgroup.com)  
Barnes Law Group, LLC  
31 Atlanta Street  
Marietta, GA 30060

Re: *Curling, et al. v. Kemp, et al.*, No. 17-CV-02989-AT (N.D. Ga.)

Dear Governor Barnes and Mr. Salter:

I am writing to alert you that we will be requesting the following electronic election records as soon as discovery opens. The records, documents, ESI, data, and materials listed below should be preserved for discovery purposes. We understand that there is shared custodianship of some of the records and equipment and are therefore also copying election officials of Habersham and Hall Counties to ensure that records are diligently preserved. We are calling upon you as counsel for the State Defendants to give close and scrupulous attention to the preservation of these records.

Please inform the appropriate election officials who are custodians of the referenced state equipment and records that these records must be preserved without alteration:

1. Hall County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DREs used in the May 22, 2018 primary election in precinct 10 (Candler).
2. Hall County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DREs used in the May 22, 2018 primary election for which machine results tapes and/or DRE machine memory cards did not report results on all races on the ballot.
3. Memory cards of ExpressPoll units used in the Hall County Candler precinct (precinct 10) in the May 22, 2018 primary election.
4. Machine results tapes from all Hall County precincts from the May 22, 2018 election.

5. All voter access cards and supervisor cards used in Candler precinct during the May 22, 2018 election.
6. All supervisor access cards used in all polling places on election day (May 22, 2018) in Hall County.
7. Habersham County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DRE's used in the May 22, 2018 primary election.
8. Habersham County ExpressPoll unit memory cards used in all precincts and polling place locations during the May 22, 2018 primary election.
9. All correspondence and communications related to the conduct and subsequent investigation and review of the May 22, 2018 primary election. (Hall County and Habersham County and SOS Kemp office.)

Our interest in these records derives from serious discrepancies in both of these counties, recently brought to our attention. The details of significant incorrect ballot issuance and disenfranchisement of voters in Habersham County are well known through the currently pending election contest in Fulton County Superior Court. We have recently learned that in Hall County at least one machine failed to report the results of several races, and reported one candidate as both a Republican and a Democrat.

The results tape also appears to reflect a loss of ballots during the counting process. A copy of one such tape is attached hereto for your convenient reference. We are concerned about the systemic problems that exist as a result of the voting system design flaws and the compromise of the system components and data during the KSU data breaches. Forensic discovery efforts will be required when discovery opens and it is therefore imperative that electronic records be diligently maintained without further alteration.

# ICHTER DAVIS LLC

Cary Ichter, Partner  
cichter@ichterdavis.com  
404.869.5243 direct  
04.769.1353 cell

Thank you for your assistance in securing these records. Please let me know whether you have questions or wish to discuss.

Sincerely,

Cary Ichter

cc: Bruce P. Brown, Esq.  
Robert A. McGuire, III, Esq.  
William Brent Ney, Esq.  
Marilyn R. Marks  
David D. Cross, Esq.  
Halsey G. Knapp, Jr., Esq.  
Daniel White, Esq.  
Adam M. Sparks, Esq.  
Jon Carlin, Esq.  
Jane P. Bentrrott, Esq.  
A. Miriyala, Esq.  
Catherine L. Chapple, Esq. Jane P. Bentrrott  
Ms. Lori Wurtz (Director of Hall County Elections) [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org)  
Laurel Ellison (Elections Director Habersham County)  
[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:42 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
John Salter is our office's attorney in this matter.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[l Ellison@habershamga.com](mailto:l Ellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.  
Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]

**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM

**To:** Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CCchapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCchapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>;  
[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CCchapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCchapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.



To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<[mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are

insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>

Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM

To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary

Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;

william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter

<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes

<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks

<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway

<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross

<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp

<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott

<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso

<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks

<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>

Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hold, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes

<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrutt  
<JBentrutt@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrutt@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspennoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.



Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter ; Roy Barnes  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire ; Bruce Brown ; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White ; Adam Sparks ; Chapple, Catherine L. ; Conaway ; David D. Cross ; Halsey Knapp ; Jane P. Bentrrott ; John Carlin ; Miriyala ; Robert Manoso ; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.

Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CCChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>;

[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,

John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be

generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary's office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients' behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties' GEMS databases. If the counties can't do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing "hide the ball" when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don't want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use

is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>



Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc

122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to “avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery.”

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire  
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM  
To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David

Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery

opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this

communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION. Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

# *Barredo*

**LAW GROUP**

---

**Making It Right**

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:53 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Okay great....thanks!

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:42 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
John Salter is our office's attorney in this matter.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris <wharvey@sos.ga.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter <Cichter@IchterDavis.com>; Roy Barnes <roy@barneslawgroup.com>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these



counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.

Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>]

**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM

**To:** Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>;  
[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**

**Ichter Davis, LLC**

3340 Peachtree Road NE

Suite 1530

Atlanta, GA 30326

phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610

cell 404.769.1353

[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross

<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)— is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a

stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do

so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email



copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list,

we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:58 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Yes, I did forward it to my county attorney and have a call in to him as well. Hopefully he will call me back soon.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan ; Rayburn, Kevin ; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris <wharvey@sos.ga.gov>  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt <hunt@huntandtaylor.com>  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** roy@barneslawgroup.com; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspennoffice.com>;

[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>

**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**

**Ichter Davis, LLC**

3340 Peachtree Road NE

Suite 1530

Atlanta, GA 30326

phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610

cell 404.769.1353

[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);

Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CCChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp

<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala

<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspensoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspensoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,

John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no

backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary's office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients' behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties' GEMS databases. If the counties can't do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing "hide the ball" when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don't want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use



is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc

122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to “avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery.”

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire  
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM  
To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David

Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery

opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this

communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records  
**Attachments:** 20180522\_235811.jpg; 0149\_001.pdf

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** roy@barneslawgroup.com; John Salter  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire ; Bruce Brown ; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White ; Adam Sparks ; Chapple, Catherine L. ; Conaway ; David D. Cross ; Halsey Knapp ; Jane P. Bentrott ; John Carlin ; Miriyala ; Robert Manoso ; Marilyn Marks ; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [mailto:ram@lawram.com]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; william@nhphlaw.com; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala



<amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspennoffice.com>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>

Cc: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>; Cary

Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com>; william@nhphlaw.com; Roy Barnes

<roy@barneslawgroup.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>;

Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;

Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspennoffice.com>

**Subject:** Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso

<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks

<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>

Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each

precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM

To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;

william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter

<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes

<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks

<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway

<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross

<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp

<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott

<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso

<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks

<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>

Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspensoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspensoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspensoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspensoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from



litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

# TIMES COUNTED 75  
# TIMES BLANK VOTED 15  
C. EATON (I) 60

\*\*\*\*\*

PSC Eaton- D

RACE # 91 PARTY:DEM

# RUNNING 3

# TO VOTE FOR 1

# TIMES COUNTED 21

# TIMES BLANK VOTED 4

L. MILLER 11

J. NOEL 3

J. C. WHITE 3

\*\*\*\*\*

PSC Pridemore- R

RACE # 95 PARTY:REP

# RUNNING 2

# TO VOTE FOR 1

# TIMES COUNTED 75

# TIMES BLANK VOTED 11

J. HITCHINS III 30

T. PRIDEMORE (I) 34

\*\*\*\*\*

PSC Pridemore- D

RACE # 96 PARTY:DEM

# RUNNING 2

# TO VOTE FOR 1

# TIMES COUNTED 21

# TIMES BLANK VOTED

RACE # 476 PARTY:REP

# RUNNING 1

# TO VOTE FOR 1

# TIMES COUNTED 74

# TIMES BLANK VOTED 9

B. THOMPSON (I) 65

\*\*\*\*\*

BOE At Large - D

RACE # 477 PARTY:DEM

# RUNNING 1

# TO VOTE FOR 1

# TIMES COUNTED 19

# TIMES BLANK VOTED 4

S. LOPEZ 15

\*\*\*\*\*

BOE 1 - R

RACE # 479 PARTY:REP

# RUNNING 1

June 30, 2018

**VIA: E-MAIL**

Roy E. Barnes, Esq. (Roy@barneslawgroup.com)  
John F. Salter, Esq. (John@barneslawgroup.com)  
Barnes Law Group, LLC  
31 Atlanta Street  
Marietta, GA 30060

Re: *Curling, et al. v. Kemp, et al.*, No. 17-CV-02989-AT (N.D. Ga.)

Dear Governor Barnes and Mr. Salter:

I am writing to alert you that we will be requesting the following electronic election records as soon as discovery opens. The records, documents, ESI, data, and materials listed below should be preserved for discovery purposes. We understand that there is shared custodianship of some of the records and equipment and are therefore also copying election officials of Habersham and Hall Counties to ensure that records are diligently preserved. We are calling upon you as counsel for the State Defendants to give close and scrupulous attention to the preservation of these records.

Please inform the appropriate election officials who are custodians of the referenced state equipment and records that these records must be preserved without alteration:

1. Hall County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DREs used in the May 22, 2018 primary election in precinct 10 (Candler).
2. Hall County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DREs used in the May 22, 2018 primary election for which machine results tapes and/or DRE machine memory cards did not report results on all races on the ballot.
3. Memory cards of ExpressPoll units used in the Hall County Candler precinct (precinct 10) in the May 22, 2018 primary election.
4. Machine results tapes from all Hall County precincts from the May 22, 2018 election.

5. All voter access cards and supervisor cards used in Candler precinct during the May 22, 2018 election.
6. All supervisor access cards used in all polling places on election day (May 22, 2018) in Hall County.
7. Habersham County DRE electronic records (DRE internal memory and memory cards) for all DRE's used in the May 22, 2018 primary election.
8. Habersham County ExpressPoll unit memory cards used in all precincts and polling place locations during the May 22, 2018 primary election.
9. All correspondence and communications related to the conduct and subsequent investigation and review of the May 22, 2018 primary election. (Hall County and Habersham County and SOS Kemp office.)

Our interest in these records derives from serious discrepancies in both of these counties, recently brought to our attention. The details of significant incorrect ballot issuance and disenfranchisement of voters in Habersham County are well known through the currently pending election contest in Fulton County Superior Court. We have recently learned that in Hall County at least one machine failed to report the results of several races, and reported one candidate as both a Republican and a Democrat.

The results tape also appears to reflect a loss of ballots during the counting process. A copy of one such tape is attached hereto for your convenient reference. We are concerned about the systemic problems that exist as a result of the voting system design flaws and the compromise of the system components and data during the KSU data breaches. Forensic discovery efforts will be required when discovery opens and it is therefore imperative that electronic records be diligently maintained without further alteration.

# ICHTER DAVIS LLC

Cary Ichter, Partner  
cichter@ichterdavis.com  
404.869.5243 direct  
04.769.1353 cell

Thank you for your assistance in securing these records. Please let me know whether you have questions or wish to discuss.

Sincerely,

Cary Ichter

cc: Bruce P. Brown, Esq.  
Robert A. McGuire, III, Esq.  
William Brent Ney, Esq.  
Marilyn R. Marks  
David D. Cross, Esq.  
Halsey G. Knapp, Jr., Esq.  
Daniel White, Esq.  
Adam M. Sparks, Esq.  
Jon Carlin, Esq.  
Jane P. Bentrrott, Esq.  
A. Miriyala, Esq.  
Catherine L. Chapple, Esq. Jane P. Bentrrott  
Ms. Lori Wurtz (Director of Hall County Elections) [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org)  
Laurel Ellison (Elections Director Habersham County)  
[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** [roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com); John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter, Partner  
Ichter Davis, LLC  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@lichterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin



<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;  
Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>  
Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.  
Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to

us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts’ forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties’ suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants’ theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia’s unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines’ electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants’ counsel that counties were “deleting,” “wiping,” and “overwriting” data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn’t make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs’ archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)<<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)<<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>>;  
[william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com)<<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Roy Barnes <[Roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)<<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)<<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)<<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)<<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb,

and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; William <william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we

assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown  
<bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter  
<CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks  
(marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>)  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the



information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:53 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records  
**Attachments:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Sender: [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

Subject: RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Message-Id: <[BN7PR09MB2578490907D304B833C92DE4CA430@BN7PR09MB2578.namprd09.prod.outlook.com](mailto:BN7PR09MB2578490907D304B833C92DE4CA430@BN7PR09MB2578.namprd09.prod.outlook.com)>

Recipient: [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:53 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Okay great....thanks!

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:42 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
John Salter is our office's attorney in this matter.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris <wharvey@sos.ga.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter <Cichter@IchterDavis.com>; Roy Barnes <roy@barneslawgroup.com>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>; William@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these

counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.

Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>]

**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM

**To:** Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>;  
[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**

**Ichter Davis, LLC**

3340 Peachtree Road NE

Suite 1530

Atlanta, GA 30326

phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610

cell 404.769.1353

[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross

<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrutt  
<JBentrutt@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrutt@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)— is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a

stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do



so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email

copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire  
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM  
To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list,

we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

# *Barred*

**LAW GROUP**

---

**Making It Right**

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** [roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com); John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CCchapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCchapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter, Partner  
Ichter Davis, LLC  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243



fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@lichterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes  
<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;  
Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;  
Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>  
Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.  
Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to

us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts’ forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties’ suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants’ theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia’s unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines’ electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants’ counsel that counties were “deleting,” “wiping,” and “overwriting” data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn’t make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs’ archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)<<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)<<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>>;  
[william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com)<<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Roy Barnes <[Roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)<<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)<<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)<<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)<<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb,

and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; William <william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we

assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala



<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown  
<bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter  
<CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks  
(marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>)  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the

information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** [roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com); John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>;  
[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter, Partner  
Ichter Davis, LLC  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@lichterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;  
Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>  
Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.  
Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to

us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts’ forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties’ suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants’ theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia’s unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines’ electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants’ counsel that counties were “deleting,” “wiping,” and “overwriting” data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn’t make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs’ archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)<<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)<<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>>;  
[william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com)<<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter  
<[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Roy Barnes  
<[Roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Adam Sparks  
<[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)<<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>>; Conaway  
<[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)<<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>>; David D. Cross  
<[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)<<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)<<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>>; John Carlin



<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb,

and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; William@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we

assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown  
<bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter  
<CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks  
(marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>)  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the

information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** [roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com); John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter, Partner  
Ichter Davis, LLC  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@lichterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes  
<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;  
Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;  
Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>  
Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.  
Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)



From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to

us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts’ forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties’ suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants’ theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia’s unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines’ electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants’ counsel that counties were “deleting,” “wiping,” and “overwriting” data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn’t make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs’ archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)<<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)<<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>>;  
[william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com)<<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Roy Barnes <[Roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)<<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)<<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)<<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)<<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb,

and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; William@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we

assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown  
<bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter  
<CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks  
(marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>)  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the

information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.



---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:42 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records  
**Attachments:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Sender: [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)

Subject: RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Message-Id: <[db8851e9f6a240b98aa713acdce1684b@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us](mailto:db8851e9f6a240b98aa713acdce1684b@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us)>

To: [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:42 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
John Salter is our office's attorney in this matter.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[l Ellison@habershamga.com](mailto:l Ellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.  
Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]

**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM

**To:** Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CCchapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCchapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>;  
[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CCchapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCchapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are

insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>

Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM

To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary

Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;

william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter

<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes

<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks

<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway

<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross

<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp

<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott

<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso

<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks

<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>

Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.



The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes

<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspennoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com/>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

# *Barnd*

**LAW GROUP**

---

**Making It Right**

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:59 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records  
**Attachments:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Sender: [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

Subject: RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Message-Id: <[BN7PR09MB2578ECF00B65819F8FFA0458CA430@BN7PR09MB2578.namprd09.prod.outlook.com](mailto:BN7PR09MB2578ECF00B65819F8FFA0458CA430@BN7PR09MB2578.namprd09.prod.outlook.com)>

Recipient: [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:58 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Yes, I did forward it to my county attorney and have a call in to him as well. Hopefully he will call me back soon.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris [mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan ; Rayburn, Kevin ; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris <wharvey@sos.ga.gov>  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt <hunt@huntandtaylor.com>  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** roy@barneslawgroup.com; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspennoffice.com>;



[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>

**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CCChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CCChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrutt <[JBentrutt@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrutt@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,

John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no

backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary's office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients' behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties' GEMS databases. If the counties can't do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing "hide the ball" when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don't want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use

is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc

122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to “avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery.”

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire  
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM  
To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David



Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery

opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this

communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter ; Roy Barnes  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire ; Bruce Brown ; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White ; Adam Sparks ; Chapple, Catherine L. ; Conaway ; David D. Cross ; Halsey Knapp ; Jane P. Bentrrott ; John Carlin ; Miriyala ; Robert Manoso ; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.

Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** Roy Barnes <roy@barneslawgroup.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>;

[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,

John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be

generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary's office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients' behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties' GEMS databases. If the counties can't do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing "hide the ball" when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don't want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use



is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc

122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to “avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery.”

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrutt  
<JBentrutt@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrutt@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire  
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM  
To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David

Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery

opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this

communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION. Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

# *Barnd*

**LAW GROUP**

---

**Making It Right**



---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** [roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com); John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrott <[JBentrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter, Partner  
Ichter Davis, LLC  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243

fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@lichterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;  
Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>  
Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.  
Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to

us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts’ forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties’ suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants’ theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia’s unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines’ electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants’ counsel that counties were “deleting,” “wiping,” and “overwriting” data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn’t make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs’ archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)<<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)<<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>>;  
[william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com)<<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Roy Barnes <[Roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)<<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)<<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)<<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)<<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb,

and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; William <william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we



assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala

<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown  
<bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter  
<CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks  
(marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>)  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the

information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison <lellison@habershamga.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 9:35 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

See below response. I wasn't sure if this is the State's attorney, so I thought I would forward it to you.

---

**From:** John Salter [mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Cary Ichter ; Roy Barnes  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire ; Bruce Brown ; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White ; Adam Sparks ; Chapple, Catherine L. ; Conaway ; David D. Cross ; Halsey Knapp ; Jane P. Bentrott ; John Carlin ; Miriyala ; Robert Manoso ; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; Laurel Ellison  
**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Cary,  
Thank you for calling this to our attention. Reviewing the news reports, it is unclear to me how the district-line mapping issues in the Habersham and Hall County elections relate to anything alleged in your complaint, such as the hacking of DRE software by third-parties and/or ballot secrecy issues. Further, because none of your clients reside in these counties, none have any standing to seek any injunctive relief as to elections in these counties. Of course, if you have any information to the contrary that shows how this relates to your complaint, I trust you will call that to our attention, as that would aid us in ensuring we are honoring our commitments to the Court regarding preservation.  
Thanks,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



---

**From:** Cary Ichter [mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** Roy Barnes <roy@barneslawgroup.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com>; william@nhphlaw.com; Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>;

[lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)

**Subject:** 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

**Cary Ichter, Partner**  
**Ichter Davis, LLC**  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243  
fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@IchterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]

**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM

To: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>

Cc: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary

Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes

<[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.

<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>;

Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>;

Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspenoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com)>

Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.

Thanks,

John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be

generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary's office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients' behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties' GEMS databases. If the counties can't do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to us that the counties and the Secretary are playing "hide the ball" when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don't want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs' existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts' forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties' suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants' theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia's unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines' electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use



is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants' counsel that counties were "deleting," "wiping," and "overwriting" data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn't make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs' archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>

Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspensoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspensoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hold, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc

122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to “avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery.”

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb, and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrrott  
<JBentrrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from  
Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire  
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM  
To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David

Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks (marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>) <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery

opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this

communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION. Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Monday, July 02, 2018 8:50 AM  
**To:** Laurel Ellison  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin; john@barneslawgroup.com  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Laurel,  
I've forwarded this to our attorneys. I think it wise to share this with your county attorney.  
I'll let you know if we have any response or guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Laurel Ellison  
**Sent:** Monday, July 2, 2018 8:44 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Donnie Hunt  
**Subject:** FW: Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

I need some guidance on this, since I have already completed L & A Testing on the few machines I am using here in my office for early voting. These are of course machines and memory cards that I used in the May 22, 2018 General Primary.

Thanks,  
Laurel Ellison

---

**From:** Cary Ichter [<mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com>]  
**Sent:** Saturday, June 30, 2018 11:24 AM  
**To:** [roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com); John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala <[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>; [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); Laurel Ellison <[lellison@habershamga.com](mailto:lellison@habershamga.com)>  
**Subject:** Voting Discrepancies in Habersham and Hall Counties--Demand for Preservation of Records

Please see the attached letter. Cary Ichter

Cary Ichter, Partner  
Ichter Davis, LLC  
3340 Peachtree Road NE  
Suite 1530  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
phone 404.869.5243



fax 404.869.7610  
cell 404.769.1353  
[cichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:cichter@lichterDavis.com)

This e-mail message and all attachments may contain legally privileged and confidential information intended solely for the use of the addressee. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you may not read, copy, distribute or otherwise use this message or its attachments. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender by email and delete all copies of the message immediately.

---

**From:** Robert McGuire [<mailto:ram@lawram.com>]  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 4:40 PM  
**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com);  
Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp  
<[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin <[jcarlin@mofo.com](mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com)>; Miriyala  
<[amiriyala@mofo.com](mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com)>; Robert Manoso <[rmanoso@mofo.com](mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com)>; Marilyn Marks <[marilyn@aspennoffice.com](mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel and John, thanks for responding, although your unwillingness to answer basic questions is disappointing.

To be clear, Doc. 122 is an order of the Court that requires you to preserve all relevant evidence. None of the counties has been given leave to remove DREs from the litigation hold without first obtaining consent of the Plaintiffs with respect to the particular machines released. Our clients have not given that consent.

Our position, therefore, is that the counties will be engaging in contempt of court if they disobey Doc. 122 by removing DREs from preservation without first obtaining leave of the Court to do so.

Daniel, do I understand you correctly that you are going to allow your clients to begin using machines without first asking the Court to be relieved of the requirements of Doc. 122?

And John, I take it you don't intend to answer my email of June 18 at all. Is that correct?

Best,  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>  
**Sent:** Friday, June 29, 2018 1:32 PM  
**To:** Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)>  
**Cc:** Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com>;  
Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com>  
Subject: Re: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

For the State Defendants, I have nothing to add to the remarks of Mr. White below.  
Thanks,  
John

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 29, 2018, at 4:28 PM, Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>> wrote:

Robert,

My client's position has been made clear: My clients provided the information they agreed to give, they are not able to generate the report you're asking for, nor has the Secretary of State agreed to provide it. That's the only answer I have for your questions. Everything other answer just prolongs your fruitless fishing expedition.

As a wise old sage (who still tours with his band on occasion) once told me, "You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need." I'm sure the Curling Plaintiffs also wanted all of the information you requested, just as my clients didn't want to hold any of their machines out of use. But the Curling Plaintiffs worked with my client on a compromise solution and they have succeeded in getting Cobb to agree to temporarily set aside fully one quarter of its machines for the upcoming primary runoff. We feel that negotiation was done in the spirit of what the judge asked us to do in the May status conference, while your client has remained intransigent on every single position they've taken since the outset of the case.

It is clear to me that our efforts at trying to reach a compromise solution with your client on this matter are at an impasse, and I don't see the point of continuing to beat this dead horse. We will honor the agreement we've reached with the Curling Plaintiffs and hold out 554 machines for the July runoff, even as we continue to try and work with them to reach a resolution about the November General Election. If you want Cobb to hold additional machines out of service over and above the 554, you'll need an order from the Court. That's all I have to say on this matter until further instruction from the Court.

Enjoy your weekend.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Friday, June 29, 2018 2:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary  
Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter  
<john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes  
<Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks  
<sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L.  
<CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway  
<jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross  
<DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp  
<hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott  
<JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin  
<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Daniel, thanks for your email below.

The counties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Their “agreement” to preserve evidence is welcome, but not required, because the common-law duty to preserve all relevant evidence—backed by a Court order (Doc. 122)—is what controls here. The only “agreement” in Doc. 210 was about the timing for an exchange of information that would have to occur before we can consent to excuse the counties from their preservation duty with respect to certain specific DREs (which we were meant to identify using the information supplied to us.) But we haven’t gotten the info we need to identify those DREs that we can consent to release, so it appears we are at an impasse.

Your email raises three points that I’d like to address in the hopes we can resolve this without you having to involve the Court.

First, you say the counties have no capability to give us the information that we require. Please clarify how this can be true. Why can your clients not produce simple reports that can be generated in 10 minutes from a backup copy of the GEMS database? Do your clients have no backup copies of the GEMS databases from each of the relevant elections? If they have no copies, then how are they complying with federal law and public open records requirements, which mandate that the county official preserve such records?

If the counties truly have no backup copies of their own election records, then have they at least authorized/asked the Secretary’s office to respond to my June 18 request seeking these reports directly from the Secretary? If not, will you go ahead now and ask the SOS on your clients’ behalf to do so? This information is available to be easily exported as a report from the counties’ GEMS databases. If the counties can’t do it, then the Secretary can Please understand why it appears to

us that the counties and the Secretary are playing “hide the ball” when each of them tells us that the other is the only party who can provide the information that we need.

We understand that your clients are not subject to discovery, and they don’t want to give us this info since doing so may feel like discovery. But please remind them that it is the counties that are asking us to provide our consent to excusing the counties from a common-law duty (and a court order) requiring preservation. If the counties want us to give our consent, then someone needs to give us the information we need in order to determine which machines can be released without destroying important evidence.

We are incapable of knowing what machines can be released without the information we have requested. The Coalition Plaintiffs have been very clear all along that our approach to selecting electronic records for testing is not a representative-sampling approach. Our approach is a stratified-sampling approach that requires us to know specific machine characteristics. We have stated our requirements, and we have never agreed to permit the preservation of a lesser set of records. We will do our best to accommodate the counties by releasing unneeded DREs, but we can only do this if the counties help us to do it. If the counties are unwilling to help us, then we cannot help them, and all potentially relevant evidence must then continue to be preserved.

Second, you say below that the DREs’ existing software archival function should suffice for our evidentiary preservation purposes. That is not correct because, while indeed the standard Diebold firmware is designed to archive certain limited prior election data, there are numerous technical and cybersecurity reasons why archives created by the DREs themselves are insufficient for our experts’ forensics analysis needs. The DREs are themselves suspect under our theory of this case. The counties’ suggestion that we rely upon the software archiving functionality of DREs that we allege are suspect requires us to adopt the defendants’ theory of the case as the premise for choosing a preservation methodology. We are not required to abandon our case as the price to maintain evidentiary preservation.

Even if we were disposed to rely on the DREs internal software to preserve evidence of malfunctions and malware (which we are not), it would still be true that Coalition Plaintiffs know little about the specialized unique software and firmware that was written by Diebold specifically for Georgia. Without any discovery, we lack the information required for us to know what archiving features are enabled on the DREs. We believe (subject to verification on Georgia’s unique system) that when past elections are archived, only the data relating to results is archived, not the files that ran the archived elections. We also do not know if the operation of the machines in new elections risks corruption of archived information. Additionally, when DREs are deployed in the field, physical security of the machines’ electronic records becomes another very real risk factor. So the counties continuing to alter the contents of the DREs through ongoing use is an unacceptably risky way to preserve the historic records that may or may not be archived on them.

Finally, we were told on the May 4 conference call several times by defendants’ counsel that counties were “deleting,” “wiping,” and “overwriting” data on the internal memories when the machines were being prepared for use in new elections. That doesn’t make it sound like archives are being preserved. We appreciate your recent assurances, but we cannot now just disregard those earlier statements. So for numerous reasons, relying on the DREs’ archival functions is not an adequate substitute for continuing to preserve the machines as they are.

Third, you suggest that we pursue unsealing of records in Superior Court in order to get the information we need from a source other than the counties. Doing so is not properly our burden. The counties are the ones that want our consent to excuse them from a legal duty. The counties are therefore the ones who properly bear whatever burdens may be associated with taking any affirmative steps necessary to make this possible. So the counties may want to go to court to unseal the records so that the counties can provide them to us, but the burden of taking that step is not appropriately shifted onto our shoulders. (We urge the counties first to determine whether they have copies of the GEMS database and the paper tapes from which the needed information can be derived. We understand that 3 copies of the results tapes are prepared on election night.)

You say at the end that your clients may need to seek guidance from the Court. Our preference is for the counties to just give us the information we need so we can release DREs. But if the counties are dead set on forcing us to blindly agree to the destruction of evidence, we will not do so. If there is no potential for you to get the reports run by the SOS that will let us identify the DREs we can release then we urge you to make a motion that puts this in front of the Court for resolution.

Thanks for your attention to this lengthy email. I apologize for the length, but this is an important issue, and I want to ensure our position on all of your points is clear.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Daniel White <[dwhite@hlw-law.com](mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com)<<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>>  
Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2018 2:12 PM  
To: Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)<<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>>; Cary Ichter <[CIchter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com)<<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>>;  
[william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com)<<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>>; John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Roy Barnes <[Roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com)<<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)<<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>>; Conaway <[jconaway@mofo.com](mailto:jconaway@mofo.com)<<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>>; David D. Cross <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)<<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)<<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>>; Jane P. Bentrrott <[JBentrrott@mofo.com](mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com)<<mailto:JBentrrott@mofo.com>>>; John Carlin

<jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala  
<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: RE: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Robert,

Thank you for your email. I appreciate your desire to keep the record clear and to continue working to resolve this matter.

In regards to the proposed release of DRE machines from the litigation hole, I can reaffirm my prior statement that Cobb and DeKalb Defendants have provided you with all of the information it agreed to provide your clients in the Status Report of May 17, 2018. I understand that the Coalition Plaintiffs would like for my clients to provide additional data, including a digital, sortable report containing a breakdown of votes by individual race on each machine, in each precinct, in each Relevant Election. I continue to state my client's position as it has been all along: Neither Cobb nor DeKalb have ever agreed to provide that level of data. Not only do my clients not have the authority from the Secretary of State to provide that information, in the most literal sense I can convey, my clients do not have the capability to provide you with what you have requested.

The good news for your clients, and for all Plaintiffs, is that in the process of gathering information about what data is preserved on the DRE machines, we have confirmed with the Secretary of State's Office that data from the Relevant Elections is not being lost when the DRE machines are used in subsequent elections. Neither the L&A testing nor the use of the machines is deleting data from the machines. Instead, the data is archived within the machines and may be accessed later, in the unlikely event you are ever granted permission to access the Secretary of State's DRE machines. In fact, the existence of archived data was raised by your own expert at the conference before the Status Hearing on May 10, 2018. Now that your expert's suggestion has been confirmed by the Secretary of State, we expect you will be relieved to know the data your client hopes to access is still in the machines. Further support for this continued preservation of data will be provided in the context of DeKalb's response to the Coalition's motion to issue subpoena which I expect to be filed shortly.

As noted by the Court in its December 15, 2018 all parties have a duty "to preserve evidence reasonably expected to become material as framed by the operative allegations in the case." [Doc 122]. Given that the data your clients are so anxious to inspect is being archived and not deleted, we hope that relieves some of your urgency to attempt to hold DRE machines out of use for the upcoming elections, particularly as it pertains to my two clients from whom you are no longer seeking judicial relief. And as you noted in your email below, hopefully this information allows you to "avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery."

However, if you still would like to work towards a framework that will allow you to identify a reasonably limited number of machines that my clients can hold out of use while we await a ruling on discovery issues, we would point out that your client still has the option to pursue the unsealing of the election records held by the Clerks of the Superior Courts in Cobb and Dekalb,

and you may use that procedure to seek the data you think might help you come up with a list of machines to release.

If that solution is not agreeable either, perhaps we can seek guidance from the Court on how to move forward with this issue. Thank you for continuing the dialogue about this matter and I hope this new information has moved us closer to a resolution regarding evidence preservation.

Daniel W. White  
Haynie, Litchfield & White, PC  
222 Washington Ave.  
Marietta, Georgia 30064  
770-422-8901 (direct dial)

From: Robert McGuire <ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com>>  
Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2018 6:17 PM  
To: Daniel White <dwhite@hlw-law.com<mailto:dwhite@hlw-law.com>>  
Cc: Bruce Brown <bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter <CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>; William@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala <amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso <rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Marilyn Marks <marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: FW: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation Hold

Daniel,

Just as a reminder, we (the Coalition Plaintiffs) still have not received the initial information we requested from Cobb and DeKalb Counties in order to select DRE electronic records for continued preservation.

Also, as we understand it, Logic and Accuracy testing for the July runoff was scheduled to begin on the machines June 11. (Fulton County gave a public notice of this testing on June 5, 2018 – we presume the same testing is underway in Cobb and DeKalb Counties.)

Assuming that DRE machines to be used for July are in fact already being tested and deployed to the polling places for early voting starting Monday in Cobb County and in DeKalb County, we

assume that the commencement of testing before the release of DREs from sequestration means that sufficient machines have been acquired for the testing and July election that are not still being sequestered under Court Order and/or our litigation hold requests. This must mean that the Counties no longer require the release of any DRE electronic records prior to the July 24 primary. If this is not correct, please let me know, but otherwise it stands to reason that perhaps we can avoid expending the resources needed to make selections of DREs to release at this time, and we can instead perhaps await further proceedings related to discovery. Do you agree? Please clarify Cobb and DeKalb Counties' respective positions on this matter, so that we can all conserve resources, if possible.

Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs have been able to update the DRE-selection criteria we expect to use in discovery, which I sent to you, among others, for Cobb and DeKalb Counties in my email copied below. Attached is an updated list of those criteria, along with a redline showing changes since June 21.

Thanks very much.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm

1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205

E: ram@lawram.com<mailto:ram@lawram.com> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530

| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<http://www.lawram.com/>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

From: Robert McGuire

Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2018 11:43 AM

To: Daniel Walter White <dwhite@hlclaw.com<mailto:dwhite@hlclaw.com>>; Bennett Davis Bryan <bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Laura K. Johnson <lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov<mailto:lkjohnson@dekalbcountyga.gov>>; Cheryl Ringer <Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov>>; David Lowman <david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov>>; Kaye Burwell <Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov<mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov>>  
Cc: John Salter <john@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com>>; Roy Barnes <Roy@barneslawgroup.com<mailto:Roy@barneslawgroup.com>>; Adam Sparks <sparks@khlawfirm.com<mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com>>; Chapple, Catherine L. <CChapple@mofo.com<mailto:CChapple@mofo.com>>; Conaway <jconaway@mofo.com<mailto:jconaway@mofo.com>>; David D. Cross <DCross@mofo.com<mailto:DCross@mofo.com>>; Halsey Knapp <hknapp@khlawfirm.com<mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com>>; Jane P. Bentrott <JBentrott@mofo.com<mailto:JBentrott@mofo.com>>; John Carlin <jcarlin@mofo.com<mailto:jcarlin@mofo.com>>; Miriyala



<amiriyala@mofo.com<mailto:amiriyala@mofo.com>>; Robert Manoso  
<rmanoso@mofo.com<mailto:rmanoso@mofo.com>>; Bruce Brown  
<bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>>; Cary Ichter  
<CIchter@IchterDavis.com<mailto:CIchter@IchterDavis.com>>;  
william@nhphlaw.com<mailto:william@nhphlaw.com>; Marilyn Marks  
(marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>)  
<marilyn@aspenoffice.com<mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com>>  
Subject: Categories of DREs to Identify and Preserve pending Release of Any from Litigation  
Hold

Counsel for Defendant Fulton County and for nonparties Cobb County and DeKalb County,

On behalf of the Coalition Plaintiffs I am writing to give you notice—which you already have from my previous correspondence—that we have not yet received the information that we require in order to consent to the release of electronic records stored on DREs and their memory cards from your preservation obligations. In order to be able to go through the exercise of identifying which DREs are of less interest to us (and which we can thus consent for you to remove from litigation hold), we have to receive the information we have previously requested. Please inform us as to when you plan to supply the vote tally information and complete the recap sheet information, giving us reasonable time to respond in order for you to prepare machines for the upcoming July 24 election.

Also, because discovery has not begun and we cannot research the records ourselves to locate the specific electronic records we seek to review, I am writing to provide the counties with 15 specific criteria we plan to use to make discovery requests. This way the counties themselves can do the identifying and can ensure that the DREs matching our criteria continue to be preserved. All of the DREs that fall into any of the 15 categories listed in the attachment to his email will contain electronic records that we intend to request in discovery, as soon as the current stay is lifted by the Court. Accordingly, none of the DREs in any of these 15 these categories can be released from the litigation hold. As more information becomes available we will expand this list to include other criteria before the release date to be agreed on.

With this list, all three counties now have advance notice that they need before the original deadline of tomorrow to identify, sequester, and continue to preserve all the electronic records on all of the DREs in these 15 categories—and none of the DREs in any of these 15 categories can be released from the litigation hold. To restate the point in other words, you have a duty not to destroy evidence on the DREs in these 15 categories because you are on clear notice that we intend to seek electronic records from the DREs that meet these 15 criteria as soon as discovery opens. You will be at risk of engaging in spoliation and contempt of court if you destroy evidence on any of the DRE machines that are included in any of the 15 categories we have identified in the attached list.

We also wish to conduct discovery on DREs that we will select based on their recorded vote counts by contest. You have not provided us this information as we have requested, and we are still expecting it to be delivered prior to our consenting to the release of any DREs or other electronic records from the current litigation hold. By providing you the attached list of categories, we are not waiving our objection to releasing any DRE electronic records from the litigation hold prior to receiving the information we have requested on this list and the in our previous request for vote tallies and machine use by serial number. When you do provide the

information we previously requested concerning vote counts and concerning your inventory of machines, then we will be able to submit a more detailed list of DREs for you to preserve, and we may be able to identify machines that can be released from litigation hold with our consent at that time.

Note that the attached list only covers electronic records on the DREs that are in these 15 categories and their memory cards. All memory cards from all other DREs used in any of the Relevant Elections (even DREs that are not in the 15 categories) must continue to be preserved under both the Court's Order (Doc 122) and Plaintiffs' prior litigation hold letters. This preservation requirement exists pursuant to the 22-month federal statutory federal requirements and pursuant to Diebold's Security Policies as published in GEMS 1.18 Election Administrator's Guide. By providing categories of DREs that are of interest of the attached list, we do not suggest that the memory cards from all other DREs do not need to be preserved—they must be.

Please see Exhibit 1 attached to this email.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III \*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: [ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)<<mailto:ram@lawram.com>> | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530  
| [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)<<http://www.lawram.com>>

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

**ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.** Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

---

**From:** Barron, Richard L. <Richard.Barron@fultoncountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 03, 2018 5:38 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Gilstrap, Derrick; Brower, Dwight; Benjamin, Sharon; Cummings, Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

Chris:

As you can read below, Ms. Marks's attorney, Robert McGuire, admits his clients were out there gathering information on serial numbers when they visited during L & A. He has no clue what we are doing L & A. Of course, the court-ordered sequestered equipment is still in that state. The cards that were sequestered are still as such.

Derrick told me today that he has never had to use resources to follow people to make sure that they are on the straight and narrow when observing L & A. It is disruptive out there because people have to babysit the Coalition plaintiffs.

I hope someone can subpoena their phones to get the images and video from them. I'm unsure if the investigators or SEB has that power.

Thanks,  
Rick

---

From: Brower, Dwight  
Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2018 4:45 PM  
To: Ringer, Cheryl; Barron, Richard L.; Gilstrap, Derrick  
Cc: Lowman, David; Burwell, Kaye  
Subject: RE: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

Marilyn Marks and her underlings were out to supposedly observe L&A testing. So as you can see they obviously had another agenda ....to capture serial number from voting units. Otherwise how would they have known we were using the same serial numbered DRE voting machines. I agree whole heartedly with your augment.

From: Ringer, Cheryl  
Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2018 3:01 PM  
To: Barron, Richard L.; Brower, Dwight; Gilstrap, Derrick  
Cc: Lowman, David; Burwell, Kaye  
Subject: FW: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

We have an argument that use of the machines does not equate to destruction of data/information. However, can you please take a look at the email below and let's discuss on Thursday how we want to respond. Thanks

Because We Care, We Serve

Cheryl M. Ringer  
Senior Assistant County Attorney  
Office of the County Attorney  
141 Pryor St, S.W.  
Suite 4038  
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 612-0246 ( Main)  
(404) 612-0263 (Direct)  
(404) 730-6324 (Fax)

Notice of Confidentiality: This communication constitutes an electronic communication within the meaning of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2510, and its disclosure is strictly limited to the recipient intended by the sender of this message. This communication, and any attachments thereto, contain confidential attorney-client privileged communications and attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, viewing, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the message and deleting it from your computer. Thank You.

From: Robert McGuire [mailto:ram@lawram.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2018 1:42 PM  
To: Ringer, Cheryl; Lowman, David; Burwell, Kaye  
Cc: Bruce Brown; Cary Ichter; william@nhphlaw.com; John Salter; Roy Barnes; Adam Sparks; Chapple, Catherine L.; Conaway; David D. Cross; Halsey Knapp; Jane P. Bentrott; John Carlin; Miriyala; Robert Manoso  
Subject: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

Dear Mr. Lowman,

As counsel for the Coalition Plaintiffs, we are concerned about ongoing conduct by Fulton County that potentially may be altering or destroying information subject to the County's preservation obligations, including those imposed by Court Order. (Doc. 122) The purpose of this communication is to confer with you regarding this conduct, to understand the extent to which any potentially relevant information may have been altered, unsecured, lost (or will be lost if this conduct continues), and to address any measures that may need to be taken to stop and/or remedy any such risk of alteration or loss. We appreciate your urgent attention to this important issue.

On Friday and Monday, representatives of the Coalition Plaintiffs attended a short portion of the public Logic and Accuracy Testing at the English Street facility for the Fulton County Elections Department. They observed scores of DRE machines being uploaded with new ballot programming and tested for deployment into the field for the July 24<x-apple-data-detectors://1> election. They saw election preparation and testing taking place that alters the existing data on the internal memory of the DREs and the data on the memory cards. They observed used memory cards being inserted into the machines. The machines' labels indicate that these are machines historically used in Fulton County elections.

We understand that approximately 1,575 machines are being deployed in the July 24<x-apple-data-detectors://2> election from the inventory in the English Street warehouse. It appears that many of the machines being prepared for service are machines that were used in prior relevant elections and are therefore DRE electronic records subject to litigation hold and the Court's preservation order (Doc. 122). Comparison of some of the machine numbers of the DREs being tested against the machine numbers of the sequestered DREs shows significant overlap, which gives rise to significant concerns about the potential alteration or loss of relevant information. Obviously putting these DREs with their relevant electronic records in the field with all the security risks inherent that implies is unacceptable from an evidence preservation standpoint.

Please explain whether Fulton County is in fact conducting testing on DREs and memory cards that were used in prior relevant elections or otherwise subject to preservation obligations and, if so, how the County is ensuring that no data on the machines is altered or lost or put at risk of alteration. If our clients' representatives have misunderstood what Fulton County is doing with the sequestered DREs, please explain precisely what the County has been (and is) doing regarding reprogramming and testing DREs and how it's complying with its preservation obligations regarding any such DRE electronic records.

As you know, it is crucial that electronic records we have identified as potential evidence be preserved either through preservation of the machines themselves, or by making exact images of the DREs subject to litigation hold. We have consistently sought to keep our preservation concerns front and center. See Steptoe & Johnson's September 12, 2017, litigation hold letter to Fulton County, attached, which lists additional electronic records and equipment that is required for preservation. Similarly, please see William Ney's letter of December 21, 2017, on the same subject, also attached.

Fulton County has many alternatives to supply the polling places with DREs, and thus there is no justification for altering equipment or records or losing security controls over the equipment and electronic records that must be preserved:

1. Electronic images of DRE electronic records can be created.
2. Fulton can provide information to plaintiffs as requested to permit release of adequate equipment for elections.
3. Machines from other counties can be borrowed for the July 24 runoff.
4. Additional DRE machines can be obtained without cost from other states and vendors which are disposing of identical equipment.

Please respond within two business days—by this time on Friday, July 6. We would like to avoid burdening the Court with this issue but reserve the right to do so—including on an emergency basis—if we do not promptly receive appropriate and specific assurances that Fulton County is fully complying with its preservation obligations, including pursuant to the Court's Order.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this urgent matter, and have a Happy Fourth of July.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530 | [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)

\*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.

---

**From:** Barron, Richard L. <Richard.Barron@fultoncountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 03, 2018 5:38 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Cc:** Gilstrap, Derrick; Brower, Dwight; Benjamin, Sharon; Cummings, Timothy  
**Subject:** FW: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

Chris:

As you can read below, Ms. Marks's attorney, Robert McGuire, admits his clients were out there gathering information on serial numbers when they visited during L & A. He has no clue what we are doing L & A. Of course, the court-ordered sequestered equipment is still in that state. The cards that were sequestered are still as such.

Derrick told me today that he has never had to use resources to follow people to make sure that they are on the straight and narrow when observing L & A. It is disruptive out there because people have to babysit the Coalition plaintiffs.

I hope someone can subpoena their phones to get the images and video from them. I'm unsure if the investigators or SEB has that power.

Thanks,  
Rick

---

From: Brower, Dwight  
Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2018 4:45 PM  
To: Ringer, Cheryl; Barron, Richard L.; Gilstrap, Derrick  
Cc: Lowman, David; Burwell, Kaye  
Subject: RE: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

Marilyn Marks and her underlings were out to supposedly observe L&A testing. So as you can see they obviously had another agenda ....to capture serial number from voting units. Otherwise how would they have known we were using the same serial numbered DRE voting machines. I agree whole heartedly with your augment.

From: Ringer, Cheryl  
Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2018 3:01 PM  
To: Barron, Richard L.; Brower, Dwight; Gilstrap, Derrick  
Cc: Lowman, David; Burwell, Kaye  
Subject: FW: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

We have an argument that use of the machines does not equate to destruction of data/information. However, can you please take a look at the email below and let's discuss on Thursday how we want to respond. Thanks

Because We Care, We Serve

Cheryl M. Ringer  
Senior Assistant County Attorney  
Office of the County Attorney  
141 Pryor St, S.W.  
Suite 4038  
Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 612-0246 ( Main)  
(404) 612-0263 (Direct)  
(404) 730-6324 (Fax)

Notice of Confidentiality: This communication constitutes an electronic communication within the meaning of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2510, and its disclosure is strictly limited to the recipient intended by the sender of this message. This communication, and any attachments thereto, contain confidential attorney-client privileged communications and attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, viewing, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the message and deleting it from your computer. Thank You.

From: Robert McGuire [mailto:ram@lawram.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, July 03, 2018 1:42 PM  
To: Ringer, Cheryl; Lowman, David; Burwell, Kaye  
Cc: Bruce Brown; Cary Ichter; william@nhphlaw.com; John Salter; Roy Barnes; Adam Sparks; Chapple, Catherine L.; Conaway; David D. Cross; Halsey Knapp; Jane P. Bentrott; John Carlin; Miriyala; Robert Manoso  
Subject: Conferral re potential alteration and/or loss of relevant information

Dear Mr. Lowman,

As counsel for the Coalition Plaintiffs, we are concerned about ongoing conduct by Fulton County that potentially may be altering or destroying information subject to the County's preservation obligations, including those imposed by Court Order. (Doc. 122) The purpose of this communication is to confer with you regarding this conduct, to understand the extent to which any potentially relevant information may have been altered, unsecured, lost (or will be lost if this conduct continues), and to address any measures that may need to be taken to stop and/or remedy any such risk of alteration or loss. We appreciate your urgent attention to this important issue.

On Friday and Monday, representatives of the Coalition Plaintiffs attended a short portion of the public Logic and Accuracy Testing at the English Street facility for the Fulton County Elections Department. They observed scores of DRE machines being uploaded with new ballot programming and tested for deployment into the field for the July 24<x-apple-data-detectors://1> election. They saw election preparation and testing taking place that alters the existing data on the internal memory of the DREs and the data on the memory cards. They observed used memory cards being inserted into the machines. The machines' labels indicate that these are machines historically used in Fulton County elections.

We understand that approximately 1,575 machines are being deployed in the July 24<x-apple-data-detectors://2> election from the inventory in the English Street warehouse. It appears that many of the machines being prepared for service are machines that were used in prior relevant elections and are therefore DRE electronic records subject to litigation hold and the Court's preservation order (Doc. 122). Comparison of some of the machine numbers of the DREs being tested against the machine numbers of the sequestered DREs shows significant overlap, which gives rise to significant concerns about the potential alteration or loss of relevant information. Obviously putting these DREs with their relevant electronic records in the field with all the security risks inherent that implies is unacceptable from an evidence preservation standpoint.

Please explain whether Fulton County is in fact conducting testing on DREs and memory cards that were used in prior relevant elections or otherwise subject to preservation obligations and, if so, how the County is ensuring that no data on the machines is altered or lost or put at risk of alteration. If our clients' representatives have misunderstood what Fulton County is doing with the sequestered DREs, please explain precisely what the County has been (and is) doing regarding reprogramming and testing DREs and how it's complying with its preservation obligations regarding any such DRE electronic records.

As you know, it is crucial that electronic records we have identified as potential evidence be preserved either through preservation of the machines themselves, or by making exact images of the DREs subject to litigation hold. We have consistently sought to keep our preservation concerns front and center. See Steptoe & Johnson's September 12, 2017, litigation hold letter to Fulton County, attached, which lists additional electronic records and equipment that is required for preservation. Similarly, please see William Ney's letter of December 21, 2017, on the same subject, also attached.

Fulton County has many alternatives to supply the polling places with DREs, and thus there is no justification for altering equipment or records or losing security controls over the equipment and electronic records that must be preserved:

1. Electronic images of DRE electronic records can be created.
2. Fulton can provide information to plaintiffs as requested to permit release of adequate equipment for elections.
3. Machines from other counties can be borrowed for the July 24 runoff.
4. Additional DRE machines can be obtained without cost from other states and vendors which are disposing of identical equipment.

Please respond within two business days—by this time on Friday, July 6. We would like to avoid burdening the Court with this issue but reserve the right to do so—including on an emergency basis—if we do not promptly receive appropriate and specific assurances that Fulton County is fully complying with its preservation obligations, including pursuant to the Court's Order.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this urgent matter, and have a Happy Fourth of July.

Best,  
Robert McGuire

Robert A. McGuire, III  
Shareholder | the Robert McGuire Law Firm  
1624 Market St Ste 226 #86685, Denver, CO 80202-2523 | 113 Cherry St #86685, Seattle, WA 98104-2205  
E: ram@lawram.com | T/F: 720.420.1395 | T/F: 253.267.8530 | [www.lawram.com](http://www.lawram.com)

\*\*\* NOTE NEW CONTACT DETAILS BELOW \*\*\*

This communication is confidential, may be privileged and is meant only for the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by reply and delete the message from your system. Any unauthorized dissemination, distribution or copying hereof is prohibited.



---

**From:** Head, Jansen  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 05, 2018 4:11 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@hotmail.com  
**Cc:** Kinnemore, Lisa  
**Subject:** RE: Overseas voting  
**Attachments:** Georgia Absentee Ballot Application.pdf

Mr. Ganduglia,

Thank you for contacting our office for assistance. For the November 6, 2018 General Election, there will be advanced voting (or "early voting") that will start on Monday, October 15, 2018 through Friday, November 2, 2018. During that time period, you can vote early in person at the early voting polling locations. Those locations and times can be found on the "My Voter Page" website at <https://www.mvp.sos.ga.gov/MVP/mvp.do>. On the "My Voter Page" homepage, you will need to enter your information.

Once you are logged into your voter registration profile, you will see four boxes and one will be titled "Polling Place for State, County, and Municipal Elections". In that box, you will see a link that says "Click Here for Early Voting Locations and Times". When you click on that link, you will see a list of all polling locations and times available for early voting.

However, if you are not able to vote early in person for the November 6, 2018 General Election, then you can submit an absentee ballot application to your county registrar. I have attached the **Georgia Application for Official Absentee Ballot**. At the top of the page, you will need to provide the date of the election for which you are requesting an absentee ballot for. If you will be overseas on the election day, then under "EXCEPTIONS", you will need to check the box that says "UOCAVA VOTER" and then a second box for either "OST" or "OSP", whichever will be applicable to you. You can either receive your absentee ballot electronically or by mail. If you wish to receive it electronically, please be sure to clearly provide your email address in the upper right corner of the application. You will also need to check the box where it says "For UOCAVA Voters Only – I would like to receive my absentee ballots by electronic transmission".

When you have completed the Georgia Application for Official Absentee Ballot and signed it, you can submit your application to your county registrar's office by email, mail, in person, or fax. Our voter registration system indicates that you are currently registered to vote in DeKalb County. That county registrar's contact information is below:

DeKalb County Chief Registrar  
4380 Memorial Drive, Suite 300  
Decatur, GA 30032-1239  
Telephone: 404-298-4020  
Fax: 404-298-4038  
Email: [voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov)  
Website: [www.dekalbvotes.com](http://www.dekalbvotes.com)

If you need further assistance, please feel free to contact our office or your local county registrar. I have also copied our Military Liaison, Lisa Kinnemore, who provides assistance to those who are in the military or who will be overseas during the elections.

Kind regards,

Jansen Head  
Elections Attorney  
Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

---

**From:** Ricardo Ganduglia  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 5, 2018 3:28 PM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** Overseas voting

Jansen head,

Hi, because in November 2018 I will be out of country for personal matters, I would like to get information about overseas voting, I will really appreciate your help we are not in the military just regular citizen, thank you very much in advance.

Best regards  
Ricardo Ganduglia.

# APPLICATION FOR OFFICIAL ABSENTEE BALLOT

**PLEASE PRINT** (FAILURE TO FILL OUT THE FORM COMPLETELY COULD DELAY YOUR APPLICATION)

Date of Primary, Election, or Runoff: \_\_\_\_/\_\_\_\_/20\_\_\_\_

**FOR PRIMARY ELECTIONS ONLY (please check one):**

**DEMOCRATIC**

**NON PARTISAN**

**REPUBLICAN**

<b>APPLICATION DATE</b> ____/____/____	<b>DATE OF BIRTH</b> ____/____/____	<b>DAYTIME CONTACT NUMBER (optional)</b> (____) ____-____	<b>EMAIL ADDRESS(required for UOCAVA Voter requesting electronic transmission)</b>
<b>NAME AS REGISTERED</b>		<b>LAST</b>	<b>FIRST</b>
<b>ADDRESS AS REGISTERED</b>		<b>STREET #</b>	<b>CITY</b>
		<b>ZIP CODE</b>	

☐ Mail the ballot to my temporary out-of-county address: (or alternate address for physically disabled voter).

# STREET CITY STATE ZIP CODE

**Note: You must file a separate application for each election for which you are requesting an absentee ballot (\*see exceptions below for voters over the age of 65, disabled, or military or overseas citizens). You may file your application no more than 180 days prior to the Date of the Election.**

**\*EXCEPTIONS:**

**If you meet the following criteria**, you may choose to complete one application and receive a ballot for the General Primary, General Primary Runoff (if any), General Election, and General Election Runoff (if any) by checking one of the following boxes:

☐ E - Elderly - I am 65 years of age or older.

☐ D - Disabled - I have a physical disability.

☐ U - UOCAVA Voter - Member of armed forces or Merchant Marines of the United States, commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, spouse or dependent residing with or accompanying said member, or a United States citizen residing overseas. My current status is **(please mark one)**:

☐ MOS - Military Overseas

☐ MST - Military Stateside

☐ OST - Overseas Temporary Resident

☐ OSP - Overseas Permanent Resident (federal offices only)

**For UOCAVA Voters Only** - I would like to receive my absentee ballots by electronic transmission ☐

**SIGNATURE OR MARK\* OF VOTER - REQUIRED**

\*Signature of person preparing application if voter is disabled or illiterate - **REQUIRED**

**You may apply on behalf of another person only in the following circumstances:** In the case of a voter residing temporarily out of the county or a physically disabled voter residing within the county, application may be made by mother, father, grandparent, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, spouse, son, daughter, niece, nephew, grandchild, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law of the age of 18 or over upon completing the following oath: I, the undersigned do swear (or affirm) that the above-named voter is (check one): ☐ residing temporarily out of the county or is a ☐ physically disabled voter residing within the county and that the facts included in this application are true.

**SIGNATURE AND RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVE REQUESTING BALLOT - REQUIRED**

Voter Registration #

DIST. COMBO \_\_\_\_\_ PRECINCT \_\_\_\_\_

APPLICATION RECEIVED DATE \_\_\_\_\_

BALLOT # \_\_\_\_\_ ISS. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CERTIFIED DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REJECTION DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ID SHOWN: GADL OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE NAMED VOTER

☐ IS ELIGIBLE

☐ IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE AN ABSENTEE BALLOT

PACKET PREPARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

PACKET REVIEWED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

REASON FOR REJECTION: \_\_\_\_\_

Ballot to be: Mailed Electronically Transmitted  
Delivered to voter in hospital by Registrar/Deputy Registrar  
Voted in office (Municipal Only)

Registrar Signature \_\_\_\_\_

*I understand that the offer or acceptance of money, gifts, or any other object of value for the purpose of voting or voting for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.*

**SPECIAL NOTE REGARDING ASSISTING VOTERS:**

**ALL ELECTIONS** - If the applicant is unable to fill out or sign his or her own absentee ballot application because of illiteracy or physical disability, the applicant shall make his or her mark, and the person filling in the rest of the absentee ballot application must sign below the voter's name as a witness. *O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381(a)(1)(F).*

**STATE, COUNTY, MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS** – A physically disabled or illiterate voter may receive assistance in preparing his or her ballot from one of the following: any voter who is qualified to vote in the same county or municipality as the disabled or illiterate voter; an attendant care provider or a person providing attendant care; or the mother, father, grandparent, aunt, uncle, brother, sister, spouse, son, daughter, niece, nephew, grandchild, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law of the disabled or illiterate voter. The person rendering assistance to the voter in preparing the ballot must sign the oath printed on the same envelope as the oath to be signed by the voter. If the disabled or illiterate voter is staying outside his or her own county or municipality, a notary public of the jurisdiction may give such assistance and shall sign the oath printed on the same envelope as the oath to be signed by the voter. No person shall assist more than ten such voters in any primary, election, or runoff in which there is no federal candidate on the ballot. *O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385(b).*

**FEDERAL ELECTIONS** – In preparing his or her ballot, a physically disabled or illiterate voter may receive assistance from a person of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union. *42 U.S.C. Section 1973aa-6.*

---

**From:** Head, Jansen  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 05, 2018 4:11 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@hotmail.com  
**Cc:** Kinnemore, Lisa  
**Subject:** RE: Overseas voting  
**Attachments:** Georgia Absentee Ballot Application.pdf

Mr. Ganduglia,

Thank you for contacting our office for assistance. For the November 6, 2018 General Election, there will be advanced voting (or "early voting") that will start on Monday, October 15, 2018 through Friday, November 2, 2018. During that time period, you can vote early in person at the early voting polling locations. Those locations and times can be found on the "My Voter Page" website at <https://www.mvp.sos.ga.gov/MVP/mvp.do>. On the "My Voter Page" homepage, you will need to enter your information.

Once you are logged into your voter registration profile, you will see four boxes and one will be titled "Polling Place for State, County, and Municipal Elections". In that box, you will see a link that says "Click Here for Early Voting Locations and Times". When you click on that link, you will see a list of all polling locations and times available for early voting.

However, if you are not able to vote early in person for the November 6, 2018 General Election, then you can submit an absentee ballot application to your county registrar. I have attached the **Georgia Application for Official Absentee Ballot**. At the top of the page, you will need to provide the date of the election for which you are requesting an absentee ballot for. If you will be overseas on the election day, then under "EXCEPTIONS", you will need to check the box that says "UOCAVA VOTER" and then a second box for either "OST" or "OSP", whichever will be applicable to you. You can either receive your absentee ballot electronically or by mail. If you wish to receive it electronically, please be sure to clearly provide your email address in the upper right corner of the application. You will also need to check the box where it says "For UOCAVA Voters Only – I would like to receive my absentee ballots by electronic transmission".

When you have completed the Georgia Application for Official Absentee Ballot and signed it, you can submit your application to your county registrar's office by email, mail, in person, or fax. Our voter registration system indicates that you are currently registered to vote in DeKalb County. That county registrar's contact information is below:

DeKalb County Chief Registrar  
4380 Memorial Drive, Suite 300  
Decatur, GA 30032-1239  
Telephone: 404-298-4020  
Fax: 404-298-4038  
Email: [voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov)  
Website: [www.dekalbvotes.com](http://www.dekalbvotes.com)

If you need further assistance, please feel free to contact our office or your local county registrar. I have also copied our Military Liaison, Lisa Kinnemore, who provides assistance to those who are in the military or who will be overseas during the elections.

Kind regards,

Jansen Head  
Elections Attorney  
Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

---

**From:** Ricardo Ganduglia  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 5, 2018 3:28 PM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** Overseas voting

Jansen head,

Hi, because in November 2018 I will be out of country for personal matters, I would like to get information about overseas voting, I will really appreciate your help we are not in the military just regular citizen, thank you very much in advance.

Best regards  
Ricardo Ganduglia.

---

**From:** Ricardo Ganduglia <[REDACTED]@hotmail.com>  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 05, 2018 4:34 PM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** Re: Overseas voting

Jansen Head,

I really want to thank you for the prompt response and all the information you sent me regarding the early voting. Again thanks

Best regards,  
Ricardo ganduglia

---

**From:** Head, Jansen  
**Sent:** Thursday, July 5, 2018 2:11:01 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@hotmail.com  
**Cc:** Kinnemore, Lisa  
**Subject:** RE: Overseas voting

Mr. Ganduglia,

Thank you for contacting our office for assistance. For the November 6, 2018 General Election, there will be advanced voting (or "early voting") that will start on Monday, October 15, 2018 through Friday, November 2, 2018. During that time period, you can vote early in person at the early voting polling locations. Those locations and times can be found on the "My Voter Page" website at <https://www.mvp.sos.ga.gov/MVP/mvp.do>. On the "My Voter Page" homepage, you will need to enter your information.

Once you are logged into your voter registration profile, you will see four boxes and one will be titled "Polling Place for State, County, and Municipal Elections". In that box, you will see a link that says "Click Here for Early Voting Locations and Times". When you click on that link, you will see a list of all polling locations and times available for early voting.

However, if you are not able to vote early in person for the November 6, 2018 General Election, then you can submit an absentee ballot application to your county registrar. I have attached the **Georgia Application for Official Absentee Ballot**. At the top of the page, you will need to provide the date of the election for which you are requesting an absentee ballot for. If you will be overseas on the election day, then under "EXCEPTIONS", you will need to check the box that says "UOCAVA VOTER" and then a second box for either "OST" or "OSP", whichever will be applicable to you. You can either receive your absentee ballot electronically or by mail. If you wish to receive it electronically, please be sure to clearly provide your email address in the upper right corner of the application. You will also need to check the box where it says "**For UOCAVA Voters Only** – I would like to receive my absentee ballots by electronic transmission".

When you have completed the Georgia Application for Official Absentee Ballot and signed it, you can submit your application to your county registrar's office by email, mail, in person, or fax. Our voter registration system indicates that you are currently registered to vote in DeKalb County. That county registrar's contact information is below:

DeKalb County Chief Registrar  
4380 Memorial Drive, Suite 300  
Decatur, GA 30032-1239  
Telephone: 404-298-4020  
Fax: 404-298-4038

Email: [voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:voterreg@dekalbcountyga.gov)

Website: [www.dekalbvotes.com](http://www.dekalbvotes.com)

If you need further assistance, please feel free to contact our office or your local county registrar. I have also copied our Military Liaison, Lisa Kinnemore, who provides assistance to those who are in the military or who will be overseas during the elections.

Kind regards,

Jansen Head

Elections Attorney

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

---

**From:** Ricardo Ganduglia

**Sent:** Thursday, July 5, 2018 3:28 PM

**To:** Head, Jansen

**Subject:** Overseas voting

Jansen head,

Hi, because in November 2018 I will be out of country for personal matters, I would like to get information about overseas voting, I will really appreciate your help we are not in the military just regular citizen, thank you very much in advance.

Best regards

Ricardo Ganduglia.



---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin; Open Records; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greencountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce  
Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin; Open Records; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greencountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce  
Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 12:05 PM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Subject:** RE: Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

You're the best!

---

**From:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 11:57 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Done

S. Merritt Beaver  
Chief Information Officer  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Office (404) 656-7744 Mobile: (770)330-0016  
[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt <[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>; Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>; Herron, Robin <[rherron@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rherron@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greencountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [rblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:rblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce

Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin; Open Records; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greencountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce  
Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 11:57 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Done

S. Merritt Beaver  
Chief Information Officer  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Office (404) 656-7744 Mobile: (770)330-0016  
[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin ; Open Records ; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a [@sos.ga.gov](mailto:@sos.ga.gov) email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a [@sos.ga.gov](mailto:@sos.ga.gov) email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in [@greencountyga.gov](mailto:@greencountyga.gov) with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a [@sos.ga.gov](mailto:@sos.ga.gov) email address has sent or received any emails from [thblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:thblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a [@sos.ga.gov](mailto:@sos.ga.gov) email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce  
Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 11:57 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Done

S. Merritt Beaver  
Chief Information Officer  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Office (404) 656-7744 Mobile: (770)330-0016  
[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin ; Open Records ; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greencountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [black.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:black.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce  
Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin; Open Records; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greenecountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:tblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce  
Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)



---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 12:05 PM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Subject:** RE: Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

You're the best!

---

**From:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 11:57 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Done

S. Merritt Beaver  
Chief Information Officer  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Office (404) 656-7744 Mobile: (770)330-0016  
[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt <[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>; Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>; Herron, Robin <[rherron@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rherron@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Sam Levine ORR - Initial Response Due by COB Today

Can you also pull these queries as soon as possible?

Sam Levine's Open Records Request asks for the following: "Any communications, including emails and text messages, discussing the closure of polling places in Randolph County"; "[a]ny communications, including emails and text messages, discussing compliance of Randolph County polling sites with the American Disabilities Act"; and "[a]ny communications, including emails text messages, with Mike Malone."

**Please search the email query system using the following criteria:**

- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [Mamalone99@hotmail.com](mailto:Mamalone99@hotmail.com) ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from an email address ending in @greencountyga.gov with the word "Malone" in the subject or body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [rblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com](mailto:rblack.randolphcounty@gmail.com) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever
- Check to see if any person with a @sos.ga.gov email address has sent or received any emails from [2006electionboard@windstream.net](mailto:2006electionboard@windstream.net) with the word "consolidate," "precinct," "ADA," or "Americans with Disabilities Act" in the body of the email ever

Candice L. Broce

Press Secretary and Staff Attorney  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
(404) 656-4269 | [cbroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:cbroce@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:22 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt; Lewis, Russell; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica; Open Records; Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Mark Niesse's Open Records Request is asking for the following: "All reports and correspondence related to precinct consolidation since Jan. 1, 2017" and "[a]ll records, reports, audits and documents related to allegations or evidence of voting by felons since Jan. 1, 2017.

**Merritt**, please run the following criteria on the email query system:

- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "precinct consolidation," "consolidating precinct," "close precinct," "precinct closure," "close polling place," or "polling place closure" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017
- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "felon vote" or "felon voting" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017

**Russell and Frances**, can you check our records to see if we have opened any cases for alleged felon voting going back to January 1, 2017 and, since I know that we have at least one, pull the cover pages for an open cases and identify for any closed cases how many total pages of documents are in the files for those closed cases? We are only looking for records related to allegations of felon voting occurring on or after January 1, 2017.

We must get our initial response to Mark Niesse by Monday, August 27. Thank you.

---

**From:** Open Records  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin ; Head, Jansen  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica ; Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Please see new ORR.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 8:46 AM  
**To:** Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

---

**From:** Niesse, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niesse@aic.com](mailto:Mark.Niesse@aic.com)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 21, 2018 10:16 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the

content is safe.

Please review the attached requests under the Georgia Open Records Act seeking records related to voting by felons and consolidation of voting precincts.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thank you.

Mark Niese

Georgia Government Reporter

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

404-526-2848

Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 1:06 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice; Lewis, Russell; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica; Open Records; Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

done

S. Merritt Beaver  
Chief Information Officer  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Office (404) 656-7744 Mobile: (770)330-0016  
[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:22 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt ; Lewis, Russell ; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica ; Open Records ; Rayburn, Kevin ; Head, Jansen ; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Mark Niese's Open Records Request is asking for the following: "All reports and correspondence related to precinct consolidation since Jan. 1, 2017" and "[a]ll records, reports, audits and documents related to allegations or evidence of voting by felons since Jan. 1, 2017.

**Merritt**, please run the following criteria on the email query system:

- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "precinct consolidation," "consolidating precinct," "close precinct," "precinct closure," "close polling place," or "polling place closure" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017
- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "felon vote" or "felon voting" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017

**Russell and Frances**, can you check our records to see if we have opened any cases for alleged felon voting going back to January 1, 2017 and, since I know that we have at least one, pull the cover pages for an open cases and identify for any closed cases how many total pages of documents are in the files for those closed cases? We are only looking for records related to allegations of felon voting occurring on or after January 1, 2017.

We must get our initial response to Mark Niese by Monday, August 27. Thank you.

---

**From:** Open Records  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>; Head, Jansen <[jhead@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jhead@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica <[jimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jimmons@sos.ga.gov)>; Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Please see new ORR.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 8:46 AM  
**To:** Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 21, 2018 10:16 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Please review the attached requests under the Georgia Open Records Act seeking records related to voting by felons and consolidation of voting precincts.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 1:06 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice; Lewis, Russell; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica; Open Records; Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

done

S. Merritt Beaver  
Chief Information Officer  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Office (404) 656-7744 Mobile: (770)330-0016  
[mbeaver@sos.ga.gov](mailto:mbeaver@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:22 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt ; Lewis, Russell ; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica ; Open Records ; Rayburn, Kevin ; Head, Jansen ; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Mark Niese's Open Records Request is asking for the following: "All reports and correspondence related to precinct consolidation since Jan. 1, 2017" and "[a]ll records, reports, audits and documents related to allegations or evidence of voting by felons since Jan. 1, 2017.

**Merritt**, please run the following criteria on the email query system:

- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "precinct consolidation," "consolidating precinct," "close precinct," "precinct closure," "close polling place," or "polling place closure" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017
- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "felon vote" or "felon voting" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017

**Russell and Frances**, can you check our records to see if we have opened any cases for alleged felon voting going back to January 1, 2017 and, since I know that we have at least one, pull the cover pages for an open cases and identify for any closed cases how many total pages of documents are in the files for those closed cases? We are only looking for records related to allegations of felon voting occurring on or after January 1, 2017.

We must get our initial response to Mark Niese by Monday, August 27. Thank you.

---

**From:** Open Records  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>; Head, Jansen <[jhead@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jhead@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica <[jimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jimmons@sos.ga.gov)>; Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Please see new ORR.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 8:46 AM  
**To:** Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 21, 2018 10:16 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Please review the attached requests under the Georgia Open Records Act seeking records related to voting by felons and consolidation of voting precincts.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese



---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:22 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt; Lewis, Russell; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica; Open Records; Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Mark Niesse's Open Records Request is asking for the following: "All reports and correspondence related to precinct consolidation since Jan. 1, 2017" and "[a]ll records, reports, audits and documents related to allegations or evidence of voting by felons since Jan. 1, 2017.

**Merritt**, please run the following criteria on the email query system:

- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "precinct consolidation," "consolidating precinct," "close precinct," "precinct closure," "close polling place," or "polling place closure" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017
- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "felon vote" or "felon voting" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017

**Russell and Frances**, can you check our records to see if we have opened any cases for alleged felon voting going back to January 1, 2017 and, since I know that we have at least one, pull the cover pages for an open cases and identify for any closed cases how many total pages of documents are in the files for those closed cases? We are only looking for records related to allegations of felon voting occurring on or after January 1, 2017.

We must get our initial response to Mark Niesse by Monday, August 27. Thank you.

---

**From:** Open Records  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin ; Head, Jansen  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica ; Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Please see new ORR.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 8:46 AM  
**To:** Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

---

**From:** Niesse, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niesse@aic.com](mailto:Mark.Niesse@aic.com)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 21, 2018 10:16 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the

content is safe.

Please review the attached requests under the Georgia Open Records Act seeking records related to voting by felons and consolidation of voting precincts.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thank you.

Mark Niese

Georgia Government Reporter

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

404-526-2848

Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:22 AM  
**To:** Beaver, Merritt; Lewis, Russell; Watson, Frances  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica; Open Records; Rayburn, Kevin; Head, Jansen; Herron, Robin  
**Subject:** RE: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Mark Niese's Open Records Request is asking for the following: "All reports and correspondence related to precinct consolidation since Jan. 1, 2017" and "[a]ll records, reports, audits and documents related to allegations or evidence of voting by felons since Jan. 1, 2017.

**Merritt**, please run the following criteria on the email query system:

- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "precinct consolidation," "consolidating precinct," "close precinct," "precinct closure," "close polling place," or "polling place closure" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017
- Any emails to or from anyone with a @sos.ga.gov email address with the words "felon vote" or "felon voting" in the subject or body of the email going back to January 1, 2017

**Russell and Frances**, can you check our records to see if we have opened any cases for alleged felon voting going back to January 1, 2017 and, since I know that we have at least one, pull the cover pages for an open cases and identify for any closed cases how many total pages of documents are in the files for those closed cases? We are only looking for records related to allegations of felon voting occurring on or after January 1, 2017.

We must get our initial response to Mark Niese by Monday, August 27. Thank you.

---

**From:** Open Records  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 9:08 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin ; Head, Jansen  
**Cc:** Simmons, Jessica ; Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

Please see new ORR.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 22, 2018 8:46 AM  
**To:** Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** FW: Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@aic.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@aic.com)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 21, 2018 10:16 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Records requests for felon voting and precinct consolidations

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the

content is safe.

Please review the attached requests under the Georgia Open Records Act seeking records related to voting by felons and consolidation of voting precincts.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thank you.

Mark Niese

Georgia Government Reporter

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

404-526-2848

Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Rainer, Clark  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 05, 2018 11:58 AM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** Re: Email Search for Open Records Request

On it

Clark

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 5, 2018, at 11:21 AM, Head, Jansen <jhead@sos.ga.gov> wrote:

Clarke,

We received an open records request for emails, and the initial response is due tomorrow. For this request, can you conduct a search on the email query system with the following criteria:

- \* Any emails with the terms "malone" AND "polling locations"
- \* Any emails with the terms "malone" AND "American with Disabilities Act"

If possible, I would like the two searches to be saved separately. You can save the results in the Legal Drive folder below:

**L:\Open Records Requests\2018\8-August 2018\Charles Bethea 2\Email Search**

Thanks,

Jansen Head

Elections Attorney

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

---

**From:** Open Records

**Sent:** Friday, August 31, 2018 12:01 PM

**To:** Head, Jansen <jhead@sos.ga.gov>; Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>; Simmons, Jessica <jsimmons@sos.ga.gov>; Rayburn, Kevin <krayburn@sos.ga.gov>

**Subject:** FW: Initial response for Open Records Request

I will add this and a response will be due next Thursday.

Thanks,

Robin

**From:** Charles Bethea

**Sent:** Friday, August 31, 2018 11:02 AM

**To:** Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>

**Cc:** Open Records <openrecords@sos.ga.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Initial response for Open Records Request

---

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

---

Thank you for your prompt response, Mrs. Broce. I'd like to narrow the FOIA request as follows, to reduce the estimated time of document delivery (as well as cost):

**I'd like to narrow my FOIA request to simply include communications between Mike Malone and officials within the offices of Georgia's Secretary of State that include the words "polling locations" or "Americans with Disabilities Act."**

Please let me know whether this can be accomplished, and, if so, how much it would cost and how long it would take to deliver.

Thank you,  
Charles Bethea

---

**From:** Rainer, Clark  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 05, 2018 11:58 AM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** Re: Email Search for Open Records Request

On it

Clark

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 5, 2018, at 11:21 AM, Head, Jansen <[jhead@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jhead@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

Clarke,

We received an open records request for emails, and the initial response is due tomorrow. For this request, can you conduct a search on the email query system with the following criteria:

- \* Any emails with the terms "malone" AND "polling locations"
- \* Any emails with the terms "malone" AND "American with Disabilities Act"

If possible, I would like the two searches to be saved separately. You can save the results in the Legal Drive folder below:

**L:\Open Records Requests\2018\8-August 2018\Charles Bethea 2\Email Search**

Thanks,

Jansen Head

Elections Attorney

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

---

**From:** Open Records

**Sent:** Friday, August 31, 2018 12:01 PM

**To:** Head, Jansen <[jhead@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jhead@sos.ga.gov)>; Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>; Simmons, Jessica <[jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)>; Rayburn, Kevin <[krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)>

**Subject:** FW: Initial response for Open Records Request

I will add this and a response will be due next Thursday.

Thanks,

Robin

**From:** Charles Bethea

**Sent:** Friday, August 31, 2018 11:02 AM

**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>

**Cc:** Open Records <[openrecords@sos.ga.gov](mailto:openrecords@sos.ga.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Initial response for Open Records Request

---

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

---

Thank you for your prompt response, Mrs. Broce. I'd like to narrow the FOIA request as follows, to reduce the estimated time of document delivery (as well as cost):

**I'd like to narrow my FOIA request to simply include communications between Mike Malone and officials within the offices of Georgia's Secretary of State that include the words "polling locations" or "Americans with Disabilities Act."**

Please let me know whether this can be accomplished, and, if so, how much it would cost and how long it would take to deliver.

Thank you,  
Charles Bethea



---

**From:** Rainer, Clark  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 05, 2018 11:58 AM  
**To:** Head, Jansen  
**Subject:** Re: Email Search for Open Records Request

On it

Clark

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 5, 2018, at 11:21 AM, Head, Jansen <jhead@sos.ga.gov> wrote:

Clarke,

We received an open records request for emails, and the initial response is due tomorrow. For this request, can you conduct a search on the email query system with the following criteria:

- \* Any emails with the terms "malone" AND "polling locations"
- \* Any emails with the terms "malone" AND "American with Disabilities Act"

If possible, I would like the two searches to be saved separately. You can save the results in the Legal Drive folder below:

**L:\Open Records Requests\2018\8-August 2018\Charles Bethea 2\Email Search**

Thanks,

Jansen Head

Elections Attorney

Georgia Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp

---

**From:** Open Records

**Sent:** Friday, August 31, 2018 12:01 PM

**To:** Head, Jansen <jhead@sos.ga.gov>; Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>; Simmons, Jessica <jsimmons@sos.ga.gov>; Rayburn, Kevin <krayburn@sos.ga.gov>

**Subject:** FW: Initial response for Open Records Request

I will add this and a response will be due next Thursday.

Thanks,

Robin

**From:** Charles Bethea

**Sent:** Friday, August 31, 2018 11:02 AM

**To:** Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>

**Cc:** Open Records <openrecords@sos.ga.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Initial response for Open Records Request

---

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

---

Thank you for your prompt response, Mrs. Broce. I'd like to narrow the FOIA request as follows, to reduce the estimated time of document delivery (as well as cost):

**I'd like to narrow my FOIA request to simply include communications between Mike Malone and officials within the offices of Georgia's Secretary of State that include the words "polling locations" or "Americans with Disabilities Act."**

Please let me know whether this can be accomplished, and, if so, how much it would cost and how long it would take to deliver.

Thank you,  
Charles Bethea

---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Monday, October 08, 2018 7:58 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** SEB Rulebook  
**Attachments:** SEB Rulebook

Sender: [rsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

Subject: SEB Rulebook

Message-Id: <[e80b7881d3404654945310d0e47aca80@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us](mailto:e80b7881d3404654945310d0e47aca80@ATLMAIL01.sos.state.ga.us)>

To: [krayburn@sos.ga.gov](mailto:krayburn@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** Simmons, Rachell  
**Sent:** Monday, October 08, 2018 7:58 AM  
**To:** Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** SEB Rulebook  
**Attachments:** 58809 Election Rules Ir.pdf

*Rachell Simmons  
Operations Supervisor  
Secretary of State Brian P. Kemp  
Elections Division  
802 West Tower  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Drive SE  
Atlanta, GA 30334  
404-651-8509*

**RULES OF THE STATE ELECTION BOARD  
AND RULES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**



**2013**

**Secretary of State  
State Capitol  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1505**

# **RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
	<b>183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	<b>5</b>
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	<b>15</b>
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	<b>17</b>
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>19</b>
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	<b>23</b>
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	<b>25</b>
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	<b>27</b>
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>31</b>
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	<b>33</b>
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	<b>37</b>
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORAL COLLEGE                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	<b>45</b>
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	<b>47</b>
<b>183-2</b>	<b>GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>183-2-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-2</b>	GOVERNING AUTHORITY                      RESERVED	
<b>183-2-3</b>	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS                      RESERVED	

183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11



## ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The **Administrative History** following each Rule gives the date on which the Rule was originally filed and its effective date, as well as the date on which any amendment or repeal was filed and its effective date. Principal abbreviations used in the Administrative History are as follows:

- f. — filed
- eff. — effective
- R. — Rule (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- Ch. — Chapter (Abbreviated only at the beginning of the control number)
- ER. — Emergency Rule
- Rev. — Revised

**Note: Emergency Rules** are listed in each Rule's Administrative History by Emergency Rule number, date filed and effective date. The Emergency Rule will be in effect for 120 days or until the effective Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency Rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency.

Chapters 183-6 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-7 entitled "Election Districts and Polling Places", 183-12-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-12-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-13 entitled "Preparation for and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-14 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. The following Chapters are reserved: 183-1 to 183-5, 183-8 to 183-11, 183-15 to 183-36. Filed July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1968.

Rules 183-6-.01, .02, 183-12-2-.04 and .05 have been amended. Rules 183-6-.03 and 183-13-.01 have been repealed. Filed August 5, 1969; effective August 24, 1969.

Rules 183-12-2-.04, .08 and 183-14-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-13-.03 to .05 have been adopted. Chapter 183-15 entitled "Returns of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed May 26, 1970; effective June 14, 1970.

Chapters 183-24 entitled "Poll Officers", 183-25 entitled "Registration of Electors", 183-26 entitled "Election Districts or Precincts and Polling Places", and 183-27 entitled "Dates of Primaries

and Elections", 183-31-1 entitled "Voting Machines", 183-31-2 entitled "Vote Recorders", 183-32 entitled "Preparation For and Conduct of Primaries and Elections", and 183-33 entitled "Absentee Voting" have been adopted. Filed August 30, 1973; effective September 19, 1973.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-14-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rules 183-7-.01 and 183-15-.01 have been amended. Chapter 183-8 entitled "Dates of Primaries and Elections" has been adopted. Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

Rules 183-6-.01, 183-13-.02, and 183-33-.01 have been repealed.

Rules 183-12-2-.06, .07, 183-14-.01, 183-15-.01, 183-33-.02 have been amended. Chapters 183-1 to 183-11, 183-12-1, 183-12-2, 183-13 to 183-20 have been renumbered to 183-1-1 to 183-1-20 by Certification. Chapters 183-21 to 183-31, 183-31-1, 183-31-2 and 183-32 to 183-36 have been renumbered to 183-2-1 to 183-2-16 by Certification. All Rules of said Chapters have been renumbered. Filed October 20, 1975; effective November 9, 1975.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.1-.01 and 183-2-5-0.2-.02 adopted. Filed May 20, 1982; effective May 17, 1982, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of permanent Rules covering the same subject matter superseding these Emergency Rules are adopted, as specified by the Agency. These Emergency Rules were adopted to prevent voter irregularities in the upcoming elections. (These Emergency Rules will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-6-.01 and 183-2-5-.02 have been adopted. Filed March 29, 1983; effective April 18, 1983.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been adopted. Filed January 22, 1985; effective February 11, 1985.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been adopted. Filed August 1, 1986; effective August 21, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.04 has been amended. Filed September 18, 1986; effective October 8, 1986.

Chapter 183-1-11 entitled "Ballots" has been adopted. Rule 183-1-12-. 10 has been adopted. Filed November 14, 1986; effective December 4, 1986.

Rule 183-1-6-.01 has been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.03, .05 to .09, 183-1-13-.03 to .05, 183-1-14-.01, 183-1-15-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-7-.01 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed January 21, 1988; effective February 10, 1988.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed April 10, 1989; effective April 30, 1989.

Rule 183-1-6-.05 has been adopted, Rules 183-1-13-.03, .05 and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Filed February 17, 1992; effective March 9, 1992.

Rules 183-1-12-.01 and .02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Filed August 30, 2002; effective September 19, 2002.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Filed October 18, 2002; effective November 7, 2002.

Rules 183-1-12-.01, .02, and 183-1-14-.01 have been amended. Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rules 183-1-14-.02, .03 and 183-1-15-.02 have been adopted. Filed October 24, 2003; effective November 13, 2003.

Rules 183-1-6-.02, 183-1-12-.05, .07 to .09, 183-1-15-.01, 183-2-4-.01, 183-2-5-.01, .02, 183-2-6-.01, 183-2-7-.01, 183-2-11-.02 to .09, 183-2-12-.02 to .05, and 183-2-13-.02 have been repealed. Rules 183-1-6-.03 to .05, 183-M2-.03, 183-1-13-.03 to .05 have been amended. Filed December 11, 2003; effective December 31, 2003.

Rule 183-1-12-.02 has been amended. Filed May 11, 2004; effective May 31, 2004.

Emergency Rules 183-1-6-0.3-.06, 183-1-12-0.4-.02, and 183-1-14-0.5-.04 adopted. Filed September 10, 2004; effective September 9, 2004, the date of adoption, to be in effect for 120 days or until the effective date of a permanent Rule covering the same subject matter superseding this Emergency rule is adopted, as specified by the Agency. This Emergency Rule was adopted to prevent confidential information being used for fraudulent purposes (Emergency Rule 183-1-6-0.3-.06), voter fraud related to the counting of absentee ballots

(Emergency Rule 183-1-12-0.4-.02), voter coercion or intimidation occurring during the absentee voting period (Emergency Rule 183-1-14-0.5-.04). (This Emergency Rule will not be published; copies may be obtained from the Agency.)

Rules 183-1-12-.06 has been amended. Rules 183-1-14-.04 and .05 have been adopted. Filed December 21, 2005; effective January 10, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been amended. Chapter 183-1-19 entitled "Penalties" has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2005; effective January 17, 2006.

Rule 183-1-12-.07 has been adopted. Filed March 8, 2006; effective March 28, 2006.

Rule 183-1-6-.03 has been amended. Filed May 30, 2006; effective June 19, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-20 entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" has been adopted. Filed June 19, 2006; effective July 9, 2006.

Chapter 183-1-1 entitled "Preliminary Provisions" has been adopted. Filed February 22, 2008; effective March 13, 2008.

Rules 183-1-6-.01, .02, 183-1-14-.06, .07, .09 and .10 have been adopted. Rules 183-1-6-.03 and 183-1-12-.02 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Chapter 183-1-10 entitled "Nomination of Candidates" has been adopted. Filed October 29, 2009; effective November 18, 2009.

Rules 183-1-6-.06 and 183-1-14-.08 have been adopted. Filed December 15, 2009; effective January 4, 2010.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been adopted. Filed March 3, 2010; effective March 23, 2010.

Rules 183-1-12-.02, .06, and 183-1-14-.04 have been repealed and new Rules adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.01 has been amended. Filed March 17, 2011; effective April 6, 2011.

Rule 183-1-12-.06 has been repealed and a new Rule adopted. Rule 183-1-14-.11 has been adopted. Filed May 27, 2011; effective June 16, 2011.

Rule 183-1-11-.02 has been amended. Filed November 10, 2014; effective November 30, 2014.

Rule 183-1-14-.12 has been adopted. Filed December 28, 2015; effective January 17, 2016.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-1 GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>183-1-1</b>	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	5
<b>183-1-2</b>	STATE ELECTION BOARD	RESERVED
<b>183-1-3</b>	SECRETARY OF STATE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-4</b>	ORDINARIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-5</b>	POLL OFFICERS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-6</b>	REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS	15
<b>183-1-7</b>	ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES	17
<b>183-1-8</b>	DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	19
<b>183-1-9</b>	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
<b>183-1-10</b>	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	23
<b>183-1-11</b>	BALLOTS	25
<b>183-1-12</b>	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	27
<b>183-1-13</b>	PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	31
<b>183-1-14</b>	ABSENTEE VOTING	33
<b>183-1-15</b>	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	37
<b>183-1-16</b>	ELECTORIAL COLLEGE	RESERVED
<b>183-1-17</b>	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-18</b>	CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS	RESERVED
<b>183-1-19</b>	PENALTIES	45
<b>183-1-20</b>	GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD	47

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-1  
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-1-.01	Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules	183-1-1-.02	Review of Initial Decisions
-------------	---	-------------	-----------------------------

**183-1-1-.01 Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules.**

(1) Interested persons may petition the State Election Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule, Such petition should be in the form of a letter addressed to the Board setting forth the language of the proposed rule, amendment, or repeal, and, where applicable, the language of the rule sought to be amended or repealed.

(2) Any interested person desiring to petition the Board requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule shall submit three copies of the petition, in writing, by certified or registered mail, to the Chairperson of the State Election Board, 2 Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive, S.E., Suite 1104, West Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9000.

(3) Each petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule made pursuant to the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act should be verified under oath, or in proper behalf of, the petitioner and shall contain:

- (a) The name and post office address of the petitioner;
- (b) The full text of the rule requested to be amended or repealed, or the full text of the rule desired to be promulgated;
- (c) The reason(s) such rule should be amended, repealed, or promulgated;
- (d) Any and all pertinent existing facts as to the petitioner's interest in the matter;

(e) Any and all facts known to the petitioner which might influence the decision of the Board to initiate or not initiate rulemaking, including identification of any parties who it is known will or may be affected by the amended, repealed, or promulgated rule; and

(f) Citations of legal authorities, if any, which authorize, support, or require the action requested by the petitioner.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after submission of a petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule or at the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the State Election Board, the Board shall decide upon the action to be taken. The Board shall not be forced to call a special meeting in order to address such a petition. If such a petition is received less than twenty (20) days before a regularly-scheduled meeting, the Board may vote to address the petition at its next regularly-scheduled meeting. Within ten (10) days after addressing the petition, the Board shall inform the petitioner by mail of the decision reached, and shall either decline to take the action requested, stating its reasons for so declining, or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Procedure to Petition for Adoption of Rules" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.

**183-1-1.02 Review of Initial Decisions.** The State Election Board (the "Board") does not routinely preside at the reception of the evidence in contested cases before it and typically refers these cases to the Office of State Administrative Hearings ("OSAH"). After receiving the evidence, an OSAH hearing officer may issue an initial decision in such a contested case more than thirty (30) days before the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board. On those occasions where the hearing officer issues an initial decision more than thirty (30) days before the Board's next regularly-scheduled meeting, the period of time in which the Board shall render a final decision shall be extended until the date of the next regularly-scheduled meeting of the Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 50-13-3, 50-13-17. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Review of Initial Decisions" adopted. F. Feb. 22, 2008; eff. Mar. 13, 2008.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-6  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-6-.01	Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications	183-1-6-.04	Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters
183-1-6-.02	Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities	183-1-6-.05	Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees
183-1-6-.03	Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars	183-1-6-.06	Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration

**183-1-6-.01 Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications.(1)**

The board of registrars shall, as of the date received, date stamp all voter registration applications delivered by hand to the board or otherwise received when the application does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that receives such application and shall be processed in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

(2) Any application of a person who is a resident of a county in this State that is delivered to the board of registrars of another county through mistake, inadvertence, neglect, or otherwise that does not have a date stamp affixed by the Secretary of State or a postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service or when the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service is illegible or bears no date shall be date stamped by the receiving board of registrars and shall be forwarded as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than seven days after receipt of the application to the correct board of registrars by the receiving county. In any such instance, a voter registration application shall be deemed to have been made as of the date stamp affixed to such application by the board of registrars that originally receives such application and shall be processed by the correct board

of registrars in accordance with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-224.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-224. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Special Registration for New (30 day) Residents" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Special 14-day Registration" adopted. F. June 24, 1974; eff. July 14, 1974. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-6-0.1-.01 entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Acceptance of Voter Registration Applications" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

## 183-1-6-.02 Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities.

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted to the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f)) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board to establish reasonable, necessary, and uniform rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the State of Georgia with respect to the registration of voters in Georgia.

For the benefit and protection of those citizens who choose to entrust their completed voter registration applications to private entities and for the benefit and protection of the public and the fair administration of the electoral process, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules for voter registration by private entities. The State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, has taken care to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this rule, unless otherwise noted, the term:

(a) "Close of registration" means the last day for the registration of voters in a primary or general election, as provided by law.

(b) "Private entity" means an individual who is not acting in an official capacity as a registrar or deputy registrar, or a non-governmental organization or other non-governmental entity that utilizes individuals other than registrars or deputy registrars to conduct voter registration programs.

(c) "Voter registration programs" means the distribution or collection of voter registration applications.

### **(3) Acceptance of Mail Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A voter registration application postmarked or received by the Secretary of State or a registrar or deputy registrar within the time frames provided by law for the registration of electors shall be processed without regard to whether such application was received by mail or otherwise, was submitted singularly or bundled with other voter registration applications, or was submitted by a private entity. No board of registrars shall reject or refuse to process a voter registration application solely on the basis of how or by whom it was submitted.

(b) Any mail voter registration application received from a private entity (other than from an individual delivering his or her own application to a state or local election official in person) shall be processed in the same manner as an application received by mail, regardless of the manner in which such application was actually delivered.

(c) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit or in any manner restrict the right of any board of registrars or other authority from investigating and addressing suspected instances of voter registration fraud or to challenge, examine, verify, or determine the validity of voter registration applications or the qualifications and eligibility of persons applying to register to vote.

**(4) Voter Registration Activities of Private Entities.** Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prevent private entities from conducting organized voter registration programs and assisting eligible citizens with voter registration as permitted by state or federal law, including the distribution, collection, and transmittal of mail voter registration applications to the appropriate board of registrars.

### **(5) Instruction and Training of Private Entities.**

(a) Instruction and training for private entity voter registration activities pursuant to this rule shall be offered by the board of registrars. Training requests by private entities shall be made in

writing to the board of registrars. The board of registrars shall respond in writing to such requests with a training confirmation, including the date, time, and location such training will take place.

(b) At a minimum, training shall be provided to each private entity who requests such training on:

1. How to complete the voter registration application designed, published, and distributed by the Secretary of State in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-223;

2. The proper security of completed voter registration applications;

3. The time frames within which completed voter registration applications are required to be transmitted to the appropriate board of registrars;

4. The identification requirements to be included with completed voter registration applications;

5. The identification requirements for voting at polling places within the state and the requirements for persons who registered to vote for the first time by mail; and

6. The required and prohibited activities of private entities as set forth in paragraphs (6) and (7) of this rule.

(c) The Secretary of State may develop and provide to the boards of registrars manuals for this instruction. The Secretary of State may also make such manuals available to the public, including via electronic means on the Secretary of State's website. Until such time as the Secretary of State develops such manuals, boards of registrars shall utilize such materials as will meet the training requirements of this rule.

**(6) Required Activities.** While engaging in organized voter registration activity within this state, a private entity shall:

(a) Advise each applicant that such applicant has the option to return his or her voter registration application personally to the appropriate board of registrars or to the Secretary of State or to permit the private entity to return it on the applicant's behalf;

(b) Inform all applicants that they are not officially registered to vote until their eligibility has been determined by the appropriate board of registrars and that, if the applicant has not received notification of the disposition of the application within three to four weeks of submitting the application, the applicant should contact the appropriate board of registrars to determine if such applicant's eligibility has been determined and the applicant's name entered on the official list of electors;

(c) Inform all applicants that, if they are registering to vote for the first time in the jurisdiction by mail or through a private entity, they must present current and valid identification either when registering to vote by mail or through a private entity or when voting for the first time after registering to vote by mail or through a private entity;

(d) Inform all Georgia applicants of the availability of an online registration status check and polling place locator service on the Secretary of State's website and encourage all applicants to access it in advance of a primary or election day to verify their registration status and correct polling place; and

(e) Inform all applicants of their right, under certain circumstances, to cast a provisional ballot in the event that their names do not appear on the official list of electors at the polls.

For purposes of compliance with the notice provisions provided in this paragraph, it shall be sufficient for the private entity either to post such notices in a conspicuous location at any fixed registration site or to provide such notices in written form to the applicant in a brochure, flyer, or other similar manner at the time of application. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities an appropriate model form that includes all required notices pursuant to this paragraph.

**(7) Prohibited Activities.** While engaging in voter registration programs within Georgia, a private entity shall not:

(a) Represent to any person that the private entity is a representative of the Secretary of State or a board of registrars authorized by law to receive voter registration applications in person;

(b) Make any statement to an applicant or take any action that the private entity knows or reasonably should know would discourage a qualified applicant from registering to vote;

(c) Refuse to accept and transmit a properly completed and contemporaneously dated voter registration application from any qualified individual;

(d) Be inebriated or otherwise impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other substances;

(e) Conduct voter registration activities at locations where the private entity knows that illegal or criminal activities are being conducted;

(f) Accept a completed registration application from the applicant unless such application has been sealed by the application, without a signed acknowledgement from the applicant that the applicant willingly and knowingly provided the unsealed application to the private entity;

(g) Copy a completed registration application without the express, written permission of the applicant; or

(h) Conduct voter registration activities in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

#### **(8) Transmittal of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall promptly transmit all completed voter registration applications to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within ten days after receiving the application or by the close of registration, whichever period is earlier. If a private entity receives a completed voter registration application fourteen days or less before the close of registration, the private entity should transmit the application to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within seventy-two hours of the date of the execution of the application or by midnight on the close of registration, whichever period is earlier.

(b) Transmittal of completed voter registration applications may be accomplished by in-person delivery, mail, commercial courier,

statutory overnight delivery, or any other form of delivery that is reasonably calculated to secure and ensure the confidential delivery and receipt of such applications by the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars within three business days after transmittal and within the time frames required by these rules and regulations and state and federal law.

(c) With each transmittal of completed voter registration applications, a private entity should include a transmittal summary sheet which, at a minimum, provides the name of the submitting individual, the name of the private entity sponsoring the voter registration programs (if different than the submitting individual), the physical residence or business address of the submitting individual, the daytime and evening telephone numbers of the submitting individual, and the total number of applications being submitted. The Secretary of State may design and make available to private entities a model transmittal summary sheet containing the information requested in this subparagraph. The failure to include the transmittal summary sheet shall not by itself be grounds for rejecting the submitted applications. The private entity may enclose a postage-prepaid, self-addressed envelope, along with a copy of the completed transmittal summary sheet, if the private entity desires a date stamped receipt of the transmittal summary sheet from the board of registrars, in which case the board of registrars shall promptly acknowledge such receipt by returning a date stamped copy of the transmittal summary sheet to the private entity.

### **(9) Confidentiality of Completed Voter Registration Applications.**

(a) A private entity shall keep all completed original voter registration applications in the possession of the private entity in a secure and confidential manner at all times until such applications are submitted to the Secretary of State or the appropriate board of registrars. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, a private entity shall not disclose any such applications or information contained therein, except as specifically provided in these rules and regulations to any member of the public. A private entity may collaborate with another affiliated private entity in the securing of completed original voter registration applications that are received during the course of a jointly organized voter registration program.

(b) With the express, written consent of the applicant, a private entity may make archival copies of an applicant's original voter registration application and retain such archival copies for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. A private entity may engage the services of a commercial copying or document management service to make such archival copies provided that the company agrees to maintain the confidentiality and security of the original applications and any copies of the applications in the same manner as is required by private entities pursuant this rule.

(c) A private entity shall keep any such archival copies in a secure and confidential manner at all times and shall not disclose any such archival copies to any member of the public; provided, how-ever, that a private entity may disclose such archival copies to another affiliated private entity as necessary for use in aiding the applicant with verifying the timely and proper receipt and processing of his/her application by the applicable board of registrars. Archival copies of completed voter registration applications must be discarded by the private entity not later than 90 days following the transmittal of the completed voter registration application to the Secretary of State or board of registrars. Whenever such archival copies are discarded by the private entity, they must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

(d) A private entity may create and keep a separate record of any information contained on the applicant's voter registration application that could otherwise be made available for public inspection pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-225(b) if collected and maintained by the Secretary of State on the official list of electors. No such information may be used by the private entity or any other person for commercial purposes. Whenever such information is discarded by the private entity, it must be discarded in the manner contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 10-15-2 for the destruction by businesses of records containing personal information.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Duplicate Voting, Procedure for Checking" adopted. F. July 24, 1968, eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Rules for Voter Registration by Private Entities" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.



**183-1-6.03 Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrars.****(1) Intent and Purpose.**

(a) These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board by Georgia Laws 1984, p. 1430, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-215(f) and by Georgia Laws 1968, p. 862, (O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-31). It is the intent of the State Election Board to increase the level of participation in the elective process in the State of Georgia by encouraging the registration of voters within the State. It is the intent and purpose of the State Election Board, within the parameters of the law, to make voter registration in Georgia as convenient and as easy as practicable while retaining the necessary controls to prevent abuse of the system and fraud in the elective process. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(b) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to prohibit any voter registration activity that is permitted pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg *et seq.*, or any other federal or state law or regulation.

(c) Rules and regulations governing voter registration by private entities are provided in a separately numbered rule within this Chapter.

**(2) Criteria for Appointment of Deputy Registrars.** The board of registrars in each county may appoint deputy registrars to aid them in the discharge of their duties. The number of deputy registrars appointed to serve shall be determined by the board of registrars.

(a) Deputy registrars appointed by each county board of registrars shall meet the following qualifications:

1. be a registered voter in the State of Georgia;
2. be able to read, write and speak the English language;
3. have legible handwriting unless the voter registration applications are to be completed by typewriter or electronic means;
4. satisfactorily complete such training as shall be required by the board of registrars;

5. not have been convicted of a felony or of any crime involving fraud or moral turpitude;

6. not be a candidate for nomination or election to any office except as allowed by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-214; and

7. not have been removed as a deputy registrar for improper conduct in the performance of the duties of deputy registrar.

(b) Deputy registrars shall not engage in political activity on behalf of a candidate, political party or body, or question while actually conducting the duties of their office. While conducting the duties of their office, each person serving as a deputy registrar shall wear a badge or display identification which shall state no more than the person's name and the fact that the person is a deputy registrar of the county. There shall be available for inspection, upon request to verify the authority of the persons involved, the names of the authorized deputy registrars serving at the site.

(c) The following activities shall subject a deputy registrar to immediate revocation of appointment as a deputy registrar:

1. registering voters at unapproved sites, times, and hours, including door to door registration;

2. intoxication while on duty;

3. falsification of registration records;

4. improper handling of registration applications;

5. engaging in any communication, wearing badges, buttons, or clothing that advocates or criticizes a particular candidate, office holder, political party or body, or ballot question while on duty, such as making verbal statements and distributing campaign literature. However, deputy registrars shall identify themselves as deputy registrars of the county by wearing the badges or displaying the identification described in paragraph (b) above; and

6. failure to appear or remain at the deputy registrar's assigned site at or during the assigned hours without adequate notice to the board of registrars or without a proper replacement.

### **(3) Criteria for Establishment of Additional Voter Registration Places:**

(a) The Board of Registrars, in addition to its main office, may designate other fixed places throughout the county as would be reasonably necessary to receive applications for registration and for the registration of electors.

(b) Such additional registration places shall be located in facilities which are open to and frequented by the general public. No place shall be used as an additional registration place unless the general public is freely admitted without regard to race, color, creed, religion, gender, or national origin,

(c) Churches which are open to all persons and which are, in fact, attended for any purpose by persons who are not members of the church shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public.

(d) The offices or facilities of community, civic, service, social, civil rights, patriotic, fraternal, and labor organizations shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if non members of the organization in fact attend various activities sponsored by the organization at its offices and facilities and such offices or facilities are open to all persons. However, offices or facilities of political parties, political bodies or candidates shall not be used as additional voter registration places.

(e) The fact that a facility is used primarily or exclusively by the general public of one race or ethnic group or socioeconomic group shall not, for that reason alone, bar its designation as a registration place.

(f) When employers or business owners request the use of their place of business as a registration place, registration shall be conducted only in that part of the place of business which is open to the general public. Such part of the place of business shall be considered to be open to and frequented by the general public if it is an area which is maintained for use by the general public and is known to serve the general public for the purpose of conducting business or engaging in other transactions with the business.

(g) Organizations, employers, offices, and businesses that register voters at their facilities shall not limit registration to their members, employees, or customers, but must register any qualified applicant.

(h) Registration of voters shall be prohibited in places where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed on the same premises.

(i) No registration of voters shall take place where criminal activities are permitted to occur.

(j) Registration places may be established on a temporary or permanent basis. Permanent places are those which operate on a fixed schedule for an indefinite period of time. Temporary places are those which operate on a temporary schedule and, among other things, may be used in voter registration drives.

1. The deputy registrars appointed by the board of registrars who staff registration places may be unpaid volunteers, employees of the board of registrars, or employees of government offices or of private businesses.

(k) Persons acting as individuals or as representatives of organizations and businesses may request the establishment of additional voter registration places. The board of registrars shall consider such requests.

1. If the request is approved, the board of registrars shall make provisions for having a deputy registrar who has been appointed by the board of registrars available at the additional voter registration places at all times which have been designated by the board of registrars and which have been precleared by the United States Department of Justice for the purpose of voter registration. The board of registrars shall inform such persons that registration may be conducted only at such times as are designated by the board of registrars, precleared by the United States Department of Justice, and advertised as required by law.

(l) The board of registrars shall retain the ultimate responsibility for the submission of additional registration places, dates, and times to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for the advertising of registration places as required by law. The board of registrars shall also retain the ultimate responsibility for the appointment and training of deputy registrars, the proper conduct of voter registration, and the security of completed registration applications; but the board of registrars may

use deputy registrars to assist them in carrying out these duties.

(m) The board of registrars shall instruct deputy registrars in the law and procedure for registration prior to the administration of the oath of office to the deputy registrars. Such training shall include the duties and obligations of deputy registrars, the proper completion of registration applications, the proper security of registration applications, the protection of the integrity of the registration process, and the taking of oaths of registrants and the procedures for appeal upon rejection of the applications for registration.

(n) The Secretary of State shall provide the board of registrars of each county manuals for the use of deputy registrars which include simple instructions on the rules and procedures for the proper conduct of voter registration. The form and content of these manuals shall be determined by the Secretary of State. The board of registrars shall provide each deputy registrar with a copy of the manual.

(o) In order to ensure that the same degree of supervision and security provided at the main office of the board of registrars to prevent voter registration irregularities is maintained for the additional voter registration places, the following rules shall apply:

1. Except as provided in this rule, completed registration applications may be maintained by registrars and deputy registrars only:

(i) at the additional voter registration place during the hours of operation;

(ii) in transit to the main office of the board of registrars;

(iii) at the main office of the board of registrars;

(iv) at permanent additional voter registration places overnight but not beyond the end of the next business day; and

(v) at sites mandated as voter registration sites under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-221 and 21-2-222 but not longer than the time permitted under those Code sections.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.

(p) The board of registrars should identify and establish additional voter registration places where the public congregates for commerce, recreation, worship, education, employment, and other such purposes which are most likely to facilitate registration and suit the convenience of the general public throughout the county. These places should be open at hours to suit the convenience of the general public including times other than the regular hours of the main office of the board of registrars.

(q) Wherever practicable, the Board of Registrars should fully utilize federal, state, county, and municipal offices located within the county which are open during regular business hours and other hours for the purpose of taking voter registration applications.

(r) All additional voter registration sites which are staffed by volunteer deputy registrars shall have prominently displayed a sign, placard, or banner which shall state that voter registration at that location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of Registrars of the county or, in counties in which the duties of the Board of Registrars are performed by Boards of Election, the county Board of Elections. If the volunteer deputy registrars are provided by an organization, club, or other group, the sign, placard, or banner may also identify the organization, club, or group providing the volunteer deputy registrars. The language contained on the sign, placard, or banner shall conform substantially to the following: "Voter registration at this location is being conducted under the authority of the Board of (Registrars or Elections) of \_\_\_\_\_ County. The volunteer deputy registrars at this location are provided by \_\_\_\_\_".

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Jan. 22, 1985; eff. Feb. 11, 1985. **Amended:** F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Amended:** F. Apr. 10, 1989; eff. Apr. 30, 1989. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Amended:** F. May 30, 2006; eff. June 19, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Rules and Regulations for Voter Registration by Registrars and Deputy Registrar" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

#### **183-1-6-.04 Accessibility for Elderly and Disabled Voters.**

(1) **Preamble.** In order to implement the provisions of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (P.L. 98-435), the

State Election Board promulgates the following rules and regulations.

(2) **Definitions.** As used in this Rule, the terms:

(a) “Accessible” shall mean that a facility has a continuous unobstructed path connecting the parking area and the area within the facility which is being used for voting or voter registration, whichever the case may be, which complies with the relevant provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of American National Standards Institute specifications A117.1-1980 for making buildings and facilities accessible to and usable by physically disabled individuals.

(b) “Disabled” shall mean a temporary or permanent physical disability.

(c) “Elderly” shall mean persons 65 years of age or older.

(d) “Polling place” means the room provided in each precinct for voting at a primary or election.

(e) “Registration place” shall mean any place, either temporary or permanent, designated by the registrars of a county or municipality as a place to be used for voter registration.

(3) **Polling Places.** All polling places in the State of Georgia shall be accessible to disabled and elderly electors.

(4) **Reserved.**

(5) **Implementation.**

(a) **Polling Places.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall conduct, or cause to be conducted, an on-site inspection of each polling place located within the county or municipality to determine if the polling place is accessible. This inspection shall be reported to the Secretary of State on forms prepared by the Secretary of State at such times as the Secretary of State shall prescribe. Any polling place found not to be accessible shall either be made accessible prior to its use in a primary or election or shall not be used as a polling place.

(6) **Waivers.** No waiver shall be granted for polling places which are not accessible.

(7) **Printed Instructions.** The Secretary of State shall provide instructions for use by election superintendents at polling places and registrars at voter registration places, printed in large type, to assist visually and hearing impaired electors in voting and registering to vote.

(8) **Notice and Advertisement.**

(a) Each election superintendent shall mark or cause to be marked in a prominent manner the accessible path for elderly and disabled voters at all polling places.

(b) The display of the international disabled access symbol shall be sufficient marking of a polling place if the symbol is of a size and is located such that it can easily be seen by the public and if the accessible path from the parking area to the polling place is the same as the path used by non-disabled persons.

(c) Election superintendents shall take reasonable steps to inform disabled and elderly electors of the availability of accessible polling places.

(9) **Voting Aids.** The election superintendent of each county and municipality shall provide at least one magnifying glass at each polling place during each primary and election for use by visually impaired electors.

(10) If the voting equipment is not accessible to a disabled voter, the disabled voter shall be permitted to use a paper ballot.

(11) **Enforcement.**

(a) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall investigate all complaints concerning accessibility to polling places and voter registration places and shall take such corrective action as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these rules concerning accessibility.

(b) Election superintendents and boards of registrars shall report in writing to the State Election Board through the Secretary of State all complaints concerning accessibility, the results of the investigation of the complaints, and any corrective actions taken.

(c) The State Election Board may, in its discretion, investigate these complaints further and take such actions as it deems



appropriate to ensure that these rules concerning accessibility are implemented and effectuated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Voters" adopted, F. Aug. 1, 1986; eff. Aug. 21, 1986. **Amended:** F. Sept. 18, 1986; eff. Oct. 8, 1986. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-6.05 Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees.**

(1) **Authority.** The president of each public or private college or university located in the State of Georgia is authorized to register to vote all qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university. For students domiciled in the State of Georgia, the college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar on behalf of all boards of registration in the State of Georgia for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for these students. For staff and faculty domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located, each college or university president or designee of the president shall be a deputy registrar of the county in which the college or university is located for the purpose of taking applications for voter registration for those faculty and staff members.

(2) **Designees.** Each college or university president is authorized to designate such persons as the college or university president deems appropriate for the purpose of aiding the college or university president in the exercise of the president's voter registration duties. It shall not be necessary for any person so designated to be a resident of the county in which the college or university is located. However, each person so designated shall be a registered voter in the State of Georgia and shall take an oath as a deputy registrar. The designation shall be in writing and shall be forwarded by the college or university president to the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located. Registration applications completed by persons who are not designated in writing to the chief registrar by the college or university president to register persons on behalf of the college or university president shall be rejected.

(3) **Training.** Each person designated by a college or university president to register voters on behalf of the president shall immediately contact the chief registrar of the county in which the college or university is located to undergo such training board of registrars of the county ordinarily provides for deputy registrars. Such training shall be completed prior to the individual taking any application for voter registration.

(4) **Registration Applications.** The board of registrars in each county in which a college or university is located shall provide to the college or university president a sufficient number of registration applications for use in registering qualified students, staff, and faculty at the college or university.

(5) **Security.** Any person designated by a college or university president to take voter registration applications on behalf of the college or university president shall also take such steps as are necessary to provide appropriate and adequate security for the registration applications which are placed in that person's possession. Completed voter registration applications shall be returned to the board of registrars in the county in which the college or university is located as soon as possible, but, in no event, later than the next business day.

(6) **Voter Registration Places.** Each place utilized for the collection and receipt of applications for voter registration by the college or university president or designee of the president shall be precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. Section 1973c). The board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall be responsible for obtaining this preclearance. No registration shall be conducted at locations which have not been precleared. Door-to-door registration is prohibited.

(7) **Receipt of Completed Applications.** Upon the receipt of completed voter registration applications from a college or university, the board of registrars of the county in which the college or university is located shall retain those applications completed by individuals who are domiciled in the county in which the college or university is located and shall forward the remainder of the applications completed by individuals domiciled in other counties directly to the appropriate county registration offices.

(8) **Limitations on Presidents and Their Designees.** College and university presidents and their designees are limited to registering only those qualified students, staff and faculty at the college and university and may not register any other individuals.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Registration of Persons by College Presidents or Their Designees" adopted, F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended;** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-6-.06 Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration.**

(1) On and after January 1, 2010, an application for registration to vote shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.

(2) Satisfactory evidence of citizenship shall include any of the following:

(a) Verified Georgia Driver's License Number or Identification Card Number or Out of State Driver's License or Identification Card.

1. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the number of the applicant's driver's license or identification card issued by the Georgia Department of Driver Services, upon verification by the Secretary of State that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Georgia Department of Driver Services.

2. An applicant may provide as satisfactory evidence of citizenship, the applicant's driver's license or identification card, or legible photocopy thereof, issued by a state driver's license agency of another state equivalent to the Georgia Department of Driver Services, or a legible photocopy thereof, if such agency indicates on the driver's license or identification card that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to such agency.

(b) Birth Certificate.

1. An applicant's birth certificate, or a legible photocopy thereof, is satisfactory evidence of citizenship so long as the birth certificate shows that the applicant was born within the United States. In the event that the birth certificate contains a different first, middle, or last name from the name contained on the application for registration, the board of registrars shall require additional supporting legal documentation to establish that the applicant is the same individual as the individual identified on the birth certificate, including but not limited to a marriage certificate or court order confirming change of name.

2. A Certificate of Birth Abroad, or legible photocopy thereof, obtained by a United States citizen when such individual registers with the Department of State in the event such individual is born

abroad in a non-military installation, shall be accepted and treated as a birth certificate.

(c) United States Passport.

1. An applicant's United States passport, or a legible photocopy of pages of the applicant's United States passport which contain the passport number, name, nationality, date of birth, place of birth, and signature, shall serve as satisfactory evidence of citizenship.

(d) United States Naturalization Documents or Verified Alien Registration Number.

1. An applicant may provide the board of registrars with the applicant's United States Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

(i) Registrars and deputy registrars who attend naturalization ceremonies may assist new citizens in registering to vote. In such event, the registrar or deputy registrar shall examine the applicant's United State Certificate of Naturalization and initial and date the application for registration. If applicants from outside the county apply at the ceremony, the registrar or deputy registrar conducting the voter registration activities shall bundle the registrations by county and send them to the appropriate county board of registrars with an official cover letter stating that all naturalization documents were verified by the registrar or deputy registrar. A county that receives applications in this manner shall accept the applications without requiring further evidence of citizenship from the applicant.

2. If only the alien registration number from naturalization documents is provided for citizenship purposes, the applicant shall not be found eligible to vote until the applicant's alien registration number is verified with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by the Secretary of State utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

(e) Documents or methods of proof that are established pursuant to the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-603).

(f) Bureau of Indian Affairs Card Number, Tribal Treaty Card Number, or Tribal Enrollment Number.

(g) Other Documents and Methods of Proof.

1. Applicants who do not have any of the documents enumerated in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and who are residents of this State and United States citizens may provide any of the following as satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship:

(i) Certificate of Citizenship issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service;

(ii) Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America;

(iii) Certification of Report of Birth issued by the United States Department of State;

(iv) United States Citizen Identification card;

(v) American Indian Card issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security with the classification code "KIC";

(vi) Final adoption decree showing the applicant's name and United States birthplace;

(vii) Evidence of the applicant's civil service employment by the United States government before June 1976;

(viii) An official United States military record of service showing a United States place of birth;

(ix) A Northern Mariana Identification Card issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service; or

(x) Extract of United States hospital record of birth created at the time of the person's birth indicating a United States place of birth.

2. If the applicant cannot obtain any of the documents described in subparagraphs (g)(2)(A) through (F) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-216 and (g)1. above, the applicant may request a hearing for the board of registrars to review other evidence of the applicant's United States citizenship. The board of registrars shall schedule a hearing to review such evidence provided by applicants at least once per month and on the last day to verify provisional ballots for any election pursuant to O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-419. The hearing shall be conducted as follows:

(IX) Statement signed by the birth physician or midwife who was in attendance at the time of birth; or

(X) If other forms of documentation cannot be obtained, documentation may be provided at the hearing by written affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, from two citizens, one of whom cannot be related to the person in question, who have specific knowledge of event(s) establishing the applicant's United States citizenship status. The applicant or another knowledgeable individual must also submit an affidavit stating why the documents are not available. Such affidavits are only expected to be used in rare circumstances.

3. The board of registrars may accept legible copies of documents bearing on United States citizenship received via United States Mail, facsimile, electronic mail, personal delivery, or other means.

4. Having a Social Security card or being a member of the United States military is not, in and of itself, sufficient evidence that an individual is a United States citizen.

(3) If an application for registration is completed in person at the board of registrars' office or other registration place and the applicant provides satisfactory evidence of citizenship at that time, the registrar or deputy registrar shall indicate on the voter registration application:

(a) That the person provided satisfactory evidence of citizenship,

(b) The type of evidence of citizenship provided, and

(c) The initials of the registrar or deputy registrar who made the verification.

(4) If an applicant fails to supply satisfactory evidence of citizenship with the application for registration, the board of registrars shall, within 10 days of receipt of the application, notify the applicant of the failure to present satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship as follows:

(a) The board of registrars shall send the notice by nonforwardable, first-class mail to the mailing address listed on the application and shall inform the applicant of the missing information and that the application will be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided to the board of registrars within 30 days following the sending of the notice.

(b) If the applicant does not provide satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the board of registrars within 30 days of the sending of the notice, the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

(c) If the initial application is received prior to the close of voter registration prior to a primary or election and the primary or election occurs within 30 days following the sending of the notice, the applicant may supply satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship on or prior to the date of the election. If the applicant supplies satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship and is found eligible to vote, the applicant shall be added to the list of electors and shall be permitted to vote in the election and any run-off elections resulting therefrom and subsequent elections.

(5) The board of registrars shall not determine the eligibility of an applicant unless and until satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is supplied by the applicant.

(6) United States citizenship question on application for registration.

(a) Regardless of whether an applicant provides satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship, if such applicant fails to answer the question on the application for registration asking, "Are you a citizen of the United States of America?", the registration shall be considered incomplete until the board of registrars obtains a completed application. The registrar shall return a copy of the application by letter sent by nonforwardable, first-class mail and request that the applicant complete the question by answering "Yes" or "No" to the question regarding United States citizenship. For the purpose of voter registration, an appropriate indicator includes marking a check mark in the box, placing "X" in the box, circling the box, shading the box, or any other method involving the "Yes" box that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States.

(b) If the citizenship box is marked "No", the board of registrars shall reject the application and shall immediately notify the applicant of the rejection in writing by nonforwardable, first-class mail at the mailing address listed on the application.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-216, 21-2-226. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of United States Citizenship of Applicants for Voter Registration" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-7  
ELECTION DISTRICTS AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-7-.01**    **Precincts, Changes in Boundaries,  
Notification of Electors**

**183-1-7-.01 Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors. Amended.** When the boundary lines of a precinct are altered, all affected electors shall be notified of the change at least thirty (30) days before the next primary or election. Such notice shall be in writing and mailed to the last known address of the elector by the Registrar or the Election Board.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31(a)(2). **Administrative History.** Original Rule was filed on July 24, 1968; effective August 12, 1966. **Amended:** Filed June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974. **Amended:** Rule repealed and a new Rule entitled "Precincts, Changes in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. Filed March 6, 1987; effective March 26, 1987.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-8  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-8-.01     Calls for Primaries and Elections**

**183-1-8-.01 Calls for Primaries and Elections.** All calls for primaries and elections shall bear the date of first publication in a newspaper of the notice of such call, and all computations of time as required by the Georgia Election Code shall be based upon such date. This provision shall not alter in any manner the publication requirements relative to notice as set forth in said Code.

Authority Georgia Election Code 1964 as amended. **History.** Original Rule was filed on June 24, 1974; effective July 14, 1974.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-10  
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-10-.01    Qualification of Candidates for Office;  
Time Period During Which Bank, Credit  
Union, or Other Financial Institution  
May Certify Error in Returning Check

**183-1-10-.01 Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time  
Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial  
Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check.**

(1) In the event a candidate for federal or state office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the Secretary of State shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the Secretary of State within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

(2) In the event a candidate for county or municipal office pays his or her qualifying fee with a check that is subsequently returned for insufficient funds, the superintendent shall automatically find that such candidate has not met the qualifications for holding the office being sought. A written certification from the bank, credit union, or other financial institution returning the check that it erred in returning the check will prevent such an automatic finding so long as the certification is received by the superintendent within two weeks after the deadline for qualifying.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-5, 21-2-6, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Qualification of Candidates for Office; Time Period During Which Bank, Credit Union, or Other Financial Institution May Certify Error in Returning Check" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1-11  
BALLOTS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-11-.01	Ballot Secrecy	183-1-11-.02	Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot
--------------	----------------	--------------	--

**183-1-11-.01 Ballot Secrecy.** Each Superintendent of Elections shall ensure that handicapped persons casting their vote at the polls are able to do so in private by providing such facilities and equipment as necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-218, 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Secrecy" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.

**183-1-11-.02 Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot.**

(1) A candidate's name on the ballot shall include the candidate's last name shown on the candidate's voter registration records and at least one of: (1) the first name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (2) the middle name shown on the candidate's voter registration records or corresponding initial, (3) an abbreviated name by which the candidate is commonly known in the community, or (4) a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community. Any nickname is subject to Section (2) of this rule.

(2) A candidate's name may include a nickname by which the candidate is commonly known in the community but shall not contain any spurious phrases, title or degree designating the business, fraternal, religious, or professional affiliation of the candidate, or political slogan or message. A title or degree includes, but is not limited to, military or professional title or rank, or references such as "Dr.", "Rev.", "Judge", "Mr.", "Ms.", "Mrs.", or "Miss". A determination as to whether a nickname violates this Rule lies within the sound discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate.

(3) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and

and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

(4) A determination as to whether the candidate's requested name on the ballot complies with this Rule shall be within the discretion of the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate. Upon a determination that the requested name does not comply with this Rule, the Secretary of State or election superintendent, as appropriate shall modify the candidate's name on the ballot so that it complies with this Rule.

Authority O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325.

(5) The total number of spaces, inclusive of letters, spaces, and punctuation, which may be utilized on the ballot for a candidate's name and, if any, nickname, shall be twenty-five (25). Notwithstanding the listing of the candidate's name on the filing papers, spaces, periods, quotation marks, and commas necessary for proper punctuation shall be added by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. No candidate's name shall exceed twenty-five (25) spaces. The Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall determine the correct listing for any candidate whose name exceeds twenty-five (25) spaces to conform to this requirement.

**Cite as Ga. Comp. R. 183-1-11-.02**

Authority O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-31, 21-2-132, 21-2-284, 21-2-284.1, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-287, 21-2-325. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Appearance of Candidate's Name on Ballot" adopted. F. Mar. 3, 2010; eff. Mar. 23, 2010. **Amended:** F. Nov. 10, 2014; eff. Nov. 30, 2014

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-12  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-12-.01	Conduct of Elections	183-1-12-.06	Provisional Ballots
183-1-12-.02	Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment	183-1-12-.07	Preparation of the Electors List and Use of Express Poll
183-1-12-.03	Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified	183-1-12-.08	Repealed
183-1-12-.04	Certification of Program Instructions	183-1-12-.09	Repealed
183-1-12-.05	Repealed	183-1-12-.10	Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible

**183-1-12-.01 Conduct of Elections.** Beginning with the November 2002 General Election, all federal, state, and county general primaries and elections, special primaries and elections, and referendums in the State of Georgia shall be conducted at the polls through the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units supplied by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. In addition, absentee balloting shall be conducted through the use of optical scan ballots which shall be tabulated on optical scan vote tabulation systems furnished by the Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State; provided, however, that the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting units is authorized by the Secretary of State for persons desiring to vote by absentee ballot in person.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted, F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Conduct of Elections" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**183-1-12-.02 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule, the term:

(a) "Assist", "assisted", "assisting", or "assistance" means the act of marking a voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot on behalf of a voter who is unable to read the English language or has a disability which renders him or her unable to see or mark the voter registration application, application for absentee ballot, or ballot or operate the voting equipment, or to enter the voting compartment or booth unaccompanied, in the manner personally

requested and communicated by such voter. This definition will apply equally to Code Sections 21-2-322, 21-2-365, 21-2-379.1, 21-2-384, 21-2-385, 21-2-385.1, 21-2-400, 21-2-402, 21-2-409, 21-2-409.1, 21-2-413, 21-2-456, 21-2-500, 21-2-568, 21-2-579, 21-2-587, 21-2-590, 21-2-592.

(b) “Ballot” shall mean the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff for each county or municipality.

(c) “Ballot Encoder Device” shall mean the electronic device by which the poll officers program the voter access card to authorize the voter to vote on the DRE units.

(d) “Ballot Style” shall mean the presentation of the offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters at a primary, election, or runoff on a DRE unit that contains only the offices and questions for the voters of specified districts within the precinct.

(e) “Counter” shall mean the registers on each DRE unit which increment by one each time a vote is cast on the unit. The “election counter” is the register which is reset for each election and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit in a particular election. The “system counter” is the register which cannot be reset and records the number of ballots voted on a DRE unit over the course of the life of the unit.

(f) “DRE unit” shall mean a direct recording electronic voting device which is a computer driven unit for casting and counting votes on which a voter casts his or her votes through the use of a touch screen or VWD device. The term shall include both state supplied devices and devices purchased by counties.

(g) “Early voting period” shall mean that period of time preceding a primary or election in which the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to all eligible applicants.

(h) “Enclosed space” shall mean that area within a polling place enclosed with a guardrail or barrier closing the inner portion of such area so that only such persons as are inside such guardrail or barrier can approach within six feet of the ballot box, voting compartments,

voting booths, or voting machines.

(i) “Memory Card” shall mean the electronic card (PCMCIA card) on which the ballot styles for a particular precinct are electronically stored and which is inserted into the direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE) to program the DRE unit for voting and on which vote totals are recorded for the DRE unit during the voting process.

(j) “Opening of the Polls” shall mean the commencement of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff. Opening of the polls does not refer to the unlocking or opening of the doors of the polling place. Similarly, the term “Closing of the Polls” shall mean the cessation of voting in a particular primary, election, or runoff and not the locking or closing of the doors of the polling place.

(k) “Supervisor’s Card” shall mean the electronic card to be used by the poll manager which is inserted into the DRE unit in order to configure the DRE unit for voting, to test the DRE unit, to terminate or suspend voting on the DRE unit, or to access other utility functions on the DRE unit.

(l) “Voter Access Card” shall mean the electronic card issued to a voter which is inserted into a DRE unit to authorize the voter to cast a ballot on the DRE unit.

(m) “VWD Device” is a device for use by illiterate and/or visually impaired voters in voting on a DRE unit and consists of an audio headset and a keypad by which the ballot can be provided to the voter aurally and the voter can cast his or her vote by use of the keypad.

(n) “Zero Tape” shall mean a tape printed out by the DRE unit which shows that all vote registers in the DRE unit for recording votes for candidates and questions are set to zero and that no votes are present on the unit.

## (2) Receipt, Maintenance, and Storage.

(a) Acceptance tests. Upon the receipt of each new direct recording electronic voting unit (DRE), the election superintendent of the county is responsible to ensure that an acceptance test is performed on the device in accordance with standards issued by the Secretary of State. No DRE unit shall be accepted by the county or placed into service

until such time as the unit satisfactorily passes the prescribed acceptance tests.

(b) Storage of DRE units.

1. The election superintendent of the county shall maintain the DRE units in accordance with the requirements of this rule, the directives of the Secretary of State, and the specifications and requirements of the manufacturer.

2. The DRE units shall be stored in a climate controlled space in which the temperature and humidity levels are maintained at acceptable levels year-round which shall not be lower than 5 degrees Celsius (41 degrees Fahrenheit) nor higher than 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) and not lower than 35 percent relative humidity and not higher than 85 percent relative humidity such that no condensation forms on such units. The units shall not be stored in an area in which liquids or fluids stand, pool, or accumulate at any time or in areas that are subject to such standing, pooling, or accumulating liquids or fluids. The space in which the units are stored shall be secured and shall be accessible only to persons authorized by the election superintendent to have access to such units or such space. The DRE units may be stacked atop each other but no more than five units may be in a stack unless a rack system has been constructed for the storage of the units. The election superintendent shall ensure that the batteries in each unit are charged at least quarterly in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications.

3. The storage areas for DRE units shall be equipped with one or more of the following forms of electronic surveillance and protection: keypads or electronic locks, motion detectors, video surveillance, or a security system that is connected to an outside monitoring source, such as the police department or fire department. In lieu of providing electronic surveillance and protection, the DRE units may be interlocked through the use of a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

4. The election superintendent shall maintain numbered seals on all DRE units in storage and all seal, numbers shall be recorded and on file in the office of the election superintendent.



5. Upon delivery to a polling place in preparation for a primary, election, or runoff, the DRE units shall be secured and protected from unauthorized access by storing the DRE units in a locked and secure room at the polling place, having the person taking possession of the units personally supervise the units at all times prior to the opening of the polls, or by interlocking the DRE units with a cable or chain that is secured by a padlock or other type of locking system.

6. The expenses for the implementation of the storage and security requirements of this rule shall be the responsibility of the county or municipal governing authority, as applicable, unless such security features are provided by the state.

(c) Software security. The software contained in each DRE unit, regardless of whether the unit is owned by the county or the state, and the software used to program the unit and to tabulate and consolidate election results shall not be modified, upgraded, or changed in any way without the specific approval of the Secretary of State. No other software shall be loaded onto or maintained or used on computers on which the GEMS software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.

(d) Maintenance of DRE units. After the end of the initial warranty period for state owned DRE units and computers for use in programming the DRE units and tabulating and consolidating the vote totals, the county shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of such devices, including the repair and/or replacement of any devices which are destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered incapable of use in elections.

(e) Access to GEMS servers.

1. The room in which the GEMS server is located shall be locked at all times when the server is not directly under the supervision of the election superintendent or the election superintendent's designee. Lock and key access to the room where the GEMS server is located shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have

access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the room in which the GEMS server is located. Emergency personnel shall have access to the room in which the GEMS server is located only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition.

2. The GEMS server shall remain locked at all times when not in use. The key or keys to the GEMS server shall remain in the possession of the election superintendent or the designee of the election superintendent at all times.

(f) Security of DRE units and accessories. All DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders shall be stored under lock and key at all times when not in use. Lock and key access to such items shall be limited to the county election superintendent; members of the county board of elections; the election supervisor, if any; personnel of the county election superintendent's office designated by the county election superintendent; building maintenance personnel; and emergency personnel. Building maintenance personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only to the extent necessary to carry out their maintenance duties. The election superintendent shall maintain on file at all times in the office of the election superintendent a complete and up to date list of all maintenance personnel with access to the area in which such items are stored. Emergency personnel shall have access to the area where such items are stored only as necessary in the event of an emergency and only for the duration of such emergency condition. Whenever maintenance or emergency personnel are required to enter the storage area, the election superintendent must be notified of that entry within 24 hours and the election superintendent must maintain a log of those persons who entered the storage area.

(g) Voting system handling requirements.

1. All personnel, with the exception of the permanent employees of the Office of the Secretary of State and permanent employees of the county or municipal election superintendent, who prepare voting

equipment for use in a primary, election, or runoff shall complete an oath of custodian before each election. One copy of the oath shall be placed on file in the office of the election superintendent and an additional copy shall be filed with the records for the election filed with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate. The oath of custodian shall be in the following form:

STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY/MUNICIPALITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
OATH OF CUSTODIANS AND DEPUTY CUSTODIANS  
OF DRE UNITS

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do swear (or affirm) that I will as a (deputy) custodian of the voting systems for the County/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_, faithfully perform all of my duties in accordance with state law; that I will prepare in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations governing the use of the voting system all DRE units to be used in primaries, elections, and runoffs in this county/municipality; that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying out my duties while preparing the DRE units for use in primaries, elections, and runoffs; and that I am not disqualified by law to hold the position of (deputy) custodian.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Deputy) Custodian

Administered by, sworn to,  
and subscribed before me,  
this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Superintendent

(Required by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-379.6(b))

2. All DRE units and accessories that are removed from storage for educational or training purposes must be signed in and out on an equipment log maintained by the election superintendent. The log shall contain, at a minimum, a description of the item being checked out, including any serial number or identifying number; the date and time when the item is checked out; the name of the person checking out the item; and the date and time when the item is returned to

storage. The items checked out of storage shall remain in the custody and control of the person checking out the items at all times and the person checking out the items shall personally return such items. Each person who utilizes equipment for educational or training purposes must be adequately trained in the use of the equipment prior to the release of the equipment into such person's custody.

3. The GEMS server shall not be moved or relocated for educational or training purposes. Should it become necessary to relocate the GEMS server or any of its components from one facility to another, the election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State in writing of the reason for the relocation and the proposed new location. Under no circumstances shall the GEMS server or any of its components be relocated unless and until written authorization for the relocation is received from the Secretary of State except in the event of an emergency situation beyond the control of the election superintendent.

4. The poll manager shall sign a receipt for all supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, and DRE unit keys assigned to such poll manager's precinct. Upon returning election supplies to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the poll manager shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

5. All supervisor cards, encoders, voter access cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, and other equipment assigned to designated county election technicians shall be accounted for on the night of a primary, election, or runoff and shall be returned to storage. Each technician shall sign a receipt for all such items issued to such technician and, upon returning such items to the election superintendent's office following the close of the polls, the technician shall account for all such items and shall certify that all such items have been returned or shall describe any missing items and explain why such items have not been returned. The Secretary of State shall prepare and provide a chain of custody sheet for this purpose.

6. The election superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State of

any instances of unaccounted for DRE units, optical scanner devices, voter access cards, supervisor cards, memory cards, DRE unit keys, voting system software, and encoders at the completion of certification by delivering such notification to the Secretary of State when the certified election results are delivered to the Secretary of State.

(3) Preparation for Elections.

(a) Ballots.

1. The election superintendent shall cause the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be used in each precinct to be prepared in accordance with law and applicable rules and regulations.

2. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct for which it is programmed for use. The election superintendent shall ensure that each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be programmed and tested to ensure that the proper ballot style or styles for the precinct for which it is programmed are included on the card and no other ballot styles.

3. Each ballot and ballot style shall be proofread by the election superintendent or a person or persons under the direction of the superintendent to ensure that the ballot contains the proper offices, candidates, and questions to be submitted to the voters, that the offices and names are spelled and designated correctly, that political party or body affiliations and incumbency of candidates are correctly designated where applicable, and that the questions are presented in accordance with law and this rule and that the correct offices and questions are presented on each ballot style.

4. For each office on the ballot, the ballot shall state the name of the office; the post, position, or person presently holding the office if necessary to identify the specific office subject to election; the number of candidates for which the voter may vote for such office; the names of the candidates; the residence address of the candidates if there has been a determination that the names are sufficiently similar to so require such information under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.5; in partisan elections, the name of the political party or body that nominated the candidate or a designation of the candidate as an independent candidate; and the designation of the incumbency of a candidate seeking reelection to the office which the candidate then holds.

5. The offices, candidates, and questions shall be listed on the ballot in the order specified in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-379.4 and 21-2-379.5.

6. The ballot shall be displayed in the following fonts:

(i) The words “Official Ballot” shall be displayed in 16 point Arial Bold.

(ii) All text beneath the words “Official Ballot” which designate the county or municipality conducting the election, precinct, type of election, and date of the election shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(iii) The words “I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.” shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Italicized.

(iv) The name of the office shall be displayed in 12 point Arial Bold.

(v) Information on the designation of the office (“To succeed \_\_\_\_\_”) and the number of candidates for which an elector may vote for each office shall be displayed in 10 point Arial.

(vi) The names of candidates shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold in all capital letters.

(vii) Incumbency designations shall be displayed in 8 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(viii) Political party or body and independent designations shall be displayed in 9 point Arial Narrow.

(ix) The text of questions to be submitted to the electors shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

(x) The choices for voting on a question (i.e., “YES” and “NO”) shall be displayed in 10 point Arial Narrow Bold.

7. The ballot shall be displayed in the following colors:

(i) All text, designations, and names shall be displayed in black letters.

(ii) The background colors shall be as follows:

(I) The overall page shall be blue (Hue: 180, Sat: 240, Lum: 60, Red: 64, Green: 0, Blue: 128).

(II) The general election header shall be yellow (Hue: 40, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(III) The Democratic Party Primary header shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(IV) The Republican Party Primary header shall be light blue (Hue: 120, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 0, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

(V) The nonpartisan election header shall be light green (Hue: 60, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 128, Green: 255, Blue: 0).

(VI) The box containing the contest or question to be voted upon shall be burnt orange (Hue: 20, Sat: 240, Lum: 120, Red: 255, Green: 128, Blue: 0).

(VII) The box containing the names of the candidates or the answers or responses to a referendum question for which an elector may vote shall be white (Hue: 160, Sat: 0, Lum: 240, Red: 255, Green: 255, Blue: 255).

8. In addition to the displayed ballot, the election superintendent shall cause an audio ballot to be prepared for use with the VWD devices. The superintendent shall ensure that all matters are recorded correctly and that the names of the candidates are pronounced correctly in the audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that no candidate's name; political party, political body, or independent designation; incumbency; or other such information nor any referendum question or answer or response thereto is emphasized, stressed, or otherwise inflected in any manner to distinguish a particular candidate, party or body, question, answer or response to a referendum question either negatively or positively or to suggest whether to vote for or against such candidates or questions in such

audio recordings. The election superintendent shall also ensure that the audio recordings are presented at a rate not to exceed 130 words per minute or 2.2 words per second on average and at a volume which shall not be less than 75 decibels nor more than 85 decibels.

(b) Setup and Testing.

1. Primaries and Elections.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary or election, including special primaries, special elections, and referendum elections, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use on Election Day. On or before the third day preceding the early voting period, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use during the early voting period. At least five days prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary or election will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.



In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations, that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE unit from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers of the DRE units from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used

to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the DRE units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary or election, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the DRE unit shall have an internal logic and accuracy test performed using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary or election for which the unit is being prepared. If the DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in a primary or election until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated vote totals for the primary or election and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken.

(iii) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such

records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iv) After being prepared for voting, each DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

## 2. Primary Runoffs and Election Runoffs.

(i) On or before the third day preceding a primary runoff or election runoff, including special primary runoffs and special election runoffs, the election superintendent shall commence the preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the primary runoff or election runoff. At least 24 hours prior to the commencement of such preparation and testing, the election superintendent shall publish a notice in the legal organ of the county stating the date, time, and place or places where preparation and testing of the DRE units for use in the runoff will commence and stating that such preparation shall continue from day to day until such preparation is complete and that such preparation and testing shall be open to the public and that members of the public are entitled to be present during the preparation and testing of the DRE units. The election superintendent shall cause such preparation and testing to begin on such date and time and at such place or places. Such preparation and testing shall be open to members of the public to observe; however, such members of the public shall not in any manner interfere with the preparation and testing of the DRE units. Any person found to be interfering with the preparation and testing process may be asked to leave the preparation and testing process and may be cited for interfering with an election official while in performance of election duties. Any questions and/or complaints from the general public regarding the preparation and testing process must be directed to the election superintendent and not to the individual personnel conducting the preparation and testing process. The election superintendent may make such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of such members of the public observing such preparation and testing as the election superintendent deems necessary and appropriate; provided, however, that such rules and regulations shall not prevent members of the public from fairly observing the preparation and testing of the DRE units.

In addition to any reasonable rules and regulations that the election superintendent may create for the public to observe the preparation and testing process, the election superintendent or designee thereof, shall:

During the first day of preparation and testing, at the beginning of the day or for the first hour of public observation be available to explain the preparation and testing process and to respond to questions and provide answers regarding the purpose and the process of preparation and testing;

(b) maintain a presence at all times during the preparation and testing process if an outside source is conducting the preparation and testing process;

(c) administer an oath of custodian prior to beginning the preparation and testing process to any county personnel (except permanent state, county, or municipal election staff) appointed by the election superintendent to conduct the preparation and testing process;

(d) establish an area reasonable in proximity for the public to observe the preparation and testing process. Such area shall provide reasonable accommodations for the public insofar as space permits, but shall not be so established as to deny the general public the opportunity to view the process; however the area should not be of such a nature so as to allow the preparation and testing process to be interfered with by the general public;

(e) allow only election office personnel or individuals assigned to conduct the preparation and testing to enter the preparation and testing area during the preparation and testing process;

(f) prohibit any preparation and testing reports created for recording the seal numbers and/or serial numbers of the DRE units from being photocopied for public disclosure;

(g) prohibit the security seals and serial numbers from being photographed or copied for public disclosure;

(h) prohibit photographic and audio equipment, of any kind, including cell phone cameras from being used to record the serial

numbers of the DRE units or to record the security seal numbers used to secure the DRE units, provided that this rule shall not prohibit the news media from reporting on the preparation and testing process, so long as seal numbers and serial numbers on the voting units are not recorded or displayed in any manner;

(ii) During the public preparation and testing of the DRE units to be used in a particular primary runoff or election runoff, the election superintendent shall cause each DRE unit to be programmed with the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the precinct at which the DRE unit will be used. After placing the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the DRE unit, the DRE unit shall have such internal diagnostic tests performed as shall be directed by the Secretary of State and the election superintendent. Following the completion of the diagnostic tests, the superintendent shall cause a number of random DRE units as provided by law to undergo an internal logic and accuracy test using the memory card (PCMCIA card) for the primary runoff or election runoff for which the unit is being prepared. If a DRE unit fails any of the diagnostic or logic and accuracy tests, the unit shall not be used in any primary, election, or runoff until such unit is repaired and inspected and found capable of proper functioning and passes the diagnostic and logic and accuracy tests. Upon the successful completion of the logic and accuracy test, the DRE unit shall be cleared of any accumulated test vote totals for the primary runoff or election runoff and a zero tape run to verify that the vote registers in the unit are set at zero. After verifying that the vote registers are set at zero, the tape shall be attached to the custodian's certification form to document the logic and accuracy testing and the unit shall be configured for voting. The unit shall then be securely closed in its case and a numbered seal placed on its case such that the case may not be opened until and unless the seal is broken. The custodian's certification shall be retained with the records for such primary runoff or election runoff and shall be stored with such records with the clerk of superior court or municipal clerk, as appropriate, for the same period of time as required by law for other election records.

(iii) All memory cards to be used in the runoff shall be tested.

(iv) The election superintendent or the custodian responsible for preparing the DRE units, if one has been appointed by the election superintendent in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6(b), shall

make a certification stating for each DRE unit the serial number of the DRE unit, the number on the system counter of the DRE unit, the number on the seal with which the DRE unit is sealed, and that the election counter and each vote register on the unit was set at zero. The case shall be appropriately labeled with the name of the precinct in which the unit is to be used and the serial number of the DRE unit.

(v) After being prepared for voting, each sealed DRE unit shall be safely and securely stored until such time as the unit is transported to the precinct in which such unit is to be used.

(c) Transport to Polls.

1. The election superintendent shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the DRE units are safely and securely transported to the polling places.

2. The election superintendent shall cause the DRE units for each precinct to be delivered to the polling place for the precinct at least one hour before the time for the opening of the polls.

3. If the DRE units are stored at a polling place after being configured for voting and sealed, the election superintendent shall ensure that the units are stored in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

4. The election superintendent shall deliver the supervisor's card, a sufficient quantity of voter access cards, and the key to the DRE units to the chief manager not later than one hour before the time set for the opening of the polls and shall obtain a receipt for the cards and key. The supervisor's card shall be sealed in an envelope and shall not be opened until the polls are closed unless all of the ballot encoding devices at the precinct fail and it is necessary to use the supervisor's card to configure a DRE unit to encode the voter access cards at the precinct. In such cases, the use of the supervisor's card before the close of the polls shall be documented in the records for the election at that precinct. In addition, the superintendent shall deliver on the appropriate form a listing containing the serial number of each DRE unit, and the number of the seal placed on each such unit.

(d) Before the Opening of the Polls.

1. The poll officers shall set up the DRE units for voting prior to the opening of the polls. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the election superintendent may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the poll officers.

2. The poll officers shall verify that the seal for each unit is intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The poll officers shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

3. Each DRE unit shall be set up and its power turned on and the privacy screens for the unit erected and its screen lifted into place.

4. The poll manager shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the opening of the polls. The poll manager, along with the other assistant managers, shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

5. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the poll manager shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The poll manager shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is

resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the poll manager.

6. The poll officers shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths.

7. The poll officers shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth and shall place at least two printed sample ballots and at least two voting instructions posters approved or provided by the Secretary of State outside the enclosed space at the polling place for the information of the voters. Prior to voters entering the enclosed space, the poll officers may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State.

#### (4) Conducting Elections.

(a) As each voter presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, each voter shall be offered instruction by a poll officer in the method of voting on the DRE units. In providing such instruction, the poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(b) When a person presents himself or herself at the polling place for the purpose of voting during the time during which the polls are open for voting, the person shall complete a voter's certificate and submit it to the poll officers. The poll officers shall then verify the identity of the person and that the person is a registered voter of the precinct and, if so, shall approve the voter's certificate and enter an appropriate designation on the electors list for the precinct reflecting that the voter has voted in the primary, election, or runoff being conducted. The voter's name shall then be entered on the appropriate numbered list of voters. The poll manager or the poll officer who has been designated by the poll manager to issue voter access cards shall then use the ballot encoder device to encode and issue the voter an appropriate voter access card authorizing the voter to vote the correct ballot style in the DRE units at the polling place. Upon a DRE unit being available, the voter shall then enter the enclosed space in the



polling place and insert the voter access card into an available DRE unit and proceed to vote his or her choices. Upon completion of voting, the voter shall press the “cast ballot” button, remove the voter access card from the DRE unit, and return the card to a poll officer.

Then the voter shall exit the enclosed area of the polling place.

(c) At least once each hour during the time while the polls are open, the poll officers shall examine the face of each DRE unit and each voting booth to verify and ensure that no unauthorized matter has been affixed to the unit or placed in the voting booth and that the unit has not been tampered with in any manner.

(d) The polling place shall be so arranged in such a manner as to ensure the privacy of the elector while voting on a DRE unit, to allow monitoring of each DRE unit by the poll officers while the polls are open, and to permit the public to observe the voting without affecting the privacy of the electors as they vote. In addition, at least one DRE unit shall be configured for voting by physically disabled voters in wheelchairs and provisions shall be made to ensure the privacy of such electors while voting.

(e) It shall be permissible under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-410 and shall not constitute assistance in voting under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409 for poll officers to assist a voter in inserting the voter card in the DRE unit and in explaining the operation of the unit to the voter; provided that the poll officer withdraws from the voting booth prior to the voter pressing the “start” button or beginning voting. The poll officers shall not in any manner request, suggest, or seek to persuade or induce any voter to vote any particular ticket or for any particular candidate or for or against any particular question.

(f) Voters utilizing a VWD device to vote on the DRE units without the assistance of any other individual shall not be considered as receiving assistance in voting and shall not be required to complete the forms required for receiving assistance in voting pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409.

(g) The poll officers shall ensure that voters return the voter access cards to the poll officials prior to leaving the enclosed space in the polling place. The poll officers shall arrange and configure the polling

place and provide staffing at such places at the polling place to ensure that a voter will not leave the polling place with a voter access card.

(h) If a voter leaves a DRE unit prior to completing the process of voting and exits the polling place and does not return to the unit to complete the voting process, the poll officers shall cancel or void the vote on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter voted and shall make a notation of the incident in the election records for the precinct.

(i) A voter may request information from the poll officers concerning how to vote on the DRE unit at any time during the voting process; provided, however, that the poll officers shall not observe or view the voter's ballot on the DRE unit or make any attempt to see how the voter has voted. However, once the voter casts his or her ballot, even if the ballot is blank with no votes cast, such voter shall be deemed to have voted and may not thereafter vote again in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(j) If a voter discovers that the ballot presented on the DRE unit is not correct or is not the ballot that the voter desired to vote, the voter shall immediately notify a poll officer. The poll officer shall cancel or void the ballot on the DRE unit without attempting in any manner to see how the voter has voted and shall then take the necessary steps to provide the voter with the correct ballot by encoding and issuing a new voter access card to the voter and making any necessary corrections to the voter's certificate of the voter, the electors list, and the numbered list of voters. If the voter presses the "cast ballot" button prior to notifying the poll officials of the error in the ballot, the voter shall be deemed to have voted and shall not be permitted to cast another ballot in the same primary, election, or runoff on that election day.

(k) If a DRE unit malfunctions during the day of a primary, election, or runoff, the poll manager shall immediately notify the election superintendent and shall not allow any voter to use the unit until and unless the malfunction is corrected. The election superintendent shall immediately arrange for the repair of the DRE unit or shall provide a replacement DRE unit as soon as practicable to replace the malfunctioning unit. A replacement DRE unit shall not be used as a replacement unit unless it has been appropriately tested prior to its use.

(5) Tabulating Results.

(a) After the Polls Close.

1. Immediately after the polls close and the last voter has voted, poll manager shall open the envelope containing the supervisor's card and use the supervisor's card to close each of the DRE units in the precinct against further voting.

2. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting as shown by the number of voters certificates, the number of persons marked on the electors list, the number of voters on the numbered list of voters, and the number of persons shown as voting on the election counters of the DRE units. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency; correct the inconsistency, if possible; and fully document the inconsistency or problem along with any corrective measures taken before going further.

3. After completing the comparison of the total number of persons voting as shown by the electors list, the voter's certificates, the numbered list of voters, and the election counters of the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of two tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and at least one assistant manager shall also compare the number of ballots voted as shown on the tape with the number of ballots voted as shown on the election counter of the DRE unit. If these numbers are not identical, the poll manager shall document the discrepancy. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes.

4. If directed by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall designate one of the DRE units as the accumulator unit to accumulate the votes for the precinct. After printing all of the tapes for the individual DRE units, the poll manager shall accumulate the totals for the accumulator DRE unit and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) from the accumulator DRE unit. The poll manager shall then collect and retain the two signed tapes (one of which shall include the zero tape) with the memory card (PCMCIA card) from each

DRE unit and shall place the memory card (PCMCIA card) in the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. The poll manager shall then begin removing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from the remaining DRE units one by one and inserting the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) into the accumulator DRE unit and accumulating the vote totals from the other DRE units into the accumulator DRE unit. Upon the vote totals for each memory card (PCMCIA card) being entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the memory card (PCMCIA card) shall be removed from the accumulator DRE unit and two signed tapes (one of which shall contain the zero tape) shall be collected and retained with the card. Each memory card (PCMCIA card) shall then be placed into the appropriate envelope provided by the election superintendent. After the results from the last memory card (PCMCIA card) are entered into the accumulator DRE unit and the last memory card (PCMCIA card) has been placed in the envelope, the envelope containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and tapes shall be sealed and secured by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager in an envelope container provided by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and the two assistant managers such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

5. After all of the results have been entered into the accumulator DRE unit, the poll manager shall cause a minimum of three tapes to be printed out by the DRE unit showing the total votes cast for the precinct. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One tape shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet for the precinct. The other tapes shall be placed into the envelope provided by the election superintendent for that purpose and sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager.

6. If the election superintendent does not direct that the results of the precinct be accumulated, then the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print an additional results tape which shall be verified and signed in the same manner as provided in paragraph 3 of this subparagraph. Such additional results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the polling place for the information of the public along with a copy of the provisional ballot recap sheet or the

precinct. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal.

7. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The number of each seal shall be entered on the appropriate form along with the serial number of the DRE unit case in which it is inserted. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control.

8. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, electors lists, numbered lists of voters, voter certificates, recap sheets, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(b) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office.

1. After accumulating all of the vote totals for the precinct, if directed to do so by the election superintendent, the poll manager shall connect the accumulator DRE unit to an analog telephone line and electronically transmit the accumulated vote totals for the precinct to the central office. The DRE unit shall not be connected to a telephone line during the time while the polls are open.

2. Vote totals reported electronically from the precinct to the central office shall be unofficial and shall not be used in preparing the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

(c) Consolidation of Results.

1. All persons involved with the tabulation and consolidation of the election results and who will operate the computer programs or handle the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sworn before entering into their duties.

2. No persons except those persons who are employed by the election superintendent and who have been duly sworn shall perform any duties in connection with the tabulation or consolidation of election results. No persons who are not employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall touch or be in contact with any container, returns, tapes, device, memory card (PCMCIA card), or any other such election materials. Only persons who are employed by the election superintendent and have been duly sworn shall be in the immediate area of the tabulating center designated by the superintendent for the officers to conduct the tabulation and consolidation of the election results.

3. The tabulation and consolidation shall be performed in public. However, the election superintendent may make reasonable rules and regulations for conduct at the tabulating center to ensure the security of the results and the returns and to avoid interference with the tabulating center personnel.

4. Upon the delivery of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) from each precinct, the election superintendent or his or her designee shall provide a receipt to the poll manager for the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and precinct election materials.

5. Upon receiving the memory cards (PCMCIA cards), the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the sealed envelopes and verify that the seals are intact, that the envelopes have not been opened, and that there is no evidence of tampering with the envelopes or their contents.

6. In the case of elections for county, state, and federal office, after verifying that the envelopes are properly sealed and have not been opened or tampered with, the election superintendent shall break the seal and open each envelope and remove the memory card (PCMCIA card) and results tapes. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall then insert the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system computer and transfer the vote totals from the memory card (PCMCIA card) into the election management system for official tabulation and consolidation.

7. After transferring all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to the election management system and

consolidating such totals with the totals from the absentee ballot system and such votes from any provisional ballots which have been found by the registrars to be authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419, the election superintendent shall prepare the official consolidated returns for the primary, election, or runoff.

8. The election superintendent shall not list and certify in the official consolidated returns for an election any results for write in candidates who were not properly qualified under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133.

9. In the case of primaries, elections, and runoffs for county, state, and federal office, the county election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State the election returns by precinct for the county in electronic format or by electronic means, as may be specified by the Secretary of State, within seven days following a primary, election, or runoff.

(d) Electronic Transmission of Precinct Results to Central Office. The election superintendent shall transmit to the Secretary of State unofficial election results for all races for state offices in any primary, election, or runoff as soon as possible after the closing of the polls for such primary, election, or runoff. Such results shall be transmitted in a format prescribed by the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the results shall be transmitted upon one third of the precincts reporting results, upon two thirds of the precincts reporting results, and upon all precincts reporting results, including absentee ballots within all precincts. Except upon notice to and consultation with the Secretary of State, no election superintendent shall conclude the tabulation of votes on election night in any primary, election, or runoff in which there are contested races for federal and state offices until and unless all such unofficial results, including absentee ballots, have been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

#### (6) Storage of Returns.

(a) After tabulating and consolidating the results, the election superintendent shall prepare a CD-ROM which shall contain a copy of the information contained on each memory card (PCMCIA card) which shall include all ballot images as well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election management system.

(b) The CD-ROM shall be placed in a sealed envelope and shall become a part of the election materials which shall be deposited with the clerk of superior court or the municipal clerk, as appropriate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-500. In addition, the signed results tape from each DRE unit containing the signed zero tape shall also be deposited with the clerk of superior court.

(c) The memory cards (PCMCIA cards) shall be sealed in an appropriate container and securely maintained by the election superintendent until the period for requesting a recount of the primary, election, or run off results has expired. The election superintendent and at least one other sworn individual in the tabulating center shall seal the container and sign the seal such that the container cannot be opened without destroying or damaging the seal. Upon the expiration of the period for requesting a recount, the election superintendent may use the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for programming DRE units for the next primary, election, or runoff.

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

#### (7) Recounts and Recanvass.

(a) The election superintendent shall, either of his or her own motion, or upon petition of any candidate or political party or three electors of the county or municipality, as may be the case, order a recanvass of all the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for a particular precinct or precincts for one or more offices in which it shall appear that a discrepancy or error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been made. Such recanvass may be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the election superintendent and shall be conducted under the direction of the election superintendent. Before making such recanvass, the election superintendent shall give notice in writing to each candidate and to the county chairperson of each party or body affected by the recanvass. Each such candidate may be present in person or by representative and each such political party or body may send two



representatives to be present at such recanvass. If upon such recanvass, it shall appear that the original vote count was incorrect, such returns and all papers being prepared by the election superintendent shall be corrected accordingly.

(b) The election superintendent shall conduct the recanvass by breaking the seal, if the ballots cards have been sealed, on the container containing the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) and removing those memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted. The election superintendent shall then cause the vote totals on each of the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) to be transferred to either an accumulator DRE unit or to the election management system computer. After all of the vote totals from the memory cards (PCMCIA cards) for the precinct or precincts for which the recanvass is being conducted have been entered, the election superintendent shall cause a printout to be made of the results and shall compare the results to the results previously obtained. If an error is found, the election superintendent shall correct the error in the returns accordingly.

(c) Recounts pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-495(c) shall be conducted in the same manner as other recounts under these rules.

(8) Maintenance of Equipment.

(a) Each county shall be responsible for maintaining the DRE units, computers, and software provided to such county by the Secretary of State or purchased by such county and shall either purchase a maintenance agreement for such equipment and software or shall self insure such equipment and software.

(b) In the event of any malfunction or problem with DRE units, the county election superintendent shall document the problem and its resolution and shall provide such information to the Secretary of State. The documentation shall include a detailed description of the malfunction or problem, the steps taken to correct the malfunction or problem, and the cause of such malfunction or problem if a cause can be determined.

(9) Use of Equipment by Municipalities. The county election superintendent is authorized to permit any municipality within the county to conduct its election with the DRE equipment through a written intergovernmental agreement between the county and the municipality; provided that the municipality agrees to maintain and operate the equipment in accordance with law, these rules and regulations, and the manufacturer's guidelines and specifications and provided further that the municipality trains all of its election personnel and poll workers in the proper operation and conduct of elections utilizing such equipment through a training program conducted by or approved by the Secretary of State.

(10) Sample Ballots. DRE units that are used for demonstration and education purposes shall not utilize or be programmed with the official ballot to be used in the primary or election for demonstrational or educational purposes. The units shall utilize or be programmed with a ballot containing the names of fictitious or historical persons whose names do not appear on the official ballot for such primary or election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Direct Recording Electronic Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 2002; eff. Sept. 19, 2002. **Amended:** F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004. **Amended:** ER. 183-1-12-0.4-.02 adopted. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** F. Dec. 28, 2005; eff. Jan. 17, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

**183-1-12-.03 Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified.** All tabulating center personnel must be trained in their respective duties and certified as required, by O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-99 for poll officers. All programmers, operators, and data center personnel shall be sworn as provided in O.C.G.A. Sections 21-2-94 and 21-2-95 for poll officers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-.04 Certification of Program Instructions.** During the official computer certification, all program test decks, program instructions, and print-out sheets become property of the superintendent. All program instructions must be certified by the programmers who programmed them, and such instructions shall be kept with the test decks and filed with the Clerk of the Superior Court following consolidation and certification of the election returns.

Authority Ga. Election Code 1964. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968.

### **183-1-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-.06 Provisional Ballots.**

(1) This rule shall govern the casting of provisional ballots by voters at primaries and elections in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418 and 21-2-419.

(2) In each polling place, there shall be established a location or station in the public area of the polling place for the purpose of issuing and receiving provisional ballots.

(3) The election superintendent shall provide each polling place with an adequate supply of provisional ballots in each ballot style (district combination) for the precinct and an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. The ballot envelopes shall be so designed that the ballot will fit within the inner ballot envelope and the inner ballot envelope will fit within the outer ballot envelope. The inner ballot envelope shall have printed on it the words "Official Provisional Ballot" and nothing else. The outer envelope shall have places for inserting the person's name, precinct, date and name of election, ballot style (district combination), and whether such ballot is a regular provisional ballot, a provisional ballot cast by a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417, or a ballot cast during poll hours extended by a court order, or a combination thereof. Primaries and elections conducted by counties shall use optical scan ballots for provisional voting. Optical scan absentee ballots shall be acceptable for use as provisional ballots. Municipalities shall use the same type of ballots as the municipality uses for mail-in absentee voting. The election superintendent shall also provide a booth for voting provisional ballots in the enclosed space which will provide privacy for a person while voting a provisional ballot and a secure container in which the voted provisional ballots shall be placed.

(4) Voters whose names do not appear on electors list.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but the person's name does not appear on the official electors list for the precinct, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, if a master list of registered electors is available, the poll workers shall check the list to determine if the person is registered at a different precinct. If the person's name appears on the master list for a different precinct, the poll workers shall direct the person to the correct precinct.

(b) If the person's name is not found on the official list of electors for the precinct or the master list, if available, the poll officers shall immediately contact the registrars and the person shall provide such information as the registrars may request to determine if the person is eligible to vote in the election. The registrars shall promptly review the information provided by the person and shall attempt to determine if the person timely and properly registered to vote.

(c) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election and should be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to add the person's name to the official electors list for the precinct and shall permit the person to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct vote. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon presentation of a properly completed voter's certificate and the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other voters in the precinct.

(d) If the registrars can immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election but should be assigned to a different precinct from the one at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate other precinct and the registrars shall

notify the officers of such other precinct to add the person's name to the official electors list for such other precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers at such other precinct which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. The person's name shall then be added to the official electors list for the other precinct by the poll officers of the other precinct with a notation of the name of the registrar who authorized such addition. Upon the completion of a voter's certificate and the submission of the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, the person shall be permitted to vote in the same manner as other persons in such other precinct. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct in which the person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(e) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if properly registered, would be assigned to the precinct at which the person is present, the registrars shall authorize the poll officers to permit the person to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person.

(f) If the registrars cannot immediately determine that the person timely and validly registered to vote in the primary or election; but, from the information presented by the person, the person, if registered, would be assigned to a different precinct from the precinct in the county or municipality at which the person is present, the registrars shall direct the poll officers to send the person to the appropriate precinct. The registrars shall notify the officers of such other precinct to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot when such person arrives at such precinct, completes an official voter

registra-tion form and a provisional ballot voter's certificate, and submits the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in such other precinct, the registrars shall also advise the poll officers which ballot style (district combination) should be issued to the person. However, if, in the reasonable exercise of discretion by the registrars or the poll workers, there is insufficient time for such person to go to such other precinct before the polls close, the poll workers may allow such person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct at which such person is present. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(g) If the person appears at a precinct in a county or municipality in which the person does not reside, the registrars shall instruct the poll officers to direct the person to contact the registrars in the county in which the person resides to determine in which precinct such person should vote.

(h) If the poll officers cannot get in touch with the registrars after making a reasonable effort to do so, the poll officers shall be authorized to permit the person to vote a provisional ballot at the precinct without additional authorization from the registrars. In such case, all votes cast by such person for candidates for whom such person is properly entitled to vote shall be counted and all votes cast for candidates for whom such person is not properly entitled to vote shall be void and shall not be counted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-419(c).

(i) Upon receiving authorization to vote a provisional ballot, the person shall complete a provisional ballot voter's certificate and an official voter registration form and submit such completed certificate and form to the poll officers along with the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct,

the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(j) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public. The provisional ballot voter's certificate and voter registration form shall be attached together and shall be placed in a separate, distinctively marked envelope which shall be placed in a secure location in the polling place.

(5) Voter who registered for first time by mail but did not provide required identification.

(a) When a person arrives at a polling place, completes a voter's certificate, and presents it to the poll workers but does not have the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 and the person's name appears on the official electors list for the precinct with a designation that the person registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail but has not provided the required identification to the registrars as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall immediately direct the person to the provisional ballot station. At the provisional ballot station, the person shall be permitted to cast a provisional ballot at such precinct. When there are multiple ballot styles (district combinations) in use in the precinct, the poll officers shall issue the appropriate ballot style (district combination) to the person as shown on the electors list. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters and issue the person a provisional ballot of the style authorized by the registrars along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot

envelope. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to the provisional ballot, voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers.

(b) Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box or boxes to designate the type of provisional ballot enclosed therein, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) The provisional ballot shall not be counted unless the voter provides the identification required by O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-220 and 21-2-417 to the registrars before the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots. Such identification may be provided to the registrars in person or by facsimile transmission or, in the case of disabled voters, by delivery by a third party.

(6) Voters voting during extended polling hours in an election in which federal candidates are on the ballot.

(a) In the event that the polling hours for a polling place are extended by a court order beyond the normal closing time for a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot, all voters who vote after the normal closing time for the polling place shall vote by provisional ballot.

(b) Voters whose names appear on the electors list and who have the appropriate identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 shall complete a provisional voter's certificate and shall be issued a provisional ballot along with an inner ballot envelope and an outer ballot envelope. Such voters shall not be required to complete a voter registration form. It also shall not be necessary to



obtain approval from the registrars to issue provisional ballots to such voters. The poll officers shall place the name of the person on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters. Before issuing the outer ballot envelope to the person, the poll officers shall enter the person's name, the name of the precinct, the date and name of the election, and the ballot style (district combination) on the outer envelope. The person shall then retire to a provisional ballot voting booth and vote the ballot. Upon completing the ballot, the person shall seal the ballot in the inner ballot envelope and place the inner ballot envelope containing the ballot into the outer ballot envelope and shall seal the outer ballot envelope. The person shall then return the sealed envelope to the poll officers. Upon receiving the sealed ballot envelope from a person casting a provisional ballot, the poll officers shall verify that the information requested on the outer ballot envelope is complete, shall mark the appropriate box to designate that the ballot is an extended poll hours provisional ballot, and shall direct the person to place the ballot envelope into the secure container for provisional ballots which shall be located within the enclosed space in the polling place where it can be monitored by the poll officers and observed by the public.

(c) If the voter's name is not on the electors list, the poll workers shall follow the provisions of this rule for regular provisional balloting under this rule and, if the voter is authorized by the registrars to vote a provisional ballot under the terms of this rule, shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(d) If the voter's name is on the electors list but registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the poll officers shall permit the voter to vote in accordance with the provisions of this rule for first time voters who register for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification, and shall also mark the appropriate box on the outer ballot envelope to indicate that the ballot was issued during extended poll hours.

(e) The poll officers shall provide each first time voter who registered for the first time in this state by mail without providing the required identification who casts a provisional ballot information on

how the voter may provide the registrars with the appropriate identification in order that the voter's ballot may be counted.

(7) Each voter casting a provisional ballot in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates appear on the ballot shall be given written information explaining how such voter can ascertain if such ballot is counted and, if such ballot is not counted, the reason why such ballot was not counted.

(8) The provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards may be picked up during the day by a registrar or deputy registrar for the purpose of beginning the process of determining the eligibility of the persons to cast provisional ballots. Before transferring the voter's certificates and registration cards to the registrars during the day, the poll officers shall note the number of certificates and cards being transferred to the registrars. If such voter's certificates and registration cards are not picked up by the registrars by the time that the polls close and the last voter has voted, the envelope in which the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards have been deposited shall be securely sealed and shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other materials from the polling place.

(9) After the close of the polls and the last voter has voted, the poll officers shall account for all voted provisional ballots, cancelled and spoiled provisional ballots, and unused provisional ballots. The ballot stubs and unused and spoiled ballots shall then be securely sealed in the container provided for them by the election superintendent. The poll officers shall then proceed to open the secure container in which the provisional ballots were deposited and count the number of voted provisional ballots contained therein. The poll officers shall then compare the total number of persons voting provisional ballots as shown on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters with the number of ballots issued and the number of ballots voted. If these numbers do not equal one another, the poll officers shall determine the reason for the inconsistency and shall correct the problem before going further. The poll officers shall seal the voted provisional ballots in a container for transfer to the election superintendent. The poll officers shall complete and sign a provisional ballot recap sheet and post one copy of the recap sheet on the door of the polling place with the election results from the precinct. The remaining copies of the

provisional ballot recap sheet along with the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be returned to the election superintendent with the other election materials from the precinct.

(10) Upon receiving the election materials from the precincts, the election superintendent shall ensure that the envelope containing the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards is promptly removed from the other materials and transferred to the registrars for processing. In any event, the voter's certificates and registration cards shall be transferred to the registrars no later than 9:00 a.m. on the day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff. The election superintendent shall also remove the container containing the voted provisional ballots and shall place such container in a secure location within the election superintendent's office.

(11)(a) Upon receiving the provisional ballot voter's certificates and voter registration cards from the election superintendent, the registrars shall promptly proceed to determine the eligibility of each person that voted a provisional ballot.

(b) If the registrars determine that the person did timely register and is eligible and entitled to vote in such primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is accepted and shall notify the election superintendent of the proper ballot style (district combination) for the voter.

(c) If the registrars determine that the person did not timely register to vote for the primary or election or is not eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election or if the registrars cannot determine by the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff if the voter timely registered and was eligible and entitled to vote in such primary or election, the registrars shall mark on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters that the ballot is rejected.

(d) Not later than the close of business on the third business day following the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall return to the election superintendent the numbered list of provisional ballot voters reflecting the accepted and rejected provisional ballots.

(e) The names of those persons whose names are accepted shall be added to the official electors list. The voter registration cards of those persons whose ballots are rejected on the numbered list of provisional ballot voters shall be processed by the registrars and, if found to be eligible and qualified, shall be added to the electors list for future elections.

(f) The registrars shall maintain the provisional ballot voter's certificates for the same period of time and under the same conditions as the regular voter's certificates. Voter registration cards completed by provisional ballot electors shall be maintained for the same period of time and under the same conditions as other voter registration cards.

(12) Upon receiving the numbered list of provisional ballot electors from the registrars, the election superintendent shall prepare to count the accepted provisional ballots. The election superintendent shall first compare the precinct designation and election district information with the style of ballot (district combination) cast by the provisional ballot voter.

(a) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and place the inner envelope containing the ballot into a ballot box.

(b) If the ballot style (district combination) voted by the voter was not correct, then the election superintendent shall open the outer envelope and note the correct ballot style (district combination) on the inner envelope. Each such inner envelope shall then be placed in a separate container until all of the outer envelopes have been opened. The outer envelopes shall then be stored in a location away from the inner envelopes in a manner such that the inner envelope and ballot of a voter cannot be identified as being the ballot of a particular voter. The superintendent shall then open each such inner envelope and remove the ballot and shall place a unique identifying number on the ballot along with the designation of the precinct in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall then prepare or cause to be prepared a duplicate ballot. The duplicate ballot shall be clearly labeled with the word "Duplicate" and shall bear the name of the precinct and the same

unique identifying number as the original ballot in the nonreflective area at the top of the ballot. The election superintendent shall transfer or cause to be transferred to the duplicate ballot, in the presence of at least two other consolidation assistants and in public, only the votes cast by the provisional ballot voter in the races and on the questions to which such voter was eligible and entitled to vote. The votes entered on the duplicate ballot shall be verified by at least one consolidation assistant. The completed duplicate ballot shall be placed in the ballot box with the other provisional ballots to be counted. The original ballot shall be placed into an appropriate container and retained.

(c) After opening all of the outer envelopes and making all necessary duplicate ballots, the election superintendent shall then open the inner envelopes of the ballots in the ballot box and proceed to count the votes in the same manner as absentee ballots are counted. Upon completing the count, the election superintendent shall add the provisional ballot votes to the other votes cast at the polls and by absentee ballot and shall consolidate and certify the results of the primary, election, or runoff. The provisional ballots and any duplicates shall be retained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots.

(d) The rejected provisional ballots shall be marked on the outer envelope as "Not Counted" and shall not be opened. The ballots shall be maintained for the same time period and in the same manner as absentee ballots which were returned too late to be counted.

(e) The election superintendent shall notify the registrars of the names of those persons who cast a provisional ballot in the wrong precinct or on an incorrect ballot style (district combination).

(13)(a) Upon identifying the rejected provisional ballot electors, the registrars shall proceed promptly to notify each such person by first-class mail at the address shown on the provisional ballot voter's certificate that his or her ballot was not counted because of the inability of the registrars to verify that the person timely registered to vote or such other proper reason. If the person's voter registration card was approved, the registrars shall also notify the person that his or her name will be added to the elector's list and the person will be eligible to vote in future primaries and elections and that a voter

notification or precinct card will be mailed to the person to provide the voter with the correct precinct and election district information.

(b) Upon receiving notification from the election superintendent of the names of persons who cast provisional ballots in the incorrect precinct or on the incorrect ballot style (district combination), the registrars shall notify such persons of their correct precinct and/or election district information. The sending of a voter notification or precinct card by first-class mail to the address shown on the voter registration card completed by such person when voting by provisional ballot shall be sufficient notice for such voters.

(c) If the person's voter registration is rejected, the registrars shall notify the person of such rejection in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-226(d).

(d) In addition, the registrars shall establish a free access system, such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet website, by which voters who cast provisional ballots in a primary, election, or runoff in which federal candidates are on the ballot may ascertain whether their ballots were counted or, if the ballots were not counted, the reasons why such ballots were not counted. The registrars shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or otherwise used by such system. Access to information about an individual provisional ballot shall be restricted to the voter who cast such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Provisional Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 18, 2002; eff. Nov. 7, 2002. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003. **Amended:** F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011. **Repealed:** New Rule of the same title adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

## 183-1-12-.07 Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll.

(1) Beginning July 1, 2006, counties shall use ExpressPoll units at precincts within the county during primaries, elections, and runoffs. The ExpressPoll units shall be utilized in lieu of the printed electors list and ballot encoders in each precinct where in use.

(2) The county election superintendent shall maintain each

ExpressPoll unit, and all components in a secure location under the same conditions as provided for DRE units under Rule 183-1-12-.02(2).

(3) Effective January 1, 2006, the registrars of each county shall utilize the absentee ballot subsystem of the statewide voter registration system for absentee balloting and advance voting.

(4) The registrars of each county shall complete the entry of new and updated voter registrations on a timely basis as required by the Secretary of State and shall notify the Secretary of State upon the completion of all such data entry after a registration deadline.

(5) Prior to each primary or election as specified by the Secretary of State, the county election superintendent shall provide to the Secretary of State or his or her designee a final copy of the GEMS database for the county.

(6) The county election superintendent and the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State or his or her designee of any changes to the voter registration file for the county or the GEMS database that occur after the process for creating ExpressPoll flash cards begins.

(7) During the period in which DRE units are tested and prepared prior to delivery to the precincts, the election superintendent shall cause each ExpressPoll unit to undergo logic and accuracy testing. Each ExpressPoll unit must pass such logic and accuracy test prior to being assigned to a precinct. The registrars shall verify the information contained on the ExpressPoll units when assigning the units to precincts.

(8) Prior to delivery to the precincts, the registrars shall ensure that all persons who have been issued or cast absentee ballots are marked accordingly on the ExpressPoll units.

(9) Upon the conclusion of each primary, election, or runoff, the poll officers shall return the ExpressPoll units with the other election materials from the precinct to the election superintendent. The registrars and election superintendent shall coordinate the return of the flash cards from the ExpressPoll units to the Secretary of State such that the cards are returned in the same time period as the

official election returns.

(10) For electors whose names are added to the voter registration rolls after the deadline for preparing the flash cards for the ExpressPoll units, the registrars shall provide a printed supplemental list for use at the affected precincts.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003. **Amended:** New Rule entitled "Preparation of the Electors List and Use of ExpressPoll adopted. F. Mar. 8, 2006; eff. Mar. 28, 2006.

### **183-1-12-08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

### **183-1-12-09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Amended:** F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-12-10 Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible.** Absentee ballots may be used by the handicapped if voting machines are inaccessible.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-218. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of Absentee Ballots When Voting Machines are Inaccessible" adopted. F. Nov. 14, 1986; eff. Dec. 4, 1986.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-13  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT  
OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>183-1-13-.01</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.04</b>	<b>Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge</b>
<b>183-1-13-.02</b>	<b>Repealed</b>	<b>183-1-13-.05</b>	<b>Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center</b>
<b>183-1-13-.03</b>	<b>Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent</b>		

**183-1-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Official Observers at Polling Places" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Aug. 5, 1969; eff. Aug. 24, 1969.

**183-1-13-.02 Repealed.**

Authority 1964 Ga. Election Code, as amended. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marketing" adopted. F. July 24, 1968; eff. Aug. 12, 1968. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-1-13-.03 Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent.**

At least three days prior to the primary or election, a copy of the designating letter issued by the political party, political body, or independent or nonpartisan candidate as specified in O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-408 shall be sent by the appropriate authority to the election superintendent of the county or municipality in which the poll watcher is to serve.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.04 Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge.** The Superintendent shall furnish a badge to each poll watcher containing the words "Official Poll Watcher," the name of the poll watcher, the primary or election in which such poll watcher shall serve, and each precinct or tabulating center in which such poll watcher is to serve. The poll watcher shall wear his or her badge at all times while he or she is serving as a poll watcher.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.05 Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center.** In counties and municipalities using central count optical scanning vote tabulation equipment, the election superintendent shall allow each political party to appoint two poll watchers for each primary or election, each political body to appoint two poll watchers for each election, and each independent candidate and each nonpartisan candidate to appoint one poll watcher for each election, to serve in each of the locations designated by the election superintendent within the tabulating center. Such designated places shall include the check-in area, the computer room, the duplication area, and such other areas as the election superintendent may deem necessary to the assurance of fair and honest procedures in the tabulating center. Poll watchers designated for the tabulating center shall be appointed and serve in the same manner as other poll watchers.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Amended:** F. Feb. 17, 1992; eff. Mar. 8, 1992. **Amended:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-1-13-.06 Poll Watchers for Advance Voting.**

For the purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-408(a)(2) and (b)(3)(A), a political party, a political body, or independent or non-partisan candidate may designate, or a candidate may submit to a political party, a different poll observer or set of poll observers for each day of advance voting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31, 21-2-408.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-14-.01	Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols	188-1-14-.07	Spoiled Ballot Definition
183-1-14-.02	Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting	183-1-14-.06	Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.03	Provisional Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.09	Voted Absentee Ballots
183-1-14-.04	Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots	183-1-14-.10	Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens
183-1-14-.05	State Write-In Absentee Ballot	183-1-14-.11	Mailing and Issuance of Ballots
183-1-14-.06	Spoiled Absentee Ballots		

**183-1-14-.01 Absentee Ballot Envelope; Definition of Advanced Age; Use of Symbols**

(1) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), "advanced age" shall mean any elector who is 65 years of age or older at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(2) For purposes of applying O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(l)(G), an elector meets the criteria of "disability" when the elector (a) has a physical disability and (b) informs the registrar of his or her status as disabled at the time of the absentee ballot request.

(3) Registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall, in a visible and legible manner, note symbols on the return absentee ballot oath envelope to designate the category under which an absentee elector applied for his or her ballot. Suggested symbols include:

- E - Elderly or of advanced age (65 years of age or older),
- D - Disabled physically,
- MOS - Military overseas,
- MST - Military stateside,
- OST - Overseas temporary,
- OSP - Overseas permanent resident,
- NR - No reason is provided.

To facilitate ballot tabulation, registrars or absentee ballot clerks shall note on the face of the absentee oath envelope the absentee elector's precinct and, in the case of a primary or primary runoff, the party in whose primary or primary runoff the elector is voting and "MIDR" if the voter is voting for the first time pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417(c).

**183-1-14-.02 Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting.**

(1) Counties and municipalities are authorized to use DRE units

for in-person absentee balloting in accordance with the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) and these rules. As used in this rule, the term "Registrars" shall include a county board of registrars, a county board of elections and registration, a joint county-municipal board of elections and registration, a municipal absentee ballot clerk, a municipal registrar, and the designee of any board of registrars, board of elections and registration, or joint county-municipal board of elections and registration. The election superintendent and registrars shall by agreement determine the type of election equipment to be used in such election for in-person absentee voting and for absentee voting by mail or other legally appropriate means in which the ballot is sent or delivered to a voter for voting away from the office of the registrars.

(2) DRE units shall be configured and tested in accordance with the provisions of Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to use in absentee balloting. Public notice of the time and place for such configuration and testing of the DRE units to be used for absentee balloting shall be given in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.6 and Rule 183-1-12-.02 prior to such configuration and testing.

(3) The DRE units to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be set up in a manner to assure the privacy of the elector while casting his or her ballot while maintaining the security of such units against tampering, damage, or other improper conduct. In addition, there shall be at least one DRE unit configured for use by physically disabled electors.

(4) Voter access cards for use in DRE units for in-person absentee balloting may be encoded by use of ballot encoder devices, DRE units specifically and exclusively set up for that purpose, or by use of the VCProgrammer software on appropriate computers.

(5) Each DRE unit to be used for in-person absentee voting shall be programmed so as to permit the challenging of ballots in accordance with law and the removal of such ballots from the count if such challenges are sustained by the registrars.

(6) On the first day of the absentee voting period, prior to any votes being cast on the DRE units, the registrars shall verify that the seal for each DRE unit is intact and that there is no evidence or

indication of any tampering with the seal or the unit. The registrars shall verify that the number of the seal matches the number of the seal recorded for that unit when such unit was prepared by the election superintendent for the primary, election, or runoff. If a seal number does not match or if there is any evidence or indication of tampering with the seal or unit, the Secretary of State and the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until such matters are resolved by agreement of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE units and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on each DRE unit prior to the beginning of absentee voting on such units. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for voting. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on each DRE unit is set at zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall verify that there is no unauthorized matter affixed to the DRE units or present in the cases or voting booths. The registrars shall affix a card of instructions for voting within each voting booth. Prior to voters entering the voting booth, the registrars may also distribute to such voters a card of instructions for voting on the DRE unit that has been approved or provided by the Secretary of State. Each DRE unit shall be clearly marked with a unique designation that is visible on the exterior of the unit.

(7) If a DRE unit is to be used for the creation of voter access cards, such DRE unit shall be set up properly for such purpose and shall be used exclusively for such purpose and no other purpose during the absentee voting period. The set up shall be performed in public and the public may view the set up subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as the registrars may deem appropriate to protect the security of the DRE unit and to prevent interference with the duties of the registrars, except that the public view shall not be obstructed. The registrars shall run a zero tape on the DRE unit prior to creating any voter access cards on such unit. The registrars shall, without removing the tape from the unit, verify that all vote registers shown on the zero tape are set to zero and that there are no votes showing on the unit and shall sign the tape in the space provided. If the zero tape does not show that all vote registers are set to zero and that there are votes on the unit, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the unit is cleared and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. After verifying and signing the zero tape, the registrars shall securely lock the tape compartment leaving the zero tape in place on the unit and shall configure the unit for the creation of voter access cards. The registrars shall verify that the election counter on the unit is set to zero. If the election counter is not set to zero, the election superintendent shall be immediately notified and such unit shall not be used until the election counter is set to zero and the matter is resolved by agreement of the election superintendent and the registrars. The registrars shall make a notation of the election counter reading on the daily recap sheet.

(8) At the close of business each day during the absentee voting period, the registrars shall document the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit used for in-person absentee voting shall then be turned off and closed. The memory card (PCMCIA card) shall remain in the unit at all times during the absentee balloting period until the polls close on the day of the primary, election, or runoff. Each DRE unit shall then be sealed and the seal number and the time of sealing shall be recorded on the daily recap sheet. Each DRE unit shall then be secured overnight. In addition, all voter access cards shall be securely stored overnight and when not in use. If a DRE unit is used to program voter access cards, the registrars shall make a notation of the election counter number

on the daily recap sheet. If such number is not zero, the registrars shall notify the Secretary of State immediately and shall ascertain the reason for the discrepancy and shall make a notation of such discrepancy and the reason for it on the daily recap sheet. Such DRE unit shall not be used for creation of voter access cards unless and until the unit is fully tested and reconfigured and the election counter reset at zero pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary of State. The DRE unit shall be turned off and secured for the night.

(9) Each morning during the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall publicly verify the seal numbers on each DRE unit to be used for absentee voting with the number of the seal recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting and shall verify that the seal and DRE unit do not show any signs of tampering. If the seal number corresponds to the entry on the daily recap sheet and there is no evidence of tampering, the DRE unit shall be opened and turned on. If the numbers do not match or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. After opening and turning on the unit, the registrars shall verify the election counter number with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet from the previous day of absentee voting. If the numbers do not match, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. The election counter number shall then be entered onto the daily recap sheet for that day. If a DRE unit is to be used for programming voter access cards, the registrars shall open and turn on the power for such unit. The registrars shall then verify that the election counter is set on zero. If the election counter is not set at zero, the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified and the unit shall not be used until such discrepancy is resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the registrars. A notation shall be made on the daily recap sheet of the election counter number and the unit shall be configured to create voter access cards.

(10) Voters who vote absentee ballots in person on the DRE units shall first complete an absentee ballot application and sign an oath

document. After the registrars determine that the voter is eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall note the voter's registration number and ballot style on the absentee ballot application. The voter shall then be issued a voter access card. The registrars shall record on the absentee voter log the voter's name, registration number, voter ID number, and designation of the DRE unit on which the voter shall vote. The voter shall then be permitted to vote on the designated DRE unit. After completing voting, the voter shall return the voter access card to the registrars.

(11) At the close of business on the day before the primary, election, or runoff at the end of the absentee balloting period, the registrars shall record the election counter number on the daily recap sheet. The registrars shall publicly configure the DRE units used for absentee voting to end the election and prevent further voting on the units. The units shall then be shut down and sealed. The registrars shall record the seal numbers on the daily recap sheet. The units shall then be secured until time for the tabulation of votes. For the DRE unit used for the creation of voter access cards, such unit shall be secured and returned to the election superintendent. Two zero tapes shall be printed and signed by the registrars confirming that all vote counters are set at zero. The memory card (PCMCIA cards) from the units used for the creation of voter access cards shall be removed from the units and placed along with the signed zero tapes in a sealed envelope which shall be returned to the election superintendent.

(12) At the close of the polls on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall deliver all of the DRE units used for in-person absentee voting and all other absentee ballots received in accordance with the provisions of the Georgia Election Code (O.C.G.A. Ch. 21-2) to the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The poll officers of the absentee ballot precinct shall count all of the absentee ballots in accordance with the procedures required by law and the rules of the State Election Board. The poll officers shall verify the seal number of each DRE unit with the number recorded on the daily recap sheet form and shall inspect each seal and unit to verify that there is no evidence of tampering with the unit. If the seal numbers are not correct or there is evidence of tampering, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken with regard to such unit until the reason for the



discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. After verifying the seal number and the integrity of the seal on each unit, the poll managers shall open each unit and turn on the power for the unit. The managers shall then compare the numbers shown on the election counters of the unit with the numbered list of absentee electors, the absentee voter log, and the absentee ballot precinct recap form to verify that there are no discrepancies. If there is a discrepancy, the Secretary of State shall be notified immediately and no further action shall be taken until the reason for the discrepancy has been determined to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the election superintendent, and the manager of the absentee ballot precinct. The managers of the absentee ballot precinct shall accept or reject absentee ballots cast on DRE units as directed by the registrars, using the procedures established by the Secretary of State. After completion of the acceptance and rejection process for the absentee ballots cast on the DRE units, the poll manager shall cause each DRE unit to print a minimum of three tapes showing the vote totals as cast on that DRE unit. The poll manager and the assistant managers shall sign each of the tapes or shall write on the tapes the reason why the poll manager or the assistant managers will not sign the tapes. One copy of the results tape for each DRE unit shall be posted on the door of the absentee ballot precinct for the information of the public. The memory card (PCMCIA card) and two signed tapes from each DRE unit shall be placed in the appropriate envelope supplied by the election superintendent which shall be sealed and initialed by the poll manager and at least one assistant manager such that the envelope cannot be opened without breaking such seal. After completing the printing of the results, the DRE units shall be turned off and secured in their cases and resealed. The DRE units shall then be placed in a secure area with appropriate climate control. The memory cards (PCMCIA cards), results tapes, voter access cards, supervisor's card, ballot encoder devices, numbered lists of absentee voters, absentee ballot precinct recap forms, and other such paperwork shall be transported to the office of the election superintendent by the poll manager and at least one other poll officer. The election superintendent or his or her designee shall receive the materials and shall issue a receipt to the poll manager for the materials.

(13) Any notices to the Secretary of State about discrepancies in

numbers or seals, zero tapes, or election counters shall also be forwarded to members of the State Election Board, but such information shall be considered confidential if the Secretary of State has initiated an investigation of the matter.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Use of DRE Units for Absentee Balloting" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

### **183-1-14-.03 Provisional Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), when the registrars receive a request for an absentee ballot from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, the registrars shall process the request in the same manner as other requests for absentee ballots. If the voter is found to be eligible to vote by absentee ballot, the registrars shall issue a ballot to the voter and mark the outer oath envelope with the code "IR." In addition to the information concerning how to vote the ballot, the registrars shall also enclose with the absentee ballot instructions on providing proper identification and in accessing the free access system to determine if the ballot was counted as required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-418(e) and (f).

(2) When an absentee ballot is received from a voter who registered to vote for the first time in this state by mail and has not provided the identification required by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220, except as otherwise provided by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-220(c), the registrars shall process the ballot as other absentee ballots returned by voters. If the ballot is accepted by the registrars but the voter has not provided the required identification, the ballot shall be treated as a provisional ballot and shall be held separate and apart from the other absentee ballots. The registrars shall maintain a numbered list of provisional absentee ballots.

(3) If an absentee voter whose ballot has been accepted but treated as a provisional ballot for failure to provide the required identification provides the required identification prior to the close of the polls on the day of the election, the voter's ballot shall be treated as a regular absentee ballot and the voter shall be switched from the numbered list of provisional absentee voters to the numbered list of regular absentee voters.

(4) As soon as practicable after 12:00 Noon on the day of the primary, election, or runoff, the registrars shall begin to deliver all accepted regular and provisional absentee ballots to the absentee ballot precinct in accordance with law. The provisional absentee ballots shall be retained by the poll officers at the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be, unopened and shall not be counted. The provisional absentee ballots shall be placed in a secure container for provisional ballots and shall be transferred to the election superintendent with the other absentee ballots and election materials from the absentee ballot precinct or tabulating center, as the case may be.

(5) If, by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars receive the required identification from an absentee voter who failed initially to provide the required identification, then the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to count the ballot of such voter in the same manner as other verified provisional ballots from the polls. If the registrars do not receive the required identification from such absentee voter by the end of the period set by law for the verification of provisional ballots, the registrars shall notify the election superintendent to not count the ballot and the ballot shall remain unopened and sealed and shall be retained in accordance with law with the other provisional ballots which the registrars did not verify for counting.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Provisional Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

#### **183-1-14-.04 Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) The registrars of each county shall on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election submit to the Secretary of State on a form provided by the Secretary of State information concerning absentee ballots requested by electors who are entitled to vote by absentee ballot under the federal Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff, et seq., as amended. Such report shall include the number of absentee ballots requested by each such category of absentee voter, the date on which the absentee ballots were available in the registrars' office, and the date on which the ballots requested by such voters were sent to the voters. The Secretary of State may request further information related to the application for and the transmittal

of such ballots.

(2) The report shall be submitted to the Secretary of State either by facsimile or other electronic means on the 32nd day prior to each statewide general primary and general election.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Electors and Campaigning in or Near Absentee Polling Places" adopted as ER. 183-1-14-0.5-.04. F. Sept. 10, 2004; eff. Sept. 9, 2004, the date of adoption. **Amended:** Permanent Rule entitled "Reporting Requirements for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006. **Repealed:** New Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 17, 2011; eff. Apr. 6, 2011.

### **183-1-14-.05 State Write-In Absentee Ballot.**

(a) The Secretary of State shall design a state write-in absentee ballot for use in runoff primaries and runoff elections by an elector of this state who resides outside the county or the municipality in which the election is being conducted and is: (1) a member of the armed forces of the United States, a member of the merchant marine of the United States, a member of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or a spouse or dependent of such member residing with or accompanying said member; or (2) A citizen of the United States residing outside the United States.

(b) Such state write-in absentee ballot shall be designed in such a manner as to permit the person voting such ballot to write-in the name of a candidate or candidates for state offices that are elected on a state-wide basis and for all federal offices in a runoff primary or runoff election. Such state write-in ballot shall automatically be included with any absentee ballot sent to such eligible electors for any general primary or general election. No special request for such ballot shall be required in such circumstances.

(c) Such ballot shall either have attached to or have included with such ballot two envelopes. One envelope shall have printed on such envelope the words "Official State Write-In Absentee Ballot" and nothing else. The other envelope shall be designed such that the first envelope will fit inside it and shall have printed on one side the absentee elector oath and the other side shall contain a place for the elector to address the ballot to the appropriate board of registrars or board of elections and registration in this state for mailing.

(d) The Secretary of State shall prepare and print instructions for completing and returning such ballot that shall also be enclosed with such ballot. The state write-in absentee ballot, the envelopes for returning it, and the instructions shall be enclosed with the regular absentee ballot, envelopes, and instructions for completing and returning the regular absentee ballot.

(e) Such ballots shall be made available in a downloadable electronic form on the Secretary of State's website as well as in printed form. Additionally, the Secretary of State and the county registrars shall provide for the transmission of such blank ballots by facsimile transmission and electronic mail transmission to electors. Instructions for voting such ballots shall be included on the website and shall accompany any facsimile and electronic mail ballot transmissions. Voted ballots shall not be returned by facsimile or electronic mail.

(f) As soon as practicable after a general primary or general election, the Secretary of State shall cause to be published on the official website of the Secretary of State a list of all federal offices and state offices in which there will be a runoff primary or runoff election, as the case may be, along with the names of the candidates who will be on the ballot in such runoff.

(g) If an elector obtains the ballot by facsimile or by downloading from electronic mail or the Secretary of State's website, the elector shall return the ballot by mail using two envelopes. The elector shall enclose and seal the ballot in a plain envelope and insert that envelope into another envelope for transmission to the registrars. The elector shall copy and sign the appropriate oath onto the back of the outer envelope. The Secretary of State shall provide a sample envelope and oath form on the Secretary of State's website in such a manner that such form may be used by an elector to print out the forms for the purpose of pasting or attaching such forms to an envelope for returning the ballot or for printing an envelope for returning the ballot.

(h) If the registrars receive both the official absentee runoff ballot and the state write-in absentee ballot from an elector during the time period for receiving such ballots, the registrars shall submit only the official absentee runoff ballot for counting. In such case, the state

write-in absentee ballot shall be handled in the same manner as ballots that are received too late for counting. In order to ensure that the correct ballot is counted, the registrars shall hold the ballots of individuals to whom both an official absentee runoff ballot and a state write-in ballot have been sent until the close of the absentee voting period before submitting such ballots for counting.

(i) The failure of an elector to seal the ballot in an inner envelope alone shall not be grounds for rejecting such ballot. The failure of the elector to complete the oath required of absentee voters on the outer envelope shall be cause to reject such ballot.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "State Write-In Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

### **183-1-14-.06 Spoiled Absentee Ballots.**

(1) When an absentee ballot is spoiled, the elector may write "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot, then fold the ballot and enclose and securely seal the same in the envelope on which is printed "Official Absentee Ballot." This envelope shall then be placed in the second one, on which is printed the form of the oath of the elector, the name, relationship, and oath of the person assisting, if any, and other required identifying information. The elector shall then fill out the required information on such envelope, without the requirement to subscribe or swear to the oath printed on such envelope. Such envelope shall then be securely sealed and the elector shall write across the face of the envelope "Spoiled" and then mail or personally deliver same to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk in accordance with O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385.

(2) Upon receipt of an absentee ballot upon which the word "Spoiled" has been written across the face of the envelope, a registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall write the day and hour of the receipt of the ballot on its envelope. The registrar or absentee ballot clerk shall, within two days after the receipt of such ballot, mail or issue another official absentee ballot to the elector. All returned spoiled ballots shall be safely kept unopened by the board or absentee ballot clerk and then transferred to the appropriate clerk for storage for the period of time required for the preservation of ballots used at the primary or election and shall then, without being opened, be destroyed in like manner as the used ballots of the primary or

election.

(3) The directions that explain how to cast a vote and how to obtain a new ballot after one is spoiled shall appear immediately under the caption on the ballot in substantially the following form as appropriate for that particular primary or election:

To vote, blacken the Oval ( ☐ ) next to the candidate of your choice. To vote for a person whose name is not on the ballot, manually WRITE his or her name in the write-in section and blacken the Oval ( ☐ ) next to the write-in section. If you desire to vote YES or NO for a PROPOSED QUESTION, blacken the corresponding Oval ( ☐ ). Use only blue or black pen or pencil.

Do not vote for more candidates than the number allowed for each specific office. Do not cross out or erase. If you erase or make other marks on the ballot or tear the ballot, your vote may not count.

If you change your mind or make a mistake, you may return the ballot by writing "Spoiled" across the face of the ballot and return envelope. You may then mail the spoiled ballot back to your county board of registrars, and you will be issued another official absentee ballot. Alternatively, you may surrender the ballot to the poll manager of an early voting site within your county or the precinct to which you are assigned. You will then be permitted to vote a regular ballot.

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law."

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-383, 21-2-388, 21-2-480. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

### **183-1-14-.07 Spoiled Ballot Definition.**

(1) **Definitions.** As used in these rules and the Georgia Election Code, the term:

(a) "Spoiled ballot" includes a ballot

1. that has been torn, defaced, or physically deformed;

2. on which there are cast more than the permitted number of votes;
3. that has been completed in a manner which is illegible or incomprehensible;
4. that contains writing which compromises the secrecy of the ballot;
5. that is marked improperly, inappropriately, or in such a way that it would be rejected;
6. that was issued in error by the election official; or
7. that contains the wrong precinct, party, or style.

(2) A spoiled ballot shall not be reinstated.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-284, 21-2-285, 21-2-285.1, 21-2-379.11, 21-2-390, 21-2-433, 21-2-434, 21-2-436, 21-2-437, 21-2-440, 21-2-480, 21-2-483, 21-2-484, 21-2-493, 21-2-587. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Spoiled Ballot Definition" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-.08 Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-382, the term:

(a) "Government building generally accessible to the public" means any building or structure which is used by the public:

1. that is owned, leased, operated, or used by, the State of Georgia, its agencies and authorities, and any political subdivision of the state, municipal corporation, or local board or authority created by general, local, or special Act of the General Assembly or by ordinance or resolution of the governing body of a county or municipal corporation individually or jointly with other political subdivisions or municipalities of the State; and

2. that is constructed or renovated in whole or in part by use of state, county, or municipal funds, the funds of any political subdivision of the State; or, to the extent not required otherwise by



federal law or regulations and not beyond the power of the State to regulate, federal funds.

(2) A board of registrars may establish additional sites as additional registrar's offices or places of registration for the purpose of receiving absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-381 and for the purpose of voting absentee ballots under O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-385. Whenever practicable, a branch of the county courthouse, a courthouse annex, a government service center providing general government services, or another government building generally accessible to the public shall be utilized for such additional sites.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-382, 30-3-2, 31-12A-3. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Additional Sites as Additional Registrar's Offices or Places of Registration for Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Dec. 15, 2009; eff. Jan. 4, 2010.

### **183-1-14-.09 Voted Absentee Ballots.**

(1) Definitions. As used in this Rule and O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-388, the phrase:

(a) "An absentee ballot which has been voted" means an absentee ballot that has been returned to and received by the board of registrars and has been certified in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386 by the board of registrars.

(2) When an absentee ballot which has been voted shall be returned to and received by the board of registrars, it shall be deemed to have been voted then and there; and no other ballot shall be issued to the same elector. If the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk rejects or otherwise fails to certify an absentee ballot in accordance with subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-386, the elector shall be provided the opportunity to vote in the primary, election, or runoff either by applying for a second absentee ballot prior to the day before such primary, election, or runoff or by voting in person at the elector's polling place on the day of the primary, election, or runoff.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-388. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voted Absentee Ballots" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-.10 Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens.** Absentee ballots cast in a primary, election, or runoff by eligible electors who reside outside the county

or municipality in which the primary, election, or runoff is held are members of the armed forces of the United States, members of the merchant marine of the United States, spouses or dependents of members of the armed forces or merchant marine residing with or accompanying such member, or overseas citizens that are received by United States Mail or commercial courier, without bearing a postmark, and within the three-day period following such primary, election, or runoff, if proper in all other respects, shall be valid ballots and shall be counted and included in the certified election results.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-386. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Acceptance of Absentee Ballots From Military and Overseas Citizens" adopted. F. Oct. 29, 2009; eff. Nov. 18, 2009.

**183-1-14-11 Mailing and Issuance of Ballots.** During early voting, as additional applicants for absentee ballots are determined to be eligible, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional applicants immediately upon determining their eligibility. The board or clerk shall make such determination and mail or issue official absentee ballots to such additional eligible applicants within 3 business days after receiving the absentee ballot applications.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-384. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Mailing and Issuance of Ballots" adopted. F. May 27, 2011; eff. June 16, 2011.

**183-1-14-12. Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot.** The application for an absentee ballot shall be in writing and shall contain sufficient information for proper identification of the elector. To be deemed sufficient, an application for an absentee ballot must contain the signature of the applicant.

1. In the case of the elector making such application for an absentee ballot, the application shall contain the signature of such elector.
2. In the case of a relative making an application on behalf of an elector pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(B), the application shall contain the signature of the elector's relative as well as the relationship of the relative to the elector.

Authority: O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-31, 21-2-381.

**History.** Original Rule entitled "Eligibility of Application for Absentee Ballot" adopted. F. Dec. 28, 2015; eff. Jan. 17, 2016.

# RULES OF STATE ELECTION BOARD GEORGIA ELECTION CODE

## CHAPTER 183-1-15 RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

183-1-15-.01 Repealed

183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote

#### **183-1-15-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Notification and Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees" adopted. F. May 26, 1970; eff. June 14, 1970. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Amended:** Rule retitled "Certificate of Nomination for Political Party Nominees". F. Mar. 6, 1987; eff. Mar. 26, 1987. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

#### **183-1-15-.02 Definition of Vote.**

(1) DRE Equipment. A vote cast on a DRE unit shall be the choice made by a voter by:

(a) Pressing the appropriate place on the DRE unit's touchscreen to cause an "X" or similar designation to display adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote;

(b) Typing on the touchscreen the name of a qualified write-in candidate in accordance with the instructions for voting on the DRE unit; or

(c) Pressing the appropriate buttons on the keypad in the case of persons using the VWD device attached to the DRE unit.

(2) Lever-type Voting Machines. A vote cast on a lever-type voting machine shall be the choice made by a voter by either operating the lever adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote or by writing of the name of a qualified write-in candidate on the machine in accordance with the instructions for voting on the voting machine and then recording such votes on the machine by the actuation of the main lever which casts such votes and returns the other levers to their original positions.

### (3) Optical Scan Voting Systems.

(a) A vote cast on an optical scan voting system shall be the choice made by a voter by either:

1. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Filling in the oval or completing the arrow adjacent to the appropriate write-in space and writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) In reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), if the voter filled in the oval or completed the arrow next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and filled in the oval or completed the arrow adjacent to the write-in space and wrote the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(c) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), it appears that there is a properly cast vote and what is clearly a stray mark which has caused the tabulator to read the vote for such office as an overvote, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the stray mark shall be ignored.

(d) If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot which has been rejected as containing an overvote in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483(g)(2), a voter marks his or her ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-483 (g)(2)(B), the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(e) When an optical scan ballot contains stray marks or marks which prevent the tabulating machine from properly recording valid

votes as determined under this rule and by law, the ballot shall be duplicated in accordance with law to correct such problems and the duplicate shall then be tabulated.

(4) Paper Ballots.

(a) A vote cast on a paper ballot shall be a choice made by a voter by either:

1. Placing an "X", a check, or other similar mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or answer to a question for which the voter desires to vote; or

2. Writing the name of a qualified write-in candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot as specified in the instructions for voting such ballot.

(b) If a voter marks his or her paper ballot in a manner other than that specified by law and this rule, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the poll officers as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-439, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote.

(c) If the voter marked the square next to the name of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot and wrote in the name of the same candidate in the write-in space for the same office, the properly cast vote shall be counted and the write-in vote shall be ignored.

(5) Write-in Votes. In no event shall votes cast for write-in candidates who have not qualified in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-133 be counted or recorded.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Definition of Vote" adopted. F. Oct. 24, 2003; eff. Nov. 13, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-19  
PENALTIES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate**

**183-1-19-.01 Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate.** In the interpretation of O.C.G.A. Section 21-2-570, the State Election Board has determined that the prohibition contained therein against the giving or receiving, offering to give or receive, or participating in the giving or receiving of money or gifts for the purpose of registering as a voter or voting does not include the provision of postage to a person solely for the purpose of (1) mailing a voter registration application in order for such person to register to vote or (2) mailing an absentee ballot application or an absentee ballot that was voted and sealed by such person in order for such person to vote.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Giving or Receiving, Offering to Give or Receive, or Participating in the Giving or Receiving of Money or Gifts for Registering as a Voter, Voting, or Voting for a Particular Candidate" adopted, F. Dec. 21, 2005; eff. Jan. 10, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-1-20  
GEORGIA VOTER IDENTIFICATION CARD**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card

**183-1-20-.01 Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(1) **Intent and Purpose.** These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority granted the State Election Board under O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-417.1 and 21-2-31. It is the intent of the State Election Board to provide for the time, place and manner in which each county Board of Registrars shall issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card to eligible electors and to provide for the acceptable types of documentation necessary to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. To this end, the State Election Board has promulgated these rules and regulations.

(2) **Application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card.** Beginning with the July 18, 2006, Party Primary Election each county registrar shall provide the application for the Georgia Voter Identification Card in the form designed and published by the State Election Board or its member designee(s). Any registered voter who meets the criteria in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1 and wishes to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be required to submit the information requested in such application. It shall be the responsibility of each county registrar to ensure that each accepted application is complete.

(3) **Availability of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) Each county shall provide a place within the voter registrar's primary or main office location, as previously approved by the Department of Justice, to process applications for Georgia Voter

Identification Cards and to process and distribute such cards.

(b) Each county registrar's office may provide additional locations or extended hours for processing applications for the Georgia Voter Identification Card and processing and distributing the cards but shall be required to comply with criteria for establishment of additional voter registration places as outlined in 183-1-6-.03(3).

(c) Each county registrar's office shall be open a minimum of eight hours per day on Monday through Friday of the week before the final primary, election, or run-off election day, except for legally observed holidays, and shall otherwise be open during normal business hours of the office in order to allow registered voters to apply for and obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card.

(d) The voter registrar's office of each county shall provide the application and process the Georgia Voter Identification Card using the equipment, forms, supplies, and written training materials and/ or verbal training provided by the State Election Board.

(e) Each county Board of Registrars shall sign and maintain an intergovernmental agreement provided by the State Election Board outlining the use of the equipment.

**(4) Documentation required for application and issuance of the Georgia Voter Identification Card.**

(a) In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e), the Board of Registrars shall require the presentation and verification of the following information before issuing a Georgia Voter Identification Card:

1. A photo identity document, except that nonphoto identity document is acceptable if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth;

2. Documentation showing the applicant's date of birth;

3. Evidence that the applicant is registered to vote in the State of Georgia, either by voter precinct card, a new voter registration application or confirmation of voter's record on the statewide voter



registration system or by verifying the original application in the voter registrar's office; and

4. Documentation showing the applicant's name and principal residence address.

(b) In determining whether the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e) have been met, the following shall apply:

1. Any of the following which contains a photograph of the applicant shall constitute a photo identity document, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1):

(i) Student ID Card including public or private high school, college, university, or vocational school;

(ii) Transit Card;

(iii) Pilot's License;

(iv) Nursing Home Identification Card;

(v) Employee Identification Card;

(vi) Government Housing Authority Identification Card;

(vii) Any government issued license;

(viii) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for the provision of benefits; or

(ix) Any card accepted by local, state or federal government for access to buildings.

2. Any of the following shall constitute a nonphoto identity document in lieu of a photo identity document as provided in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(1) only if it includes both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth:

(i) Original birth certificate or certified copy of birth certificate;

- (ii) Certificate of birth registration;
  - (iii) Voter Registration Application;
  - (iv) Copy of records filed in court by the applicant or on behalf of the applicant by the applicant's counsel;
  - (v) Naturalization documentation;
  - (vi) Copy of Marriage License Application;
  - (vii) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal Tax Return filed for the previous calendar year;
  - (viii) Any other document issued by local, state, or federal government so long as the document provides a reasonably reliable confirmation of the identity of the applicant;
  - (ix) Paycheck or paycheck stub bearing the imprinted name of the applicant's employer;
  - (x) An original of the annual social security statement received by the applicant for current or preceding calendar year;
  - (xi) An original of a Medicare or Medicaid statement received by the applicant;
  - (xii) Certified school record or transcript for current or preceding calendar year;
  - (xiii) Hospital birth certificate;
  - (xiv) An authenticated copy of a doctor's record of post-natal care;
- or
- (xv) A federal Affidavit of Birth, form DS-10.

3. The registrar shall accept as documentation showing the applicant's date of birth under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(2) any of the documents described in subparagraph (b)2. above.

4. The registrar shall accept as proof of voter registration under

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(3) the applicant's voter registration application or a voter's precinct card.

5. Any of the documents described in subparagraphs (b)1. and 2. shall be acceptable as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(e)(4) if the documentation contains the applicant's name and address of principal residence. In addition, the registrar shall also accept the following as documentation showing the applicant's name and address of principal residence if the applicant's name and address of principal residence appears on the document:

- (i) Voter Precinct Card;
- (ii) Utility or cable bill issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iii) Bank statement issued within the last sixty (60) days;
- (iv) Currently valid rental contracts and/or receipts for payments made within the last sixty (60) days for rent payments;
- (v) A copy of the applicant's State or Federal income tax return filed for the preceding calendar year;
- (vi) Homeowners insurance policy or bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (vii) Mortgage, payment coupon, deed, or property tax bill for current or preceding calendar year;
- (viii) Current Automobile Registration Receipt;
- (ix) Homestead Exemption documentation; or
- (x) W-2 for the preceding calendar year.

6. The application and supporting documentation of any applicant who is denied a Georgia Voter Identification Card shall be immediately forwarded via facsimile and U.S. mail to the State Election Board for automatic review to determine if the applicant has provided reasonably reliable documentary indicia confirming the

identity of the applicant in which case the State Election Board shall direct the voter registrar to issue the Georgia Voter Identification Card.

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Georgia Voter Identification Card" adopted. F. June 19, 2006; eff. July 9, 2006.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
183-2 GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
183-2-1	PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS	RESERVED
183-2-2	GOVERNING AUTHORITY	RESERVED
183-2-3	MUNICIPAL SUPERINTENDENTS	RESERVED
183-2-4	REPEALED	57
183-2-5	REPEALED	59
183-2-6	REPEALED	61
183-2-7	REPEALED	63
183-2-8	POLITICAL PARTIES AND BODIES	RESERVED
183-2-9	NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES	RESERVED
183-2-10	BALLOTS	RESERVED
183-2-11	VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS	71
183-2-12	REPEALED	75
183-2-13	REPEALED	77
183-2-14	RETURNS OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-15	CONTESTED PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS	RESERVED
183-2-16	PENALTIES	RESERVED

**NEXT PAGE IS 57**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
POLL OFFICERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-4-.01    Repealed**

**183-2-4-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oaths of Poll Officers" adopted, F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-4  
REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed**

**183-2-5-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Oath of Registration Officers" adopted F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-5-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Proper Identification for Registration" adopted as ER. 183-2-5-0.2-.02. F. and eff. May 20, 1982, as specified by the Agency. **Amended:** Permanent Rule of same title adopted. F. Mar. 29, 1983; eff. Apr. 18, 1983. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-6  
ELECTIONS DISTRICTS OR PRECINTS  
AND POLLING PLACES**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-6-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-6.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Election Districts, Change in Boundaries, Notification of Electors" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-7  
DATES OF PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-7-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-7-.01 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. History. Original Rule entitled "Calls for Primaries and Elections" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. Repealed: E Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**NEXT PAGE IS 71**

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-11  
VOTING MACHINES — VOTE RECORDERS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines**  
**183-2-11-.02**  
**to**  
**183-2-11-.01 Repealed**

**183-2-11-.01 Voting Machines. No rules applicable to voting machines have been adopted.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Voting Machines" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973.

**183-2-11-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Vote Recorders" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Tabulating Center Personnel, Trained and Certified" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Program Instructions" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Envelopes and Fold Over Ballot Cards" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.06 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective Ballot Cards, Duplication and Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.07 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-11-.08 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Defective and Duplicated Ballot Cards, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

## **183-2-11.09 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Write-In Ballots, Sealed After Tabulation" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-12  
PREPARATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF  
PRIMARIES AND ELECTIONS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-12-.01 Reserved  
183-2-12-.02  
to  
183-2-12-.05 Repealed

**183-2-12-.01 Reserved.**

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Ballots, Paper, Validity of Marking" adopted. F Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.03 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers, Notification to Superintendent" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.04 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers Required to Wear Badge" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**183-2-12-.05 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Poll Watchers for Tabulating Center" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD  
GEORGIA MUNICIPAL ELECTION CODE**

**CHAPTER 183-2-13  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-2-13-.01 Repealed

183-2-13.02 Repealed

**183-2-13-.01 Repealed.**

Authority 1968 Ga. Municipal Election Code. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Voting, Jurat Validity" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 13, 1973. **Repealed:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975.

**183-2-12-.02 Repealed.**

Authority O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-31. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Absentee Ballot Envelope, Use of Symbols" adopted. F. Aug. 30, 1973; eff. Sept. 19, 1973. **Amended:** F. Oct. 20, 1975; eff. Nov. 9, 1975. **Repealed:** F. Dec. 11, 2003; eff. Dec. 31, 2003.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

	<b>CHAPTERS</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>590-8-1</b>	CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS	123
<b>590-8-2</b>	HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS	238.11

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
ELECTIONS DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-1  
CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-1-.01	Certification of Voting Systems	590-8-1-.02	Verification of Voter Registration Information
-------------	---------------------------------	-------------	--

**590-8-1-.01 Certification of Voting Systems.**

**(a) Purpose.**

1. These Rules establish performance requirements and characteristics for voting systems and their components used in the State of Georgia and identify performance characteristics of these systems and components.
2. Compliance with the requirements of these Rules shall be assessed by means of code analysis, formal tests, and documentation review.
3. The intent of these Rules is to assure that hardware, firmware, and software have been shown to be reliable, accurate, and capable of secure operation before they are used in elections in the State. Hardware, firmware, and software products with performance proven in commercial applications are deemed inherently acceptable, provided that they are shown to be compatible with the operational and administrative requirements of the voting environment. Products not in wide commercial use, regardless of their performance histories, shall require Qualification, Certification, and Acceptance tests before they can be used.
4. These rules are intended to assist local jurisdictions in identifying products and provide a standardized terminology which shall facilitate the specification and demonstration of system requirements.

**(b) Applicability.**

1. These Rules are applicable to voting systems first used in the State of Georgia on or after the effective date of these Rules. These Rules are waived for all voting systems in use in the State of Georgia as of the effective date of these Rules. Successful performance during past elections are deemed sufficient evidence of adequate design. These Rules shall apply to systems developed by non-governmental third parties and those developed in-house by a local government.

2. These Rules apply to all equipment and computer programs used in a voting system including, but not limited to, the hardware, firmware, and software required for defining an election, formatting ballots, setting up precincts for voting, recording votes, tallying the results, and producing all reports.

3. These Rules apply to any agency, group, or individual responsible for the analysis, design, manufacture, procurement, or use of voting systems, their subsystems, or their components.

4. Any modification to the hardware, firmware, or software of a voting system which has completed Qualification, Certification, or Acceptance testing in accordance with these Rules shall invalidate the State certification unless it can be shown that the modification does not affect the overall flow of program control or the manner in which the ballots are recorded and the vote data are processed, and the modification falls into one of the following classifications listed below. The Secretary of State shall be the sole judge of whether or not a modification requires additional testing.

(i) The modification is made for the purpose of correcting a defect and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that the installation of the hardware change or corrected code does not result in any consequence other than the elimination of the defect.

(ii) The modification is made for the purpose of enabling interaction with other general purpose or approved equipment or computer programs and databases, and procedural and test documentation is provided which verifies that such interaction does not involve or adversely affect vote counting and data storage.

5. The addition or alteration of utility software and device handlers which do not interact with vote counting software except through the



intended input/output channels in the manner originally intended does not constitute a requirement for a mandatory retest.

(c) **Reciprocity.** The Secretary of State may accept the results of the Qualification tests and/or Certification tests from another state or testing agency that has performed the tests described in these Rules. This reciprocity does not extend to the Acceptance tests or any portion of the Certification tests, which are considered to be unique to the State of Georgia.

(d) **Procedure.** This review and approval procedure is limited to those voting systems and equipment that have passed the prototype stage and are in full production and available for immediate installation and use. Qualification tests shall be performed to evaluate the degree to which a system complies with the requirements of the *Voting Systems Standards* issued by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Whenever possible, Qualification tests shall be conducted by Independent Test Agencies (ITA) certified by the EAC. In the event that tests by an ITA are not feasible, these tests shall be conducted by a Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State.

Certification tests shall be performed to certify that the voting system complies with the Georgia Election Code, the Rules of the Georgia State Election Board, and the Rules of the Secretary of State. A Georgia Certification Agent designated by the Secretary of State shall conduct certification tests. The Qualification and Certification testing of a voting system for use in the State of Georgia shall proceed in the following steps.

1. **Qualification.** Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the *Voting Systems Standards* published by the EAC.

**2. Letter of Request.** After the voting system has completed EAC Qualification testing, the evaluation procedure to obtain certification for use of the voting system in the State of Georgia shall be initiated by letter from the vendor of the voting system to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for a specific voting system. The Secretary of State or her representative shall notify the vendor of the earliest date after which the requested evaluation may begin and provide the vendor with the name and telephone number of the designated Georgia Certification Agent.

**3. Submission of Complete Technical Data Package.** The vendor shall submit the Technical Data Package described in section (g) to the Certification Agent designated by the State. The Certification Agent shall review the submission of the Technical Data Package and notify the vendor of any deficiencies. Certification of the voting system shall not proceed until the Technical Data Package is complete.

**4. Preliminary Review.** The Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct a preliminary analysis of the Technical Data Package and prepare an Evaluation Proposal containing the following information:

(i) Components of the voting system requiring evaluation.

(ii) Identification of any hardware or software components requiring additional testing by the EAC ITAs.

(iii) Description of the activities required to complete that portion of the evaluation which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(iv) Estimate of time required to complete the portion of the evaluation, which is to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

(v) Estimate of cost of tests which are to be performed by the Georgia Certification Agent.

**5. Authorization to Proceed.** The vendor shall review the Evaluation Proposal and notify the Secretary of State, in writing, of

the desire to continue or terminate the evaluation process. The evaluation of the system shall not begin until the manufacturer or vendor notifies the Secretary of State to proceed. A copy of this notification shall be sent to the Georgia Certification Agent. A decision to continue shall obligate the vendor to the cost of the evaluation contained in the Evaluation Proposal.

**6. Evaluation.** The vendor shall arrange with the EAC ITAs for any additional required ITA testing identified in the Evaluation Proposal. After any required ITA tests have been successfully completed, the Georgia Certification Agent shall conduct the tests described in the Evaluation Proposal and submit a report of the findings to the Secretary of State.

**7. Certification.** Based on the information contained in the report from the Georgia Certification Agent, and any other information in her possession, the Secretary of State shall determine whether the proposed voting system shall be certified for use in the State of Georgia and so notify the vendor.

**8. Local Jurisdiction Acceptance.** After a voting system is delivered to a local jurisdiction, acceptance tests shall be performed in the user's environment to demonstrate that the voting system as delivered and installed is identical to the system that was certified by the State and satisfies the requirements specified in the procurement documents.

**(e) Proprietary Information.** The State of Georgia shall make every effort to protect the proprietary nature of information provided to the State or its agents during the course of these evaluations in accordance to Georgia law for protecting proprietary information. Any proposed non-disclosure agreements shall be of the type and form in common commercial usage appropriate to similar situations and shall be subject to review and approval by the Georgia Attorney General.

**(f) Audit and Validation of Certification.**

1. It shall be the responsibility of the vendor to ensure that any voting system or component of a voting system that it markets or supplies for use in the State of Georgia has been certified by the Secretary of State. It is also the responsibility of the vendor to submit

any modifications to a previously certified system or component to the Secretary of State for re-certification and to update the Technical Data Package on file in the Office of the Secretary of State to accurately reflect the modifications.

2. If any question arises involving the certification of a voting system or a component of a voting system in use in the State, the Technical Data Package and Certification documentation on file in the Office of the Secretary of State shall be used to verify that the system or component in question is *identical* to the system or component that was submitted for certification.

(g) **Technical Data Package.** Before evaluation can begin, the vendor must submit to the Georgia Certification Agent the Technical Data Package required to complete the evaluation of the proposed voting system. Each item in the Technical Data Package must be clearly identified. If the Technical Data Package is incomplete or the items in the package are not clearly identified, the entire package may be returned to the vendor and the evaluation of the voting system rescheduled. In most cases, the Technical Data Package submitted to the ITAs shall be sufficient for State certification.

The Technical Data Package shall contain the following items in hard copy and in electronic form when available.

(i) *Customer Maintenance Documentation.* Documentation describing any maintenance that the vendor recommends that can be performed by a customer with minimal knowledge of the system.

(ii) *Operations Manual.* Operations documentation that is normally supplied to the customer for use by the person(s) who shall operate the equipment.

(iii) *Software Source Code.* Source code of all software and firmware in the voting system. The source code shall be supplied in the form of a listing and in a machine-readable form on media that is acceptable to the Georgia Certification Agent. If there is any chance of ambiguity, the required compiler) and/or development environment must be specified.

(iv) *Software System Design.* Documentation describing the logical

design of the software. This documentation should clearly indicate the various modules of the software, their functions, and their interrelationships. The minimum acceptable documentation is a system flowchart. Deviation of the source code from the system design may be cause for rejection of the voting system.

(v) *Customer Documentation.* A complete set of all documentation which is available to the purchaser/user of the voting system. Clearly identify that documentation which is included in the cost of the system and that documentation which is available for an additional charge.

(vi) *ITA Qualification Reports.* Copies of the ITA reports for the hardware and software qualification of the voting system. These reports must be sent directly from the ITA to the Georgia Certification Agent.

(vii) *Formal Complaints and Decertification Notices.* Copies of any formal complaints and/or decertification notices that have been filed against the proposed system. This documentation must clearly identify the jurisdiction filing the complaint or decertification notice and give the details of the resolution.

(viii) *Test Data/Software (Optional).* Any available test data, ballot decks, and/or software that can be used to demonstrate the various functions of the voting system. Although optional, these items can significantly reduce the effort, and hence the time and cost, involved in the evaluation of the system.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50, 21-2-258, 21-2-368, 21-2-379.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Equipment" adopted. F. Jan. 21, 1988; eff. Feb. 10, 1988. **Repealed:** New Rule entitled "Certification of Voting Systems" adopted. F. Mar. 28, 2005; eff. Apr. 17, 2005.

## **590-8-1.02 Verification of Voter Registration Information.**

(1) The board of registrars shall enter the information contained on voter registration applications into the statewide voter registration database in a timely manner.

(2) Verification of applicant's United States citizenship.

(a) Georgia driver's license number or identification card number.

1. If an applicant submits an application for registration and uses the applicant's Georgia driver's license number or identification card number for evidence of United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to match such number to the Department of Driver Services database.

2. If the Department of Driver Services records indicate that the applicant is not a United States citizen in the Department of Driver Services database, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's United States citizenship status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. Such verification will indicate whether the applicant is designated as a citizen of the United States within the Verification Information System database.

3. If the Department of Driver Services cannot confirm that the applicant has provided satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship to the Department of Driver Services and the Secretary of State cannot confirm the applicant's United States citizenship through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, the board of registrars shall take the following steps:

(i) The board of registrars shall ensure that the Georgia driver's license number or identification card number was entered correctly into the statewide voter registration system. If the board of registrars determines the number was not entered correctly, the board of registrars shall correct the driver's license number or identification card number in the statewide voter registration system. The Secretary of State shall match the new driver's license number or identification card number to the Department of Driver Services database.

(b) Alien registration number.

1. If only the alien registration number from an applicant's naturalization documents is provided for United States citizenship purposes, the Secretary of State shall attempt to verify the applicant's alien registration number with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services utilizing the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-216. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Verification of Voter Registration Information" adopted, F. Dec. 16, 2009; eff. Jan. 5, 2010.

**RULES  
OF  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE ELECTIONS  
DIVISION**

**CHAPTER 590-8-2  
HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 PROVISIONS  
TABLE OF CONTENTS**

590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure  
for Violations of Title III of the Help  
America Vote Act of 2002

**590-8-2-.01 Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the  
Help America Vote Act of 2002.**

(1) Any person who believes that a violation of any provision of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252; 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq.) has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Such complaint shall be open to inspection by the public during business hours upon reasonable notice.

(2) Such complaint shall be in writing and shall be signed and sworn to by the person making the complaint and shall be properly notarized in accordance with state law. The complaint shall be delivered to and served upon the Secretary of State as the chief state election official in person, by U.S. Mail, or by guaranteed overnight delivery.

(3) The Secretary of State shall investigate the allegations of such complaint. If more than one complaint is filed concerning the same alleged violation, the Secretary of State may consolidate such complaints for investigation.

(4) If the complainant requests, the Secretary of State or a designee thereof shall conduct a hearing on the allegations of the complaint. Such hearing may be by telephone, conference call, or in person and shall be recorded.

(5) If the Secretary of State or a designee thereof determines that such complaint is unfounded, the Secretary of State may dismiss the complaint and notify the complainant of her decision. The Secretary of State shall make the results of her investigation into the complaint available for public inspection during normal business hours upon reasonable notice after the matter has been resolved.

(6) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall make a determination of the validity of the complaint within 90 days following the date on which the complaint is received by and filed with the Secretary of State unless the complainant agrees to an extension of such time period.

(7) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof determines that such complaint is valid, the Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate actions within her authority to address the violation; and

(8) If the Secretary of State or designee thereof does not render a final determination on a complaint filed pursuant to this rule within 90 days after the complaint is filed, or within any extension period to which the complainant has agreed, the Secretary of State or designee thereof will, on or before the third business day after the final determination was due to be issued, initiate proceedings for alternative dispute resolution;

(a) To facilitate alternative dispute resolution, the Secretary of State shall maintain a list of qualified independent professionals who are capable of acting as a mediator, from which the Secretary of State or designee thereof and the complainant shall each choose one mediator to review the case.

(b) The Secretary of State or designee thereof shall designate in writing to the complainant the name of a mediator from the list referenced in section (a) to serve on an alternative dispute resolution panel (resolution panel) to review the complaint.

1. If proceedings for alternative dispute resolution are initiated pursuant to this paragraph, not later than 3 business days after the complainant receives such a designation from the Secretary of State or designee thereof, the complainant shall designate in writing to the Secretary of State or designee thereof the name of a second mediator. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review the record from the hearing and make a final recommendation based on the submitted record. Not later than 3 business days after such a designation by the complainant, the two mediators so designated shall select a third mediator to complete the resolution panel. If the complainant fails to designate a mediator within the time allowed above, the sole mediator shall review and dispose of the matter without selecting a second or third mediator.

2. The mediator or resolution panel may review the record compiled in connection with the complaint, including, without limitation, the investigative file on the matter, the audio recording of the hearing, any transcript of the hearing and any briefs or memoranda submitted by the parties but shall not receive any additional testimony or evidence to resolve the matter.

3. The mediator or resolution panel by a majority vote, shall after reviewing the record referenced above, provide a recommendation to the Secretary of State not later than 50 days after the final determination of the Secretary of State was due. This period for issuing a written recommendation will not be extended.

4. Upon receipt of the recommendation from the mediator or resolution panel, the Secretary of State or designee thereof shall issue a final order pursuant to the authority granted under O.C.G.A. 21-2-50.2(c), but such remedy shall not exceed the remedies available under Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

5. The final order of the Secretary of State or designee thereof will be:

(i) Mailed to the complainant, each respondent and any other person who requested in writing to be advised of the final resolution;

(ii) Posted on the website of the Secretary of State; and



(iii) Made available by the Secretary of State, upon request by any interested person.

6. A final determination by the Secretary of State or designee thereof is not subject to appeal in any state or federal court.

Authority O.C.G.A. Secs. 21-2-1, 21-2-50.2. **History.** Original Rule entitled "Administrative Complaint Procedure for Violations of Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002" adopted. F. May 11, 2004; eff. May 31, 2004.

**WHEREAS:** On October 9 and 10, 2018, a State of Emergency was declared for multiple counties within the state of Georgia; and

**WHEREAS:** Elections offices in Grady and Randolph Counties were forced to close on October 9, due to the potential impact of Hurricane Michael and in response to the State of Emergency; and

**WHEREAS:** The voter registration deadline for the upcoming November 6, 2018 election fell on October 9, 2018; and

**WHEREAS:** Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 38-3-51, et seq., the authority is vested in the Governor to issue reasonable orders, rules and regulations deemed necessary to protect public health, safety and welfare, and bring the emergency situation under control within the acknowledged limitations of the powers of the Governor.

**NOW, THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, IT IS HEREBY**

**ORDERED:** That elections offices in Grady and Randolph shall accept voter registration applications from citizens of those counties for an additional day until \_\_\_\_\_.

This 12<sup>TH</sup> day of October, 2018.

---

**GOVERNOR**

---

**From:** Barron, Richard L. <Richard.Barron@fultoncountyga.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 2:21 AM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** Sequestered machines

Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Chris:

The sequestered DREs forced us to limit the number of DREs that we could place in the field. We have approximately 700 DREs that Judge Totenberg sequestered. With the ballot as long as it was, we could have used those to bolster polling places all over the county. Dwight revised his initial allocation downwards in order for us to have some spares. We had requests from many polling places, but we had to hold onto about 40 units in case of emergency. Our attorneys asked for the DREs to be released a few times to no avail.

Sincerely,  
Rick

---

**From:** Reinhard, Beth <Beth.Reinhard@washpost.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 3:53 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** Re: Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi there, haven't heard from your press office. Hearing that you personally asked Fulton County (and I assume other counties affected by the litigation) about the impact of the sequestered machines.

Hope to hear from you soon!

Beth Reinhard

The Washington Post

[beth.reinhard@washpost.com](mailto:beth.reinhard@washpost.com)

202 334 7568 work

 cell

Follow me @BethReinhard

---

**From:** Reinhard, Beth  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 12:56:45 PM  
**To:** [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)  
**Subject:** Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation  
Hi there

Hope you are holding up ok after what I imagine was a sleepless night!

I imagine you are slammed but I urgently need to speak to you about why these machines were not deployed in what was expected to be a high-turnout election. I'm told you have the breakdown of how many machines are currently off-line in the counties affected by this litigation- can I get those numbers, please? Were there concerns raised by your office or by the local election officials or voting rights advocates about these machines not being available yesterday? If not - how come? Does your office make recommendations to local election officials as to how many machines should be available per capita?

Thanks so much for making time for me as soon as you can today.

Beth Reinhard

The Washington Post  
[beth.reinhard@washpost.com](mailto:beth.reinhard@washpost.com)  
202 334 7568 work  
[REDACTED] cell  
Follow me @BethReinhard

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 9:27 AM  
**To:** Barron, Richard L.  
**Subject:** Re: Sequestered machines

Thanks.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Nov 7, 2018, at 2:20 AM, Barron, Richard L. <[Richard.Barron@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Richard.Barron@fultoncountyga.gov)> wrote:

>

> Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

>

> Chris:

>

> The sequestered DREs forced us to limit the number of DREs that we could place in the field. We have approximately 700 DREs that Judge Totenberg sequestered. With the ballot as long as it was, we could have used those to bolster polling places all over the county. Dwight revised his initial allocation downwards in order for us to have some spares. We had requests from many polling places, but we had to hold onto about 40 units in case of emergency. Our attorneys asked for the DREs to be released a few times to no avail.

>

> Sincerely,

> Rick

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 5:24 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** FW: Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Reinhard, Beth  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 3:53 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** Re: Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi there, haven't heard from your press office. Hearing that you personally asked Fulton County (and I assume other counties affected by the litigation) about the impact of the sequestered machines.

Hope to hear from you soon!

Beth Reinhard

The Washington Post

[beth.reinhard@washpost.com](mailto:beth.reinhard@washpost.com)

202 334 7568 work

cell

Follow me @BethReinhard

---

**From:** Reinhard, Beth  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 12:56:45 PM

**To:** [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)

**Subject:** Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

Hi there

Hope you are holding up ok after what I imagine was a sleepless night!

I imagine you are slammed but I urgently need to speak to you about why these machines were not deployed in what was expected to be a high-turnout election. I'm told you have the breakdown of how many machines are currently off-line in the counties affected by this litigation- can I get those numbers, please? Were there concerns raised by your office or by the local election officials or voting rights advocates about these machines not being available yesterday? If not - how come? Does your office make recommendations to local election officials as to how many machines should be available per capita?

Thanks so much for making time for me as soon as you can today.

Beth Reinhard

The Washington Post

[beth.reinhard@washpost.com](mailto:beth.reinhard@washpost.com)

202 334 7568 work

cell

Follow me @BethReinhard



---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <Mark.Niese@ajc.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 11:11 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** Sequestered DREs from Curling litigation

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good morning,

Hope you got some rest last night.

I'm following up on a story about how sequestration of voting machines contributed to long lines in metro counties.

Is the number of DREs and staffing entirely a county decision?

Do county election offices send any plans for elections administration to the Secretary of State's Office? Does your office review or approve those plans?

Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 5:24 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** FW: Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Reinhard, Beth  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 3:53 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** Re: Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi there, haven't heard from your press office. Hearing that you personally asked Fulton County (and I assume other counties affected by the litigation) about the impact of the sequestered machines.

Hope to hear from you soon!

Beth Reinhard

The Washington Post

[beth.reinhard@washpost.com](mailto:beth.reinhard@washpost.com)

202 334 7568 work

██████████ cell

Follow me @BethReinhard

---

**From:** Reinhard, Beth  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 12:56:45 PM

**To:** [wharvey@sos.ga.gov](mailto:wharvey@sos.ga.gov)

**Subject:** Hundreds of voting machines off line because of Coalition for Good Governance litigation

Hi there

Hope you are holding up ok after what I imagine was a sleepless night!

I imagine you are slammed but I urgently need to speak to you about why these machines were not deployed in what was expected to be a high-turnout election. I'm told you have the breakdown of how many machines are currently off-line in the counties affected by this litigation- can I get those numbers, please? Were there concerns raised by your office or by the local election officials or voting rights advocates about these machines not being available yesterday? If not - how come? Does your office make recommendations to local election officials as to how many machines should be available per capita?

Thanks so much for making time for me as soon as you can today.

Beth Reinhard

The Washington Post

[beth.reinhard@washpost.com](mailto:beth.reinhard@washpost.com)

202 334 7568 work

cell

Follow me @BethReinhard

---

**From:** Williams, Vanessa <Vanessa.Williams@washpost.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 5:46 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** Question about voting machines/law suit

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Candice,

There seems to be conflicting coverage about whether counties could use all voting machines or had to sequester some of them as part of the lawsuit over paper ballots. Did the SoS give any direction or guidance to county officials about this, as ordered by the judge?

Thanks

V

Vanessa Williams  
Staff Writer  
The Washington Post  
[Vanessa.Williams@washpost.com](mailto:Vanessa.Williams@washpost.com)  
202-334-6922  
@WaPoVanessa

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <Mark.Niese@ajc.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 12:06 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** Re: Outstanding precincts

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thank you.

Do you have any information on my other questions about sequestered DREs?

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 7, 2018, at 12:02 PM, Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)> wrote:

Follow up on background: We do not have a provisional ballot total from counties yet. We are working to gather information from counties where the results are incomplete. Our understanding is that they are still working through tabulation of absentee by mail ballots, and duplication efforts are taking a substantial amount of time.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 11:40 AM  
**To:** 'Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)' <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Outstanding precincts  
Yes.

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 11:28 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Outstanding precincts

---

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Candice,

Here's another question:

Do you know if the election reporting website will be updated today with the roughly 200 precincts that haven't been fully reported?

Thanks again.

Mark Niese

Georgia Government Reporter

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

404-526-2848

Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <Mark.Niese@ajc.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 12:20 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Outstanding precincts

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Yes, that's helpful. It appears that a shortage of available DREs contributed to lines, and I'm talking to county election officials about that issue.

Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 07, 2018 12:12 PM  
**To:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Subject:** RE: Outstanding precincts

I was waiting to hear back from Chris Harvey. Just did.

State law outlines how county officials must notify the Secretary of State's office if they intend on tabulating absentee by mail ballots early on Election Day. If they provide notice ahead of time, they can begin early tabulation starting as early as 7 AM on Election Day. Otherwise, they are not obligated to share, and do not share, their plans for allocating and deploying voting equipment to specific polling locations. Does that answer your question?

Candice

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <Mark.Niese@ajc.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 12:06 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Outstanding precincts

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thank you.

Do you have any information on my other questions about sequestered DREs?

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 7, 2018, at 12:02 PM, Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov> wrote:

Follow up on background: We do not have a provisional ballot total from counties yet. We are working to gather information from counties where the results are incomplete. Our understanding is that they

are still working through tabulation of absentee by mail ballots, and duplication efforts are taking a substantial amount of time.

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 11:40 AM  
**To:** 'Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)' <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Outstanding precincts

Yes.

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 7, 2018 11:28 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Outstanding precincts

---

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

---

Candice,

Here's another question:

Do you know if the election reporting website will be updated today with the roughly 200 precincts that haven't been fully reported?

Thanks again.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Grace Walker <gwalker@wabe.org>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:14 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Statement on Lt. Gov Lawsuit | WABE (deadline: 12:30 p.m.)

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thanks, Candice. I appreciate it!

**Grace Walker** | Producer, *Closer Look with Rose Scott* | O: 678.686.0330

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:10:56 PM  
**To:** Grace Walker  
**Subject:** RE: Statement on Lt. Gov Lawsuit | WABE (deadline: 12:30 p.m.)  
Statement from Secretary Crittenden: "Despite the Plaintiffs' vague, unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, November's election was accurate and secure. Ultimately, we believe that their claims will fail in court, and the integrity of the election system will be affirmed."

My observations for background:

It's very telling that Sarah Riggs Amico is not part of this lawsuit.

In order to do a statewide election contest, you have to sue all 159 county election boards. The Plaintiffs have sued three. In their complaint, they call out about ten counties with so-called election administration problems, yet they don't sue any of them.

There is a responsible way to replace Georgia's voting system, and it continues with the SAFE Commission under Secretary Crittenden. We remain committed to having a new system in place for the 2020 election cycle. The right way to do that is to have the people's elected policy-makers weigh the options and make a determination. This lawsuit is just the latest gambit from a group to get around this process and impose their own will via judicial fiat. If they were truly interested in the security of Georgia's elections, they would drop all of their ridiculous lawsuits and work through the ongoing process. Their lawsuits, and their ridiculous claims to sequester machines for current elections, make the ultimate goal more difficult.

Candice

---

**From:** Grace Walker  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 11:36 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** Statement on Lt. Gov Lawsuit | WABE (deadline: 12:30 p.m.)

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good afternoon Candice,



Does the SOS's office have a statement regarding the lawsuit surrounding the Lieutenant Governor's race? If so, would you mind sending it my way before today's edition of *Closer Look* on WABE?

Thanks,

**Grace Walker** | Producer, *Closer Look with Rose Scott* | O: 678.686.0330

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:11 PM  
**To:** Grace Walker  
**Subject:** RE: Statement on Lt. Gov Lawsuit | WABE (deadline: 12:30 p.m.)

Statement from Secretary Crittenden: "Despite the Plaintiffs' vague, unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, November's election was accurate and secure. Ultimately, we believe that their claims will fail in court, and the integrity of the election system will be affirmed."

My observations for background:

It's very telling that Sarah Riggs Amico is not part of this lawsuit.

In order to do a statewide election contest, you have to sue all 159 county election boards. The Plaintiffs have sued three. In their complaint, they call out about ten counties with so-called election administration problems, yet they don't sue any of them.

There is a responsible way to replace Georgia's voting system, and it continues with the SAFE Commission under Secretary Crittenden. We remain committed to having a new system in place for the 2020 election cycle. The right way to do that is to have the people's elected policy-makers weigh the options and make a determination. This lawsuit is just the latest gambit from a group to get around this process and impose their own will via judicial fiat. If they were truly interested in the security of Georgia's elections, they would drop all of their ridiculous lawsuits and work through the ongoing process. Their lawsuits, and their ridiculous claims to sequester machines for current elections, make the ultimate goal more difficult.

Candice

---

**From:** Grace Walker  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 11:36 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** Statement on Lt. Gov Lawsuit | WABE (deadline: 12:30 p.m.)

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Good afternoon Candice,

Does the SOS's office have a statement regarding the lawsuit surrounding the Lieutenant Governor's race? If so, would you mind sending it my way before today's edition of *Closer Look* on WABE?

Thanks,

**Grace Walker** | Producer, *Closer Look with Rose Scott* | O: 678.686.0330

---

**From:** Niesse, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <Mark.Niesse@ajc.com>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:23 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thank you.

Separately, do you think the SAFE Commission will meet again before the end of the year?

Mark Niesse  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniesse

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:10 PM  
**To:** Niesse, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

Statement from Secretary Crittenden: "Despite the Plaintiffs' vague, unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, November's election was accurate and secure. Ultimately, we believe that their claims will fail in court, and the integrity of the election system will be affirmed."

My observations for background:

It's very telling that Sarah Riggs Amico is not part of this lawsuit.

In order to do a statewide election contest, you have to sue all 159 county election boards. The Plaintiffs have sued three. In their complaint, they call out about ten counties with so-called election administration problems, yet they don't sue any of them.

There is a responsible way to replace Georgia's voting system, and it continues with the SAFE Commission under Secretary Crittenden. We remain committed to having a new system in place for the 2020 election cycle. The right way to do that is to have the people's elected policy-makers weigh the options and make a determination. This lawsuit is just the latest gambit from a group to get around this process and impose their own will via judicial fiat. If they were truly interested in the security of Georgia's elections, they would drop all of their ridiculous lawsuits and work through the ongoing process. Their lawsuits, and their ridiculous claims to sequester machines for current elections, make the ultimate goal more difficult.

---

**From:** Niesse, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niesse@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niesse@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 3:06 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

I'm checking back with you on this statement. Is it coming soon? Editors are pushing for the article to be finished.  
Thanks again.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 12:48 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 12:47 PM  
**To:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

I was in a meeting. I'm working on a statement, and I'll send it to you as soon as I can.

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 11:00 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Candice,  
I'm writing about the lawsuit filed by Coalition for Good Governance alleging that votes weren't counted in the lieutenant governor's race. I've reviewed the letter from Secretary of State Robyn Crittenden that's posted on Sarah Riggs Amico's website: <https://sarahforgeorgia.com/letter-secretary-state/>  
What is the explanation for this alleged undervote? It does appear anomalous when compared to other statewide races. I'm writing an article over the next couple of hours. Please let me know.  
Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848



---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:14 PM  
**To:** Johnny Kauffman  
**Subject:** RE: TIME SENSITIVE: Response to LG election challenge based on irregularities

I'm sorry for the delay.

Statement from Secretary Crittenden: "Despite the Plaintiffs' vague, unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, November's election was accurate and secure. Ultimately, we believe that their claims will fail in court, and the integrity of the election system will be affirmed."

My observations for background:

It's very telling that Sarah Riggs Amico is not part of this lawsuit.

In order to do a statewide election contest, you have to sue all 159 county election boards. The Plaintiffs have sued three. In their complaint, they call out about ten counties with so-called election administration problems, yet they don't sue any of them.

There is a responsible way to replace Georgia's voting system, and it continues with the SAFE Commission under Secretary Crittenden. We remain committed to having a new system in place for the 2020 election cycle. The right way to do that is to have the people's elected policy-makers weigh the options and make a determination. This lawsuit is just the latest gambit from a group to get around this process and impose their own will via judicial fiat. If they were truly interested in the security of Georgia's elections, they would drop all of their ridiculous lawsuits and work through the ongoing process. Their lawsuits, and their ridiculous claims to sequester machines for current elections, make the ultimate goal more difficult.

We are actively working on getting a date set for the next SAFE Commission meeting.

---

**From:** Johnny Kauffman  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 10:35 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** TIME SENSITIVE: Response to LG election challenge based on irregularities

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hey Candice,

Hope you had a good Thanksgiving.

Wondering if you have any response to the LG election challenge in Fulton County Superior Court?

The complaint included SoS Crittenden's response to Sarah Riggs Amico's letter from earlier this month, so I have that. But that was before the lawsuit was filed.

If you have anything to add let me know. My deadline is 3 p.m.

Thanks

Johnny Kauffman  
Reporter  
WABE News, NPR Atlanta  
Desk: 678-686-0392  
Cell: 574-849-0794  
@JohnnyIK

---

**From:** Broce, Candice  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:23 PM  
**To:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

Yes

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:23 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Thank you.

Separately, do you think the SAFE Commission will meet again before the end of the year?

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 4:10 PM  
**To:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

Statement from Secretary Crittenden: "Despite the Plaintiffs' vague, unsubstantiated claims to the contrary, November's election was accurate and secure. Ultimately, we believe that their claims will fail in court, and the integrity of the election system will be affirmed."

My observations for background:

It's very telling that Sarah Riggs Amico is not part of this lawsuit.

In order to do a statewide election contest, you have to sue all 159 county election boards. The Plaintiffs have sued three. In their complaint, they call out about ten counties with so-called election administration problems, yet they don't sue any of them.

There is a responsible way to replace Georgia's voting system, and it continues with the SAFE Commission under Secretary Crittenden. We remain committed to having a new system in place for the 2020 election cycle. The right way to do that is to have the people's elected policy-makers weigh the options and make a determination. This lawsuit is just the latest gambit from a group to get around this process and impose their own will via judicial fiat. If they were truly interested in the security of Georgia's elections, they would drop all of their ridiculous lawsuits and work through the ongoing process. Their lawsuits, and their ridiculous claims to sequester machines for current elections, make the ultimate goal more difficult.



---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 3:06 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

I'm checking back with you on this statement. Is it coming soon? Editors are pushing for the article to be finished. Thanks again.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta)  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 12:48 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

---

**From:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 12:47 PM  
**To:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Subject:** RE: Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

I was in a meeting. I'm working on a statement, and I'll send it to you as soon as I can.

---

**From:** Niese, Mark (CMG-Atlanta) <[Mark.Niese@ajc.com](mailto:Mark.Niese@ajc.com)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 11:00 AM  
**To:** Broce, Candice <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
**Subject:** Lawsuit in lieutenant governor's race

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Candice,  
I'm writing about the lawsuit filed by Coalition for Good Governance alleging that votes weren't counted in the lieutenant governor's race. I've reviewed the letter from Secretary of State Robyn Crittenden that's posted on Sarah Riggs Amico's website: <https://sarahforgeorgia.com/letter-secretary-state/>  
What is the explanation for this alleged undervote? It does appear anomalous when compared to other statewide races.

I'm writing an article over the next couple of hours. Please let me know.  
Thank you.

Mark Niese  
Georgia Government Reporter  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution  
404-526-2848  
Twitter: @markniese

**From:** John Salter

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 20, 2018 12:11 PM

**To:** 'Bruce Brown' <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@ichterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@ichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Bruce,

Please allow this to respond to your emails of yesterday, Nov. 19, 2018. As I interpret it, the “urgent” “evidence preservation” concern expressed by the Coalition Plaintiffs is really an objection to the preparation of DRE machines for use in the upcoming December 4 Runoff election. The remedy your clients suggest, as a practical matter, would prevent the use of DRE machines for the December 4 Runoff, thereby requiring an entirely paper-ballot runoff election. It cannot be coincidence that this replays the Coalition Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctions that were denied by the Court. *See* Doc. 309 at 41 (“the eleventh-hour timing of [the Coalition Plaintiffs’] motions and an instant grant of the paper ballot relief requested could just as readily jeopardize the upcoming elections, voter turnout, and the orderly administration of the election”); *see also* Doc. 336.

As your second email of yesterday clarified, your concerns arose from an email sent by Georgia’s Election Director of the Office of the Secretary of State, Chris Harvey (dated Nov. 15, 2018 at 3:17 PM) with the subject line “GEMS Database Deliveries Tuesday.” In that email, the Election Director advises elections officials of various counties that “[i]n preparation for the December 4, 2018 run-off, our office will be delivering your GEMS Database on CD in the same manner that we normally deliver the ExpressPoll cards.” It goes on to state as follows:

*“This coming Tuesday, November 20, 2018, Investigators from the Secretary of State’s Office will be at assigned locations with your GEMS Database in your secured bag. You will meet the investigator at the location and follow the same protocol with showing ID or a letter to claim yours GEMS database.”*

My interpretation of Mr. Harvey’s email is that it appears to be the kind of routine, election-related correspondence one would expect the Elections Director to

provide county election officials in furtherance of an election like the upcoming December 4 Runoff.

The sort of preparations for the Dec. 4 2018 Runoff election suggested by Mr. Harvey's Email are no different from (or more- or less-than) what is required to execute any other statewide election using DRE machines. The Coalition Plaintiffs apparently (mis)characterize this routine, election-related correspondence as an urgent preservation issue—as if SoS officials are poised to destroy evidence in violation of Judge Totenberg's Order. Based upon my investigation, I do not see how any reasonable person could agree there is cause for alarm.

The Coalition Plaintiffs appear to equate mere use of the DRE machines with spoliation and, from this premise, leap to the conclusion that the State Defendants must be violating the Court's preservation orders. Specifically, your email claims that using these DRE machines without making a "complete electronic image," will place the State Defendants in violation of the Court's preservation orders and State Election Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d). Under this mis-interpretation, it seems the Coalition Plaintiffs are asserting the Court's preservation Order was violated simply because DRE machines were used for elections in May, July and November. We disagree with your clients' premise and their conclusion.

The Court has never conditioned continued use of DRE machines upon making a "complete electronic image" of every DRE machine in between every episodic Georgia election, despite several such elections occurring since this case began. Nor would such waste of time and money be reasonable burdens to impose upon the State or its county governments.

Your reference to the State Election Rule misunderstands the situation. In order to conduct an election, DRE units must be programmed to execute the Dec. 4 Runoff Election by adding an additional election ballot. Otherwise, electors would be presented with the same candidate choices as Nov. 6's election. The addition of such data would not subtract from, or overwrite, the data previously recorded in the DRE unit's archival memory for any of the elections at issue in this case. In other words, the kind of actions the SoS and counties must undertake in order to perform an orderly election *would not erase data from the Nov. 6<sup>th</sup> election*. Therefore, the use of the DRE machines in an upcoming election is lawful and in keeping with the State Election Board's Rule (1-183-12-.02(6)(d)), restricting "erasure" of internal memory storage of a DRE unit.

In order for Georgia counties to perform an orderly election for the upcoming Dec. 4 Runoff—and if electors who go to the polls are to receive a properly-formatted runoff ballot—they must prepare the DRE machines and (as described in Mr. Harvey’s email), each county needs to receive from the SoS a copy of the GEMS Database.

To the extent you allege a “violation” of the Court’s Order regarding preservation of evidence, I invite you to re-read the Order. It is plain that the Court “expects the parties to work cooperatively and in good faith to preserve evidence” something the State Defendants have done throughout. *See* Doc. 122 at 1. In defining the contours of that expectation, the Court added this important sentence:

“At the same time, *the Court recognizes this case involves governments and public officials with legal duties and responsibilities to execute the business of the State of Georgia, including preparations for upcoming and future elections*. Inherent in those duties is the transmission of data by and between the codefendants and various other agents of the state government and/or third parties.”

Doc. 122 at 2 (emphasis supplied). If the Plaintiffs objected to this language in the Order, it was incumbent upon them to file a timely motion for reconsideration, something they did not do.

Since this case began (and even after the above-mentioned Order was issued on December 15, 2017), the State Defendants have assisted counties in preparing for state-wide elections in May 2018 (general primary), July 2018 (primary runoff) and November of 2018 (general). In executing their lawful duties, the State Defendants have acted under the understanding that—so long as they acted reasonably and in good faith under the Court’s Order of December 15, 2017—preparation for upcoming and future elections could continue until further order of the Court. Performance of the State Defendants’ lawful duties should not be misconstrued as defiance or disobedience of their duty to take all *reasonable* steps to preserve evidence that could *reasonably* be construed as related to the allegations of the Complaints.

The performance of lawful election duties should not be impeded by demands for “preservation of evidence” that are unnecessary, unreasonable, or mere pretexts for obstructing the effective use of DRE machines to ensure orderly elections. Good-faith use of DRE machines—especially when that use does not result in the erasure of relevant data retained on DRE units’ archival memory—in upcoming elections

is not tantamount to violation of the Court's Order. Based on its Order, the Court understands—even if the Coalition Plaintiffs do not—that “preparation for upcoming and future elections” is indispensable to ensuring orderly elections. Doc. 122. The text of the Court's preservation Order supports this understanding. It would be unfair, harmful and disruptive to change it for the December 4 Runoff.

While I think this situation is anything but an urgent matter, should you still intend to treat it as such and to trouble the Court with it, I would ask that you provide a copy of this email so that the Court can understand the State Defendants' position. Otherwise, I wish everyone a safe and happy Thanksgiving.

Respectfully,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



**From:** Bruce Brown [<mailto:bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com>]

**Sent:** Monday, November 19, 2018 7:15 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>

**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Urgent: Preservation of Evidence Issue

John,

Further to the issue of preservation of evidence:

The attached email apparently sent to most counties' election departments from Chris Harvey indicates that runoff programming for the GEMS database is being distributed tomorrow, Tuesday, November 20. We assume that many counties will immediately undertake the installation of the new database and the programming of memory cards for their DRE machines and will begin the reprogramming process unless there are SOS instructions to the contrary.

In the event that no instructions have been issued to the counties to await the one month period to comply with the Internal Memory Election Rule or the need to permit potential contesting litigants to obtain uncompromised electronic data, we request that Secretary Crittenden issue immediate instructions not to reprogram DRE machines until this matter can be resolved for purposes of the Curling v Kemp case.

While we are likely to be able to select a sample of machines to request for preservation, we will need certain information from Defendants in order to select the type of sample our experts require. Again, we request that until we can resolve this matter, the machines not be uploaded with new election data which will alter the electronic records in the internal memory.

Thanks, and please let us know as soon as you receive a response from your clients.

Bruce

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Sent:** Monday, November 19, 2018 4:16 PM

**To:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>

**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Bruce,

I will respond to your email by close of business tomorrow (Tuesday) after conferring with my client and counsel for Fulton County.

--John

**From:** Bruce Brown [<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>]

**Sent:** Monday, November 19, 2018 1:55 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp

<hknapp@khlawfirm.com>

**Subject:** Re: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Re: Electronic Evidence Preservation and Telephone  
Conference with the Court

Counsel,

On behalf of Coalition Plaintiffs, we are writing to remind you of the urgent and imperative requirement to preserve electronic evidence stored on the State's DRE voting system. It has been recently reported to us that some counties have stated their intention to reprogram the DRE machines immediately in anticipation of the December 4 runoff election, and that the Secretary of State is delivering electronic ballot programming materials tomorrow, November 20. If officials intend to program DRE machines that were used in the November 6, 2018 election or machines previously requested to be preserved by Coalition Plaintiffs, without making a complete electronic image, the reprogramming for the December 4, 2018 election is in violation the Court's prior preservation orders, Coalition Plaintiffs' litigation hold letters, and of State Election Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d) ("DRE Internal Memory Rule").

The State's DRE Internal Memory Rule provides: "The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election." Using the DRE machines from the November 6, 2018 election in the runoff would be in plain violation of the DRE Internal Memory Rule. A complete electronic record of each DRE is time consuming to create, and is **not** created by Diebold archival programs that archive certain records including results, ballot images, and ballot programming, and some officials mistakenly believe.

Please confirm, by 7pm today, that all electronic data in all DRE voting system equipment used in the 2018 general election (the "Required Data" as defined below) is going to be preserved without alteration, including programming of the DRE units. If you do not so confirm, we will seek a telephonic conference with the Court consistent with the requirements of the Court's December, 2017 Order (attached).



All of this data is subject to Plaintiffs' litigation hold letters and, to our knowledge, no party associated with the State has sought or obtained from the Court any exception to the litigation hold requirements, despite the obligation to do so.

We must reiterate that preserving memory card data is nowhere near sufficient to meet preservation requirements, and reliance on the DREs' archival of election results and cast vote records is wholly insufficient as well. Instead, the following data ("the Required Data") must be preserved:

- a. all electronic data residing in the internal memory of the DRE machines prepared for use in the November 6, 2018 election, including DRE machines used for uploading memory cards in election offices;
- b. all electronic data on DRE memory cards from all polling places and election offices used in early voting and Election Day voting related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- c. all electronic data residing on the GEMS servers, including logging records and audit logs related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- d. all electronic data residing on external media devices used to upload results to the Election Night Reporting system related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- e. all electronic data residing on Electronic Media Processors related to the November 6, 2018 elections.
- f. all electronic data on ExpressPollbooks memory cards used in the November 6, 2018 election.
- g. all electronic data in the internal memory of the ExpressPollbooks used in the November 6, 2018 election.

- h. all electronic data including logging records (including the E-Net systems and vendors' records) used in the upload or download of voter registration records and the electronic pollbooks.

We note further that the State can preserve the Required Data and conduct the runoff election by taking advantage of several alternatives, such as (a) using DRE machines that were not used in November and not otherwise under preservation orders and litigation hold requests; (b) using paper ballots counted by optical scan which would be faster, easier, less costly and provide a reliable, verifiable election; or (c) using DRE machines from other jurisdictions or the vendor. What is not an acceptable alternative is to destroy this evidence without the consent of the parties to the litigation and the approval of the Court. The State's present methods of updating, reprogramming and securing DRE machines fall far short of meeting the DRE Internal Memory Rule or the preservation requirements of the *Curling v Kemp* litigation.

We would also remind you that voters or candidates planning to file an election contest may have until early December (depending on individual circumstances) to file. Altering DRE internal memory data will also compromise their rights to evidence that is contemplated to be preserved through the pendency of an election contest by the DRE Internal Memory Rule.

The preservation of the Required Data would be required regardless of the actual performance of the systems in the November 6 election. However, given the widespread errors reported and evidenced in the official reports of the Secretary of State, the numerous reports of machine failures and irregularities in the November 6 election, the errors and irregularities documented in the primaries as set forth in the Coalition Plaintiffs' prior filings, the errors and irregularities documented by the Plaintiffs in the *Common Cause* case, and reported anomalous undervote in the DRE machine results in the Lieutenant Governor race, it is imperative that this electronic evidence be completely preserved. Uncompromised forensic review is more critical than ever, given the widespread credible reports of operating problems and anomalies in the November 6, 2018 results

We look forward to hearing from you.

Many thanks,

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia  
30306  
(404) 881-0700

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.

Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION. Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

## Germany, Ryan

---

**From:** Cristina Correia <ccorreia@law.ga.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 2:45 PM  
**To:** 'Bruce Brown'; bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov; Cheryl Ringer; info@teamduncan.org  
**Cc:** David Lowman; Kaye Burwell; Bryan Tyson; Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bruce,

Thank you for your email. We cannot agree that the preparation of DRE machines for use in the upcoming December 4 Runoff election will in any way compromise the preservation of evidence in this matter. As counsel for the Secretary and SEB in the *Curling* matter has previously advised you, the suggestion that DRE machines be sequestered is unworkable and would frustrate public officials' legal duties and responsibilities to execute the business of the State of Georgia, including preparations for upcoming and future elections.

In order to conduct an election, DRE units must be programed to execute the Dec. 4 Runoff Election by adding an additional election ballot. Otherwise, electors would be presented with the same candidate choices as Nov. 6's election. The addition of such data does not subtract from, or overwrite, the data previously recorded in the DRE unit's archival memory for any of the elections at issue in this case. In other words, the kind of actions the SoS and counties must undertake in order to perform an orderly election *would not erase data from the Nov. 6<sup>th</sup> election*. Therefore, the use of the DRE machines in an upcoming election is lawful and in keeping with the State Election Board's Rule (1-183-12-.02(6)(d)), restricting "erasure" of internal memory storage of a DRE unit.

I am happy to discuss this further if you have any questions.

Best regards,  
Cris Correia



**Cristina Correia**  
**Senior Assistant Attorney General**  
**Office of Attorney General Chris Carr**  
**Government Services & Employment**

Tel: 404-656-7063  
ccorreia@law.ga.gov

Georgia Department of Law  
40 Capitol Square SW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334



---

**From:** Bruce Brown [mailto:bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 3:01 PM  
**To:** Cristina Correia; bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov; Cheryl Ringer; info@teamduncan.org  
**Cc:** David Lowman; Kaye Burwell; Bryan Tyson  
**Subject:** Re: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Counsel:

As you know, your clients are under a duty to preserve evidence that is or may be relevant to this litigation. This includes, but is not limited to, all of the DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election. We will be following up with more detailed information about the preservation of evidence.

This email is to make a specific request for defendants to set aside and preserve two groups of DRE's immediately:

A. The DRE's identified on the attached Exhibit A. This is a small fraction of the total number of machines used in the November 6, 2018 election, and only a portion of the machines that exhibited malfunctions in the polling places in the November 6, 2018 election. These machines need to be preserved intact *without* programming them or using them in the runoff early voting or runoff election day voting.

Please note that the process of updating, or reusing the machines, alters the internal memory of the machines, memory which constitutes evidence that is required to be preserved as evidence under Georgia law because of this litigation.

In addition, preserving the internal memory is also required by State regulations, specifically State Election Rule Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d), which states:

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election **stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit** shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

We have conferred with numerous computer science and voting system experts and there is unanimous agreement that using these machines in the runoff, or uploading new programming, alters the internal memory of the DRE machines in violation defendants' duties to preserve evidence in the litigation and of the State Election Rule quoted above. In support, I have attached to this email the Declaration of Richard DeMillo in another case, *Curling v. Kemp*, and reference is made specifically to paragraphs 15 through 20. We are not aware of any contrary opinion from any expert.

Given that considerably lower turnout is expected for the December 4 runoff, a considerably shorter ballot causing faster voting time, and fewer early voting locations are open, there should be no need for all machines used in November to be used in the December runoff.

Exhibit A is our preliminary list of DRE equipment that we request be immediately sequestered, secured and not put into any use until further discussions. The machines should not be turned on or otherwise used until parties have had the chance to confer.

The same requests apply to the categories of machines included below in paragraph B.

B. All DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election that fit the following descriptions of DRE voting machines:

1. All machines taken out of service, temporarily or permanently.
2. All machines for which voter complaints were received regarding “vote flipping” or “slipping” –where voter’s vote was recorded for a different choice than voter indicated on the touch screen.
3. All machines reported as not permitting the voter to review the summary screen and press the final review/cast vote target area before the machine cast the ballot. (There have been numerous reports of summary screen displaying for a short time before automatically casting ballot without voter touching the screen.)
4. All machines reported as not displaying the Lieutenant Governor’s race on the initial voting screen.
5. All machines reporting one or more blank ballots.
6. All machines for which the public counter number on the machine tape is different than the total ballots cast on the machine tape.

Thanks and let me know if you have any questions.

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia 30306  
(404) 881-0700

---

This message is intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This communication may contain information that is proprietary, privileged, confidential or otherwise legally exempt from disclosure. If you are not the named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy or disseminate this message or any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete all copies of the message.

---

**From:** Germany, Ryan  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 1:18 PM  
**To:** Eveler, Janine; 'Daniel White'; 'Gregg Litchfield'  
**Cc:** WilsonJr, Darryl; Aiken, Fred; Brooks, Jessica; Pettit, Joe; Daniell, Phil; Harvey, Chris; Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records

Janine,

No—this has not been ordered by any court. The same people asked Judge Totenberg to order it in the Curling case, but she declined to do and specifically recognized that counties have to continue to conduct elections. They has asked for the same thing multiple times, but we continue to tell them that adding a new election to your DREs does not erase the archived memory of the previous elections. So, you can continue to use your DREs as normal. We are putting something together to send to all counties to let them know. This is just a tactic by a group of plaintiffs to attempt to cause chaos in Georgia elections.

Thanks,  
Ryan

---  
C. Ryan Germany  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Robyn A. Crittenden  
Office: (404) 657-7778 | Cell: (678) 672-9230 | [rgermany@sos.ga.gov](mailto:rgermany@sos.ga.gov)

---

This message is intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This communication may contain information that is proprietary, privileged, confidential or otherwise legally exempt from disclosure. If you are not the named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy or disseminate this message or any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete all copies of the message.

---

**From:** Eveler, Janine  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 12:48 PM  
**To:** Germany, Ryan ; 'Daniel White' ; 'Gregg Litchfield'  
**Cc:** WilsonJr, Darryl ; Aiken, Fred ; Brooks, Jessica ; Pettit, Joe ; Daniell, Phil  
**Subject:** FW: Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

We just received this request to preserve DRE units used in the November election. First, has this been ordered by any court? And second, the majority of units used in November have already been readied for the December runoff. We have started delivering the units to the polls.

*Janine Eveler*

Director,  
Cobb County Elections & Registration  
770-528-2312  
770-528-2519 Fax  
678-315-0439 Cell

*Register...then Vote!*

---

**From:** Marilyn Marks [<mailto:marilyn@aspennoffice.com>]

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 11:51 AM

**To:** [vrbalde@baldwincountyga.com](mailto:vrbalde@baldwincountyga.com); [mfranklin@barrowga.org](mailto:mfranklin@barrowga.org); [kpowell@bleckley.org](mailto:kpowell@bleckley.org); [jwatson@maconbibb.us](mailto:jwatson@maconbibb.us); [charlotte.rosebee@athensclarkecounty.com](mailto:charlotte.rosebee@athensclarkecounty.com); [elections@co.dayton.ga.us](mailto:elections@co.dayton.ga.us); Brooks, Jessica <[Jessica.Brooks@cobbcounty.org](mailto:Jessica.Brooks@cobbcounty.org)>; Pettit, Joe <[Joe.Pettit@cobbcounty.org](mailto:Joe.Pettit@cobbcounty.org)>; Daniell, Phil <[Phil.Daniell@cobbcounty.org](mailto:Phil.Daniell@cobbcounty.org)>; Aiken, Fred <[Fred.Aiken@cobbcounty.org](mailto:Fred.Aiken@cobbcounty.org)>; Eveler, Janine <[Janine.Eveler@cobbcounty.org](mailto:Janine.Eveler@cobbcounty.org)>; [bhodes@charltoncountyga.gov](mailto:bhodes@charltoncountyga.gov); [ngay@columbiacountyga.gov](mailto:ngay@columbiacountyga.gov); [tvaughan@dadeconomy-ga.gov](mailto:tvaughan@dadeconomy-ga.gov); [elections@decaturcountyga.gov](mailto:elections@decaturcountyga.gov); [bdofelections@co.douglas.ga.us](mailto:bdofelections@co.douglas.ga.us); [KCurry@emanuelco-ga.gov](mailto:KCurry@emanuelco-ga.gov); [electionsgroup@fayettecountyga.gov](mailto:electionsgroup@fayettecountyga.gov); [dhicks@fayettecountyga.gov](mailto:dhicks@fayettecountyga.gov); [alester@fayettecountyga.gov](mailto:alester@fayettecountyga.gov); [awright@fayettecountyga.gov](mailto:awright@fayettecountyga.gov); [voter@forsythco.com](mailto:voter@forsythco.com); [boe-list@glynncounty-ga.gov](mailto:boe-list@glynncounty-ga.gov); [ckathleen@greenecountyga.gov](mailto:ckathleen@greenecountyga.gov); [tsmiley@lakewoodlife.org](mailto:tsmiley@lakewoodlife.org); [ghsheats\\_06@yahoo.com](mailto:ghsheats_06@yahoo.com); [boatfarm@bellsouth.net](mailto:boatfarm@bellsouth.net); [michellesanchez404@gmail.com](mailto:michellesanchez404@gmail.com); [lwurtz@hallcounty.org](mailto:lwurtz@hallcounty.org); [tina.lunsford@co.henry.ga.us](mailto:tina.lunsford@co.henry.ga.us); [elections@houstoncountyga.org](mailto:elections@houstoncountyga.org); [marion.hatton@jonescountyga.org](mailto:marion.hatton@jonescountyga.org); [ella.golden@libertycountyga.com](mailto:ella.golden@libertycountyga.com); [longcountyelections@gmail.com](mailto:longcountyelections@gmail.com); [dcox@lowndescounty.com](mailto:dcox@lowndescounty.com); [kwarren@monroecoga.com](mailto:kwarren@monroecoga.com); [adumas@monroecoga.org](mailto:adumas@monroecoga.org); [elections@co.newton.ga.us](mailto:elections@co.newton.ga.us); [elections@paulding.gov](mailto:elections@paulding.gov); [lgeorge@polkga.org](mailto:lgeorge@polkga.org); [richmondelections@augustaga.gov](mailto:richmondelections@augustaga.gov); [cynthia.welch@rockdalecountyga.gov](mailto:cynthia.welch@rockdalecountyga.gov); [mridley@spaldingCounty.com](mailto:mridley@spaldingCounty.com); [carolyn03@windstream.net](mailto:carolyn03@windstream.net); [lori.wood@co.walton.ga.us](mailto:lori.wood@co.walton.ga.us); [supervisor@worthelections.com](mailto:supervisor@worthelections.com); [elections@wilkinsoncounty.net](mailto:elections@wilkinsoncounty.net)

**Cc:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>

**Subject:** Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records

Dear Georgia Election Official,

Please see the correspondence below related to required records preservation sent by our attorney Bruce Brown to the Defendants in the Coalition for Good Governance v Crittenden lawsuit filed on Friday challenging the Lieutenant Governor election.

There are electronic records in your county that will be required in the litigation that must be preserved without alteration, including the alteration to the DRE **internal memory** that occurs when the DREs are updated for the December 4 runoff. As noted below by Mr. Brown, Georgia's Election Code prohibits the alternation of internal memory for one month after an election and through the pendency of an election contest, of the type that was filed Friday.

Although Georgia Election Code requires that all DREs be preserved and the **internal memories** not altered, plaintiffs are specifically requiring the preservation of electronic data in the two categories mentioned below in Brown's email.

As noted in Mr. Brown's letter, merely saving the memory cards and/or relying on the archive function of the DRE does not preserve the internal memory of the DRE in the state it was in during the November 6 election, as needed for any forensic examination. As with any computer, use of the computer will always change the electronic information on the internal memory, regardless of whether specific documents and files are altered. Also, sending DREs out to polling places will put electronic data in the internal memory at risk.

Please ensure that the DRE machines used in the November 6 election, and particularly those specified below, are not used or altered in any way, including by uploading December election programming.



Thank you for your attention to this matter.  
Feel free to contact me if you have questions.

Marilyn Marks  
Executive Director  
Coalition for Good Governance  
704 292 9802  
[Marilyn@USCGG.org](mailto:Marilyn@USCGG.org)

---

**From:** "[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)" <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>  
**Date:** Monday, November 26, 2018 at 3:00 PM  
**To:** Cristina Correia <[ccorreia@law.ga.gov](mailto:ccorreia@law.ga.gov)>, "[bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov)" <[bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov)>, Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>, "[info@teamduncan.org](mailto:info@teamduncan.org)" <[info@teamduncan.org](mailto:info@teamduncan.org)>  
**Cc:** David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>, Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>, Bryan Tyson <[bpt@sbllaw.net](mailto:bpt@sbllaw.net)>  
**Subject:** Re: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

Counsel:

As you know, your clients are under a duty to preserve evidence that is or may be relevant to this litigation. This includes, but is not limited to, all of the DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election. We will be following up with more detailed information about the preservation of evidence.

This email is to make a specific request for defendants to set aside and preserve two groups of DRE's immediately:

A. The DRE's identified on the attached Exhibit A. This is a small fraction of the total number of machines used in the November 6, 2018 election, and only a portion of the machines that exhibited malfunctions in the polling places in the November 6, 2018 election. These machines need to be preserved intact *without* programming them or using them in the runoff early voting or runoff election day voting.

Please note that the process of updating, or reusing the machines, alters the internal memory of the machines, memory which constitutes evidence that is required to be preserved as evidence under Georgia law because of this litigation.

In addition, preserving the internal memory is also required by State regulations, specifically State Election Rule Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d), which states:

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election **stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit** shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

We have conferred with numerous computer science and voting system experts and there is unanimous agreement that using these machines in the runoff, or uploading new programming, alters the internal memory of the DRE machines in violation defendants' duties to preserve evidence in the litigation and of the State Election Rule quoted above. In support, I have attached to this email the Declaration of Richard DeMillo in another case, *Curling v. Kemp*, and reference is made specifically to paragraphs 15 through 20. We are not aware of any contrary opinion from any expert.

Given that considerably lower turnout is expected for the December 4 runoff, a considerably shorter ballot causing faster voting time, and fewer early voting locations are open, there should be no need for all machines used in November to be used in the December runoff.

Exhibit A is our preliminary list of DRE equipment that we request be immediately sequestered, secured and not put into any use until further discussions. The machines should not be turned on or otherwise used until parties have had the chance to confer.

The same requests apply to the categories of machines included below in paragraph B.

B. All DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election that fit the following descriptions of DRE voting machines:

1. All machines taken out of service, temporarily or permanently.
2. All machines for which voter complaints were received regarding “vote flipping” or “slipping” –where voter’s vote was recorded for a different choice than voter indicated on the touch screen.
3. All machines reported as not permitting the voter to review the summary screen and press the final review/cast vote target area before the machine cast the ballot. (There have been numerous reports of summary screen displaying for a short time before automatically casting ballot without voter touching the screen.)
4. All machines reported as not displaying the Lieutenant Governor’s race on the initial voting screen.
5. All machines reporting one or more blank ballots.
6. All machines for which the public counter number on the machine tape is different than the total ballots cast on the machine tape.

Thanks and let me know if you have any questions.

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia 30306  
(404) 881-0700

**From:** John Salter

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 20, 2018 12:11 PM

**To:** 'Bruce Brown' <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@ichterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@ichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Bruce,

Please allow this to respond to your emails of yesterday, Nov. 19, 2018. As I interpret it, the “urgent” “evidence preservation” concern expressed by the Coalition Plaintiffs is really an objection to the preparation of DRE machines for use in the upcoming December 4 Runoff election. The remedy your clients suggest, as a practical matter, would prevent the use of DRE machines for the December 4 Runoff, thereby requiring an entirely paper-ballot runoff election. It cannot be coincidence that this replays the Coalition Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctions that were denied by the Court. *See* Doc. 309 at 41 (“the eleventh-hour timing of [the Coalition Plaintiffs’] motions and an instant grant of the paper ballot relief requested could just as readily jeopardize the upcoming elections, voter turnout, and the orderly administration of the election”); *see also* Doc. 336.

As your second email of yesterday clarified, your concerns arose from an email sent by Georgia’s Election Director of the Office of the Secretary of State, Chris Harvey (dated Nov. 15, 2018 at 3:17 PM) with the subject line “GEMS Database Deliveries Tuesday.” In that email, the Election Director advises elections officials of various counties that “[i]n preparation for the December 4, 2018 run-off, our office will be delivering your GEMS Database on CD in the same manner that we normally deliver the ExpressPoll cards.” It goes on to state as follows:

*“This coming Tuesday, November 20, 2018, Investigators from the Secretary of State’s Office will be at assigned locations with your GEMS Database in your secured bag. You will meet the investigator at the location and follow the same protocol with showing ID or a letter to claim yours GEMS database.”*

My interpretation of Mr. Harvey’s email is that it appears to be the kind of routine, election-related correspondence one would expect the Elections Director to

provide county election officials in furtherance of an election like the upcoming December 4 Runoff.

The sort of preparations for the Dec. 4 2018 Runoff election suggested by Mr. Harvey's Email are no different from (or more- or less-than) what is required to execute any other statewide election using DRE machines. The Coalition Plaintiffs apparently (mis)characterize this routine, election-related correspondence as an urgent preservation issue—as if SoS officials are poised to destroy evidence in violation of Judge Totenberg's Order. Based upon my investigation, I do not see how any reasonable person could agree there is cause for alarm.

The Coalition Plaintiffs appear to equate mere use of the DRE machines with spoliation and, from this premise, leap to the conclusion that the State Defendants must be violating the Court's preservation orders. Specifically, your email claims that using these DRE machines without making a "complete electronic image," will place the State Defendants in violation of the Court's preservation orders and State Election Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d). Under this mis-interpretation, it seems the Coalition Plaintiffs are asserting the Court's preservation Order was violated simply because DRE machines were used for elections in May, July and November. We disagree with your clients' premise and their conclusion.

The Court has never conditioned continued use of DRE machines upon making a "complete electronic image" of every DRE machine in between every episodic Georgia election, despite several such elections occurring since this case began. Nor would such waste of time and money be reasonable burdens to impose upon the State or its county governments.

Your reference to the State Election Rule misunderstands the situation. In order to conduct an election, DRE units must be programmed to execute the Dec. 4 Runoff Election by adding an additional election ballot. Otherwise, electors would be presented with the same candidate choices as Nov. 6's election. The addition of such data would not subtract from, or overwrite, the data previously recorded in the DRE unit's archival memory for any of the elections at issue in this case. In other words, the kind of actions the SoS and counties must undertake in order to perform an orderly election *would not erase data from the Nov. 6<sup>th</sup> election*. Therefore, the use of the DRE machines in an upcoming election is lawful and in keeping with the State Election Board's Rule (1-183-12-.02(6)(d)), restricting "erasure" of internal memory storage of a DRE unit.

In order for Georgia counties to perform an orderly election for the upcoming Dec. 4 Runoff—and if electors who go to the polls are to receive a properly-formatted runoff ballot—they must prepare the DRE machines and (as described in Mr. Harvey’s email), each county needs to receive from the SoS a copy of the GEMS Database.

To the extent you allege a “violation” of the Court’s Order regarding preservation of evidence, I invite you to re-read the Order. It is plain that the Court “expects the parties to work cooperatively and in good faith to preserve evidence” something the State Defendants have done throughout. *See* Doc. 122 at 1. In defining the contours of that expectation, the Court added this important sentence:

“At the same time, *the Court recognizes this case involves governments and public officials with legal duties and responsibilities to execute the business of the State of Georgia, including preparations for upcoming and future elections*. Inherent in those duties is the transmission of data by and between the codefendants and various other agents of the state government and/or third parties.”

Doc. 122 at 2 (emphasis supplied). If the Plaintiffs objected to this language in the Order, it was incumbent upon them to file a timely motion for reconsideration, something they did not do.

Since this case began (and even after the above-mentioned Order was issued on December 15, 2017), the State Defendants have assisted counties in preparing for state-wide elections in May 2018 (general primary), July 2018 (primary runoff) and November of 2018 (general). In executing their lawful duties, the State Defendants have acted under the understanding that—so long as they acted reasonably and in good faith under the Court’s Order of December 15, 2017—preparation for upcoming and future elections could continue until further order of the Court. Performance of the State Defendants’ lawful duties should not be misconstrued as defiance or disobedience of their duty to take all *reasonable* steps to preserve evidence that could *reasonably* be construed as related to the allegations of the Complaints.

The performance of lawful election duties should not be impeded by demands for “preservation of evidence” that are unnecessary, unreasonable, or mere pretexts for obstructing the effective use of DRE machines to ensure orderly elections. Good-faith use of DRE machines—especially when that use does not result in the erasure of relevant data retained on DRE units’ archival memory—in upcoming elections

is not tantamount to violation of the Court's Order. Based on its Order, the Court understands—even if the Coalition Plaintiffs do not—that “preparation for upcoming and future elections” is indispensable to ensuring orderly elections. Doc. 122. The text of the Court's preservation Order supports this understanding. It would be unfair, harmful and disruptive to change it for the December 4 Runoff.

While I think this situation is anything but an urgent matter, should you still intend to treat it as such and to trouble the Court with it, I would ask that you provide a copy of this email so that the Court can understand the State Defendants' position. Otherwise, I wish everyone a safe and happy Thanksgiving.

Respectfully,  
John

John F. Salter | Attorney at Law  
BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC

31 ATLANTA STREET | MARIETTA, GEORGIA 30060  
770 BARNES LAW (227-6375) | 770 BARNES FAX (227-6373)  
[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)

BARNESLAWGROUP.COM



**From:** Bruce Brown [<mailto:bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com>]

**Sent:** Monday, November 19, 2018 7:15 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Cichter@IchterDavis.com](mailto:Cichter@IchterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>

**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Urgent: Preservation of Evidence Issue

John,

Further to the issue of preservation of evidence:

The attached email apparently sent to most counties' election departments from Chris Harvey indicates that runoff programming for the GEMS database is being distributed tomorrow, Tuesday, November 20. We assume that many counties will immediately undertake the installation of the new database and the programming of memory cards for their DRE machines and will begin the reprogramming process unless there are SOS instructions to the contrary.

In the event that no instructions have been issued to the counties to await the one month period to comply with the Internal Memory Election Rule or the need to permit potential contesting litigants to obtain uncompromised electronic data, we request that Secretary Crittenden issue immediate instructions not to reprogram DRE machines until this matter can be resolved for purposes of the Curling v Kemp case.

While we are likely to be able to select a sample of machines to request for preservation, we will need certain information from Defendants in order to select the type of sample our experts require. Again, we request that until we can resolve this matter, the machines not be uploaded with new election data which will alter the electronic records in the internal memory.

Thanks, and please let us know as soon as you receive a response from your clients.

Bruce

**From:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Sent:** Monday, November 19, 2018 4:16 PM

**To:** Bruce Brown <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp <[hknapp@khlawfirm.com](mailto:hknapp@khlawfirm.com)>

**Subject:** RE: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Bruce,

I will respond to your email by close of business tomorrow (Tuesday) after conferring with my client and counsel for Fulton County.

--John

**From:** Bruce Brown [<mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com>]

**Sent:** Monday, November 19, 2018 1:55 PM

**To:** John Salter <[john@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:john@barneslawgroup.com)>; Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>; David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>; Roy Barnes <[roy@barneslawgroup.com](mailto:roy@barneslawgroup.com)>

**Cc:** Cross, David D. <[DCross@mofo.com](mailto:DCross@mofo.com)>; Chapple, Catherine L. <[CChapple@mofo.com](mailto:CChapple@mofo.com)>; Robert McGuire <[ram@lawram.com](mailto:ram@lawram.com)>; Cary Ichter <[Clichter@lichterDavis.com](mailto:Clichter@lichterDavis.com)>; [william@nhphlaw.com](mailto:william@nhphlaw.com); Manoso, Robert W. <[RManoso@mofo.com](mailto:RManoso@mofo.com)>; Adam Sparks <[sparks@khlawfirm.com](mailto:sparks@khlawfirm.com)>; Halsey Knapp

<hknapp@khlawfirm.com>

**Subject:** Re: 17-0167 Curling, et al v. Kemp, et al: Preservation and Telephone Conference with the Court

Re: Electronic Evidence Preservation and Telephone  
Conference with the Court

Counsel,

On behalf of Coalition Plaintiffs, we are writing to remind you of the urgent and imperative requirement to preserve electronic evidence stored on the State's DRE voting system. It has been recently reported to us that some counties have stated their intention to reprogram the DRE machines immediately in anticipation of the December 4 runoff election, and that the Secretary of State is delivering electronic ballot programming materials tomorrow, November 20. If officials intend to program DRE machines that were used in the November 6, 2018 election or machines previously requested to be preserved by Coalition Plaintiffs, without making a complete electronic image, the reprogramming for the December 4, 2018 election is in violation the Court's prior preservation orders, Coalition Plaintiffs' litigation hold letters, and of State Election Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d) ("DRE Internal Memory Rule").

The State's DRE Internal Memory Rule provides: "The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election." Using the DRE machines from the November 6, 2018 election in the runoff would be in plain violation of the DRE Internal Memory Rule. A complete electronic record of each DRE is time consuming to create, and is **not** created by Diebold archival programs that archive certain records including results, ballot images, and ballot programming, and some officials mistakenly believe.

Please confirm, by 7pm today, that all electronic data in all DRE voting system equipment used in the 2018 general election (the "Required Data" as defined below) is going to be preserved without alteration, including programming of the DRE units. If you do not so confirm, we will seek a telephonic conference with the Court consistent with the requirements of the Court's December, 2017 Order (attached).



All of this data is subject to Plaintiffs' litigation hold letters and, to our knowledge, no party associated with the State has sought or obtained from the Court any exception to the litigation hold requirements, despite the obligation to do so.

We must reiterate that preserving memory card data is nowhere near sufficient to meet preservation requirements, and reliance on the DREs' archival of election results and cast vote records is wholly insufficient as well. Instead, the following data ("the Required Data") must be preserved:

- a. all electronic data residing in the internal memory of the DRE machines prepared for use in the November 6, 2018 election, including DRE machines used for uploading memory cards in election offices;
- b. all electronic data on DRE memory cards from all polling places and election offices used in early voting and Election Day voting related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- c. all electronic data residing on the GEMS servers, including logging records and audit logs related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- d. all electronic data residing on external media devices used to upload results to the Election Night Reporting system related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- e. all electronic data residing on Electronic Media Processors related to the November 6, 2018 elections.
- f. all electronic data on ExpressPollbooks memory cards used in the November 6, 2018 election.
- g. all electronic data in the internal memory of the ExpressPollbooks used in the November 6, 2018 election.

- h. all electronic data including logging records (including the E-Net systems and vendors' records) used in the upload or download of voter registration records and the electronic pollbooks.

We note further that the State can preserve the Required Data and conduct the runoff election by taking advantage of several alternatives, such as (a) using DRE machines that were not used in November and not otherwise under preservation orders and litigation hold requests; (b) using paper ballots counted by optical scan which would be faster, easier, less costly and provide a reliable, verifiable election; or (c) using DRE machines from other jurisdictions or the vendor. What is not an acceptable alternative is to destroy this evidence without the consent of the parties to the litigation and the approval of the Court. The State's present methods of updating, reprogramming and securing DRE machines fall far short of meeting the DRE Internal Memory Rule or the preservation requirements of the *Curling v Kemp* litigation.

We would also remind you that voters or candidates planning to file an election contest may have until early December (depending on individual circumstances) to file. Altering DRE internal memory data will also compromise their rights to evidence that is contemplated to be preserved through the pendency of an election contest by the DRE Internal Memory Rule.

The preservation of the Required Data would be required regardless of the actual performance of the systems in the November 6 election. However, given the widespread errors reported and evidenced in the official reports of the Secretary of State, the numerous reports of machine failures and irregularities in the November 6 election, the errors and irregularities documented in the primaries as set forth in the Coalition Plaintiffs' prior filings, the errors and irregularities documented by the Plaintiffs in the *Common Cause* case, and reported anomalous undervote in the DRE machine results in the Lieutenant Governor race, it is imperative that this electronic evidence be completely preserved.

Uncompromised forensic review is more critical than ever, given the widespread credible reports of operating problems and anomalies in the November 6, 2018 results

We look forward to hearing from you.

Many thanks,

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia  
30306  
(404) 881-0700

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION.

Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED; DO NOT FORWARD OR DISCLOSE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION. Communications from attorneys and their employees are confidential and may not be forwarded or disclosed without the sender's express permission. There is no intent on the part of the sender to waive any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, that may attach to this communication. Further, anything you believe to be tax advice in this communication, including attachments, cannot be used to avoid penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor does it promote, market, or recommend any transaction or tax-related matter. Barnes Law Group does not give tax advice.

## Germany, Ryan

---

**From:** Cristina Correia <ccorreia@law.ga.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 2:45 PM  
**To:** 'Bruce Brown'; bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov; Cheryl Ringer; info@teamduncan.org  
**Cc:** David Lowman; Kaye Burwell; Bryan Tyson; Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Bruce,

Thank you for your email. We cannot agree that the preparation of DRE machines for use in the upcoming December 4 Runoff election will in any way compromise the preservation of evidence in this matter. As counsel for the Secretary and SEB in the *Curling* matter has previously advised you, the suggestion that DRE machines be sequestered is unworkable and would frustrate public officials' legal duties and responsibilities to execute the business of the State of Georgia, including preparations for upcoming and future elections.

In order to conduct an election, DRE units must be programed to execute the Dec. 4 Runoff Election by adding an additional election ballot. Otherwise, electors would be presented with the same candidate choices as Nov. 6's election. The addition of such data does not subtract from, or overwrite, the data previously recorded in the DRE unit's archival memory for any of the elections at issue in this case. In other words, the kind of actions the SoS and counties must undertake in order to perform an orderly election *would not erase data from the Nov. 6<sup>th</sup> election*. Therefore, the use of the DRE machines in an upcoming election is lawful and in keeping with the State Election Board's Rule (1-183-12-.02(6)(d)), restricting "erasure" of internal memory storage of a DRE unit.

I am happy to discuss this further if you have any questions.

Best regards,  
Cris Correia



**Cristina Correia**  
**Senior Assistant Attorney General**  
**Office of Attorney General Chris Carr**  
**Government Services & Employment**

Tel: 404-656-7063  
ccorreia@law.ga.gov

Georgia Department of Law  
40 Capitol Square SW  
Atlanta, Georgia 30334



---

**From:** Bruce Brown [mailto:bbrown@brucebrownlaw.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, November 26, 2018 3:01 PM  
**To:** Cristina Correia; bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov; Cheryl Ringer; info@teamduncan.org  
**Cc:** David Lowman; Kaye Burwell; Bryan Tyson  
**Subject:** Re: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Counsel:

As you know, your clients are under a duty to preserve evidence that is or may be relevant to this litigation. This includes, but is not limited to, all of the DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election. We will be following up with more detailed information about the preservation of evidence.

This email is to make a specific request for defendants to set aside and preserve two groups of DRE's immediately:

A. The DRE's identified on the attached Exhibit A. This is a small fraction of the total number of machines used in the November 6, 2018 election, and only a portion of the machines that exhibited malfunctions in the polling places in the November 6, 2018 election. These machines need to be preserved intact *without* programming them or using them in the runoff early voting or runoff election day voting.

Please note that the process of updating, or reusing the machines, alters the internal memory of the machines, memory which constitutes evidence that is required to be preserved as evidence under Georgia law because of this litigation.

In addition, preserving the internal memory is also required by State regulations, specifically State Election Rule Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d), which states:

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election **stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit** shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

We have conferred with numerous computer science and voting system experts and there is unanimous agreement that using these machines in the runoff, or uploading new programming, alters the internal memory of the DRE machines in violation defendants' duties to preserve evidence in the litigation and of the State Election Rule quoted above. In support, I have attached to this email the Declaration of Richard DeMillo in another case, *Curling v. Kemp*, and reference is made specifically to paragraphs 15 through 20. We are not aware of any contrary opinion from any expert.

Given that considerably lower turnout is expected for the December 4 runoff, a considerably shorter ballot causing faster voting time, and fewer early voting locations are open, there should be no need for all machines used in November to be used in the December runoff.

Exhibit A is our preliminary list of DRE equipment that we request be immediately sequestered, secured and not put into any use until further discussions. The machines should not be turned on or otherwise used until parties have had the chance to confer.

The same requests apply to the categories of machines included below in paragraph B.

B. All DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election that fit the following descriptions of DRE voting machines:

1. All machines taken out of service, temporarily or permanently.
2. All machines for which voter complaints were received regarding “vote flipping” or “slipping” –where voter’s vote was recorded for a different choice than voter indicated on the touch screen.
3. All machines reported as not permitting the voter to review the summary screen and press the final review/cast vote target area before the machine cast the ballot. (There have been numerous reports of summary screen displaying for a short time before automatically casting ballot without voter touching the screen.)
4. All machines reported as not displaying the Lieutenant Governor’s race on the initial voting screen.
5. All machines reporting one or more blank ballots.
6. All machines for which the public counter number on the machine tape is different than the total ballots cast on the machine tape.

Thanks and let me know if you have any questions.

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia 30306  
(404) 881-0700

---

This message is intended exclusively for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This communication may contain information that is proprietary, privileged, confidential or otherwise legally exempt from disclosure. If you are not the named addressee, you are not authorized to read, print, retain, copy or disseminate this message or any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete all copies of the message.

---

**From:** Monica Franklin <mfranklin@barrowga.org>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 1:48 PM  
**To:** Pitts, Ameika; Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** FW: Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records  
**Attachments:** 20181126 CGG v Crittenden Exhibit A to Preservation Notice.xlsx; 20181121 CGG DeMillo Declaration Signed.pdf

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Monica Franklin  
**Director of Elections & Voter Registration**  
Barrow County Board of  
Elections and Registration  
233 E. Broad St.  
Winder, GA 30680  
V: 770.307.3510  
F: 770.307.1054

---

**From:** Marilyn Marks [mailto:marilyn@aspensoffice.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 11:51 AM  
**To:** vrbaldc@baldwincountyga.com; Monica Franklin; kpowell@bleckley.org; jwatson@maconbibb.us; charlotte.rosebee@athensclarkecounty.com; elections@co.clayton.ga.us; Jessica.Brooks@cobbcounty.org; Joe.Pettit@cobbcounty.org; Phil.Daniell@cobbcounty.org; Fred.Aiken@cobbcounty.org; Janine.Eveler@cobbcounty.org; bhodges@charltoncountyga.gov; ngay@columbiacountyga.gov; tvaughan@dadeconomy-ga.gov; elections@decaturcountyga.gov; bdofelections@co.douglas.ga.us; KCurry@emanuelco-ga.gov; electionsgroup@fayettecountyga.gov; dhicks@fayettecountyga.gov; alester@fayettecountyga.gov; awright@fayettecountyga.gov; voter@forsythco.com; boe-list@glynncounty-ga.gov; ckathleen@greenecountyga.gov; tsmiley@lakewoodlife.org; ghsheats\_06@yahoo.com; boatfarm@bellsouth.net; michellesanchez404@gmail.com; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; tina.lunsford@co.henry.ga.us; elections@houstoncountyga.org; marion.hatton@jonescountyga.org; ella.golden@libertycountyga.com; longcountyelections@gmail.com; dcox@lowndescounty.com; kwarren@monroecoga.com; adumas@monroecoga.org; elections@co.newton.ga.us; elections@paulding.gov; lgeorge@polkga.org; richmondelections@augustaga.gov; cynthia.welch@rockdalecountyga.gov; mridley@spaldingCounty.com; carolyn03@windstream.net; lori.wood@co.walton.ga.us; supervisor@worthelections.com; elections@wilkinsoncounty.net  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown  
**Subject:** Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records

Dear Georgia Election Official,

Please see the correspondence below related to required records preservation sent by our attorney Bruce Brown to the Defendants in the Coalition for Good Governance v Crittenden lawsuit filed on Friday challenging the Lieutenant Governor election.

There are electronic records in your county that will be required in the litigation that must be preserved without alteration, including the alteration to the DRE *internal memory* that occurs when the DREs are updated for the

December 4 runoff. As noted below by Mr. Brown, Georgia's Election Code prohibits the alternation of internal memory for one month after an election and through the pendency of an election contest, of the type that was filed Friday.

Although Georgia Election Code requires that all DREs be preserved and the **internal memories** not altered, plaintiffs are specifically requiring the preservation of electronic data in the two categories mentioned below in Brown's email.

As noted in Mr. Brown's letter, merely saving the memory cards and/or relying on the archive function of the DRE does not preserve the internal memory of the DRE in the state it was in during the November 6 election, as needed for any forensic examination. As with any computer, use of the computer will always change the electronic information on the internal memory, regardless of whether specific documents and files are altered. Also, sending DREs out to polling places will put electronic data in the internal memory at risk.

Please ensure that the DRE machines used in the November 6 election, and particularly those specified below, are not used or altered in any way, including by uploading December election programming.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.  
Feel free to contact me if you have questions.

Marilyn Marks  
Executive Director  
Coalition for Good Governance  
704 292 9802  
[Marilyn@USCGG.org](mailto:Marilyn@USCGG.org)

---

**From:** "[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)" <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>  
**Date:** Monday, November 26, 2018 at 3:00 PM  
**To:** Cristina Correia <[ccorreia@law.ga.gov](mailto:ccorreia@law.ga.gov)>, "[bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov)" <[bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov)>, Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>, "[info@teamduncan.org](mailto:info@teamduncan.org)" <[info@teamduncan.org](mailto:info@teamduncan.org)>  
**Cc:** David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>, Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>, Bryan Tyson <[bpt@sblaw.net](mailto:bpt@sblaw.net)>  
**Subject:** Re: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

Counsel:

As you know, your clients are under a duty to preserve evidence that is or may be relevant to this litigation. This includes, but is not limited to, all of the DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election. We will be following up with more detailed information about the preservation of evidence.

This email is to make a specific request for defendants to set aside and preserve two groups of DRE's immediately:

A. The DRE's identified on the attached Exhibit A. This is a small fraction of the total number of machines used in the November 6, 2018 election, and only a portion of the machines that exhibited malfunctions in the polling places in the November 6, 2018 election. These machines need to be preserved intact *without* programming them or using them in the runoff early voting or runoff election day voting.

Please note that the process of updating, or reusing the machines, alters the internal memory of the machines, memory which constitutes evidence that is required to be preserved as evidence under Georgia law because of this litigation.



In addition, preserving the internal memory is also required by State regulations, specifically State Election Rule Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d), which states:

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election **stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit** shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

We have conferred with numerous computer science and voting system experts and there is unanimous agreement that using these machines in the runoff, or uploading new programming, alters the internal memory of the DRE machines in violation defendants' duties to preserve evidence in the litigation and of the State Election Rule quoted above. In support, I have attached to this email the Declaration of Richard DeMillo in another case, *Curling v. Kemp*, and reference is made specifically to paragraphs 15 through 20. We are not aware of any contrary opinion from any expert.

Given that considerably lower turnout is expected for the December 4 runoff, a considerably shorter ballot causing faster voting time, and fewer early voting locations are open, there should be no need for all machines used in November to be used in the December runoff.

Exhibit A is our preliminary list of DRE equipment that we request be immediately sequestered, secured and not put into any use until further discussions. The machines should not be turned on or otherwise used until parties have had the chance to confer.

The same requests apply to the categories of machines included below in paragraph B.

B. All DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election that fit the following descriptions of DRE voting machines:

1. All machines taken out of service, temporarily or permanently.
2. All machines for which voter complaints were received regarding "vote flipping" or "slipping" –where voter's vote was recorded for a different choice than voter indicated on the touch screen.
3. All machines reported as not permitting the voter to review the summary screen and press the final review/cast vote target area before the machine cast the ballot. (There have been numerous reports of summary screen displaying for a short time before automatically casting ballot without voter touching the screen.)
4. All machines reported as not displaying the Lieutenant Governor's race on the initial voting screen.
5. All machines reporting one or more blank ballots.
6. All machines for which the public counter number on the machine tape is different than the total ballots cast on the machine tape.

Thanks and let me know if you have any questions.

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia 30306  
(404) 881-0700

<b>Early voting or ED</b>	<b>Polling Location</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Machines to preserve</b>
ED	Hardwick Fire Dept	Baldwin	All machines
Early	Barrow County Elections Office	Barrow	All machines
ED	Macon-Bibb Board of Elections	Bibb	All machines
Early	Macon-Bibb Board of Elections	Bibb	All machines
Early	Bleckley County Courthouse	Bleckley	All machines
ED	Folkston Fire Station	Charlton	All machines
Early	Islands Library	Chatham	All machines
ED	Islands Library	Chatham	All machines
Early	Savannah High School	Chatham	All machines
ED	Elks Lodge	Chatham	All machines
ED	Christ Community Church at Morningside	Chatham	All machines
ED	8c Firestation #7	Clarke	All machines
ED	Winterville Train Depot	Clarke	All machines
ED	Thomas N Lay Park	Clarke	All machines
Early	Clarke County BoE	Clarke	All machines
ED	Clarke County BoE	Clarke	All machines
ED	Lovejoy High	Clayton	All machines
ED	Hawthorne Elem	Clayton	All machines
ED	Church St Elem	Clayton	All machines
Early	Virginia Burton Gray Rec Ctr	Clayton	All machines
ED	Lovejoy Middle	Clayton	All machines
ED	Cobb Civic Center	Cobb	All machines
ED	Salem Middle	Cobb	All machines
ED	Russell Elem	Cobb	All machines
Early	Ackworth Sr Ctr	Cobb	All machines
Early	North Cobb Sr Ctr	Cobb	All machines
Early	Jim R Miller Park Event Center	Cobb	All machines
Early	Main Elections Office	Cobb	All machines
ED	Dominion Christian HS	Cobb	All machines
Early	South Cobb Community Ctr	Cobb	All machines
Early	E Cobb Gov't Ctr	Cobb	All machines
ED	Pebblebrook High	Cobb	All machines
ED	Blanchard Park	Columbia	All machines
Early	Ronald Reagan Blvd Bldg	Columbia	All machines
ED	Community Ctr (Precinct 1038)	Dade	All machines
ED	W Bainbridge Old Middle School	Decatur	All machines
ED	Oakcliff Elementary	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Midvale Elementary	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Gallery at South DeKalb Mall	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Lithonia High School	DeKalb	All machines

ED	Berean Christian Church	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Memorial Dr Complex	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Memorial Dr Complex	DeKalb	All machines
ED	First Christian Church	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Dunwoody Library	DeKalb	All machines
Early	First Christian Church	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Reid Cofer Library	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Reid Cofer Library	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Candy Lane Elem	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Beulah Missionary Baptist	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Big Miller Grove Baptist	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Kingswood United Methodist	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Fairington Elem	DeKalb	All machines
Early	N DeKalb Sr Ctr	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Mirror Lake Elem	Douglas	All machines
ED	Prays Mill Gym	Douglas	All machines
ED	Swainsboro	Emanuel	All machines
Early	Tyrone Town Hall	Fayette	All machines
ED	Tyrone Town Hall	Fayette	All machines
ED	27 Concord	Forsyth	All machines
Early	Sharon Springs Park Community Bldg	Forsyth	All machines
Early	Forsyth Board of Elections	Forsyth	All machines
ED	Forsyth Board of Elections	Forsyth	All machines
Early	Midway Park Community Bldg	Forsyth	All machines
ED	Grady High School	Fulton	All machines
ED	Butler St Baptist	Fulton	All machines
ED	Esther Jackson Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	River Eves Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Inman Middle	Fulton	All Machines
ED	Sandy Springs Christian Church	Fulton	All machines
ED	Lake Forest Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Lang-Carson Rec Ctr	Fulton	All machines
Early	Adams Park Library	Fulton	All machines
Early	Adamsville Rec Ctr	Fulton	All machines
Early	SW Art Ctr	Fulton	All machines
ED	Sara Rawson Smith Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Peachtree Christian Church	Fulton	All machines
Early	North Fulton County Annex	Fulton	All machines
ED	NW Library at Scotts Crossings	Fulton	All machines
Early	Ponce Library	Fulton	All machines
Early	Government Center	Fulton	All machines

ED	New Life Pres	Fulton	All machines
Early	College Park Library	Fulton	All machines
ED	College Park Library	Fulton	All machines
ED	Shakerag Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Southeast Branch Library	Fulton	All machines
ED	The Defoors Centre	Fulton	All machines
ED	Glynn Elections Board	Glynn	All machines
Early	Glynn BoE	Glynn	All machines
ED	Lakeside Church	Greene	All machines
ED	Suwanee Public Library	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	T.W. Briscoe Park Main Bldg	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Dacula Activity Building	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Gwinnett County Board of Elections	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Gwinnett County Board of Elections	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Peachcrest Christian Church	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Shorty Howell Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Shorty Howell Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	George Pierce Park Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Lucky Shoals Park Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Hall County Courthouse	Hall	All machines
ED	Gainesville 1 <sup>st</sup> Church of Nazarene	Hall	All machines
ED	Henry County Board of Elections	Henry	All machines
Early	Stockbridge Municipal Court	Henry	All machines
Early	Henry County Board of Elections	Henry	All machines
ED	Thomson Middle	Houston	All machines
ED	WE Knox Civic Ctr	Jones	All machines
ED	Walthourville City Hall	Liberty	All machines
Early	Liberty County Historical Courthouse	Liberty	All machines
ED	Fire Station Darwell Ling Rd	Long	All machines
Early	Lowndes County BoE	Lowndes	All machines
ED	Monroe County Board of Registration	Monroe	All machines
ED	Zion Baptist	Newton	All machines
ED	Paulding County Board of Elections	Paulding	All machines
Early	Paulding BoE	Paulding	All machines
ED	Aragon Community Center	Polk	All machines
ED	E Central Reg Hospital--Gracewood	Richmond	All machines
ED	Rockdale County Board of Elections	Rockdale	All machines
ED	Rockdale County Board of Elections	Rockdale	All machines
ED	Gary Reid Fire Station	Spalding	All machines
Early	Government Building-BoE	Terrell	All machines
Early	Walton County Board of Elections	Walton	All machines

ED	Walton County Board of Elections	Walton	All machines
ED	The Praise Center	Walton	All machines
ED	Walnut Grove Community Ctr	Walton	All machines
ED	Red Rock Community Ctr	Worth	All machines

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
November 26, 2018, 3pm

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION**

**DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,**

**Plaintiffs, v.**

**BRIAN KEMP, ET AL.,**

**Defendants.**

**Civil Action No.**

**1:17-CV-2989-AT**

**DECLARATION OF RICHARD A. DeMILLO**

**RICHARD A. DeMILLO** (“Declarant”) hereby declares as follows:

1. I am a registered voter in Fulton County Georgia. I am deeply interested in the proper functioning of the Georgia’s voting system from both a personal and professional perspective.
2. I am not a retained expert by any party to this action, but in the desire to aid the Court in the evaluation of technical assertions, I wish to voluntarily offer my opinion on the particular topic of the essential requirements of preservation of electronic records of the DRE voting system including the electronic pollbooks.

3. I am currently the Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Chair of Computer Science at Georgia Tech. I have served as Dean of the College of Computing at Georgia Tech and Director of the Georgia Tech Center for Information Security. I have also served as the Chief Technology Officer for Hewlett-Packard, Vice President and General Manager of Computing and Information Research at Bell Communications Research, Director of the Computer and Communications Research Division at the National Science Foundation, and Director of the Software Test and Evaluation Project for the U.S. Department of Defense.
4. In all these appointments, my primary technology focus has been information, communication, cyber security, and computer system testing. I have taught both graduate and undergraduate courses in cyber security, supervised PhD dissertations and conducted peer-reviewed research leading to books, journal articles, patents, and invited addresses, all related to the topic of cyber threats to computer systems. I have served on editorial boards for major journals, chaired program committees for cybersecurity symposia and conferences, and served on government advisory boards and panels. I have been an officer, director, and board member for various public and private corporations in the cyber security industry.

5. I have conducted research and taught courses related to voting system and election security since 2002. I have served as an official observer of foreign electronic voting systems for the Carter Center and participated in the writing of Carter Center guidelines for using electronic voting machines. I serve on the advisory boards of Verified Voting and the Open Software Election Technology Institute.
6. My qualifications and experience are described further in my August 20, 2018 Declaration in this case, Doc. 277 at 52 et seq.
7. I have reviewed the Court's order in this case, as well as the Court's Order in Common Cause Georgia v. Kemp (18-cv-5102).
8. I am familiar with Georgia's Diebold DRE voting system, its design, the body of academic literature compiled on the system in the last ten years, and its operation as it is deployed in the polling places in Georgia.
9. I own both Diebold TSx and TS voting machines which I have examined and used to conduct certain experiments related to DRE system security.
10. I have observed the operation of Diebold DRE systems in polling places in multiple Georgia counties over the course of multiple elections and in county election offices where the system was being programmed and tested. I have observed the testing procedures conducted prior to machine deployment to the polling places.



11. I observed the operation of the ExpressPollbooks (electronic pollbooks) as well as the DRE machines in my role as a statewide pollwatcher during the November 6, 2018 election.
12. During my pollwatching activities, I had occasion to speak with voters, election workers, and cybersecurity experts, and to consult various reports. Credible information thus obtained was consistent with the existence of failures and malfunctions of both Diebold ExpressPollbooks operations and DRE voting machines during the November 6, 2018 election.
13. Also, during my pollwatching activities on November 6, 2018, I became aware that certain sites in Gwinnett County were experiencing significant delays in voting and that those delays may have been attributable to malfunctioning Diebold ExpressPollbooks.
14. On the afternoon of November 6, I conferred with nationally recognized Diebold voting systems expert Harri Hursti and cyber security researcher Logan Lamb. This conversation took place a few minutes after Hursti and Lamb completed a review of technical information on site in Anistown Precinct in Gwinnett County, where four-hour voting delays were being attributed to malfunctioning ExpressPollbooks. I visited the Anistown Precinct a few hours after the malfunction had reportedly occurred and

observed the operations at the polling place before visiting other polling locations.

15. I am aware of Election Rule 183-1-12-.02 (6)(d) stating that:

*“The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.”*

16. One purpose for the requirement for maintaining the information described in Rule (183-1-12-.02(6)(d)) is to make possible forensic analysis in the event of election tampering, system compromise, or system malfunction. This is particularly significant in Georgia because Georgia elections do not create or maintain paper audit trail that can be reviewed as a record of voter intent. Lacking an independent way to judge voter intent, experts need access to the detailed digital records known as footprints (citation: <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/technology/computer-forensics-teams-learn-to-follow-digital-footprints.html> )

17. The information thus required is not merely a copy of the cast vote records on the machine or ballot images or audit logs, all of which are subject to accidental or malicious corruption, manipulation or destruction during a cyber-attack, system compromise, or system failure, but for all electronic information stored in internal memory. (citation: S. Garfinkel et al, “Practical Unix and Internet Security, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition,” O’Reilley Publishing, 2003, pp 677+).
18. Furthermore, merely saving the related memory cards is an inadequate response to this requirement since the very act of copying information from internal memories to memory cards is carried out by software that must be presumed to be untrustworthy in the event of system failure or compromise. (citation: [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected\\_files/guidance\\_files/common\\_cyber\\_attacks\\_ncsc.pdf](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/guidance_files/common_cyber_attacks_ncsc.pdf)) (citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines on PDA Forensics, Special Publication 800-72, November 2004) Additionally, memory cards contain only selected data intended for reporting, not all the operating information on in the DRE internal memory needed for forensic review.
19. Preserving the electronic data in the internal memory of the DRE requires that no new election data be written onto the hard drive of DRE machines,

no further use after the close of the election, including recounts, and that the DRE machines thus preserved be strictly physically secured and not deployed to polling places (see Paragraphs 22 and 23 below).

20. The Election Rule appears to recognize that it is critical that the electronic data in the internal memory of the DRE be preserved for a substantial time in order to permit time for systemic and isolated problems to surface.
21. Therefore, a consequence of Paragraph 19 and the one-month preservation rule is the required availability and use of either alternative DRE machines or paper ballots for elections falling shortly after an election.
22. Preservation of machines identified for analysis is required for this analysis, and therefore all such machines should be removed from service and placed in a secure storage facility, where adequate access and physical safeguards can be implemented to deter tampering. Defendants have represented in prior public statements that election officers already implement secure physical custody. I disagree with this assessment based on well-documented instances in which unattended DREs are easily accessible by persons without authorization or supervision. Defendants have also represented in prior public statements that tamper-evident seals prevent unauthorized access. I disagree with this assessment based on well-known and widely distributed videos that demonstrate how to undetectably defeat

such seals. I have personally observed persons with little or no prior training using shims cut from soft drink cans to defeat the tamper evident seals used in Georgia's elections.

23. Defendants have represented in prior public statements that removal from service is not necessary since data from prior elections cannot be erased, overwritten, or otherwise lost when a new election is carried out. I am unaware of any technical means that would support such a claim. The Windows CE operating system, on which the Diebold Ballot Station software runs, contains only rudimentary memory management and is prone to a phenomenon called memory fragmentation wherein memory locations are not allocated in contiguous blocks but rather are allocated in blocks that are dispersed throughout physical memory. Because Windows CE has no built-in features for signaling to an application that a candidate block of storage has previously been allocated, application software that needs to maintain intact memory from prior elections must carry out the necessary checks. Because Diebold BallotStation software is proprietary and held as a trade secret, it is unavailable for third party evaluation. I have examined various public disclosures that describe the design and coding of BallotStation software. I have not found evidence of such software safeguards in the Diebold BallotStation software.

24. Selection of machines for forensic review during discovery will be done by an algorithm for which selection parameters are not yet known and cannot be known until a preliminary analysis has been carried out. For example, one such parameter might be: machines where the polling place manual recap sheet of ballots cast shows a different number than the DRE reported total of ballots cast.
25. All DRE machine electronic data must be preserved. Random sampling of DRE machines for preservation is not sufficient for safe-guarding of electronic evidence required to be used in discovery. Deliberate and time-consuming analysis must first be conducted to determine which DRE machines have exhibited attributes that indicate potential malfunction or have been exposed to greater risk of compromise than others. Randomly sampling the DREs is not a mathematically acceptable way of conducting this analysis. Random sampling assumes an underlying probability distribution for the attributes being tested. A random sample for example might be constructed assuming that defects are uniformly distributed among the DREs. That assumption is untenable since the machines of interest may be associated with certain races, ballots choices, racial distribution, root cause of failure/compromise, geography, population density, number of ballots cast on a machine, voter complaints, anomalous results, or other

attributes that are not uniformly distributed throughout the voting population.

26. Therefore, no statistically valid conclusion can be drawn from a random sample. In addition, statistical tools which might be used to approximate sampling distributions are not applicable in this case, either because the attributes of interest are not statistically independent, or because the software is able to modify its own behavior when it is being tested (as was demonstrated in the Volkswagen emissions testing scandal of 2015 when the US Environmental Protection Agency discovered that on-board software had been programmed to sense when an automobile was being tested and deliver results that did not reflect emissions control impact on vehicle performance. (citation: EPA Notice of Violation September 15, 2015)).
27. Individual imaging of DRE internal memory is technically possible and has been publicly suggested as a way of avoiding preservation. This procedure, however, requires intrusive access to each DRE which makes it an infeasible solution. In the first place, I do not believe there are enough sufficiently trained technicians to accomplish the task. In the second place, it takes anywhere from 3 to 10 hours to obtain an acceptable image of the internal memory of a DRE.

28. The electronic data residing on the components of Georgia's electronic voting systems ("the Required Electronic Data") essential for preservation for the purpose of determining the causes of irregularities and the performance of those systems in the November 6, 2018 General Election follows below in Paragraph 29.

29. The Required Data includes:

- a. all electronic data residing in the internal memory of the DRE machines prepared for use in the November 6, 2018 election, including DRE machines used for uploading memory cards in election offices;
- b. all electronic data on DRE memory cards from all polling places and election offices used in early voting and Election Day voting related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- c. all electronic data residing on the GEMS servers, including logging records and audit logs related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- d. all electronic data residing on external media devices used to upload results to the Election Night Reporting system related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- e. all electronic data residing on Electronic Media Processors related to the November 6, 2018 elections.



- f. all electronic data on ExpressPollbooks memory cards used in the November 6, 2018 election.
  - g. all electronic data in the internal memory of the ExpressPollbooks used in the November 6, 2018 election.
  - h. all electronic data including logging records (including the E-Net systems and vendors' records) used in the upload or download of voter registration records and the electronic pollbooks.
30. As recently as November 17 and 18, I have been made aware of possible anomalies from the November 6 election, and I am aware of various public disclosures of other anomalies. Anomalies such as these would be subject to investigation under the one-month DRE internal memory preservation rule. Investigation of these anomalies would be jeopardized without preservation of the affected DREs.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare and verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this date, November 21, 2018.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. DeMillo", with a stylized, cursive script.

---

Richard A. DeMillo

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 28, 2018 5:12 PM  
**To:** Coine-Mayers Kathleen  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: Jarrard & Davis

Kathleen,  
No. I'm not familiar with that person.  
I recommend you engage your attorney for guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Coine-Mayers Kathleen  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 28, 2018 5:06 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** Jarrard & Davis

**Chris:**

**I received a phone call from a Sam Van Volkenburgh, a lawyer  
with Jarrard and Davis. (REDACTED)**

**He started asking me some questions about the sequestering of machines and your notice.**

**I did not have time to talk to him at the moment ( I am the only one in the office) and  
asked him to call back tomorrow.**

**Is he calling on your behalf?**

**Thanks**

Kathleen Mayers, Elections Supervisor  
Greene County Board of Elections & Registration  
1180 C. Weldon Smith Drive  
Greensboro, Ga 30642  
Office: 706-453-1108  
Fax: 706-453-9438

---

**From:** Marcia Ridley <mridley@spaldingcounty.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 28, 2018 1:09 PM  
**To:** Pitts, Ameika  
**Subject:** Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records  
**Attachments:** 20181126 CGG v Crittenden Exhibit A to Preservation Notice.xlsx; 20181121 CGG DeMillo Declaration Signed.pdf

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

---

**From:** Marilyn Marks [mailto:marilyn@aspenoffice.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 27, 2018 11:51 AM  
**To:** vrbaldc@baldwincountyga.com; mfranklin@barrowga.org; kpowell@bleckley.org; jwatson@maconbibb.us; charlotte.sosebee@athensclarkecounty.com; elections@co.clayton.ga.us; Jessica.Brooks@cobbcounty.org; Joe.Pettit@cobbcounty.org; Phil.Daniell@cobbcounty.org; Fred.Aiken@cobbcounty.org; Janine.Eveler@cobbcounty.org; bhodges@charltoncountyga.gov; ngay@columbiacountyga.gov; tvaughan@dadeconomy-ga.gov; elections@decaturcountyga.gov; bdofelections@co.douglas.ga.us; KCurry@emanuelco-ga.gov; electionsgroup@fayettecountyga.gov; dhicks@fayettecountyga.gov; alester@fayettecountyga.gov; awright@fayettecountyga.gov; voter@forsythco.com; boe-list@glynncounty-ga.gov; ckathleen@greenecountyga.gov; tsmiley@lakewoodlife.org; ghsheats\_06@yahoo.com; boatfarm@bellsouth.net; michellesanchez404@gmail.com; lwurtz@hallcounty.org; tina.lunsford@co.henry.ga.us; elections@houstoncountyga.org; marion.hatton@jonescountyga.org; ella.golden@libertycountyga.com; longcountyelections@gmail.com; dcox@lowndescounty.com; kwarren@monroecoga.com; adumas@monroecoga.org; elections@co.newton.ga.us; elections@paulding.gov; lgeorge@polkga.org; richmondelections@augustaga.gov; cynthia.welch@rockdalecountyga.gov; Marcia Ridley ; carolyn03@windstream.net; lori.wood@co.walton.ga.us; supervisor@worthelections.com; elections@wilkinsoncounty.net  
**Cc:** Bruce Brown  
**Subject:** Legal requirement to preserve November 6 DRE electronic records

Dear Georgia Election Official,

Please see the correspondence below related to required records preservation sent by our attorney Bruce Brown to the Defendants in the Coalition for Good Governance v Crittenden lawsuit filed on Friday challenging the Lieutenant Governor election.

There are electronic records in your county that will be required in the litigation that must be preserved without alteration, including the alteration to the DRE **internal memory** that occurs when the DREs are updated for the December 4 runoff. As noted below by Mr. Brown, Georgia's Election Code prohibits the alternation of internal memory for one month after an election and through the pendency of an election contest, of the type that was filed Friday.

Although Georgia Election Code requires that all DREs be preserved and the **internal memories** not altered, plaintiffs are specifically requiring the preservation of electronic data in the two categories mentioned below in Brown's email.

As noted in Mr. Brown's letter, merely saving the memory cards and/or relying on the archive function of the DRE does not preserve the internal memory of the DRE in the state it was in during the November 6 election, as needed for any forensic examination. As with any computer, use of the computer will always change the electronic information on the

internal memory, regardless of whether specific documents and files are altered. Also, sending DREs out to polling places will put electronic data in the internal memory at risk.

Please ensure that the DRE machines used in the November 6 election, and particularly those specified below, are not used or altered in any way, including by uploading December election programming.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.  
Feel free to contact me if you have questions.

Marilyn Marks  
Executive Director  
Coalition for Good Governance  
704 292 9802  
[Marilyn@USCGG.org](mailto:Marilyn@USCGG.org)

---

**From:** "bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com" <[bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com](mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com)>  
**Date:** Monday, November 26, 2018 at 3:00 PM  
**To:** Cristina Correia <[ccorreia@law.ga.gov](mailto:ccorreia@law.ga.gov)>, "bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov" <[bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov](mailto:bdbryan@dekalbcountyga.gov)>, Cheryl Ringer <[Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Cheryl.ringer@fultoncountyga.gov)>, "info@teamduncan.org" <[info@teamduncan.org](mailto:info@teamduncan.org)>  
**Cc:** David Lowman <[david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:david.lowman@fultoncountyga.gov)>, Kaye Burwell <[Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov](mailto:Kaye.burwell@fultoncountyga.gov)>, Bryan Tyson <[bpt@sblaw.net](mailto:bpt@sblaw.net)>  
**Subject:** Re: Waiver of Service on Petition to Contest Election Result of Lieutenant Governor Race

Counsel:

As you know, your clients are under a duty to preserve evidence that is or may be relevant to this litigation. This includes, but is not limited to, all of the DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election. We will be following up with more detailed information about the preservation of evidence.

This email is to make a specific request for defendants to set aside and preserve two groups of DRE's immediately:

A. The DRE's identified on the attached Exhibit A. This is a small fraction of the total number of machines used in the November 6, 2018 election, and only a portion of the machines that exhibited malfunctions in the polling places in the November 6, 2018 election. These machines need to be preserved intact *without* programming them or using them in the runoff early voting or runoff election day voting.

Please note that the process of updating, or reusing the machines, alters the internal memory of the machines, memory which constitutes evidence that is required to be preserved as evidence under Georgia law because of this litigation.

In addition, preserving the internal memory is also required by State regulations, specifically State Election Rule Rule 1-183-12-.02(6)(d), which states:

(d) The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election **stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit** shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.

We have conferred with numerous computer science and voting system experts and there is unanimous agreement that using these machines in the runoff, or uploading new programming, alters the internal memory of the DRE machines in violation of defendants' duties to preserve evidence in the litigation and of the State Election Rule quoted above. In support, I have attached to this email the Declaration of Richard DeMillo in another case, *Curling v. Kemp*, and reference is made specifically to paragraphs 15 through 20. We are not aware of any contrary opinion from any expert.

Given that considerably lower turnout is expected for the December 4 runoff, a considerably shorter ballot causing faster voting time, and fewer early voting locations are open, there should be no need for all machines used in November to be used in the December runoff.

Exhibit A is our preliminary list of DRE equipment that we request be immediately sequestered, secured and not put into any use until further discussions. The machines should not be turned on or otherwise used until parties have had the chance to confer.

The same requests apply to the categories of machines included below in paragraph B.

B. All DRE machines used in the November 6, 2018 election that fit the following descriptions of DRE voting machines:

1. All machines taken out of service, temporarily or permanently.
2. All machines for which voter complaints were received regarding "vote flipping" or "slipping" –where voter's vote was recorded for a different choice than voter indicated on the touch screen.
3. All machines reported as not permitting the voter to review the summary screen and press the final review/cast vote target area before the machine cast the ballot. (There have been numerous reports of summary screen displaying for a short time before automatically casting ballot without voter touching the screen.)
4. All machines reported as not displaying the Lieutenant Governor's race on the initial voting screen.
5. All machines reporting one or more blank ballots.
6. All machines for which the public counter number on the machine tape is different than the total ballots cast on the machine tape.

Thanks and let me know if you have any questions.

Bruce

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
1123 Zonolite Rd. NE  
Suite 6  
Atlanta, Georgia 30306  
(404) 881-0700

<b>Early voting or ED</b>	<b>Polling Location</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Machines to preserve</b>
ED	Hardwick Fire Dept	Baldwin	All machines
Early	Barrow County Elections Office	Barrow	All machines
ED	Macon-Bibb Board of Elections	Bibb	All machines
Early	Macon-Bibb Board of Elections	Bibb	All machines
Early	Bleckley County Courthouse	Bleckley	All machines
ED	Folkston Fire Station	Charlton	All machines
Early	Islands Library	Chatham	All machines
ED	Islands Library	Chatham	All machines
Early	Savannah High School	Chatham	All machines
ED	Elks Lodge	Chatham	All machines
ED	Christ Community Church at Morningside	Chatham	All machines
ED	8c Firestation #7	Clarke	All machines
ED	Winterville Train Depot	Clarke	All machines
ED	Thomas N Lay Park	Clarke	All machines
Early	Clarke County BoE	Clarke	All machines
ED	Clarke County BoE	Clarke	All machines
ED	Lovejoy High	Clayton	All machines
ED	Hawthorne Elem	Clayton	All machines
ED	Church St Elem	Clayton	All machines
Early	Virginia Burton Gray Rec Ctr	Clayton	All machines
ED	Lovejoy Middle	Clayton	All machines
ED	Cobb Civic Center	Cobb	All machines
ED	Salem Middle	Cobb	All machines
ED	Russell Elem	Cobb	All machines
Early	Ackworth Sr Ctr	Cobb	All machines
Early	North Cobb Sr Ctr	Cobb	All machines
Early	Jim R Miller Park Event Center	Cobb	All machines
Early	Main Elections Office	Cobb	All machines
ED	Dominion Christian HS	Cobb	All machines
Early	South Cobb Community Ctr	Cobb	All machines
Early	E Cobb Gov't Ctr	Cobb	All machines
ED	Pebblebrook High	Cobb	All machines
ED	Blanchard Park	Columbia	All machines
Early	Ronald Reagan Blvd Bldg	Columbia	All machines
ED	Community Ctr (Precinct 1038)	Dade	All machines
ED	W Bainbridge Old Middle School	Decatur	All machines
ED	Oakcliff Elementary	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Midvale Elementary	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Gallery at South DeKalb Mall	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Lithonia High School	DeKalb	All machines

ED	Berean Christian Church	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Memorial Dr Complex	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Memorial Dr Complex	DeKalb	All machines
ED	First Christian Church	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Dunwoody Library	DeKalb	All machines
Early	First Christian Church	DeKalb	All machines
Early	Reid Cofer Library	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Reid Cofer Library	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Candy Lane Elem	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Beulah Missionary Baptist	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Big Miller Grove Baptist	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Kingswood United Methodist	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Fairington Elem	DeKalb	All machines
Early	N DeKalb Sr Ctr	DeKalb	All machines
ED	Mirror Lake Elem	Douglas	All machines
ED	Prays Mill Gym	Douglas	All machines
ED	Swainsboro	Emanuel	All machines
Early	Tyrone Town Hall	Fayette	All machines
ED	Tyrone Town Hall	Fayette	All machines
ED	27 Concord	Forsyth	All machines
Early	Sharon Springs Park Community Bldg	Forsyth	All machines
Early	Forsyth Board of Elections	Forsyth	All machines
ED	Forsyth Board of Elections	Forsyth	All machines
Early	Midway Park Community Bldg	Forsyth	All machines
ED	Grady High School	Fulton	All machines
ED	Butler St Baptist	Fulton	All machines
ED	Esther Jackson Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	River Eves Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Inman Middle	Fulton	All Machines
ED	Sandy Springs Christian Church	Fulton	All machines
ED	Lake Forest Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Lang-Carson Rec Ctr	Fulton	All machines
Early	Adams Park Library	Fulton	All machines
Early	Adamsville Rec Ctr	Fulton	All machines
Early	SW Art Ctr	Fulton	All machines
ED	Sara Rawson Smith Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Peachtree Christian Church	Fulton	All machines
Early	North Fulton County Annex	Fulton	All machines
ED	NW Library at Scotts Crossings	Fulton	All machines
Early	Ponce Library	Fulton	All machines
Early	Government Center	Fulton	All machines



ED	New Life Pres	Fulton	All machines
Early	College Park Library	Fulton	All machines
ED	College Park Library	Fulton	All machines
ED	Shakerag Elem	Fulton	All machines
ED	Southeast Branch Library	Fulton	All machines
ED	The Defoors Centre	Fulton	All machines
ED	Glynn Elections Board	Glynn	All machines
Early	Glynn BoE	Glynn	All machines
ED	Lakeside Church	Greene	All machines
ED	Suwanee Public Library	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	T.W. Briscoe Park Main Bldg	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Dacula Activity Building	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Gwinnett County Board of Elections	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Gwinnett County Board of Elections	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Peachcrest Christian Church	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Shorty Howell Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
ED	Shorty Howell Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	George Pierce Park Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Lucky Shoals Park Community Rec Ctr	Gwinnett	All machines
Early	Hall County Courthouse	Hall	All machines
ED	Gainesville 1 <sup>st</sup> Church of Nazarene	Hall	All machines
ED	Henry County Board of Elections	Henry	All machines
Early	Stockbridge Municipal Court	Henry	All machines
Early	Henry County Board of Elections	Henry	All machines
ED	Thomson Middle	Houston	All machines
ED	WE Knox Civic Ctr	Jones	All machines
ED	Walthourville City Hall	Liberty	All machines
Early	Liberty County Historical Courthouse	Liberty	All machines
ED	Fire Station Darwell Ling Rd	Long	All machines
Early	Lowndes County BoE	Lowndes	All machines
ED	Monroe County Board of Registration	Monroe	All machines
ED	Zion Baptist	Newton	All machines
ED	Paulding County Board of Elections	Paulding	All machines
Early	Paulding BoE	Paulding	All machines
ED	Aragon Community Center	Polk	All machines
ED	E Central Reg Hospital--Gracewood	Richmond	All machines
ED	Rockdale County Board of Elections	Rockdale	All machines
ED	Rockdale County Board of Elections	Rockdale	All machines
ED	Gary Reid Fire Station	Spalding	All machines
Early	Government Building-BoE	Terrell	All machines
Early	Walton County Board of Elections	Walton	All machines

ED	Walton County Board of Elections	Walton	All machines
ED	The Praise Center	Walton	All machines
ED	Walnut Grove Community Ctr	Walton	All machines
ED	Red Rock Community Ctr	Worth	All machines

Bruce P. Brown Law LLC  
November 26, 2018, 3pm

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION**

**DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,**

**Plaintiffs, v.**

**BRIAN KEMP, ET AL.,**

**Defendants.**

**Civil Action No.**

**1:17-CV-2989-AT**

**DECLARATION OF RICHARD A. DeMILLO**

**RICHARD A. DeMILLO** (“Declarant”) hereby declares as follows:

1. I am a registered voter in Fulton County Georgia. I am deeply interested in the proper functioning of the Georgia’s voting system from both a personal and professional perspective.
2. I am not a retained expert by any party to this action, but in the desire to aid the Court in the evaluation of technical assertions, I wish to voluntarily offer my opinion on the particular topic of the essential requirements of preservation of electronic records of the DRE voting system including the electronic pollbooks.

3. I am currently the Charlotte B. and Roger C. Warren Chair of Computer Science at Georgia Tech. I have served as Dean of the College of Computing at Georgia Tech and Director of the Georgia Tech Center for Information Security. I have also served as the Chief Technology Officer for Hewlett-Packard, Vice President and General Manager of Computing and Information Research at Bell Communications Research, Director of the Computer and Communications Research Division at the National Science Foundation, and Director of the Software Test and Evaluation Project for the U.S. Department of Defense.
4. In all these appointments, my primary technology focus has been information, communication, cyber security, and computer system testing. I have taught both graduate and undergraduate courses in cyber security, supervised PhD dissertations and conducted peer-reviewed research leading to books, journal articles, patents, and invited addresses, all related to the topic of cyber threats to computer systems. I have served on editorial boards for major journals, chaired program committees for cybersecurity symposia and conferences, and served on government advisory boards and panels. I have been an officer, director, and board member for various public and private corporations in the cyber security industry.

5. I have conducted research and taught courses related to voting system and election security since 2002. I have served as an official observer of foreign electronic voting systems for the Carter Center and participated in the writing of Carter Center guidelines for using electronic voting machines. I serve on the advisory boards of Verified Voting and the Open Software Election Technology Institute.
6. My qualifications and experience are described further in my August 20, 2018 Declaration in this case, Doc. 277 at 52 et seq.
7. I have reviewed the Court's order in this case, as well as the Court's Order in Common Cause Georgia v. Kemp (18-cv-5102).
8. I am familiar with Georgia's Diebold DRE voting system, its design, the body of academic literature compiled on the system in the last ten years, and its operation as it is deployed in the polling places in Georgia.
9. I own both Diebold TSx and TS voting machines which I have examined and used to conduct certain experiments related to DRE system security.
10. I have observed the operation of Diebold DRE systems in polling places in multiple Georgia counties over the course of multiple elections and in county election offices where the system was being programmed and tested. I have observed the testing procedures conducted prior to machine deployment to the polling places.

11. I observed the operation of the ExpressPollbooks (electronic pollbooks) as well as the DRE machines in my role as a statewide pollwatcher during the November 6, 2018 election.
12. During my pollwatching activities, I had occasion to speak with voters, election workers, and cybersecurity experts, and to consult various reports. Credible information thus obtained was consistent with the existence of failures and malfunctions of both Diebold ExpressPollbooks operations and DRE voting machines during the November 6, 2018 election.
13. Also, during my pollwatching activities on November 6, 2018, I became aware that certain sites in Gwinnett County were experiencing significant delays in voting and that those delays may have been attributable to malfunctioning Diebold ExpressPollbooks.
14. On the afternoon of November 6, I conferred with nationally recognized Diebold voting systems expert Harri Hursti and cyber security researcher Logan Lamb. This conversation took place a few minutes after Hursti and Lamb completed a review of technical information on site in Anistown Precinct in Gwinnett County, where four-hour voting delays were being attributed to malfunctioning ExpressPollbooks. I visited the Anistown Precinct a few hours after the malfunction had reportedly occurred and

observed the operations at the polling place before visiting other polling locations.

15. I am aware of Election Rule 183-1-12-.02 (6)(d) stating that:

*“The election results, ballot styles, ballot images, and other information for each election stored in the internal memory storage of each DRE unit shall be maintained for a minimum of one month following each election after which time the results may be erased provided that there are no election contests pending concerning such election.”*

16. One purpose for the requirement for maintaining the information described in Rule (183-1-12-.02(6)(d)) is to make possible forensic analysis in the event of election tampering, system compromise, or system malfunction. This is particularly significant in Georgia because Georgia elections do not create or maintain paper audit trail that can be reviewed as a record of voter intent. Lacking an independent way to judge voter intent, experts need access to the detailed digital records known as footprints (citation: <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/technology/computer-forensics-teams-learn-to-follow-digital-footprints.html> )

17. The information thus required is not merely a copy of the cast vote records on the machine or ballot images or audit logs, all of which are subject to accidental or malicious corruption, manipulation or destruction during a cyber-attack, system compromise, or system failure, but for all electronic information stored in internal memory. (citation: S. Garfinkel et al, “Practical Unix and Internet Security, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition,” O’Reilley Publishing, 2003, pp 677+).
18. Furthermore, merely saving the related memory cards is an inadequate response to this requirement since the very act of copying information from internal memories to memory cards is carried out by software that must be presumed to be untrustworthy in the event of system failure or compromise. (citation: [https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected\\_files/guidance\\_files/common\\_cyber\\_attacks\\_ncsc.pdf](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/guidance_files/common_cyber_attacks_ncsc.pdf) ) (citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines on PDA Forensics, Special Publication 800-72, November 2004) Additionally, memory cards contain only selected data intended for reporting, not all the operating information on in the DRE internal memory needed for forensic review.
19. Preserving the electronic data in the internal memory of the DRE requires that no new election data be written onto the hard drive of DRE machines,



no further use after the close of the election, including recounts, and that the DRE machines thus preserved be strictly physically secured and not deployed to polling places (see Paragraphs 22 and 23 below).

20. The Election Rule appears to recognize that it is critical that the electronic data in the internal memory of the DRE be preserved for a substantial time in order to permit time for systemic and isolated problems to surface.
21. Therefore, a consequence of Paragraph 19 and the one-month preservation rule is the required availability and use of either alternative DRE machines or paper ballots for elections falling shortly after an election.
22. Preservation of machines identified for analysis is required for this analysis, and therefore all such machines should be removed from service and placed in a secure storage facility, where adequate access and physical safeguards can be implemented to deter tampering. Defendants have represented in prior public statements that election officers already implement secure physical custody. I disagree with this assessment based on well-documented instances in which unattended DREs are easily accessible by persons without authorization or supervision. Defendants have also represented in prior public statements that tamper-evident seals prevent unauthorized access. I disagree with this assessment based on well-known and widely distributed videos that demonstrate how to undetectably defeat

such seals. I have personally observed persons with little or no prior training using shims cut from soft drink cans to defeat the tamper evident seals used in Georgia's elections.

23. Defendants have represented in prior public statements that removal from service is not necessary since data from prior elections cannot be erased, overwritten, or otherwise lost when a new election is carried out. I am unaware of any technical means that would support such a claim. The Windows CE operating system, on which the Diebold Ballot Station software runs, contains only rudimentary memory management and is prone to a phenomenon called memory fragmentation wherein memory locations are not allocated in contiguous blocks but rather are allocated in blocks that are dispersed throughout physical memory. Because Windows CE has no built-in features for signaling to an application that a candidate block of storage has previously been allocated, application software that needs to maintain intact memory from prior elections must carry out the necessary checks. Because Diebold BallotStation software is proprietary and held as a trade secret, it is unavailable for third party evaluation. I have examined various public disclosures that describe the design and coding of BallotStation software. I have not found evidence of such software safeguards in the Diebold BallotStation software.

24. Selection of machines for forensic review during discovery will be done by an algorithm for which selection parameters are not yet known and cannot be known until a preliminary analysis has been carried out. For example, one such parameter might be: machines where the polling place manual recap sheet of ballots cast shows a different number than the DRE reported total of ballots cast.
25. All DRE machine electronic data must be preserved. Random sampling of DRE machines for preservation is not sufficient for safe-guarding of electronic evidence required to be used in discovery. Deliberate and time-consuming analysis must first be conducted to determine which DRE machines have exhibited attributes that indicate potential malfunction or have been exposed to greater risk of compromise than others. Randomly sampling the DREs is not a mathematically acceptable way of conducting this analysis. Random sampling assumes an underlying probability distribution for the attributes being tested. A random sample for example might be constructed assuming that defects are uniformly distributed among the DREs. That assumption is untenable since the machines of interest may be associated with certain races, ballots choices, racial distribution, root cause of failure/compromise, geography, population density, number of ballots cast on a machine, voter complaints, anomalous results, or other

attributes that are not uniformly distributed throughout the voting population.

26. Therefore, no statistically valid conclusion can be drawn from a random sample. In addition, statistical tools which might be used to approximate sampling distributions are not applicable in this case, either because the attributes of interest are not statistically independent, or because the software is able to modify its own behavior when it is being tested (as was demonstrated in the Volkswagen emissions testing scandal of 2015 when the US Environmental Protection Agency discovered that on-board software had been programmed to sense when an automobile was being tested and deliver results that did not reflect emissions control impact on vehicle performance. (citation: EPA Notice of Violation September 15, 2015)).
27. Individual imaging of DRE internal memory is technically possible and has been publicly suggested as a way of avoiding preservation. This procedure, however, requires intrusive access to each DRE which makes it an infeasible solution. In the first place, I do not believe there are enough sufficiently trained technicians to accomplish the task. In the second place, it takes anywhere from 3 to 10 hours to obtain an acceptable image of the internal memory of a DRE.

28. The electronic data residing on the components of Georgia’s electronic voting systems (“the Required Electronic Data”) essential for preservation for the purpose of determining the causes of irregularities and the performance of those systems in the November 6, 2018 General Election follows below in Paragraph 29.


29. The Required Data includes:

- a. all electronic data residing in the internal memory of the DRE machines prepared for use in the November 6, 2018 election, including DRE machines used for uploading memory cards in election offices;
- b. all electronic data on DRE memory cards from all polling places and election offices used in early voting and Election Day voting related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- c. all electronic data residing on the GEMS servers, including logging records and audit logs related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- d. all electronic data residing on external media devices used to upload results to the Election Night Reporting system related to the November 6, 2018 election;
- e. all electronic data residing on Electronic Media Processors related to the November 6, 2018 elections.

- f. all electronic data on ExpressPollbooks memory cards used in the November 6, 2018 election.
  - g. all electronic data in the internal memory of the ExpressPollbooks used in the November 6, 2018 election.
  - h. all electronic data including logging records (including the E-Net systems and vendors' records) used in the upload or download of voter registration records and the electronic pollbooks.
30. As recently as November 17 and 18, I have been made aware of possible anomalies from the November 6 election, and I am aware of various public disclosures of other anomalies. Anomalies such as these would be subject to investigation under the one-month DRE internal memory preservation rule. Investigation of these anomalies would be jeopardized without preservation of the affected DREs.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare and verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this date, November 21, 2018.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. DeMillo". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "R" and a trailing flourish.

---

Richard A. DeMillo

---

**From:** Harvey, Chris  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 28, 2018 5:12 PM  
**To:** Coine-Mayers Kathleen  
**Cc:** Germany, Ryan; Rayburn, Kevin  
**Subject:** RE: Jarrard & Davis

Kathleen,  
No. I'm not familiar with that person.  
I recommend you engage your attorney for guidance.

Chris Harvey  
Elections Director, Georgia Secretary of State

404-657-5380 DIRECT  
404-985-6351 MOBILE

---

**From:** Coine-Mayers Kathleen  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 28, 2018 5:06 PM  
**To:** Harvey, Chris  
**Subject:** Jarrard & Davis

**Chris:**

**I received a phone call from a Sam Van Volkenburgh, a lawyer with Jarrard and Davis. ( [REDACTED] )**

**He started asking me some questions about the sequestering of machines and your notice.**

**I did not have time to talk to him at the moment ( I am the only one in the office) and asked him to call back tomorrow.**

**Is he calling on your behalf?**

**Thanks**

Kathleen Mayers, Elections Supervisor  
Greene County Board of Elections & Registration  
1180 C. Weldon Smith Drive  
Greensboro, Ga 30642  
Office: 706-453-1108  
Fax: 706-453-9438



---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 5:32 PM  
**To:** Raheem, Nassar  
**Cc:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Subject:** Website  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript 12.12.18.pdf

Can you please attach the attached file on the website below to HERE?

Click HERE for the meeting transcript for the December 12, 2018 meeting.

<http://soswebadmin02.sos.state.ga.us/admin/index.php/elections/editPage/2245>

--

Jessica Simmons  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Robyn A. Crittenden  
(404) 463-1601 (Direct)  
[jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?



1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1       Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2       staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3       on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4       talk a little better into it.

5       MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6       Check, check, testing, testing.

7       AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8       MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9       So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10      better?

11      AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12      MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13      AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14      AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15      MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17      While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18      I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19      faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20      phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21      We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22      Good to see you.

23      MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25      could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1           could supply an independent audit trail.

2           The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3           legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4           did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5           purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6           May 4th, 2002.

7           The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8           commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9           same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10          only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11          fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12          have that in your recommendations.

13          So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14          2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15          verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16          to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17          system today.

18          So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19          Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20          perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21          or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22          you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23          the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24          screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25          the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1       could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2               So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3       Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4       ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5       elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6       getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7       device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8               So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9       and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10      server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11      by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12      have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13      happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14      Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15      great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16      lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17              So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18      commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19      can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20      you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21      The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22      it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23      but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24      counties.

25              So if we're going to continue with a centralized



1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the



1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the



1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently



1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind



1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1       which one's better?

2               MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3       work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4       felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5       that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6       would have to review.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8               MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9       off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10      we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11      that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12      we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13      audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14      precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15      precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16      will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17      done.

18              You know, there are important things going on in that  
19      three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20      looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21      example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22              And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23      ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24      process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25      mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,



1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13           We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18           We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting



1       going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2               The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3       votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4       refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5       the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6       whatever could happen.

7               They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8       machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9       needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10      the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11      paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12      Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13              The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14      surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15      surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16      came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17      and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18      of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19      optical-scan ballots.

20              At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21      a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22      because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23      would register in the whole county that night because,  
24      obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25      voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go



1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1       estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2       which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3       to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4       governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5       than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6       that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7       front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8               So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9       I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10      answer what you were thinking --

11             SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13             SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14      so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15      state money --

16             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17      model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18      understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19      the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20      training, and so forth and so on.

21             SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22      I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23      state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24      counties also.

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --



1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really



easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?



1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10       And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11       Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12       there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13       that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15       -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16       problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17       but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19       heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20       o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21       to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22       of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23       working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24       it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25       poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,



1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want



1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3           MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5           MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8           MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13          MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14          AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16          MS. NELSON: This one?

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19          MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22                So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,



1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a



1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between



1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1       lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2       generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3       for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4       a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5       in my hometown of Atlanta.

6               The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7       dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8       technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9       to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10      should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11      so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12      and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13             A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14      combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15      auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16      and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17             This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18      of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19      Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20      given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21      legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22      federal and state elections.

23             Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24      headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25      also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1       infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2       citizenry is fair and just.

3             Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4       art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5       continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6       voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7       importance of the task ahead of you.

8             Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9       foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10      would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11      confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12      values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13      elect our own leaders.

14            And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15      road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16      all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17      spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18      equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19      trial of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20      of their votes. Thank you.

21            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22      appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23      Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24      way?

25            MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1           -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3 any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4 that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5 barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6 favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7 scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9 ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10 never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11 Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12           But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13 anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14 like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15 office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16 how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17 it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18           And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19 think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20 most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21 doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22 taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24 Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25 and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14          Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21          MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from



1       Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2       heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3       and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5               MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7       for.

8               MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9       Representatives, District 25.

10              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11              MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13              MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14       am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15       percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16       County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17              But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18       -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19       -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20       tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21       ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22       like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23              But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24       that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25       and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1 goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2 that's at stake.

3 As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4 and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5 didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6 involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7 will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8 afraid their vote will not count.

9 If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10 you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11 goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12 anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13 handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14 go. Thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16 Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17 MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19 MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20 allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21 work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22 of Georgia.

23 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24 MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25 voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.



1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1           that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2           accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3           the legislature decides on the system.

4           And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5           the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6           aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7           guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8           got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9           confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11           George Ballbona (ph)?

12           MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14           George.

15           MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17           for being here today.

18           MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19           live in Cobb County.

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21           MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22           those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23           but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24           anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25           something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I



1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1           thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2           when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3           Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4           course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5           you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6           this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7           time.

8           Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9           funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10          county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11          an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12          from our election officials on how important that could be.

13          Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14          In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15          poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16          if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17          other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18          Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19          have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20          the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21          Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22          should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23          discussion has been here today on that.

24          Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25          we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5             And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10            And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17            So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21            The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we



1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15           MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21           And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --



1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.



1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22          important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23          talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24          systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in



1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON:  -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30.  Okay.  Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:  Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE:  So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY:  We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE:  So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:  You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE:  Yes.  But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:  The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly.  Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically.  Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND:  Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that



1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

MS. BAILEY: -- location --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking about. Yeah.

MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that, but let us figure out a way that's going to work for Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the legislation could require an audit and leave the particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can -- can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating at that time?

And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1       to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2       spent wisely.

3               So this relationship between the state and the county  
4       on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5       counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6       it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7       the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8       commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9       them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10      jurisdiction.

11             So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12      tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13      government quite often is the government that's most local  
14      to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15      system work, but we also want the local input.

16             And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17      fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18      more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19             So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20      not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21      Nancy?

22             MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23      expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24      demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25      demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.



1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a



1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1       produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2       slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3       prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4       sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5       doesn't retain any votes.

6               And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7       election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8       easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9       election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10      in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11      multiple ways.

12             So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13      an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14      devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15      mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16      and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17      who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18      them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19      would like to do that.

20             We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21      a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22      if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23      ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24      the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25      that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10



<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>



204:6 <b>disenfranchising</b> 124:22 219:2,9 <b>disparity</b> 65:16,25 67:7 <b>disproportionate</b> 180:18 <b>dispute</b> 125:11 <b>distinguish</b> 55:22 <b>distinguished</b> 158:24 <b>distress</b> 123:6 <b>distribute</b> 59:24 <b>distribution</b> 44:7 <b>district</b> 38:14,15 45:21 110:15 152:9 200:3 <b>districts</b> 72:19 <b>distrust</b> 186:5,6 189:9 <b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15 <b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3 <b>Doctor</b> 203:20 <b>documentation</b> 156:23 <b>documented</b> 220:23 <b>dodge</b> 195:24 <b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1 97:17 108:13 146:4 187:17 202:21 225:5 226:3 <b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12 39:14 40:11 42:9 48:21 54:6 64:14 77:13 99:5,15 100:15 129:4 131:21 134:24 137:7 154:25 155:21 157:6 166:18 179:6 185:1 186:8 190:14 192:4 198:9 222:20 228:25 <b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15 <b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15 78:18,19,20 87:2 139:4 142:7 163:5	165:5,21 211:11 222:10 224:4 <b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8 13:5,10 20:14 21:25 23:13 25:3 25:24,25 26:2,14 28:11 30:18 32:9 32:9 33:6 36:9 44:22 49:18 50:22 58:9 59:23 70:1 72:12 76:25 87:20 88:4 90:25 99:2,3 109:9 111:25 113:19 125:16 129:11 135:9 138:1 147:12 155:11,25 156:12 160:21 164:7 165:8 167:3 171:22,25 177:12 178:16 183:6,7,16 184:18 186:2 195:20 197:1 198:6 202:12 204:1 205:7,7,15 206:3 211:9,10,16 213:8 217:21,22 217:22 221:11,17 223:10 224:7 <b>doomed</b> 62:23 <b>door</b> 39:17 <b>doors</b> 152:3,18 <b>double</b> 74:10 100:6 <b>double-digit</b> 86:16 <b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6 147:21 173:5 174:12 191:16 209:7 211:11 <b>doubted</b> 172:2 <b>Douglas</b> 19:19 <b>download</b> 27:18 <b>downside</b> 40:16,25 <b>down-ballot</b> 24:21 25:6 <b>dozen</b> 77:23 <b>dozens</b> 154:8 <b>DPH</b> 210:7 <b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22 76:7,9 77:11,16 77:18,21,24 78:6	78:9,11,14 183:21 183:22,23 184:7 184:11,17 185:7 185:13 186:10,15 186:22,25 203:21 205:4,5,7,14 210:20,21 211:1 220:21,22 223:15 223:16 <b>dramatically</b> 25:4 26:1 <b>draw</b> 86:6 <b>drawback</b> 226:15 <b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8 <b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14 30:14,23 31:6 102:8 104:12,13 148:10,17 160:23 197:18 <b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17 86:19 <b>drilled</b> 65:15 <b>drink</b> 163:14 <b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1 209:9 <b>Driver</b> 204:22 <b>driver's</b> 201:6 <b>driver's</b> 72:14 200:23 203:24 204:5 <b>drop</b> 188:16 <b>dropped</b> 158:14 <b>drops</b> 158:21 <b>drove</b> 18:10 <b>dry</b> 82:13 <b>dude</b> 165:2 <b>due</b> 45:6 104:12 105:15 133:20 143:5 <b>due's</b> 10:21 <b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22 123:24 124:2,2,3 124:4,7,9 <b>durable</b> 32:4 <b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12 135:14,17,17 <b>dynamics</b> 103:25 <b>dysfunctional</b> 136:10	<b>E</b> <b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1 <b>eager</b> 192:11 <b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6 62:10 85:4 102:22 140:17 169:5 171:18 190:9 191:12 207:19,23 208:5 209:13 218:4 225:20 <b>early</b> 7:14 14:19 16:9 27:1 32:6 51:9 75:21 89:3 97:13 101:23 116:19 177:6 181:5 197:22,24 198:3,24 227:16 227:18 <b>earpiece</b> 71:13 <b>ease</b> 91:3 <b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13 50:1 130:9 193:21 <b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24 225:8 <b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25 175:4 194:11 227:1,3 <b>eat</b> 7:5 <b>echo</b> 221:14 <b>economical</b> 165:19 <b>Ed</b> 163:17 <b>educate</b> 87:14 89:20 90:10 138:17 <b>educating</b> 192:25 193:1 <b>education</b> 66:25 77:5,13 78:3,5,20 88:3 89:17,23 92:14 126:25 145:10 169:9 191:2,9,13 192:5 192:25 195:1 205:6 <b>educational</b> 65:4 65:22 87:2 90:17 <b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16 180:18 <b>effective</b> 129:24 <b>effectively</b> 127:3	<b>efficient</b> 201:20 <b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23 70:13 91:22 92:8 105:1 154:25 <b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8 <b>eight</b> 98:24 <b>either</b> 23:13 26:23 27:1 33:2 43:15 56:21 83:22 224:8 <b>elderly</b> 125:4,6 144:16 <b>elect</b> 143:13 <b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8 154:13 162:8 164:13 226:9 <b>election</b> 4:3 10:7 13:1 14:19 15:1,3 16:8,9,11,18 18:14,22 22:15 24:15 25:5 29:25 32:6 33:10,18 34:4 36:23 38:1 38:11 39:2,7,18 39:20,22,23 40:18 40:19,21,23 41:2 41:8,12,16 42:10 44:10 45:3,14,19 46:11,20,24,25 47:8 48:6,7 50:4 51:2 52:13,14 53:9,10,12,12,23 56:19,22 57:7,13 57:14,18,22,24 58:22 59:12 63:2 63:11,13 64:20,21 66:6,13 67:2 68:8 69:10 72:9 73:7 73:19 74:20 80:25 81:6,9,21,25 82:20 87:12 89:17 93:5 96:6,21,25 97:1,6 98:1,3 99:14,16,20 100:4 100:7,9,9,15,19 100:21 101:9,10 101:11,13,19,21 102:5,19,24 103:3 103:4,14,17,20 105:9,16,23 106:19 108:24
---	--	--	---	---

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---



22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23		<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>L</b>	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	124:14 156:14	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	171:25 172:4	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	189:8	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	<b>language</b> 29:20	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	72:4 104:7	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	72:7 180:12	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	195:7 196:25	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	222:23 229:1	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	133:13	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>largest</b> 125:18	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>Las</b> 153:8	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	164:15	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	<b>laughingstock</b>	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	143:5 156:13	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>launch</b> 113:17	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	11:24 12:2,3	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	13:11 41:4 56:19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	60:7 61:11,14,19	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	112:15 141:21	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	142:1,4 177:2	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	182:16,18 183:7	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	216:14 224:21	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	183:10 195:25	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	216:19	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	138:2,3	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17	109:8 111:11,13	205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	---	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16



40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13	5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12	101:24 154:16 <b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13 <b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25	203:7 207:12 <b>quieter</b> 139:11 <b>quit</b> 140:10 <b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23 <b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12	<b>rarely</b> 222:4 <b>rat</b> 163:14 <b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7 <b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19 <b>ratings</b> 223:4 <b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17
<b>proponent</b> 91:5 <b>proportion</b> 73:1 <b>proposal</b> 160:21 <b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16 <b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4 <b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10 <b>Protecting</b> 150:22 <b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13 <b>protects</b> 15:22 <b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13 <b>prove</b> 13:6 <b>proved</b> 224:2 <b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9 <b>proves</b> 106:21 <b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2 <b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14 <b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20 <b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15 <b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15 <b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11 <b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22 <b>prudence</b> 222:1 <b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9	<b>publicity</b> 15:16 <b>publicly</b> 185:24 <b>public-input</b> 166:9 <b>pulled</b> 208:13 <b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20 <b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7 <b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5 <b>purchases</b> 222:23 <b>pure</b> 73:24 <b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18 <b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22 <b>pursuant</b> 202:10 <b>pursues</b> 133:16 <b>pursuit</b> 164:7 <b>push</b> 73:23 161:21 <b>pushed</b> 100:18 <b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18 <b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12	<b>QR</b> 160:7 <b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24 <b>quarter</b> 25:20 <b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18 <b>questioning</b> 103:2 <b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10 <b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14 <b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25	<b>R</b> <b>R</b> 2:1 230:1 <b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25 <b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23 <b>racial</b> 180:11 <b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11 <b>raise</b> 212:1 <b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13 <b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16 <b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11 <b>random</b> 33:2 56:10 <b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20 <b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12 <b>rank</b> 183:16 <b>rapid</b> 67:25 <b>rare</b> 30:7	<b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9 <b>reached</b> 194:9 <b>reaction</b> 107:17 <b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6 <b>readable</b> 147:4 <b>reader</b> 201:6 <b>reading</b> 107:22 <b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13 <b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15 <b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7 <b>realized</b> 28:17 <b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8	<b>success</b> 122:9	91:5 94:21 96:4	51:11,16,17,21,23
<b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4	<b>strange</b> 26:8	<b>successful</b> 99:7	97:5 100:1 105:4	52:3,5 53:22 56:7
3:22,25 13:20	<b>strengthened</b> 147:1	<b>successfully</b> 69:12	113:4 114:13	56:18 58:10,11
24:22 37:6,14	<b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20	101:8 214:10	118:12 119:8	62:1,9 63:15,23
51:13 108:22	<b>stretch</b> 97:2	<b>sucked</b> 98:15,18	120:7 122:2	66:23 67:10,16
113:3 134:2	<b>stretches</b> 178:16	<b>sucks</b> 164:11	124:17 134:25	68:20 69:4,5,21
139:24 150:15	<b>STRICKLAND</b>	<b>sudden</b> 165:10	164:17 167:25	70:17 71:25 72:5
181:17 193:21	171:14 205:25	<b>sue</b> 138:14	171:7,11 172:17	72:6,20 73:12,22
228:18	206:2	<b>sues</b> 33:18	178:8,22 181:11	73:25 74:2 79:1
<b>station</b> 75:23 78:7	<b>strips</b> 197:21	<b>sugar</b> 163:14	184:25 190:3	80:4,5,10 85:20
84:20 93:13	<b>strong</b> 92:6	<b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15	195:9 201:13,18	85:24 86:9,12,12
<b>stations</b> 84:18,19	<b>strongly</b> 62:21	50:9 151:4	205:14 209:19	86:21 87:7,8 89:2
84:24 205:10	151:4 161:18	<b>suggesting</b> 50:7	212:1,6 214:11	96:24 109:14,16
<b>statistical</b> 41:22	229:14	154:16	216:18 227:13	109:16 110:2
42:3	<b>structure</b> 196:5	<b>suggestion</b> 23:20	<b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24	111:17 112:8
<b>statistically-based</b>	<b>structured</b> 176:5	<b>suggestions</b> 8:25	<b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4	117:14 118:4,6,7
40:2 44:17	<b>struggle</b> 209:20	<b>suggests</b> 187:10	<b>surprise</b> 64:15	118:9,13 119:23
<b>statistically-valid</b>	211:24	<b>suit</b> 125:2,7	125:14 148:16	119:24 120:10
149:16	<b>stub</b> 215:2	<b>suits</b> 72:15	<b>surprised</b> 122:25	121:19 122:5,10
<b>statistical-based</b>	<b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3	<b>summary</b> 20:25	<b>surrounded</b> 193:23	127:16,16,22
41:19	222:11 223:23	107:24 148:22,22	<b>survey</b> 97:25	128:2,8 129:14
<b>statistician</b> 55:2	224:4	158:8 159:5	<b>surveyed</b> 9:18	130:15 132:22,23
<b>statistics</b> 44:2	<b>Student</b> 2:15	170:15	80:20	133:3,11,15
59:18 125:22	<b>students</b> 142:1	<b>summer</b> 127:5	<b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11	135:23 136:14,18
<b>statutory</b> 50:18	<b>studied</b> 66:13	<b>super</b> 197:1	153:11,19 157:11	140:7 141:1
<b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21	76:21	<b>superfluous</b> 164:3	157:14,15,23	142:12 145:16,19
114:23,24 202:4	<b>study</b> 30:24 54:25	<b>superintendent</b>	159:9	147:19 148:7
<b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18	63:8 65:3 66:3,4	182:19,23	<b>Susan's</b> 34:23	150:4,6,12,23
<b>staying</b> 216:18	66:14,15,17,21	<b>Superior</b> 111:3	154:1	151:5,13,17
<b>steal</b> 77:2	68:8 80:18 92:22	<b>supervisor</b> 134:9	<b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12	152:21 154:11,12
<b>step</b> 53:11 149:12	139:24 187:10	198:13	182:20	156:11 157:1,5
164:4	221:6	<b>supervisors</b> 128:6	<b>sustain</b> 173:11	158:13 160:11
<b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5	<b>studying</b> 75:7	<b>supply</b> 12:1	<b>swapping</b> 16:24	161:16,17,19,21
230:5,18,18	80:18	<b>support</b> 3:24 92:7	<b>swear</b> 117:15	161:25 162:1,3,6
<b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10	<b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8	135:23 143:9	<b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12	163:15 164:10
<b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10	106:25 126:1	<b>supportable</b> 129:25	<b>switched</b> 57:15	168:24 169:1,8,13
115:10 228:5	155:6 160:25	<b>supporting</b> 150:19	81:23 85:4	169:16,17,20
<b>STICKLAND</b>	<b>stuffing</b> 158:18	<b>suppose</b> 211:10	<b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5	170:7,23,23 171:3
172:22	<b>style</b> 72:15	<b>supposed</b> 72:18	167:5	171:4,5,11,25
<b>stone</b> 167:10	<b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1	160:9 213:6	<b>symptom</b> 82:17	172:5,7,11 173:4
228:24	214:15 215:9	<b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11	<b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12	173:4 177:9,12,14
<b>stools</b> 120:15	224:17	16:1 17:15 18:17	9:3,25 10:22,23	179:17,24 180:3
<b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10	<b>submitted</b> 47:16	19:13 21:15 29:3	11:10,11,13,25	180:18,20,25
155:10 188:19	124:19	29:4 33:12 34:3	12:5,13,17,18,22	183:25 184:21,22
<b>stopped</b> 211:22	<b>submitting</b> 122:4	34:11 35:4 39:3,8	13:4,7,18 14:11	185:15,16 189:11
<b>store</b> 162:22	<b>Subscription</b> 222:6	43:13 49:6,20	19:17 20:3 23:22	189:24 190:3,7,25
<b>stored</b> 27:14,22	<b>subset</b> 38:17	50:22 51:1 58:19	23:23 27:13 32:1	191:1,4,6,15,22
<b>stores</b> 135:5	<b>substitute</b> 133:4	62:4 69:23 70:13	34:12 35:6 36:18	192:15 193:9,15
<b>stories</b> 186:5	<b>subtle</b> 188:3	73:2 74:9 75:14	37:21 38:22,25	193:20 194:24
<b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>subtract</b> 146:10	79:9 85:1 89:17	49:7,10 50:23	195:1,5,15,18



196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>well-designed</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>well-funded</b> 192:7	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>well-intended</b> 5:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>well-to-do</b> 93:17	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winner</b> 46:21
	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winning</b> 182:11
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wisely</b> 212:2,7
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wished</b> 84:6
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>withdrawn</b> 230:9
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
223:5	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	224:15 228:14	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worst</b> 161:2	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
104:6 113:2 116:8	163:14 193:4,4	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
124:22 126:22	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
131:7 133:19	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
140:23 144:6,13	151:8 161:4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
174:25 175:2	<b>write</b> 89:8	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
178:24 191:5	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	55:24 63:20 64:17	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
192:5 199:8,25	<b>writing</b> 170:4	68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
202:21 203:14,19	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	74:18 79:19 93:18	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
212:15 222:8	108:8 162:7	138:19 142:3,3	212:11 228:6	141:4
224:23	187:15,15,16	147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	189:21 198:16	156:11,11 158:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
124:16,20,20	202:21 207:12	158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
127:1 138:24	217:6,7,19	170:11 192:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
173:10		207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
158:2 193:6 200:1		219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
202:20		221:18,22 222:13	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>X</b>	223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
100:1 101:25	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10	224:11	206:13 214:14	167:4
104:22,22 117:2	93:13	<b>yell</b> 166:15	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
169:10 191:9	<b>Y</b>	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
193:1 194:5	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---



---

**From:** Patrick Stephens <ptrckstephens1@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 2:27 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Cc:** gree806  
**Subject:** \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript (2).pdf; safecommissiontranscriptmini.pdf

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hey, Candice! I've attached the transcript to this E-mail. Please let me know that you've received it all right.

Thanks,

--

- Patrick A. Stephens, CCR -

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?



1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1           Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2           staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3           on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4           talk a little better into it.

5           MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6           Check, check, testing, testing.

7           AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8           MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9           So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10          better?

11          AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12          MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13          AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15          MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17          While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18          I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19          faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20          phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21          We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22          Good to see you.

23          MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25          could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1           could supply an independent audit trail.

2           The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3           legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4           did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5           purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6           May 4th, 2002.

7           The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8           commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9           same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10          only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11          fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12          have that in your recommendations.

13          So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14          2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15          verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16          to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17          system today.

18          So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19          Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20          perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21          or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22          you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23          the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24          screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25          the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized



1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the



1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the



1        voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2        suggest that -- we think is important:

3            The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4        We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5        It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6        everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7        and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8        disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9        ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10       disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11       then their voter anonymity is better.

12           Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13       tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14       be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15       allowed in Georgia.

16           Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17       think is really important that we want the commission to  
18       consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19       a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20       tabulators.

21           So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22       counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23       better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24       information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25       fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently



1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind



1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,



1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1       system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2       that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3       and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4       I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5       you.

6           I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7       of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8       put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9       here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10          And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11       probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12       some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13       consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14       much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15          MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16       I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17       Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18       so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19       have a few minutes with you today.

20          The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21       today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22       starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23       remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24       give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25       to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13           We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18           We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting



1       going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2               The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3       votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4       refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5       the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6       whatever could happen.

7               They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8       machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9       needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10      the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11      paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12      Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13              The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14      surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15      surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16      came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17      and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18      of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19      optical-scan ballots.

20              At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21      a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22      because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23      would register in the whole county that night because,  
24      obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25      voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go



1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1       contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2       think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3       could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4       was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5       education.

6             DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7       station worker training?

8             MS. COX: Yes.

9             DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10            MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11            DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13            SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14       Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15       thank you for being here.

16            MS. COX: Thank you.

17            SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18       million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19       and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20       dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21       Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22       voting machine?

23            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24       tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25       seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11                SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13                SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21                SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --



1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really



easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?



Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd love to hear from you.

MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris. We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic. Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

MS. BROCHE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second, Chris.

MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the first meeting talking about our current voting system.

I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10      And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11      Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12      there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13      that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15      -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16      problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17      but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19      heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20      o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21      to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22      of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23      working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24      it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25      poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,



1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2           through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3           deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4           think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5           continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6           litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8           give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9           election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10          -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11          Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12          use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13          lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15          Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16          in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17          for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19          the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20          plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21          goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22          pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23          rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25          briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want



1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,



1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1       stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2       equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3       speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4       useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5           And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6       in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7       in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8       think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10       appreciate you being here today.

11          Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12       Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13          MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15       We'd love to hear from you.

16          MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17       Brewer.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19          MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20       and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21       ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22       nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23       space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24       missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25       voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a



1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between



1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1           be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2           dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3           are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4           on.

5           So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6           of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7           audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8           integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9           the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10          very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12          today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13          Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14          us where you're from.

15          MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16          executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17          today to talk to you --

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19          MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21          MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23          MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25          MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1        want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2        to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3        right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4        with 400 million dollars in debt.

5                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6        appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7        Marilyn, good to have you today.

8                (Alarm chiming.)

9                MS. MARKS: Already?

10               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11               MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13               MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15        tell us where you live.

16               MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17        -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18        I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20        which county you live in.

21               MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23               MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24        time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25        voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1       infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2       citizenry is fair and just.

3             Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4       art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5       continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6       voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7       importance of the task ahead of you.

8             Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9       foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10      would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11      confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12      values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13      elect our own leaders.

14            And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15      road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16      all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17      spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18      equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19      trial of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20      of their votes. Thank you.

21            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22      appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23      Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24      way?

25            MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14          Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21          MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from



1       Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2       heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3       and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5               MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7       for.

8               MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9       Representatives, District 25.

10              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11              MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13              MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14       am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15       percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16       County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17              But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18       -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19       -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20       tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21       ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22       like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23              But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24       that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25       and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1           goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2           that's at stake.

3           As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4           and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5           didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6           involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7           will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8           afraid their vote will not count.

9           If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10          you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11          goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12          anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13          handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14          go. Thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16          Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17          MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19          MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20          allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21          work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22          of Georgia.

23          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24          MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25          voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11              We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16              Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20              I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.



1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I



1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1           thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2           when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3           Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4           course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5           you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6           this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7           time.

8           Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9           funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10          county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11          an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12          from our election officials on how important that could be.

13          Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14          In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15          poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16          if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17          other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18          Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19          have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20          the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21          Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22          should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23          discussion has been here today on that.

24          Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25          we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5           And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10           And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17           So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21           The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we



1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15           MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21           And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --



1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.



1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22          important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23          talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24          systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in



1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that



1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

MS. BAILEY: -- location --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking about. Yeah.

MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that, but let us figure out a way that's going to work for Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the legislation could require an audit and leave the particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can -- can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating at that time?

And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1       to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2       spent wisely.

3               So this relationship between the state and the county  
4       on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5       counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6       it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7       the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8       commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9       them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10      jurisdiction.

11             So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12      tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13      government quite often is the government that's most local  
14      to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15      system work, but we also want the local input.

16             And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17      fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18      more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19             So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20      not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21      Nancy?

22             MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23      expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24      demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25      demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.



1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a



1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1       produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2       slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3       prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4       sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5       doesn't retain any votes.

6               And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7       election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8       easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9       election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10      in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11      multiple ways.

12             So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13      an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14      devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15      mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16      and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17      who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18      them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19      would like to do that.

20             We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21      a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22      if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23      ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24      the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25      that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10



<b>analysis</b> 35:15	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15	144:3,3 145:23	142:5 167:11,14	80:15 127:19,20
<b>analysts</b> 150:9	9:21 10:6 37:2,3	146:12	<b>attached</b> 158:19	134:24 135:9
<b>analyze</b> 11:9	61:24 62:2,14,16	<b>Asian</b> 144:6	230:13	140:18 149:17
<b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6	62:18 75:7 76:9	<b>Asian-American</b>	<b>attachment</b> 201:1,2	162:7 172:10
<b>anecdotal</b> 84:1	95:18 108:20	141:25	<b>attack</b> 14:25,25	173:15,16,25
<b>anecdotes</b> 133:10	113:24 114:6	<b>Asian-Pacific</b>	15:11,22 143:8	174:1,17 175:2,12
<b>angle</b> 219:8	118:20 119:10,21	141:24	<b>attacker</b> 13:25	175:18 176:5
<b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22	121:1 122:12	<b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2	<b>Attaining</b> 133:3	177:2 178:4,9,23
151:25 153:5	123:17 126:10	<b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11	<b>attendees</b> 3:19	181:2,10,14,15,17
<b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14	130:20 131:8	89:20 96:25 98:16	<b>attention</b> 12:7	182:2,6,6,7
147:23	132:7 134:5	102:24 103:14	13:16 15:17 16:21	183:13,24 184:16
<b>announce</b> 7:13	135:12 137:12	169:19 198:25	20:18 30:8 34:9	184:18 185:1
<b>announced</b> 42:6,8	139:6 141:11	206:8 221:5	50:6 68:16 99:3	187:17 188:4,5
<b>annual</b> 205:22	143:22 146:13	228:17	106:13 142:18	190:8,10,14
<b>anonymity</b> 32:11	149:24 151:21	<b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17	161:1 198:25	207:13,20 209:14
<b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10	153:6 166:7,11	30:10 114:14	<b>attesting</b> 117:16	209:15
80:7 106:23 113:4	172:25	206:8 219:18	<b>attorney</b> 6:8	<b>auditable</b> 12:10
113:5 149:2 172:7	<b>approach</b> 158:12	<b>Askins</b> 153:20,20	<b>atypical</b> 105:9	13:17 118:15
172:8 175:10	221:2	153:21,25,25	<b>audible</b> 122:6,6	120:9 140:5,9
221:12	<b>appropriate</b> 16:23	154:4	<b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14	141:1 142:15
<b>answered</b> 44:19	93:14	<b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25	9:7,11,13,14,18	143:18 145:1
46:2 47:12 78:14	<b>appropriated</b> 51:9	201:17 210:14	10:9,10,12,14,16	153:17 186:21
108:17	77:15	<b>aspects</b> 36:5	21:18 37:11 75:17	187:3
<b>answers</b> 44:22	<b>appropriation</b>	<b>Assembly</b> 4:15	76:2 96:8,17	<b>audited</b> 12:20
<b>anticipate</b> 36:2	69:15	66:7 218:15	114:20 115:11	52:14 54:20 57:1
62:10 105:18	<b>approve</b> 115:11	<b>assessed</b> 18:18	119:12,14 155:23	134:20 140:21,22
218:14 228:17	166:15	<b>assessment</b> 208:1	186:19 188:17	149:3,16 156:25
<b>anticipated</b> 78:21	<b>approves</b> 218:15	<b>asset</b> 128:1	<b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21	172:6
78:24 105:5	<b>April</b> 51:9	<b>assigned</b> 18:18	12:1 13:2,2,6	<b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13
<b>anticipation</b> 7:12	<b>architect</b> 163:18	78:2 221:4	16:22,23 19:18	47:8 50:19 53:9
<b>antithetical</b> 133:12	<b>archives</b> 66:4	<b>assist</b> 195:4	26:7,12,12 30:19	58:18 80:22,23
<b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23	<b>area</b> 60:23 97:17	<b>assistant</b> 37:13	34:3 38:2,8,12,16	161:17,21 162:1,5
22:6,21 106:12	104:11 106:9	<b>assisted</b> 117:1	38:23 39:3,10	176:20,21,24
114:8 115:23	107:9,12	<b>associated</b> 35:11	40:1,2,2,3,12,16	177:3,24 178:23
128:16 222:3	<b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22	51:4 76:19 77:5	40:22 41:20,21	179:10 181:24
<b>anybody's</b> 147:13	87:3 97:21 195:8	135:7,7	42:1,3,17,25	182:22 187:14,15
<b>anymore</b> 76:18	216:16	<b>Association</b> 141:24	43:17,20 44:12,17	188:6
163:11	<b>arena</b> 93:10	<b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7	44:20 45:3,4,8,13	<b>auditors</b> 46:1
<b>anyway</b> 14:2	<b>aren't</b> 6:20,21	88:14 203:24	45:18,19,23 46:8	<b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18
123:15 157:20	162:6 165:6	<b>assuming</b> 34:12	46:17,19,19,20,20	37:19 39:17,25
167:15 225:7	<b>argument</b> 110:16	52:21 53:2	46:25 47:5,13	41:19 42:20,24
<b>apologize</b> 109:11	190:23	<b>assumption</b> 169:11	48:1,1,3,11,21	43:12 44:18 45:10
<b>apparently</b> 28:10	<b>arguments</b> 13:21	193:14	49:1,6,13,13,15	45:24 46:4 48:15
<b>appeal</b> 110:15	<b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19	<b>assurances</b> 41:24	49:15,19,19 50:5	48:25 49:2,5,10
203:10 225:13	<b>armed</b> 39:17	<b>assure</b> 74:12	50:23,24 51:25	49:16,18,24 51:2
<b>appear</b> 117:17,20	<b>arrive</b> 221:7,8	<b>assured</b> 163:18	52:4,12,13 53:2	51:18 53:7 54:6
203:10	<b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11	215:3	53:19,19,23,24	54:13 80:13 81:10
<b>appeared</b> 117:20	89:1,7	<b>Athens</b> 150:3	54:12 55:13 56:9	125:9 127:24
<b>appearing</b> 117:9	<b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4	161:12	56:18,19 58:2,3,4	130:16 134:18
<b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	<b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	58:11,16 59:5	137:7 169:24

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

<p>98:23,23  <b>beginning</b> 127:14  191:15,15  <b>begins</b> 4:14  <b>behalf</b> 155:21  <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2  <b>beings</b> 159:6  <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17  20:23 23:2 28:13  42:18 60:17 77:22  78:13 83:18 120:8  121:21 130:3  163:8 172:12  179:1 227:11  228:9  <b>believed</b> 12:14  <b>believes</b> 187:13  <b>bell</b> 141:2  <b>benefit</b> 201:7  <b>benefiting</b> 143:15  <b>benefits</b> 39:10  171:12  <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2  49:14 73:18,21  101:4 105:25  112:23 122:1  124:10,10 137:8,9  149:17 158:12  159:7 168:21  180:20 190:18  191:17 194:7  209:9,17 212:1  221:2,10 223:4,8  223:9 224:9 229:7  <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13  <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16  30:3,5 32:11,23  54:22 55:1 56:12  63:8 130:8 134:3  212:18 222:17  <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14  50:13 59:16,17  <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12  <b>bias</b> 145:3  <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3  27:11  <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20  36:4 43:11 46:16  46:17,18 53:11  61:16 75:5 130:17</p>	<p>155:24 182:6  214:20 218:11  229:9  <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3  <b>biggest</b> 91:15  219:19  <b>bill</b> 168:16  <b>billion</b> 18:18  <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9  91:22,23 92:7  145:3  <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7  31:9 34:6,7,7  42:23 85:8 97:21  103:12 105:24  120:11 156:13  190:17 212:22  222:13,16,17  <b>bite</b> 76:3  <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7  86:16  <b>blackout</b> 192:3  <b>blame</b> 123:23,25  198:15  <b>blank</b> 23:7,21  24:17 26:18 86:5  86:10 225:1  <b>blanket</b> 78:3  <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5  18:15 26:24  <b>Blassingame</b>  122:13,15  <b>blessed</b> 158:6  <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5  <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23  <b>board</b> 19:20,21  38:1 45:24 50:4  53:23 80:25 81:9  124:10 126:20  128:6 141:23  145:24 170:3,6  200:5 204:19  209:16 212:17  <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2  165:8  <b>Bobby</b> 92:4  <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4  118:8  <b>Bogart</b> 131:3  <b>Boldly</b> 132:24</p>	<p><b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1  223:4,10  <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9  <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1  200:5,23 201:2  205:8 206:12  207:3  <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2  201:12 206:3,4,15  206:23 210:12  227:22  <b>boost</b> 9:2  <b>booth</b> 153:3  <b>booths</b> 64:25  117:21  <b>bored</b> 49:20  <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23  88:25 174:4,6  183:12 184:1,8  185:4,8,21 204:12  204:19,25 212:22  213:6,19,22  <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4  <b>borrow</b> 223:5  <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13  <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8  74:23 118:5 206:9  215:18 224:8  <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8  140:19  <b>bounce</b> 107:14  <b>bouncing</b> 107:18  <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1  73:25 89:9 158:14  188:16 225:24  226:1  <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19  74:22 77:1 154:10  158:18  <b>Brad</b> 3:6  <b>brag</b> 124:9,12  <b>bragging</b> 172:21  <b>brazen</b> 164:16  <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20  165:23  <b>breath</b> 156:19  <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13  126:16,17,18,19  128:10,11  <b>Brian</b> 206:21</p>	<p><b>bridges</b> 223:6  <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22  109:3,7 110:8  <b>briefly</b> 110:25  111:7  <b>brilliant</b> 49:23  <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15  15:17 16:21 20:18  30:8 34:9 62:20  62:21 68:13,16  75:8 81:15 82:10  132:2 142:24  168:7 198:25  214:23  <b>brings</b> 160:18  <b>broadening</b> 132:23  <b>broadest</b> 132:17  <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13  <b>broke</b> 118:4  <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20  <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14  94:18 97:16 114:6  212:23 215:24  218:4  <b>Broward</b> 28:12  <b>browser</b> 76:23  <b>Bruce</b> 164:6  <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4  85:23 86:2  <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14  <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4  78:6 190:24  205:17  <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13  53:15 162:8 176:2  212:18 223:6  <b>building</b> 15:4  <b>buildings</b> 99:25  <b>built</b> 55:16  <b>bunch</b> 103:24  147:5 199:7  <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5  48:22 93:1 129:23  211:12  <b>buses</b> 90:7  <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5  <b>businesses</b> 98:7  <b>button</b> 73:23  <b>buttoned</b> 192:6  <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6</p>	<p>222:4,5  <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13  173:7 222:9  <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>C</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1  <b>calculated</b> 39:9  <b>calculating</b> 102:6  <b>calculators</b> 222:15  <b>calibrated</b> 107:10  108:7,12  <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24  29:11,22 30:14  114:15 139:2  182:20 193:22,24  <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17  30:17 42:2 64:20  82:8 99:10 110:9  111:1 150:22  <b>calling</b> 140:10  182:23  <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13  116:15,16,20  <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23  144:3 145:21  146:11  <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8  134:4  <b>campaigning</b> 129:9  <b>campaigns</b> 87:15  <b>campus</b> 95:4  <b>Candace</b> 96:12  <b>candidate</b> 33:16  65:7 89:11 106:5  106:7 107:5,6  135:18 182:16  202:9  <b>candidates</b> 23:13  40:20 41:11 89:8  <b>candidate's</b> 86:4  <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7  <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10  15:19 29:15 43:19  71:1 95:6 119:12  119:14 122:6  123:23 130:12  144:18 161:16,21  172:4 188:16  208:19 215:11</p>
---	--	---	---	---

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20
<b>clarifying</b> 24:11	<b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22		<b>commissioner's</b> 23:12	<b>compliance</b> 2:11
<b>clarity</b> 132:18	<b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23	<b>commencing</b> 1:9	<b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19	<b>compliant</b> 216:18
<b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24	<b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7	<b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18	<b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18	<b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3
<b>clean</b> 4:2	<b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13		<b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12	<b>Complies</b> 114:20
<b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3	<b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24		<b>commitment</b> 93:20	<b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17
<b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4	<b>color-coded</b> 215:10		<b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19	<b>components</b> 191:13
<b>clever</b> 16:12	<b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14	<b>commenters</b> 160:4	<b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6	<b>composed</b> 66:12
<b>clicked</b> 120:4	<b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13	<b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5	<b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15	<b>comprehensive</b> 169:9
<b>climate</b> 81:19		<b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8	<b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4	<b>compromise</b> 15:1
<b>climates</b> 82:17			<b>communicated</b> 101:3	<b>compromised</b> 15:10
<b>clock</b> 98:15,16			<b>communities</b> 130:18	<b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10
<b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5	<b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8		<b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12	<b>computerized</b> 165:3
<b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17	<b>comfort</b> 210:22		<b>commute</b> 146:21	<b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13
<b>closet</b> 177:18	<b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19		<b>company</b> 59:20	<b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9
<b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5			<b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20	<b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6
<b>cloud</b> 61:16	<b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18		<b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20	<b>computing</b> 158:24
<b>clubs</b> 70:7			<b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19	<b>con</b> 174:12
<b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17			<b>compelling</b> 33:19	<b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6
<b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19			<b>complaint</b> 105:21	<b>conceive</b> 215:13
<b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11			<b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24	<b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13
<b>codes</b> 160:7			<b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7	<b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21
<b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24			<b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22	<b>concerned</b> 14:20
<b>codify</b> 51:25			<b>completeness</b> 149:6	
<b>codifying</b> 51:18			<b>completion</b> 4:16	
<b>coffee</b> 163:13		<b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	
<b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19				
<b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17				
<b>Coliseum</b> 1:12				

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>



204:6 <b>disenfranchising</b> 124:22 219:2,9 <b>disparity</b> 65:16,25 67:7 <b>disproportionate</b> 180:18 <b>dispute</b> 125:11 <b>distinguish</b> 55:22 <b>distinguished</b> 158:24 <b>distress</b> 123:6 <b>distribute</b> 59:24 <b>distribution</b> 44:7 <b>district</b> 38:14,15 45:21 110:15 152:9 200:3 <b>districts</b> 72:19 <b>distrust</b> 186:5,6 189:9 <b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15 <b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3 <b>Doctor</b> 203:20 <b>documentation</b> 156:23 <b>documented</b> 220:23 <b>dodge</b> 195:24 <b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1 97:17 108:13 146:4 187:17 202:21 225:5 226:3 <b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12 39:14 40:11 42:9 48:21 54:6 64:14 77:13 99:5,15 100:15 129:4 131:21 134:24 137:7 154:25 155:21 157:6 166:18 179:6 185:1 186:8 190:14 192:4 198:9 222:20 228:25 <b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15 <b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15 78:18,19,20 87:2 139:4 142:7 163:5	165:5,21 211:11 222:10 224:4 <b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8 13:5,10 20:14 21:25 23:13 25:3 25:24,25 26:2,14 28:11 30:18 32:9 32:9 33:6 36:9 44:22 49:18 50:22 58:9 59:23 70:1 72:12 76:25 87:20 88:4 90:25 99:2,3 109:9 111:25 113:19 125:16 129:11 135:9 138:1 147:12 155:11,25 156:12 160:21 164:7 165:8 167:3 171:22,25 177:12 178:16 183:6,7,16 184:18 186:2 195:20 197:1 198:6 202:12 204:1 205:7,7,15 206:3 211:9,10,16 213:8 217:21,22 217:22 221:11,17 223:10 224:7 <b>doomed</b> 62:23 <b>door</b> 39:17 <b>doors</b> 152:3,18 <b>double</b> 74:10 100:6 <b>double-digit</b> 86:16 <b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6 147:21 173:5 174:12 191:16 209:7 211:11 <b>doubted</b> 172:2 <b>Douglas</b> 19:19 <b>download</b> 27:18 <b>downside</b> 40:16,25 <b>down-ballot</b> 24:21 25:6 <b>dozen</b> 77:23 <b>dozens</b> 154:8 <b>DPH</b> 210:7 <b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22 76:7,9 77:11,16 77:18,21,24 78:6	78:9,11,14 183:21 183:22,23 184:7 184:11,17 185:7 185:13 186:10,15 186:22,25 203:21 205:4,5,7,14 210:20,21 211:1 220:21,22 223:15 223:16 <b>dramatically</b> 25:4 26:1 <b>draw</b> 86:6 <b>drawback</b> 226:15 <b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8 <b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14 30:14,23 31:6 102:8 104:12,13 148:10,17 160:23 197:18 <b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17 86:19 <b>drilled</b> 65:15 <b>drink</b> 163:14 <b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1 209:9 <b>Driver</b> 204:22 <b>driver's</b> 201:6 <b>driver's</b> 72:14 200:23 203:24 204:5 <b>drop</b> 188:16 <b>dropped</b> 158:14 <b>drops</b> 158:21 <b>drove</b> 18:10 <b>dry</b> 82:13 <b>dude</b> 165:2 <b>due</b> 45:6 104:12 105:15 133:20 143:5 <b>due's</b> 10:21 <b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22 123:24 124:2,2,3 124:4,7,9 <b>durable</b> 32:4 <b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12 135:14,17,17 <b>dynamics</b> 103:25 <b>dysfunctional</b> 136:10	<b>E</b> <b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1 <b>eager</b> 192:11 <b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6 62:10 85:4 102:22 140:17 169:5 171:18 190:9 191:12 207:19,23 208:5 209:13 218:4 225:20 <b>early</b> 7:14 14:19 16:9 27:1 32:6 51:9 75:21 89:3 97:13 101:23 116:19 177:6 181:5 197:22,24 198:3,24 227:16 227:18 <b>earpiece</b> 71:13 <b>ease</b> 91:3 <b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13 50:1 130:9 193:21 <b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24 225:8 <b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25 175:4 194:11 227:1,3 <b>eat</b> 7:5 <b>echo</b> 221:14 <b>economical</b> 165:19 <b>Ed</b> 163:17 <b>educate</b> 87:14 89:20 90:10 138:17 <b>educating</b> 192:25 193:1 <b>education</b> 66:25 77:5,13 78:3,5,20 88:3 89:17,23 92:14 126:25 145:10 169:9 191:2,9,13 192:5 192:25 195:1 205:6 <b>educational</b> 65:4 65:22 87:2 90:17 <b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16 180:18 <b>effective</b> 129:24 <b>effectively</b> 127:3	<b>efficient</b> 201:20 <b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23 70:13 91:22 92:8 105:1 154:25 <b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8 <b>eight</b> 98:24 <b>either</b> 23:13 26:23 27:1 33:2 43:15 56:21 83:22 224:8 <b>elderly</b> 125:4,6 144:16 <b>elect</b> 143:13 <b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8 154:13 162:8 164:13 226:9 <b>election</b> 4:3 10:7 13:1 14:19 15:1,3 16:8,9,11,18 18:14,22 22:15 24:15 25:5 29:25 32:6 33:10,18 34:4 36:23 38:1 38:11 39:2,7,18 39:20,22,23 40:18 40:19,21,23 41:2 41:8,12,16 42:10 44:10 45:3,14,19 46:11,20,24,25 47:8 48:6,7 50:4 51:2 52:13,14 53:9,10,12,12,23 56:19,22 57:7,13 57:14,18,22,24 58:22 59:12 63:2 63:11,13 64:20,21 66:6,13 67:2 68:8 69:10 72:9 73:7 73:19 74:20 80:25 81:6,9,21,25 82:20 87:12 89:17 93:5 96:6,21,25 97:1,6 98:1,3 99:14,16,20 100:4 100:7,9,9,15,19 100:21 101:9,10 101:11,13,19,21 102:5,19,24 103:3 103:4,14,17,20 105:9,16,23 106:19 108:24
---	--	--	---	---

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---



22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16



40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24  <b>S</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--



196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11		<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19		<b>wealthy</b> 93:16		<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19		<b>wearing</b> 107:22	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5 <b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walked</b> 98:14		<b>weather</b> 82:25		<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>walks</b> 70:14		<b>week</b> 3:21 97:8,15 98:24 105:17,18 167:8 191:21 208:12 228:22,22 228:23		<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>wane</b> 105:24		<b>weekend</b> 176:2		<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wanting</b> 211:22 <b>wants</b> 114:8 <b>War</b> 144:4 <b>warranty</b> 93:24 <b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12 <b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17 <b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25 <b>watchdog</b> 212:6 <b>watched</b> 208:11 <b>watcher</b> 129:2 <b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17 <b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25 <b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23 <b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20 <b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21 <b>weird</b> 86:8 <b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5 <b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19 <b>welcomed</b> 91:24 <b>well-designed</b> 125:8 <b>well-funded</b> 192:7 <b>well-intended</b> 5:19 <b>well-to-do</b> 93:17 <b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10 <b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13 <b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we've</b> 15:2 17:21	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19 <b>witnesses</b> 117:16 <b>WMAZ</b> 126:11 <b>women</b> 127:7,8,9 127:10 192:9

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3	197:24 198:2,6,21	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	95:12 124:16	205:23,24 208:20	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15	171:8,8,12 200:2	209:5 220:2	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>02</b> 194:21
169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5	224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>1</b>
223:5	66:16	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13	53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	40:8 41:10 56:4
17:18 34:1,10	77:1 175:22	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	57:2 151:2 156:17
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	156:18 176:10
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worst</b> 161:2	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	182:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	42:4,5,13 55:24
104:6 113:2 116:8	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	84:19 125:16
124:22 126:22	58:7 59:11,12	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	147:9 206:14
131:7 133:19	163:14 193:4,4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	207:24 224:5
140:23 144:6,13	<b>wow</b> 217:16	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
174:25 175:2	125:24 145:22	19:11 29:15 42:14	157:23 165:2	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
178:24 191:5	151:8 161:4	55:24 63:20 64:17	172:21,21 186:25	165:5,21 198:20
192:5 199:8,25	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	68:8,13 69:2	193:23 194:10	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
202:21 203:14,19	<b>write</b> 89:8	74:18 79:19 93:18	200:7,21,24	141:4
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	127:2 136:4	212:11 228:6	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
212:15 222:8	<b>writing</b> 170:4	138:19 142:3,3	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
224:23	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6	147:9 154:5 156:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>114</b> 18:4
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5	150:18	156:11,11 158:2	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>12</b> 125:19
49:8 81:1 83:19	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17	158:17 165:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12th</b> 1:10
124:16,20,20	42:6,8 76:15	170:11 192:10	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
127:1 138:24	108:8 162:7	207:24 212:24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
173:10	187:15,15,16	213:25 218:23,24	140:1 154:14	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23	189:21 198:16	219:4,17,23	157:16 166:18	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
106:14 156:7	202:21 207:12	221:18,22 222:13	169:5 188:19	167:4
158:2 193:6 200:1	217:6,7,19	223:23,25 224:6	206:13 214:14	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
202:20	<b>X</b>	224:11	223:15	48:24 221:18
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
90:2,3,4,11,19,21	85:23 86:2,10	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7	51:16 109:19	163:4 222:9 224:4
100:1 101:25	93:13	200:9	111:19 165:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
104:22,22 117:2	<b>Y</b>	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5	206:5	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
169:10 191:9	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6	122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
193:1 194:5	9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	<b>Z</b>	218:23,24 219:17
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21	<b>zero</b> 12:16	219:23
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	219:23	<b>zone</b> 210:22	<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15		28:8,10,14
		145:15		<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---



## SECURE, ACCESSIBLE &amp; FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

## STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

## TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity, transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it has been throughout my career in public service.

Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I spent time in several different areas of state government, including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the Department of Human Services.

Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of

Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

(Collective Pledge.)

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

group has already heard from several different groups, and stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the important discussion about our state's next voting system.

We're -- we're joined here today by Representative Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature and Governor-elect Kemp.

Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all of the attendees here.

Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of State's office as we began our transition planning. I realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very grateful for the support you've given us.

As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

focal point for elections because the priceless franchise to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections throughout every aspect of the election process.

Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and, today, it is imperative we complete our research for security and technology for the next decade.

I have said that we need the most secure, updated voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a system that moves voters faster through the line so we can reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our next-generation voting machines.

Our next legislative session begins on January 14th and I know that the General Assembly and our department is looking forward to the completion and recommendations from this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank you for offering yourself for service in this critical and noble effort.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda for today.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary, and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to talk about something very important to Georgia; that is, voting in our state.

We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be able to help you out.

As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had very good participation from the public at our prior meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you for being here.

As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have time limits for our presentations today and we will gently initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.  
17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.  
21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

could supply an independent audit trail.

The law -- in order to get the machines in, the legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal did not take effect until after the contract was -- was purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on May 4th, 2002.

The reason that I bring this to the attention of the commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have -- have that in your recommendations.

So when that new system was implemented back then in 2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable system today.

So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system? Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well, you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot screen that you see may not be what's happening on the -- the inside of the machine.

trust in Georgia voting.

So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go through to do a big project like this.

And, typically, what you do is you analyze your current system for improvement opportunities, you define the new system requirements and then evaluate the alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is to help you identify the current system improvement opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for defining your objectives and requirements.

Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great protection for Georgia voters.

But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

As election officials, many of you know when -- there are no audit procedures in place today to audit their elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results, you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the correct results that the system told you.

And then lastly, but not least, is the recount situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable system.

So that's the election-integrity advocates' perspective, but what about the state's perspective? We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The -- the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that -- of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2 So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3 Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4 ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5 elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6 getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7 device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8 So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9 and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10 server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11 by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12 have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13 happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14 Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15 great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16 lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17 So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18 commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19 can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20 you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21 The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22 it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23 but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24 counties.

25 So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPL0ST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPL0ST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.  
25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1 either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2 MS. BAILEY: So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3 considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4 MR. FAVORITO: That's exactly right. There was no  
5 mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6 ballots cast in those races.

7 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you.

9 MS. ROSS: Can I get a point of clarification?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Just a point of clarification: For Bibb  
12 County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13 lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14 that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15 as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16 that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17 do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18 from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19 card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20 for.

21 MR. FAVORITO: So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22 the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23 itself.

24 MS. ROSS: They are on the voting unit, too.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And



1 that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2 nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3 machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4 non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5 A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6 which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7 very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8 have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9 commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10 ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11 recommendation.

12 So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13 systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14 replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15 that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16 those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17 well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18 electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19 really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20 cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21 -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22 The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23 DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24 Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25 University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6 Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14 And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24 So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

elections, it's going to require some additional work on the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be able to audit, recount and make sure that we have transparency in the election process.

This is going to be an increased burden on the county elections directors. It's going to require a little bit more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want to bring that to your attention because I think the Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county commissions in making sure that they understand this when we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement auditing, recounting and transparency.

So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've given you and see exactly what you really think we need to do and we think that you need to define the requirements, basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report. Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to release this until Friday because I wanted to get some feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

but you save all of this administrative work for the elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't have enough, then there's a big scramble.

So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections. Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know, any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with that ballot.

So we actually recommend that people vote by mail given the current -- the current situation with these machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of election is basically foolproof and no particular voting type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

the presentation and then I was going to make some adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared to talk about it in case there any questions.

And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be glad to take any other questions about the new system as well.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the preprinted ballots that are wasted --

MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used. Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much. We appreciate you being here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you. Thank you for having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see you today.

MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear me okay?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn. I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the honor of previously presenting to you on our first commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back. And the topic I'm going to talk about today is postelection audits.

Postelection audits are something that we currently don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we will be able to do. It's something that most states do, so it's something that you may want to include in the recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that later today and something for the legislature and our state

election board to really work with in the future.

So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your results using the same underlying data. So, in our world, the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're trying to independently re-create that tabulated results, looking back at the cast votes.

What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment and the procedures used to count the votes worked correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the election yielded the correct result.

What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a recount is, is when you count every single vote for a particular race. So when you recount a house district, you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full re-creation, you will know what the results is.

So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures worked.

So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

So the benefits of a audit are that you can find errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental errors, it can help you have data and information so that you can improve the process for future elections; you can iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits going to be done after an election, you know that they are going to dig in and review those results, look at the ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps build public confidence in the election and the outcome of an election.

So I'm going to describe the three main categories or types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What this means is there is a predetermined percentage of usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of the percentages that you would go back and review. The advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of precincts you would have to look at and that makes it easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a scope.

The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout, you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close the election is.

But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered percentage is being done by two states right now, and what that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how many precincts you will check based on how close the election is.

So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin, you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5 percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the election is.

And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and, at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1 audit.

2 So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3 a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4 time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5 percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6 that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7 catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8 the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9 you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10 and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11 is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12 So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13 statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14 years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15 journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16 elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17 they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18 There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19 Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20 audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21 smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22 able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23 To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24 of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25 comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1 it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2 make changes.

3 If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4 potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5 records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6 fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7 recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8 election you are auditing if you do it before  
9 certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10 it pre, some states do it after certification.

11 And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12 that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13 audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14 do you review the digital image of the paper?

15 The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16 you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17 they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18 single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19 technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20 of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21 they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22 pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23 So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24 we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25 ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2 for risk-limited audits.

3 So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4 know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5 verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6 confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7 any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8 worked correctly.

9 You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10 new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11 makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12 overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13 audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14 as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15 we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16 audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17 And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18 audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19 audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20 but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21 death from what I've talked about.

22 There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23 brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24 life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25 them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6 MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.  
9 And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16 MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18 MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1 which one's better?

2 MR. RAYBURN: So I think if we had a statistician to  
3 work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4 felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5 that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6 would have to review.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Lynn?

8 MS. BAILEY: Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Speaking  
9 off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10 we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11 that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12 we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13 audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14 precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15 precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16 will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17 done.

18 You know, there are important things going on in that  
19 three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20 looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21 example. So we do definitely need to look at that.

22 And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23 ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24 process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25 mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1 audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2 greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3 difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4 recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5 to recertify a result.

6 MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7 election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8 over. You see what I'm saying?

9 MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10 on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11 a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12 precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13 results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14 have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15 switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16 MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17 recount, not a do over, is my question.

18 MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19 and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20 would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21 going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22 new election.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24 the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25 ordered. Senator?

1 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6 MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23 MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3 MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8 Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10 MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12 PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16 MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19 MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22 MS. COX: That's right.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25 MS. COX: That's right.

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.  
24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3 MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5 MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9 MS. COX: That's right.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12 MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15 MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18 MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22 MS. COX: Exactly.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting



1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1 going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2 The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3 votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4 refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5 the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6 whatever could happen.

7 They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8 machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9 needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10 the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11 paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12 Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13 The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14 surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15 surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16 came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17 and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18 of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19 optical-scan ballots.

20 At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21 a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22 because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23 would register in the whole county that night because,  
24 obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25 voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7 I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13 We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.

14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18 We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate these lost votes and we took that original study -- which should be in the state archives -- we took that study to the legislature and said, We need to really do something on our watch before we have the next election cycle.

So that was when the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the commission, several others of you might have, but we had a combination, as your commission is composed, of local election officials and legislators that studied for a full year. We took the study we had done internally of what had happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in Georgia.

And it was a result of that study that led us into deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and to move, for the first time, into a system where every county would use the same voting equipment so that we could do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't even envision the things that are happening today in technology or the threats that are happening today to technology back in the day when we put this equipment in -- in place.

I think we also envisioned that there would be a continuous study of election equipment over the years and that there would be continuous need to purchase additional equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us to where we are today.

But one of the main -- a couple of the main points that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a decision for making a change today is to be mindful that, yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair; things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be replaced and upgraded.

So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

that the Secretary of State could do training for all county election officials and then to help the poll-worker training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis across the state, that the state would then, whatever equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the counties and, at least on the first round, make that purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got into the system we have now.

We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think -- my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that model.

We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the technology wasn't there at the time.

Honestly, I think that our commission thought back in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two, technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure voting system but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure but that also -- you understand the voter interface with technology.

We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000 presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill in DC of working with our congressional delegation and others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50 million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the equipment that we purchased.

In fact, the only money that the state ended up putting into the purchase was really the voter-education piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to make sure that voters are never turned away from voting because they don't want to show up in a polling place and be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6 Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9 DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17 So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23 You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.  
24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1 there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2 and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3 upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4 whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5 that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6 less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7 that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8 Michael?

9 MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10 when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11 Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12 elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13 time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14 purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15 was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16 at that time?

17 MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18 study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19 start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20 Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21 equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22 auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23 definition of auditing.

24 You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25 purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

The same thing with paper receipts from voting machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident prior to the new equipment being put in place where a county with an optical scan called us at one point and they had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the hairdryers --

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it helped. I mean --

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do, but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on election day and see some of the rural precincts and places where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is definitely something that we need to consider with -- with paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal, experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then, even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished and just loved, loved, the experience of having that independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was heard.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you again.

MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct, there's no way that we would be able to function with just one ballot printer. That would definitely create long lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a printer on each station. If you think about the concept of one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just created long lines.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of conducting state and federal elections on the county level, the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers, printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no funding from the state or federal government to our counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent statewide runoff.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the importance around access for individuals with disability and the ability to independently cast their vote and privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting process for people with disabilities?

MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they just didn't vote.

sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and -- and why you think that occurred?

MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes between majority-black and majority-white precincts within the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts using optical-scan ballots.

We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and look at the average age of voters, for example, because it just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were using standardized testing might not be familiar with an optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in that bubble or mark the X.

We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6 MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12 So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20 People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part of the training money was allocated to train poll workers, because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And -- and you need to realize these are temporary workers that only work two or three elections every other year.

And I remember there was money put regionally into the technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses and carried them and they were taught how to operate the equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters how to use the equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to underscore, just like many others have around the table, the importance of the educational component and my -- that comment is more related to the judge's comments about training poll workers.

Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it. Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

solutions that we were coming up with and, when we ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as the security piece. It's not one or the other and they -- they've got to be equally considered in your decision-making.

And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and to keep up with changes in technology and to help the counties.

We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just uncomfortable with the entire process.

So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all of us around the table could at least agree on that.

JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too proud to ask for help.

MS. BAILEY: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made and how can we learn from your experience?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with the legislature.

MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines that we experienced in this election cycle because counties -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think, understood we're probably heading into something new so they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying additional equipment.

But since the state moved into this arena, unified the state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to the counties so that we can keep up that level playing field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to buy new equipment in the years to come.

We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the state would really help voters everywhere.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment expired, the state required the counties to fund the



1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2 State's office is always going to need that level of  
3 staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4 university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5 that is purchased new.

6 You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7 think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8 the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9 provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10 equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11 the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12 based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14 much.

15 MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17 MS. COX: Thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19 today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20 (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22 would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23 started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24 Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25 to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1 their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2 advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3 people vote in advanced voting.

4 By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5 were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6 advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7 advanced voting in this election.

8 We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9 election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10 to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11 litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12 to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13 citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14 essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15 that county election officials had been doing.

16 And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17 county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18 as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19 And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20 changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21 And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22 officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23 on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24 ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25 some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1 done in the past had been altered.

2 But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3 what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4 our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5 as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6 I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7 through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8 successfully at the county level.

9 On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10 And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11 Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12 there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13 that happened on election day.

14 You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15 -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16 problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17 but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18 We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19 heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20 o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21 to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22 of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23 working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24 it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25 poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1 what lines looked like throughout the state.

2 And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3 terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4 election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5 not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6 About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7 that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8 but in some locations.

9 Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10 said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11 voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12 about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13 2018.

14 We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15 longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16 gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17 did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18 about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19 again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20 to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21 about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22 and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23 There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24 look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25 dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10 We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15 Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19 In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2 Senator Jackson.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4 for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5 how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6 candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7 MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8 that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9 know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10 calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11 grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12 you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13 ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14 know, bounce around.

15 These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16 fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17 you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18 people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19 finger around.

20 It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21 screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22 spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23 glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24 always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25 show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1 We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7 The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14 That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18 Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24 The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1 this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2 state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3 the Secretary of State's office.

4 So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5 even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6 in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7 chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9 MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10 that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11 this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12 election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13 it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14 an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15 elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16 allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17 launch in municipal elections.

18 And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19 we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20 likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21 into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22 right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24 Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25 you do.

MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission members, we're now going to move to the portion of our agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right where you are, stand up.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing up, stay standing up.

Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you for that.

What I would ask of you now is, is to understand clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going to ask you to stick to that.

Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself. If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But, generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as well.

So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments, making their point but making it in such a way that it's not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so thank you for that in the past.

Is there anyone who does not understand the ground rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start going down the list, and thank you so much.

Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia. Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara, please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear from you.

MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party, county-party committees and election officials. I also oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching program.

Over the course of this election season, our voter-protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November 6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and hundreds more during the early voting periods.

Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a voter would make a selection only to have the machine reflect a different result.

In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There was one voter who reported having to change her vote five times before it correctly reflected her choice. In another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to three separate machines before they could find a machine that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

We also received multiple reports of races not appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

Problems weren't limited to the election machines. There were many problems with the registration system. We had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

We have other cases where voters found their registrations online, they had printed registration cards; they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the -- at the polling booths.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to research these problems. I would like to share them with each county as we go through so that we can look at them and figure out what happened and where the system broke down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and in the officials and the administration of the system.

What's critical now is that this body develop a set of standards against which the decisions that -- on a system will be made. You have to have standards that you establish here because if we don't set a baseline that includes making sure that the voters are able to create and confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these votes are auditable independently without any intervention by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply continue.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

MS. NELSON: Yes.

Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any central database.

So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little bit to the disabilities concerns.

I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where little people showed up to their polling places and were not given stools or chairs, left without casting their vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their access to cast their vote.

So, right now, we are already facing a lot of disability issues and, completely understandably, with handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

MS. NELSON: -- having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not with any particular organization. I really appreciate your time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

MS. NELSON: This one?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little closer.

MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned citizen and not with any particular organization and I appreciate your time.

So I am concerned particularly with any electronic system, as has been proven by experts that there's no system known out there right now that is completely secure from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name right?

MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again. I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from.

MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I spent the last several months working as a field organizer for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast. The trust in the election system has degraded significantly.

There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust, which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1 therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2 make sure that that happens.

3 They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4 they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5 the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6 audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7 restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8 consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9 critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10 system.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12 Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13 Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14 first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15 Blassingame?

16 Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17 pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18 MR. WEIR: Yep.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20 have you and please tell us where you're from.

21 MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22 just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23 is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24 learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25 I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning



1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4 MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10 MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13 MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1 Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7 My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11 The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18 Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23 In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1 this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2 citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3 better by one another.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5 today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6 Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7 Please tell us where you're from.

8 MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9 elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10 degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11 of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12 including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13 held my current position since 2007.

14 I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15 voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16 through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17 local jurisdictions.

18 We need to have meaningful audits before  
19 certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20 I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21 lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22 certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23 barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24 we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25 whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 was accurate.

2 So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3 paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4 marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5 it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6 what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7 is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8 evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9 receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10 any different. Thank you very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12 appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13 for coming today. Good to have you again.

14 MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16 from.

17 MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18 County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19 Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20 representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21 to address you guys.

22 The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23 that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24 and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25 alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 than you've had the time to go through yet.

2 What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3 is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4 elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5 going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6 Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7 verifiable system.

8 The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9 all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10 not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11 verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12 to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13 that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14 systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15 one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16 elections.

17 I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18 you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19 you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20 set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21 Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22 need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23 terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24 what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25 of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3 MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8 You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13 And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20 So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditale (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one, I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be negative one and subtract from your total.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann, thank you for coming today.

MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972 and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

hear from you.

MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to have their votes represent their intentions.

It is imperative that the new voting system that you recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their voices heard on election day. In our recent election, there were reports of problems with the DREs showing erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen technology these problems will persist. They can be avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise; right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented the rule of the voter.

I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking -- marking devices that you are considering will produce a paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and recorded.

-- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded scanners that can handle the humidity.

And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there. Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

But -- and one other thing that I don't think anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today, and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the separate verification step and issues of human limitations become moot.

Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid audit is the best available method for conducting elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to heart the recommendations of the experts.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration and service to the voters of Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John, good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1 you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2 MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3 Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4 restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5 and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6 the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7 officials since that time despite that information being  
8 thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9 The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10 and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11 of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12 They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13 point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14 University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15 State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16 statewide.

17 So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18 professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19 supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21 this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22 Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23 the technology involved in our election system.

24 And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25 Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time since she offered?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the news business a few years back after a long career both in national news and state-local news in another part of the country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot boxes we were talking about.

So I understand that any system can be hacked, any system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials here, but you've all heard about it.

And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle, suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly. We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

I love the idea that we can print them on demand. That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

-- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and, having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a pension for accurate, reliable data.

And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will tell you that my experience since we have had electronic voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've never quite trusted it.

We've been using that system for years and years and lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of trust.

Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know, that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

I think what I want to see is that everyone gets -- everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever they voted for, that they can have documentation that their vote went through as they intended and that those votes can be audited.

goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy that's at stake.

As been said many times today -- and I've heard over and over since I got involved with this issue, which I didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote will not count. Think about that. American citizens are afraid their vote will not count.

If you're afraid your vote's not going to count, you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to go. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people of Georgia.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this electronic system that we have, remember the definition of insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5 now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the past.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as good as I used to be.

MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission for allowing us to speak here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again, where you're from, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.



MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we just listen to the IT experts?

And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns; we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled, Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system, but also dropped into a safe box.

And not much has been said about what happens to these paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years, about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate that problem. These would be attached to the optical scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure place. So I think that solves that one problem.

We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying -- verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an average of 3.9 seconds.

When you're given a summary that you have to check, human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best advice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan. Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a second now. T-H-R --

MS. THROOP: Yeah.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- 0-0-P.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go. Throop. All right.

MS. THROOP: Good.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you, Liz.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of good presentations this morning and have had a lot of good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I think it's important to be very specific with these things.

So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be signifying something as simple as the precinct number could introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for that reason, I think it's very important that we get proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there are no barcodes on the ballots.

It's been a little while since I've looked at those proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent set of presentations we heard today should have happened at the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what those ballots are going to look like.

And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs, they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

are the focus of national press attention as one of the worst states for voting integrity.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and allow you to wrap up, Liz.

MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay. Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to have you.

MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing really quickly.

The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next session or something because you know how hard that is, that things don't get done that way.

And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal -- detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1 that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2 accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3 the legislature decides on the system.

4 And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5 the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6 aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7 guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8 got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9 confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11 George Ballbona (ph)?

12 MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14 George.

15 MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17 for being here today.

18 MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19 live in Cobb County.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21 MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22 those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23 but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24 anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25 something costs.

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsnor? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1 No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.  
3 Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6 This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12 A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17 Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24 However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2 Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3 scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4 Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5 know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6 y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7 to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8 boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9 all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10 things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11 it needs upgrading.

12 But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13 They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14 update your thing and it is now your financial  
15 responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16 So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17 came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18 way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19 tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20 trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21 saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23 members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24 about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25 we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.  
2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1 having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2 session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3 as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4 until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5 all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6 is inaugurated.

7 And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8 two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9 in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10 meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11 would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12 There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13 and can accommodate people this size.

14 Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15 period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16 every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17 Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18 agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19 certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20 However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21 throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22 you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23 move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24 discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25 would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?  
21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 comments from the commission? Lynn?

2 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. Lynn Bailey out  
3 of Richmond County. I agree with what I've heard. I think  
4 Georgia does need a new system. The system that we have  
5 now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6 As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7 replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8 previously-owned units in other states and other  
9 jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10 it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11 sustain or continue.

12 Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13 over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14 voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15 concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16 good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17 way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18 right path.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other comments?  
20 Senator?

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Certainly.

23 SENATOR JACKSON: -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24 -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25 think an audit should be pre-certified. I think that the

1 audit should be done before we certify the general  
2 election.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4 MS. BOREN: Concur.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6 MS. BOREN: We agree.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8 -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9 counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10 the date you certify on?

11 Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12 con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13 great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14 implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15 said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16 fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17 The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18 that certification and how much?

19 MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23 MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24 November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25 provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2 The audit would also be important work not to be  
3 rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4 time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5 that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6 the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7 November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8 tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9 consideration.

10 I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11 I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12 audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13 they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14 you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15 that path.

16 But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17 three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18 in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19 any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20 it.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22 three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23 were going to say weeks.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25 MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1 because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2 type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3 system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4 types of lawsuits.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6 generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7 access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8 people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9 not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10 MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11 standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12 groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13 you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14 why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15 impact on certain voters versus others.

16 And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17 we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18 secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19 certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20 best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21 need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22 And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23 any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24 NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25 that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1 Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7 With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15 MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21 And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1 So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2 some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3 is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4 Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5 there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6 for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7 that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8 we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9 upon us.

10 You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11 sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12 actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13 there's still going to be a process for an election  
14 contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15 dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16 contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17 state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18 an election-contest proceeding.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20 sir, Michael?

21 MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22 comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23 things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24 things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25 which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to order a deeper-dive audit.

But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep an audit as something that's relatively close.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by 73 percent, there's a difference --

MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know, 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

And, you know, there may be some thought that we need to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion about the superintendent calling on particular races or whatever where they've -- where there could be a discrepancy or something.

MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.  
(Crosstalk.)

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

MS. BOREN: The election.

JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.  
(Crosstalk.)

DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or precertification.

COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the audit.

DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment, that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no -- there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page; right?

Because, when you go back to the system, if everything is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't -- won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously, maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state. You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections, the charter is what governs whether there has to be a runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review our laws on -- on runoffs.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those other solutions.

DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the system --

understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a paper trail.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us are talking about with the pre-audit --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the field.

DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. BOREN: We test everything.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1 your point.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3 everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4 shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5 stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6 wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7 the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8 we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11 Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12 ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13 ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14 a piece of paper; correct?

15 DR. LEE: Yes.

16 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17 the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18 they voted --

19 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21 auditable. No?

22 DR. LEE: So --

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24 papers --

25 DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.  
19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?  
15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of



1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1 And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2 month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3 be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4 officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5 the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6 component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7 But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8 need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9 fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10 has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11 very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12 other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13 groups out there that are ready to help.

14 I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15 implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16 completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17 funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18 report that we come up with.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21 MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22 important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23 talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24 systems are different all over the place.

25 So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7 But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18 If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

1 hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team  
4 counting ballots and then let the other team count behind  
5 them and see if the numbers were the same.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't  
7 realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in  
8 Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that  
9 been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they  
13 contract with me to be the supervisor over their old  
14 equipment.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if  
16 something goes wrong?

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only  
20 have 100 registered voters each.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

22 JUDGE MCCOY: So...

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one  
24 of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll  
25 bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2 that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3 courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4 in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5 school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6 you are given the correct ballot.

7 That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8 card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9 only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10 machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11 much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13 we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14 it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15 now are a little dated -- are they?

16 MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19 frankly. They're just a --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22 about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23 beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24 that what you're talking about?

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1 there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2 that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3 They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4 and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6 MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7 required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8 who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9 there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10 pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11 -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12 express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13 that.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16 system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17 voter --

18 MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20 human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21 doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22 ballot.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24 MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25 that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1 who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2 it's a state-issued ID card.

3 I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4 disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5 go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6 think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7 a ID card.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.  
9 (Crosstalk.)

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11 SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12 MS. BOREN: Yes.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14 to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15 card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16 SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18 SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19 MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20 that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21 cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22 of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23 they can also get that one free.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25 MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1 SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5 DR. LEE: So --

6 JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7 DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14 DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1 accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2 micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3 always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4 important part. Judge?

5 JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6 and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7 records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8 -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9 look at, to model.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11 on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12 paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13 us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14 aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15 that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16 forward, deal with other things.

17 Are there other things in our election process that  
18 we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19 major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20 about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21 DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22 of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23 -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25 in the legislature if you did that.

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.  
21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2 ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3 so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4 republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6 MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7 ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8 since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9 So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10 went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11 again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12 -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13 So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14 in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15 ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16 expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17 on-demand component --

18 JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19 MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21 the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22 MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23 \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24 We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25 on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1 ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2 almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3 or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4 voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5 I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6 to.

7 Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8 card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9 election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10 even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11 workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12 problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13 where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14 mistake like that, it's still made.

15 And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16 pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17 differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18 that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19 mistakes.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21 heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22 provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23 and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24 all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25 and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1 And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2 done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3 forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4 something that -- that we should -- we should think about.  
5 Madam Secretary?

6 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7 discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8 equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9 issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10 way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11 code and SEB procedures and things.

12 So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13 we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14 also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15 necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16 you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17 issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18 -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19 laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20 things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21 it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22 that we're looking at everything.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24 JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25 There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be hand-marked paper ballots?

Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly that have participated and -- has been on that -- that central issue that affects many of the other questions that we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next session? How long do we envision using the system that we decide upon?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question. I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have, that means a child born two years from now will be voting on a system that we decide on today.

And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single child -- so we're talking about children. Children today will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or another. I just think we need to consider that if this system is going to last as long as the last system has lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our future because the majority of the voters, if this system lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote very differently, take tests very differently, do things very differently than most of the people in this room.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for -- we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on paper, I would not trust that system.

So I think we're going to get -- there's always going to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is -- or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so that's why there's an important balance here.

And I do think, you know, between the -- the administration of the election, for election officials, but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know, at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending, but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's not going to be a perfect system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean, the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know, is the best available approach right now.

And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive -- to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I don't think we should have to find a solution and then use it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer technologies.

I really think that we should -- we should have this ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's available, and what has been working for us, and what needs to be improved and then have a new round of selection of new systems.



1 So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2 that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3 in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4 in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5 actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6 on leasing; right? Subscription.

7 I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8 you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9 instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10 dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11 are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12 Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13 bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14 later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15 change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16 know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17 little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18 comment.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20 thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21 anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22 flexibility to be flexible.

23 And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24 at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25 the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2 level.

3 But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4 involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5 in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6 money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7 taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8 the best practices of bonding.

9 And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10 oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11 lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12 we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13 agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14 leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15 you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16 DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17 is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18 then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19 safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20 -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21 right?

22 You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23 to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24 solution possible because there's no way out.

25 You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1 that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2 that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3 that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5 MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6 well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7 marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8 Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9 elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10 city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11 the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12 And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13 from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14 workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15 loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16 we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17 ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18 marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19 marking system.

20 It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21 the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22 was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23 race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24 wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25 could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1 The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2 -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3 that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4 transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5 used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6 read, as well as a regular voter.

7 So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8 like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9 it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10 that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11 on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12 them.

13 I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14 that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15 that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16 early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17 results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18 come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19 we felt comfortable with the results.

20 We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21 system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22 Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23 still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24 Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25 those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2 accommodate this.

3 The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4 process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5 Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6 gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7 thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8 the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9 make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10 decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11 Georgia.

12 Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13 come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14 I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15 you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16 workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17 we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18 for caring enough to be here today.

19 Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20 you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21 again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens  
PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR  
CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15	144:3,3 145:23	142:5 167:11,14	80:15 127:19,20
<b>analysts</b> 150:9	9:21 10:6 37:2,3	146:12	<b>attached</b> 158:19	134:24 135:9
<b>analyze</b> 11:9	61:24 62:2,14,16	<b>Asian</b> 144:6	230:13	140:18 149:17
<b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6	62:18 75:7 76:9	<b>Asian-American</b>	<b>attachment</b> 201:1,2	162:7 172:10
<b>anecdotal</b> 84:1	95:18 108:20	141:25	<b>attack</b> 14:25,25	173:15,16,25
<b>anecdotes</b> 133:10	113:24 114:6	<b>Asian-Pacific</b>	15:11,22 143:8	174:1,17 175:2,12
<b>angle</b> 219:8	118:20 119:10,21	141:24	<b>attacker</b> 13:25	175:18 176:5
<b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22	121:1 122:12	<b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2	<b>Attaining</b> 133:3	177:2 178:4,9,23
151:25 153:5	123:17 126:10	<b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11	<b>attendees</b> 3:19	181:2,10,14,15,17
<b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14	130:20 131:8	89:20 96:25 98:16	<b>attention</b> 12:7	182:2,6,6,7
147:23	132:7 134:5	102:24 103:14	13:16 15:17 16:21	183:13,24 184:16
<b>announce</b> 7:13	135:12 137:12	169:19 198:25	20:18 30:8 34:9	184:18 185:1
<b>announced</b> 42:6,8	139:6 141:11	206:8 221:5	50:6 68:16 99:3	187:17 188:4,5
<b>annual</b> 205:22	143:22 146:13	228:17	106:13 142:18	190:8,10,14
<b>anonymity</b> 32:11	149:24 151:21	<b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17	161:1 198:25	207:13,20 209:14
<b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10	153:6 166:7,11	30:10 114:14	<b>attesting</b> 117:16	209:15
80:7 106:23 113:4	172:25	206:8 219:18	<b>attorney</b> 6:8	<b>auditable</b> 12:10
113:5 149:2 172:7	<b>approach</b> 158:12	<b>Askins</b> 153:20,20	<b>atypical</b> 105:9	13:17 118:15
172:8 175:10	221:2	153:21,25,25	<b>audible</b> 122:6,6	120:9 140:5,9
221:12	<b>appropriate</b> 16:23	154:4	<b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14	141:1 142:15
<b>answered</b> 44:19	93:14	<b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25	9:7,11,13,14,18	143:18 145:1
46:2 47:12 78:14	<b>appropriated</b> 51:9	201:17 210:14	10:9,10,12,14,16	153:17 186:21
108:17	77:15	<b>aspects</b> 36:5	21:18 37:11 75:17	187:3
<b>answers</b> 44:22	<b>appropriation</b>	<b>Assembly</b> 4:15	76:2 96:8,17	<b>audited</b> 12:20
<b>anticipate</b> 36:2	69:15	66:7 218:15	114:20 115:11	52:14 54:20 57:1
62:10 105:18	<b>approve</b> 115:11	<b>assessed</b> 18:18	119:12,14 155:23	134:20 140:21,22
218:14 228:17	166:15	<b>assessment</b> 208:1	186:19 188:17	149:3,16 156:25
<b>anticipated</b> 78:21	<b>approves</b> 218:15	<b>asset</b> 128:1	<b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21	172:6
78:24 105:5	<b>April</b> 51:9	<b>assigned</b> 18:18	12:1 13:2,2,6	<b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13
<b>anticipation</b> 7:12	<b>architect</b> 163:18	78:2 221:4	16:22,23 19:18	47:8 50:19 53:9
<b>antithetical</b> 133:12	<b>archives</b> 66:4	<b>assist</b> 195:4	26:7,12,12 30:19	58:18 80:22,23
<b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23	<b>area</b> 60:23 97:17	<b>assistant</b> 37:13	34:3 38:2,8,12,16	161:17,21 162:1,5
22:6,21 106:12	104:11 106:9	<b>assisted</b> 117:1	38:23 39:3,10	176:20,21,24
114:8 115:23	107:9,12	<b>associated</b> 35:11	40:1,2,2,3,12,16	177:3,24 178:23
128:16 222:3	<b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22	51:4 76:19 77:5	40:22 41:20,21	179:10 181:24
<b>anybody's</b> 147:13	87:3 97:21 195:8	135:7,7	42:1,3,17,25	182:22 187:14,15
<b>anymore</b> 76:18	216:16	<b>Association</b> 141:24	43:17,20 44:12,17	188:6
163:11	<b>arena</b> 93:10	<b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7	44:20 45:3,4,8,13	<b>auditors</b> 46:1
<b>anyway</b> 14:2	<b>aren't</b> 6:20,21	88:14 203:24	45:18,19,23 46:8	<b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18
123:15 157:20	162:6 165:6	<b>assuming</b> 34:12	46:17,19,19,20,20	37:19 39:17,25
167:15 225:7	<b>argument</b> 110:16	52:21 53:2	46:25 47:5,13	41:19 42:20,24
<b>apologize</b> 109:11	190:23	<b>assumption</b> 169:11	48:1,1,3,11,21	43:12 44:18 45:10
<b>apparently</b> 28:10	<b>arguments</b> 13:21	193:14	49:1,6,13,13,15	45:24 46:4 48:15
<b>appeal</b> 110:15	<b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19	<b>assurances</b> 41:24	49:15,19,19 50:5	48:25 49:2,5,10
203:10 225:13	<b>armed</b> 39:17	<b>assure</b> 74:12	50:23,24 51:25	49:16,18,24 51:2
<b>appear</b> 117:17,20	<b>arrive</b> 221:7,8	<b>assured</b> 163:18	52:4,12,13 53:2	51:18 53:7 54:6
203:10	<b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11	215:3	53:19,19,23,24	54:13 80:13 81:10
<b>appeared</b> 117:20	89:1,7	<b>Athens</b> 150:3	54:12 55:13 56:9	125:9 127:24
<b>appearing</b> 117:9	<b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4	161:12	56:18,19 58:2,3,4	130:16 134:18
<b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	<b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	58:11,16 59:5	137:7 169:24

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14



<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12	<b>experiment</b> 87:17	<b>faced</b> 46:10	154:7	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9
<b>excellent</b> 75:12	<b>experimental</b> 53:24	<b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19	<b>fault</b> 50:12	63:8 66:19 118:4
95:16 160:18	<b>expert</b> 125:10	115:1	<b>favor</b> 147:6	140:20 206:13
<b>exception</b> 98:20	156:4	<b>facilitate</b> 201:20	<b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5	209:8,10
122:25	<b>expertise</b> 65:21	<b>facing</b> 109:4	8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12	<b>figured</b> 97:6
<b>exceptionally</b> 104:2	73:9 75:6 94:15	120:19	9:15,23 10:1,4,11	<b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8
104:10	95:3,8 166:22	<b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12	10:13,15 21:2,5,8	<b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3
<b>excited</b> 3:3	<b>experts</b> 14:24	16:3 20:22 25:2	21:13,20 22:9	<b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7
<b>excitement</b> 153:1	16:15 49:17 74:9	32:25 69:18 90:1	23:6,8,25 24:11	<b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2
<b>exciting</b> 49:4	119:23 125:10,12	94:19 117:16	24:19 25:10,14,16	<b>filling</b> 65:7
<b>exclusively</b> 56:1	149:14,19 158:5	138:16 149:7	26:22,24 27:4,8	<b>final</b> 33:24 61:15
<b>excuse</b> 73:19	159:7 221:1,7	163:2 172:21	27:21 28:9,13,24	166:1,6 168:8,16
220:12	<b>expired</b> 93:25	174:15 175:6	35:13,19 36:15	<b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14
<b>executed</b> 101:7	<b>explain</b> 21:16	181:21 187:6	37:3 110:24	39:21 48:24 84:8
<b>executive</b> 137:16	91:25 183:23	195:19 203:7	138:23 158:7	170:5
139:17	<b>explained</b> 25:9	208:6 222:3	160:8	<b>Finance</b> 2:15
<b>exhaustive</b> 66:17	35:21	<b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15	<b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22	<b>financial</b> 165:14
97:3	<b>explains</b> 19:25	154:21	<b>fear</b> 133:7	<b>financially</b> 140:15
<b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12	<b>explanation</b> 18:13	<b>factors</b> 222:14	<b>feared</b> 87:22	<b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1
<b>existed</b> 66:15,18	24:25	<b>fails</b> 47:6	<b>feature</b> 132:22	30:20 39:10 42:8
<b>existing</b> 80:19,20	<b>exponentially</b>	<b>failure</b> 151:14	<b>fed</b> 226:20	43:7,7,16 50:15
<b>exists</b> 163:25	102:2	203:10	<b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19	56:5,8 63:11
<b>exit</b> 43:24	<b>exposed</b> 15:13	<b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9	83:3,6 113:20	72:23,24,25 74:22
<b>expand</b> 49:12,16	<b>express</b> 199:14,17	133:6 143:2	138:2,7 142:22	117:6 156:7 157:4
<b>expect</b> 97:10	202:12 227:24	194:12 230:8	180:6 202:9	184:24 190:12
101:10 208:3	<b>expressed</b> 121:17	<b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6	216:18	221:17
<b>expected</b> 75:12	122:5 229:16	203:7	<b>federally</b> 192:14	<b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6
<b>expecting</b> 157:7	<b>expressing</b> 219:6	<b>fairness</b> 133:14	<b>feds</b> 78:18	<b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17
<b>expedite</b> 129:23	<b>expression</b> 163:22	<b>faith</b> 175:19	<b>fee</b> 79:23	49:19 181:3
<b>expense</b> 79:17	<b>expressly</b> 230:9	<b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5	<b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8	198:11,12 200:18
212:23 213:24	<b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16	<b>fallible</b> 154:12	34:25 212:18	205:10
<b>expenses</b> 79:18	101:17	<b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21	226:12,13,14	<b>finger</b> 107:19
213:25	<b>extended</b> 97:20,20	89:2 196:18	<b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1	<b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18
<b>expensive</b> 31:15	105:11	208:21	83:15 87:11,16	143:14
44:15 46:8 140:14	<b>extending</b> 102:11	<b>families</b> 98:8	90:22,23 91:3	<b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20
164:4 165:1 213:3	<b>extensive</b> 14:1	<b>family</b> 83:24	114:16 122:3	<b>firm</b> 141:21
213:9,16 225:10	<b>extent</b> 216:3	<b>fantastic</b> 101:21	127:25 129:16	<b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10
<b>experience</b> 53:25	<b>external</b> 13:24	<b>fantastically</b> 99:4	146:25 147:13	29:11 32:3 37:15
54:4,5 58:21	179:2,4	<b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21	161:18 168:3	38:19 42:17 45:3
64:10 65:4,23	<b>extra</b> 165:5,9	42:12 68:2 85:14	194:2 229:14	66:23 67:6 76:10
73:16 74:12 77:7	<b>extraordinarily</b>	89:17 145:4	<b>feeling</b> 91:13	76:21 94:21 95:23
77:11 84:7 91:17	136:22	147:19 166:18	189:22	96:24 98:21 99:12
99:19 111:14,16	<b>extremely</b> 137:1	167:3 175:14	<b>fellow</b> 113:6	122:14 123:2,20
111:21 134:15	177:11 181:6	188:19 229:17	<b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21	129:2 131:6 133:3
152:20,23 156:5	213:9	<b>fashion</b> 207:15,16	69:20 73:21	146:23 160:20
166:22 205:9		<b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25	152:21 227:19	167:8 171:22
214:5 220:16		68:2 107:16	<b>fess</b> 11:5	191:20 213:12,23
<b>experienced</b> 24:16	<b>F</b>	224:15	<b>fewer</b> 40:20	228:22,22,23
93:5 124:15	<b>F</b> 230:1	<b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25	<b>field</b> 93:16 121:13	<b>fit</b> 58:11
<b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>fabulous</b> 124:12	<b>father</b> 60:18,20	185:5,10,12	<b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
	<b>facade</b> 98:15,18			

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--



90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18



9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	---	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
<b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	<b>P</b> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	<b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	58:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--



188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8	<b>success</b> 122:9	91:5 94:21 96:4	51:11,16,17,21,23
<b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4	<b>strange</b> 26:8	<b>successful</b> 99:7	97:5 100:1 105:4	52:3,5 53:22 56:7
3:22,25 13:20	<b>strengthened</b> 147:1	<b>successfully</b> 69:12	113:4 114:13	56:18 58:10,11
24:22 37:6,14	<b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20	101:8 214:10	118:12 119:8	62:1,9 63:15,23
51:13 108:22	<b>stretch</b> 97:2	<b>sucked</b> 98:15,18	120:7 122:2	66:23 67:10,16
113:3 134:2	<b>stretches</b> 178:16	<b>sucks</b> 164:11	124:17 134:25	68:20 69:4,5,21
139:24 150:15	<b>STRICKLAND</b>	<b>sudden</b> 165:10	164:17 167:25	70:17 71:25 72:5
181:17 193:21	171:14 205:25	<b>sue</b> 138:14	171:7,11 172:17	72:6,20 73:12,22
228:18	206:2	<b>sues</b> 33:18	178:8,22 181:11	73:25 74:2 79:1
<b>station</b> 75:23 78:7	<b>strips</b> 197:21	<b>sugar</b> 163:14	184:25 190:3	80:4,5,10 85:20
84:20 93:13	<b>strong</b> 92:6	<b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15	195:9 201:13,18	85:24 86:9,12,12
<b>stations</b> 84:18,19	<b>strongly</b> 62:21	50:9 151:4	205:14 209:19	86:21 87:7,8 89:2
84:24 205:10	151:4 161:18	<b>suggesting</b> 50:7	212:1,6 214:11	96:24 109:14,16
<b>statistical</b> 41:22	229:14	154:16	216:18 227:13	109:16 110:2
42:3	<b>structure</b> 196:5	<b>suggestion</b> 23:20	<b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24	111:17 112:8
<b>statistically-based</b>	<b>structured</b> 176:5	<b>suggestions</b> 8:25	<b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4	117:14 118:4,6,7
40:2 44:17	<b>struggle</b> 209:20	<b>suggests</b> 187:10	<b>surprise</b> 64:15	118:9,13 119:23
<b>statistically-valid</b>	211:24	<b>suit</b> 125:2,7	125:14 148:16	119:24 120:10
149:16	<b>stub</b> 215:2	<b>suits</b> 72:15	<b>surprised</b> 122:25	121:19 122:5,10
<b>statistical-based</b>	<b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3	<b>summary</b> 20:25	<b>surrounded</b> 193:23	127:16,16,22
41:19	222:11 223:23	107:24 148:22,22	<b>survey</b> 97:25	128:2,8 129:14
<b>statistician</b> 55:2	224:4	158:8 159:5	<b>surveyed</b> 9:18	130:15 132:22,23
<b>statistics</b> 44:2	<b>Student</b> 2:15	170:15	80:20	133:3,11,15
59:18 125:22	<b>students</b> 142:1	<b>summer</b> 127:5	<b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11	135:23 136:14,18
<b>statutory</b> 50:18	<b>studied</b> 66:13	<b>super</b> 197:1	153:11,19 157:11	140:7 141:1
<b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21	76:21	<b>superfluous</b> 164:3	157:14,15,23	142:12 145:16,19
114:23,24 202:4	<b>study</b> 30:24 54:25	<b>superintendent</b>	159:9	147:19 148:7
<b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18	63:8 65:3 66:3,4	182:19,23	<b>Susan's</b> 34:23	150:4,6,12,23
<b>staying</b> 216:18	66:14,15,17,21	<b>Superior</b> 111:3	154:1	151:5,13,17
<b>steal</b> 77:2	68:8 80:18 92:22	<b>supervisor</b> 134:9	<b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12	152:21 154:11,12
<b>step</b> 53:11 149:12	139:24 187:10	198:13	182:20	156:11 157:1,5
164:4	221:6	<b>supervisors</b> 128:6	<b>sustain</b> 173:11	158:13 160:11
<b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5	<b>studying</b> 75:7	<b>supply</b> 12:1	<b>swapping</b> 16:24	161:16,17,19,21
230:5,18,18	80:18	<b>support</b> 3:24 92:7	<b>swear</b> 117:15	161:25 162:1,3,6
<b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10	<b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8	135:23 143:9	<b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12	163:15 164:10
<b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10	106:25 126:1	<b>supportable</b> 129:25	<b>switched</b> 57:15	168:24 169:1,8,13
115:10 228:5	155:6 160:25	<b>supporting</b> 150:19	81:23 85:4	169:16,17,20
<b>STICKLAND</b>	<b>stuffing</b> 158:18	<b>suppose</b> 211:10	<b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5	170:7,23,23 171:3
172:22	<b>style</b> 72:15	<b>supposed</b> 72:18	167:5	171:4,5,11,25
<b>stone</b> 167:10	<b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1	160:9 213:6	<b>symptom</b> 82:17	172:5,7,11 173:4
228:24	214:15 215:9	<b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11	<b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12	173:4 177:9,12,14
<b>stools</b> 120:15	224:17	16:1 17:15 18:17	9:3,25 10:22,23	179:17,24 180:3
<b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10	<b>submitted</b> 47:16	19:13 21:15 29:3	11:10,11,13,25	180:18,20,25
155:10 188:19	124:19	29:4 33:12 34:3	12:5,13,17,18,22	183:25 184:21,22
<b>stopped</b> 211:22	<b>submitting</b> 122:4	34:11 35:4 39:3,8	13:4,7,18 14:11	185:15,16 189:11
<b>store</b> 162:22	<b>Subscription</b> 222:6	43:13 49:6,20	19:17 20:3 23:22	189:24 190:3,7,25
<b>stored</b> 27:14,22	<b>subset</b> 38:17	50:22 51:1 58:19	23:23 27:13 32:1	191:1,4,6,15,22
<b>stores</b> 135:5	<b>substitute</b> 133:4	62:4 69:23 70:13	34:12 35:6 36:18	192:15 193:9,15
<b>stories</b> 186:5	<b>subtle</b> 188:3	73:2 74:9 75:14	37:21 38:22,25	193:20 194:24
<b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>subtract</b> 146:10	79:9 85:1 89:17	49:7,10 50:23	195:1,5,15,18

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--



<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11		<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19		<b>wealthy</b> 93:16		<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19		<b>wearing</b> 107:22		<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14		<b>weather</b> 82:25		<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14		<b>week</b> 3:21 97:8,15 98:24 105:17,18 167:8 191:21 208:12 228:22,22 228:23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24		<b>weekend</b> 176:2		<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wanting</b> 211:22 <b>wants</b> 114:8 <b>War</b> 144:4 <b>warranty</b> 93:24 <b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12 <b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17 <b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25 <b>watchdog</b> 212:6 <b>watched</b> 208:11 <b>watcher</b> 129:2 <b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17 <b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25 <b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23 <b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20 <b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21 <b>weird</b> 86:8 <b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5 <b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19 <b>welcomed</b> 91:24 <b>well-designed</b> 125:8 <b>well-funded</b> 192:7 <b>well-intended</b> 5:19 <b>well-to-do</b> 93:17 <b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10 <b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13 <b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we've</b> 15:2 17:21	<b>winner</b> 46:21 <b>winning</b> 182:11 <b>wisely</b> 212:2,7 <b>wished</b> 84:6 <b>withdrawn</b> 230:9 <b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19 <b>witnesses</b> 117:16 <b>WMAZ</b> 126:11 <b>women</b> 127:7,8,9 127:10 192:9

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3	197:24 198:2,6,21	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	95:12 124:16	205:23,24 208:20	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15	171:8,8,12 200:2	209:5 220:2	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>02</b> 194:21
169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5	224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>1</b>
223:5	66:16	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13	53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	40:8 41:10 56:4
17:18 34:1,10	77:1 175:22	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	57:2 151:2 156:17
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	156:18 176:10
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worst</b> 161:2	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	182:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	42:4,5,13 55:24
104:6 113:2 116:8	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	84:19 125:16
124:22 126:22	58:7 59:11,12	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	147:9 206:14
131:7 133:19	163:14 193:4,4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	207:24 224:5
140:23 144:6,13	<b>wow</b> 217:16	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
174:25 175:2	125:24 145:22	19:11 29:15 42:14	157:23 165:2	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
178:24 191:5	151:8 161:4	55:24 63:20 64:17	172:21,21 186:25	165:5,21 198:20
192:5 199:8,25	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	68:8,13 69:2	193:23 194:10	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
202:21 203:14,19	<b>write</b> 89:8	74:18 79:19 93:18	200:7,21,24	141:4
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	127:2 136:4	212:11 228:6	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
212:15 222:8	<b>writing</b> 170:4	138:19 142:3,3	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
224:23	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6	147:9 154:5 156:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>114</b> 18:4
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5	150:18	156:11,11 158:2	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>12</b> 125:19
49:8 81:1 83:19	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17	158:17 165:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12th</b> 1:10
124:16,20,20	42:6,8 76:15	170:11 192:10	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
127:1 138:24	108:8 162:7	207:24 212:24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
173:10	187:15,15,16	213:25 218:23,24	140:1 154:14	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23	189:21 198:16	219:4,17,23	157:16 166:18	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
106:14 156:7	202:21 207:12	221:18,22 222:13	169:5 188:19	167:4
158:2 193:6 200:1	217:6,7,19	223:23,25 224:6	206:13 214:14	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
202:20	<b>X</b>	224:11	223:15	48:24 221:18
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
90:2,3,4,11,19,21	85:23 86:2,10	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7	51:16 109:19	163:4 222:9 224:4
100:1 101:25	93:13	200:9	111:19 165:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
104:22,22 117:2	<b>Y</b>	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5	206:5	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
169:10 191:9	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6	122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
193:1 194:5	9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	<b>Z</b>	218:23,24 219:17
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21	<b>zero</b> 12:16	219:23
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	219:23	<b>zone</b> 210:22	<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15		28:8,10,14
		145:15		<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 5:32 PM  
**To:** Raheem, Nassar  
**Cc:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Subject:** Website  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript 12.12.18.pdf

Can you please attach the attached file on the website below to HERE?

Click HERE for the meeting transcript for the December 12, 2018 meeting.

<http://soswebadmin02.sos.state.ga.us/admin/index.php/elections/editPage/2245>

--

Jessica Simmons  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Robyn A. Crittenden  
(404) 463-1601 (Direct)  
[jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the



1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1       Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2       staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3       on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4       talk a little better into it.

5       MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6       Check, check, testing, testing.

7       AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8       MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9       So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10      better?

11      AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12      MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13      AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14      AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15      MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17      While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18      I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19      faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20      phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21      We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22      Good to see you.

23      MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25      could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a dues-free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that



1       could supply an independent audit trail.

2               The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3       legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4       did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5       purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6       May 4th, 2002.

7               The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8       commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9       same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10      only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11      fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12      have that in your recommendations.

13              So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14      2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15      verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16      to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17      system today.

18              So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19      Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20      perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21      or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22      you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23      the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24      screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25      the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1       could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2               So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3       Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4       ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5       elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6       getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7       device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8               So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9       and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10      server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11      by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12      have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13      happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14      Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15      great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16      lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17              So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18      commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19      can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20      you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21      The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22      it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23      but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24      counties.

25              So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains



1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.



1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1       voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2       suggest that -- we think is important:

3             The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4       We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5       It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6       everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7       and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8       disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9       ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10      disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11      then their voter anonymity is better.

12            Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13      tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14      be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15      allowed in Georgia.

16            Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17      think is really important that we want the commission to  
18      consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19      a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20      tabulators.

21            So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22      counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23      better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24      information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25      fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,



1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you



1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing



1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then



1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1       system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2       that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3       and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4       I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5       you.

6           I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7       of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8       put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9       here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10          And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11       probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12       some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13       consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14       much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15          MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16       I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17       Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18       so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19       have a few minutes with you today.

20          The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21       today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22       starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23       remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24       give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25       to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13          We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18          We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1           going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2           The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3           votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4           refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5           the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6           whatever could happen.

7           They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8           machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9           needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10          the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11          paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12          Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13          The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14          surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15          surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16          came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17          and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18          of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19          optical-scan ballots.

20          At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21          a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22          because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23          would register in the whole county that night because,  
24          obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25          voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd



1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1       solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2       in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3       task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4       the surface.

5               But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6       expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7       studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8       bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9       very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10      have.

11             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12      expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13      we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14      where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15      questions and comments here for you.

16             Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17      quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18      we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19      visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20      noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21             As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22      commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23      the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24             Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25      here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.



1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11               SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13               SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21               SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.



1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the



1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and



1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10       And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11       Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12       there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13       that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15       -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16       problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17       but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19       heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20       o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21       to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22       of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23       working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24       it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25       poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a



1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.



1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being



1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1       stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2       equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3       speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4       useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5             And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6       in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7       in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8       think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10       appreciate you being here today.

11            Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12       Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13            MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15       We'd love to hear from you.

16            MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17       Brewer.

18            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19            MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20       and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21       ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22       nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23       space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24       missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25       voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8           MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14         I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18         We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1        want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2        to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3        right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4        with 400 million dollars in debt.

5                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6        appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7        Marilyn, good to have you today.

8                (Alarm chiming.)

9                MS. MARKS: Already?

10               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11               MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13               MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15        tell us where you live.

16               MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17        -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18        I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20        which county you live in.

21               MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23               MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24        time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25        voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process



1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13           And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20           So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to



1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14          Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21          MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1       you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2               MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3       Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4       restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5       and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6       the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7       officials since that time despite that information being  
8       thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9               The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10       and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11       of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12       They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13       point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14       University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15       State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16       statewide.

17              So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18       professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19       supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20       National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21       this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22       Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23       the technology involved in our election system.

24              And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25       Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1           goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2           that's at stake.

3           As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4           and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5           didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6           involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7           will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8           afraid their vote will not count.

9           If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10          you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11          goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12          anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13          handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14          go. Thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16          Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17          MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19          MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20          allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21          work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22          of Georgia.

23          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24          MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25          voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had



1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.

1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that



1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5           And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10           And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17           So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21           The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack



1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15           MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21           And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that



1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand



1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21          MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22          important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23          talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24          systems are different all over the place.

25          So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --



1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1       there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2       that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3       They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4       and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6               MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7       required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8       who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9       there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10      pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11      -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12      express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13      that.

14              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15              JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16      system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17      voter --

18              MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19              JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20      human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21      doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22      ballot.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24              MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25      that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people



1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

MS. BAILEY: -- location --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking about. Yeah.

MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that, but let us figure out a way that's going to work for Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the legislation could require an audit and leave the particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can -- can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating at that time?

And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having



1       to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2       spent wisely.

3               So this relationship between the state and the county  
4       on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5       counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6       it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7       the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8       commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9       them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10      jurisdiction.

11             So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12      tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13      government quite often is the government that's most local  
14      to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15      system work, but we also want the local input.

16             And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17      fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18      more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19             So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20      not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21      Nancy?

22             MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23      expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24      demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25      demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1       produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2       slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3       prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4       sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5       doesn't retain any votes.

6               And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7       election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8       easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9       election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10      in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11      multiple ways.

12             So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13      an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14      devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15      mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16      and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17      who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18      them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19      would like to do that.

20             We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21      a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22      if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23      ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24      the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25      that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like



1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14



<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6 <b>disenfranchising</b> 124:22 219:2,9 <b>disparity</b> 65:16,25 67:7 <b>disproportionate</b> 180:18 <b>dispute</b> 125:11 <b>distinguish</b> 55:22 <b>distinguished</b> 158:24 <b>distress</b> 123:6 <b>distribute</b> 59:24 <b>distribution</b> 44:7 <b>district</b> 38:14,15 45:21 110:15 152:9 200:3 <b>districts</b> 72:19 <b>distrust</b> 186:5,6 189:9 <b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15 <b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3 <b>Doctor</b> 203:20 <b>documentation</b> 156:23 <b>documented</b> 220:23 <b>dodge</b> 195:24 <b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1 97:17 108:13 146:4 187:17 202:21 225:5 226:3 <b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12 39:14 40:11 42:9 48:21 54:6 64:14 77:13 99:5,15 100:15 129:4 131:21 134:24 137:7 154:25 155:21 157:6 166:18 179:6 185:1 186:8 190:14 192:4 198:9 222:20 228:25 <b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15 <b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15 78:18,19,20 87:2 139:4 142:7 163:5	165:5,21 211:11 222:10 224:4 <b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8 13:5,10 20:14 21:25 23:13 25:3 25:24,25 26:2,14 28:11 30:18 32:9 32:9 33:6 36:9 44:22 49:18 50:22 58:9 59:23 70:1 72:12 76:25 87:20 88:4 90:25 99:2,3 109:9 111:25 113:19 125:16 129:11 135:9 138:1 147:12 155:11,25 156:12 160:21 164:7 165:8 167:3 171:22,25 177:12 178:16 183:6,7,16 184:18 186:2 195:20 197:1 198:6 202:12 204:1 205:7,7,15 206:3 211:9,10,16 213:8 217:21,22 217:22 221:11,17 223:10 224:7 <b>doomed</b> 62:23 <b>door</b> 39:17 <b>doors</b> 152:3,18 <b>double</b> 74:10 100:6 <b>double-digit</b> 86:16 <b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6 147:21 173:5 174:12 191:16 209:7 211:11 <b>doubted</b> 172:2 <b>Douglas</b> 19:19 <b>download</b> 27:18 <b>downside</b> 40:16,25 <b>down-ballot</b> 24:21 25:6 <b>dozen</b> 77:23 <b>dozens</b> 154:8 <b>DPH</b> 210:7 <b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22 76:7,9 77:11,16 77:18,21,24 78:6	78:9,11,14 183:21 183:22,23 184:7 184:11,17 185:7 185:13 186:10,15 186:22,25 203:21 205:4,5,7,14 210:20,21 211:1 220:21,22 223:15 223:16 <b>dramatically</b> 25:4 26:1 <b>draw</b> 86:6 <b>drawback</b> 226:15 <b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8 <b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14 30:14,23 31:6 102:8 104:12,13 148:10,17 160:23 197:18 <b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17 86:19 <b>drilled</b> 65:15 <b>drink</b> 163:14 <b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1 209:9 <b>Driver</b> 204:22 <b>driver's</b> 201:6 <b>driver's</b> 72:14 200:23 203:24 204:5 <b>drop</b> 188:16 <b>dropped</b> 158:14 <b>drops</b> 158:21 <b>drove</b> 18:10 <b>dry</b> 82:13 <b>dude</b> 165:2 <b>due</b> 45:6 104:12 105:15 133:20 143:5 <b>due's</b> 10:21 <b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22 123:24 124:2,2,3 124:4,7,9 <b>durable</b> 32:4 <b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12 135:14,17,17 <b>dynamics</b> 103:25 <b>dysfunctional</b> 136:10	<b>E</b> <b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1 <b>eager</b> 192:11 <b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6 62:10 85:4 102:22 140:17 169:5 171:18 190:9 191:12 207:19,23 208:5 209:13 218:4 225:20 <b>early</b> 7:14 14:19 16:9 27:1 32:6 51:9 75:21 89:3 97:13 101:23 116:19 177:6 181:5 197:22,24 198:3,24 227:16 227:18 <b>earpiece</b> 71:13 <b>ease</b> 91:3 <b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13 50:1 130:9 193:21 <b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24 225:8 <b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25 175:4 194:11 227:1,3 <b>eat</b> 7:5 <b>echo</b> 221:14 <b>economical</b> 165:19 <b>Ed</b> 163:17 <b>educate</b> 87:14 89:20 90:10 138:17 <b>educating</b> 192:25 193:1 <b>education</b> 66:25 77:5,13 78:3,5,20 88:3 89:17,23 92:14 126:25 145:10 169:9 191:2,9,13 192:5 192:25 195:1 205:6 <b>educational</b> 65:4 65:22 87:2 90:17 <b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16 180:18 <b>effective</b> 129:24 <b>effectively</b> 127:3	<b>efficient</b> 201:20 <b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23 70:13 91:22 92:8 105:1 154:25 <b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8 <b>eight</b> 98:24 <b>either</b> 23:13 26:23 27:1 33:2 43:15 56:21 83:22 224:8 <b>elderly</b> 125:4,6 144:16 <b>elect</b> 143:13 <b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8 154:13 162:8 164:13 226:9 <b>election</b> 4:3 10:7 13:1 14:19 15:1,3 16:8,9,11,18 18:14,22 22:15 24:15 25:5 29:25 32:6 33:10,18 34:4 36:23 38:1 38:11 39:2,7,18 39:20,22,23 40:18 40:19,21,23 41:2 41:8,12,16 42:10 44:10 45:3,14,19 46:11,20,24,25 47:8 48:6,7 50:4 51:2 52:13,14 53:9,10,12,12,23 56:19,22 57:7,13 57:14,18,22,24 58:22 59:12 63:2 63:11,13 64:20,21 66:6,13 67:2 68:8 69:10 72:9 73:7 73:19 74:20 80:25 81:6,9,21,25 82:20 87:12 89:17 93:5 96:6,21,25 97:1,6 98:1,3 99:14,16,20 100:4 100:7,9,9,15,19 100:21 101:9,10 101:11,13,19,21 102:5,19,24 103:3 103:4,14,17,20 105:9,16,23 106:19 108:24
---	--	--	---	---

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--



90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18



9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25  <b>N</b> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--



188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24  <b>S</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--



<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11		<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19		<b>wealthy</b> 93:16		<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19		<b>wearing</b> 107:22		<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14		<b>weather</b> 82:25		<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14		<b>week</b> 3:21 97:8,15 98:24 105:17,18 167:8 191:21 208:12 228:22,22 228:23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24		<b>weekend</b> 176:2		<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wanting</b> 211:22 <b>wants</b> 114:8 <b>War</b> 144:4 <b>warranty</b> 93:24 <b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12 <b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17 <b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25 <b>watchdog</b> 212:6 <b>watched</b> 208:11 <b>watcher</b> 129:2 <b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17 <b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25 <b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23 <b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20 <b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21 <b>weird</b> 86:8 <b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5 <b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19 <b>welcomed</b> 91:24 <b>well-designed</b> 125:8 <b>well-funded</b> 192:7 <b>well-intended</b> 5:19 <b>well-to-do</b> 93:17 <b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10 <b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13 <b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we've</b> 15:2 17:21	<b>winner</b> 46:21 <b>winning</b> 182:11 <b>wisely</b> 212:2,7 <b>wished</b> 84:6 <b>withdrawn</b> 230:9 <b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19 <b>witnesses</b> 117:16 <b>WMAZ</b> 126:11 <b>women</b> 127:7,8,9 127:10 192:9

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4 223:5	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2 224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	66:14 77:25 88:7	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worst</b> 161:2	88:20 90:5 97:1	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	97:12 99:7 103:22	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	104:3 113:14	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
104:6 113:2 116:8	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	124:15 129:2,9	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
124:22 126:22	163:14 193:4,4	138:3 152:1 167:2	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
131:7 133:19	<b>wow</b> 217:16	172:15 173:13,13	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
140:23 144:6,13	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	191:16 209:18	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
155:21 170:15	151:8 161:4	213:23	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
174:25 175:2	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
178:24 191:5	<b>write</b> 89:8	55:24 63:20 64:17	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
192:5 199:8,25	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	68:8,13 69:2	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
202:21 203:14,19	<b>writing</b> 170:4	74:18 79:19 93:18	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	127:2 136:4	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
212:15 222:8	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	138:19 142:3,3	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
224:23	108:8 162:7	147:9 154:5 156:2	212:11 228:6	141:4
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	187:15,15,16	156:11,11 158:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
124:16,20,20	189:21 198:16	158:17 165:10	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
127:1 138:24	202:21 207:12	170:11 192:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
173:10	217:6,7,19	207:24 212:24	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
158:2 193:6 200:1 202:20		219:4,17,23	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21		221:18,22 222:13	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
100:1 101:25		223:23,25 224:6	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
104:22,22 117:2		224:11	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
169:10 191:9		<b>yell</b> 166:15	206:13 214:14	167:4
193:1 194:5		<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
201:14 214:17		<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
215:11 226:14		<b>yielded</b> 38:11	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
			<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

---

**From:** STEVEN GREEN <gree806@bellsouth.net>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 4:04 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Cc:** sraygreen@bellsouth.net  
**Subject:** Fw: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript (2).pdf; safecommissiontranscriptmini.pdf

\*\* Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe. \*\*

--- On Wed, 1/9/19, Patrick Stephens <[ptrckstephens1@gmail.com](mailto:ptrckstephens1@gmail.com)> wrote:

> From: Patrick Stephens <[ptrckstephens1@gmail.com](mailto:ptrckstephens1@gmail.com)>  
> Subject: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
> To: "Broce, Candice" <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
> Cc: "gree806" <[gree806@bellsouth.net](mailto:gree806@bellsouth.net)>  
> Date: Wednesday, January 9, 2019, 2:26 PM Hey, Candice!  
> I've attached the transcript to this E-mail. Please let me know that  
> you've received it all right.  
> Thanks,  
>  
> --  
> - Patrick A. Stephens, CCR  
> -  
>  
>

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the



1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1       Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2       staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3       on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4       talk a little better into it.

5       MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6       Check, check, testing, testing.

7       AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8       MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9       So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10      better?

11      AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12      MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13      AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14      AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15      MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17      While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18      I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19      faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20      phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21      We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22      Good to see you.

23      MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25      could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that



1       could supply an independent audit trail.

2               The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3       legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4       did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5       purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6       May 4th, 2002.

7               The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8       commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9       same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10      only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11      fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12      have that in your recommendations.

13              So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14      2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15      verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16      to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17      system today.

18              So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19      Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20      perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21      or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22      you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23      the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24      screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25      the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains



1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.



1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,



1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16           The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17      doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18      election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19      election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20      the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21      ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22      fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23           So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24      you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25      have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you



1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10       new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11       makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12       overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13       audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14       as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15       we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16       audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18       audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19       audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20       but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21       death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23       brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24       life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25       them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing



1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1       which one's better?

2               MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3       work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4       felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5       that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6       would have to review.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8               MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9       off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10      we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11      that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12      we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13      audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14      precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15      precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16      will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17      done.

18              You know, there are important things going on in that  
19      three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20      looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21      example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22              And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23      ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24      process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25      mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then



1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1       system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2       that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3       and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4       I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5       you.

6           I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7       of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8       put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9       here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10          And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11       probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12       some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13       consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14       much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15          MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16       I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17       Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18       so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19       have a few minutes with you today.

20          The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21       today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22       starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23       remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24       give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25       to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13          We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18          We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1       going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2               The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3       votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4       refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5       the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6       whatever could happen.

7               They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8       machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9       needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10      the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11      paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12      Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13              The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14      surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15      surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16      came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17      and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18      of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19      optical-scan ballots.

20              At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21      a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22      because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23      would register in the whole county that night because,  
24      obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25      voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd



1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.



1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11               SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13               SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21               SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.



1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11          MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12          again.

13          MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14          MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15          we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16          there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17          one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18          lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19          at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20          printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21          one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22          created long lines.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24          MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25          than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the



1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and



1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10       And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11       Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12       there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13       that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15       -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16       problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17       but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19       heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20       o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21       to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22       of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23       working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24       it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25       poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a



1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2           through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3           deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4           think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5           continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6           litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8           give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9           election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10          -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11          Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12          use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13          lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15          Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16          in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17          for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19          the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20          plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21          goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22          pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23          rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25          briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.



1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being



1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process



1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13           And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20           So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1           -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3           any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4           that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5           barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6           favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7           scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9           ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10          never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11          Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13          anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14          like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15          office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16          how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17          it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19          think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20          most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21          doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22          taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24          Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25          and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to



1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14           Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21           MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1       Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2       heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3       and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5               MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7       for.

8               MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9       Representatives, District 25.

10              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11              MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13              MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14       am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15       percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16       County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17              But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18       -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19       -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20       tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21       ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22       like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23              But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24       that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25       and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1 goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2 that's at stake.

3 As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4 and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5 didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6 involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7 will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8 afraid their vote will not count.

9 If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10 you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11 goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12 anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13 handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14 go. Thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16 Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17 MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19 MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20 allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21 work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22 of Georgia.

23 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24 MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25 voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had



1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.

1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that



1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1       thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2       when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3               Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4       course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5       you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6       this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7       time.

8               Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9       funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10      county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11      an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12      from our election officials on how important that could be.

13              Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14      In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15      poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16      if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17      other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18              Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19      have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20      the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21      Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22      should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23      discussion has been here today on that.

24              Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25      we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5             And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10            And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17            So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21            The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack



1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2           possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3           audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4           elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5           And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6           audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8           -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9           the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10          auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11          want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12          having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13          to keep that in mind.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15          MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16          I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17          verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18          important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19          at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20          use the phrase security and inclusion.

21          And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22          discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23          the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24          a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25          of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that



1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand



1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22               important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23               talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24               systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --



1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7             That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16            MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18            MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21            MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people



1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON:  -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30.  Okay.  Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:  Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE:  So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY:  We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE:  So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:  You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE:  Yes.  But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:  The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly.  Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically.  Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND:  Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having



1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like



1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14



<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6 <b>disenfranchising</b> 124:22 219:2,9 <b>disparity</b> 65:16,25 67:7 <b>disproportionate</b> 180:18 <b>dispute</b> 125:11 <b>distinguish</b> 55:22 <b>distinguished</b> 158:24 <b>distress</b> 123:6 <b>distribute</b> 59:24 <b>distribution</b> 44:7 <b>district</b> 38:14,15 45:21 110:15 152:9 200:3 <b>districts</b> 72:19 <b>distrust</b> 186:5,6 189:9 <b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15 <b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3 <b>Doctor</b> 203:20 <b>documentation</b> 156:23 <b>documented</b> 220:23 <b>dodge</b> 195:24 <b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1 97:17 108:13 146:4 187:17 202:21 225:5 226:3 <b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12 39:14 40:11 42:9 48:21 54:6 64:14 77:13 99:5,15 100:15 129:4 131:21 134:24 137:7 154:25 155:21 157:6 166:18 179:6 185:1 186:8 190:14 192:4 198:9 222:20 228:25 <b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15 <b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15 78:18,19,20 87:2 139:4 142:7 163:5	165:5,21 211:11 222:10 224:4 <b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8 13:5,10 20:14 21:25 23:13 25:3 25:24,25 26:2,14 28:11 30:18 32:9 32:9 33:6 36:9 44:22 49:18 50:22 58:9 59:23 70:1 72:12 76:25 87:20 88:4 90:25 99:2,3 109:9 111:25 113:19 125:16 129:11 135:9 138:1 147:12 155:11,25 156:12 160:21 164:7 165:8 167:3 171:22,25 177:12 178:16 183:6,7,16 184:18 186:2 195:20 197:1 198:6 202:12 204:1 205:7,7,15 206:3 211:9,10,16 213:8 217:21,22 217:22 221:11,17 223:10 224:7 <b>doomed</b> 62:23 <b>door</b> 39:17 <b>doors</b> 152:3,18 <b>double</b> 74:10 100:6 <b>double-digit</b> 86:16 <b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6 147:21 173:5 174:12 191:16 209:7 211:11 <b>doubted</b> 172:2 <b>Douglas</b> 19:19 <b>download</b> 27:18 <b>downside</b> 40:16,25 <b>down-ballot</b> 24:21 25:6 <b>dozen</b> 77:23 <b>dozens</b> 154:8 <b>DPH</b> 210:7 <b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22 76:7,9 77:11,16 77:18,21,24 78:6	78:9,11,14 183:21 183:22,23 184:7 184:11,17 185:7 185:13 186:10,15 186:22,25 203:21 205:4,5,7,14 210:20,21 211:1 220:21,22 223:15 223:16 <b>dramatically</b> 25:4 26:1 <b>draw</b> 86:6 <b>drawback</b> 226:15 <b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8 <b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14 30:14,23 31:6 102:8 104:12,13 148:10,17 160:23 197:18 <b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17 86:19 <b>drilled</b> 65:15 <b>drink</b> 163:14 <b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1 209:9 <b>Driver</b> 204:22 <b>driver's</b> 201:6 <b>driver's</b> 72:14 200:23 203:24 204:5 <b>drop</b> 188:16 <b>dropped</b> 158:14 <b>drops</b> 158:21 <b>drove</b> 18:10 <b>dry</b> 82:13 <b>dude</b> 165:2 <b>due</b> 45:6 104:12 105:15 133:20 143:5 <b>due's</b> 10:21 <b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22 123:24 124:2,2,3 124:4,7,9 <b>durable</b> 32:4 <b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12 135:14,17,17 <b>dynamics</b> 103:25 <b>dysfunctional</b> 136:10	<b>E</b> <b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1 <b>eager</b> 192:11 <b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6 62:10 85:4 102:22 140:17 169:5 171:18 190:9 191:12 207:19,23 208:5 209:13 218:4 225:20 <b>early</b> 7:14 14:19 16:9 27:1 32:6 51:9 75:21 89:3 97:13 101:23 116:19 177:6 181:5 197:22,24 198:3,24 227:16 227:18 <b>earpiece</b> 71:13 <b>ease</b> 91:3 <b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13 50:1 130:9 193:21 <b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24 225:8 <b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25 175:4 194:11 227:1,3 <b>eat</b> 7:5 <b>echo</b> 221:14 <b>economical</b> 165:19 <b>Ed</b> 163:17 <b>educate</b> 87:14 89:20 90:10 138:17 <b>educating</b> 192:25 193:1 <b>education</b> 66:25 77:5,13 78:3,5,20 88:3 89:17,23 92:14 126:25 145:10 169:9 191:2,9,13 192:5 192:25 195:1 205:6 <b>educational</b> 65:4 65:22 87:2 90:17 <b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16 180:18 <b>effective</b> 129:24 <b>effectively</b> 127:3	<b>efficient</b> 201:20 <b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23 70:13 91:22 92:8 105:1 154:25 <b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8 <b>eight</b> 98:24 <b>either</b> 23:13 26:23 27:1 33:2 43:15 56:21 83:22 224:8 <b>elderly</b> 125:4,6 144:16 <b>elect</b> 143:13 <b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8 154:13 162:8 164:13 226:9 <b>election</b> 4:3 10:7 13:1 14:19 15:1,3 16:8,9,11,18 18:14,22 22:15 24:15 25:5 29:25 32:6 33:10,18 34:4 36:23 38:1 38:11 39:2,7,18 39:20,22,23 40:18 40:19,21,23 41:2 41:8,12,16 42:10 44:10 45:3,14,19 46:11,20,24,25 47:8 48:6,7 50:4 51:2 52:13,14 53:9,10,12,12,23 56:19,22 57:7,13 57:14,18,22,24 58:22 59:12 63:2 63:11,13 64:20,21 66:6,13 67:2 68:8 69:10 72:9 73:7 73:19 74:20 80:25 81:6,9,21,25 82:20 87:12 89:17 93:5 96:6,21,25 97:1,6 98:1,3 99:14,16,20 100:4 100:7,9,9,15,19 100:21 101:9,10 101:11,13,19,21 102:5,19,24 103:3 103:4,14,17,20 105:9,16,23 106:19 108:24
---	--	--	---	---

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12	<b>experiment</b> 87:17	<b>faced</b> 46:10	154:7	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9
<b>excellent</b> 75:12	<b>experimental</b> 53:24	<b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19	<b>fault</b> 50:12	63:8 66:19 118:4
95:16 160:18	<b>expert</b> 125:10	115:1	<b>favor</b> 147:6	140:20 206:13
<b>exception</b> 98:20	156:4	<b>facilitate</b> 201:20	<b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5	209:8,10
122:25	<b>expertise</b> 65:21	<b>facing</b> 109:4	8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12	<b>figured</b> 97:6
<b>exceptionally</b> 104:2	73:9 75:6 94:15	120:19	9:15,23 10:1,4,11	<b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8
104:10	95:3,8 166:22	<b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12	10:13,15 21:2,5,8	<b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3
<b>excited</b> 3:3	<b>experts</b> 14:24	16:3 20:22 25:2	21:13,20 22:9	<b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7
<b>excitement</b> 153:1	16:15 49:17 74:9	32:25 69:18 90:1	23:6,8,25 24:11	<b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2
<b>exciting</b> 49:4	119:23 125:10,12	94:19 117:16	24:19 25:10,14,16	<b>filling</b> 65:7
<b>exclusively</b> 56:1	149:14,19 158:5	138:16 149:7	26:22,24 27:4,8	<b>final</b> 33:24 61:15
<b>excuse</b> 73:19	159:7 221:1,7	163:2 172:21	27:21 28:9,13,24	166:1,6 168:8,16
220:12	<b>expired</b> 93:25	174:15 175:6	35:13,19 36:15	<b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14
<b>executed</b> 101:7	<b>explain</b> 21:16	181:21 187:6	37:3 110:24	39:21 48:24 84:8
<b>executive</b> 137:16	91:25 183:23	195:19 203:7	138:23 158:7	170:5
139:17	<b>explained</b> 25:9	208:6 222:3	160:8	<b>Finance</b> 2:15
<b>exhaustive</b> 66:17	35:21	<b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15	<b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22	<b>financial</b> 165:14
97:3	<b>explains</b> 19:25	154:21	<b>fear</b> 133:7	<b>financially</b> 140:15
<b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12	<b>explanation</b> 18:13	<b>factors</b> 222:14	<b>feared</b> 87:22	<b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1
<b>existed</b> 66:15,18	24:25	<b>fails</b> 47:6	<b>feature</b> 132:22	30:20 39:10 42:8
<b>existing</b> 80:19,20	<b>exponentially</b>	<b>failure</b> 151:14	<b>fed</b> 226:20	43:7,7,16 50:15
<b>exists</b> 163:25	102:2	203:10	<b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19	56:5,8 63:11
<b>exit</b> 43:24	<b>exposed</b> 15:13	<b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9	83:3,6 113:20	72:23,24,25 74:22
<b>expand</b> 49:12,16	<b>express</b> 199:14,17	133:6 143:2	138:2,7 142:22	117:6 156:7 157:4
<b>expect</b> 97:10	202:12 227:24	194:12 230:8	180:6 202:9	184:24 190:12
101:10 208:3	<b>expressed</b> 121:17	<b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6	216:18	221:17
<b>expected</b> 75:12	122:5 229:16	203:7	<b>federally</b> 192:14	<b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6
<b>expecting</b> 157:7	<b>expressing</b> 219:6	<b>fairness</b> 133:14	<b>feds</b> 78:18	<b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17
<b>expedite</b> 129:23	<b>expression</b> 163:22	<b>faith</b> 175:19	<b>fee</b> 79:23	49:19 181:3
<b>expense</b> 79:17	<b>expressly</b> 230:9	<b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5	<b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8	198:11,12 200:18
212:23 213:24	<b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16	<b>fallible</b> 154:12	34:25 212:18	205:10
<b>expenses</b> 79:18	101:17	<b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21	226:12,13,14	<b>finger</b> 107:19
213:25	<b>extended</b> 97:20,20	89:2 196:18	<b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1	<b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18
<b>expensive</b> 31:15	105:11	208:21	83:15 87:11,16	143:14
44:15 46:8 140:14	<b>extending</b> 102:11	<b>families</b> 98:8	90:22,23 91:3	<b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20
164:4 165:1 213:3	<b>extensive</b> 14:1	<b>family</b> 83:24	114:16 122:3	<b>firm</b> 141:21
213:9,16 225:10	<b>extent</b> 216:3	<b>fantastic</b> 101:21	127:25 129:16	<b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10
<b>experience</b> 53:25	<b>external</b> 13:24	<b>fantastically</b> 99:4	146:25 147:13	29:11 32:3 37:15
54:4,5 58:21	179:2,4	<b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21	161:18 168:3	38:19 42:17 45:3
64:10 65:4,23	<b>extra</b> 165:5,9	42:12 68:2 85:14	194:2 229:14	66:23 67:6 76:10
73:16 74:12 77:7	<b>extraordinarily</b>	89:17 145:4	<b>feeling</b> 91:13	76:21 94:21 95:23
77:11 84:7 91:17	136:22	147:19 166:18	189:22	96:24 98:21 99:12
99:19 111:14,16	<b>extremely</b> 137:1	167:3 175:14	<b>fellow</b> 113:6	122:14 123:2,20
111:21 134:15	177:11 181:6	188:19 229:17	<b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21	129:2 131:6 133:3
152:20,23 156:5	213:9	<b>fashion</b> 207:15,16	69:20 73:21	146:23 160:20
166:22 205:9		<b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25	152:21 227:19	167:8 171:22
214:5 220:16		68:2 107:16	<b>fess</b> 11:5	191:20 213:12,23
<b>experienced</b> 24:16	<b>F</b>	224:15	<b>fewer</b> 40:20	228:22,22,23
93:5 124:15	<b>F</b> 230:1	<b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25	<b>field</b> 93:16 121:13	<b>fit</b> 58:11
<b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>fabulous</b> 124:12	<b>father</b> 60:18,20	185:5,10,12	<b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
	<b>facade</b> 98:15,18			

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--



90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18



9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
<b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	<b>P</b> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	<b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	58:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--



188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24  <b>S</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--



<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--



<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3	197:24 198:2,6,21	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	95:12 124:16	205:23,24 208:20	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15	171:8,8,12 200:2	209:5 220:2	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>02</b> 194:21
169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5	224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>1</b>
223:5	66:16	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13	53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	40:8 41:10 56:4
17:18 34:1,10	77:1 175:22	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	57:2 151:2 156:17
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	156:18 176:10
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worst</b> 161:2	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	182:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	42:4,5,13 55:24
104:6 113:2 116:8	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	84:19 125:16
124:22 126:22	58:7 59:11,12	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	147:9 206:14
131:7 133:19	163:14 193:4,4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	207:24 224:5
140:23 144:6,13	<b>wow</b> 217:16	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
174:25 175:2	125:24 145:22	19:11 29:15 42:14	157:23 165:2	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
178:24 191:5	151:8 161:4	55:24 63:20 64:17	172:21,21 186:25	165:5,21 198:20
192:5 199:8,25	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	68:8,13 69:2	193:23 194:10	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
202:21 203:14,19	<b>write</b> 89:8	74:18 79:19 93:18	200:7,21,24	141:4
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	127:2 136:4	212:11 228:6	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
212:15 222:8	<b>writing</b> 170:4	138:19 142:3,3	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
224:23	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6	147:9 154:5 156:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>114</b> 18:4
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5	150:18	156:11,11 158:2	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>12</b> 125:19
49:8 81:1 83:19	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17	158:17 165:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12th</b> 1:10
124:16,20,20	42:6,8 76:15	170:11 192:10	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
127:1 138:24	108:8 162:7	207:24 212:24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
173:10	187:15,15,16	213:25 218:23,24	140:1 154:14	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23	189:21 198:16	219:4,17,23	157:16 166:18	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
106:14 156:7	202:21 207:12	221:18,22 222:13	169:5 188:19	167:4
158:2 193:6 200:1	217:6,7,19	223:23,25 224:6	206:13 214:14	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
202:20	<b>X</b>	224:11	223:15	48:24 221:18
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
90:2,3,4,11,19,21	85:23 86:2,10	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7	51:16 109:19	163:4 222:9 224:4
100:1 101:25	93:13	200:9	111:19 165:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
104:22,22 117:2	<b>Y</b>	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5	206:5	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
169:10 191:9	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6	122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
193:1 194:5	9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	<b>Z</b>	218:23,24 219:17
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21	<b>zero</b> 12:16	219:23
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	219:23	<b>zone</b> 210:22	<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15		28:8,10,14
		145:15		<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

## SECURE, ACCESSIBLE &amp; FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

## STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

## TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

-	(Interjection of thought for clarification)
--	(Interruption of thought)
...	(Trailing off or did not complete thought)
(ph)	(Phonetically)
[sic]	(In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity, transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it has been throughout my career in public service.

Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I spent time in several different areas of state government, including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the Department of Human Services.

Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.  
(Collective Pledge.)

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

group has already heard from several different groups, and stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the important discussion about our state's next voting system.

We're -- we're joined here today by Representative Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature and Governor-elect Kemp.

Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all of the attendees here.

Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of State's office as we began our transition planning. I realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very grateful for the support you've given us.

As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

focal point for elections because the priceless franchise to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections throughout every aspect of the election process.

Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and, today, it is imperative we complete our research for security and technology for the next decade.

I have said that we need the most secure, updated voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a system that moves voters faster through the line so we can reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our next-generation voting machines.

Our next legislative session begins on January 14th and I know that the General Assembly and our department is looking forward to the completion and recommendations from this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank you for offering yourself for service in this critical and noble effort.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda for today.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary, and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to talk about something very important to Georgia; that is, voting in our state.

We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be able to help you out.

As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had very good participation from the public at our prior meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you for being here.

As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have time limits for our presentations today and we will gently initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.  
17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.  
21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

could supply an independent audit trail.

The law -- in order to get the machines in, the legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal did not take effect until after the contract was -- was purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on May 4th, 2002.

The reason that I bring this to the attention of the commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have -- have that in your recommendations.

So when that new system was implemented back then in 2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable system today.

So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system? Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well, you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot screen that you see may not be what's happening on the -- the inside of the machine.

trust in Georgia voting.

So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go through to do a big project like this.

And, typically, what you do is you analyze your current system for improvement opportunities, you define the new system requirements and then evaluate the alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is to help you identify the current system improvement opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for defining your objectives and requirements.

Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great protection for Georgia voters.

But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

As election officials, many of you know when -- there are no audit procedures in place today to audit their elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results, you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the correct results that the system told you.

And then lastly, but not least, is the recount situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable system.

So that's the election-integrity advocates' perspective, but what about the state's perspective? We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The -- the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that -- of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access



1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2 So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3 Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4 ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5 elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6 getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7 device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8 So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9 and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10 server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11 by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12 have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13 happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14 Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15 great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16 lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17 So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18 commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19 can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20 you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21 The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22 it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23 but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24 counties.

25 So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPL0ST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPL0ST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1 either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2 MS. BAILEY: So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3 considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4 MR. FAVORITO: That's exactly right. There was no  
5 mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6 ballots cast in those races.

7 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you.

9 MS. ROSS: Can I get a point of clarification?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Just a point of clarification: For Bibb  
12 County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13 lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14 that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15 as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16 that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17 do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18 from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19 card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20 for.

21 MR. FAVORITO: So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22 the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23 itself.

24 MS. ROSS: They are on the voting unit, too.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1 that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2 nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3 machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4 non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5 A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6 which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7 very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8 have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9 commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10 ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11 recommendation.

12 So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13 systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14 replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15 that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16 those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17 well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18 electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19 really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20 cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21 -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22 The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23 DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24 Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25 University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6 Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14 And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24 So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

elections, it's going to require some additional work on the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be able to audit, recount and make sure that we have transparency in the election process.

This is going to be an increased burden on the county elections directors. It's going to require a little bit more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want to bring that to your attention because I think the Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county commissions in making sure that they understand this when we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement auditing, recounting and transparency.

So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've given you and see exactly what you really think we need to do and we think that you need to define the requirements, basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report. Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to release this until Friday because I wanted to get some feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

but you save all of this administrative work for the elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't have enough, then there's a big scramble.

So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections. Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know, any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with that ballot.

So we actually recommend that people vote by mail given the current -- the current situation with these machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of election is basically foolproof and no particular voting type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

the presentation and then I was going to make some adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared to talk about it in case there any questions.

And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be glad to take any other questions about the new system as well.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the preprinted ballots that are wasted --

MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used. Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much. We appreciate you being here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you. Thank you for having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see you today.

MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear me okay?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn. I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the honor of previously presenting to you on our first commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back. And the topic I'm going to talk about today is postelection audits.

Postelection audits are something that we currently don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we will be able to do. It's something that most states do, so it's something that you may want to include in the recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that later today and something for the legislature and our state

election board to really work with in the future.

So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your results using the same underlying data. So, in our world, the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're trying to independently re-create that tabulated results, looking back at the cast votes.

What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment and the procedures used to count the votes worked correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the election yielded the correct result.

What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a recount is, is when you count every single vote for a particular race. So when you recount a house district, you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full re-creation, you will know what the results is.

So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What this means is there is a predetermined percentage of usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of the percentages that you would go back and review. The advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of precincts you would have to look at and that makes it easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a scope.

The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout, you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures worked.

So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

So the benefits of a audit are that you can find errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental errors, it can help you have data and information so that you can improve the process for future elections; you can iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits going to be done after an election, you know that they are going to dig in and review those results, look at the ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps build public confidence in the election and the outcome of an election.

So I'm going to describe the three main categories or types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close the election is.

But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered percentage is being done by two states right now, and what that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how many precincts you will check based on how close the election is.

So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin, you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5 percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the election is.

And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and, at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1 audit.

2 So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3 a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4 time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5 percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6 that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7 catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8 the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9 you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10 and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11 is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12 So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13 statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14 years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15 journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16 elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17 they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18 There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19 Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20 audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21 smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22 able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23 To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24 of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25 comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out. All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-



1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1 it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2 make changes.

3 If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4 potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5 records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6 fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7 recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8 election you are auditing if you do it before  
9 certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10 it pre, some states do it after certification.

11 And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12 that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13 audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14 do you review the digital image of the paper?

15 The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16 you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17 they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18 single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19 technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20 of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21 they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22 pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23 So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24 we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25 ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2 for risk-limited audits.

3 So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4 know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5 verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6 confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7 any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8 worked correctly.

9 You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10 new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11 makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12 overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13 audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14 as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15 we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16 audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17 And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18 audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19 audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20 but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21 death from what I've talked about.

22 There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23 brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24 life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25 them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6 MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.  
9 And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16 MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18 MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1 which one's better?

2 MR. RAYBURN: So I think if we had a statistician to  
3 work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4 felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5 that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6 would have to review.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Lynn?

8 MS. BAILEY: Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Speaking  
9 off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10 we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11 that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12 we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13 audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14 precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15 precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16 will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17 done.

18 You know, there are important things going on in that  
19 three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20 looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21 example. So we do definitely need to look at that.

22 And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23 ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24 process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25 mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1 audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2 greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3 difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4 recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5 to recertify a result.

6 MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7 election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8 over. You see what I'm saying?

9 MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10 on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11 a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12 precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13 results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14 have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15 switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16 MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17 recount, not a do over, is my question.

18 MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19 and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20 would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21 going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22 new election.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24 the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25 ordered. Senator?

1 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6 MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23 MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3 MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8 Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10 MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12 PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16 MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19 MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22 MS. COX: That's right.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25 MS. COX: That's right.

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.  
24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3 MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5 MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9 MS. COX: That's right.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12 MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15 MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18 MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22 MS. COX: Exactly.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1 going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2 The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3 votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4 refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5 the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6 whatever could happen.

7 They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8 machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9 needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10 the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11 paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12 Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13 The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14 surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15 surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16 came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17 and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18 of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19 optical-scan ballots.

20 At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21 a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22 because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23 would register in the whole county that night because,  
24 obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25 voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7 I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13 We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.

14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18 We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate these lost votes and we took that original study -- which should be in the state archives -- we took that study to the legislature and said, We need to really do something on our watch before we have the next election cycle.

So that was when the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the commission, several others of you might have, but we had a combination, as your commission is composed, of local election officials and legislators that studied for a full year. We took the study we had done internally of what had happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in Georgia.

And it was a result of that study that led us into deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and to move, for the first time, into a system where every county would use the same voting equipment so that we could do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't even envision the things that are happening today in technology or the threats that are happening today to technology back in the day when we put this equipment in -- in place.

I think we also envisioned that there would be a continuous study of election equipment over the years and that there would be continuous need to purchase additional equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us to where we are today.

But one of the main -- a couple of the main points that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a decision for making a change today is to be mindful that, yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair; things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be replaced and upgraded.

So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

that the Secretary of State could do training for all county election officials and then to help the poll-worker training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis across the state, that the state would then, whatever equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the counties and, at least on the first round, make that purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got into the system we have now.

We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think -- my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that model.

We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the technology wasn't there at the time.

Honestly, I think that our commission thought back in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two, technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure voting system but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure but that also -- you understand the voter interface with technology.

We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000 presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill in DC of working with our congressional delegation and others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50 million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the equipment that we purchased.

In fact, the only money that the state ended up putting into the purchase was really the voter-education piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to make sure that voters are never turned away from voting because they don't want to show up in a polling place and be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6 Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9 DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17 So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23 You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.  
24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making



1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2 and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3 upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4 whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5 that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6 less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7 that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8 Michael?

9 MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10 when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11 Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12 elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13 time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14 purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15 was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16 at that time?

17 MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18 study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19 start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20 Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21 equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22 auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23 definition of auditing.

24 You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25 purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

The same thing with paper receipts from voting machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident prior to the new equipment being put in place where a county with an optical scan called us at one point and they had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the hairdryers --

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it helped. I mean --

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do, but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on election day and see some of the rural precincts and places where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is definitely something that we need to consider with -- with paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal, experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then, even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished and just loved, loved, the experience of having that independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was heard.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you again.

MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct, there's no way that we would be able to function with just one ballot printer. That would definitely create long lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a printer on each station. If you think about the concept of one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just created long lines.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of conducting state and federal elections on the county level, the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers, printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no funding from the state or federal government to our counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent statewide runoff.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the importance around access for individuals with disability and the ability to independently cast their vote and privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting process for people with disabilities?

MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they just didn't vote.

sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and -- and why you think that occurred?

MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes between majority-black and majority-white precincts within the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts using optical-scan ballots.

We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and look at the average age of voters, for example, because it just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were using standardized testing might not be familiar with an optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in that bubble or mark the X.

We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6 MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12 So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20 People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part of the training money was allocated to train poll workers, because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And -- and you need to realize these are temporary workers that only work two or three elections every other year.

And I remember there was money put regionally into the technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses and carried them and they were taught how to operate the equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters how to use the equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to underscore, just like many others have around the table, the importance of the educational component and my -- that comment is more related to the judge's comments about training poll workers.

Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it. Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

solutions that we were coming up with and, when we ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as the security piece. It's not one or the other and they -- they've got to be equally considered in your decision-making.

And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and to keep up with changes in technology and to help the counties.

We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just uncomfortable with the entire process.

So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all of us around the table could at least agree on that.

JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too proud to ask for help.

MS. BAILEY: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made and how can we learn from your experience?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with the legislature.

MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines that we experienced in this election cycle because counties -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think, understood we're probably heading into something new so they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying additional equipment.

But since the state moved into this arena, unified the state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to the counties so that we can keep up that level playing field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to buy new equipment in the years to come.

We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the state would really help voters everywhere.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2 State's office is always going to need that level of  
3 staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4 university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5 that is purchased new.

6 You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7 think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8 the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9 provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10 equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11 the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12 based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14 much.

15 MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17 MS. COX: Thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19 today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20 (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22 would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23 started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24 Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25 to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1 their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2 advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3 people vote in advanced voting.

4 By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5 were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6 advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7 advanced voting in this election.

8 We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9 election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10 to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11 litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12 to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13 citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14 essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15 that county election officials had been doing.

16 And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17 county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18 as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19 And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20 changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21 And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22 officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23 on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24 ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25 some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1 done in the past had been altered.

2 But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3 what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4 our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5 as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6 I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7 through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8 successfully at the county level.

9 On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10 And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11 Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12 there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13 that happened on election day.

14 You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15 -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16 problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17 but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18 We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19 heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20 o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21 to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22 of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23 working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24 it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25 poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1 what lines looked like throughout the state.

2 And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3 terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4 election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5 not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6 About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7 that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8 but in some locations.

9 Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10 said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11 voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12 about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13 2018.

14 We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15 longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16 gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17 did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18 about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19 again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20 to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21 about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22 and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23 There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24 look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25 dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10 We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15 Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19 In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2 Senator Jackson.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4 for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5 how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6 candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7 MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8 that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9 know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10 calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11 grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12 you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13 ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14 know, bounce around.

15 These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16 fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17 you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18 people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19 finger around.

20 It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21 screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22 spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23 glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24 always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25 show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.



1 We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7 The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14 That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18 Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24 The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1 this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2 state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3 the Secretary of State's office.

4 So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5 even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6 in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7 chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9 MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10 that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11 this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12 election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13 it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14 an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15 elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16 allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17 launch in municipal elections.

18 And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19 we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20 likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21 into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22 right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24 Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25 you do.

MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission members, we're now going to move to the portion of our agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right where you are, stand up.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing up, stay standing up.

Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you for that.

What I would ask of you now is, is to understand clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going to ask you to stick to that.

Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself. If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But, generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as well.

So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments, making their point but making it in such a way that it's not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so thank you for that in the past.

Is there anyone who does not understand the ground rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start going down the list, and thank you so much.

Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia. Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara, please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear from you.

MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party, county-party committees and election officials. I also oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching program.

Over the course of this election season, our voter-protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November 6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and hundreds more during the early voting periods.

Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a voter would make a selection only to have the machine reflect a different result.

In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There was one voter who reported having to change her vote five times before it correctly reflected her choice. In another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to three separate machines before they could find a machine that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

We also received multiple reports of races not appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

Problems weren't limited to the election machines. There were many problems with the registration system. We had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

We have other cases where voters found their registrations online, they had printed registration cards; they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the -- at the polling booths.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to research these problems. I would like to share them with each county as we go through so that we can look at them and figure out what happened and where the system broke down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and in the officials and the administration of the system.

What's critical now is that this body develop a set of standards against which the decisions that -- on a system will be made. You have to have standards that you establish here because if we don't set a baseline that includes making sure that the voters are able to create and confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these votes are auditable independently without any intervention by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply continue.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

MS. NELSON: Yes.

Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any central database.

So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little bit to the disabilities concerns.

I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where little people showed up to their polling places and were not given stools or chairs, left without casting their vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their access to cast their vote.

So, right now, we are already facing a lot of disability issues and, completely understandably, with handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

MS. NELSON: -- having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not with any particular organization. I really appreciate your time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

MS. NELSON: This one?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little closer.

MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned citizen and not with any particular organization and I appreciate your time.

So I am concerned particularly with any electronic system, as has been proven by experts that there's no system known out there right now that is completely secure from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name right?

MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again. I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from.

MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I spent the last several months working as a field organizer for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast. The trust in the election system has degraded significantly.

There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust, which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1 therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2 make sure that that happens.

3 They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4 they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5 the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6 audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7 restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8 consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9 critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10 system.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12 Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13 Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14 first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15 Blassingame?

16 Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17 pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18 MR. WEIR: Yep.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20 have you and please tell us where you're from.

21 MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22 just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23 is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24 learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25 I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4 MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10 MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13 MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1 Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7 My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11 The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18 Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23 In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1 this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2 citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3 better by one another.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5 today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6 Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7 Please tell us where you're from.

8 MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9 elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10 degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11 of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12 including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13 held my current position since 2007.

14 I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15 voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16 through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17 local jurisdictions.

18 We need to have meaningful audits before  
19 certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20 I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21 lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22 certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23 barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24 we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25 whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 was accurate.

2 So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3 paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4 marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5 it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6 what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7 is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8 evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9 receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10 any different. Thank you very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12 appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13 for coming today. Good to have you again.

14 MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16 from.

17 MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18 County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19 Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20 representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21 to address you guys.

22 The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23 that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24 and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25 alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 than you've had the time to go through yet.

2 What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3 is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4 elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5 going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6 Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7 verifiable system.

8 The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9 all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10 not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11 verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12 to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13 that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14 systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15 one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16 elections.

17 I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18 you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19 you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20 set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21 Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22 need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23 terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24 what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25 of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American



1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3 MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8 You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13 And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20 So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditale (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one, I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be negative one and subtract from your total.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann, thank you for coming today.

MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972 and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

hear from you.

MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to have their votes represent their intentions.

It is imperative that the new voting system that you recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their voices heard on election day. In our recent election, there were reports of problems with the DREs showing erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen technology these problems will persist. They can be avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise; right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented the rule of the voter.

I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking -- marking devices that you are considering will produce a paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and recorded.

-- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded scanners that can handle the humidity.

And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there. Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

But -- and one other thing that I don't think anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today, and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the separate verification step and issues of human limitations become moot.

Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid audit is the best available method for conducting elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to heart the recommendations of the experts.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration and service to the voters of Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John, good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1 you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2 MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3 Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4 restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5 and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6 the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7 officials since that time despite that information being  
8 thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9 The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10 and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11 of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12 They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13 point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14 University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15 State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16 statewide.

17 So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18 professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19 supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21 this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22 Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23 the technology involved in our election system.

24 And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25 Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time since she offered?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the news business a few years back after a long career both in national news and state-local news in another part of the country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot boxes we were talking about.

So I understand that any system can be hacked, any system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials here, but you've all heard about it.

And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle, suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly. We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

I love the idea that we can print them on demand. That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

-- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and, having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a pension for accurate, reliable data.

And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will tell you that my experience since we have had electronic voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've never quite trusted it.

We've been using that system for years and years and lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of trust.

Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know, that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

I think what I want to see is that everyone gets -- everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever they voted for, that they can have documentation that their vote went through as they intended and that those votes can be audited.

goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy that's at stake.

As been said many times today -- and I've heard over and over since I got involved with this issue, which I didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote will not count. Think about that. American citizens are afraid their vote will not count.

If you're afraid your vote's not going to count, you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to go. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people of Georgia.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this electronic system that we have, remember the definition of insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5 now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the past.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as good as I used to be.

MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission for allowing us to speak here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again, where you're from, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we just listen to the IT experts?

And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns; we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled, Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system, but also dropped into a safe box.

And not much has been said about what happens to these paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years, about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate that problem. These would be attached to the optical scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure place. So I think that solves that one problem.

We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying -- verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an average of 3.9 seconds.

When you're given a summary that you have to check, human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best advice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.  
Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a second now. T-H-R --

MS. THROOP: Yeah.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- 0-0-P.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go. Throop. All right.

MS. THROOP: Good.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you, Liz.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of good presentations this morning and have had a lot of good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I think it's important to be very specific with these things.

So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be signifying something as simple as the precinct number could introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for that reason, I think it's very important that we get proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there are no barcodes on the ballots.

It's been a little while since I've looked at those proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent set of presentations we heard today should have happened at the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what those ballots are going to look like.

And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs, they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

are the focus of national press attention as one of the worst states for voting integrity.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and allow you to wrap up, Liz.

MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay. Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to have you.

MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing really quickly.

The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next session or something because you know how hard that is, that things don't get done that way.

And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal -- detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1 that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2 accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3 the legislature decides on the system.

4 And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5 the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6 aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7 guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8 got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9 confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11 George Ballbona (ph)?

12 MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14 George.

15 MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17 for being here today.

18 MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19 live in Cobb County.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21 MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22 those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23 but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24 anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25 something costs.

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsnor? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1 No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.  
3 Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6 This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12 A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17 Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24 However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2 Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3 scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4 Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5 know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6 y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7 to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8 boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9 all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10 things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11 it needs upgrading.

12 But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13 They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14 update your thing and it is now your financial  
15 responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16 So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17 came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18 way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19 tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20 trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21 saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23 members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24 about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25 we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.  
2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1 having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2 session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3 as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4 until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5 all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6 is inaugurated.

7 And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8 two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9 in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10 meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11 would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12 There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13 and can accommodate people this size.

14 Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15 period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16 every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17 Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18 agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19 certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20 However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21 throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22 you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23 move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24 discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25 would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?  
21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 comments from the commission? Lynn?

2 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. Lynn Bailey out  
3 of Richmond County. I agree with what I've heard. I think  
4 Georgia does need a new system. The system that we have  
5 now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6 As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7 replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8 previously-owned units in other states and other  
9 jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10 it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11 sustain or continue.

12 Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13 over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14 voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15 concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16 good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17 way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18 right path.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other comments?  
20 Senator?

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Certainly.

23 SENATOR JACKSON: -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24 -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25 think an audit should be pre-certified. I think that the



1 audit should be done before we certify the general  
2 election.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4 MS. BOREN: Concur.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6 MS. BOREN: We agree.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8 -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9 counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10 the date you certify on?

11 Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12 con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13 great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14 implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15 said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16 fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17 The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18 that certification and how much?

19 MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23 MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24 November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25 provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2 The audit would also be important work not to be  
3 rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4 time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5 that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6 the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7 November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8 tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9 consideration.

10 I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11 I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12 audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13 they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14 you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15 that path.

16 But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17 three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18 in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19 any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20 it.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22 three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23 were going to say weeks.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25 MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1 because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2 type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3 system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4 types of lawsuits.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6 generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7 access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8 people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9 not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10 MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11 standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12 groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13 you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14 why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15 impact on certain voters versus others.

16 And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17 we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18 secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19 certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20 best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21 need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22 And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23 any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24 NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25 that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1 Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7 With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15 MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21 And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1 So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2 some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3 is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4 Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5 there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6 for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7 that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8 we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9 upon us.

10 You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11 sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12 actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13 there's still going to be a process for an election  
14 contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15 dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16 contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17 state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18 an election-contest proceeding.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20 sir, Michael?

21 MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22 comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23 things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24 things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25 which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.  
5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.  
10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1 your point.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3 everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4 shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5 stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6 wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7 the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8 we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11 Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12 ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13 ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14 a piece of paper; correct?

15 DR. LEE: Yes.

16 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17 the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18 they voted --

19 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21 auditable. No?

22 DR. LEE: So --

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24 papers --

25 DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.  
19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?  
15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1 And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2 month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3 be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4 officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5 the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6 component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7 But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8 need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9 fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10 has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11 very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12 other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13 groups out there that are ready to help.

14 I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15 implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16 completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17 funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18 report that we come up with.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21 MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22 important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23 talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24 systems are different all over the place.

25 So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7 But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18 If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

1 hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team  
4 counting ballots and then let the other team count behind  
5 them and see if the numbers were the same.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't  
7 realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in  
8 Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that  
9 been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they  
13 contract with me to be the supervisor over their old  
14 equipment.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if  
16 something goes wrong?

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only  
20 have 100 registered voters each.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

22 JUDGE MCCOY: So...

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one  
24 of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll  
25 bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1 that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2 that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3 courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4 in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5 school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6 you are given the correct ballot.

7 That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8 card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9 only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10 machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11 much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13 we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14 it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15 now are a little dated -- are they?

16 MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19 frankly. They're just a --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22 about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23 beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24 that what you're talking about?

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1 there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2 that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3 They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4 and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6 MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7 required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8 who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9 there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10 pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11 -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12 express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13 that.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16 system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17 voter --

18 MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20 human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21 doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22 ballot.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24 MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25 that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2 it's a state-issued ID card.

3 I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4 disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5 go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6 think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7 a ID card.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.  
9 (Crosstalk.)

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11 SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12 MS. BOREN: Yes.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14 to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15 card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16 SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18 SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19 MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20 that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21 cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22 of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23 they can also get that one free.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25 MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1 SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5 DR. LEE: So --

6 JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7 DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14 DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1 accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2 micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3 always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4 important part. Judge?

5 JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6 and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7 records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8 -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9 look at, to model.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11 on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12 paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13 us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14 aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15 that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16 forward, deal with other things.

17 Are there other things in our election process that  
18 we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19 major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20 about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21 DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22 of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23 -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25 in the legislature if you did that.

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.  
21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2 ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3 so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4 republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6 MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7 ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8 since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9 So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10 went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11 again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12 -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13 So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14 in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15 ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16 expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17 on-demand component --

18 JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19 MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21 the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22 MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23 \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24 We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25 on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1 ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2 almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3 or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4 voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5 I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6 to.

7 Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8 card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9 election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10 even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11 workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12 problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13 where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14 mistake like that, it's still made.

15 And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16 pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17 differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18 that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19 mistakes.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21 heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22 provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23 and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24 all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25 and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1 And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2 done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3 forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4 something that -- that we should -- we should think about.  
5 Madam Secretary?

6 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7 discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8 equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9 issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10 way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11 code and SEB procedures and things.

12 So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13 we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14 also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15 necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16 you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17 issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18 -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19 laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20 things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21 it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22 that we're looking at everything.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24 JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25 There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be hand-marked paper ballots?

Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly that have participated and -- has been on that -- that central issue that affects many of the other questions that we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next session? How long do we envision using the system that we decide upon?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question. I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have, that means a child born two years from now will be voting on a system that we decide on today.

And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single child -- so we're talking about children. Children today will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or another. I just think we need to consider that if this system is going to last as long as the last system has lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our future because the majority of the voters, if this system lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote very differently, take tests very differently, do things very differently than most of the people in this room.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for -- we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on paper, I would not trust that system.

So I think we're going to get -- there's always going to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is -- or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so that's why there's an important balance here.

And I do think, you know, between the -- the administration of the election, for election officials, but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know, at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending, but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's not going to be a perfect system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean, the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know, is the best available approach right now.

And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive -- to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I don't think we should have to find a solution and then use it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer technologies.

I really think that we should -- we should have this ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's available, and what has been working for us, and what needs to be improved and then have a new round of selection of new systems.

1 So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2 that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3 in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4 in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5 actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6 on leasing; right? Subscription.

7 I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8 you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9 instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10 dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11 are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12 Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13 bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14 later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15 change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16 know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17 little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18 comment.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20 thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21 anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22 flexibility to be flexible.

23 And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24 at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25 the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2 level.

3 But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4 involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5 in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6 money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7 taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8 the best practices of bonding.

9 And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10 oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11 lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12 we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13 agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14 leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15 you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16 DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17 is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18 then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19 safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20 -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21 right?

22 You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23 to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24 solution possible because there's no way out.

25 You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1 that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2 that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3 that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5 MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6 well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7 marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8 Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9 elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10 city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11 the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12 And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13 from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14 workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15 loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16 we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17 ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18 marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19 marking system.

20 It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21 the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22 was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23 race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24 wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25 could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1 The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2 -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3 that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4 transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5 used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6 read, as well as a regular voter.

7 So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8 like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9 it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10 that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11 on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12 them.

13 I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14 that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15 that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16 early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17 results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18 come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19 we felt comfortable with the results.

20 We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21 system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22 Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23 still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24 Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25 those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2 accommodate this.

3 The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4 process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5 Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6 gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7 thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8 the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9 make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10 decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11 Georgia.

12 Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13 come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14 I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15 you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16 workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17 we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18 for caring enough to be here today.

19 Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20 you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21 again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January \_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens  
PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR  
CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10



<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>



204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---



22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16



40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13	5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12	101:24 154:16 <b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13 <b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25	203:7 207:12 <b>quieter</b> 139:11 <b>quit</b> 140:10 <b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23 <b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12	<b>rarely</b> 222:4 <b>rat</b> 163:14 <b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7 <b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19 <b>ratings</b> 223:4 <b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17
<b>proponent</b> 91:5 <b>proportion</b> 73:1 <b>proposal</b> 160:21 <b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16 <b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4 <b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10 <b>Protecting</b> 150:22 <b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13 <b>protects</b> 15:22 <b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13 <b>prove</b> 13:6 <b>proved</b> 224:2 <b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9 <b>proves</b> 106:21 <b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2 <b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14 <b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20 <b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15 <b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15 <b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11 <b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22 <b>prudence</b> 222:1 <b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9	<b>publicity</b> 15:16 <b>publicly</b> 185:24 <b>public-input</b> 166:9 <b>pulled</b> 208:13 <b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20 <b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7 <b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5 <b>purchases</b> 222:23 <b>pure</b> 73:24 <b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18 <b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22 <b>pursuant</b> 202:10 <b>pursues</b> 133:16 <b>pursuit</b> 164:7 <b>push</b> 73:23 161:21 <b>pushed</b> 100:18 <b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18 <b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12	<b>QR</b> 160:7 <b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24 <b>quarter</b> 25:20 <b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18 <b>questioning</b> 103:2 <b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10 <b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14 <b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25	<b>R</b> <b>R</b> 2:1 230:1 <b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25 <b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23 <b>racial</b> 180:11 <b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11 <b>raise</b> 212:1 <b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13 <b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16 <b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11 <b>random</b> 33:2 56:10 <b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20 <b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12 <b>rank</b> 183:16 <b>rapid</b> 67:25 <b>rare</b> 30:7	<b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9 <b>reached</b> 194:9 <b>reaction</b> 107:17 <b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6 <b>readable</b> 147:4 <b>reader</b> 201:6 <b>reading</b> 107:22 <b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13 <b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15 <b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7 <b>realized</b> 28:17 <b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--



196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--



<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4 223:5	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2 224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	66:14 77:25 88:7	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worst</b> 161:2	88:20 90:5 97:1	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	97:12 99:7 103:22	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	104:3 113:14	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
104:6 113:2 116:8	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	124:15 129:2,9	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
124:22 126:22	163:14 193:4,4	138:3 152:1 167:2	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
131:7 133:19	<b>wow</b> 217:16	172:15 173:13,13	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
140:23 144:6,13	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	191:16 209:18	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
155:21 170:15	151:8 161:4	213:23	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
174:25 175:2	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
178:24 191:5	<b>write</b> 89:8	55:24 63:20 64:17	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
192:5 199:8,25	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	68:8,13 69:2	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
202:21 203:14,19	<b>writing</b> 170:4	74:18 79:19 93:18	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	127:2 136:4	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
212:15 222:8	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	138:19 142:3,3	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
224:23	108:8 162:7	147:9 154:5 156:2	212:11 228:6	141:4
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	187:15,15,16	156:11,11 158:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
124:16,20,20	189:21 198:16	158:17 165:10	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
127:1 138:24	202:21 207:12	170:11 192:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
173:10	217:6,7,19	207:24 212:24	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
158:2 193:6 200:1 202:20		219:4,17,23	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21		221:18,22 222:13	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
100:1 101:25		223:23,25 224:6	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
104:22,22 117:2		224:11	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
169:10 191:9		<b>yell</b> 166:15	206:13 214:14	167:4
193:1 194:5		<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
201:14 214:17		<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
215:11 226:14		<b>yielded</b> 38:11	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
			<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---



---

**From:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 5:32 PM  
**To:** Raheem, Nassar  
**Cc:** Beaver, Merritt  
**Subject:** Website  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript 12.12.18.pdf

Can you please attach the attached file on the website below to HERE?

Click HERE for the meeting transcript for the December 12, 2018 meeting.

<http://soswebadmin02.sos.state.ga.us/admin/index.php/elections/editPage/2245>

--

Jessica Simmons  
Chief of Staff  
Office of Georgia Secretary of State Robyn A. Crittenden  
(404) 463-1601 (Direct)  
[jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?



1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1       Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2       staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3       on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4       talk a little better into it.

5       MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6       Check, check, testing, testing.

7       AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8       MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9       So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10      better?

11      AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12      MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13      AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14      AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15      MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17      While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18      I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19      faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20      phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21      We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22      Good to see you.

23      MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25      could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1       could supply an independent audit trail.

2               The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3       legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4       did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5       purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6       May 4th, 2002.

7               The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8       commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9       same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10      only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11      fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12      have that in your recommendations.

13              So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14      2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15      verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16      to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17      system today.

18              So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19      Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20      perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21      or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22      you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23      the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24      screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25      the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvas  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized



1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the



1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the



1        voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2        suggest that -- we think is important:

3            The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4        We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5        It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6        everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7        and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8        disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9        ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10       disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11       then their voter anonymity is better.

12           Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13       tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14       be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15       allowed in Georgia.

16           Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17       think is really important that we want the commission to  
18       consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19       a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20       tabulators.

21           So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22       counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23       better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24       information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25       fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently



1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind



1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,



1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13          We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18          We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting



1           going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2           The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3           votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4           refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5           the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6           whatever could happen.

7           They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8           machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9           needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10          the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11          paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12          Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13          The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14          surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15          surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16          came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17          and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18          of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19          optical-scan ballots.

20          At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21          a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22          because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23          would register in the whole county that night because,  
24          obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25          voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go



1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --



1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really



easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?



1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10      And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11      Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12      there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13      that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15      -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16      problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17      but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19      heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20      o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21      to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22      of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23      working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24      it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25      poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,



1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2           through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3           deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4           think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5           continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6           litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8           give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9           election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10          -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11          Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12          use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13          lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15          Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16          in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17          for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19          the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20          plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21          goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22          pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23          rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25          briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want



1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,



1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a



1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between



1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1           be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2           dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3           are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4           on.

5           So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6           of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7           audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8           integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9           the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10          very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12          today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13          Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14          us where you're from.

15          MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16          executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17          today to talk to you --

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19          MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21          MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23          MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25          MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1       infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2       citizenry is fair and just.

3             Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4       art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5       continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6       voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7       importance of the task ahead of you.

8             Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9       foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10      would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11      confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12      values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13      elect our own leaders.

14            And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15      road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16      all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17      spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18      equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19      trial of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20      of their votes. Thank you.

21            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22      appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23      Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24      way?

25            MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14          Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21          MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from



1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1           goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2           that's at stake.

3           As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4           and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5           didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6           involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7           will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8           afraid their vote will not count.

9           If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10          you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11          goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12          anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13          handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14          go. Thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16          Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17          MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19          MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20          allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21          work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22          of Georgia.

23          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24          MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25          voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.



1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1           are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2           worst states for voting integrity.

3           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4           allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5           MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7           Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8           have you.

9           MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11          from.

12          MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13          Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14          really quickly.

15          The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16          the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17          unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18          they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19          that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20          legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21          the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22          session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23          that things don't get done that way.

24          And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25          detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12             But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16             So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I



1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1           thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2           when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3           Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4           course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5           you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6           this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7           time.

8           Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9           funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10          county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11          an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12          from our election officials on how important that could be.

13          Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14          In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15          poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16          if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17          other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18          Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19          have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20          the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21          Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22          should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23          discussion has been here today on that.

24          Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25          we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5           And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10           And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17           So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21           The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1           audit should be done before we certify the general  
2           election.

3           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4           MS. BOREN: Concur.

5           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6           MS. BOREN: We agree.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8           -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9           counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10          the date you certify on?

11          Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12          con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13          great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14          implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15          said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16          fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17          The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18          that certification and how much?

19          MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21          MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23          MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24          November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25          provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10           I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11           I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12           audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13           they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14           you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15           that path.

16           But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17           three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18           in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19           any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20           it.

21           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22           three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23           were going to say weeks.

24           JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25           MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we



1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2           possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3           audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4           elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5           And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6           audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8           -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9           the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10          auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11          want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12          having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13          to keep that in mind.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15          MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16          I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17          verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18          important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19          at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20          use the phrase security and inclusion.

21          And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22          discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23          the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24          a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25          of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --



MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

(Crosstalk.)

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

MS. BOREN: The election.

JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

(Crosstalk.)

DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
precertification.

COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
audit.

DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
right?

Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.



1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22               important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23               talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24               systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in



1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that



1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.



1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a



1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1       produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2       slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3       prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4       sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5       doesn't retain any votes.

6               And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7       election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8       easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9       election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10      in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11      multiple ways.

12             So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13      an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14      devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15      mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16      and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17      who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18      them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19      would like to do that.

20             We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21      a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22      if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23      ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24      the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25      that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10



<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

<p>98:23,23  <b>beginning</b> 127:14  191:15,15  <b>begins</b> 4:14  <b>behalf</b> 155:21  <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2  <b>beings</b> 159:6  <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17  20:23 23:2 28:13  42:18 60:17 77:22  78:13 83:18 120:8  121:21 130:3  163:8 172:12  179:1 227:11  228:9  <b>believed</b> 12:14  <b>believes</b> 187:13  <b>bell</b> 141:2  <b>benefit</b> 201:7  <b>benefiting</b> 143:15  <b>benefits</b> 39:10  171:12  <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2  49:14 73:18,21  101:4 105:25  112:23 122:1  124:10,10 137:8,9  149:17 158:12  159:7 168:21  180:20 190:18  191:17 194:7  209:9,17 212:1  221:2,10 223:4,8  223:9 224:9 229:7  <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13  <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16  30:3,5 32:11,23  54:22 55:1 56:12  63:8 130:8 134:3  212:18 222:17  <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14  50:13 59:16,17  <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12  <b>bias</b> 145:3  <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3  27:11  <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20  36:4 43:11 46:16  46:17,18 53:11  61:16 75:5 130:17</p>	<p>155:24 182:6  214:20 218:11  229:9  <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3  <b>biggest</b> 91:15  219:19  <b>bill</b> 168:16  <b>billion</b> 18:18  <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9  91:22,23 92:7  145:3  <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7  31:9 34:6,7,7  42:23 85:8 97:21  103:12 105:24  120:11 156:13  190:17 212:22  222:13,16,17  <b>bite</b> 76:3  <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7  86:16  <b>blackout</b> 192:3  <b>blame</b> 123:23,25  198:15  <b>blank</b> 23:7,21  24:17 26:18 86:5  86:10 225:1  <b>blanket</b> 78:3  <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5  18:15 26:24  <b>Blassingame</b>  122:13,15  <b>blessed</b> 158:6  <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5  <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23  <b>board</b> 19:20,21  38:1 45:24 50:4  53:23 80:25 81:9  124:10 126:20  128:6 141:23  145:24 170:3,6  200:5 204:19  209:16 212:17  <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2  165:8  <b>Bobby</b> 92:4  <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4  118:8  <b>Bogart</b> 131:3  <b>Boldly</b> 132:24</p>	<p><b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1  223:4,10  <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9  <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1  200:5,23 201:2  205:8 206:12  207:3  <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2  201:12 206:3,4,15  206:23 210:12  227:22  <b>boost</b> 9:2  <b>booth</b> 153:3  <b>booths</b> 64:25  117:21  <b>bored</b> 49:20  <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23  88:25 174:4,6  183:12 184:1,8  185:4,8,21 204:12  204:19,25 212:22  213:6,19,22  <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4  <b>borrow</b> 223:5  <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13  <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8  74:23 118:5 206:9  215:18 224:8  <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8  140:19  <b>bounce</b> 107:14  <b>bouncing</b> 107:18  <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1  73:25 89:9 158:14  188:16 225:24  226:1  <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19  74:22 77:1 154:10  158:18  <b>Brad</b> 3:6  <b>brag</b> 124:9,12  <b>bragging</b> 172:21  <b>brazen</b> 164:16  <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20  165:23  <b>breath</b> 156:19  <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13  126:16,17,18,19  128:10,11  <b>Brian</b> 206:21</p>	<p><b>bridges</b> 223:6  <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22  109:3,7 110:8  <b>briefly</b> 110:25  111:7  <b>brilliant</b> 49:23  <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15  15:17 16:21 20:18  30:8 34:9 62:20  62:21 68:13,16  75:8 81:15 82:10  132:2 142:24  168:7 198:25  214:23  <b>brings</b> 160:18  <b>broadening</b> 132:23  <b>broadest</b> 132:17  <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13  <b>broke</b> 118:4  <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20  <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14  94:18 97:16 114:6  212:23 215:24  218:4  <b>Broward</b> 28:12  <b>browser</b> 76:23  <b>Bruce</b> 164:6  <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4  85:23 86:2  <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14  <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4  78:6 190:24  205:17  <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13  53:15 162:8 176:2  212:18 223:6  <b>building</b> 15:4  <b>buildings</b> 99:25  <b>built</b> 55:16  <b>bunch</b> 103:24  147:5 199:7  <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5  48:22 93:1 129:23  211:12  <b>buses</b> 90:7  <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5  <b>businesses</b> 98:7  <b>button</b> 73:23  <b>buttoned</b> 192:6  <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6</p>	<p>222:4,5  <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13  173:7 222:9  <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>C</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1  <b>calculated</b> 39:9  <b>calculating</b> 102:6  <b>calculators</b> 222:15  <b>calibrated</b> 107:10  108:7,12  <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24  29:11,22 30:14  114:15 139:2  182:20 193:22,24  <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17  30:17 42:2 64:20  82:8 99:10 110:9  111:1 150:22  <b>calling</b> 140:10  182:23  <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13  116:15,16,20  <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23  144:3 145:21  146:11  <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8  134:4  <b>campaigning</b> 129:9  <b>campaigns</b> 87:15  <b>campus</b> 95:4  <b>Candace</b> 96:12  <b>candidate</b> 33:16  65:7 89:11 106:5  106:7 107:5,6  135:18 182:16  202:9  <b>candidates</b> 23:13  40:20 41:11 89:8  <b>candidate's</b> 86:4  <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7  <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10  15:19 29:15 43:19  71:1 95:6 119:12  119:14 122:6  123:23 130:12  144:18 161:16,21  172:4 188:16  208:19 215:11</p>
---	--	---	---	---

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>



204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---



22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	---	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16



40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13	5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12	101:24 154:16 <b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13 <b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25	203:7 207:12 <b>quieter</b> 139:11 <b>quit</b> 140:10 <b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23 <b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12	<b>rarely</b> 222:4 <b>rat</b> 163:14 <b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7 <b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19 <b>ratings</b> 223:4 <b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17
<b>proponent</b> 91:5 <b>proportion</b> 73:1 <b>proposal</b> 160:21 <b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16 <b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4 <b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10 <b>Protecting</b> 150:22 <b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13 <b>protects</b> 15:22 <b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13 <b>prove</b> 13:6 <b>proved</b> 224:2 <b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9 <b>proves</b> 106:21 <b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2 <b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14 <b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20 <b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15 <b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15 <b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11 <b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22 <b>prudence</b> 222:1 <b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9	<b>publicity</b> 15:16 <b>publicly</b> 185:24 <b>public-input</b> 166:9 <b>pulled</b> 208:13 <b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20 <b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7 <b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5 <b>purchases</b> 222:23 <b>pure</b> 73:24 <b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18 <b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22 <b>pursuant</b> 202:10 <b>pursues</b> 133:16 <b>pursuit</b> 164:7 <b>push</b> 73:23 161:21 <b>pushed</b> 100:18 <b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18 <b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12	<b>QR</b> 160:7 <b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24 <b>quarter</b> 25:20 <b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18 <b>questioning</b> 103:2 <b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10 <b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14 <b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25	<b>R</b> <b>R</b> 2:1 230:1 <b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25 <b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23 <b>racial</b> 180:11 <b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11 <b>raise</b> 212:1 <b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13 <b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16 <b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11 <b>random</b> 33:2 56:10 <b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20 <b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12 <b>rank</b> 183:16 <b>rapid</b> 67:25 <b>rare</b> 30:7	<b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9 <b>reached</b> 194:9 <b>reaction</b> 107:17 <b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6 <b>readable</b> 147:4 <b>reader</b> 201:6 <b>reading</b> 107:22 <b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13 <b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15 <b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7 <b>realized</b> 28:17 <b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8	<b>success</b> 122:9	91:5 94:21 96:4	51:11,16,17,21,23
<b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4	<b>strange</b> 26:8	<b>successful</b> 99:7	97:5 100:1 105:4	52:3,5 53:22 56:7
3:22,25 13:20	<b>strengthened</b> 147:1	<b>successfully</b> 69:12	113:4 114:13	56:18 58:10,11
24:22 37:6,14	<b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20	101:8 214:10	118:12 119:8	62:1,9 63:15,23
51:13 108:22	<b>stretch</b> 97:2	<b>sucked</b> 98:15,18	120:7 122:2	66:23 67:10,16
113:3 134:2	<b>stretches</b> 178:16	<b>sucks</b> 164:11	124:17 134:25	68:20 69:4,5,21
139:24 150:15	<b>STRICKLAND</b>	<b>sudden</b> 165:10	164:17 167:25	70:17 71:25 72:5
181:17 193:21	171:14 205:25	<b>sue</b> 138:14	171:7,11 172:17	72:6,20 73:12,22
228:18	206:2	<b>sues</b> 33:18	178:8,22 181:11	73:25 74:2 79:1
<b>station</b> 75:23 78:7	<b>strips</b> 197:21	<b>sugar</b> 163:14	184:25 190:3	80:4,5,10 85:20
84:20 93:13	<b>strong</b> 92:6	<b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15	195:9 201:13,18	85:24 86:9,12,12
<b>stations</b> 84:18,19	<b>strongly</b> 62:21	50:9 151:4	205:14 209:19	86:21 87:7,8 89:2
84:24 205:10	151:4 161:18	<b>suggesting</b> 50:7	212:1,6 214:11	96:24 109:14,16
<b>statistical</b> 41:22	229:14	154:16	216:18 227:13	109:16 110:2
42:3	<b>structure</b> 196:5	<b>suggestion</b> 23:20	<b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24	111:17 112:8
<b>statistically-based</b>	<b>structured</b> 176:5	<b>suggestions</b> 8:25	<b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4	117:14 118:4,6,7
40:2 44:17	<b>struggle</b> 209:20	<b>suggests</b> 187:10	<b>surprise</b> 64:15	118:9,13 119:23
<b>statistically-valid</b>	211:24	<b>suit</b> 125:2,7	125:14 148:16	119:24 120:10
149:16	<b>stub</b> 215:2	<b>suits</b> 72:15	<b>surprised</b> 122:25	121:19 122:5,10
<b>statistical-based</b>	<b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3	<b>summary</b> 20:25	<b>surrounded</b> 193:23	127:16,16,22
41:19	222:11 223:23	107:24 148:22,22	<b>survey</b> 97:25	128:2,8 129:14
<b>statistician</b> 55:2	224:4	158:8 159:5	<b>surveyed</b> 9:18	130:15 132:22,23
<b>statistics</b> 44:2	<b>Student</b> 2:15	170:15	80:20	133:3,11,15
59:18 125:22	<b>students</b> 142:1	<b>summer</b> 127:5	<b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11	135:23 136:14,18
<b>statutory</b> 50:18	<b>studied</b> 66:13	<b>super</b> 197:1	153:11,19 157:11	140:7 141:1
<b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21	76:21	<b>superfluous</b> 164:3	157:14,15,23	142:12 145:16,19
114:23,24 202:4	<b>study</b> 30:24 54:25	<b>superintendent</b>	159:9	147:19 148:7
<b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18	63:8 65:3 66:3,4	182:19,23	<b>Susan's</b> 34:23	150:4,6,12,23
<b>staying</b> 216:18	66:14,15,17,21	<b>Superior</b> 111:3	154:1	151:5,13,17
<b>steal</b> 77:2	68:8 80:18 92:22	<b>supervisor</b> 134:9	<b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12	152:21 154:11,12
<b>step</b> 53:11 149:12	139:24 187:10	198:13	182:20	156:11 157:1,5
164:4	221:6	<b>supervisors</b> 128:6	<b>sustain</b> 173:11	158:13 160:11
<b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5	<b>studying</b> 75:7	<b>supply</b> 12:1	<b>swapping</b> 16:24	161:16,17,19,21
230:5,18,18	80:18	<b>support</b> 3:24 92:7	<b>swear</b> 117:15	161:25 162:1,3,6
<b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10	<b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8	135:23 143:9	<b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12	163:15 164:10
<b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10	106:25 126:1	<b>supportable</b> 129:25	<b>switched</b> 57:15	168:24 169:1,8,13
115:10 228:5	155:6 160:25	<b>supporting</b> 150:19	81:23 85:4	169:16,17,20
<b>STICKLAND</b>	<b>stuffing</b> 158:18	<b>suppose</b> 211:10	<b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5	170:7,23,23 171:3
172:22	<b>style</b> 72:15	<b>supposed</b> 72:18	167:5	171:4,5,11,25
<b>stone</b> 167:10	<b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1	160:9 213:6	<b>symptom</b> 82:17	172:5,7,11 173:4
228:24	214:15 215:9	<b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11	<b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12	173:4 177:9,12,14
<b>stools</b> 120:15	224:17	16:1 17:15 18:17	9:3,25 10:22,23	179:17,24 180:3
<b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10	<b>submitted</b> 47:16	19:13 21:15 29:3	11:10,11,13,25	180:18,20,25
155:10 188:19	124:19	29:4 33:12 34:3	12:5,13,17,18,22	183:25 184:21,22
<b>stopped</b> 211:22	<b>submitting</b> 122:4	34:11 35:4 39:3,8	13:4,7,18 14:11	185:15,16 189:11
<b>store</b> 162:22	<b>Subscription</b> 222:6	43:13 49:6,20	19:17 20:3 23:22	189:24 190:3,7,25
<b>stored</b> 27:14,22	<b>subset</b> 38:17	50:22 51:1 58:19	23:23 27:13 32:1	191:1,4,6,15,22
<b>stores</b> 135:5	<b>substitute</b> 133:4	62:4 69:23 70:13	34:12 35:6 36:18	192:15 193:9,15
<b>stories</b> 186:5	<b>subtle</b> 188:3	73:2 74:9 75:14	37:21 38:22,25	193:20 194:24
<b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>subtract</b> 146:10	79:9 85:1 89:17	49:7,10 50:23	195:1,5,15,18



196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

**VVPAT 30:14****W**

**wait** 4:11 107:25  
 151:15 176:22  
 209:18  
**waited** 18:10  
**waiting** 9:17  
 176:19  
**walk** 4:22 106:14  
 153:2 199:8,19  
**walked** 98:14  
**walks** 70:14  
**wane** 105:24  
**want** 6:15 7:11,25  
 8:8,12 10:5,16,21  
 12:8,11 14:10  
 15:19 16:25 19:10  
 21:6,7,14,15  
 25:12 29:1,4,9  
 31:23 32:17 34:8  
 37:23 39:8 45:1  
 49:11 50:22,22  
 54:11 58:2 69:24  
 74:25 76:3 79:22  
 81:15 84:14,25  
 87:20 92:19 95:25  
 97:7 109:3,9,13  
 109:22 110:7  
 111:7,25 114:18  
 115:3 117:23  
 122:13 123:8,24  
 124:9 128:3,16  
 129:6,12 134:19  
 136:2,14 137:6  
 139:1 141:17  
 142:25 150:10,24  
 152:11,12 154:1  
 155:11 156:20  
 160:24 161:13  
 162:1 164:14,24  
 166:13,13,15,16  
 166:18,23 167:25  
 175:14,14 177:21  
 179:11,11 182:15  
 184:17,25 185:1  
 186:12 188:5,15  
 188:20,22 189:6,8  
 202:6 205:2,11,14  
 210:15 212:15

220:22 221:3,11  
 221:11 223:23  
 226:1 228:7 229:6  
**wanted** 19:15 20:2  
 34:24 35:4 57:4  
 62:20 63:15,17  
 68:16 76:1,4  
 83:12 87:25 89:11  
 90:15 94:12  
 102:25 110:7  
 120:10 127:6  
 152:24 162:4  
 178:22 193:8  
 211:19,20 226:24  
**wanting** 211:22  
**wants** 114:8  
**War** 144:4  
**warranty** 93:24  
**wasn't** 67:21,22  
 108:12  
**wasted** 31:21 35:12  
 35:17  
**watch** 63:9 66:6  
 185:25  
**watchdog** 212:6  
**watched** 208:11  
**watcher** 129:2  
**watchers** 116:17  
 195:16,17  
**watching** 17:10  
 142:25  
**way** 5:7 13:5 14:19  
 16:1 26:6,12,14  
 41:15 42:21 44:15  
 53:13,15 63:17  
 66:16 72:23,24,25  
 84:16 86:5 104:6  
 109:10 115:19,20  
 120:9 121:22,23  
 121:25 122:1  
 125:4,5 134:1  
 136:15,19,25  
 140:4 143:3,24  
 146:20 148:17  
 152:24 155:13  
 157:2 161:23  
 165:18 168:21  
 173:17 178:10  
 184:24 194:19  
 195:16 203:10

209:10 215:3  
 216:10 219:6,14  
 223:24 224:23  
 225:9  
**ways** 102:16 129:25  
 194:10 196:11  
 212:18 225:10,11  
**wayside** 144:11  
**wealthy** 93:16  
**wearing** 107:22  
**weather** 82:25  
**week** 3:21 97:8,15  
 98:24 105:17,18  
 167:8 191:21  
 208:12 228:22,22  
 228:23  
**weekend** 176:2  
**weeks** 167:7,8  
 175:7,23  
**weigh** 58:10 209:20  
**Weir** 122:16,18,21  
**weird** 86:8  
**Welch** 84:10,11,14  
 84:24 176:7 226:5  
**welcome** 2:2 3:21  
 60:11 113:6 116:2  
 121:2 122:19  
 124:6 126:12  
 134:6 137:13,25  
 141:11 143:22  
 161:7 167:19  
**welcomed** 91:24  
**well-designed**  
 125:8  
**well-funded** 192:7  
**well-intended** 5:19  
**well-to-do** 93:17  
**went** 12:14 18:11  
 19:20,22 66:15,17  
 70:6 75:13 79:19  
 89:4,18,21 97:25  
 98:13 99:22,23  
 100:2 101:10  
 102:10 104:19  
 108:23 154:25  
 156:24 211:19  
 212:23 213:10  
**weren't** 104:13  
 117:13  
**we'll** 7:1 9:1 60:8

96:11  
**we're** 3:5 178:20  
**we've** 5:16 76:21  
 169:4 189:18  
**we'd** 20:20 31:23  
 67:25 76:2 96:2  
 116:3 119:6  
 126:15 128:25  
 147:25 151:23  
 153:12,23 174:13  
 223:12  
**we'll** 6:24 7:2,5,8  
 7:20 9:3 10:4  
 16:23 21:22 37:5  
 37:9 38:2 45:7,18  
 95:19 109:17,17  
 132:1,1 150:1  
 165:25 166:1  
 167:7 179:21  
 188:21 228:23  
**we're** 3:5 5:7 9:17  
 12:9 14:20,21  
 15:25 20:3 23:16  
 25:16 27:19 30:10  
 34:12 37:8 41:17  
 48:9,15 54:3  
 55:13 58:11 61:15  
 75:18 93:7 95:22  
 111:24 114:3,10  
 114:10,14,23,25  
 115:6 130:5,5,6  
 130:13 134:24,24  
 135:4 138:25  
 167:4,9 173:6  
 176:18,19 177:1  
 178:22 179:6,21  
 180:3 181:8,8  
 184:9 185:1 186:8  
 191:14,18,24  
 192:4,7,8,8  
 193:14 195:13,22  
 208:7 209:23  
 210:18 214:12,15  
 216:13,18,19,22  
 218:11 219:10,17  
 220:9,11,12,18  
 222:12 223:22  
 224:4,5 225:7  
 229:10  
**we've** 15:2 17:21

19:10 34:15,21  
 35:20 58:10 59:6  
 76:11 136:7  
 146:25 147:1  
 156:11 158:16,17  
 168:24 173:12  
 179:15,16 180:22  
 202:25 206:7  
 207:17 210:10  
 214:1,5 216:8  
 225:6  
**whatnot** 52:7  
 190:22 210:12  
 223:6  
**whatsoever** 61:17  
 184:24 227:21  
**what's** 12:24 23:21  
 38:23 77:8 118:8  
 137:3 144:23,23  
 156:9 167:23  
 179:22 187:14  
 190:17 209:8  
 221:22  
**wheelchairs** 120:16  
**wheels** 64:5  
**white** 65:25 85:7  
 86:17  
**wholeheartedly**  
 173:15  
**wholesale** 221:4  
**who's** 48:20 114:17  
 202:8,20 220:10  
**wide** 65:16  
**wife** 6:8 71:7  
**willing** 117:15  
**win** 152:13 182:8  
**window** 76:23 81:4  
 142:20 175:7,17  
 192:2  
**winner** 46:21  
**winning** 182:11  
**wisely** 212:2,7  
**wished** 84:6  
**withdrawn** 230:9  
**witnessed** 24:14  
 82:19  
**witnesses** 117:16  
**WMAZ** 126:11  
**women** 127:7,8,9  
 127:10 192:9

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3	197:24 198:2,6,21	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	95:12 124:16	205:23,24 208:20	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15	171:8,8,12 200:2	209:5 220:2	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>02</b> 194:21
169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5	224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>1</b>
223:5	66:16	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13	53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	40:8 41:10 56:4
17:18 34:1,10	77:1 175:22	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	57:2 151:2 156:17
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	156:18 176:10
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worst</b> 161:2	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	182:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	42:4,5,13 55:24
104:6 113:2 116:8	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	84:19 125:16
124:22 126:22	58:7 59:11,12	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	147:9 206:14
131:7 133:19	163:14 193:4,4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	207:24 224:5
140:23 144:6,13	<b>wow</b> 217:16	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
174:25 175:2	125:24 145:22	19:11 29:15 42:14	157:23 165:2	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
178:24 191:5	151:8 161:4	55:24 63:20 64:17	172:21,21 186:25	165:5,21 198:20
192:5 199:8,25	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	68:8,13 69:2	193:23 194:10	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
202:21 203:14,19	<b>write</b> 89:8	74:18 79:19 93:18	200:7,21,24	141:4
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	127:2 136:4	212:11 228:6	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
212:15 222:8	<b>writing</b> 170:4	138:19 142:3,3	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
224:23	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6	147:9 154:5 156:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>114</b> 18:4
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5	150:18	156:11,11 158:2	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>12</b> 125:19
49:8 81:1 83:19	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17	158:17 165:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12th</b> 1:10
124:16,20,20	42:6,8 76:15	170:11 192:10	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
127:1 138:24	108:8 162:7	207:24 212:24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
173:10	187:15,15,16	213:25 218:23,24	140:1 154:14	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23	189:21 198:16	219:4,17,23	157:16 166:18	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
106:14 156:7	202:21 207:12	221:18,22 222:13	169:5 188:19	167:4
158:2 193:6 200:1	217:6,7,19	223:23,25 224:6	206:13 214:14	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
202:20	<b>X</b>	224:11	223:15	48:24 221:18
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
90:2,3,4,11,19,21	85:23 86:2,10	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7	51:16 109:19	163:4 222:9 224:4
100:1 101:25	93:13	200:9	111:19 165:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
104:22,22 117:2	<b>Y</b>	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5	206:5	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
169:10 191:9	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6	122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
193:1 194:5	9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	<b>Z</b>	218:23,24 219:17
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21	<b>zero</b> 12:16	219:23
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	219:23	<b>zone</b> 210:22	<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15		28:8,10,14
		145:15		<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---



---

**From:** Microsoft Outlook on behalf of STEVEN GREEN <gree806@bellsouth.net>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 4:04 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Cc:** sraygreen@bellsouth.net  
**Subject:** Fw: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** Fw: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*

Sender: [gree806@bellsouth.net](mailto:gree806@bellsouth.net)  
Subject: Fw: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
Message-Id: <[1034167106.9001122.1547067848872@mail.yahoo.com](mailto:1034167106.9001122.1547067848872@mail.yahoo.com)>  
Recipient: [jsimmons@sos.ga.gov](mailto:jsimmons@sos.ga.gov)

---

**From:** STEVEN GREEN <gree806@bellsouth.net>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 4:04 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Cc:** sraygreen@bellsouth.net  
**Subject:** Fw: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript (2).pdf; safecommissiontranscriptmini.pdf

\*\* Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe. \*\*

--- On Wed, 1/9/19, Patrick Stephens <[ptrckstephens1@gmail.com](mailto:ptrckstephens1@gmail.com)> wrote:

> From: Patrick Stephens <[ptrckstephens1@gmail.com](mailto:ptrckstephens1@gmail.com)>  
> Subject: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
> To: "Broce, Candice" <[CBroce@sos.ga.gov](mailto:CBroce@sos.ga.gov)>  
> Cc: "gree806" <[gree806@bellsouth.net](mailto:gree806@bellsouth.net)>  
> Date: Wednesday, January 9, 2019, 2:26 PM Hey, Candice!  
> I've attached the transcript to this E-mail. Please let me know that  
> you've received it all right.  
> Thanks,  
>  
> --  
> - Patrick A. Stephens, CCR  
> -  
>  
>

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,



1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1       Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2       staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3       on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4       talk a little better into it.

5       MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6       Check, check, testing, testing.

7       AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8       MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9       So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10      better?

11      AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12      MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13      AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14      AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15      MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17      While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18      I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19      faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20      phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21      We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22      Good to see you.

23      MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25      could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a dues-free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1           could supply an independent audit trail.

2           The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3           legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4           did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5           purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6           May 4th, 2002.

7           The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8           commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9           same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10          only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11          fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12          have that in your recommendations.

13          So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14          2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15          verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16          to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17          system today.

18          So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19          Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20          perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21          or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22          you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23          the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24          screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25          the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you



1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't



1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1        voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2        suggest that -- we think is important:

3            The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4        We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5        It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6        everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7        and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8        disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9        ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10       disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11       then their voter anonymity is better.

12           Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13       tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14       be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15       allowed in Georgia.

16           Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17       think is really important that we want the commission to  
18       consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19       a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20       tabulators.

21           So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22       counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23       better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24       information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25       fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers



1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but



1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1           MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14           But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19           MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21           MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say



1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.



1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13           We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18           We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1           going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2           The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3           votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4           refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5           the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6           whatever could happen.

7           They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8           machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9           needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10          the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11          paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12          Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13          The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14          surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15          surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16          came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17          and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18          of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19          optical-scan ballots.

20          At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21          a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22          because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23          would register in the whole county that night because,  
24          obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25          voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a



1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the



1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11                SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13                SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21                SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1           sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4           earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5           in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6           participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7           black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8           curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9           and why you think that occurred?

10          MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11          reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12          that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13          between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14          the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15          some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16          using optical-scan ballots.

17          We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18          look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19          just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20          didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21          using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22          optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23          that bubble or mark the X.

24          We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25          I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?



1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.



1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd love to hear from you.

MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris. We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic. Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

MS. BROCHE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second, Chris.

MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the first meeting talking about our current voting system.

I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10       And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11       Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12       there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13       that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15       -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16       problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17       but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19       heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20       o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21       to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22       of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23       working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24       it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25       poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --



1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2           through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3           deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4           think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5           continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6           litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8           give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9           election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10          -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11          Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12          use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13          lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15          Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16          in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17          for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19          the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20          plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21          goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22          pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23          rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25          briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant



1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3           MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5           MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8           MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13          MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14          AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16          MS. NELSON: This one?

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19          MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22                So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these



1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it



1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1        want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2        to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3        right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4        with 400 million dollars in debt.

5                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6        appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7        Marilyn, good to have you today.

8                (Alarm chiming.)

9                MS. MARKS: Already?

10               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11               MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13               MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15        tell us where you live.

16               MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17        -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18        I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20        which county you live in.

21               MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23               MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24        time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25        voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1       lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2       generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3       for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4       a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5       in my hometown of Atlanta.

6               The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7       dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8       technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9       to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10      should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11      so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12      and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13             A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14      combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15      auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16      and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17             This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18      of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19      Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20      given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21      legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22      federal and state elections.

23             Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24      headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25      also watching us. They want to know that our state's



1       infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2       citizenry is fair and just.

3             Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4       art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5       continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6       voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7       importance of the task ahead of you.

8             Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9       foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10      would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11      confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12      values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13      elect our own leaders.

14            And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15      road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16      all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17      spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18      equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19      trial of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20      of their votes. Thank you.

21            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22      appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23      Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24      way?

25            MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14          Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21          MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic



1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1 goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2 that's at stake.

3 As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4 and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5 didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6 involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7 will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8 afraid their vote will not count.

9 If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10 you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11 goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12 anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13 handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14 go. Thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16 Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17 MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19 MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20 allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21 work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22 of Georgia.

23 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24 MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25 voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with



1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.

1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of



1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5           And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10          And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17          So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21          The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.



1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2           possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3           audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4           elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5           And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6           audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8           -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9           the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10          auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11          want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12          having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13          to keep that in mind.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15          MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16          I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17          verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18          important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19          at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20          use the phrase security and inclusion.

21          And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22          discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23          the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24          a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25          of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.



1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22               important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23               talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24               systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should



1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?



1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to



1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --



1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064



A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10
<b>C</b>				
<b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11				

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25



<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--



133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
<b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	<b>P</b> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	<b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	58:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>



54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13	5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12	101:24 154:16 <b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13 <b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25	203:7 207:12 <b>quieter</b> 139:11 <b>quit</b> 140:10 <b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23 <b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12	<b>rarely</b> 222:4 <b>rat</b> 163:14 <b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7 <b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19 <b>ratings</b> 223:4 <b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17
<b>proponent</b> 91:5 <b>proportion</b> 73:1 <b>proposal</b> 160:21 <b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16 <b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4 <b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10 <b>Protecting</b> 150:22 <b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13 <b>protects</b> 15:22 <b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13 <b>prove</b> 13:6 <b>proved</b> 224:2 <b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9 <b>proves</b> 106:21 <b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2 <b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14 <b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20 <b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15 <b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15 <b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11 <b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22 <b>prudence</b> 222:1 <b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9	<b>publicity</b> 15:16 <b>publicly</b> 185:24 <b>public-input</b> 166:9 <b>pulled</b> 208:13 <b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20 <b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7 <b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5 <b>purchases</b> 222:23 <b>pure</b> 73:24 <b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18 <b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22 <b>pursuant</b> 202:10 <b>pursues</b> 133:16 <b>pursuit</b> 164:7 <b>push</b> 73:23 161:21 <b>pushed</b> 100:18 <b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18 <b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12	<b>QR</b> 160:7 <b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24 <b>quarter</b> 25:20 <b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18 <b>questioning</b> 103:2 <b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10 <b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14 <b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25	<b>R</b> <b>R</b> 2:1 230:1 <b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25 <b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23 <b>racial</b> 180:11 <b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11 <b>raise</b> 212:1 <b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13 <b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16 <b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11 <b>random</b> 33:2 56:10 <b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20 <b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12 <b>rank</b> 183:16 <b>rapid</b> 67:25 <b>rare</b> 30:7	<b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9 <b>reached</b> 194:9 <b>reaction</b> 107:17 <b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6 <b>readable</b> 147:4 <b>reader</b> 201:6 <b>reading</b> 107:22 <b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13 <b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15 <b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7 <b>realized</b> 28:17 <b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24  <b>S</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---



<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8	<b>success</b> 122:9	91:5 94:21 96:4	51:11,16,17,21,23
<b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4	<b>strange</b> 26:8	<b>successful</b> 99:7	97:5 100:1 105:4	52:3,5 53:22 56:7
3:22,25 13:20	<b>strengthened</b> 147:1	<b>successfully</b> 69:12	113:4 114:13	56:18 58:10,11
24:22 37:6,14	<b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20	101:8 214:10	118:12 119:8	62:1,9 63:15,23
51:13 108:22	<b>stretch</b> 97:2	<b>sucked</b> 98:15,18	120:7 122:2	66:23 67:10,16
113:3 134:2	<b>stretches</b> 178:16	<b>sucks</b> 164:11	124:17 134:25	68:20 69:4,5,21
139:24 150:15	<b>STRICKLAND</b>	<b>sudden</b> 165:10	164:17 167:25	70:17 71:25 72:5
181:17 193:21	171:14 205:25	<b>sue</b> 138:14	171:7,11 172:17	72:6,20 73:12,22
228:18	206:2	<b>sues</b> 33:18	178:8,22 181:11	73:25 74:2 79:1
<b>station</b> 75:23 78:7	<b>strips</b> 197:21	<b>sugar</b> 163:14	184:25 190:3	80:4,5,10 85:20
84:20 93:13	<b>strong</b> 92:6	<b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15	195:9 201:13,18	85:24 86:9,12,12
<b>stations</b> 84:18,19	<b>strongly</b> 62:21	50:9 151:4	205:14 209:19	86:21 87:7,8 89:2
84:24 205:10	151:4 161:18	<b>suggesting</b> 50:7	212:1,6 214:11	96:24 109:14,16
<b>statistical</b> 41:22	229:14	154:16	216:18 227:13	109:16 110:2
42:3	<b>structure</b> 196:5	<b>suggestion</b> 23:20	<b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24	111:17 112:8
<b>statistically-based</b>	<b>structured</b> 176:5	<b>suggestions</b> 8:25	<b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4	117:14 118:4,6,7
40:2 44:17	<b>struggle</b> 209:20	<b>suggests</b> 187:10	<b>surprise</b> 64:15	118:9,13 119:23
<b>statistically-valid</b>	211:24	<b>suit</b> 125:2,7	125:14 148:16	119:24 120:10
149:16	<b>stub</b> 215:2	<b>suits</b> 72:15	<b>surprised</b> 122:25	121:19 122:5,10
<b>statistical-based</b>	<b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3	<b>summary</b> 20:25	<b>surrounded</b> 193:23	127:16,16,22
41:19	222:11 223:23	107:24 148:22,22	<b>survey</b> 97:25	128:2,8 129:14
<b>statistician</b> 55:2	224:4	158:8 159:5	<b>surveyed</b> 9:18	130:15 132:22,23
<b>statistics</b> 44:2	<b>Student</b> 2:15	170:15	80:20	133:3,11,15
59:18 125:22	<b>students</b> 142:1	<b>summer</b> 127:5	<b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11	135:23 136:14,18
<b>statutory</b> 50:18	<b>studied</b> 66:13	<b>super</b> 197:1	153:11,19 157:11	140:7 141:1
<b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21	76:21	<b>superfluous</b> 164:3	157:14,15,23	142:12 145:16,19
114:23,24 202:4	<b>study</b> 30:24 54:25	<b>superintendent</b>	159:9	147:19 148:7
<b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18	63:8 65:3 66:3,4	182:19,23	<b>Susan's</b> 34:23	150:4,6,12,23
<b>staying</b> 216:18	66:14,15,17,21	<b>Superior</b> 111:3	154:1	151:5,13,17
<b>steal</b> 77:2	68:8 80:18 92:22	<b>supervisor</b> 134:9	<b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12	152:21 154:11,12
<b>step</b> 53:11 149:12	139:24 187:10	198:13	182:20	156:11 157:1,5
164:4	221:6	<b>supervisors</b> 128:6	<b>sustain</b> 173:11	158:13 160:11
<b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5	<b>studying</b> 75:7	<b>supply</b> 12:1	<b>swapping</b> 16:24	161:16,17,19,21
230:5,18,18	80:18	<b>support</b> 3:24 92:7	<b>swear</b> 117:15	161:25 162:1,3,6
<b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10	<b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8	135:23 143:9	<b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12	163:15 164:10
<b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10	106:25 126:1	<b>supportable</b> 129:25	<b>switched</b> 57:15	168:24 169:1,8,13
115:10 228:5	155:6 160:25	<b>supporting</b> 150:19	81:23 85:4	169:16,17,20
<b>STICKLAND</b>	<b>stuffing</b> 158:18	<b>suppose</b> 211:10	<b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5	170:7,23,23 171:3
172:22	<b>style</b> 72:15	<b>supposed</b> 72:18	167:5	171:4,5,11,25
<b>stone</b> 167:10	<b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1	160:9 213:6	<b>symptom</b> 82:17	172:5,7,11 173:4
228:24	214:15 215:9	<b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11	<b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12	173:4 177:9,12,14
<b>stools</b> 120:15	224:17	16:1 17:15 18:17	9:3,25 10:22,23	179:17,24 180:3
<b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10	<b>submitted</b> 47:16	19:13 21:15 29:3	11:10,11,13,25	180:18,20,25
155:10 188:19	124:19	29:4 33:12 34:3	12:5,13,17,18,22	183:25 184:21,22
<b>stopped</b> 211:22	<b>submitting</b> 122:4	34:11 35:4 39:3,8	13:4,7,18 14:11	185:15,16 189:11
<b>store</b> 162:22	<b>Subscription</b> 222:6	43:13 49:6,20	19:17 20:3 23:22	189:24 190:3,7,25
<b>stored</b> 27:14,22	<b>subset</b> 38:17	50:22 51:1 58:19	23:23 27:13 32:1	191:1,4,6,15,22
<b>stores</b> 135:5	<b>substitute</b> 133:4	62:4 69:23 70:13	34:12 35:6 36:18	192:15 193:9,15
<b>stories</b> 186:5	<b>subtle</b> 188:3	73:2 74:9 75:14	37:21 38:22,25	193:20 194:24
<b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>subtract</b> 146:10	79:9 85:1 89:17	49:7,10 50:23	195:1,5,15,18

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	--	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>well-designed</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>well-funded</b> 192:7	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>well-intended</b> 5:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>well-to-do</b> 93:17	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winner</b> 46:21
	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winning</b> 182:11
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wisely</b> 212:2,7
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wished</b> 84:6
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>withdrawn</b> 230:9
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7 200:18 205:10	159:16,18 160:1 174:20 179:15	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17 194:1,23 197:8,23	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	<b>workings</b> 229:16	197:24 198:2,6,21 205:23,24 208:20	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5 38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17 184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	209:5 220:2 224:15 228:14	40:24 42:9 43:9 46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	107:9,9 108:3,6 114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4 223:5	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	53:5 61:12,13 66:14 77:25 88:7	121:9 122:14,20 123:22 125:4,5	<b>0</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	88:20 90:5 97:1 97:12 99:7 103:22	126:6,14 128:25 132:12 134:7,21	<b>02</b> 194:21
36:1 38:1 43:18 52:22 53:13,15	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	104:3 113:14 124:15 129:2,9	135:15 136:15,25 137:14,25 139:10	<b>1</b>
55:3,3 56:12 58:8 71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worst</b> 161:2	138:3 152:1 167:2 172:15 173:13,13	141:15 144:1 146:17 147:25	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
104:6 113:2 116:8 124:22 126:22	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	191:16 209:18 213:23	150:1 151:23 153:12,23 155:9	40:8 41:10 56:4
131:7 133:19 140:23 144:6,13	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3 157:23 165:2	57:2 151:2 156:17
155:21 170:15 174:25 175:2	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	55:24 63:20 64:17 68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25 193:23 194:10	156:18 176:10
178:24 191:5 192:5 199:8,25	163:14 193:4,4	74:18 79:19 93:18 127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24 212:11 228:6	182:17
202:21 203:14,19 205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:19 142:3,3 147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14 53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
212:15 222:8 224:23	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	156:11,11 158:2 158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13 95:8 117:22	42:4,5,13 55:24
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	151:8 161:4	170:11 192:10 207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16 129:17 131:8	84:19 125:16
124:16,20,20 127:1 138:24	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:25 218:23,24 219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14 157:16 166:18	147:9 206:14
173:10	<b>write</b> 89:8	221:18,22 222:13 223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19 206:13 214:14	207:24 224:5
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	224:11	223:15	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
158:2 193:6 200:1 202:20	<b>writing</b> 170:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	111:19 165:6 206:5	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
100:1 101:25 104:22,22 117:2	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	165:5,21 198:20
169:10 191:9 193:1 194:5	108:8 162:7 187:15,15,16	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
201:14 214:17 215:11 226:14	189:21 198:16 202:21 207:12	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>zone</b> 210:22	141:4
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24	217:6,7,19	<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15		<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
	<b>X</b>			<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10 93:13			<b>114</b> 18:4
	<b>Y</b>			<b>12</b> 125:19
	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9 26:11 28:9,14 53:6 54:9 61:20			<b>12th</b> 1:10



<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

## SECURE, ACCESSIBLE &amp; FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

## STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

## TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

-	(Interjection of thought for clarification)
--	(Interruption of thought)
...	(Trailing off or did not complete thought)
(ph)	(Phonetically)
[sic]	(In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity, transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it has been throughout my career in public service.

Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I spent time in several different areas of state government, including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the Department of Human Services.

Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of

Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

(Collective Pledge.)

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

group has already heard from several different groups, and stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the important discussion about our state's next voting system.

We're -- we're joined here today by Representative Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature and Governor-elect Kemp.

Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all of the attendees here.

Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of State's office as we began our transition planning. I realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very grateful for the support you've given us.

As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

focal point for elections because the priceless franchise to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections throughout every aspect of the election process.

Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and, today, it is imperative we complete our research for security and technology for the next decade.

I have said that we need the most secure, updated voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a system that moves voters faster through the line so we can reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our next-generation voting machines.

Our next legislative session begins on January 14th and I know that the General Assembly and our department is looking forward to the completion and recommendations from this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank you for offering yourself for service in this critical and noble effort.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda for today.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary, and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to talk about something very important to Georgia; that is, voting in our state.

We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be able to help you out.

As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had very good participation from the public at our prior meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you for being here.

As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have time limits for our presentations today and we will gently initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.  
17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.  
21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

could supply an independent audit trail.

The law -- in order to get the machines in, the legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal did not take effect until after the contract was -- was purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on May 4th, 2002.

The reason that I bring this to the attention of the commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have -- have that in your recommendations.

So when that new system was implemented back then in 2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable system today.

So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system? Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well, you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot screen that you see may not be what's happening on the -- the inside of the machine.

trust in Georgia voting.

So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go through to do a big project like this.

And, typically, what you do is you analyze your current system for improvement opportunities, you define the new system requirements and then evaluate the alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is to help you identify the current system improvement opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for defining your objectives and requirements.

Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great protection for Georgia voters.

But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

As election officials, many of you know when -- there are no audit procedures in place today to audit their elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results, you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the correct results that the system told you.

And then lastly, but not least, is the recount situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvas votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable system.

So that's the election-integrity advocates' perspective, but what about the state's perspective? We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The -- the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that -- of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2 So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3 Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4 ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5 elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6 getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7 device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8 So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9 and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10 server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11 by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12 have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13 happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14 Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15 great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16 lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17 So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18 commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19 can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20 you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21 The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22 it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23 but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24 counties.

25 So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPL0ST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPL0ST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.  
25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really



1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1 either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2 MS. BAILEY: So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3 considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4 MR. FAVORITO: That's exactly right. There was no  
5 mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6 ballots cast in those races.

7 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you.

9 MS. ROSS: Can I get a point of clarification?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Just a point of clarification: For Bibb  
12 County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13 lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14 that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15 as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16 that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17 do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18 from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19 card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20 for.

21 MR. FAVORITO: So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22 the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23 itself.

24 MS. ROSS: They are on the voting unit, too.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1 that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2 nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3 machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4 non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5 A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6 which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7 very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8 have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9 commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10 ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11 recommendation.

12 So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13 systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14 replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15 that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16 those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17 well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18 electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19 really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20 cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21 -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22 The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23 DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24 Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25 University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6 Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14 And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24 So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

elections, it's going to require some additional work on the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be able to audit, recount and make sure that we have transparency in the election process.

This is going to be an increased burden on the county elections directors. It's going to require a little bit more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want to bring that to your attention because I think the Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county commissions in making sure that they understand this when we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement auditing, recounting and transparency.

So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've given you and see exactly what you really think we need to do and we think that you need to define the requirements, basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report. Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to release this until Friday because I wanted to get some feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

but you save all of this administrative work for the elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't have enough, then there's a big scramble.

So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections. Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know, any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with that ballot.

So we actually recommend that people vote by mail given the current -- the current situation with these machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of election is basically foolproof and no particular voting type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

the presentation and then I was going to make some adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared to talk about it in case there any questions.

And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be glad to take any other questions about the new system as well.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the preprinted ballots that are wasted --

MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used. Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much. We appreciate you being here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you. Thank you for having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see you today.

MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear me okay?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn. I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the honor of previously presenting to you on our first commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back. And the topic I'm going to talk about today is postelection audits.

Postelection audits are something that we currently don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we will be able to do. It's something that most states do, so it's something that you may want to include in the recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that later today and something for the legislature and our state

election board to really work with in the future.

So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your results using the same underlying data. So, in our world, the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're trying to independently re-create that tabulated results, looking back at the cast votes.

What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment and the procedures used to count the votes worked correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the election yielded the correct result.

What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a recount is, is when you count every single vote for a particular race. So when you recount a house district, you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full re-creation, you will know what the results is.

So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures worked.

So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

So the benefits of a audit are that you can find errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental errors, it can help you have data and information so that you can improve the process for future elections; you can iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits going to be done after an election, you know that they are going to dig in and review those results, look at the ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps build public confidence in the election and the outcome of an election.

So I'm going to describe the three main categories or types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What this means is there is a predetermined percentage of usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of the percentages that you would go back and review. The advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of precincts you would have to look at and that makes it easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a scope.

The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout, you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close the election is.

But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered percentage is being done by two states right now, and what that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how many precincts you will check based on how close the election is.

So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin, you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5 percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the election is.

And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and, at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1 audit.

2 So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3 a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4 time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5 percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6 that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7 catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8 the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9 you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10 and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11 is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12 So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13 statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14 years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15 journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16 elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17 they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18 There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19 Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20 audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21 smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22 able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23 To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24 of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25 comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1 it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2 make changes.

3 If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4 potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5 records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6 fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7 recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8 election you are auditing if you do it before  
9 certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10 it pre, some states do it after certification.

11 And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12 that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13 audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14 do you review the digital image of the paper?

15 The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16 you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17 they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18 single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19 technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20 of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21 they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22 pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23 So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24 we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25 ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2 for risk-limited audits.

3 So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4 know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5 verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6 confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7 any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8 worked correctly.

9 You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10 new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11 makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12 overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13 audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14 as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15 we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16 audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17 And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18 audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19 audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20 but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21 death from what I've talked about.

22 There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23 brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24 life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25 them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6 MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.  
9 And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16 MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18 MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1 which one's better?

2 MR. RAYBURN: So I think if we had a statistician to  
3 work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4 felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5 that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6 would have to review.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Lynn?

8 MS. BAILEY: Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Speaking  
9 off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10 we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11 that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12 we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13 audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14 precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15 precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16 will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17 done.

18 You know, there are important things going on in that  
19 three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20 looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21 example. So we do definitely need to look at that.

22 And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23 ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24 process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25 mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1 audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2 greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3 difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4 recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5 to recertify a result.

6 MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7 election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8 over. You see what I'm saying?

9 MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10 on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11 a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12 precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13 results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14 have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15 switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16 MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17 recount, not a do over, is my question.

18 MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19 and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20 would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21 going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22 new election.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24 the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25 ordered. Senator?



1 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6 MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23 MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3 MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8 Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10 MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12 PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16 MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19 MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22 MS. COX: That's right.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25 MS. COX: That's right.

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.  
24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3 MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5 MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9 MS. COX: That's right.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12 MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15 MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18 MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22 MS. COX: Exactly.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1 going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2 The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3 votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4 refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5 the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6 whatever could happen.

7 They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8 machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9 needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10 the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11 paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12 Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13 The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14 surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15 surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16 came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17 and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18 of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19 optical-scan ballots.

20 At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21 a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22 because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23 would register in the whole county that night because,  
24 obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25 voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7 I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13 We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.

14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18 We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate these lost votes and we took that original study -- which should be in the state archives -- we took that study to the legislature and said, We need to really do something on our watch before we have the next election cycle.

So that was when the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the commission, several others of you might have, but we had a combination, as your commission is composed, of local election officials and legislators that studied for a full year. We took the study we had done internally of what had happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in Georgia.

And it was a result of that study that led us into deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and to move, for the first time, into a system where every county would use the same voting equipment so that we could do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't even envision the things that are happening today in technology or the threats that are happening today to technology back in the day when we put this equipment in -- in place.

I think we also envisioned that there would be a continuous study of election equipment over the years and that there would be continuous need to purchase additional equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us to where we are today.

But one of the main -- a couple of the main points that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a decision for making a change today is to be mindful that, yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair; things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be replaced and upgraded.

So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

that the Secretary of State could do training for all county election officials and then to help the poll-worker training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis across the state, that the state would then, whatever equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the counties and, at least on the first round, make that purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got into the system we have now.

We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think -- my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that model.

We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the technology wasn't there at the time.

Honestly, I think that our commission thought back in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two, technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure voting system but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure but that also -- you understand the voter interface with technology.

We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000 presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill in DC of working with our congressional delegation and others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50 million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the equipment that we purchased.

In fact, the only money that the state ended up putting into the purchase was really the voter-education piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to make sure that voters are never turned away from voting because they don't want to show up in a polling place and be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.  
24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1 I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6 Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9 DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17 So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23 You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1 there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2 and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3 upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4 whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5 that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6 less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7 that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8 Michael?

9 MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10 when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11 Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12 elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13 time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14 purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15 was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16 at that time?

17 MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18 study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19 start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20 Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21 equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22 auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23 definition of auditing.

24 You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25 purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

The same thing with paper receipts from voting machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident prior to the new equipment being put in place where a county with an optical scan called us at one point and they had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the hairdryers --

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it helped. I mean --

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do, but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on election day and see some of the rural precincts and places where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is definitely something that we need to consider with -- with paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal, experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then, even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished and just loved, loved, the experience of having that independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was heard.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you again.

MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct, there's no way that we would be able to function with just one ballot printer. That would definitely create long lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a printer on each station. If you think about the concept of one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just created long lines.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of conducting state and federal elections on the county level, the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers, printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no funding from the state or federal government to our counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent statewide runoff.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the importance around access for individuals with disability and the ability to independently cast their vote and privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting process for people with disabilities?

MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they just didn't vote.

sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and -- and why you think that occurred?

MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes between majority-black and majority-white precincts within the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts using optical-scan ballots.

We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and look at the average age of voters, for example, because it just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were using standardized testing might not be familiar with an optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in that bubble or mark the X.

We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6 MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12 So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20 People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?



JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part of the training money was allocated to train poll workers, because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And -- and you need to realize these are temporary workers that only work two or three elections every other year.

And I remember there was money put regionally into the technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses and carried them and they were taught how to operate the equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters how to use the equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to underscore, just like many others have around the table, the importance of the educational component and my -- that comment is more related to the judge's comments about training poll workers.

Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it. Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

solutions that we were coming up with and, when we ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as the security piece. It's not one or the other and they -- they've got to be equally considered in your decision-making.

And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and to keep up with changes in technology and to help the counties.

We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just uncomfortable with the entire process.

So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all of us around the table could at least agree on that.

JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too proud to ask for help.

MS. BAILEY: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made and how can we learn from your experience?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with the legislature.

MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines that we experienced in this election cycle because counties -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think, understood we're probably heading into something new so they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying additional equipment.

But since the state moved into this arena, unified the state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to the counties so that we can keep up that level playing field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to buy new equipment in the years to come.

We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the state would really help voters everywhere.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2 State's office is always going to need that level of  
3 staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4 university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5 that is purchased new.

6 You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7 think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8 the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9 provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10 equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11 the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12 based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14 much.

15 MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17 MS. COX: Thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19 today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20 (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22 would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23 started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24 Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25 to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1 their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2 advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3 people vote in advanced voting.

4 By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5 were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6 advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7 advanced voting in this election.

8 We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9 election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10 to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11 litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12 to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13 citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14 essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15 that county election officials had been doing.

16 And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17 county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18 as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19 And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20 changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21 And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22 officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23 on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24 ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25 some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1 done in the past had been altered.

2 But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3 what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4 our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5 as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6 I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7 through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8 successfully at the county level.

9 On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10 And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11 Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12 there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13 that happened on election day.

14 You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15 -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16 problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17 but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18 We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19 heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20 o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21 to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22 of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23 working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24 it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25 poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1 what lines looked like throughout the state.

2 And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3 terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4 election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5 not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6 About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7 that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8 but in some locations.

9 Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10 said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11 voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12 about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13 2018.

14 We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15 longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16 gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17 did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18 about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19 again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20 to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21 about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22 and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23 There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24 look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25 dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10 We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15 Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19 In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2 Senator Jackson.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4 for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5 how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6 candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7 MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8 that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9 know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10 calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11 grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12 you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13 ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14 know, bounce around.

15 These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16 fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17 you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18 people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19 finger around.

20 It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21 screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22 spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23 glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24 always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25 show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1 We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7 The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14 That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18 Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24 The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1 this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2 state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3 the Secretary of State's office.

4 So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5 even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6 in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7 chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9 MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10 that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11 this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12 election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13 it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14 an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15 elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16 allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17 launch in municipal elections.

18 And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19 we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20 likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21 into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22 right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24 Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25 you do.

MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission members, we're now going to move to the portion of our agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right where you are, stand up.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing up, stay standing up.

Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you for that.

What I would ask of you now is, is to understand clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going to ask you to stick to that.

Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself. If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But, generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as well.

So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments, making their point but making it in such a way that it's not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so thank you for that in the past.

Is there anyone who does not understand the ground rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start going down the list, and thank you so much.

Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia. Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara, please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear from you.

MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party, county-party committees and election officials. I also oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching program.

Over the course of this election season, our voter-protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November 6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and hundreds more during the early voting periods.

Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a voter would make a selection only to have the machine reflect a different result.

In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There was one voter who reported having to change her vote five times before it correctly reflected her choice. In another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to three separate machines before they could find a machine that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

We also received multiple reports of races not appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

Problems weren't limited to the election machines. There were many problems with the registration system. We had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

We have other cases where voters found their registrations online, they had printed registration cards; they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the -- at the polling booths.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to research these problems. I would like to share them with each county as we go through so that we can look at them and figure out what happened and where the system broke down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and in the officials and the administration of the system.

What's critical now is that this body develop a set of standards against which the decisions that -- on a system will be made. You have to have standards that you establish here because if we don't set a baseline that includes making sure that the voters are able to create and confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these votes are auditable independently without any intervention by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply continue.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

MS. NELSON: Yes.

Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any central database.

So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little bit to the disabilities concerns.

I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where little people showed up to their polling places and were not given stools or chairs, left without casting their vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their access to cast their vote.

So, right now, we are already facing a lot of disability issues and, completely understandably, with handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

MS. NELSON: -- having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not with any particular organization. I really appreciate your time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

MS. NELSON: This one?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little closer.

MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned citizen and not with any particular organization and I appreciate your time.

So I am concerned particularly with any electronic system, as has been proven by experts that there's no system known out there right now that is completely secure from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name right?

MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again. I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from.

MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I spent the last several months working as a field organizer for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast. The trust in the election system has degraded significantly.

There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust, which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually made were registered in the way that they intended. And,



1 therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2 make sure that that happens.

3 They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4 they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5 the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6 audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7 restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8 consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9 critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10 system.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12 Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13 Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14 first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15 Blassingame?

16 Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17 pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18 MR. WEIR: Yep.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20 have you and please tell us where you're from.

21 MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22 just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23 is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24 learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25 I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4 MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10 MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13 MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1 Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7 My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11 The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18 Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23 In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1 this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2 citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3 better by one another.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5 today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6 Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7 Please tell us where you're from.

8 MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9 elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10 degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11 of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12 including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13 held my current position since 2007.

14 I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15 voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16 through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17 local jurisdictions.

18 We need to have meaningful audits before  
19 certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20 I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21 lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22 certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23 barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24 we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25 whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 was accurate.

2 So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3 paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4 marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5 it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6 what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7 is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8 evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9 receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10 any different. Thank you very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12 appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13 for coming today. Good to have you again.

14 MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16 from.

17 MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18 County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19 Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20 representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21 to address you guys.

22 The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23 that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24 and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25 alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 than you've had the time to go through yet.

2 What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3 is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4 elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5 going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6 Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7 verifiable system.

8 The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9 all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10 not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11 verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12 to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13 that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14 systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15 one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16 elections.

17 I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18 you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19 you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20 set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21 Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22 need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23 terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24 what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25 of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3 MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8 You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13 And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20 So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one, I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be negative one and subtract from your total.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann, thank you for coming today.

MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972 and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

hear from you.

MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to have their votes represent their intentions.

It is imperative that the new voting system that you recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their voices heard on election day. In our recent election, there were reports of problems with the DREs showing erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen technology these problems will persist. They can be avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise; right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented the rule of the voter.

I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking -- marking devices that you are considering will produce a paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and recorded.

-- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded scanners that can handle the humidity.

And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there. Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

But -- and one other thing that I don't think anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today, and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the separate verification step and issues of human limitations become moot.

Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid audit is the best available method for conducting elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to heart the recommendations of the experts.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration and service to the voters of Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John, good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1 you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2 MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3 Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4 restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5 and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6 the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7 officials since that time despite that information being  
8 thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9 The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10 and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11 of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12 They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13 point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14 University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15 State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16 statewide.

17 So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18 professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19 supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21 this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22 Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23 the technology involved in our election system.

24 And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25 Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb



County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time since she offered?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the news business a few years back after a long career both in national news and state-local news in another part of the country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot boxes we were talking about.

So I understand that any system can be hacked, any system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials here, but you've all heard about it.

And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle, suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly. We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

I love the idea that we can print them on demand. That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

-- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and, having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a pension for accurate, reliable data.

And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will tell you that my experience since we have had electronic voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've never quite trusted it.

We've been using that system for years and years and lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of trust.

Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know, that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

I think what I want to see is that everyone gets -- everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever they voted for, that they can have documentation that their vote went through as they intended and that those votes can be audited.

goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy that's at stake.

As been said many times today -- and I've heard over and over since I got involved with this issue, which I didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote will not count. Think about that. American citizens are afraid their vote will not count.

If you're afraid your vote's not going to count, you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to go. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people of Georgia.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this electronic system that we have, remember the definition of insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5 now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the past.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as good as I used to be.

MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission for allowing us to speak here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again, where you're from, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we just listen to the IT experts?

And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns; we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled, Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system, but also dropped into a safe box.

And not much has been said about what happens to these paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years, about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate that problem. These would be attached to the optical scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure place. So I think that solves that one problem.

We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying -- verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an average of 3.9 seconds.

When you're given a summary that you have to check, human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best advice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.  
Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a second now. T-H-R --

MS. THROOP: Yeah.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- 0-0-P.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go. Throop. All right.

MS. THROOP: Good.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you, Liz.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of good presentations this morning and have had a lot of good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I think it's important to be very specific with these things.

So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be signifying something as simple as the precinct number could introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for that reason, I think it's very important that we get proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there are no barcodes on the ballots.

It's been a little while since I've looked at those proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent set of presentations we heard today should have happened at the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what those ballots are going to look like.

And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs, they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

are the focus of national press attention as one of the worst states for voting integrity.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and allow you to wrap up, Liz.

MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay. Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to have you.

MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing really quickly.

The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next session or something because you know how hard that is, that things don't get done that way.

And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal -- detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1 that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2 accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3 the legislature decides on the system.

4 And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5 the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6 aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7 guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8 got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9 confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11 George Ballbona (ph)?

12 MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14 George.

15 MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17 for being here today.

18 MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19 live in Cobb County.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21 MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22 those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23 but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24 anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25 something costs.

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsnor? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1 No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.  
3 Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6 This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12 A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17 Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24 However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2 Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3 scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4 Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5 know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6 y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7 to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8 boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9 all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10 things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11 it needs upgrading.

12 But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13 They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14 update your thing and it is now your financial  
15 responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16 So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17 came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18 way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19 tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20 trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21 saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23 members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24 about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25 we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.  
2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1 having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2 session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3 as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4 until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5 all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6 is inaugurated.

7 And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8 two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9 in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10 meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11 would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12 There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13 and can accommodate people this size.

14 Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15 period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16 every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17 Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18 agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19 certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20 However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21 throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22 you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23 move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24 discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25 would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?  
21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 comments from the commission? Lynn?

2 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. Lynn Bailey out  
3 of Richmond County. I agree with what I've heard. I think  
4 Georgia does need a new system. The system that we have  
5 now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6 As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7 replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8 previously-owned units in other states and other  
9 jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10 it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11 sustain or continue.

12 Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13 over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14 voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15 concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16 good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17 way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18 right path.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other comments?  
20 Senator?

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Certainly.

23 SENATOR JACKSON: -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24 -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25 think an audit should be pre-certified. I think that the

1 audit should be done before we certify the general  
2 election.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4 MS. BOREN: Concur.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6 MS. BOREN: We agree.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8 -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9 counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10 the date you certify on?

11 Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12 con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13 great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14 implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15 said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16 fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17 The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18 that certification and how much?

19 MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23 MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24 November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25 provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2 The audit would also be important work not to be  
3 rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4 time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5 that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6 the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7 November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8 tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9 consideration.

10 I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11 I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12 audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13 they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14 you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15 that path.

16 But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17 three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18 in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19 any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20 it.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22 three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23 were going to say weeks.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25 MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1 because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2 type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3 system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4 types of lawsuits.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6 generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7 access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8 people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9 not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10 MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11 standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12 groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13 you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14 why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15 impact on certain voters versus others.

16 And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17 we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18 secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19 certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20 best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21 need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22 And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23 any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24 NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25 that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1 Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7 With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15 MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21 And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1 So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2 some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3 is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4 Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5 there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6 for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7 that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8 we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9 upon us.

10 You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11 sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12 actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13 there's still going to be a process for an election  
14 contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15 dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16 contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17 state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18 an election-contest proceeding.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20 sir, Michael?

21 MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22 comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23 things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24 things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25 which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to order a deeper-dive audit.

But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep an audit as something that's relatively close.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by 73 percent, there's a difference --

MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know, 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

And, you know, there may be some thought that we need to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion about the superintendent calling on particular races or whatever where they've -- where there could be a discrepancy or something.

MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.  
(Crosstalk.)

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

MS. BOREN: The election.

JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.  
(Crosstalk.)

DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or precertification.

COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the audit.

DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment, that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no -- there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page; right?

Because, when you go back to the system, if everything is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't -- won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously, maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state. You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections, the charter is what governs whether there has to be a runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review our laws on -- on runoffs.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those other solutions.

DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the system --

understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a paper trail.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us are talking about with the pre-audit --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the field.

DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. BOREN: We test everything.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is



1 your point.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3 everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4 shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5 stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6 wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7 the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8 we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11 Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12 ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13 ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14 a piece of paper; correct?

15 DR. LEE: Yes.

16 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17 the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18 they voted --

19 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21 auditable. No?

22 DR. LEE: So --

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24 papers --

25 DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.  
19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?  
15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1 And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2 month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3 be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4 officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5 the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6 component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7 But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8 need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9 fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10 has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11 very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12 other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13 groups out there that are ready to help.

14 I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15 implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16 completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17 funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18 report that we come up with.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21 MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22 important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23 talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24 systems are different all over the place.

25 So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7 But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18 If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

1 hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team  
4 counting ballots and then let the other team count behind  
5 them and see if the numbers were the same.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't  
7 realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in  
8 Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that  
9 been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they  
13 contract with me to be the supervisor over their old  
14 equipment.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if  
16 something goes wrong?

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only  
20 have 100 registered voters each.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

22 JUDGE MCCOY: So...

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one  
24 of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll  
25 bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2 that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3 courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4 in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5 school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6 you are given the correct ballot.

7 That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8 card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9 only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10 machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11 much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13 we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14 it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15 now are a little dated -- are they?

16 MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19 frankly. They're just a --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22 about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23 beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24 that what you're talking about?

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1 there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2 that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3 They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4 and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6 MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7 required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8 who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9 there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10 pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11 -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12 express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13 that.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16 system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17 voter --

18 MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20 human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21 doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22 ballot.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24 MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25 that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1 who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2 it's a state-issued ID card.

3 I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4 disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5 go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6 think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7 a ID card.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.  
9 (Crosstalk.)

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11 SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12 MS. BOREN: Yes.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14 to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15 card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16 SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18 SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19 MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20 that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21 cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22 of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23 they can also get that one free.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25 MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1 SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5 DR. LEE: So --

6 JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7 DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14 DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1 accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2 micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3 always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4 important part. Judge?

5 JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6 and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7 records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8 -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9 look at, to model.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11 on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12 paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13 us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14 aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15 that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16 forward, deal with other things.

17 Are there other things in our election process that  
18 we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19 major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20 about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21 DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22 of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23 -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25 in the legislature if you did that.

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.  
21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2 ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3 so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4 republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6 MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7 ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8 since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9 So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10 went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11 again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12 -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13 So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14 in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15 ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16 expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17 on-demand component --

18 JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19 MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21 the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22 MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23 \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24 We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25 on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1 ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2 almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3 or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4 voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5 I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6 to.

7 Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8 card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9 election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10 even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11 workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12 problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13 where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14 mistake like that, it's still made.

15 And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16 pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17 differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18 that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19 mistakes.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21 heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22 provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23 and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24 all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25 and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1 And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2 done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3 forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4 something that -- that we should -- we should think about.  
5 Madam Secretary?

6 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7 discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8 equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9 issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10 way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11 code and SEB procedures and things.

12 So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13 we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14 also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15 necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16 you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17 issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18 -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19 laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20 things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21 it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22 that we're looking at everything.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24 JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25 There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.



JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be hand-marked paper ballots?

Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly that have participated and -- has been on that -- that central issue that affects many of the other questions that we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next session? How long do we envision using the system that we decide upon?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question. I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have, that means a child born two years from now will be voting on a system that we decide on today.

And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single child -- so we're talking about children. Children today will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or another. I just think we need to consider that if this system is going to last as long as the last system has lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our future because the majority of the voters, if this system lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote very differently, take tests very differently, do things very differently than most of the people in this room.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for -- we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on paper, I would not trust that system.

So I think we're going to get -- there's always going to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is -- or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so that's why there's an important balance here.

And I do think, you know, between the -- the administration of the election, for election officials, but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know, at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending, but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's not going to be a perfect system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean, the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know, is the best available approach right now.

And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive -- to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I don't think we should have to find a solution and then use it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer technologies.

I really think that we should -- we should have this ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's available, and what has been working for us, and what needs to be improved and then have a new round of selection of new systems.

1 So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2 that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3 in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4 in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5 actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6 on leasing; right? Subscription.

7 I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8 you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9 instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10 dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11 are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12 Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13 bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14 later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15 change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16 know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17 little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18 comment.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20 thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21 anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22 flexibility to be flexible.

23 And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24 at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25 the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?  
4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2 level.

3 But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4 involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5 in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6 money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7 taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8 the best practices of bonding.

9 And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10 oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11 lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12 we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13 agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14 leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15 you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16 DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17 is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18 then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19 safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20 -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21 right?

22 You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23 to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24 solution possible because there's no way out.

25 You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1 that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2 that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3 that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5 MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6 well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7 marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8 Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9 elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10 city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11 the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12 And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13 from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14 workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15 loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16 we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17 ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18 marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19 marking system.

20 It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21 the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22 was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23 race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24 wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25 could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1 The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2 -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3 that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4 transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5 used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6 read, as well as a regular voter.

7 So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8 like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9 it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10 that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11 on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12 them.

13 I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14 that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15 that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16 early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17 results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18 come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19 we felt comfortable with the results.

20 We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21 system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22 Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23 still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24 Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25 those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2 accommodate this.

3 The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4 process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5 Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6 gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7 thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8 the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9 make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10 decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11 Georgia.

12 Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13 come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14 I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15 you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16 workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17 we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18 for caring enough to be here today.

19 Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20 you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21 again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January \_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens  
PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR  
CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <hr/> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	---



<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20
<b>clarifying</b> 24:11	<b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22		<b>commissioner's</b> 23:12	<b>compliance</b> 2:11
<b>clarity</b> 132:18	<b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23	<b>commencing</b> 1:9	<b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19	<b>compliant</b> 216:18
<b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24	<b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7	<b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18	<b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18	<b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3
<b>clean</b> 4:2	<b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13		<b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12	<b>Complies</b> 114:20
<b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3	<b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24		<b>commitment</b> 93:20	<b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17
<b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4	<b>color-coded</b> 215:10		<b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19	<b>components</b> 191:13
<b>clever</b> 16:12	<b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14	<b>commenters</b> 160:4	<b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6	<b>composed</b> 66:12
<b>clicked</b> 120:4	<b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13	<b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5	<b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15	<b>comprehensive</b> 169:9
<b>climate</b> 81:19		<b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8	<b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4	<b>compromise</b> 15:1
<b>climates</b> 82:17			<b>communicated</b> 101:3	<b>compromised</b> 15:10
<b>clock</b> 98:15,16			<b>communities</b> 130:18	<b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10
<b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5	<b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8		<b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12	<b>computerized</b> 165:3
<b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17	<b>comfort</b> 210:22		<b>commute</b> 146:21	<b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13
<b>closet</b> 177:18	<b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19		<b>company</b> 59:20	<b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9
<b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5			<b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20	<b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6
<b>cloud</b> 61:16	<b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18		<b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20	<b>computing</b> 158:24
<b>clubs</b> 70:7			<b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19	<b>con</b> 174:12
<b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17			<b>compelling</b> 33:19	<b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6
<b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19			<b>complaint</b> 105:21	<b>conceive</b> 215:13
<b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11			<b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24	<b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13
<b>codes</b> 160:7			<b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7	<b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21
<b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24			<b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22	<b>concerned</b> 14:20
<b>codify</b> 51:25			<b>completeness</b> 149:6	
<b>codifying</b> 51:18			<b>completion</b> 4:16	
<b>coffee</b> 163:13		<b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	
<b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19				
<b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17				
<b>Coliseum</b> 1:12				

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6 <b>disenfranchising</b> 124:22 219:2,9 <b>disparity</b> 65:16,25 67:7 <b>disproportionate</b> 180:18 <b>dispute</b> 125:11 <b>distinguish</b> 55:22 <b>distinguished</b> 158:24 <b>distress</b> 123:6 <b>distribute</b> 59:24 <b>distribution</b> 44:7 <b>district</b> 38:14,15 45:21 110:15 152:9 200:3 <b>districts</b> 72:19 <b>distrust</b> 186:5,6 189:9 <b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15 <b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3 <b>Doctor</b> 203:20 <b>documentation</b> 156:23 <b>documented</b> 220:23 <b>dodge</b> 195:24 <b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1 97:17 108:13 146:4 187:17 202:21 225:5 226:3 <b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12 39:14 40:11 42:9 48:21 54:6 64:14 77:13 99:5,15 100:15 129:4 131:21 134:24 137:7 154:25 155:21 157:6 166:18 179:6 185:1 186:8 190:14 192:4 198:9 222:20 228:25 <b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15 <b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15 78:18,19,20 87:2 139:4 142:7 163:5	165:5,21 211:11 222:10 224:4 <b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8 13:5,10 20:14 21:25 23:13 25:3 25:24,25 26:2,14 28:11 30:18 32:9 32:9 33:6 36:9 44:22 49:18 50:22 58:9 59:23 70:1 72:12 76:25 87:20 88:4 90:25 99:2,3 109:9 111:25 113:19 125:16 129:11 135:9 138:1 147:12 155:11,25 156:12 160:21 164:7 165:8 167:3 171:22,25 177:12 178:16 183:6,7,16 184:18 186:2 195:20 197:1 198:6 202:12 204:1 205:7,7,15 206:3 211:9,10,16 213:8 217:21,22 217:22 221:11,17 223:10 224:7 <b>doomed</b> 62:23 <b>door</b> 39:17 <b>doors</b> 152:3,18 <b>double</b> 74:10 100:6 <b>double-digit</b> 86:16 <b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6 147:21 173:5 174:12 191:16 209:7 211:11 <b>doubted</b> 172:2 <b>Douglas</b> 19:19 <b>download</b> 27:18 <b>downside</b> 40:16,25 <b>down-ballot</b> 24:21 25:6 <b>dozen</b> 77:23 <b>dozens</b> 154:8 <b>DPH</b> 210:7 <b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22 76:7,9 77:11,16 77:18,21,24 78:6	78:9,11,14 183:21 183:22,23 184:7 184:11,17 185:7 185:13 186:10,15 186:22,25 203:21 205:4,5,7,14 210:20,21 211:1 220:21,22 223:15 223:16 <b>dramatically</b> 25:4 26:1 <b>draw</b> 86:6 <b>drawback</b> 226:15 <b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8 <b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14 30:14,23 31:6 102:8 104:12,13 148:10,17 160:23 197:18 <b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17 86:19 <b>drilled</b> 65:15 <b>drink</b> 163:14 <b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1 209:9 <b>Driver</b> 204:22 <b>driver's</b> 201:6 <b>driver's</b> 72:14 200:23 203:24 204:5 <b>drop</b> 188:16 <b>dropped</b> 158:14 <b>drops</b> 158:21 <b>drove</b> 18:10 <b>dry</b> 82:13 <b>dude</b> 165:2 <b>due</b> 45:6 104:12 105:15 133:20 143:5 <b>due's</b> 10:21 <b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22 123:24 124:2,2,3 124:4,7,9 <b>durable</b> 32:4 <b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12 135:14,17,17 <b>dynamics</b> 103:25 <b>dysfunctional</b> 136:10	<b>E</b> <b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1 <b>eager</b> 192:11 <b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6 62:10 85:4 102:22 140:17 169:5 171:18 190:9 191:12 207:19,23 208:5 209:13 218:4 225:20 <b>early</b> 7:14 14:19 16:9 27:1 32:6 51:9 75:21 89:3 97:13 101:23 116:19 177:6 181:5 197:22,24 198:3,24 227:16 227:18 <b>earpiece</b> 71:13 <b>ease</b> 91:3 <b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13 50:1 130:9 193:21 <b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24 225:8 <b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25 175:4 194:11 227:1,3 <b>eat</b> 7:5 <b>echo</b> 221:14 <b>economical</b> 165:19 <b>Ed</b> 163:17 <b>educate</b> 87:14 89:20 90:10 138:17 <b>educating</b> 192:25 193:1 <b>education</b> 66:25 77:5,13 78:3,5,20 88:3 89:17,23 92:14 126:25 145:10 169:9 191:2,9,13 192:5 192:25 195:1 205:6 <b>educational</b> 65:4 65:22 87:2 90:17 <b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16 180:18 <b>effective</b> 129:24 <b>effectively</b> 127:3	<b>efficient</b> 201:20 <b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23 70:13 91:22 92:8 105:1 154:25 <b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8 <b>eight</b> 98:24 <b>either</b> 23:13 26:23 27:1 33:2 43:15 56:21 83:22 224:8 <b>elderly</b> 125:4,6 144:16 <b>elect</b> 143:13 <b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8 154:13 162:8 164:13 226:9 <b>election</b> 4:3 10:7 13:1 14:19 15:1,3 16:8,9,11,18 18:14,22 22:15 24:15 25:5 29:25 32:6 33:10,18 34:4 36:23 38:1 38:11 39:2,7,18 39:20,22,23 40:18 40:19,21,23 41:2 41:8,12,16 42:10 44:10 45:3,14,19 46:11,20,24,25 47:8 48:6,7 50:4 51:2 52:13,14 53:9,10,12,12,23 56:19,22 57:7,13 57:14,18,22,24 58:22 59:12 63:2 63:11,13 64:20,21 66:6,13 67:2 68:8 69:10 72:9 73:7 73:19 74:20 80:25 81:6,9,21,25 82:20 87:12 89:17 93:5 96:6,21,25 97:1,6 98:1,3 99:14,16,20 100:4 100:7,9,9,15,19 100:21 101:9,10 101:11,13,19,21 102:5,19,24 103:3 103:4,14,17,20 105:9,16,23 106:19 108:24
---	--	--	---	---

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12	<b>experiment</b> 87:17	<b>faced</b> 46:10	154:7	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9
<b>excellent</b> 75:12	<b>experimental</b> 53:24	<b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19	<b>fault</b> 50:12	63:8 66:19 118:4
95:16 160:18	<b>expert</b> 125:10	115:1	<b>favor</b> 147:6	140:20 206:13
<b>exception</b> 98:20	156:4	<b>facilitate</b> 201:20	<b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5	209:8,10
122:25	<b>expertise</b> 65:21	<b>facing</b> 109:4	8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12	<b>figured</b> 97:6
<b>exceptionally</b> 104:2	73:9 75:6 94:15	120:19	9:15,23 10:1,4,11	<b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8
104:10	95:3,8 166:22	<b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12	10:13,15 21:2,5,8	<b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3
<b>excited</b> 3:3	<b>experts</b> 14:24	16:3 20:22 25:2	21:13,20 22:9	<b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7
<b>excitement</b> 153:1	16:15 49:17 74:9	32:25 69:18 90:1	23:6,8,25 24:11	<b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2
<b>exciting</b> 49:4	119:23 125:10,12	94:19 117:16	24:19 25:10,14,16	<b>filling</b> 65:7
<b>exclusively</b> 56:1	149:14,19 158:5	138:16 149:7	26:22,24 27:4,8	<b>final</b> 33:24 61:15
<b>excuse</b> 73:19	159:7 221:1,7	163:2 172:21	27:21 28:9,13,24	166:1,6 168:8,16
220:12	<b>expired</b> 93:25	174:15 175:6	35:13,19 36:15	<b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14
<b>executed</b> 101:7	<b>explain</b> 21:16	181:21 187:6	37:3 110:24	39:21 48:24 84:8
<b>executive</b> 137:16	91:25 183:23	195:19 203:7	138:23 158:7	170:5
139:17	<b>explained</b> 25:9	208:6 222:3	160:8	<b>Finance</b> 2:15
<b>exhaustive</b> 66:17	35:21	<b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15	<b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22	<b>financial</b> 165:14
97:3	<b>explains</b> 19:25	154:21	<b>fear</b> 133:7	<b>financially</b> 140:15
<b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12	<b>explanation</b> 18:13	<b>factors</b> 222:14	<b>feared</b> 87:22	<b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1
<b>existed</b> 66:15,18	24:25	<b>fails</b> 47:6	<b>feature</b> 132:22	30:20 39:10 42:8
<b>existing</b> 80:19,20	<b>exponentially</b>	<b>failure</b> 151:14	<b>fed</b> 226:20	43:7,7,16 50:15
<b>exists</b> 163:25	102:2	203:10	<b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19	56:5,8 63:11
<b>exit</b> 43:24	<b>exposed</b> 15:13	<b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9	83:3,6 113:20	72:23,24,25 74:22
<b>expand</b> 49:12,16	<b>express</b> 199:14,17	133:6 143:2	138:2,7 142:22	117:6 156:7 157:4
<b>expect</b> 97:10	202:12 227:24	194:12 230:8	180:6 202:9	184:24 190:12
101:10 208:3	<b>expressed</b> 121:17	<b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6	216:18	221:17
<b>expected</b> 75:12	122:5 229:16	203:7	<b>federally</b> 192:14	<b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6
<b>expecting</b> 157:7	<b>expressing</b> 219:6	<b>fairness</b> 133:14	<b>feds</b> 78:18	<b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17
<b>expedite</b> 129:23	<b>expression</b> 163:22	<b>faith</b> 175:19	<b>fee</b> 79:23	49:19 181:3
<b>expense</b> 79:17	<b>expressly</b> 230:9	<b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5	<b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8	198:11,12 200:18
212:23 213:24	<b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16	<b>fallible</b> 154:12	34:25 212:18	205:10
<b>expenses</b> 79:18	101:17	<b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21	226:12,13,14	<b>finger</b> 107:19
213:25	<b>extended</b> 97:20,20	89:2 196:18	<b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1	<b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18
<b>expensive</b> 31:15	105:11	208:21	83:15 87:11,16	143:14
44:15 46:8 140:14	<b>extending</b> 102:11	<b>families</b> 98:8	90:22,23 91:3	<b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20
164:4 165:1 213:3	<b>extensive</b> 14:1	<b>family</b> 83:24	114:16 122:3	<b>firm</b> 141:21
213:9,16 225:10	<b>extent</b> 216:3	<b>fantastic</b> 101:21	127:25 129:16	<b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10
<b>experience</b> 53:25	<b>external</b> 13:24	<b>fantastically</b> 99:4	146:25 147:13	29:11 32:3 37:15
54:4,5 58:21	179:2,4	<b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21	161:18 168:3	38:19 42:17 45:3
64:10 65:4,23	<b>extra</b> 165:5,9	42:12 68:2 85:14	194:2 229:14	66:23 67:6 76:10
73:16 74:12 77:7	<b>extraordinarily</b>	89:17 145:4	<b>feeling</b> 91:13	76:21 94:21 95:23
77:11 84:7 91:17	136:22	147:19 166:18	189:22	96:24 98:21 99:12
99:19 111:14,16	<b>extremely</b> 137:1	167:3 175:14	<b>fellow</b> 113:6	122:14 123:2,20
111:21 134:15	177:11 181:6	188:19 229:17	<b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21	129:2 131:6 133:3
152:20,23 156:5	213:9	<b>fashion</b> 207:15,16	69:20 73:21	146:23 160:20
166:22 205:9		<b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25	152:21 227:19	167:8 171:22
214:5 220:16		68:2 107:16	<b>fess</b> 11:5	191:20 213:12,23
<b>experienced</b> 24:16		224:15	<b>fewer</b> 40:20	228:22,22,23
93:5 124:15		<b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25	<b>field</b> 93:16 121:13	<b>fit</b> 58:11
<b>experiences</b> 84:2		<b>father</b> 60:18,20	185:5,10,12	<b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
	<b>F</b>			
	<b>F</b> 230:1			
	<b>fabulous</b> 124:12			
	<b>facade</b> 98:15,18			



167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23		<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>L</b>	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	124:14 156:14	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	171:25 172:4	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	189:8	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	<b>language</b> 29:20	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	72:4 104:7	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	72:7 180:12	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	195:7 196:25	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	222:23 229:1	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	133:13	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>largest</b> 125:18	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>Las</b> 153:8	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	164:15	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	<b>laughingstock</b>	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	143:5 156:13	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>launch</b> 113:17	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	11:24 12:2,3	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	13:11 41:4 56:19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	60:7 61:11,14,19	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	112:15 141:21	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	142:1,4 177:2	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	182:16,18 183:7	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	216:14 224:21	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	183:10 195:25	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	216:19	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	138:2,3	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17	109:8 111:11,13	205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--



205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12 <b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25 38:25 39:1 44:10 92:10,12 132:25 164:8,11,11 220:20 <b>perfectly</b> 49:19 101:11 154:16 <b>perform</b> 14:1 175:18 <b>performed</b> 98:4 99:5 <b>performing</b> 80:13 <b>period</b> 53:21 55:9 55:19 58:25 100:11 132:2 167:15 176:21,25 192:3 <b>periods</b> 116:19 <b>permanently</b> 33:16 <b>persist</b> 148:14 <b>person</b> 17:14 84:4 99:9 163:1 171:24 181:11,11 197:24 200:2 204:20 225:22 227:5 <b>personal</b> 141:20 <b>personally</b> 3:20 70:7 152:20 153:15 183:9 190:16 <b>person's</b> 172:18 <b>perspective</b> 10:7,8 12:20 13:20,20 14:5 15:5,8 25:5 25:19 30:13 62:20 179:21 195:14 <b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8 145:16 153:6 157:11 159:10 162:11 164:10 <b>pharmacies</b> 70:7 <b>phase</b> 79:13 <b>phases</b> 11:7 <b>phone</b> 9:20 <b>Phonetically</b> 1:19 <b>photocopying</b> 230:10 <b>phrase</b> 179:20 <b>physical</b> 13:25	14:12,18 26:9 36:17 43:8 120:5 <b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21 214:18 <b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17 <b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3 <b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20 69:22,25 70:2 74:14 77:17 92:16 92:19 94:19 95:7 130:10 151:12 186:14,17 195:1 <b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8 202:3 215:16 <b>piggybacking</b> 214:4 <b>pillars</b> 143:11 <b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2 59:25 83:20 <b>piloted</b> 226:6 <b>piloting</b> 191:25 <b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8 59:25 <b>place</b> 11:23 13:2 44:21 56:18 59:19 67:20 68:6 69:24 73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7 83:23 86:22 87:18 88:9 89:19 94:20 97:10 102:14 108:10,11 112:9 113:15,19 158:22 168:23 169:2 170:22,25 171:4 179:10 188:25 192:24 195:6 199:10,23 202:4 208:18 218:22 <b>places</b> 21:24 68:12 82:20 89:21 101:15 102:3,4,6 102:7 103:14 104:25 105:2 120:14 192:12 194:9 204:5 <b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12 <b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8 110:12 <b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20 <b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	75:19 155:5 171:21 <b>planning</b> 3:22 34:23 43:13 <b>plans</b> 112:23 <b>plausible</b> 18:13 <b>playing</b> 93:15 <b>pleasantly</b> 122:25 <b>please</b> 5:22 12:9 21:19 94:11 108:5 115:12,14 116:3 122:20 129:22 131:1 134:7 135:15 137:13 139:14 143:15 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 153:12 155:23 159:6 161:10 166:17 174:22 229:4 <b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21 <b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8 147:11 <b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25 15:11,22 20:24 27:9,11 28:6,19 50:14 55:24 61:7 82:8 105:21 109:13,22 112:20 113:18 115:19 150:13 152:17 174:8 178:5,7 186:1 187:12,14 188:4 192:6 202:6 207:18 208:2 221:10 <b>points</b> 68:15 73:21 75:8 127:15 146:1 177:6 <b>poison</b> 163:14 <b>polarization</b> 123:5 <b>policies</b> 140:3 <b>political</b> 86:18 133:24 163:10,25 <b>politicians</b> 163:8 163:10 <b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4 <b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24 83:4,23 90:2,3,10	90:19,21 100:1 101:24,25 102:11 102:25 104:22,22 106:11,14,14 108:11 116:17 117:1 129:2 156:7 158:2 169:10,15 193:1,6 194:5 195:16,17 199:2 199:14,17,18 200:1,1,5,23 201:2,12,14 202:20 205:8 206:3,4,12,15,23 207:3 214:17 215:10 226:13 227:22 <b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24 78:6 81:5 83:23 87:18 94:20 101:15 102:3,6,7 103:14 105:1,11 108:11 117:21 120:14 205:10 <b>polling-station</b> 77:6 <b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20 102:25 127:2 227:24 <b>poll-watching</b> 116:10 <b>poll-worker</b> 67:2 194:19 <b>pop</b> 210:14 <b>popped</b> 107:5 <b>popping</b> 177:18 <b>popular</b> 160:4 <b>population</b> 71:23 94:25 <b>portion</b> 38:16 48:22 114:3 165:25 166:1 <b>portions</b> 71:23 <b>position</b> 96:2 134:13 <b>positive</b> 124:25 <b>possibility</b> 166:25 179:2 228:25 <b>possible</b> 101:5 105:2 111:15	154:12,17 176:4 180:7 210:15 223:19,24 224:9 228:19 229:7 <b>possibly</b> 23:18 47:11 112:18 180:14 225:16 <b>postelection</b> 37:18 37:19 39:25 55:12 120:10,13 125:9 137:6 169:24 173:16 175:11 186:8 <b>post-Vietnam</b> 144:4 <b>potential</b> 19:3 36:16 73:5 151:13 170:12 206:8 219:2 <b>potentially</b> 13:15 46:15 47:4 49:4 75:14 112:21 <b>power</b> 98:19 99:24 151:14 <b>powers</b> 143:9 <b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4 <b>practices</b> 49:14 73:18 100:14,25 223:8,9 <b>practitioners</b> 49:23 <b>prayer</b> 156:8 <b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11 <b>precertification</b> 47:3 55:14,15 57:12 58:2,3 162:5 184:3,4,12 184:13,14 <b>precinct</b> 29:25 31:11,18 35:23 36:8 46:12,14,17 54:17,18,19,24 55:4 65:15 72:2 72:11,13,22 84:15 84:25 106:8 125:18 126:7 151:3 160:10 193:7 203:2 206:19 213:7 224:20 <b>precincts</b> 14:16
---	--	--	--	--

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---



89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24  <b>S</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--



<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>well-designed</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>well-funded</b> 192:7	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>well-intended</b> 5:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>well-to-do</b> 93:17	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winner</b> 46:21
	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winning</b> 182:11
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wisely</b> 212:2,7
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wished</b> 84:6
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>withdrawn</b> 230:9
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
223:5	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	224:15 228:14	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worst</b> 161:2	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
104:6 113:2 116:8	163:14 193:4,4	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
124:22 126:22	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
131:7 133:19	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
140:23 144:6,13	151:8 161:4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
174:25 175:2	<b>write</b> 89:8	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
178:24 191:5	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	55:24 63:20 64:17	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
192:5 199:8,25	<b>writing</b> 170:4	68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
202:21 203:14,19	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	74:18 79:19 93:18	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
212:15 222:8	108:8 162:7	138:19 142:3,3	212:11 228:6	141:4
224:23	187:15,15,16	147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	189:21 198:16	156:11,11 158:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
124:16,20,20	202:21 207:12	158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
127:1 138:24	217:6,7,19	170:11 192:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
173:10		207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
158:2 193:6 200:1		219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
202:20		221:18,22 222:13	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>X</b>	223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
100:1 101:25	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10	224:11	206:13 214:14	167:4
104:22,22 117:2	93:13	<b>yell</b> 166:15	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
169:10 191:9	<b>Y</b>	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
193:1 194:5	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

---

**From:** Patrick Stephens <ptrckstephens1@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 09, 2019 2:27 PM  
**To:** Broce, Candice  
**Cc:** gree806  
**Subject:** \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript (2).pdf; safecommissiontranscriptmini.pdf

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hey, Candice! I've attached the transcript to this E-mail. Please let me know that you've received it all right.

Thanks,

--

- Patrick A. Stephens, CCR -

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this



1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1       Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2       staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3       on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4       talk a little better into it.

5       MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6       Check, check, testing, testing.

7       AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8       MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9       So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10      better?

11      AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12      MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13      AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14      AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15      MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17      While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18      I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19      faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20      phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21      We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22      Good to see you.

23      MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24      REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25      could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the



1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1       could supply an independent audit trail.

2               The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3       legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4       did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5       purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6       May 4th, 2002.

7               The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8       commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9       same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10      only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11      fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12      have that in your recommendations.

13              So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14      2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15      verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16      to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17      system today.

18              So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19      Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20      perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21      or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22      you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23      the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24      screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25      the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the



1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines



1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1        voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2        suggest that -- we think is important:

3            The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4        We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5        It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6        everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7        and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8        disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9        ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10       disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11       then their voter anonymity is better.

12           Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13       tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14       be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15       allowed in Georgia.

16           Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17       think is really important that we want the commission to  
18       consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19       a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20       tabulators.

21           So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22       counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23       better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24       information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25       fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about



1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going



1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?



1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after



1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1       system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2       that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3       and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4       I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5       you.

6           I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7       of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8       put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9       here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10          And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11       probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12       some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13       consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14       much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15          MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16       I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17       Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18       so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19       have a few minutes with you today.

20          The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21       today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22       starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23       remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24       give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25       to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13           We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18           We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1           going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2           The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3           votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4           refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5           the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6           whatever could happen.

7           They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8           machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9           needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10          the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11          paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12          Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13          The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14          surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15          surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16          came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17          and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18          of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19          optical-scan ballots.

20          At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21          a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22          because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23          would register in the whole county that night because,  
24          obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25          voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,



1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to



1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1           contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2           think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3           could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4           was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5           education.

6           DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7           station worker training?

8           MS. COX: Yes.

9           DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10          MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11          DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13          SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14          Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15          thank you for being here.

16          MS. COX: Thank you.

17          SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18          million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19          and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20          dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21          Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22          voting machine?

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24          tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25          seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11               SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13               SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21               SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9           MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17          MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24          You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.



1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it



1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd love to hear from you.

MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris. We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic. Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

MS. BROCHE: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second, Chris.

MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the first meeting talking about our current voting system.

I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for



1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10      And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11      Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12      there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13      that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15      -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16      problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17      but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19      heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20      o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21      to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22      of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23      working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24      it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25      poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I



1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:



1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for



1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we



1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1       lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2       generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3       for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4       a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5       in my hometown of Atlanta.

6               The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7       dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8       technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9       to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10      should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11      so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12      and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13             A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14      combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15      auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16      and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17             This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18      of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19      Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20      given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21      legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22      federal and state elections.

23             Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24      headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25      also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1       infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2       citizenry is fair and just.

3             Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4       art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5       continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6       voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7       importance of the task ahead of you.

8             Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9       foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10      would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11      confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12      values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13      elect our own leaders.

14            And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15      road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16      all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17      spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18      equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19      trial of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20      of their votes. Thank you.

21            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22      appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23      Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24      way?

25            MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the



1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14           Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21           MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my



1 goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2 that's at stake.

3 As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4 and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5 didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6 involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7 will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8 afraid their vote will not count.

9 If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10 you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11 goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12 anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13 handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14 go. Thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16 Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17 MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19 MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20 allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21 work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22 of Georgia.

23 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24 MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25 voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11              We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16              Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20              I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.

1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.



1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1           thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2           when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3           Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4           course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5           you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6           this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7           time.

8           Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9           funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10          county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11          an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12          from our election officials on how important that could be.

13          Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14          In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15          poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16          if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17          other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18          Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19          have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20          the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21          Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22          should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23          discussion has been here today on that.

24          Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25          we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5             And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10            And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17            So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21            The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?



1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.



1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2           possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3           audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4           elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5           And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6           audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8           -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9           the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10          auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11          want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12          having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13          to keep that in mind.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15          MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16          I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17          verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18          important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19          at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20          use the phrase security and inclusion.

21          And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22          discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23          the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24          a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25          of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're



1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22               important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23               talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24               systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform



1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've



1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.



1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1       to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2       spent wisely.

3               So this relationship between the state and the county  
4       on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5       counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6       it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7       the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8       commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9       them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10      jurisdiction.

11              So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12      tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13      government quite often is the government that's most local  
14      to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15      system work, but we also want the local input.

16              And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17      fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18      more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19              So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20      not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21      Nancy?

22              MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23      expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24      demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25      demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.



1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.



1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--



<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---



167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23		<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>L</b>	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	124:14 156:14	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	171:25 172:4	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	189:8	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	<b>language</b> 29:20	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	72:4 104:7	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	72:7 180:12	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	195:7 196:25	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	222:23 229:1	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	133:13	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>largest</b> 125:18	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>Las</b> 153:8	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	164:15	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	<b>laughingstock</b>	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	143:5 156:13	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>launch</b> 113:17	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	11:24 12:2,3	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	13:11 41:4 56:19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	60:7 61:11,14,19	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	112:15 141:21	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	142:1,4 177:2	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	182:16,18 183:7	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	216:14 224:21	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	183:10 195:25	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	216:19	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	138:2,3	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17	109:8 111:11,13	205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--



205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---



89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24  <b>S</b>	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--



<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winner</b> 46:21
	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winning</b> 182:11
		<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wisely</b> 212:2,7
		<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wished</b> 84:6
		<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>withdrawn</b> 230:9
		<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
		<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
223:5	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	224:15 228:14	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worst</b> 161:2	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
104:6 113:2 116:8	163:14 193:4,4	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
124:22 126:22	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
131:7 133:19	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
140:23 144:6,13	151:8 161:4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
174:25 175:2	<b>write</b> 89:8	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
178:24 191:5	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	55:24 63:20 64:17	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
192:5 199:8,25	<b>writing</b> 170:4	68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
202:21 203:14,19	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	74:18 79:19 93:18	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
212:15 222:8	108:8 162:7	138:19 142:3,3	212:11 228:6	141:4
224:23	187:15,15,16	147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	189:21 198:16	156:11,11 158:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
124:16,20,20	202:21 207:12	158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
127:1 138:24	217:6,7,19	170:11 192:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
173:10		207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
158:2 193:6 200:1		219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
202:20		221:18,22 222:13	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>X</b>	223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
100:1 101:25	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10	224:11	206:13 214:14	167:4
104:22,22 117:2	93:13	<b>yell</b> 166:15	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
169:10 191:9	<b>Y</b>	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
193:1 194:5	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

## SECURE, ACCESSIBLE &amp; FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

## STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

## TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity, transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it has been throughout my career in public service.

Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I spent time in several different areas of state government, including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the Department of Human Services.

Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of

Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

(Collective Pledge.)

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

group has already heard from several different groups, and stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the important discussion about our state's next voting system.

We're -- we're joined here today by Representative Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature and Governor-elect Kemp.

Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all of the attendees here.

Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of State's office as we began our transition planning. I realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very grateful for the support you've given us.

As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

focal point for elections because the priceless franchise to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections throughout every aspect of the election process.

Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and, today, it is imperative we complete our research for security and technology for the next decade.

I have said that we need the most secure, updated voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a system that moves voters faster through the line so we can reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our next-generation voting machines.

Our next legislative session begins on January 14th and I know that the General Assembly and our department is looking forward to the completion and recommendations from this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank you for offering yourself for service in this critical and noble effort.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda for today.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary, and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to talk about something very important to Georgia; that is, voting in our state.

We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be able to help you out.

As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had very good participation from the public at our prior meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you for being here.

As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have time limits for our presentations today and we will gently initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.  
17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.  
21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.



MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

trust in Georgia voting.

So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go through to do a big project like this.

And, typically, what you do is you analyze your current system for improvement opportunities, you define the new system requirements and then evaluate the alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is to help you identify the current system improvement opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for defining your objectives and requirements.

Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great protection for Georgia voters.

But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

could supply an independent audit trail.

The law -- in order to get the machines in, the legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal did not take effect until after the contract was -- was purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on May 4th, 2002.

The reason that I bring this to the attention of the commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have -- have that in your recommendations.

So when that new system was implemented back then in 2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable system today.

So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system? Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well, you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot screen that you see may not be what's happening on the -- the inside of the machine.

As election officials, many of you know when -- there are no audit procedures in place today to audit their elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results, you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the correct results that the system told you.

And then lastly, but not least, is the recount situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable system.

So that's the election-integrity advocates' perspective, but what about the state's perspective? We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The -- the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that -- of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2 So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3 Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4 ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5 elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6 getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7 device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8 So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9 and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10 server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11 by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12 have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13 happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14 Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15 great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16 lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17 So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18 commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19 can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20 you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21 The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22 it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23 but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24 counties.

25 So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPL0ST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPL0ST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1 either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2 MS. BAILEY: So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3 considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4 MR. FAVORITO: That's exactly right. There was no  
5 mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6 ballots cast in those races.

7 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you.

9 MS. ROSS: Can I get a point of clarification?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Just a point of clarification: For Bibb  
12 County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13 lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14 that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15 as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16 that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17 do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18 from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19 card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20 for.

21 MR. FAVORITO: So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22 the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23 itself.

24 MS. ROSS: They are on the voting unit, too.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1 that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2 nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3 machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4 non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5 A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6 which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7 very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8 have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9 commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10 ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11 recommendation.

12 So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13 systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14 replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15 that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16 those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17 well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18 electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19 really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20 cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21 -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22 The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23 DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24 Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25 University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6 Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14 And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24 So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

elections, it's going to require some additional work on the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be able to audit, recount and make sure that we have transparency in the election process.

This is going to be an increased burden on the county elections directors. It's going to require a little bit more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want to bring that to your attention because I think the Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county commissions in making sure that they understand this when we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement auditing, recounting and transparency.

So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've given you and see exactly what you really think we need to do and we think that you need to define the requirements, basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report. Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to release this until Friday because I wanted to get some feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

but you save all of this administrative work for the elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't have enough, then there's a big scramble.

So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections. Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know, any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with that ballot.

So we actually recommend that people vote by mail given the current -- the current situation with these machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of election is basically foolproof and no particular voting type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

the presentation and then I was going to make some adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared to talk about it in case there any questions.

And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be glad to take any other questions about the new system as well.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the preprinted ballots that are wasted --

MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used. Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much. We appreciate you being here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you. Thank you for having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see you today.

MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear me okay?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn. I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the honor of previously presenting to you on our first commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back. And the topic I'm going to talk about today is postelection audits.

Postelection audits are something that we currently don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we will be able to do. It's something that most states do, so it's something that you may want to include in the recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that later today and something for the legislature and our state

election board to really work with in the future.

So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your results using the same underlying data. So, in our world, the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're trying to independently re-create that tabulated results, looking back at the cast votes.

What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment and the procedures used to count the votes worked correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the election yielded the correct result.

What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a recount is, is when you count every single vote for a particular race. So when you recount a house district, you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full re-creation, you will know what the results is.

So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures worked.

So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

So the benefits of a audit are that you can find errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental errors, it can help you have data and information so that you can improve the process for future elections; you can iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits going to be done after an election, you know that they are going to dig in and review those results, look at the ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps build public confidence in the election and the outcome of an election.

So I'm going to describe the three main categories or types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What this means is there is a predetermined percentage of usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of the percentages that you would go back and review. The advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of precincts you would have to look at and that makes it easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a scope.

The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout, you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close the election is.

But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered percentage is being done by two states right now, and what that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how many precincts you will check based on how close the election is.

So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin, you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5 percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the election is.

And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and, at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an



1 audit.

2 So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3 a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4 time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5 percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6 that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7 catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8 the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9 you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10 and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11 is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12 So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13 statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14 years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15 journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16 elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17 they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18 There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19 Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20 audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21 smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22 able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23 To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24 of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25 comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1 it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2 make changes.

3 If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4 potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5 records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6 fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7 recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8 election you are auditing if you do it before  
9 certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10 it pre, some states do it after certification.

11 And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12 that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13 audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14 do you review the digital image of the paper?

15 The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16 you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17 they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18 single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19 technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20 of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21 they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22 pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23 So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24 we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25 ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2 for risk-limited audits.

3 So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4 know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5 verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6 confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7 any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8 worked correctly.

9 You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10 new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11 makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12 overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13 audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14 as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15 we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16 audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17 And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18 audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19 audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20 but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21 death from what I've talked about.

22 There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23 brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24 life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25 them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6 MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.  
9 And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16 MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18 MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1 which one's better?

2 MR. RAYBURN: So I think if we had a statistician to  
3 work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4 felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5 that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6 would have to review.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Lynn?

8 MS. BAILEY: Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Speaking  
9 off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10 we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11 that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12 we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13 audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14 precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15 precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16 will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17 done.

18 You know, there are important things going on in that  
19 three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20 looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21 example. So we do definitely need to look at that.

22 And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23 ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24 process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25 mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1 audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2 greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3 difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4 recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5 to recertify a result.

6 MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7 election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8 over. You see what I'm saying?

9 MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10 on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11 a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12 precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13 results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14 have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15 switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16 MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17 recount, not a do over, is my question.

18 MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19 and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20 would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21 going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22 new election.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24 the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25 ordered. Senator?

1 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6 MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23 MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3 MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8 Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10 MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12 PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16 MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19 MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22 MS. COX: That's right.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25 MS. COX: That's right.

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.  
24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3 MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5 MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9 MS. COX: That's right.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12 MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15 MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18 MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22 MS. COX: Exactly.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1 going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2 The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3 votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4 refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5 the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6 whatever could happen.

7 They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8 machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9 needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10 the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11 paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12 Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13 The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14 surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15 surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16 came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17 and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18 of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19 optical-scan ballots.

20 At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21 a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22 because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23 would register in the whole county that night because,  
24 obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25 voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7 I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13 We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18 We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate these lost votes and we took that original study -- which should be in the state archives -- we took that study to the legislature and said, We need to really do something on our watch before we have the next election cycle.

So that was when the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the commission, several others of you might have, but we had a combination, as your commission is composed, of local election officials and legislators that studied for a full year. We took the study we had done internally of what had happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in Georgia.

And it was a result of that study that led us into deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and to move, for the first time, into a system where every county would use the same voting equipment so that we could do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't even envision the things that are happening today in technology or the threats that are happening today to technology back in the day when we put this equipment in -- in place.

I think we also envisioned that there would be a continuous study of election equipment over the years and that there would be continuous need to purchase additional equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us to where we are today.

But one of the main -- a couple of the main points that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a decision for making a change today is to be mindful that, yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair; things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be replaced and upgraded.

So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

that the Secretary of State could do training for all county election officials and then to help the poll-worker training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis across the state, that the state would then, whatever equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the counties and, at least on the first round, make that purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got into the system we have now.

We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think -- my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that model.

We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the technology wasn't there at the time.

Honestly, I think that our commission thought back in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two, technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure voting system but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure but that also -- you understand the voter interface with technology.

We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000 presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill in DC of working with our congressional delegation and others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50 million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the equipment that we purchased.

In fact, the only money that the state ended up putting into the purchase was really the voter-education piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to make sure that voters are never turned away from voting because they don't want to show up in a polling place and be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box



1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.  
24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1 I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6 Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9 DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17 So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23 You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1 there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2 and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3 upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4 whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5 that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6 less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7 that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8 Michael?

9 MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10 when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11 Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12 elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13 time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14 purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15 was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16 at that time?

17 MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18 study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19 start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20 Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21 equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22 auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23 definition of auditing.

24 You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25 purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1 So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2 experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3 trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4 and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5 even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6 tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7 and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8 independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9 heard.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11 MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12 again.

13 MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14 MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15 we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16 there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17 one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18 lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19 at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20 printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21 one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22 created long lines.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24 MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25 than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1 And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2 and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3 conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4 the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5 printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6 funding from the state or federal government to our  
7 counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8 not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9 statewide runoff.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11 MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12 Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13 importance around access for individuals with disability  
14 and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15 privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16 access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17 process for people with disabilities?

18 MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19 voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20 when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21 different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22 and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23 a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24 didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25 just didn't vote.

1 sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4 earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5 in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6 participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7 black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8 curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9 and why you think that occurred?

10 MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11 reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12 that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13 between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14 the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15 some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16 using optical-scan ballots.

17 We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18 look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19 just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20 didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21 using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22 optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23 that bubble or mark the X.

24 We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25 I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6 MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12 So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20 People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part of the training money was allocated to train poll workers, because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And -- and you need to realize these are temporary workers that only work two or three elections every other year.

And I remember there was money put regionally into the technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses and carried them and they were taught how to operate the equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters how to use the equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to underscore, just like many others have around the table, the importance of the educational component and my -- that comment is more related to the judge's comments about training poll workers.

Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it. Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

solutions that we were coming up with and, when we ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as the security piece. It's not one or the other and they -- they've got to be equally considered in your decision-making.

And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and to keep up with changes in technology and to help the counties.

We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just uncomfortable with the entire process.

So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all of us around the table could at least agree on that.

JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too proud to ask for help.

MS. BAILEY: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made and how can we learn from your experience?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with the legislature.

MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines that we experienced in this election cycle because counties -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think, understood we're probably heading into something new so they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying additional equipment.

But since the state moved into this arena, unified the state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to the counties so that we can keep up that level playing field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to buy new equipment in the years to come.

We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the state would really help voters everywhere.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2 State's office is always going to need that level of  
3 staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4 university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5 that is purchased new.

6 You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7 think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8 the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9 provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10 equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11 the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12 based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14 much.

15 MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17 MS. COX: Thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19 today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20 (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22 would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23 started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24 Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25 to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1 their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2 advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3 people vote in advanced voting.

4 By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5 were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6 advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7 advanced voting in this election.

8 We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9 election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10 to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11 litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12 to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13 citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14 essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15 that county election officials had been doing.

16 And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17 county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18 as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19 And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20 changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21 And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22 officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23 on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24 ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25 some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1 done in the past had been altered.

2 But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3 what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4 our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5 as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6 I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7 through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8 successfully at the county level.

9 On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10 And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11 Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12 there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13 that happened on election day.

14 You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15 -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16 problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17 but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18 We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19 heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20 o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21 to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22 of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23 working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24 it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25 poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1 what lines looked like throughout the state.

2 And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3 terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4 election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5 not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6 About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7 that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8 but in some locations.

9 Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10 said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11 voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12 about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13 2018.

14 We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15 longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16 gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17 did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18 about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19 again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20 to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21 about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22 and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23 There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24 look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25 dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10 We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15 Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19 In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some



1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2 Senator Jackson.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4 for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5 how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6 candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7 MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8 that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9 know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10 calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11 grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12 you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13 ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14 know, bounce around.

15 These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16 fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17 you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18 people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19 finger around.

20 It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21 screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22 spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23 glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24 always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25 show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1 We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7 The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14 That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18 Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24 The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1 this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2 state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3 the Secretary of State's office.

4 So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5 even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6 in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7 chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9 MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10 that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11 this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12 election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13 it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14 an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15 elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16 allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17 launch in municipal elections.

18 And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19 we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20 likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21 into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22 right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24 Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25 you do.

MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission members, we're now going to move to the portion of our agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right where you are, stand up.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing up, stay standing up.

Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you for that.

What I would ask of you now is, is to understand clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going to ask you to stick to that.

Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself. If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But, generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as well.

So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments, making their point but making it in such a way that it's not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so thank you for that in the past.

Is there anyone who does not understand the ground rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start going down the list, and thank you so much.

Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia. Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara, please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear from you.

MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party, county-party committees and election officials. I also oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching program.

Over the course of this election season, our voter-protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November 6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and hundreds more during the early voting periods.

Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a voter would make a selection only to have the machine reflect a different result.

In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There was one voter who reported having to change her vote five times before it correctly reflected her choice. In another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to three separate machines before they could find a machine that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

We also received multiple reports of races not appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

Problems weren't limited to the election machines. There were many problems with the registration system. We had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

We have other cases where voters found their registrations online, they had printed registration cards; they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the -- at the polling booths.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to research these problems. I would like to share them with each county as we go through so that we can look at them and figure out what happened and where the system broke down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and in the officials and the administration of the system.

What's critical now is that this body develop a set of standards against which the decisions that -- on a system will be made. You have to have standards that you establish here because if we don't set a baseline that includes making sure that the voters are able to create and confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these votes are auditable independently without any intervention by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply continue.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

MS. NELSON: Yes.

Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any central database.

So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little bit to the disabilities concerns.

I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where little people showed up to their polling places and were not given stools or chairs, left without casting their vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their access to cast their vote.

So, right now, we are already facing a lot of disability issues and, completely understandably, with handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

MS. NELSON: -- having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not with any particular organization. I really appreciate your time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

MS. NELSON: This one?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little closer.

MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned citizen and not with any particular organization and I appreciate your time.

So I am concerned particularly with any electronic system, as has been proven by experts that there's no system known out there right now that is completely secure from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name right?

MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again. I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from.

MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I spent the last several months working as a field organizer for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast. The trust in the election system has degraded significantly.

There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust, which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1 therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2 make sure that that happens.

3 They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4 they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5 the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6 audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7 restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8 consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9 critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10 system.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12 Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13 Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14 first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15 Blassingame?

16 Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17 pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18 MR. WEIR: Yep.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20 have you and please tell us where you're from.

21 MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22 just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23 is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24 learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25 I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4 MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10 MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13 MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1 Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7 My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11 The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18 Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23 In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1 this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2 citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3 better by one another.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5 today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6 Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7 Please tell us where you're from.

8 MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9 elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10 degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11 of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12 including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13 held my current position since 2007.

14 I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15 voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16 through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17 local jurisdictions.

18 We need to have meaningful audits before  
19 certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20 I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21 lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22 certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23 barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24 we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25 whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 was accurate.

2 So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3 paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4 marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5 it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6 what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7 is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8 evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9 receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10 any different. Thank you very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12 appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13 for coming today. Good to have you again.

14 MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16 from.

17 MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18 County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19 Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20 representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21 to address you guys.

22 The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23 that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24 and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25 alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today



1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 than you've had the time to go through yet.

2 What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3 is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4 elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5 going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6 Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7 verifiable system.

8 The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9 all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10 not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11 verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12 to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13 that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14 systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15 one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16 elections.

17 I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18 you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19 you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20 set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21 Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22 need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23 terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24 what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25 of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3 MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8 You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13 And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20 So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one, I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be negative one and subtract from your total.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann, thank you for coming today.

MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972 and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

hear from you.

MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to have their votes represent their intentions.

It is imperative that the new voting system that you recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their voices heard on election day. In our recent election, there were reports of problems with the DREs showing erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen technology these problems will persist. They can be avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise; right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented the rule of the voter.

I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking -- marking devices that you are considering will produce a paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and recorded.

-- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded scanners that can handle the humidity.

And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there. Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

But -- and one other thing that I don't think anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today, and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the separate verification step and issues of human limitations become moot.

Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid audit is the best available method for conducting elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to heart the recommendations of the experts.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration and service to the voters of Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John, good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1 you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2 MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3 Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4 restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5 and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6 the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7 officials since that time despite that information being  
8 thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9 The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10 and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11 of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12 They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13 point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14 University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15 State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16 statewide.

17 So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18 professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19 supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21 this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22 Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23 the technology involved in our election system.

24 And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25 Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time since she offered?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the news business a few years back after a long career both in national news and state-local news in another part of the country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot boxes we were talking about.

So I understand that any system can be hacked, any system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials here, but you've all heard about it.

And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle, suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly. We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

I love the idea that we can print them on demand. That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

-- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and, having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a pension for accurate, reliable data.

And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will tell you that my experience since we have had electronic voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've never quite trusted it.

We've been using that system for years and years and lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of trust.

Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know, that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

I think what I want to see is that everyone gets -- everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever they voted for, that they can have documentation that their vote went through as they intended and that those votes can be audited.

goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy that's at stake.

As been said many times today -- and I've heard over and over since I got involved with this issue, which I didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote will not count. Think about that. American citizens are afraid their vote will not count.

If you're afraid your vote's not going to count, you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to go. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people of Georgia.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this electronic system that we have, remember the definition of insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5 now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the past.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as good as I used to be.

MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission for allowing us to speak here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again, where you're from, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we just listen to the IT experts?

And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns; we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled, Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system, but also dropped into a safe box.

And not much has been said about what happens to these paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years, about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate that problem. These would be attached to the optical scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure place. So I think that solves that one problem.

We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying -- verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an average of 3.9 seconds.

When you're given a summary that you have to check, human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best advice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.  
Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a second now. T-H-R --

MS. THROOP: Yeah.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- 0-0-P.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go. Throop. All right.

MS. THROOP: Good.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you, Liz.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of good presentations this morning and have had a lot of good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I think it's important to be very specific with these things.

So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be signifying something as simple as the precinct number could introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for that reason, I think it's very important that we get proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there are no barcodes on the ballots.

It's been a little while since I've looked at those proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent set of presentations we heard today should have happened at the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what those ballots are going to look like.

And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs, they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

are the focus of national press attention as one of the worst states for voting integrity.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and allow you to wrap up, Liz.

MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay. Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to have you.

MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing really quickly.

The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next session or something because you know how hard that is, that things don't get done that way.

And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal -- detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1 that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2 accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3 the legislature decides on the system.

4 And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5 the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6 aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7 guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8 got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9 confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11 George Ballbona (ph)?

12 MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14 George.

15 MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17 for being here today.

18 MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19 live in Cobb County.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21 MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22 those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23 but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24 anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25 something costs.

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsnor? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1 No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.  
3 Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6 This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12 A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17 Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24 However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2 Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3 scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4 Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5 know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6 y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7 to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8 boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9 all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10 things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11 it needs upgrading.

12 But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13 They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14 update your thing and it is now your financial  
15 responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16 So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17 came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18 way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19 tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20 trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21 saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23 members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24 about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25 we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.  
2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1 having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2 session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3 as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4 until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5 all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6 is inaugurated.

7 And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8 two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9 in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10 meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11 would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12 There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13 and can accommodate people this size.

14 Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15 period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16 every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17 Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18 agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19 certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20 However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21 throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22 you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23 move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24 discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25 would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?  
21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our



1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 comments from the commission? Lynn?

2 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. Lynn Bailey out  
3 of Richmond County. I agree with what I've heard. I think  
4 Georgia does need a new system. The system that we have  
5 now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6 As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7 replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8 previously-owned units in other states and other  
9 jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10 it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11 sustain or continue.

12 Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13 over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14 voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15 concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16 good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17 way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18 right path.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other comments?  
20 Senator?

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Certainly.

23 SENATOR JACKSON: -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24 -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25 think an audit should be pre-certified. I think that the

1 audit should be done before we certify the general  
2 election.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4 MS. BOREN: Concur.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6 MS. BOREN: We agree.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8 -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9 counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10 the date you certify on?

11 Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12 con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13 great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14 implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15 said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16 fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17 The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18 that certification and how much?

19 MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23 MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24 November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25 provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2 The audit would also be important work not to be  
3 rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4 time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5 that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6 the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7 November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8 tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9 consideration.

10 I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11 I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12 audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13 they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14 you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15 that path.

16 But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17 three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18 in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19 any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20 it.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22 three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23 were going to say weeks.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25 MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1 because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2 type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3 system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4 types of lawsuits.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6 generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7 access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8 people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9 not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10 MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11 standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12 groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13 you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14 why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15 impact on certain voters versus others.

16 And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17 we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18 secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19 certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20 best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21 need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22 And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23 any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24 NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25 that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1 Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7 With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15 MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21 And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1 So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2 some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3 is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4 Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5 there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6 for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7 that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8 we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9 upon us.

10 You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11 sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12 actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13 there's still going to be a process for an election  
14 contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15 dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16 contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17 state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18 an election-contest proceeding.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20 sir, Michael?

21 MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22 comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23 things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24 things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25 which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.  
5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.  
10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1 your point.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3 everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4 shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5 stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6 wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7 the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8 we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11 Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12 ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13 ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14 a piece of paper; correct?

15 DR. LEE: Yes.

16 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17 the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18 they voted --

19 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21 auditable. No?

22 DR. LEE: So --

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24 papers --

25 DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.  
19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?  
15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1 And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2 month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3 be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4 officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5 the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6 component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7 But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8 need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9 fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10 has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11 very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12 other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13 groups out there that are ready to help.

14 I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15 implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16 completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17 funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18 report that we come up with.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21 MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22 important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23 talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24 systems are different all over the place.

25 So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7 But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18 If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

1 hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team  
4 counting ballots and then let the other team count behind  
5 them and see if the numbers were the same.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't  
7 realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in  
8 Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that  
9 been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they  
13 contract with me to be the supervisor over their old  
14 equipment.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if  
16 something goes wrong?

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only  
20 have 100 registered voters each.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

22 JUDGE MCCOY: So...

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one  
24 of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll  
25 bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2 that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3 courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4 in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5 school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6 you are given the correct ballot.

7 That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8 card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9 only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10 machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11 much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13 we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14 it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15 now are a little dated -- are they?

16 MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19 frankly. They're just a --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22 about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23 beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24 that what you're talking about?

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap



1 there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2 that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3 They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4 and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6 MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7 required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8 who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9 there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10 pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11 -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12 express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13 that.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16 system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17 voter --

18 MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20 human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21 doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22 ballot.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24 MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25 that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2 it's a state-issued ID card.

3 I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4 disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5 go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6 think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7 a ID card.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.  
9 (Crosstalk.)

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11 SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12 MS. BOREN: Yes.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14 to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15 card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16 SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18 SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19 MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20 that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21 cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22 of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23 they can also get that one free.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25 MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1 SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5 DR. LEE: So --

6 JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7 DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14 DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1 accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2 micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3 always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4 important part. Judge?

5 JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6 and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7 records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8 -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9 look at, to model.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11 on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12 paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13 us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14 aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15 that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16 forward, deal with other things.

17 Are there other things in our election process that  
18 we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19 major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20 about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21 DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22 of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23 -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25 in the legislature if you did that.

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.  
21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2 ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3 so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4 republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6 MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7 ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8 since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9 So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10 went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11 again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12 -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13 So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14 in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15 ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16 expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17 on-demand component --

18 JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19 MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21 the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22 MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23 \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24 We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25 on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1 ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2 almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3 or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4 voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5 I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6 to.

7 Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8 card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9 election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10 even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11 workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12 problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13 where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14 mistake like that, it's still made.

15 And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16 pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17 differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18 that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19 mistakes.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21 heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22 provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23 and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24 all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25 and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1 And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2 done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3 forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4 something that -- that we should -- we should think about.  
5 Madam Secretary?

6 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7 discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8 equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9 issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10 way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11 code and SEB procedures and things.

12 So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13 we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14 also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15 necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16 you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17 issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18 -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19 laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20 things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21 it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22 that we're looking at everything.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24 JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25 There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be hand-marked paper ballots?

Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly that have participated and -- has been on that -- that central issue that affects many of the other questions that we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next session? How long do we envision using the system that we decide upon?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question. I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have, that means a child born two years from now will be voting on a system that we decide on today.

And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single child -- so we're talking about children. Children today will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or another. I just think we need to consider that if this system is going to last as long as the last system has lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our future because the majority of the voters, if this system lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote very differently, take tests very differently, do things very differently than most of the people in this room.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for -- we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on paper, I would not trust that system.

So I think we're going to get -- there's always going to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is -- or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so that's why there's an important balance here.

And I do think, you know, between the -- the administration of the election, for election officials, but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know, at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending, but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's not going to be a perfect system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean, the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know, is the best available approach right now.

And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive -- to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I don't think we should have to find a solution and then use it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer technologies.

I really think that we should -- we should have this ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's available, and what has been working for us, and what needs to be improved and then have a new round of selection of new systems.

1 So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2 that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3 in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4 in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5 actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6 on leasing; right? Subscription.

7 I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8 you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9 instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10 dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11 are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12 Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13 bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14 later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15 change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16 know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17 little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18 comment.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20 thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21 anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22 flexibility to be flexible.

23 And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24 at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25 the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2 level.

3 But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4 involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5 in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6 money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7 taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8 the best practices of bonding.

9 And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10 oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11 lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12 we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13 agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14 leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15 you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16 DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17 is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18 then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19 safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20 -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21 right?

22 You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23 to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24 solution possible because there's no way out.

25 You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1 that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2 that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3 that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5 MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6 well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7 marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8 Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9 elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10 city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11 the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12 And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13 from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14 workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15 loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16 we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17 ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18 marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19 marking system.

20 It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21 the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22 was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23 race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24 wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25 could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1 The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2 -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3 that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4 transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5 used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6 read, as well as a regular voter.

7 So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8 like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9 it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10 that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11 on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12 them.

13 I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14 that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15 that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16 early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17 results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18 come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19 we felt comfortable with the results.

20 We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21 system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22 Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23 still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24 Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25 those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2 accommodate this.

3 The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4 process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5 Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6 gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7 thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8 the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9 make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10 decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11 Georgia.

12 Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13 come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14 I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15 you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16 workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17 we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18 for caring enough to be here today.

19 Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20 you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21 again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January \_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens  
PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR  
CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064



A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <hr/> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	---

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25



<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--



133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23		<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>L</b>	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	124:14 156:14	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	171:25 172:4	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	189:8	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	<b>language</b> 29:20	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	72:4 104:7	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	72:7 180:12	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	195:7 196:25	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	222:23 229:1	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	133:13	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>largest</b> 125:18	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>Las</b> 153:8	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	164:15	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	<b>laughingstock</b>	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	143:5 156:13	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>launch</b> 113:17	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	11:24 12:2,3	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	13:11 41:4 56:19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	60:7 61:11,14,19	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	112:15 141:21	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	142:1,4 177:2	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	182:16,18 183:7	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	216:14 224:21	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	183:10 195:25	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	216:19	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	138:2,3	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17	109:8 111:11,13	205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--



54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---



<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8	<b>success</b> 122:9	91:5 94:21 96:4	51:11,16,17,21,23
<b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4	<b>strange</b> 26:8	<b>successful</b> 99:7	97:5 100:1 105:4	52:3,5 53:22 56:7
3:22,25 13:20	<b>strengthened</b> 147:1	<b>successfully</b> 69:12	113:4 114:13	56:18 58:10,11
24:22 37:6,14	<b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20	101:8 214:10	118:12 119:8	62:1,9 63:15,23
51:13 108:22	<b>stretch</b> 97:2	<b>sucked</b> 98:15,18	120:7 122:2	66:23 67:10,16
113:3 134:2	<b>stretches</b> 178:16	<b>sucks</b> 164:11	124:17 134:25	68:20 69:4,5,21
139:24 150:15	<b>STRICKLAND</b>	<b>sudden</b> 165:10	164:17 167:25	70:17 71:25 72:5
181:17 193:21	171:14 205:25	<b>sue</b> 138:14	171:7,11 172:17	72:6,20 73:12,22
228:18	206:2	<b>sues</b> 33:18	178:8,22 181:11	73:25 74:2 79:1
<b>station</b> 75:23 78:7	<b>strips</b> 197:21	<b>sugar</b> 163:14	184:25 190:3	80:4,5,10 85:20
84:20 93:13	<b>strong</b> 92:6	<b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15	195:9 201:13,18	85:24 86:9,12,12
<b>stations</b> 84:18,19	<b>strongly</b> 62:21	50:9 151:4	205:14 209:19	86:21 87:7,8 89:2
84:24 205:10	151:4 161:18	<b>suggesting</b> 50:7	212:1,6 214:11	96:24 109:14,16
<b>statistical</b> 41:22	229:14	154:16	216:18 227:13	109:16 110:2
42:3	<b>structure</b> 196:5	<b>suggestion</b> 23:20	<b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24	111:17 112:8
<b>statistically-based</b>	<b>structured</b> 176:5	<b>suggestions</b> 8:25	<b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4	117:14 118:4,6,7
40:2 44:17	<b>struggle</b> 209:20	<b>suggests</b> 187:10	<b>surprise</b> 64:15	118:9,13 119:23
<b>statistically-valid</b>	211:24	<b>suit</b> 125:2,7	125:14 148:16	119:24 120:10
149:16	<b>stub</b> 215:2	<b>suits</b> 72:15	<b>surprised</b> 122:25	121:19 122:5,10
<b>statistical-based</b>	<b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3	<b>summary</b> 20:25	<b>surrounded</b> 193:23	127:16,16,22
41:19	222:11 223:23	107:24 148:22,22	<b>survey</b> 97:25	128:2,8 129:14
<b>statistician</b> 55:2	224:4	158:8 159:5	<b>surveyed</b> 9:18	130:15 132:22,23
<b>statistics</b> 44:2	<b>Student</b> 2:15	170:15	80:20	133:3,11,15
59:18 125:22	<b>students</b> 142:1	<b>summer</b> 127:5	<b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11	135:23 136:14,18
<b>statutory</b> 50:18	<b>studied</b> 66:13	<b>super</b> 197:1	153:11,19 157:11	140:7 141:1
<b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21	76:21	<b>superfluous</b> 164:3	157:14,15,23	142:12 145:16,19
114:23,24 202:4	<b>study</b> 30:24 54:25	<b>superintendent</b>	159:9	147:19 148:7
<b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18	63:8 65:3 66:3,4	182:19,23	<b>Susan's</b> 34:23	150:4,6,12,23
<b>staying</b> 216:18	66:14,15,17,21	<b>Superior</b> 111:3	154:1	151:5,13,17
<b>steal</b> 77:2	68:8 80:18 92:22	<b>supervisor</b> 134:9	<b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12	152:21 154:11,12
<b>step</b> 53:11 149:12	139:24 187:10	198:13	182:20	156:11 157:1,5
164:4	221:6	<b>supervisors</b> 128:6	<b>sustain</b> 173:11	158:13 160:11
<b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5	<b>studying</b> 75:7	<b>supply</b> 12:1	<b>swapping</b> 16:24	161:16,17,19,21
230:5,18,18	80:18	<b>support</b> 3:24 92:7	<b>swear</b> 117:15	161:25 162:1,3,6
<b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10	<b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8	135:23 143:9	<b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12	163:15 164:10
<b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10	106:25 126:1	<b>supportable</b> 129:25	<b>switched</b> 57:15	168:24 169:1,8,13
115:10 228:5	155:6 160:25	<b>supporting</b> 150:19	81:23 85:4	169:16,17,20
<b>STICKLAND</b>	<b>stuffing</b> 158:18	<b>suppose</b> 211:10	<b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5	170:7,23,23 171:3
172:22	<b>style</b> 72:15	<b>supposed</b> 72:18	167:5	171:4,5,11,25
<b>stone</b> 167:10	<b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1	160:9 213:6	<b>symptom</b> 82:17	172:5,7,11 173:4
228:24	214:15 215:9	<b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11	<b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12	173:4 177:9,12,14
<b>stools</b> 120:15	224:17	16:1 17:15 18:17	9:3,25 10:22,23	179:17,24 180:3
<b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10	<b>submitted</b> 47:16	19:13 21:15 29:3	11:10,11,13,25	180:18,20,25
155:10 188:19	124:19	29:4 33:12 34:3	12:5,13,17,18,22	183:25 184:21,22
<b>stopped</b> 211:22	<b>submitting</b> 122:4	34:11 35:4 39:3,8	13:4,7,18 14:11	185:15,16 189:11
<b>store</b> 162:22	<b>Subscription</b> 222:6	43:13 49:6,20	19:17 20:3 23:22	189:24 190:3,7,25
<b>stored</b> 27:14,22	<b>subset</b> 38:17	50:22 51:1 58:19	23:23 27:13 32:1	191:1,4,6,15,22
<b>stores</b> 135:5	<b>substitute</b> 133:4	62:4 69:23 70:13	34:12 35:6 36:18	192:15 193:9,15
<b>stories</b> 186:5	<b>subtle</b> 188:3	73:2 74:9 75:14	37:21 38:22,25	193:20 194:24
<b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>subtract</b> 146:10	79:9 85:1 89:17	49:7,10 50:23	195:1,5,15,18

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11		<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19		<b>wealthy</b> 93:16		<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19		<b>wearing</b> 107:22	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5 <b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walked</b> 98:14		<b>weather</b> 82:25		<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>walks</b> 70:14		<b>week</b> 3:21 97:8,15 98:24 105:17,18 167:8 191:21 208:12 228:22,22 228:23		<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>wane</b> 105:24		<b>weekend</b> 176:2		<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wanting</b> 211:22 <b>wants</b> 114:8 <b>War</b> 144:4 <b>warranty</b> 93:24 <b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12 <b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17 <b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25 <b>watchdog</b> 212:6 <b>watched</b> 208:11 <b>watcher</b> 129:2 <b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17 <b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25 <b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23 <b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20 <b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21 <b>weird</b> 86:8 <b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5 <b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19 <b>welcomed</b> 91:24 <b>well-designed</b> 125:8 <b>well-funded</b> 192:7 <b>well-intended</b> 5:19 <b>well-to-do</b> 93:17 <b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10 <b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13 <b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we've</b> 15:2 17:21	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19 <b>witnesses</b> 117:16 <b>WMAZ</b> 126:11 <b>women</b> 127:7,8,9 127:10 192:9

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>02</b> 194:21
223:5	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	224:15 228:14	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>1</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worst</b> 161:2	66:14 77:25 88:7	121:9 122:14,20	40:8 41:10 56:4
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	88:20 90:5 97:1	123:22 125:4,5	57:2 151:2 156:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	97:12 99:7 103:22	126:6,14 128:25	156:18 176:10
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	104:3 113:14	132:12 134:7,21	182:17
104:6 113:2 116:8	163:14 193:4,4	124:15 129:2,9	135:15 136:15,25	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
124:22 126:22	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:3 152:1 167:2	137:14,25 139:10	42:4,5,13 55:24
131:7 133:19	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	172:15 173:13,13	141:15 144:1	84:19 125:16
140:23 144:6,13	151:8 161:4	191:16 209:18	146:17 147:25	147:9 206:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:23	150:1 151:23	207:24 224:5
174:25 175:2	<b>write</b> 89:8	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	153:12,23 155:9	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
178:24 191:5	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	55:24 63:20 64:17	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
192:5 199:8,25	<b>writing</b> 170:4	68:8,13 69:2	157:23 165:2	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
202:21 203:14,19	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	74:18 79:19 93:18	172:21,21 186:25	165:5,21 198:20
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	127:2 136:4	193:23 194:10	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
212:15 222:8	108:8 162:7	138:19 142:3,3	200:7,21,24	141:4
224:23	187:15,15,16	147:9 154:5 156:2	212:11 228:6	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	189:21 198:16	156:11,11 158:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
124:16,20,20	202:21 207:12	158:17 165:10	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>114</b> 18:4
127:1 138:24	217:6,7,19	170:11 192:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>12</b> 125:19
173:10		207:24 212:24	95:8 117:22	<b>12th</b> 1:10
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
158:2 193:6 200:1		219:4,17,23	129:17 131:8	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
202:20		221:18,22 222:13	140:1 154:14	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21		223:23,25 224:6	157:16 166:18	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
100:1 101:25		224:11	169:5 188:19	167:4
104:22,22 117:2		<b>yell</b> 166:15	206:13 214:14	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
169:10 191:9		<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	223:15	48:24 221:18
193:1 194:5		<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
201:14 214:17		<b>yielded</b> 38:11	111:19 165:6	163:4 222:9 224:4
215:11 226:14		<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	206:5	<b>158</b> 92:3
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>Z</b>	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	218:23,24 219:17
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18



<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

---

**From:** Patrick Stephens <ptrckstephens1@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, January 18, 2019 1:19 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Cc:** gree806  
**Subject:** Fwd: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript (2).pdf; safecommissiontranscriptmini.pdf

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hey, Ms. Simmons! I'm not sure if Ms. Hammock forwarded this to you or not. My firm just informed me that you'll be accepting transcripts and invoices from us. I've forwarded the original emails with the transcript and invoice to you.

Definitely let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Patrick Stephens <ptrckstephens1@gmail.com>  
**Date:** Wed, Jan 9, 2019, 2:26 PM  
**Subject:** \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**To:** Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>  
**Cc:** gree806 <gree806@bellsouth.net>

Hey, Candice! I've attached the transcript to this E-mail. Please let me know that you've received it all right.

Thanks,

--

- Patrick A. Stephens, CCR -

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,



1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1           Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2           staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3           on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4           talk a little better into it.

5           MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6           Check, check, testing, testing.

7           AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8           MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9           So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10          better?

11          AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12          MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13          AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15          MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17          While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18          I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19          faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20          phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21          We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22          Good to see you.

23          MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25          could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a dues-free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1       could supply an independent audit trail.

2               The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3       legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4       did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5       purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6       May 4th, 2002.

7               The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8       commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9       same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10      only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11      fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12      have that in your recommendations.

13              So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14      2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15      verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16      to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17      system today.

18              So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19      Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20      perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21      or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22      you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23      the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24      screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25      the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you



1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1       fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2               In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3       lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4       decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5       ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6       there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7       know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8       county -- there's no other elections on there.

9               When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10      voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11      their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12      then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13      plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14      again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15      than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16              So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17      there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18      a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19      against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20      could have been lost.

21              In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22      election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23      a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24      we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25      consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't



1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1       voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2       suggest that -- we think is important:

3             The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4       We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5       It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6       everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7       and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8       disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9       ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10      disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11      then their voter anonymity is better.

12            Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13      tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14      be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15      allowed in Georgia.

16            Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17      think is really important that we want the commission to  
18      consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19      a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20      tabulators.

21            So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22      counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23      better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24      information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25      fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers



1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but



1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say



1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.



1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13          We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18          We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1           going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2           The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3           votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4           refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5           the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6           whatever could happen.

7           They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8           machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9           needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10          the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11          paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12          Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13          The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14          surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15          surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16          came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17          and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18          of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19          optical-scan ballots.

20          At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21          a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22          because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23          would register in the whole county that night because,  
24          obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25          voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a



1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the



1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11               SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13               SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21               SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9               MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17              MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24              You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?



1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.



1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2               But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9               On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10       And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11       Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12       there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13       that happened on election day.

14              You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15       -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16       problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17       but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18              We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19       heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20       o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21       to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22       of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23       working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24       it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25       poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --



1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2           through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3           deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4           think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5           continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6           litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8           give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9           election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10          -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11          Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12          use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13          lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15          Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16          in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17          for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19          the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20          plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21          goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22          pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23          rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25          briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant



1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these



1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it



1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1       be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2       dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3       are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4       on.

5               So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6       of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7       audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8       integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9       the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10      very much.

11             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12      today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13      Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14      us where you're from.

15             MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16      executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17      today to talk to you --

18             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19             MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21             MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23             MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25             MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1       want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2       to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3       right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4       with 400 million dollars in debt.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6       appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7       Marilyn, good to have you today.

8               (Alarm chiming.)

9       MS. MARKS: Already?

10       REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11       MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12       REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13       MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14       REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15       tell us where you live.

16       MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17       -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18       I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19       REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20       which county you live in.

21       MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22       REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23       MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24       time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25       voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's



1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14           Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21           MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1           you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2           MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3           Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4           restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5           and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6           the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7           officials since that time despite that information being  
8           thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9           The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10          and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11          of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12          They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13          point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14          University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15          State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16          statewide.

17          So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18          professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19          supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20          National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21          this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22          Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23          the technology involved in our election system.

24          And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25          Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic



1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1       Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2       heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3       and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5               MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7       for.

8               MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9       Representatives, District 25.

10              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11              MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13              MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14       am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15       percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16       County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17              But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18       -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19       -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20       tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21       ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22       like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23              But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24       that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25       and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

1           goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2           that's at stake.

3           As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4           and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5           didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6           involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7           will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8           afraid their vote will not count.

9           If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10          you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11          goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12          anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13          handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14          go. Thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16          Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17          MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19          MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20          allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21          work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22          of Georgia.

23          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24          MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25          voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with



1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.

1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1           that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2           accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3           the legislature decides on the system.

4           And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5           the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6           aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7           guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8           got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9           confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11           George Ballbona (ph)?

12           MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14           George.

15           MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17           for being here today.

18           MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19           live in Cobb County.

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21           MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22           those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23           but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24           anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25           something costs.

1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of



1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3             JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4             MS. BOREN: Concur.

5             JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6             MS. BOREN: We agree.

7             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11            Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19            MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21            MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23            MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.



1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2           possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3           audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4           elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5           And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6           audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8           -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9           the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10          auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11          want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12          having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13          to keep that in mind.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15          MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16          I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17          verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18          important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19          at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20          use the phrase security and inclusion.

21          And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22          discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23          the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24          a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25          of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.



1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

1 understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a  
2 paper trail.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

4 MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to  
5 putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us  
6 are talking about with the pre-audit --

7 DR. LEE: Okay.

8 MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to  
9 ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you  
10 intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the  
11 pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the  
12 field.

13 DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic  
15 system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a  
16 paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BOREN: We test everything.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this  
24 is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11       ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12       look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14       with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15       done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16       and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20       want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21       we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22       but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23       this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25       that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.



1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22               important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23               talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24               systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should



1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1       there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2       that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3       They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4       and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6               MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7       required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8       who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9       there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10      pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11      -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12      express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13      that.

14              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15              JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16      system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17      voter --

18              MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19              JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20      human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21      doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22      ballot.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24              MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25      that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?



1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to



1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --



1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1       produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2       slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3       prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4       sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5       doesn't retain any votes.

6               And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7       election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8       easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9       election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10      in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11      multiple ways.

12             So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13      an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14      devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15      mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16      and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17      who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18      them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19      would like to do that.

20             We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21      a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22      if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23      ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24      the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25      that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064



A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10 <hr/> <b>C</b> <b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11
--	---	--	--	--

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20
<b>clarifying</b> 24:11	<b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22		<b>commissioner's</b> 23:12	<b>compliance</b> 2:11
<b>clarity</b> 132:18	<b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23	<b>commencing</b> 1:9	<b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19	<b>compliant</b> 216:18
<b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24	<b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7	<b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18	<b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18	<b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3
<b>clean</b> 4:2	<b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13		<b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12	<b>Complies</b> 114:20
<b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3	<b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24		<b>commitment</b> 93:20	<b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17
<b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4	<b>color-coded</b> 215:10		<b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19	<b>components</b> 191:13
<b>clever</b> 16:12	<b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14	<b>commenters</b> 160:4	<b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6	<b>composed</b> 66:12
<b>clicked</b> 120:4	<b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13	<b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5	<b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15	<b>comprehensive</b> 169:9
<b>climate</b> 81:19		<b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8	<b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4	<b>compromise</b> 15:1
<b>climates</b> 82:17			<b>communicated</b> 101:3	<b>compromised</b> 15:10
<b>clock</b> 98:15,16			<b>communities</b> 130:18	<b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10
<b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5	<b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8		<b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12	<b>computerized</b> 165:3
<b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17	<b>comfort</b> 210:22		<b>commute</b> 146:21	<b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13
<b>closet</b> 177:18	<b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19		<b>company</b> 59:20	<b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9
<b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5			<b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20	<b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6
<b>cloud</b> 61:16	<b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18		<b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20	<b>computing</b> 158:24
<b>clubs</b> 70:7			<b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19	<b>con</b> 174:12
<b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17			<b>compelling</b> 33:19	<b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6
<b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19			<b>complaint</b> 105:21	<b>conceive</b> 215:13
<b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11			<b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24	<b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13
<b>codes</b> 160:7			<b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7	<b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21
<b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24			<b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22	<b>concerned</b> 14:20
<b>codify</b> 51:25			<b>completeness</b> 149:6	
<b>codifying</b> 51:18			<b>completion</b> 4:16	
<b>coffee</b> 163:13		<b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	
<b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19				
<b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17				
<b>Coliseum</b> 1:12				

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25



<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<p><b>exceeded</b> 85:12</p> <p><b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18</p> <p><b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25</p> <p><b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10</p> <p><b>excited</b> 3:3</p> <p><b>excitement</b> 153:1</p> <p><b>exciting</b> 49:4</p> <p><b>exclusively</b> 56:1</p> <p><b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12</p> <p><b>executed</b> 101:7</p> <p><b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17</p> <p><b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3</p> <p><b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12</p> <p><b>existed</b> 66:15,18</p> <p><b>existing</b> 80:19,20</p> <p><b>exists</b> 163:25</p> <p><b>exit</b> 43:24</p> <p><b>expand</b> 49:12,16</p> <p><b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3</p> <p><b>expected</b> 75:12</p> <p><b>expecting</b> 157:7</p> <p><b>expedite</b> 129:23</p> <p><b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24</p> <p><b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25</p> <p><b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10</p> <p><b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16</p> <p><b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15</p> <p><b>experiences</b> 84:2</p>	<p><b>experiment</b> 87:17</p> <p><b>experimental</b> 53:24</p> <p><b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4</p> <p><b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22</p> <p><b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7</p> <p><b>expired</b> 93:25</p> <p><b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23</p> <p><b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21</p> <p><b>explains</b> 19:25</p> <p><b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25</p> <p><b>exponentially</b> 102:2</p> <p><b>exposed</b> 15:13</p> <p><b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24</p> <p><b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16</p> <p><b>expressing</b> 219:6</p> <p><b>expression</b> 163:22</p> <p><b>expressly</b> 230:9</p> <p><b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17</p> <p><b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11</p> <p><b>extending</b> 102:11</p> <p><b>extensive</b> 14:1</p> <p><b>extent</b> 216:3</p> <p><b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4</p> <p><b>extra</b> 165:5,9</p> <p><b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22</p> <p><b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9</p>	<p><b>faced</b> 46:10</p> <p><b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1</p> <p><b>facilitate</b> 201:20</p> <p><b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19</p> <p><b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3</p> <p><b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21</p> <p><b>factors</b> 222:14</p> <p><b>fails</b> 47:6</p> <p><b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10</p> <p><b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8</p> <p><b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7</p> <p><b>fairness</b> 133:14</p> <p><b>faith</b> 175:19</p> <p><b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5</p> <p><b>fallible</b> 154:12</p> <p><b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21</p> <p><b>families</b> 98:8</p> <p><b>family</b> 83:24</p> <p><b>fantastic</b> 101:21</p> <p><b>fantastically</b> 99:4</p> <p><b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17</p> <p><b>fashion</b> 207:15,16</p> <p><b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15</p> <p><b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25</p> <p><b>father</b> 60:18,20</p>	<p>154:7</p> <p><b>fault</b> 50:12</p> <p><b>favor</b> 147:6</p> <p><b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8</p> <p><b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22</p> <p><b>fear</b> 133:7</p> <p><b>feared</b> 87:22</p> <p><b>feature</b> 132:22</p> <p><b>fed</b> 226:20</p> <p><b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18</p> <p><b>federally</b> 192:14</p> <p><b>feds</b> 78:18</p> <p><b>fee</b> 79:23</p> <p><b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14</p> <p><b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14</p> <p><b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22</p> <p><b>fellow</b> 113:6</p> <p><b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19</p> <p><b>fess</b> 11:5</p> <p><b>fewer</b> 40:20</p> <p><b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12</p>	<p><b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10</p> <p><b>figured</b> 97:6</p> <p><b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8</p> <p><b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3</p> <p><b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7</p> <p><b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2</p> <p><b>filling</b> 65:7</p> <p><b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16</p> <p><b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5</p> <p><b>Finance</b> 2:15</p> <p><b>financial</b> 165:14</p> <p><b>financially</b> 140:15</p> <p><b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17</p> <p><b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6</p> <p><b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10</p> <p><b>finger</b> 107:19</p> <p><b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14</p> <p><b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20</p> <p><b>firm</b> 141:21</p> <p><b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23</p> <p><b>fit</b> 58:11</p> <p><b>five</b> 98:1 117:3</p>
---	--	--	---	--

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
---	--	---	---	--

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--



133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
<b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	<b>P</b> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	<b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	58:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>



54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8	220:25 227:8	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19	114:18 225:4	<b>signs</b> 204:20
<b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8	228:1	220:24	<b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5	<b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5
14:15 15:4,21	<b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16	<b>sentiment</b> 189:19	<b>Sheila</b> 221:15	114:17
16:3 32:21,25	99:20 111:13	<b>separate</b> 116:21	<b>shelf</b> 95:6	<b>silent</b> 159:18
36:13 69:3,5	123:19	117:6 149:12	<b>shenanigans</b>	<b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7
70:17 72:23	<b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2	201:23 217:2	154:12	191:1 200:11,14
119:24 120:5,10	170:24	<b>sequential</b> 56:3	<b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19	214:5
127:16 135:24	<b>seeking</b> 142:23	<b>sequestered</b> 104:12	<b>she'd</b> 71:8	<b>Simonia</b> 122:14
145:18 158:21	<b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12	<b>serious</b> 129:14	<b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21	<b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17
172:17 180:2,18	102:22 111:10	130:7 138:8,11,12	<b>shifted</b> 63:6	160:10 212:20
201:25 205:19	115:7 154:8	<b>seriously</b> 131:23	<b>shop</b> 135:5	<b>simplified</b> 73:25
223:23 230:8	158:20 229:16	132:15 183:3	<b>shopping</b> 5:2	<b>simply</b> 17:23
<b>Securing</b> 150:21	<b>segment</b> 166:6	<b>seriousness</b> 78:25	<b>short</b> 113:4 129:19	118:16 163:10
<b>security</b> 4:7 14:24	<b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20	<b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5	142:20 146:21	165:12
15:6 30:1 32:16	87:7 106:5,6	<b>served</b> 60:20 66:10	<b>shortages</b> 97:20	<b>single</b> 14:24,25
32:23 74:8 92:16	222:16	<b>server</b> 15:10,10,14	<b>shorter</b> 113:5	15:11,22 38:13
132:20,21 133:11	<b>selected</b> 165:19	19:17 202:1,2	<b>short-term</b> 149:7	44:11 46:7 47:18
133:12,13,14,22	<b>selection</b> 116:24	<b>serves</b> 39:15	<b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10	48:8 54:14 72:21
137:9 138:8	221:24 226:23	<b>service</b> 2:12 4:18	72:14 87:15 90:11	86:15 98:9 152:2
146:24 150:10	<b>selections</b> 12:23	149:22 193:8	107:25	172:18 187:4,7
151:4 158:11	29:7 148:16	<b>Services</b> 2:17	<b>showed</b> 94:20	206:12 219:9
164:15 179:16,20	<b>selective</b> 33:4	204:22	120:2,14 203:4	<b>single-ballot</b> 42:24
203:13 205:17	<b>self-reported</b> 106:9	<b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7	<b>showing</b> 146:4	43:2
219:8 221:1	<b>selling</b> 73:21	126:20 141:18	148:10 166:8	<b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15
227:20	<b>Seminole</b> 97:13	<b>session</b> 4:14 29:21	186:7	53:17 79:12 80:7
<b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24	98:12,20,22	51:22,24 55:11	<b>shown</b> 199:25	132:10 145:23
7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2	<b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10	62:13 112:14	<b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6	172:22 179:15
9:19,20,22 12:24	168:15 173:24	142:21 161:22	183:13 186:4	181:20
14:13 15:19 21:7	216:25	167:2 215:23	<b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22	<b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15
21:14 25:24 26:10	<b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24	218:16	84:5 131:17 135:6	175:4
27:3 29:15 33:15	36:11,12 57:25	<b>set</b> 11:14 20:15	163:15 164:15	<b>sits</b> 200:22
33:16,17 34:16	58:1 78:12,13,17	40:25 42:3,4	173:24	<b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9
35:22 37:6 40:8	79:11,13,21 85:2	46:21 54:12 94:13	<b>sick</b> 156:2	124:11 138:24
41:14 45:7 50:10	85:3 86:24,25	110:16 112:24	<b>side</b> 14:13 168:15	165:6
51:2 53:7,14	87:1 88:5 107:2,3	118:8,11 122:23	168:15 223:20	<b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2
56:21,25 57:8	108:3,6 164:6	123:6 127:13	227:1,2	19:16 20:12 26:8
60:6,9 62:15,17	171:1,2,13,13,14	140:20 160:19	<b>sided</b> 138:7,9	36:21 87:22 98:25
76:24 81:13 82:20	171:14 172:20,22	167:10 226:10	<b>sides</b> 171:16	148:23 163:16
84:11 87:25 88:13	173:20,21,23	229:1	<b>sight-impaired</b>	215:12 224:8
88:23 90:15 96:11	203:20,22 204:11	<b>sets</b> 173:17	225:23	<b>situations</b> 17:21
97:25 102:25	204:16,18,24	<b>Setting</b> 132:17	<b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20	191:17
109:18 110:4	205:1,25 206:2	<b>Setzler</b> 163:17	114:8 129:12	<b>six</b> 167:21 177:1
111:23 122:3	<b>senators</b> 209:19	164:1	168:16 222:5	212:24
130:11 134:20	222:25	<b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24	<b>signature</b> 230:13	<b>sixth-district</b> 17:10
135:5,9 141:12	<b>send</b> 59:4 82:9	<b>shaky</b> 125:5,6	<b>signed</b> 114:7,9	17:12
143:23 152:23	<b>senior</b> 70:6	<b>share</b> 118:2 127:6	<b>significant</b> 86:16	<b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11
156:20 171:11	<b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4	171:25 194:2	121:17 206:25	167:13 215:16
175:21 186:17	53:1,4 142:7,7,13	<b>shared</b> 130:10	<b>significantly</b>	<b>skill</b> 136:20
198:5 199:9	143:15 152:2	<b>shed</b> 196:17	121:20	<b>skills</b> 136:16
201:14 214:20	210:23 212:9	<b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	<b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>skin</b> 212:5

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---



<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>well</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>well-funded</b> 192:7	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>well-intended</b> 5:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>well-to-do</b> 93:17	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winner</b> 46:21
	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winning</b> 182:11
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wisely</b> 212:2,7
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wished</b> 84:6
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>withdrawn</b> 230:9
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
223:5	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	224:15 228:14	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worst</b> 161:2	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
104:6 113:2 116:8	163:14 193:4,4	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
124:22 126:22	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
131:7 133:19	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
140:23 144:6,13	151:8 161:4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
174:25 175:2	<b>write</b> 89:8	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
178:24 191:5	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	55:24 63:20 64:17	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
192:5 199:8,25	<b>writing</b> 170:4	68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
202:21 203:14,19	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	74:18 79:19 93:18	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
212:15 222:8	108:8 162:7	138:19 142:3,3	212:11 228:6	141:4
224:23	187:15,15,16	147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	189:21 198:16	156:11,11 158:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
124:16,20,20	202:21 207:12	158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
127:1 138:24	217:6,7,19	170:11 192:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
173:10		207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
158:2 193:6 200:1		219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
202:20		221:18,22 222:13	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>X</b>	223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
100:1 101:25	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10	224:11	206:13 214:14	167:4
104:22,22 117:2	93:13	<b>yell</b> 166:15	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
169:10 191:9	<b>Y</b>	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
193:1 194:5	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18



<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

## SECURE, ACCESSIBLE &amp; FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

## STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

## TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity, transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it has been throughout my career in public service.

Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I spent time in several different areas of state government, including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the Department of Human Services.

Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of

Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

(Collective Pledge.)

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

group has already heard from several different groups, and stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the important discussion about our state's next voting system.

We're -- we're joined here today by Representative Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature and Governor-elect Kemp.

Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all of the attendees here.

Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of State's office as we began our transition planning. I realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very grateful for the support you've given us.

As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

focal point for elections because the priceless franchise to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections throughout every aspect of the election process.

Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and, today, it is imperative we complete our research for security and technology for the next decade.

I have said that we need the most secure, updated voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a system that moves voters faster through the line so we can reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our next-generation voting machines.

Our next legislative session begins on January 14th and I know that the General Assembly and our department is looking forward to the completion and recommendations from this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank you for offering yourself for service in this critical and noble effort.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda for today.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary, and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to talk about something very important to Georgia; that is, voting in our state.

We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be able to help you out.

As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had very good participation from the public at our prior meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you for being here.

As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have time limits for our presentations today and we will gently initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.  
17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.  
21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

could supply an independent audit trail.

The law -- in order to get the machines in, the legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal did not take effect until after the contract was -- was purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on May 4th, 2002.

The reason that I bring this to the attention of the commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have -- have that in your recommendations.

So when that new system was implemented back then in 2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable system today.

So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system? Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well, you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot screen that you see may not be what's happening on the -- the inside of the machine.

trust in Georgia voting.

So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go through to do a big project like this.

And, typically, what you do is you analyze your current system for improvement opportunities, you define the new system requirements and then evaluate the alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is to help you identify the current system improvement opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for defining your objectives and requirements.

Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great protection for Georgia voters.

But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

As election officials, many of you know when -- there are no audit procedures in place today to audit their elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results, you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the correct results that the system told you.

And then lastly, but not least, is the recount situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable system.

So that's the election-integrity advocates' perspective, but what about the state's perspective? We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The -- the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that -- of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2 So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3 Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4 ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5 elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6 getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7 device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8 So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9 and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10 server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11 by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12 have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13 happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14 Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15 great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16 lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17 So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18 commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19 can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20 you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21 The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22 it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23 but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24 counties.

25 So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPL0ST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPL0ST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.  
25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really



1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1 either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2 MS. BAILEY: So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3 considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4 MR. FAVORITO: That's exactly right. There was no  
5 mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6 ballots cast in those races.

7 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you.

9 MS. ROSS: Can I get a point of clarification?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Just a point of clarification: For Bibb  
12 County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13 lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14 that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15 as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16 that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17 do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18 from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19 card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20 for.

21 MR. FAVORITO: So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22 the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23 itself.

24 MS. ROSS: They are on the voting unit, too.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1 that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2 nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3 machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4 non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5 A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6 which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7 very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8 have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9 commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10 ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11 recommendation.

12 So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13 systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14 replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15 that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16 those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17 well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18 electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19 really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20 cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21 -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22 The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23 DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24 Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25 University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6 Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14 And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24 So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

elections, it's going to require some additional work on the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be able to audit, recount and make sure that we have transparency in the election process.

This is going to be an increased burden on the county elections directors. It's going to require a little bit more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want to bring that to your attention because I think the Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county commissions in making sure that they understand this when we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement auditing, recounting and transparency.

So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've given you and see exactly what you really think we need to do and we think that you need to define the requirements, basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report. Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to release this until Friday because I wanted to get some feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

but you save all of this administrative work for the elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't have enough, then there's a big scramble.

So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections. Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know, any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with that ballot.

So we actually recommend that people vote by mail given the current -- the current situation with these machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of election is basically foolproof and no particular voting type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

the presentation and then I was going to make some adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared to talk about it in case there any questions.

And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be glad to take any other questions about the new system as well.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the preprinted ballots that are wasted --

MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used. Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much. We appreciate you being here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you. Thank you for having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see you today.

MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear me okay?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn. I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the honor of previously presenting to you on our first commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back. And the topic I'm going to talk about today is postelection audits.

Postelection audits are something that we currently don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we will be able to do. It's something that most states do, so it's something that you may want to include in the recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that later today and something for the legislature and our state

election board to really work with in the future.

So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your results using the same underlying data. So, in our world, the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're trying to independently re-create that tabulated results, looking back at the cast votes.

What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment and the procedures used to count the votes worked correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the election yielded the correct result.

What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a recount is, is when you count every single vote for a particular race. So when you recount a house district, you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full re-creation, you will know what the results is.

So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures worked.

So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

So the benefits of a audit are that you can find errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental errors, it can help you have data and information so that you can improve the process for future elections; you can iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits going to be done after an election, you know that they are going to dig in and review those results, look at the ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps build public confidence in the election and the outcome of an election.

So I'm going to describe the three main categories or types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What this means is there is a predetermined percentage of usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of the percentages that you would go back and review. The advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of precincts you would have to look at and that makes it easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a scope.

The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout, you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close the election is.

But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered percentage is being done by two states right now, and what that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how many precincts you will check based on how close the election is.

So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin, you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5 percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the election is.

And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and, at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1 audit.

2 So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3 a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4 time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5 percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6 that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7 catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8 the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9 you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10 and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11 is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12 So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13 statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14 years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15 journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16 elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17 they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18 There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19 Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20 audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21 smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22 able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23 To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24 of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25 comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1 it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2 make changes.

3 If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4 potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5 records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6 fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7 recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8 election you are auditing if you do it before  
9 certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10 it pre, some states do it after certification.

11 And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12 that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13 audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14 do you review the digital image of the paper?

15 The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16 you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17 they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18 single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19 technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20 of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21 they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22 pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23 So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24 we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25 ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2 for risk-limited audits.

3 So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4 know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5 verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6 confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7 any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8 worked correctly.

9 You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10 new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11 makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12 overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13 audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14 as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15 we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16 audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17 And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18 audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19 audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20 but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21 death from what I've talked about.

22 There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23 brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24 life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25 them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6 MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.  
9 And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16 MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18 MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1 which one's better?

2 MR. RAYBURN: So I think if we had a statistician to  
3 work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4 felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5 that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6 would have to review.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Lynn?

8 MS. BAILEY: Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Speaking  
9 off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10 we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11 that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12 we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13 audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14 precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15 precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16 will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17 done.

18 You know, there are important things going on in that  
19 three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20 looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21 example. So we do definitely need to look at that.

22 And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23 ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24 process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25 mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1 audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2 greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3 difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4 recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5 to recertify a result.

6 MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7 election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8 over. You see what I'm saying?

9 MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10 on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11 a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12 precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13 results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14 have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15 switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16 MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17 recount, not a do over, is my question.

18 MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19 and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20 would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21 going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22 new election.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24 the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25 ordered. Senator?



1 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6 MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23 MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3 MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8 Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10 MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12 PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16 MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19 MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22 MS. COX: That's right.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25 MS. COX: That's right.

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.  
24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3 MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5 MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9 MS. COX: That's right.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12 MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15 MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18 MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22 MS. COX: Exactly.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1 going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2 The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3 votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4 refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5 the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6 whatever could happen.

7 They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8 machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9 needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10 the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11 paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12 Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13 The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14 surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15 surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16 came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17 and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18 of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19 optical-scan ballots.

20 At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21 a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22 because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23 would register in the whole county that night because,  
24 obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25 voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7 I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13 We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18 We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate these lost votes and we took that original study -- which should be in the state archives -- we took that study to the legislature and said, We need to really do something on our watch before we have the next election cycle.

So that was when the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the commission, several others of you might have, but we had a combination, as your commission is composed, of local election officials and legislators that studied for a full year. We took the study we had done internally of what had happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in Georgia.

And it was a result of that study that led us into deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and to move, for the first time, into a system where every county would use the same voting equipment so that we could do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't even envision the things that are happening today in technology or the threats that are happening today to technology back in the day when we put this equipment in -- in place.

I think we also envisioned that there would be a continuous study of election equipment over the years and that there would be continuous need to purchase additional equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us to where we are today.

But one of the main -- a couple of the main points that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a decision for making a change today is to be mindful that, yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair; things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be replaced and upgraded.

So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

that the Secretary of State could do training for all county election officials and then to help the poll-worker training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis across the state, that the state would then, whatever equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the counties and, at least on the first round, make that purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got into the system we have now.

We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think -- my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that model.

We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the technology wasn't there at the time.

Honestly, I think that our commission thought back in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two, technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure voting system but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure but that also -- you understand the voter interface with technology.

We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000 presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill in DC of working with our congressional delegation and others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50 million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the equipment that we purchased.

In fact, the only money that the state ended up putting into the purchase was really the voter-education piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to make sure that voters are never turned away from voting because they don't want to show up in a polling place and be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6 Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9 DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17 So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23 You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1 there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2 and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3 upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4 whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5 that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6 less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7 that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8 Michael?

9 MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10 when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11 Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12 elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13 time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14 purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15 was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16 at that time?

17 MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18 study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19 start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20 Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21 equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22 auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23 definition of auditing.

24 You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25 purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1 So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2 experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3 trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4 and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5 even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6 tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7 and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8 independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9 heard.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11 MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12 again.

13 MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14 MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15 we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16 there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17 one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18 lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19 at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20 printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21 one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22 created long lines.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24 MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25 than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1 And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2 and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3 conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4 the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5 printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6 funding from the state or federal government to our  
7 counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8 not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9 statewide runoff.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11 MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12 Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13 importance around access for individuals with disability  
14 and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15 privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16 access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17 process for people with disabilities?

18 MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19 voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20 when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21 different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22 and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23 a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24 didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25 just didn't vote.

1 sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4 earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5 in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6 participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7 black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8 curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9 and why you think that occurred?

10 MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11 reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12 that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13 between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14 the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15 some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16 using optical-scan ballots.

17 We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18 look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19 just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20 didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21 using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22 optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23 that bubble or mark the X.

24 We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25 I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6 MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12 So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20 People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?



JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part of the training money was allocated to train poll workers, because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And -- and you need to realize these are temporary workers that only work two or three elections every other year.

And I remember there was money put regionally into the technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses and carried them and they were taught how to operate the equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters how to use the equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to underscore, just like many others have around the table, the importance of the educational component and my -- that comment is more related to the judge's comments about training poll workers.

Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it. Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

solutions that we were coming up with and, when we ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as the security piece. It's not one or the other and they -- they've got to be equally considered in your decision-making.

And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and to keep up with changes in technology and to help the counties.

We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just uncomfortable with the entire process.

So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all of us around the table could at least agree on that.

JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too proud to ask for help.

MS. BAILEY: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made and how can we learn from your experience?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with the legislature.

MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines that we experienced in this election cycle because counties -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think, understood we're probably heading into something new so they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying additional equipment.

But since the state moved into this arena, unified the state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to the counties so that we can keep up that level playing field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to buy new equipment in the years to come.

We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the state would really help voters everywhere.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2 State's office is always going to need that level of  
3 staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4 university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5 that is purchased new.

6 You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7 think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8 the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9 provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10 equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11 the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12 based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14 much.

15 MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17 MS. COX: Thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19 today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20 (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22 would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23 started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24 Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25 to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1 their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2 advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3 people vote in advanced voting.

4 By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5 were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6 advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7 advanced voting in this election.

8 We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9 election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10 to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11 litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12 to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13 citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14 essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15 that county election officials had been doing.

16 And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17 county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18 as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19 And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20 changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21 And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22 officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23 on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24 ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25 some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1 done in the past had been altered.

2 But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3 what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4 our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5 as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6 I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7 through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8 successfully at the county level.

9 On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10 And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11 Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12 there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13 that happened on election day.

14 You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15 -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16 problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17 but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18 We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19 heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20 o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21 to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22 of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23 working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24 it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25 poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1 what lines looked like throughout the state.

2 And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3 terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4 election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5 not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6 About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7 that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8 but in some locations.

9 Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10 said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11 voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12 about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13 2018.

14 We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15 longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16 gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17 did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18 about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19 again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20 to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21 about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22 and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23 There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24 look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25 dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10 We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15 Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19 In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2 Senator Jackson.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4 for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5 how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6 candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7 MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8 that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9 know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10 calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11 grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12 you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13 ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14 know, bounce around.

15 These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16 fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17 you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18 people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19 finger around.

20 It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21 screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22 spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23 glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24 always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25 show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1 We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7 The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14 That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18 Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24 The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1 this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2 state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3 the Secretary of State's office.

4 So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5 even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6 in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7 chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9 MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10 that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11 this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12 election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13 it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14 an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15 elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16 allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17 launch in municipal elections.

18 And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19 we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20 likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21 into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22 right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24 Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25 you do.

MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission members, we're now going to move to the portion of our agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right where you are, stand up.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing up, stay standing up.

Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you for that.

What I would ask of you now is, is to understand clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going to ask you to stick to that.

Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself. If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But, generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as well.

So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments, making their point but making it in such a way that it's not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so thank you for that in the past.

Is there anyone who does not understand the ground rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start going down the list, and thank you so much.

Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia. Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara, please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear from you.

MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party, county-party committees and election officials. I also oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching program.

Over the course of this election season, our voter-protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November 6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and hundreds more during the early voting periods.

Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a voter would make a selection only to have the machine reflect a different result.

In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There was one voter who reported having to change her vote five times before it correctly reflected her choice. In another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to three separate machines before they could find a machine that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

We also received multiple reports of races not appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

Problems weren't limited to the election machines. There were many problems with the registration system. We had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

We have other cases where voters found their registrations online, they had printed registration cards; they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the -- at the polling booths.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to research these problems. I would like to share them with each county as we go through so that we can look at them and figure out what happened and where the system broke down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and in the officials and the administration of the system.

What's critical now is that this body develop a set of standards against which the decisions that -- on a system will be made. You have to have standards that you establish here because if we don't set a baseline that includes making sure that the voters are able to create and confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these votes are auditable independently without any intervention by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply continue.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

MS. NELSON: Yes.

Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any central database.

So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little bit to the disabilities concerns.

I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where little people showed up to their polling places and were not given stools or chairs, left without casting their vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their access to cast their vote.

So, right now, we are already facing a lot of disability issues and, completely understandably, with handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

MS. NELSON: -- having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not with any particular organization. I really appreciate your time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

MS. NELSON: This one?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little closer.

MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned citizen and not with any particular organization and I appreciate your time.

So I am concerned particularly with any electronic system, as has been proven by experts that there's no system known out there right now that is completely secure from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name right?

MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again. I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from.

MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I spent the last several months working as a field organizer for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast. The trust in the election system has degraded significantly.

There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust, which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually made were registered in the way that they intended. And,



therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to make sure that that happens.

They need to be able to know, and see and feel that they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be restored. So I really hope that you take that into consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so critical to the success and the stability of our election system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much, Heidi. We appreciate you being here today. Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the first name since you're not responding. Simonia Blassingame?

Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I pronounce your last name right, Eric?

MR. WEIR: Yep.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to have you and please tell us where you're from.

MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

good. Okay. All right.

MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne, welcome --

MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the best election board and we have the best election director other than those of you who are election directors sitting here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

And -- and that's important because in this day of lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have experienced voting this year in a county that gets it right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

We literally got down to only one advanced paper ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was because we worked with private citizens, worked with our election director to reach people to solve problems, so you can work with the rules without disenfranchising voters.

I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really critical issue.

As we all know, we live in a time of polarization, of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats, independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible, fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest priority.

You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort? Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I mispronounce it this time?

MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county. That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've read so that should not be in dispute that that is what the experts are saying.

As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 -- 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your equipment was down, so don't be confused by those statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people had real fundamental problems.

So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4 MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10 MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13 MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1 Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7 My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11 The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18 Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23 In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1 this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2 citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3 better by one another.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5 today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6 Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7 Please tell us where you're from.

8 MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9 elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10 degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11 of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12 including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13 held my current position since 2007.

14 I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15 voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16 through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17 local jurisdictions.

18 We need to have meaningful audits before  
19 certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20 I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21 lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22 certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23 barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24 we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25 whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 was accurate.

2 So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3 paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4 marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5 it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6 what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7 is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8 evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9 receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10 any different. Thank you very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12 appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13 for coming today. Good to have you again.

14 MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16 from.

17 MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18 County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19 Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20 representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21 to address you guys.

22 The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23 that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24 and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25 alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 than you've had the time to go through yet.

2 What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3 is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4 elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5 going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6 Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7 verifiable system.

8 The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9 all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10 not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11 verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12 to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13 that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14 systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15 one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16 elections.

17 I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18 you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19 you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20 set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21 Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22 need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23 terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24 what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25 of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3 MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8 You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13 And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20 So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditale (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one, I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be negative one and subtract from your total.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann, thank you for coming today.

MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972 and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

hear from you.

MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to have their votes represent their intentions.

It is imperative that the new voting system that you recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their voices heard on election day. In our recent election, there were reports of problems with the DREs showing erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen technology these problems will persist. They can be avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise; right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented the rule of the voter.

I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking -- marking devices that you are considering will produce a paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and recorded.

-- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded scanners that can handle the humidity.

And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there. Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

But -- and one other thing that I don't think anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today, and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the separate verification step and issues of human limitations become moot.

Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid audit is the best available method for conducting elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to heart the recommendations of the experts.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration and service to the voters of Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John, good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1 you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2 MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3 Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4 restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5 and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6 the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7 officials since that time despite that information being  
8 thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9 The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10 and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11 of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12 They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13 point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14 University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15 State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16 statewide.

17 So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18 professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19 supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21 this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22 Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23 the technology involved in our election system.

24 And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25 Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb



County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time since she offered?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the news business a few years back after a long career both in national news and state-local news in another part of the country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot boxes we were talking about.

So I understand that any system can be hacked, any system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials here, but you've all heard about it.

And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle, suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly. We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

I love the idea that we can print them on demand. That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

-- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and, having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a pension for accurate, reliable data.

And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will tell you that my experience since we have had electronic voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've never quite trusted it.

We've been using that system for years and years and lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of trust.

Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know, that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

I think what I want to see is that everyone gets -- everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever they voted for, that they can have documentation that their vote went through as they intended and that those votes can be audited.

goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy that's at stake.

As been said many times today -- and I've heard over and over since I got involved with this issue, which I didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote will not count. Think about that. American citizens are afraid their vote will not count.

If you're afraid your vote's not going to count, you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to go. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people of Georgia.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this electronic system that we have, remember the definition of insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5 now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the past.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as good as I used to be.

MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission for allowing us to speak here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again, where you're from, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we just listen to the IT experts?

And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns; we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled, Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system, but also dropped into a safe box.

And not much has been said about what happens to these paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years, about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate that problem. These would be attached to the optical scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure place. So I think that solves that one problem.

We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying -- verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an average of 3.9 seconds.

When you're given a summary that you have to check, human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best advice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.  
Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a second now. T-H-R --

MS. THROOP: Yeah.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- 0-0-P.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go. Throop. All right.

MS. THROOP: Good.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you, Liz.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of good presentations this morning and have had a lot of good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I think it's important to be very specific with these things.

So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be signifying something as simple as the precinct number could introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for that reason, I think it's very important that we get proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there are no barcodes on the ballots.

It's been a little while since I've looked at those proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent set of presentations we heard today should have happened at the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what those ballots are going to look like.

And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs, they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

are the focus of national press attention as one of the worst states for voting integrity.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and allow you to wrap up, Liz.

MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay. Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to have you.

MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing really quickly.

The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next session or something because you know how hard that is, that things don't get done that way.

And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal -- detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1 that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2 accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3 the legislature decides on the system.

4 And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5 the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6 aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7 guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8 got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9 confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11 George Ballbona (ph)?

12 MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14 George.

15 MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17 for being here today.

18 MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19 live in Cobb County.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21 MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22 those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23 but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24 anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25 something costs.

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsnor? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1 No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.  
3 Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6 This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12 A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17 Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24 However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2 Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3 scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4 Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5 know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6 y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7 to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8 boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9 all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10 things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11 it needs upgrading.

12 But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13 They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14 update your thing and it is now your financial  
15 responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16 So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17 came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18 way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19 tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20 trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21 saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23 members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24 about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25 we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.  
2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1 having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2 session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3 as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4 until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5 all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6 is inaugurated.

7 And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8 two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9 in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10 meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11 would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12 There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13 and can accommodate people this size.

14 Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15 period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16 every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17 Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18 agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19 certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20 However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21 throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22 you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23 move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24 discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25 would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?  
21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 comments from the commission? Lynn?

2 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. Lynn Bailey out  
3 of Richmond County. I agree with what I've heard. I think  
4 Georgia does need a new system. The system that we have  
5 now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6 As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7 replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8 previously-owned units in other states and other  
9 jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10 it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11 sustain or continue.

12 Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13 over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14 voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15 concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16 good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17 way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18 right path.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other comments?  
20 Senator?

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Certainly.

23 SENATOR JACKSON: -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24 -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25 think an audit should be pre-certified. I think that the

1 audit should be done before we certify the general  
2 election.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4 MS. BOREN: Concur.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6 MS. BOREN: We agree.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8 -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9 counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10 the date you certify on?

11 Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12 con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13 great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14 implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15 said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16 fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17 The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18 that certification and how much?

19 MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23 MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24 November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25 provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2 The audit would also be important work not to be  
3 rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4 time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5 that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6 the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7 November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8 tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9 consideration.

10 I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11 I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12 audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13 they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14 you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15 that path.

16 But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17 three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18 in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19 any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20 it.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22 three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23 were going to say weeks.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25 MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1 because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2 type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3 system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4 types of lawsuits.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6 generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7 access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8 people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9 not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10 MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11 standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12 groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13 you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14 why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15 impact on certain voters versus others.

16 And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17 we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18 secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19 certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20 best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21 need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22 And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23 any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24 NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25 that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1 Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7 With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15 MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21 And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1 So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2 some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3 is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4 Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5 there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6 for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7 that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8 we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9 upon us.

10 You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11 sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12 actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13 there's still going to be a process for an election  
14 contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15 dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16 contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17 state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18 an election-contest proceeding.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20 sir, Michael?

21 MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22 comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23 things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24 things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25 which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to order a deeper-dive audit.

But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep an audit as something that's relatively close.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by 73 percent, there's a difference --

MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know, 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

And, you know, there may be some thought that we need to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion about the superintendent calling on particular races or whatever where they've -- where there could be a discrepancy or something.

MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.  
(Crosstalk.)

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

MS. BOREN: The election.

JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

(Crosstalk.)

DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or precertification.

COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the audit.

DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment, that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no -- there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page; right?

Because, when you go back to the system, if everything is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't -- won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously, maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state. You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections, the charter is what governs whether there has to be a runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review our laws on -- on runoffs.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those other solutions.

DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the system --

understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a paper trail.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us are talking about with the pre-audit --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the field.

DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. BOREN: We test everything.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is



1 your point.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3 everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4 shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5 stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6 wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7 the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8 we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11 Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12 ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13 ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14 a piece of paper; correct?

15 DR. LEE: Yes.

16 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17 the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18 they voted --

19 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21 auditable. No?

22 DR. LEE: So --

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24 papers --

25 DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.  
19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?  
15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1 And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2 month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3 be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4 officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5 the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6 component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7 But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8 need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9 fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10 has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11 very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12 other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13 groups out there that are ready to help.

14 I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15 implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16 completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17 funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18 report that we come up with.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21 MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22 important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23 talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24 systems are different all over the place.

25 So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7 But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18 If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

1 hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team  
4 counting ballots and then let the other team count behind  
5 them and see if the numbers were the same.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't  
7 realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in  
8 Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that  
9 been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they  
13 contract with me to be the supervisor over their old  
14 equipment.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if  
16 something goes wrong?

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only  
20 have 100 registered voters each.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

22 JUDGE MCCOY: So...

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one  
24 of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll  
25 bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2 that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3 courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4 in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5 school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6 you are given the correct ballot.

7 That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8 card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9 only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10 machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11 much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13 we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14 it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15 now are a little dated -- are they?

16 MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19 frankly. They're just a --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22 about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23 beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24 that what you're talking about?

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1 there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2 that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3 They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4 and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6 MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7 required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8 who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9 there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10 pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11 -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12 express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13 that.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16 system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17 voter --

18 MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20 human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21 doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22 ballot.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24 MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25 that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1 who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2 it's a state-issued ID card.

3 I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4 disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5 go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6 think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7 a ID card.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.  
9 (Crosstalk.)

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11 SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12 MS. BOREN: Yes.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14 to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15 card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16 SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18 SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19 MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20 that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21 cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22 of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23 they can also get that one free.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25 MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1 SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5 DR. LEE: So --

6 JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7 DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14 DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1 accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2 micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3 always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4 important part. Judge?

5 JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6 and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7 records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8 -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9 look at, to model.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11 on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12 paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13 us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14 aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15 that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16 forward, deal with other things.

17 Are there other things in our election process that  
18 we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19 major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20 about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21 DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22 of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23 -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25 in the legislature if you did that.

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.  
21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2 ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3 so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4 republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6 MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7 ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8 since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9 So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10 went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11 again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12 -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13 So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14 in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15 ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16 expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17 on-demand component --

18 JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19 MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21 the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22 MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23 \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24 We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25 on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1 ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2 almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3 or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4 voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5 I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6 to.

7 Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8 card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9 election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10 even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11 workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12 problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13 where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14 mistake like that, it's still made.

15 And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16 pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17 differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18 that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19 mistakes.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21 heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22 provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23 and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24 all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25 and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1 And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2 done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3 forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4 something that -- that we should -- we should think about.  
5 Madam Secretary?

6 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7 discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8 equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9 issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10 way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11 code and SEB procedures and things.

12 So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13 we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14 also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15 necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16 you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17 issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18 -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19 laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20 things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21 it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22 that we're looking at everything.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24 JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25 There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.



JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be hand-marked paper ballots?

Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly that have participated and -- has been on that -- that central issue that affects many of the other questions that we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next session? How long do we envision using the system that we decide upon?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question. I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have, that means a child born two years from now will be voting on a system that we decide on today.

And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single child -- so we're talking about children. Children today will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or another. I just think we need to consider that if this system is going to last as long as the last system has lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our future because the majority of the voters, if this system lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote very differently, take tests very differently, do things very differently than most of the people in this room.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for -- we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on paper, I would not trust that system.

So I think we're going to get -- there's always going to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is -- or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so that's why there's an important balance here.

And I do think, you know, between the -- the administration of the election, for election officials, but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know, at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending, but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's not going to be a perfect system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean, the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know, is the best available approach right now.

And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive -- to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I don't think we should have to find a solution and then use it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer technologies.

I really think that we should -- we should have this ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's available, and what has been working for us, and what needs to be improved and then have a new round of selection of new systems.

1 So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2 that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3 in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4 in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5 actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6 on leasing; right? Subscription.

7 I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8 you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9 instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10 dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11 are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12 Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13 bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14 later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15 change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16 know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17 little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18 comment.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20 thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21 anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22 flexibility to be flexible.

23 And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24 at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25 the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2 level.

3 But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4 involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5 in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6 money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7 taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8 the best practices of bonding.

9 And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10 oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11 lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12 we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13 agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14 leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15 you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16 DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17 is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18 then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19 safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20 -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21 right?

22 You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23 to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24 solution possible because there's no way out.

25 You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1 that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2 that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3 that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5 MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6 well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7 marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8 Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9 elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10 city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11 the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12 And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13 from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14 workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15 loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16 we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17 ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18 marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19 marking system.

20 It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21 the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22 was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23 race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24 wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25 could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1 The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2 -- we were really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3 that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4 transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5 used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6 read, as well as a regular voter.

7 So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8 like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9 it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10 that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11 on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12 them.

13 I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14 that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15 that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16 early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17 results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18 come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19 we felt comfortable with the results.

20 We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21 system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22 Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23 still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24 Express Polls that we have now, we were able to actually use  
25 those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2 accommodate this.

3 The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4 process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5 Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6 gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7 thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8 the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9 make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10 decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11 Georgia.

12 Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13 come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14 I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15 you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16 workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17 we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18 for caring enough to be here today.

19 Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20 you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21 again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens  
PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR  
CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

<p>98:23,23  <b>beginning</b> 127:14  191:15,15  <b>begins</b> 4:14  <b>behalf</b> 155:21  <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2  <b>beings</b> 159:6  <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17  20:23 23:2 28:13  42:18 60:17 77:22  78:13 83:18 120:8  121:21 130:3  163:8 172:12  179:1 227:11  228:9  <b>believed</b> 12:14  <b>believes</b> 187:13  <b>bell</b> 141:2  <b>benefit</b> 201:7  <b>benefiting</b> 143:15  <b>benefits</b> 39:10  171:12  <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2  49:14 73:18,21  101:4 105:25  112:23 122:1  124:10,10 137:8,9  149:17 158:12  159:7 168:21  180:20 190:18  191:17 194:7  209:9,17 212:1  221:2,10 223:4,8  223:9 224:9 229:7  <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13  <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16  30:3,5 32:11,23  54:22 55:1 56:12  63:8 130:8 134:3  212:18 222:17  <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14  50:13 59:16,17  <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12  <b>bias</b> 145:3  <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3  27:11  <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20  36:4 43:11 46:16  46:17,18 53:11  61:16 75:5 130:17</p>	<p>155:24 182:6  214:20 218:11  229:9  <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3  <b>biggest</b> 91:15  219:19  <b>bill</b> 168:16  <b>billion</b> 18:18  <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9  91:22,23 92:7  145:3  <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7  31:9 34:6,7,7  42:23 85:8 97:21  103:12 105:24  120:11 156:13  190:17 212:22  222:13,16,17  <b>bite</b> 76:3  <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7  86:16  <b>blackout</b> 192:3  <b>blame</b> 123:23,25  198:15  <b>blank</b> 23:7,21  24:17 26:18 86:5  86:10 225:1  <b>blanket</b> 78:3  <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5  18:15 26:24  <b>Blassingame</b>  122:13,15  <b>blessed</b> 158:6  <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5  <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23  <b>board</b> 19:20,21  38:1 45:24 50:4  53:23 80:25 81:9  124:10 126:20  128:6 141:23  145:24 170:3,6  200:5 204:19  209:16 212:17  <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2  165:8  <b>Bobby</b> 92:4  <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4  118:8  <b>Bogart</b> 131:3  <b>Boldly</b> 132:24</p>	<p><b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1  223:4,10  <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9  <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1  200:5,23 201:2  205:8 206:12  207:3  <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2  201:12 206:3,4,15  206:23 210:12  227:22  <b>boost</b> 9:2  <b>booth</b> 153:3  <b>booths</b> 64:25  117:21  <b>bored</b> 49:20  <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23  88:25 174:4,6  183:12 184:1,8  185:4,8,21 204:12  204:19,25 212:22  213:6,19,22  <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4  <b>borrow</b> 223:5  <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13  <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8  74:23 118:5 206:9  215:18 224:8  <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8  140:19  <b>bounce</b> 107:14  <b>bouncing</b> 107:18  <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1  73:25 89:9 158:14  188:16 225:24  226:1  <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19  74:22 77:1 154:10  158:18  <b>Brad</b> 3:6  <b>brag</b> 124:9,12  <b>bragging</b> 172:21  <b>brazen</b> 164:16  <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20  165:23  <b>breath</b> 156:19  <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13  126:16,17,18,19  128:10,11  <b>Brian</b> 206:21</p>	<p><b>bridges</b> 223:6  <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22  109:3,7 110:8  <b>briefly</b> 110:25  111:7  <b>brilliant</b> 49:23  <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15  15:17 16:21 20:18  30:8 34:9 62:20  62:21 68:13,16  75:8 81:15 82:10  132:2 142:24  168:7 198:25  214:23  <b>brings</b> 160:18  <b>broadening</b> 132:23  <b>broadest</b> 132:17  <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13  <b>broke</b> 118:4  <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20  <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14  94:18 97:16 114:6  212:23 215:24  218:4  <b>Broward</b> 28:12  <b>browser</b> 76:23  <b>Bruce</b> 164:6  <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4  85:23 86:2  <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14  <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4  78:6 190:24  205:17  <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13  53:15 162:8 176:2  212:18 223:6  <b>building</b> 15:4  <b>buildings</b> 99:25  <b>built</b> 55:16  <b>bunch</b> 103:24  147:5 199:7  <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5  48:22 93:1 129:23  211:12  <b>buses</b> 90:7  <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5  <b>businesses</b> 98:7  <b>button</b> 73:23  <b>buttoned</b> 192:6  <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6</p>	<p>222:4,5  <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13  173:7 222:9  <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>C</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1  <b>calculated</b> 39:9  <b>calculating</b> 102:6  <b>calculators</b> 222:15  <b>calibrated</b> 107:10  108:7,12  <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24  29:11,22 30:14  114:15 139:2  182:20 193:22,24  <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17  30:17 42:2 64:20  82:8 99:10 110:9  111:1 150:22  <b>calling</b> 140:10  182:23  <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13  116:15,16,20  <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23  144:3 145:21  146:11  <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8  134:4  <b>campaigning</b> 129:9  <b>campaigns</b> 87:15  <b>campus</b> 95:4  <b>Candace</b> 96:12  <b>candidate</b> 33:16  65:7 89:11 106:5  106:7 107:5,6  135:18 182:16  202:9  <b>candidates</b> 23:13  40:20 41:11 89:8  <b>candidate's</b> 86:4  <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7  <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10  15:19 29:15 43:19  71:1 95:6 119:12  119:14 122:6  123:23 130:12  144:18 161:16,21  172:4 188:16  208:19 215:11</p>
---	--	---	---	---



<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6 <b>disenfranchising</b> 124:22 219:2,9 <b>disparity</b> 65:16,25 67:7 <b>disproportionate</b> 180:18 <b>dispute</b> 125:11 <b>distinguish</b> 55:22 <b>distinguished</b> 158:24 <b>distress</b> 123:6 <b>distribute</b> 59:24 <b>distribution</b> 44:7 <b>district</b> 38:14,15 45:21 110:15 152:9 200:3 <b>districts</b> 72:19 <b>distrust</b> 186:5,6 189:9 <b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15 <b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3 <b>Doctor</b> 203:20 <b>documentation</b> 156:23 <b>documented</b> 220:23 <b>dodge</b> 195:24 <b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1 97:17 108:13 146:4 187:17 202:21 225:5 226:3 <b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12 39:14 40:11 42:9 48:21 54:6 64:14 77:13 99:5,15 100:15 129:4 131:21 134:24 137:7 154:25 155:21 157:6 166:18 179:6 185:1 186:8 190:14 192:4 198:9 222:20 228:25 <b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15 <b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15 78:18,19,20 87:2 139:4 142:7 163:5	165:5,21 211:11 222:10 224:4 <b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8 13:5,10 20:14 21:25 23:13 25:3 25:24,25 26:2,14 28:11 30:18 32:9 32:9 33:6 36:9 44:22 49:18 50:22 58:9 59:23 70:1 72:12 76:25 87:20 88:4 90:25 99:2,3 109:9 111:25 113:19 125:16 129:11 135:9 138:1 147:12 155:11,25 156:12 160:21 164:7 165:8 167:3 171:22,25 177:12 178:16 183:6,7,16 184:18 186:2 195:20 197:1 198:6 202:12 204:1 205:7,7,15 206:3 211:9,10,16 213:8 217:21,22 217:22 221:11,17 223:10 224:7 <b>doomed</b> 62:23 <b>door</b> 39:17 <b>doors</b> 152:3,18 <b>double</b> 74:10 100:6 <b>double-digit</b> 86:16 <b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6 147:21 173:5 174:12 191:16 209:7 211:11 <b>doubted</b> 172:2 <b>Douglas</b> 19:19 <b>download</b> 27:18 <b>downside</b> 40:16,25 <b>down-ballot</b> 24:21 25:6 <b>dozen</b> 77:23 <b>dozens</b> 154:8 <b>DPH</b> 210:7 <b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22 76:7,9 77:11,16 77:18,21,24 78:6	78:9,11,14 183:21 183:22,23 184:7 184:11,17 185:7 185:13 186:10,15 186:22,25 203:21 205:4,5,7,14 210:20,21 211:1 220:21,22 223:15 223:16 <b>dramatically</b> 25:4 26:1 <b>draw</b> 86:6 <b>drawback</b> 226:15 <b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8 <b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14 30:14,23 31:6 102:8 104:12,13 148:10,17 160:23 197:18 <b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17 86:19 <b>drilled</b> 65:15 <b>drink</b> 163:14 <b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1 209:9 <b>Driver</b> 204:22 <b>driver's</b> 201:6 <b>driver's</b> 72:14 200:23 203:24 204:5 <b>drop</b> 188:16 <b>dropped</b> 158:14 <b>drops</b> 158:21 <b>drove</b> 18:10 <b>dry</b> 82:13 <b>dude</b> 165:2 <b>due</b> 45:6 104:12 105:15 133:20 143:5 <b>due's</b> 10:21 <b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22 123:24 124:2,2,3 124:4,7,9 <b>durable</b> 32:4 <b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12 135:14,17,17 <b>dynamics</b> 103:25 <b>dysfunctional</b> 136:10	<b>E</b> <b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1 <b>eager</b> 192:11 <b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6 62:10 85:4 102:22 140:17 169:5 171:18 190:9 191:12 207:19,23 208:5 209:13 218:4 225:20 <b>early</b> 7:14 14:19 16:9 27:1 32:6 51:9 75:21 89:3 97:13 101:23 116:19 177:6 181:5 197:22,24 198:3,24 227:16 227:18 <b>earpiece</b> 71:13 <b>ease</b> 91:3 <b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13 50:1 130:9 193:21 <b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24 225:8 <b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25 175:4 194:11 227:1,3 <b>eat</b> 7:5 <b>echo</b> 221:14 <b>economical</b> 165:19 <b>Ed</b> 163:17 <b>educate</b> 87:14 89:20 90:10 138:17 <b>educating</b> 192:25 193:1 <b>education</b> 66:25 77:5,13 78:3,5,20 88:3 89:17,23 92:14 126:25 145:10 169:9 191:2,9,13 192:5 192:25 195:1 205:6 <b>educational</b> 65:4 65:22 87:2 90:17 <b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16 180:18 <b>effective</b> 129:24 <b>effectively</b> 127:3	<b>efficient</b> 201:20 <b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23 70:13 91:22 92:8 105:1 154:25 <b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8 <b>eight</b> 98:24 <b>either</b> 23:13 26:23 27:1 33:2 43:15 56:21 83:22 224:8 <b>elderly</b> 125:4,6 144:16 <b>elect</b> 143:13 <b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8 154:13 162:8 164:13 226:9 <b>election</b> 4:3 10:7 13:1 14:19 15:1,3 16:8,9,11,18 18:14,22 22:15 24:15 25:5 29:25 32:6 33:10,18 34:4 36:23 38:1 38:11 39:2,7,18 39:20,22,23 40:18 40:19,21,23 41:2 41:8,12,16 42:10 44:10 45:3,14,19 46:11,20,24,25 47:8 48:6,7 50:4 51:2 52:13,14 53:9,10,12,12,23 56:19,22 57:7,13 57:14,18,22,24 58:22 59:12 63:2 63:11,13 64:20,21 66:6,13 67:2 68:8 69:10 72:9 73:7 73:19 74:20 80:25 81:6,9,21,25 82:20 87:12 89:17 93:5 96:6,21,25 97:1,6 98:1,3 99:14,16,20 100:4 100:7,9,9,15,19 100:21 101:9,10 101:11,13,19,21 102:5,19,24 103:3 103:4,14,17,20 105:9,16,23 106:19 108:24
---	--	--	---	---

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---



167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hauled</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--



205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---



89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--



<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unnneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11		<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19		<b>wealthy</b> 93:16		<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19		<b>wearing</b> 107:22		<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14		<b>weather</b> 82:25		<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14		<b>week</b> 3:21 97:8,15 98:24 105:17,18 167:8 191:21 208:12 228:22,22 228:23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24		<b>weekend</b> 176:2		<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wanting</b> 211:22 <b>wants</b> 114:8 <b>War</b> 144:4 <b>warranty</b> 93:24 <b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12 <b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17 <b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25 <b>watchdog</b> 212:6 <b>watched</b> 208:11 <b>watcher</b> 129:2 <b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17 <b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25 <b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23 <b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20 <b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21 <b>weird</b> 86:8 <b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5 <b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19 <b>welcomed</b> 91:24 <b>well-designed</b> 125:8 <b>well-funded</b> 192:7 <b>well-intended</b> 5:19 <b>well-to-do</b> 93:17 <b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10 <b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13 <b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we've</b> 15:2 17:21	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8 <b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2 <b>winner</b> 46:21 <b>winning</b> 182:11 <b>wisely</b> 212:2,7 <b>wished</b> 84:6 <b>withdrawn</b> 230:9 <b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19 <b>witnesses</b> 117:16 <b>WMAZ</b> 126:11 <b>women</b> 127:7,8,9 127:10 192:9

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7 200:18 205:10	159:16,18 160:1 174:20 179:15	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17 194:1,23 197:8,23	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	<b>workings</b> 229:16	197:24 198:2,6,21 205:23,24 208:20	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5 38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17 184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	209:5 220:2 224:15 228:14	40:24 42:9 43:9 46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	107:9,9 108:3,6 114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4 223:5	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	53:5 61:12,13 66:14 77:25 88:7	121:9 122:14,20 123:22 125:4,5	<b>0</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	88:20 90:5 97:1 97:12 99:7 103:22	126:6,14 128:25 132:12 134:7,21	<b>02</b> 194:21
36:1 38:1 43:18 52:22 53:13,15	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	104:3 113:14 124:15 129:2,9	135:15 136:15,25 137:14,25 139:10	<b>1</b>
55:3,3 56:12 58:8 71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worst</b> 161:2	138:3 152:1 167:2 172:15 173:13,13	141:15 144:1 146:17 147:25	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
104:6 113:2 116:8 124:22 126:22	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	191:16 209:18 213:23	150:1 151:23 153:12,23 155:9	40:8 41:10 56:4
131:7 133:19 140:23 144:6,13	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3 157:23 165:2	57:2 151:2 156:17
155:21 170:15 174:25 175:2	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	55:24 63:20 64:17 68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25 193:23 194:10	156:18 176:10
178:24 191:5 192:5 199:8,25	163:14 193:4,4	74:18 79:19 93:18 127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24 212:11 228:6	182:17
202:21 203:14,19 205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:19 142:3,3 147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14 53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
212:15 222:8 224:23	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	156:11,11 158:2 158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13 95:8 117:22	42:4,5,13 55:24
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	151:8 161:4	170:11 192:10 207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16 129:17 131:8	84:19 125:16
124:16,20,20 127:1 138:24	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:25 218:23,24 219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14 157:16 166:18	147:9 206:14
173:10	<b>write</b> 89:8	221:18,22 222:13 223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19 206:13 214:14	207:24 224:5
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	224:11	223:15	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
158:2 193:6 200:1 202:20	<b>writing</b> 170:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	111:19 165:6 206:5	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
100:1 101:25 104:22,22 117:2	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	165:5,21 198:20
169:10 191:9 193:1 194:5	108:8 162:7 187:15,15,16	<b>yielded</b> 38:11		<b>100,000</b> 52:14
201:14 214:17 215:11 226:14	189:21 198:16 202:21 207:12	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23		141:4
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24	217:6,7,19	<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15		<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
	<b>X</b>			<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10 93:13			<b>114</b> 18:4
	<b>Y</b>			<b>12</b> 125:19
	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9 26:11 28:9,14 53:6 54:9 61:20			<b>12th</b> 1:10
				<b>12:11</b> 95:20
				<b>12:30</b> 75:25
				<b>12:49</b> 95:20
				<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
				167:4
				<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17 48:24 221:18
				<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6 163:4 222:9 224:4
				<b>158</b> 92:3
				<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
				<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14 218:23,24 219:17 219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14 28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

---

**From:** Patrick Stephens <ptrckstephens1@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, January 18, 2019 1:19 PM  
**To:** Simmons, Jessica  
**Cc:** gree806  
**Subject:** Fwd: \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**Attachments:** safecommissiontranscript (2).pdf; safecommissiontranscriptmini.pdf

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.

Hey, Ms. Simmons! I'm not sure if Ms. Hammock forwarded this to you or not. My firm just informed me that you'll be accepting transcripts and invoices from us. I've forwarded the original emails with the transcript and invoice to you.

Definitely let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** Patrick Stephens <ptrckstephens1@gmail.com>  
**Date:** Wed, Jan 9, 2019, 2:26 PM  
**Subject:** \*\*\*TRANSCRIPT - SAFE Commission 12/12/18 \*\*\*  
**To:** Broce, Candice <CBroce@sos.ga.gov>  
**Cc:** gree806 <gree806@bellsouth.net>

Hey, Candice! I've attached the transcript to this E-mail. Please let me know that you've received it all right.

Thanks,

--

- Patrick A. Stephens, CCR -

SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

1  
2 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to  
3 the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division  
4 office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and  
5 Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

6 I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

7 I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the  
8 remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's  
9 not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to  
10 serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity,  
11 transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it  
12 has been throughout my career in public service.

13 Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I  
14 spent time in several different areas of state government,  
15 including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission  
16 and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the  
17 Department of Human Services.

18 Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of  
19 Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.

20 (Collective Pledge.)

21 I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United  
22 States of America, and to the Republic for which it  
23 stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty  
24 and justice for all.

25 Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this



1 group has already heard from several different groups, and  
2 stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a  
3 great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the  
4 important discussion about our state's next voting system.

5 We're -- we're joined here today by Representative  
6 Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in  
7 continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to  
8 oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature  
9 and Governor-elect Kemp.

10 Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for  
11 being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

12 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

14 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

16 SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary  
17 Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this  
18 opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all  
19 of the attendees here.

20 Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you  
21 for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of  
22 State's office as we began our transition planning. I  
23 realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very  
24 grateful for the support you've given us.

25 As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

1 focal point for elections because the priceless franchise  
2 to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections  
3 throughout every aspect of the election process.  
4 Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting  
5 machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and,  
6 today, it is imperative we complete our research for  
7 security and technology for the next decade.

8 I have said that we need the most secure, updated  
9 voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a  
10 system that moves voters faster through the line so we can  
11 reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no  
12 predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our  
13 next-generation voting machines.

14 Our next legislative session begins on January 14th  
15 and I know that the General Assembly and our department is  
16 looking forward to the completion and recommendations from  
17 this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank  
18 you for offering yourself for service in this critical and  
19 noble effort.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm  
21 going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry  
22 Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda  
23 for today.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary,  
25 and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

1       you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of  
2       your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you  
3       should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to  
4       talk about something very important to Georgia; that is,  
5       voting in our state.

6               We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are  
7       copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly  
8       going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda  
9       for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that  
10      should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if  
11      you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the  
12      sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over  
13      here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be  
14      able to help you out.

15             As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a  
16      -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had  
17      very good participation from the public at our prior  
18      meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I  
19      know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you  
20      for being here.

21             As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with  
22      their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have  
23      time limits for our presentations today and we will gently  
24      initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us  
25      keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.

17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.

21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.

MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a dues-free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the



1 trust in Georgia voting.

2 So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've  
3 been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit  
4 that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to  
5 fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-  
6 development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it  
7 tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go  
8 through to do a big project like this.

9 And, typically, what you do is you analyze your  
10 current system for improvement opportunities, you define  
11 the new system requirements and then evaluate the  
12 alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is  
13 to help you identify the current system improvement  
14 opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for  
15 defining your objectives and requirements.

16 Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia  
17 elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

18 Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We  
19 had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that  
20 we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent  
21 audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great  
22 protection for Georgia voters.

23 But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the  
24 seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was  
25 one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

1           could supply an independent audit trail.

2           The law -- in order to get the machines in, the  
3           legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal  
4           did not take effect until after the contract was -- was  
5           purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on  
6           May 4th, 2002.

7           The reason that I bring this to the attention of the  
8           commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the  
9           same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please  
10          only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect  
11          fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have --  
12          have that in your recommendations.

13          So when that new system was implemented back then in  
14          2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent  
15          verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer  
16          to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable  
17          system today.

18          So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system?  
19          Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity  
20          perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited  
21          or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well,  
22          you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated  
23          the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot  
24          screen that you see may not be what's happening on the --  
25          the inside of the machine.

1           As election officials, many of you know when -- there  
2           are no audit procedures in place today to audit their  
3           elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results,  
4           you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it  
5           was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to  
6           audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the  
7           correct results that the system told you.

8           And then lastly, but not least, is the recount  
9           situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass  
10          votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So  
11          that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really  
12          requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is  
13          just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

14          So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and  
15          errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's  
16          attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that  
17          you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable  
18          system.

19          So that's the election-integrity advocates'  
20          perspective, but what about the state's perspective?  
21          We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these  
22          down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The --  
23          the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's  
24          no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that --  
25          of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1           could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2           So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3           Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4           ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5           elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6           getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7           device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8           So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9           and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10          server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11          by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12          have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13          happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14          Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15          great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16          lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17          So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18          commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19          can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20          you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21          The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22          it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23          but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24          counties.

25          So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPLOST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPLOST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the



1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.

25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines



1           either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2           MS. BAILEY:   So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3           considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4           MR. FAVORITO:   That's exactly right.   There was no  
5           mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6           ballots cast in those races.

7           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you.

8           MR. FAVORITO:   Thank you.

9           MS. ROSS:   Can I get a point of clarification?

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Ms. Ross?

11          MS. ROSS:   Just a point of clarification:   For Bibb  
12          County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13          lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14          that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15          as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16          that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17          do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18          from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19          card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20          for.

21          MR. FAVORITO:   So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22          the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23          itself.

24          MS. ROSS:   They are on the voting unit, too.

25          JUDGE MCCOY:   That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1       that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2       nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3       machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4       non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5       A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6       which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7       very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8       have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9       commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10      ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11      recommendation.

12      So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13      systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14      replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15      that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16      those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17      well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18      electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19      really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20      cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21      -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22      The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23      DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24      Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25      University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1           Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6           Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14          And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24          So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

1 elections, it's going to require some additional work on  
2 the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be  
3 able to audit, recount and make sure that we have  
4 transparency in the election process.

5 This is going to be an increased burden on the county  
6 elections directors. It's going to require a little bit  
7 more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit  
8 more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want  
9 to bring that to your attention because I think the  
10 Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county  
11 commissions in making sure that they understand this when  
12 we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement  
13 auditing, recounting and transparency.

14 So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would  
15 like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've  
16 given you and see exactly what you really think we need to  
17 do and we think that you need to define the requirements,  
18 basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare  
19 legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

20 So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone  
21 would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we  
22 have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report.  
23 Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to  
24 release this until Friday because I wanted to get some  
25 feedback from the commission as to what you thought about



1 the presentation and then I was going to make some  
2 adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared  
3 to talk about it in case there any questions.

4 And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I  
5 stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be  
6 glad to take any other questions about the new system as  
7 well.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

9 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I  
10 have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand  
11 printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the  
12 preprinted ballots that are wasted --

13 MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

14 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used.  
15 Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you  
16 know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted  
17 ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going  
18 to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

19 MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we  
20 -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've  
21 explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the  
22 cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one  
23 on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not  
24 -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

25 And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

1 but you save all of this administrative work for the  
2 elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many  
3 ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't  
4 have enough, then there's a big scramble.

5 So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and  
6 that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the  
7 administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of  
8 putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I  
9 don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question.

10 Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

12 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This  
13 commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections.

14 Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

15 MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know,  
16 any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote  
17 by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical  
18 ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with  
19 that ballot.

20 So we actually recommend that people vote by mail  
21 given the current -- the current situation with these  
22 machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of  
23 election is basically foolproof and no particular voting  
24 type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right  
25 now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much.  
2           We appreciate you being here today.

3           MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate  
4           you. Thank you for having me.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin  
6           Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see  
7           you today.

8           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get  
9           mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear  
10          me okay?

11          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

12          MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn.  
13          I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general  
14          counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had  
15          the honor of previously presenting to you on our first  
16          commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back.  
17          And the topic I'm going to talk about today is  
18          postelection audits.

19          Postelection audits are something that we currently  
20          don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to  
21          a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we  
22          will be able to do. It's something that most states do,  
23          so it's something that you may want to include in the  
24          recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that  
25          later today and something for the legislature and our state

1 election board to really work with in the future.

2 So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition  
3 is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your  
4 results using the same underlying data. So, in our world,  
5 the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're  
6 trying to independently re-create that tabulated results,  
7 looking back at the cast votes.

8 What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment  
9 and the procedures used to count the votes worked  
10 correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the  
11 election yielded the correct result.

12 What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a  
13 recount is, is when you count every single vote for a  
14 particular race. So when you recount a house district,  
15 you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

16 What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a  
17 subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can  
18 give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly  
19 the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full  
20 re-creation, you will know what the results is.

21 So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far  
22 that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote  
23 record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's  
24 the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting  
25 system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

1       aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had  
2       a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would  
3       be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who  
4       hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures  
5       worked.

6               So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated  
7       election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are  
8       going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed  
9       correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

10              So the benefits of a audit are that you can find  
11       errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental  
12       errors, it can help you have data and information so that  
13       you can improve the process for future elections; you can  
14       iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

15              It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are  
16       probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a  
17       armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits  
18       going to be done after an election, you know that they are  
19       going to dig in and review those results, look at the  
20       ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election  
21       fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps  
22       build public confidence in the election and the outcome of  
23       an election.

24              So I'm going to describe the three main categories or  
25       types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

1       exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-  
2       percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most  
3       states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What  
4       this means is there is a predetermined percentage of  
5       usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you  
6       know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are  
7       going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

8           Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5  
9       percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of  
10      the percentages that you would go back and review. The  
11      advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of  
12      the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of  
13      precincts you would have to look at and that makes it  
14      easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a  
15      scope.

16         The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it  
17       doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the  
18       election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an  
19       election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between  
20       the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer  
21       ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the  
22       fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

23         So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout,  
24       you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to  
25       have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

1       It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close  
2       the election is.

3       But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement  
4       in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered  
5       percentage is being done by two states right now, and what  
6       that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how  
7       many precincts you will check based on how close the  
8       election is.

9       So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin,  
10      you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin  
11      between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if  
12      it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5  
13      percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear  
14      buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time  
15      and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the  
16      election is.

17      And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's  
18      the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the  
19      statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a  
20      risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a  
21      Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use  
22      advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of  
23      ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and,  
24      at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree  
25      of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an

1       audit.

2               So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3       a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4       time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5       percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6       that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7       catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8       the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9       you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10      and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11      is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12             So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13      statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14      years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15      journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16      elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17      they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18             There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19      Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20      audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21      smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22      able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23             To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24      of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25      comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going



1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out, All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1       it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2       make changes.

3             If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4       potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5       records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6       fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7       recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8       election you are auditing if you do it before  
9       certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10      it pre, some states do it after certification.

11            And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12      that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13      audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14      do you review the digital image of the paper?

15            The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16      you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17      they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18      single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19      technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20      of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21      they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22      pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23            So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24      we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25      ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1       audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2       for risk-limited audits.

3               So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4       know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5       verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6       confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7       any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8       worked correctly.

9               You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10      new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11      makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12      overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13      audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14      as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15      we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16      audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17              And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18      audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19      audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20      but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21      death from what I've talked about.

22              There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23      brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24      life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25      them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?



1           MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14           But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19           MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21           MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1           MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6           MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.

9           And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16          MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18          MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1           which one's better?

2           MR. RAYBURN:   So I think if we had a statistician to  
3           work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4           felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5           that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6           would have to review.

7           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Yes, Lynn?

8           MS. BAILEY:   Lynn Bailey, Richmond County.   Speaking  
9           off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10          we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11          that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12          we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13          audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14          precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15          precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16          will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17          done.

18          You know, there are important things going on in that  
19          three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20          looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21          example.   So we do definitely need to look at that.

22          And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23          ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24          process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25          mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1        audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2        greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3        difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4        recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5        to recertify a result.

6            MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7        election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8        over. You see what I'm saying?

9            MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10       on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11       a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12       precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13       results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14       have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15       switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16           MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17       recount, not a do over, is my question.

18           MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19       and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20       would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21       going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22       new election.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24       the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25       ordered. Senator?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6           MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14          MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23          MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after



1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.

24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1           -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3           MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5           last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6           Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7           the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8           Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9           get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10          MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12          PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14          great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15          in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16          MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18          father --

19          MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21          there; did he not? Representing --

22          MS. COX: That's right.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24          right?

25          MS. COX: That's right.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3           MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5           MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9           MS. COX: That's right.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12          MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15          MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18          MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22          MS. COX: Exactly.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1           For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2       presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3       memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4       world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5       recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6       shifted to Florida.

7           I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8       so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9       happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10      pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11      were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12      lost almost 95,000 votes.

13           We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14      Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15      system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16      really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17      elections in the way that they wanted to.

18           We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19      lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20      50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21      moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22      of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23      system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24      actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25      the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1           going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2           The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3           votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4           refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5           the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6           whatever could happen.

7           They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8           machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9           needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10          the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11          paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12          Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13          The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14          surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15          surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16          came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17          and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18          of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19          optical-scan ballots.

20          At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21          a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22          because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23          would register in the whole county that night because,  
24          obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25          voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

1 precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

2 So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate  
3 these lost votes and we took that original study -- which  
4 should be in the state archives -- we took that study to  
5 the legislature and said, We need to really do something on  
6 our watch before we have the next election cycle.

7 So that was when the Georgia General Assembly  
8 authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting  
9 Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that  
10 was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the  
11 commission, several others of you might have, but we had a  
12 combination, as your commission is composed, of local  
13 election officials and legislators that studied for a full  
14 year. We took the study we had done internally of what had  
15 happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in  
16 the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

17 So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of  
18 all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001  
19 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in  
20 Georgia.

21 And it was a result of that study that led us into  
22 deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and  
23 to move, for the first time, into a system where every  
24 county would use the same voting equipment so that we could  
25 do massive voter education for all voters across the state,



1       that the Secretary of State could do training for all  
2       county election officials and then to help the poll-worker  
3       training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis  
4       across the state, that the state would then, whatever  
5       equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the  
6       counties and, at least on the first round, make that  
7       purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity  
8       of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase  
9       new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got  
10      into the system we have now.

11       We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into  
12      electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some  
13      type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think --  
14      my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time  
15      that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really  
16      didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really  
17      usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that  
18      model.

19       We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of  
20      equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked  
21      that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the  
22      technology wasn't there at the time.

23       Honestly, I think that our commission thought back  
24      in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two,  
25      technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

1       probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the  
2       technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't  
3       even envision the things that are happening today in  
4       technology or the threats that are happening today to  
5       technology back in the day when we put this equipment in --  
6       in place.

7               I think we also envisioned that there would be a  
8       continuous study of election equipment over the years and  
9       that there would be continuous need to purchase additional  
10      equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the  
11      growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming  
12      long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of  
13      that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us  
14      to where we are today.

15             But one of the main -- a couple of the main points  
16      that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a  
17      decision for making a change today is to be mindful that,  
18      yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an  
19      upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology  
20      they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment  
21      that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair;  
22      things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be  
23      replaced and upgraded.

24             So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason  
25      for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

1       The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in  
2       -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but  
3       your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure  
4       voting system but not to throw the baby out with the  
5       bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure  
6       but that also -- you understand the voter interface with  
7       technology.

8               We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment  
9       in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000  
10      presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on  
11      the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting  
12      equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying  
13      congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill  
14      in DC of working with our congressional delegation and  
15      others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50  
16      million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the  
17      equipment that we purchased.

18             In fact, the only money that the state ended up  
19      putting into the purchase was really the voter-education  
20      piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt  
21      like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to  
22      go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to  
23      make sure that voters are never turned away from voting  
24      because they don't want to show up in a polling place and  
25      be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box

1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to



1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.

24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1           I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6           Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9           DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17           So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23           You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1        estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2        which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3        to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4        governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5        than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6        that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7        front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8                So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9        I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10       answer what you were thinking --

11               SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13               SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14       so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15       state money --

16               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17       model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18       understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19       the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20       training, and so forth and so on.

21               SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22       I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23       state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24       counties also.

25               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1       there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2       and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3       upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4       whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5       that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6       less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7       that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8       Michael?

9           MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10       when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11       Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12       elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13       time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14       purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15       was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16       at that time?

17          MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18       study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19       start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20       Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21       equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22       auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23       definition of auditing.

24          You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25       purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.



1           And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2           and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3           conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4           the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5           printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6           funding from the state or federal government to our  
7           counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8           not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9           statewide runoff.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11           MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12           Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13           importance around access for individuals with disability  
14           and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15           privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16           access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17           process for people with disabilities?

18           MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19           voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20           when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21           different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22           and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23           a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24           didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25           just didn't vote.

1           So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2           experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3           trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4           and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5           even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6           tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7           and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8           independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9           heard.

10           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11           MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12           again.

13           MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14           MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15           we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16           there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17           one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18           lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19           at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20           printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21           one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22           created long lines.

23           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24           MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25           than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1       sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3               SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4       earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5       in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6       participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7       black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8       curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9       and why you think that occurred?

10              MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11      reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12      that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13      between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14      the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15      some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16      using optical-scan ballots.

17              We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18      look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19      just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20      didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21      using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22      optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23      that bubble or mark the X.

24              We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25      I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1           SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6           MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12           So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20           People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

easily.

But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think -- with massive voter education, I think you could probably overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was in the legislature, so I think --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the straight party --

MS. COX: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting. Yes? Nancy, did you have --

MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

MS. COX: You, too.

MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part  
2 of the training money was allocated to train poll workers,  
3 because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And --  
4 and you need to realize these are temporary workers that  
5 only work two or three elections every other year.

6 And I remember there was money put regionally into the  
7 technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses  
8 and carried them and they were taught how to operate the  
9 equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that  
10 needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll  
11 workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters  
12 how to use the equipment.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey,  
15 Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to  
16 underscore, just like many others have around the table,  
17 the importance of the educational component and my -- that  
18 comment is more related to the judge's comments about  
19 training poll workers.

20 Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the  
21 road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that  
22 they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more  
23 important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it.  
24 Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant  
25 to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it



1 would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just  
2 uncomfortable with the entire process.

3 So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting  
4 their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would  
5 certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all  
6 of us around the table could at least agree on that.

7 JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too  
8 proud to ask for help.

9 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,  
12 Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to  
13 us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling  
14 the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could  
15 you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm  
16 almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made  
17 and how can we learn from your experience?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with  
19 the legislature.

20 MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an  
21 example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this  
22 was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century  
23 Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the  
24 legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me  
25 into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

1 solutions that we were coming up with and, when we  
2 ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my  
3 recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to  
4 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you  
5 know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

6 But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong  
7 bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think  
8 there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to  
9 understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

10 You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect  
11 technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think  
12 whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's  
13 why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter  
14 education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the  
15 voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as  
16 the security piece. It's not one or the other and they --  
17 they've got to be equally considered in your decision-  
18 making.

19 And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for  
20 the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my  
21 regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature  
22 understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and  
23 to keep up with changes in technology and to help the  
24 counties.

25 We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

1       burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep  
2       up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where  
3       we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources  
4       to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines  
5       that we experienced in this election cycle because counties  
6       -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think,  
7       understood we're probably heading into something new so  
8       they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying  
9       additional equipment.

10       But since the state moved into this arena, unified the  
11       state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing  
12       allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you  
13       allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of  
14       voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to  
15       the counties so that we can keep up that level playing  
16       field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties  
17       versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to  
18       buy new equipment in the years to come.

19       We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of  
20       the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the  
21       state would really help voters everywhere.

22       MS. ROSS: Thank you.

23       JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just  
24       said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment  
25       expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1           And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2           State's office is always going to need that level of  
3           staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4           university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5           that is purchased new.

6           You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7           think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8           the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9           provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10          equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11          the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12          based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14          much.

15          MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17          MS. COX: Thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19          today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20          (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22          would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23          started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24          Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25          to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for



1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1       their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2       advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3       people vote in advanced voting.

4               By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5       were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6       advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7       advanced voting in this election.

8               We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9       election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10      to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11      litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12      to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13      citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14      essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15      that county election officials had been doing.

16              And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17      county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18      as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19      And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20      changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21              And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22      officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23      on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24      ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25      some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1       done in the past had been altered.

2           But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3       what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4       our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5       as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6       I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7       through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8       successfully at the county level.

9           On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10       And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11       Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12       there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13       that happened on election day.

14          You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15       -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16       problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17       but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18          We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19       heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20       o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21       to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22       of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23       working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24       it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25       poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1        what lines looked like throughout the state.

2            And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3        terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4        election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5        not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6        About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7        that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8        but in some locations.

9            Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10       said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11       voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12       about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13       2018.

14           We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15       longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16       gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17       did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18       about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19       again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20       to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21       about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22       and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23           There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24       look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25       dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1           So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10           We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15           Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19           In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some

1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.



1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2           Senator Jackson.

3           SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4           for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5           how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6           candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7           MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8           that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9           know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10          calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11          grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12          you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13          ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14          know, bounce around.

15          These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16          fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17          you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18          people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19          finger around.

20          It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21          screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22          spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23          glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24          always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25          show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1           We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7           The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14          That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18          Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24          The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1       this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2       state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3       the Secretary of State's office.

4               So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5       even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6       in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7       chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8               MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9               MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10      that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11      this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12      election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13      it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14      an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15      elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16      allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17      launch in municipal elections.

18              And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19      we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20      likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21      into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22      right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24      Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25      you do.

1 MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission  
3 members, we're now going to move to the portion of our  
4 agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are  
5 some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be  
6 brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told  
7 about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

8 Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that  
9 hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on  
10 the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to  
11 it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

12 All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like  
13 to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding  
14 of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to  
15 move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come  
16 up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel  
17 for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up  
18 sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right  
19 where you are, stand up.

20 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's  
22 most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how  
23 we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing  
24 up, stay standing up.

25 Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I



1 recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I  
2 think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself  
3 very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you  
4 for that.

5 What I would ask of you now is, is to understand  
6 clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle  
7 this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen  
8 before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making  
9 a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going  
10 to ask you to stick to that.

11 Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove  
12 of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself.  
13 If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But,  
14 generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be  
15 respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as  
16 well.

17 So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a  
18 -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments,  
19 making their point but making it in such a way that it's  
20 not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so  
21 thank you for that in the past.

22 Is there anyone who does not understand the ground  
23 rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those  
24 ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start  
25 going down the list, and thank you so much.

1           Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia.

2           Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara,  
3           please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear  
4           from you.

5           MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and  
6           I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the  
7           voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of  
8           Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party,  
9           county-party committees and election officials. I also  
10          oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching  
11          program.

12          Over the course of this election season, our voter-  
13          protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through  
14          December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we  
15          received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November  
16          6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had  
17          observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across  
18          the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and  
19          hundreds more during the early voting periods.

20          Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we  
21          recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during  
22          the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds  
23          of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a  
24          voter would make a selection only to have the machine  
25          reflect a different result.

1           In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll  
2 workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There  
3 was one voter who reported having to change her vote five  
4 times before it correctly reflected her choice. In  
5 another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to  
6 three separate machines before they could find a machine  
7 that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

8           We also received multiple reports of races not  
9 appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general  
10 election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were  
11 unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was  
12 recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

13           Problems weren't limited to the election machines.  
14 There were many problems with the registration system. We  
15 had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they  
16 voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that  
17 they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

18           We have other cases where voters found their  
19 registrations online, they had printed registration cards;  
20 they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the  
21 -- at the polling booths.

22           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed  
23 your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

24           MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

25           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

1 MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to  
2 research these problems. I would like to share them with  
3 each county as we go through so that we can look at them  
4 and figure out what happened and where the system broke  
5 down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a  
6 crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and  
7 in the officials and the administration of the system.

8 What's critical now is that this body develop a set of  
9 standards against which the decisions that -- on a system  
10 will be made. You have to have standards that you  
11 establish here because if we don't set a baseline that  
12 includes making sure that the voters are able to create and  
13 confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018  
14 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these  
15 votes are auditable independently without any intervention  
16 by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply  
17 continue.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

19 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
21 today.

22 MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.

24 Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

25 MS. NELSON: Yes.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you  
2 today.

3 MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

5 MS. NELSON: -- having me.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love  
7 to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

8 MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a  
9 registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not  
10 with any particular organization. I really appreciate your  
11 time.

12 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

13 MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

16 MS. NELSON: This one?

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little  
18 closer.

19 MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned  
20 citizen and not with any particular organization and I  
21 appreciate your time.

22 So I am concerned particularly with any electronic  
23 system, as has been proven by experts that there's no  
24 system known out there right now that is completely secure  
25 from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

1 Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's  
2 courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed  
3 us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether  
4 the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a  
5 physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any  
6 central database.

7 So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be  
8 helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are  
9 the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable  
10 postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little  
11 bit to the disabilities concerns.

12 I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that  
13 are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where  
14 little people showed up to their polling places and were  
15 not given stools or chairs, left without casting their  
16 vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or  
17 even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their  
18 access to cast their vote.

19 So, right now, we are already facing a lot of  
20 disability issues and, completely understandably, with  
21 handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the  
22 considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here  
24 today.

25 MS. NELSON: Thank you.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from  
2           you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to  
3           have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name  
4           right?

5           MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again.  
7           I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

8           MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
10          from.

11          MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in  
12          Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I  
13          spent the last several months working as a field organizer  
14          for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

15                 And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters  
16          that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three  
17          months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot  
18          of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast.  
19          The trust in the election system has degraded  
20          significantly.

21                 There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that  
22          there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust,  
23          which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify  
24          that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually  
25          made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1           therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2           make sure that that happens.

3           They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4           they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5           the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6           audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7           restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8           consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9           critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10          system.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12          Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13          Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14          first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15          Blassingame?

16          Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17          pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18          MR. WEIR: Yep.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20          have you and please tell us where you're from.

21          MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22          just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23          is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24          learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25          I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:



1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for



1           coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2           you're from.

3           MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4           and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5           important decision that you have to make.

6           First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7           that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8           I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9           that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10          here.

11          I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12          but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13          were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14          than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15          consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16          solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17          difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18          But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19          I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20          really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21          doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23          MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24          considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25          that on the table?

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4           MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10          MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13          MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20                 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1           Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7           My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11           The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18           Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23           In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1       this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2       citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3       better by one another.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5       today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6       Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7       Please tell us where you're from.

8               MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9       elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10      degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11      of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12      including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13      held my current position since 2007.

14              I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15      voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16      through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17      local jurisdictions.

18              We need to have meaningful audits before  
19      certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20      I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21      lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22      certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23      barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24      we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25      whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1           was accurate.

2           So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3           paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4           marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5           it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6           what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7           is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8           evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9           receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10          any different. Thank you very much.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12          appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13          for coming today. Good to have you again.

14          MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16          from.

17          MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18          County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19          Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20          representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21          to address you guys.

22          The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23          that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24          and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25          alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today

1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we



1        want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2        to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3        right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4        with 400 million dollars in debt.

5                REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6        appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7        Marilyn, good to have you today.

8                (Alarm chiming.)

9                MS. MARKS: Already?

10               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11               MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13               MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15        tell us where you live.

16               MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17        -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18        I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20        which county you live in.

21               MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23               MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24        time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25        voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1       than you've had the time to go through yet.

2               What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3       is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4       elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5       going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6       Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7       verifiable system.

8               The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9       all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10      not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11      verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12      to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13      that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14      systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15      one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16      elections.

17              I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18      you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19      you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20      set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21      Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22      need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23      terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24      what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25      of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1       lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2       generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3       for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4       a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5       in my hometown of Atlanta.

6               The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7       dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8       technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9       to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10      should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11      so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12      and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13             A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14      combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15      auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16      and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17             This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18      of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19      Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20      given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21      legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22      federal and state elections.

23             Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24      headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25      also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1       infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2       citizenry is fair and just.

3             Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4       art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5       continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6       voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7       importance of the task ahead of you.

8             Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9       foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10      would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11      confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12      values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13      elect our own leaders.

14            And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15      road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16      all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17      spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18      equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19      trial of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20      of their votes. Thank you.

21            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22      appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23      Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24      way?

25            MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2           from.

3           MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4           County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5           I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6           Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7           American community in Gwinnett County.

8           You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9           democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10          countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11          to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12          would have.

13          And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14          Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15          naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16          elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17          to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18          turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19          will get counted.

20          So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21          we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22          reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23          and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24          the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25          and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditable (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

1           Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you  
2           had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

3           So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is  
4           showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So  
5           that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

6           And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the  
7           negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away  
8           somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one,  
9           I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be  
10          negative one and subtract from your total.

11          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

12          MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming  
14          today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann,  
15          thank you for coming today.

16          MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

17          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
18          from.

19          MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

21          MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just  
22          here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972  
23          and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber  
24          security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of  
25          State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the



1       -- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

2           And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to  
3       any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode  
4       that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a  
5       barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in  
6       favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded  
7       scanners that can handle the humidity.

8           And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper  
9       ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was  
10      never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there.  
11      Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

12          But -- and one other thing that I don't think  
13      anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel  
14      like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding  
15      office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and  
16      how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if  
17      it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

18          And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I  
19      think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the  
20      most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any  
21      doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not  
22      taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda  
24      Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today,  
25      and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

1       hear from you.

2               MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a  
3       Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The  
4       foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to  
5       vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to  
6       have their votes represent their intentions.

7               It is imperative that the new voting system that you  
8       recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their  
9       voices heard on election day. In our recent election,  
10      there were reports of problems with the DREs showing  
11      erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

12              I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen  
13      technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen  
14      technology these problems will persist. They can be  
15      avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper  
16      ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise;  
17      right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way  
18      to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented  
19      the rule of the voter.

20              I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking --  
21      marking devices that you are considering will produce a  
22      paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary  
23      includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing  
24      if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and  
25      recorded.

1           Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the  
2 answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking  
3 devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I  
4 cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the  
5 touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a  
6 ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

7           In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make  
8 it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions  
9 when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to  
10 the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots  
11 marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the  
12 separate verification step and issues of human limitations  
13 become moot.

14          Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree  
15 that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted  
16 by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid  
17 audit is the best available method for conducting  
18 elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to  
19 heart the recommendations of the experts.

20          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

21          MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration  
22 and service to the voters of Georgia.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We  
24 appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John,  
25 good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1       you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2               MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3       Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4       restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5       and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6       the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7       officials since that time despite that information being  
8       thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9               The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10       and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11       of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12       They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13       point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14       University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15       State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16       statewide.

17              So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18       professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19       supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20       National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21       this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22       Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23       the technology involved in our election system.

24              And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25       Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

1 County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time  
2 since she offered?

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

4 MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the  
5 news business a few years back after a long career both in  
6 national news and state-local news in another part of the  
7 country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an  
8 elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of  
9 elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot  
10 boxes we were talking about.

11 So I understand that any system can be hacked, any  
12 system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not  
13 that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials  
14 here, but you've all heard about it.

15 And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle,  
16 suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly.  
17 We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the  
18 voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper  
19 ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

20 I love the idea that we can print them on demand.  
21 That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a  
22 lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor  
23 of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee  
24 ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the  
25 herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my



1           goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy  
2           that's at stake.

3           As been said many times today -- and I've heard over  
4           and over since I got involved with this issue, which I  
5           didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting  
6           involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote  
7           will not count. Think about that. American citizens are  
8           afraid their vote will not count.

9           If you're afraid your vote's not going to count,  
10          you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy  
11          goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think  
12          anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a  
13          handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to  
14          go. Thank you.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory  
16          Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

17          MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

19          MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for  
20          allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the  
21          work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people  
22          of Georgia.

23          AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

24          MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big  
25          voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

1       -- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and,  
2       having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a  
3       pension for accurate, reliable data.

4               And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will  
5       tell you that my experience since we have had electronic  
6       voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little  
7       yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a  
8       little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put  
9       on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've  
10      never quite trusted it.

11             We've been using that system for years and years and  
12      lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we  
13      kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the  
14      USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of  
15      trust.

16             Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm  
17      wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a  
18      negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know,  
19      that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

20             I think what I want to see is that everyone gets --  
21      everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one  
22      accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever  
23      they voted for, that they can have documentation that their  
24      vote went through as they intended and that those votes can  
25      be audited.

1           And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the  
2           paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As  
3           you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your  
4           decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this  
5           electronic system that we have, remember the definition of  
6           insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again  
7           and expecting different results.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

9           MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5  
11          now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

12          MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

13          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

14          MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

15          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

16          MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the  
17          past.

18          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as  
19          good as I used to be.

20          MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission  
21          for allowing us to speak here.

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again,  
23          where you're from, Susan.

24          MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

25          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

1 MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for  
2 years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my  
3 question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated  
4 here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we  
5 just listen to the IT experts?

6 And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people  
7 here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had  
8 really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns;  
9 we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to  
10 quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled,  
11 Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The  
12 best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper  
13 ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system,  
14 but also dropped into a safe box.

15 And not much has been said about what happens to these  
16 paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and  
17 we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years,  
18 about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate  
19 that problem. These would be attached to the optical  
20 scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the  
21 voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure  
22 place. So I think that solves that one problem.

23 We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back  
24 there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at  
25 Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

1 a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying --  
2 verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect  
3 their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an  
4 average of 3.9 seconds.

5 When you're given a summary that you have to check,  
6 human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please  
7 listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best  
8 advice.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.

10 Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

11 MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

13 MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a  
15 second now. T-H-R --

16 MS. THROOP: Yeah.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- O-O-P.

18 MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go.  
20 Throop. All right.

21 MS. THROOP: Good.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

23 MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you,  
25 Liz.

1 MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of  
2 good presentations this morning and have had a lot of  
3 good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots  
4 are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I  
5 think it's important to be very specific with these things.

6 So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still  
7 involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important  
8 things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was  
9 that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be  
10 signifying something as simple as the precinct number could  
11 introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for  
12 that reason, I think it's very important that we get  
13 proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there  
14 are no barcodes on the ballots.

15 It's been a little while since I've looked at those  
16 proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly  
17 what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it  
18 -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent  
19 set of presentations we heard today should have happened at  
20 the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone  
21 were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what  
22 those ballots are going to look like.

23 And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs,  
24 they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's  
25 important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

1 are the focus of national press attention as one of the  
2 worst states for voting integrity.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and  
4 allow you to wrap up, Liz.

5 MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay.  
7 Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to  
8 have you.

9 MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
11 from.

12 MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-  
13 Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing  
14 really quickly.

15 The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in  
16 the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence  
17 unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that  
18 they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly  
19 that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the  
20 legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on  
21 the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next  
22 session or something because you know how hard that is,  
23 that things don't get done that way.

24 And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal --  
25 detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1       that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2       accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3       the legislature decides on the system.

4             And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5       the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6       aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7       guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8       got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9       confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11       George Ballbona (ph)?

12            MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14       George.

15            MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17       for being here today.

18            MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19       live in Cobb County.

20            REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21            MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22       those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23       but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24       anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25       something costs.



1           No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.

3           Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6           This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12           A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17           Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24           However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsner? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1       it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2       Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3       scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4               Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5       know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6       y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7       to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8       boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9       all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10      things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11      it needs upgrading.

12              But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13      They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14      update your thing and it is now your financial  
15      responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16              So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17      came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18      way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19      tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20      trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21      saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23      members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24      about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25      we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.

2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1       having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2       session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3       as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4       until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5       all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6       is inaugurated.

7               And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8       two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9       in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10      meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11      would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12      There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13      and can accommodate people this size.

14             Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15      period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16      every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17      Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18      agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19      certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20             However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21      throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22      you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23      move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24      discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25      would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?

21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our

1       traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2       should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3       should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4       writing it into code or not.

5             And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6       election code and/or state election board rules should  
7       Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8       going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9       the legislature, on this issue.

10            And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11       there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12       elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13       changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14       thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15       to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16       discussions.

17            So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18       I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19       invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20       to be free-flowing.

21            The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22       initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23       system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24       record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25       place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?



1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1           comments from the commission?   Lynn?

2           MS. BAILEY:   Thank you, Mr. Co-chair.   Lynn Bailey out  
3           of Richmond County.   I agree with what I've heard.   I think  
4           Georgia does need a new system.   The system that we have  
5           now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6           As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7           replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8           previously-owned units in other states and other  
9           jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10          it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11          sustain or continue.

12          Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13          over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14          voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15          concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16          good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17          way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18          right path.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Okay.   Other comments?  
20          Senator?

21          SENATOR JACKSON:   Mr. Chairman --

22          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING:   Certainly.

23          SENATOR JACKSON:   -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24          -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25          think an audit should be pre-certified.   I think that the

1       audit should be done before we certify the general  
2       election.

3               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4               MS. BOREN: Concur.

5               JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6               MS. BOREN: We agree.

7               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8       -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9       counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10      the date you certify on?

11              Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12      con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13      great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14      implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15      said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16      fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17      The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18      that certification and how much?

19              MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21              MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23              MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24      November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25      provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1           It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2           The audit would also be important work not to be  
3           rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4           time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5           that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6           the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7           November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8           tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9           consideration.

10          I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11          I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12          audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13          they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14          you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15          that path.

16          But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17          three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18          in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19          any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20          it.

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22          three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23          were going to say weeks.

24          JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25          MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1       have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2       but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3       had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4       it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5       the audit is structured.

6               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7               MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8       what election officials do, there are three things that  
9       we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10              Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11      we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12      reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13      the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14      for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15      found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16      those unused ballots.

17              The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18      validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19      we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20      So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21      time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22      we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23              Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24      ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25      process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.



1           Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2           possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3           audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4           elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5           And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6           audits to think about as we're doing this.

7           With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8           -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9           the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10          auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11          want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12          having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13          to keep that in mind.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15          MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16          I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17          verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18          important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19          at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20          use the phrase security and inclusion.

21          And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22          discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23          the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24          a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25          of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1       because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2       type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3       system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4       types of lawsuits.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6       generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7       access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8       people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9       not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10              MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11       standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12       groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13       you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14       why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15       impact on certain voters versus others.

16              And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17       we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18       secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19       certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20       best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21       need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22              And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23       any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24       NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25       that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1           So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2           some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3           is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4           Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5           there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6           for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7           that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8           we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9           upon us.

10           You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11           sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12           actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13           there's still going to be a process for an election  
14           contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15           dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16           contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17           state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18           an election-contest proceeding.

19           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20           sir, Michael?

21           MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22           comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23           things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24           things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25           which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

1 remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to  
2 order a deeper-dive audit.

3 But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the  
4 state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to  
5 the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an  
6 audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep  
7 an audit as something that's relatively close.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by  
9 73 percent, there's a difference --

10 MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know,  
12 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under  
16 current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you  
17 know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also  
18 discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where  
19 the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when  
20 they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

21 And, you know, there may be some thought that we need  
22 to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion  
23 about the superintendent calling on particular races or  
24 whatever where they've -- where there could be a  
25 discrepancy or something.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the  
3 rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously,  
4 maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state.  
5 You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in  
6 their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and  
7 some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections,  
8 the charter is what governs whether there has to be a  
9 runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review  
10 our laws on -- on runoffs.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

12 MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if  
13 the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a  
14 margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to  
15 be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think  
16 runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-  
17 choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the  
18 state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than  
19 a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those  
20 other solutions.

21 DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

23 DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the  
24 pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the  
25 system --

1 MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.

5 (Crosstalk.)

6 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

7 DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

8 MS. BOREN: The election.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.

10 (Crosstalk.)

11 DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or  
12 precertification.

13 COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the  
16 audit.

17 DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment,  
18 that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no --  
19 there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page;  
20 right?

21 Because, when you go back to the system, if everything  
22 is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been  
23 hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't --  
24 won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or  
25 the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a paper trail.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us are talking about with the pre-audit --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the field.

DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. BOREN: We test everything.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1           your point.

2           JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3           everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4           shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5           stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6           wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7           the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8           we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11          Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12          ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13          ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14          a piece of paper; correct?

15          DR. LEE: Yes.

16          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17          the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18          they voted --

19          AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21          auditable. No?

22          DR. LEE: So --

23          SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24          papers --

25          DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're



1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?

15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1       forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2       that's me, my vote.

3               So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4       very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5       want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6       Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7       accurate.

8               SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10              JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11      ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12      look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13              That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14      with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15      done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16      and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17              AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18              REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.

19              Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20      want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21      we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22      but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23      this room.

24              So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25      that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1           If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7           But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11           MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18           If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1           And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2           month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3           be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4           officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5           the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6           component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7           But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8           need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9           fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10          has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11          very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12          other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13          groups out there that are ready to help.

14          I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15          implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16          completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17          funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18          report that we come up with.

19               JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21               MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22               important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23               talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24               systems are different all over the place.

25               So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform



1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day of or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team counting ballots and then let the other team count behind them and see if the numbers were the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they contract with me to be the supervisor over their old equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if something goes wrong?

JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only have 100 registered voters each.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: So...

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1       that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2       that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3       courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4       in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5       school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6       you are given the correct ballot.

7               That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8       card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9       only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10      machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11      much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13      we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14      it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15      now are a little dated -- are they?

16             MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18             MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19      frankly. They're just a --

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21             MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22      about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23      beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24      that what you're talking about?

25             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap

1           there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2           that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3           They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4           and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6           MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7           required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8           who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9           there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10          pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11          -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12          express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13          that.

14          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15          JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16          system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17          voter --

18          MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19          JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20          human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21          doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22          ballot.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24          MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25          that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've



1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1       who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2       it's a state-issued ID card.

3           I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4       disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5       go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6       think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7       a ID card.

8           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.

9           (Crosstalk.)

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11          SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12          MS. BOREN: Yes.

13          JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14       to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15       card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16          SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17          JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18          SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19          MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20       that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21       cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22       of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23       they can also get that one free.

24          SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25          MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1           SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2           want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3           you.

4           REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5           DR. LEE: So --

6           JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7           DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8           the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9           because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10          polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11          want to say that --

12          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13          computer, I bet.

14          DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15          you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16          recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17          item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18          of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19          know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20          should be, so...

21          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22          annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23          regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24          basically. Yeah.

25          SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1       accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2       micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3       always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4       important part. Judge?

5           JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6       and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7       records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8       -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9       look at, to model.

10          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11       on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12       paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13       us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14       aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15       that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16       forward, deal with other things.

17          Are there other things in our election process that  
18       we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19       major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20       about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21          DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22       of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23       -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25       in the legislature if you did that.



1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1       to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2       spent wisely.

3               So this relationship between the state and the county  
4       on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5       counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6       it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7       the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8       commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9       them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10      jurisdiction.

11             So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12      tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13      government quite often is the government that's most local  
14      to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15      system work, but we also want the local input.

16             And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17      fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18      more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19             So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20      not so simple that just the state pay for everything.

21      Nancy?

22             MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23      expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24      demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25      demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1       this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2       ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3       so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4       republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6               MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7       ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8       since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9               So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10      went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11      again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12      -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13      So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14      in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15      ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16      expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17      on-demand component --

18              JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19              MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20              JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21      the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22              MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23      \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24      We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25      on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1       ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2       almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3       or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4       voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5       I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6       to.

7               Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8       card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9       election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10      even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11      workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12      problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13      where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14      mistake like that, it's still made.

15             And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16      pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17      differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18      that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19      mistakes.

20             REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21      heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22      provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23      and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24      all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25      and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1           And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2           done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3           forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4           something that -- that we should -- we should think about.

5           Madam Secretary?

6           SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7           discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8           equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9           issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10          way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11          code and SEB procedures and things.

12          So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13          we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14          also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15          necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16          you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17          issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18          -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19          laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20          things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21          it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22          that we're looking at everything.

23          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24          JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25          There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

1 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last  
3 question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is  
4 one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the  
5 primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should  
6 it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be  
7 hand-marked paper ballots?

8 Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly  
9 that have participated and -- has been on that -- that  
10 central issue that affects many of the other questions that  
11 we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

12 MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

14 MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that  
15 the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next  
16 session? How long do we envision using the system that we  
17 decide upon?

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question.  
19 I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the  
20 current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging  
21 chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

22 This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

23 JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to  
25 say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.



1 MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and  
2 disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it  
3 -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have,  
4 that means a child born two years from now will be voting  
5 on a system that we decide on today.

6 And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or  
7 the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the  
8 cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security  
9 with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single  
10 child -- so we're talking about children. Children today  
11 will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

12 Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their  
13 tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how  
14 to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or  
15 another. I just think we need to consider that if this  
16 system is going to last as long as the last system has  
17 lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need  
18 to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking  
19 Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

20 I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking  
21 for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our  
22 future because the majority of the voters, if this system  
23 lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote  
24 very differently, take tests very differently, do things  
25 very differently than most of the people in this room.

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

2 MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

4 MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for --  
5 we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not  
6 trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from  
7 people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on  
8 paper, I would not trust that system.

9 So I think we're going to get -- there's always going  
10 to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily  
11 trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is --  
12 or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so  
13 that's why there's an important balance here.

14 And I do think, you know, between the -- the  
15 administration of the election, for election officials,  
16 but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know,  
17 at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult  
18 decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending,  
19 but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's  
20 not going to be a perfect system.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

22 DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean,  
23 the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in  
24 the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can  
25 see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

1 security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know,  
2 is the best available approach right now.

3 And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take  
4 that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I  
5 was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my  
6 time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of  
7 computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive --  
8 to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

9 So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security  
10 point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if  
11 you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

12 Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So  
13 that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

14 I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what  
15 Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with  
16 any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I  
17 don't think we should have to find a solution and then use  
18 it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be  
19 several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer  
20 technologies.

21 I really think that we should -- we should have this  
22 ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's  
23 available, and what has been working for us, and what needs  
24 to be improved and then have a new round of selection of  
25 new systems.

1           So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2           that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3           in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4           in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5           actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6           on leasing; right? Subscription.

7           I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8           you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9           instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10          dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11          are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12          Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13          bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14          later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15          change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16          know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17          little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18          comment.

19          REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20          thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21          anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22          flexibility to be flexible.

23          And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24          at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25          the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1       that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2       level.

3               But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4       involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5       in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6       money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7       taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8       the best practices of bonding.

9               And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10      oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11      lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12      we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13      agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14      leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15      you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16              DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17      is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18      then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19      safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20      -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21      right?

22              You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23      to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24      solution possible because there's no way out.

25              You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1       produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2       slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3       prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4       sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5       doesn't retain any votes.

6               And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7       election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8       easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9       election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10      in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11      multiple ways.

12             So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13      an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14      devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15      mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16      and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17      who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18      them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19      would like to do that.

20             We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21      a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22      if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23      ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24      the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25      that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1       that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2       that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3       that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4               REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5               MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6       well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7       marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8       Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9       elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10      city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11      the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12              And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13      from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14      workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15      loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16      we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17      ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18      marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19      marking system.

20              It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21      the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22      was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23      race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24      wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25      could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.



1           The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2           -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3           that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4           transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5           used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6           read, as well as a regular voter.

7           So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8           like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9           it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10          that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11          on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12          them.

13          I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14          that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15          that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16          early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17          results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18          come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19          we felt comfortable with the results.

20          We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21          system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22          Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23          still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24          Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25          those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1       There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2       accommodate this.

3       The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4       process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5       Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6       gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7       thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8       the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9       make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10      decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11      Georgia.

12      Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13      come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14      I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15      you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16      workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17      we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18      for caring enough to be here today.

19      Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20      you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21      again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25      (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January\_\_\_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064

A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

98:23,23 <b>beginning</b> 127:14 191:15,15 <b>begins</b> 4:14 <b>behalf</b> 155:21 <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2 <b>beings</b> 159:6 <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17 20:23 23:2 28:13 42:18 60:17 77:22 78:13 83:18 120:8 121:21 130:3 163:8 172:12 179:1 227:11 228:9 <b>believed</b> 12:14 <b>believes</b> 187:13 <b>bell</b> 141:2 <b>benefit</b> 201:7 <b>benefiting</b> 143:15 <b>benefits</b> 39:10 171:12 <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2 49:14 73:18,21 101:4 105:25 112:23 122:1 124:10,10 137:8,9 149:17 158:12 159:7 168:21 180:20 190:18 191:17 194:7 209:9,17 212:1 221:2,10 223:4,8 223:9 224:9 229:7 <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13 <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16 30:3,5 32:11,23 54:22 55:1 56:12 63:8 130:8 134:3 212:18 222:17 <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14 50:13 59:16,17 <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12 <b>bias</b> 145:3 <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3 27:11 <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20 36:4 43:11 46:16 46:17,18 53:11 61:16 75:5 130:17	155:24 182:6 214:20 218:11 229:9 <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3 <b>biggest</b> 91:15 219:19 <b>bill</b> 168:16 <b>billion</b> 18:18 <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9 91:22,23 92:7 145:3 <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:24 120:11 156:13 190:17 212:22 222:13,16,17 <b>bite</b> 76:3 <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7 86:16 <b>blackout</b> 192:3 <b>blame</b> 123:23,25 198:15 <b>blank</b> 23:7,21 24:17 26:18 86:5 86:10 225:1 <b>blanket</b> 78:3 <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5 18:15 26:24 <b>Blassingame</b> 122:13,15 <b>blessed</b> 158:6 <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5 <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23 <b>board</b> 19:20,21 38:1 45:24 50:4 53:23 80:25 81:9 124:10 126:20 128:6 141:23 145:24 170:3,6 200:5 204:19 209:16 212:17 <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2 165:8 <b>Bobby</b> 92:4 <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4 118:8 <b>Bogart</b> 131:3 <b>Boldly</b> 132:24	<b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1 223:4,10 <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9 <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1 200:5,23 201:2 205:8 206:12 207:3 <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2 201:12 206:3,4,15 206:23 210:12 227:22 <b>boost</b> 9:2 <b>booth</b> 153:3 <b>booths</b> 64:25 117:21 <b>bored</b> 49:20 <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23 88:25 174:4,6 183:12 184:1,8 185:4,8,21 204:12 204:19,25 212:22 213:6,19,22 <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4 <b>borrow</b> 223:5 <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13 <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8 74:23 118:5 206:9 215:18 224:8 <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8 140:19 <b>bounce</b> 107:14 <b>bouncing</b> 107:18 <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1 73:25 89:9 158:14 188:16 225:24 226:1 <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19 74:22 77:1 154:10 158:18 <b>Brad</b> 3:6 <b>brag</b> 124:9,12 <b>bragging</b> 172:21 <b>brazen</b> 164:16 <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20 165:23 <b>breath</b> 156:19 <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13 126:16,17,18,19 128:10,11 <b>Brian</b> 206:21	<b>bridges</b> 223:6 <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22 109:3,7 110:8 <b>briefly</b> 110:25 111:7 <b>brilliant</b> 49:23 <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 62:20 62:21 68:13,16 75:8 81:15 82:10 132:2 142:24 168:7 198:25 214:23 <b>brings</b> 160:18 <b>broadening</b> 132:23 <b>broadest</b> 132:17 <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13 <b>broke</b> 118:4 <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20 <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14 94:18 97:16 114:6 212:23 215:24 218:4 <b>Broward</b> 28:12 <b>browser</b> 76:23 <b>Bruce</b> 164:6 <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2 <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14 <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4 78:6 190:24 205:17 <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13 53:15 162:8 176:2 212:18 223:6 <b>building</b> 15:4 <b>buildings</b> 99:25 <b>built</b> 55:16 <b>bunch</b> 103:24 147:5 199:7 <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5 48:22 93:1 129:23 211:12 <b>buses</b> 90:7 <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5 <b>businesses</b> 98:7 <b>button</b> 73:23 <b>buttoned</b> 192:6 <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6	222:4,5 <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13 173:7 222:9 <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10
<b>C</b>				
<b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1 <b>calculated</b> 39:9 <b>calculating</b> 102:6 <b>calculators</b> 222:15 <b>calibrated</b> 107:10 108:7,12 <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24 29:11,22 30:14 114:15 139:2 182:20 193:22,24 <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17 30:17 42:2 64:20 82:8 99:10 110:9 111:1 150:22 <b>calling</b> 140:10 182:23 <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13 116:15,16,20 <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23 144:3 145:21 146:11 <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8 134:4 <b>campaigning</b> 129:9 <b>campaigns</b> 87:15 <b>campus</b> 95:4 <b>Candace</b> 96:12 <b>candidate</b> 33:16 65:7 89:11 106:5 106:7 107:5,6 135:18 182:16 202:9 <b>candidates</b> 23:13 40:20 41:11 89:8 <b>candidate's</b> 86:4 <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7 <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10 15:19 29:15 43:19 71:1 95:6 119:12 119:14 122:6 123:23 130:12 144:18 161:16,21 172:4 188:16 208:19 215:11				



<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12 <b>clarifying</b> 24:11 <b>clarity</b> 132:18 <b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24 <b>clean</b> 4:2 <b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3 <b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4 <b>clever</b> 16:12 <b>clicked</b> 120:4 <b>climate</b> 81:19 <b>climates</b> 82:17 <b>clock</b> 98:15,16 <b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5 <b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17 <b>closet</b> 177:18 <b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5 <b>cloud</b> 61:16 <b>clubs</b> 70:7 <b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17 <b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19 <b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11 <b>codes</b> 160:7 <b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24 <b>codify</b> 51:25 <b>codifying</b> 51:18 <b>coffee</b> 163:13 <b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19 <b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17 <b>Coliseum</b> 1:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21 <b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22 <b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23 <b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7 <b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13 <b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24 <b>color-coded</b> 215:10 <b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14 <b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13 <b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8 <b>comfort</b> 210:22 <b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19 <b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7 <b>commencing</b> 1:9 <b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18 <b>commenters</b> 160:4 <b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5 <b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8 <b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16 <b>commissioner's</b> 23:12 <b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19 <b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18 <b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12 <b>commitment</b> 93:20 <b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19 <b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6 <b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15 <b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4 <b>communicated</b> 101:3 <b>communities</b> 130:18 <b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12 <b>commute</b> 146:21 <b>company</b> 59:20 <b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20 <b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20 <b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19 <b>compelling</b> 33:19 <b>complaint</b> 105:21 <b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24 <b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7 <b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22 <b>completeness</b> 149:6 <b>completion</b> 4:16 <b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20 <b>compliance</b> 2:11 <b>compliant</b> 216:18 <b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3 <b>Complies</b> 114:20 <b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17 <b>components</b> 191:13 <b>composed</b> 66:12 <b>comprehensive</b> 169:9 <b>compromise</b> 15:1 <b>compromised</b> 15:10 <b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10 <b>computerized</b> 165:3 <b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13 <b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9 <b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6 <b>computing</b> 158:24 <b>con</b> 174:12 <b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6 <b>conceive</b> 215:13 <b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13 <b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21 <b>concerned</b> 14:20
--	--	--	---	--

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25

<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---



167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--

133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--



205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <hr/> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--

54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13	5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12	101:24 154:16 <b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13 <b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25	203:7 207:12 <b>quieter</b> 139:11 <b>quit</b> 140:10 <b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23 <b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12	<b>rarely</b> 222:4 <b>rat</b> 163:14 <b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7 <b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19 <b>ratings</b> 223:4 <b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17
<b>proponent</b> 91:5 <b>proportion</b> 73:1 <b>proposal</b> 160:21 <b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16 <b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4 <b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10 <b>Protecting</b> 150:22 <b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13 <b>protects</b> 15:22 <b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13 <b>prove</b> 13:6 <b>proved</b> 224:2 <b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9 <b>proves</b> 106:21 <b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2 <b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14 <b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20 <b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15 <b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15 <b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11 <b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22 <b>prudence</b> 222:1 <b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9	<b>publicity</b> 15:16 <b>publicly</b> 185:24 <b>public-input</b> 166:9 <b>pulled</b> 208:13 <b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20 <b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7 <b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5 <b>purchases</b> 222:23 <b>pure</b> 73:24 <b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18 <b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22 <b>pursuant</b> 202:10 <b>pursues</b> 133:16 <b>pursuit</b> 164:7 <b>push</b> 73:23 161:21 <b>pushed</b> 100:18 <b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18 <b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12	<b>QR</b> 160:7 <b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24 <b>quarter</b> 25:20 <b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18 <b>questioning</b> 103:2 <b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10 <b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14 <b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25	<b>R</b> <b>R</b> 2:1 230:1 <b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25 <b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23 <b>racial</b> 180:11 <b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11 <b>raise</b> 212:1 <b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13 <b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16 <b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11 <b>random</b> 33:2 56:10 <b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20 <b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12 <b>rank</b> 183:16 <b>rapid</b> 67:25 <b>rare</b> 30:7	<b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9 <b>reached</b> 194:9 <b>reaction</b> 107:17 <b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6 <b>readable</b> 147:4 <b>reader</b> 201:6 <b>reading</b> 107:22 <b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13 <b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15 <b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7 <b>realized</b> 28:17 <b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---



89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---

<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3 <b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4 3:22,25 13:20 24:22 37:6,14 51:13 108:22 113:3 134:2 139:24 150:15 181:17 193:21 228:18 <b>station</b> 75:23 78:7 84:20 93:13 <b>stations</b> 84:18,19 84:24 205:10 <b>statistical</b> 41:22 42:3 <b>statistically-based</b> 40:2 44:17 <b>statistically-valid</b> 149:16 <b>statistical-based</b> 41:19 <b>statistician</b> 55:2 <b>statistics</b> 44:2 59:18 125:22 <b>statutory</b> 50:18 <b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21 114:23,24 202:4 <b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18 <b>staying</b> 216:18 <b>steal</b> 77:2 <b>step</b> 53:11 149:12 164:4 <b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5 230:5,18,18 <b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10 <b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10 115:10 228:5 <b>STICKLAND</b> 172:22 <b>stone</b> 167:10 228:24 <b>stools</b> 120:15 <b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10 155:10 188:19 <b>stopped</b> 211:22 <b>store</b> 162:22 <b>stored</b> 27:14,22 <b>stores</b> 135:5 <b>stories</b> 186:5 <b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8 <b>strange</b> 26:8 <b>strengthened</b> 147:1 <b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20 <b>stretch</b> 97:2 <b>stretches</b> 178:16 <b>STRICKLAND</b> 171:14 205:25 206:2 <b>strips</b> 197:21 <b>strong</b> 92:6 <b>strongly</b> 62:21 151:4 161:18 229:14 <b>structure</b> 196:5 <b>structured</b> 176:5 <b>struggle</b> 209:20 211:24 <b>stub</b> 215:2 <b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3 222:11 223:23 224:4 <b>Student</b> 2:15 <b>students</b> 142:1 <b>studied</b> 66:13 76:21 <b>study</b> 30:24 54:25 63:8 65:3 66:3,4 66:14,15,17,21 68:8 80:18 92:22 139:24 187:10 221:6 <b>studying</b> 75:7 80:18 <b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8 106:25 126:1 155:6 160:25 <b>stuffing</b> 158:18 <b>style</b> 72:15 <b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1 214:15 215:9 224:17 <b>submitted</b> 47:16 124:19 <b>submitting</b> 122:4 <b>Subscription</b> 222:6 <b>subset</b> 38:17 <b>substitute</b> 133:4 <b>subtle</b> 188:3 <b>subtract</b> 146:10	<b>success</b> 122:9 <b>successful</b> 99:7 <b>successfully</b> 69:12 101:8 214:10 <b>sucked</b> 98:15,18 <b>sucks</b> 164:11 <b>sudden</b> 165:10 <b>sue</b> 138:14 <b>sues</b> 33:18 <b>sugar</b> 163:14 <b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15 50:9 151:4 <b>suggesting</b> 50:7 154:16 <b>suggestion</b> 23:20 <b>suggestions</b> 8:25 <b>suggests</b> 187:10 <b>suit</b> 125:2,7 <b>suits</b> 72:15 <b>summary</b> 20:25 107:24 148:22,22 158:8 159:5 170:15 <b>summer</b> 127:5 <b>super</b> 197:1 <b>superfluous</b> 164:3 <b>superintendent</b> 182:19,23 <b>Superior</b> 111:3 <b>supervisor</b> 134:9 198:13 <b>supervisors</b> 128:6 <b>supply</b> 12:1 <b>support</b> 3:24 92:7 135:23 143:9 <b>supportable</b> 129:25 <b>supporting</b> 150:19 <b>suppose</b> 211:10 <b>supposed</b> 72:18 160:9 213:6 <b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11 16:1 17:15 18:17 19:13 21:15 29:3 29:4 33:12 34:3 34:11 35:4 39:3,8 43:13 49:6,20 50:22 51:1 58:19 62:4 69:23 70:13 73:2 74:9 75:14 79:9 85:1 89:17	91:5 94:21 96:4 97:5 100:1 105:4 113:4 114:13 118:12 119:8 120:7 122:2 124:17 134:25 164:17 167:25 171:7,11 172:17 178:8,22 181:11 184:25 190:3 195:9 201:13,18 205:14 209:19 212:1,6 214:11 216:18 227:13 <b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24 <b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4 <b>surprise</b> 64:15 125:14 148:16 <b>surprised</b> 122:25 <b>surrounded</b> 193:23 <b>survey</b> 97:25 <b>surveyed</b> 9:18 80:20 <b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11 153:11,19 157:11 157:14,15,23 159:9 <b>Susan's</b> 34:23 154:1 <b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12 182:20 <b>sustain</b> 173:11 <b>swapping</b> 16:24 <b>swear</b> 117:15 <b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12 <b>switched</b> 57:15 81:23 85:4 <b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5 167:5 <b>symptom</b> 82:17 <b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12 9:3,25 10:22,23 11:10,11,13,25 12:5,13,17,18,22 13:4,7,18 14:11 19:17 20:3 23:22 23:23 27:13 32:1 34:12 35:6 36:18 37:21 38:22,25 49:7,10 50:23	51:11,16,17,21,23 52:3,5 53:22 56:7 56:18 58:10,11 62:1,9 63:15,23 66:23 67:10,16 68:20 69:4,5,21 70:17 71:25 72:5 72:6,20 73:12,22 73:25 74:2 79:1 80:4,5,10 85:20 85:24 86:9,12,12 86:21 87:7,8 89:2 96:24 109:14,16 109:16 110:2 111:17 112:8 117:14 118:4,6,7 118:9,13 119:23 119:24 120:10 121:19 122:5,10 127:16,16,22 128:2,8 129:14 130:15 132:22,23 133:3,11,15 135:23 136:14,18 140:7 141:1 142:12 145:16,19 147:19 148:7 150:4,6,12,23 151:5,13,17 152:21 154:11,12 156:11 157:1,5 158:13 160:11 161:16,17,19,21 161:25 162:1,3,6 163:15 164:10 168:24 169:1,8,13 169:16,17,20 170:7,23,23 171:3 171:4,5,11,25 172:5,7,11 173:4 173:4 177:9,12,14 179:17,24 180:3 180:18,20,25 183:25 184:21,22 185:15,16 189:11 189:24 190:3,7,25 191:1,4,6,15,22 192:15 193:9,15 193:20 194:24 195:1,5,15,18
---	---	--	---	--

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--



<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>U</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>V</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>Weir</b> 122:16,18,21	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>welcome</b> 2:2 3:21 60:11 113:6 116:2 121:2 122:19 124:6 126:12 134:6 137:13,25 141:11 143:22 161:7 167:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>well</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>well-funded</b> 192:7	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>well-intended</b> 5:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>well-to-do</b> 93:17	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnesses</b> 117:16
<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>WMAZ</b> 126:11
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 1	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7 200:18 205:10	159:16,18 160:1 174:20 179:15	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17 194:1,23 197:8,23	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	<b>workings</b> 229:16	197:24 198:2,6,21 205:23,24 208:20	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5 38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17 184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	209:5 220:2 224:15 228:14	40:24 42:9 43:9 46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	107:9,9 108:3,6 114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4 223:5	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	53:5 61:12,13 66:14 77:25 88:7	121:9 122:14,20 123:22 125:4,5	<b>0</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	88:20 90:5 97:1 97:12 99:7 103:22	126:6,14 128:25 132:12 134:7,21	<b>02</b> 194:21
36:1 38:1 43:18 52:22 53:13,15	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	104:3 113:14 124:15 129:2,9	135:15 136:15,25 137:14,25 139:10	<b>1</b>
55:3,3 56:12 58:8 71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>worst</b> 161:2	138:3 152:1 167:2 172:15 173:13,13	141:15 144:1 146:17 147:25	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
104:6 113:2 116:8 124:22 126:22	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	191:16 209:18 213:23	150:1 151:23 153:12,23 155:9	40:8 41:10 56:4
131:7 133:19 140:23 144:6,13	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3 157:23 165:2	57:2 151:2 156:17
155:21 170:15 174:25 175:2	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	55:24 63:20 64:17 68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25 193:23 194:10	156:18 176:10
178:24 191:5 192:5 199:8,25	163:14 193:4,4	74:18 79:19 93:18 127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24 212:11 228:6	182:17
202:21 203:14,19 205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:19 142:3,3 147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14 53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
212:15 222:8 224:23	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	156:11,11 158:2 158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13 95:8 117:22	42:4,5,13 55:24
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	151:8 161:4	170:11 192:10 207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16 129:17 131:8	84:19 125:16
124:16,20,20 127:1 138:24	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:25 218:23,24 219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14 157:16 166:18	147:9 206:14
173:10	<b>write</b> 89:8	221:18,22 222:13 223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19 206:13 214:14	207:24 224:5
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	224:11	223:15	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
158:2 193:6 200:1 202:20	<b>writing</b> 170:4	<b>yell</b> 166:15	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	111:19 165:6 206:5	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
100:1 101:25 104:22,22 117:2	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	165:5,21 198:20
169:10 191:9 193:1 194:5	108:8 162:7 187:15,15,16	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
201:14 214:17 215:11 226:14	189:21 198:16 202:21 207:12	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>zone</b> 210:22	141:4
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24	217:6,7,19	<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15		<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
	<b>X</b>			<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10 93:13			<b>114</b> 18:4
	<b>Y</b>			<b>12</b> 125:19
	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9 26:11 28:9,14 53:6 54:9 61:20			<b>12th</b> 1:10

<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

## SECURE, ACCESSIBLE &amp; FAIR ELECTIONS COMMISSION

## STATE OF GEORGIA

-----

The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 10:00 a.m. on this, the 12th day of December, 2018, at Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Boards Division, 237 Coliseum Drive, Macon, Georgia 31217.

-----

## TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)  
-- (Interruption of thought)  
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)  
(ph) (Phonetically)  
[sic] (In its original form)

( P R O C E E D I N G S )

10:00 A.M.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Good morning, and welcome to the Secretary of State's Professional Licensing Division office here in Macon and the third Secure, Accessible, and Fair Elections or SAFE Commission Meeting.

I am Robyn Crittenden and I'm the Secretary of State.

I was appointed by Governor Deal last month to fill the remainder of Governor-elect Kemp's term following -- it's not on? -- following his resignation. I am honored to serve in this capacity, and my focus has been on integrity, transparency and compliance with the law, which is what it has been throughout my career in public service.

Prior to coming to the Secretary of State's office, I spent time in several different areas of state government, including working at the Georgia Student Finance Commission and, most recently, serving as the commissioner of the Department of Human Services.

Now, at this time, I'd like to lead the Pledge of Allegiance, so if everyone would stand and join me.  
(Collective Pledge.)

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Now, from -- from what I understand, this

group has already heard from several different groups, and stakeholders, and public comment and has already made a great deal of progress, but I'm excited to continue the important discussion about our state's next voting system.

We're -- we're joined here today by Representative Brad Raffensperger, and he is going to be critical in continuing to carry out these efforts forward and to oversee the implementation of the work of the Legislature and Governor-elect Kemp.

Representative Raffensperger, thank you so much for being here. Would you like to give a few comments?

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Sure. From this -- here?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Is that good?

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, that's fine.

SECRETARY RAFFENSPERGER: Thank you, Secretary Crittenden and Co-chair Fleming. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the commission members and to all of the attendees here.

Secretary Crittenden, I'd like to personally thank you for your gracious welcome last week in the Secretary of State's office as we began our transition planning. I realize how many demands you have on your time and I'm very grateful for the support you've given us.

As you know, the Secretary of State's office is the

focal point for elections because the priceless franchise to vote requires free, clean and accurate elections throughout every aspect of the election process.

Obviously, a key component of this is secure voting machines. Our machines were state of the art in 2002 and, today, it is imperative we complete our research for security and technology for the next decade.

I have said that we need the most secure, updated voting technology with a verifiable paper audit trail and a system that moves voters faster through the line so we can reduce wait times. Aside from that, I have no predetermined outcome on the system or the vendor for our next-generation voting machines.

Our next legislative session begins on January 14th and I know that the General Assembly and our department is looking forward to the completion and recommendations from this commission's very important work. Thanking -- thank you for offering yourself for service in this critical and noble effort.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to turn the meeting over to Representative Barry Fleming and he's going to walk everyone through our agenda for today.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Madam Secretary, and good morning to all. It's -- it's good to see all of

you again. I thank all of you for taking the time out of your regular schedules and Christmas shopping that you should be doing and -- and being here for -- once again, to talk about something very important to Georgia; that is, voting in our state.

We do have an agenda this morning and I know there are copies on the way in right over there. We're certainly going to try to stick to it. There is a time on the agenda for public comment. I know there are sign-up sheets that should be circulating throughout the audience. And so, if you need to sign up and, for some reason, don't find the sheet, Secretary of State Crittenden's staff is right over here to my left and -- and -- and they can, obviously, be able to help you out.

As always, I appreciate all of you coming that has a -- have an interest in our proceedings today. We've had very good participation from the public at our prior meetings. I know -- recognize a lot of faces out there. I know all of you are well-intended citizens and we thank you for being here.

As always, we would ask everyone to be civil with their comments. Also, please recognize that we do have time limits for our presentations today and we will gently initially remind you of that and ask you to -- to help us keep that in order. My goal is not to have to call anybody

1 down for not being civil, and it hasn't happened so far,  
2 and -- and I thank all of you for that. But let's keep  
3 those in mind as our rules.

4 We also have with us today, again, a court reporter.  
5 Patrick Stephens is right over there with that thing  
6 covering his mouth. He's repeating everything I say, I  
7 hope, and I -- I told Patrick, when I first met him, that  
8 my dear wife is a court reporter and, as an attorney, I  
9 have been trained well not to speak over other people  
10 because the court reporter gets mad when you do that  
11 because they're trying to take down everything we say  
12 accurately.

13 So I would remind -- of course, members of the panel  
14 know this, and the audience that as we have discussions,  
15 that we want to be careful not to talk over one another so  
16 the transcript can be taken down accurately.

17 As you see from your agenda this morning -- getting a  
18 little feedback there.

19 STAFF MEMBER: Can you try turning off the microphones  
20 that aren't being used?

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Turn off the ones that aren't  
22 being used. That would be... there we go. That will help  
23 us a little bit. All right.

24 But, as you see from your agenda there, we'll have  
25 three presentations from -- starting now until about noon,

1 and then we'll have a lunch break and then probably come  
2 back around the 1 o'clock hour, and we'll adjust that as  
3 need be.

4 Members of the Commission, we have brought lunch in  
5 for you so that you can eat and we'll have some -- some  
6 comments there to make that time productive for us as well.

7 There is a, as I mentioned earlier, a time for public  
8 comment and then we'll end our meeting with a discussion  
9 amongst the members of the commission.

10 Our hope is to begin now to formulate our thoughts,  
11 our questions that we want the Secretary's staff to -- to  
12 work on for us. My anticipation is, is that we probably  
13 will announce another meeting in January, maybe the --  
14 early January before the legislature meets for us to  
15 actually formalize, hopefully, a recommendation to the  
16 governor and to the legislature as far as our thoughts on  
17 Georgia moving ahead with our -- our voting machines and --  
18 and what we do next basically.

19 So that's -- that's the tentative outline, the best  
20 laid plan of mice and men, and we'll see how it goes today.

21 But, once again, thank you all for being here. Are there  
22 any questions from any of our commission members before we  
23 get started into -- into the program? Anybody?

24 All right. Well, let's get going then. Garland --  
25 and I want to say Favorito. Did I get that right?

1 MR. FAVORITO: Yes, sir, you did.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come -- come on up. Good to  
3 see you. I know that -- to the microphone right here would  
4 be best.

5 MR. FAVORITO: So, Mr. Chairman --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah?

7 MR. FAVORITO: -- I'm going to present from back there  
8 on the computer and you're going to probably want to see  
9 the slides.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. You're going to  
11 present from right here?

12 MR. FAVORITO: You may want to --

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So turn our chairs around for  
14 you? Okay.

15 MR. FAVORITO: I think that the slides are important  
16 for you to see.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. And there's a  
18 microphone up there for you so, hopefully, it'll do well.  
19 Senator?

20 SENATOR JACKSON: A lot of people in the back can't  
21 hear.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: A lot of people in the back  
23 can't hear.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Cannot hear.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Two suggestions:

1 Move closer to the front and, second of all, we'll let the  
2 staff see if we can boost the volume a little bit for you  
3 on -- on our microphone system. Okay? And we'll try to  
4 talk a little better into it.

5 MR. FAVORITO: This one's not on yet, I don't think.  
6 Check, check, testing, testing.

7 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Feedback.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Feedback? Testing, testing. Nothing?  
9 So can y'all hear? Maybe if I just hold it. Is this  
10 better?

11 AUDIENCE: Yeah.

12 MR. FAVORITO: Is this better?

13 AUDIENCE: (Crosstalk.)

14 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah, a little bit. I can hear.

15 MR. FAVORITO: Is that okay?

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, that -- that's better.  
17 While -- while we're waiting to get everything going here,  
18 I did, as I surveyed the audience, saw a lot of familiar  
19 faces. I did see Representative Sam Teasley. Put your  
20 phone down. I'm talking about you. Sam, good to see you.  
21 We appreciate you following us and coming down today.  
22 Good to see you.

23 MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working. I -- I  
25 could hear it over the system.



MR. FAVORITO: Testing, testing, check.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The mic is working, Garland, so just -- just speak right into it.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. We'll go ahead and start then. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate the opportunity to -- to come today and give a little bit different perspective from an election-integrity perspective. I'm the cofounder of Voter GA --

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We cannot hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't -- I cannot hear.

MR. FAVORITO: Okay. Testing.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative responses.)

MR. FAVORITO: Is that -- is that good enough?

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Yes.

MR. FAVORITO: Is that good? Okay. Thank you. Thank you, audience folks. So, again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a true honor for me to be here and present today.

As y'all know, I'm the cofounder of Voter GA. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan, all-volunteer organization, a due's free member group. I want to spend about 15 minutes on the current system and improvement opportunities, and about 10 on new system requirements. I'm going to be running through some slides really fast and just -- the objective is to -- the presentation, how to restore the

could supply an independent audit trail.

The law -- in order to get the machines in, the legislature then repealed that law in 2002, but the repeal did not take effect until after the contract was -- was purchased back in -- after the system was purchased back on May 4th, 2002.

The reason that I bring this to the attention of the commission is that we don't -- we don't want to make the same mistake again, so we're going to ask you to please only legalize auditable verifiable voting that can detect fraud. So we want to make sure that you make -- have -- have that in your recommendations.

So when that new system was implemented back then in 2002, we went from what we believed to be 83 percent verifiability with punch cards and an optical-scan printer to zero percent with what we consider to be an unverifiable system today.

So what do I mean by an unverifiable voting system? Well, what we contend, from the election-integrity perspective, is that the votes cannot be verified, audited or recounted properly. So what do I mean by that? Well, you, as a voter, cannot verify that the system tabulated the votes and the selections that you made, the cast-ballot screen that you see may not be what's happening on the -- the inside of the machine.

trust in Georgia voting.

So I'm an IT guy. As I think many of you know, I've been in the business for 40 years -- and I hate to admit that because it kind of dates me, but I'm going to have to fess up to it. So, in IT, we use something called systems-development life cycles, and that is a -- basically, it tells you the phases and the tasks that you have to go through to do a big project like this.

And, typically, what you do is you analyze your current system for improvement opportunities, you define the new system requirements and then evaluate the alternatives. So the purpose of my presentation today is to help you identify the current system improvement opportunities and then to set the -- a framework for defining your objectives and requirements.

Before we get into restoring the trust of Georgia elections, we have to talk about how the trust was broken.

Back in 2001, everything started off on a great foot. We had a -- a tremendous law that said any voting systems that we evaluate from the pilot have to have an independent audit trail of each vote cast, a great law, a great protection for Georgia voters.

But as the pilot took -- took place, only one of the seven systems met the requirement of the law and there was one other system that was not part of the evaluation that

As election officials, many of you know when -- there are no audit procedures in place today to audit their elections. So -- so when you -- you certify those results, you're putting down what the system told you that it -- it was -- it tabulated, but you don't really have a way to audit that and prove that, in fact, that that was the correct results that the system told you.

And then lastly, but not least, is the recount situation. As you know, here in Georgia, we recanvass votes. We don't actually recount them on the DREs. So that is a partial recount, and what, really, the law really requires -- and, essentially, what you're doing there is just reprinting previously unverifiable results.

So that leaves us open to -- to fraud and -- and errors potentially. So we bring this to the commission's attention because what we hope we will do is to ensure that you will give us a verifiable, auditable and re-countable system.

So that's the election-integrity advocates' perspective, but what about the state's perspective? We -- we hear quite a few arguments, and I condensed these down to the four that we hear the most, and one is: The -- the machines are not connected to the Internet, so there's no risk of external hacking, and we also have heard that -- of course, that an attacker needs to have physical access

1 to a machine to hack it and the counties perform extensive  
2 logic and accuracy anyway that would detect any hack and  
3 there's been -- really, there haven't been any reported  
4 crimes since the 2002 implementation.

5 So there is a huge gap in the perspective between the  
6 election-integrity advocates, and the computer scientists  
7 and the -- the states and -- and these -- some of the  
8 county elections directors. So let's look at why we have  
9 this gap.

10 So I want to take the first two -- two issues: Is our  
11 system vulnerable to -- vulnerable to Internet hacking and,  
12 two, does a hacker need physical access. Okay. On the  
13 right-hand side here, you'll see that we have a voting  
14 machine and that voting machine is not connected to the  
15 Internet and no -- it's -- it's secure in the county  
16 offices and/or the precincts and, therefore, it is not --  
17 it -- it -- it should be fine. It's not connected to the  
18 Internet; there's no physical access to it.

19 However, the way it works on election day and in early  
20 voting, that's not necessarily what we're concerned about.

21 What we're really concerned about and part of the process  
22 is the preparation process. The preparation, Georgia runs  
23 a centralized preparation process and that leaves us  
24 vulnerable to what the security experts call a single point  
25 of attack. And, with that single point of attack, you

1 process, we need to find a way to make sure that the  
2 counties can verify that the information that is -- they  
3 receive from the central source is, in fact, secure.

4 Logic and accuracy testing: While you -- we would  
5 say, Well, that would -- that would -- well, that would  
6 detect a hack, wouldn't it? Well, no, not really because  
7 the voting machines operate in test mode when you're  
8 testing them but, when you put them into election mode for  
9 election day and early voting [sic]. Well, the software  
10 can determine what mode it's in and count differently in  
11 test mode than it does in election mode. So it can be  
12 intentionally designed, in any clever hack, to deceive the  
13 tester to believe that everything is correct.

14 So, this, you do not have to take my word for it  
15 because virtually all of the experts in all of the lawsuits  
16 that have gone on in the state of Georgia have all agreed  
17 that this is true; that the software can detect what mode  
18 it's in and count differently in test mode than election  
19 mode. So that negates so much of your logic and accuracy  
20 testing and it -- it still leaves us vulnerable.

21 So the reason that we bring this to the attention of  
22 the commission is to ensure that the audit procedures --  
23 we'll have the appropriate audit procedures to protect  
24 Georgians against election-day vote swapping malware.

25 Finally, I want to just quickly, as -- as fast as I

1 could conceivably compromise any -- any given election.

2 So, for years, we've operated from the Kennesaw State  
3 Center for Election Systems. That's where you do your  
4 ballot building; that then, in turn, gives you a secure  
5 elections database. From the county perspective, you're  
6 getting that typically through the mail or some security  
7 device. You don't get that from the Internet.

8 So, from the county perspective, everything is tight  
9 and locked down. However, what happens if that -- that  
10 server -- that ballot-building server has been compromised  
11 by that single point of attack? That is the risk that you  
12 have there, and we learned in 2017 that, in fact, did  
13 happen and Kennesaw State was exposed for -- to the  
14 Internet, that ballot-building server, and that was a  
15 great concern to all of us. And, of course, there was a  
16 lot of publicity about -- about that back then.

17 So, again, we bring this to the attention of the  
18 commission because what we would like you to do -- and you  
19 can't quite see the bottom of the slide here, but we want  
20 you to consider decentralization versus centralization.  
21 The decentralization is more secure because you cannot --  
22 it would -- it protects you from the single point of attack  
23 but, at the same time, it puts more burden on the -- on the  
24 counties.

25 So if we're going to continue with a centralized

1 can, talk about Georgia voting problems. There have been  
2 quite a few problems that we need to consider. And,  
3 starting in 2002, we had a lot of invalid votes. We had  
4 3256 test votes included in Cobb County certified results.

5 Now, the Cobb County elections people caught the error and  
6 they fixed it; everything turned out all right, but the  
7 machines accepted these invalid votes.

8 It happened again in 2008 in Lowndes County and, in  
9 2017, you might remember there was a big delay in that  
10 sixth-district race where the nation was watching us, and  
11 it turned out that Fulton County had accidentally put a  
12 Roswell runoff card into their sixth-district results.

13 Now, that was a human error but the machines should  
14 have caught that error. As an IT person, I mean, our  
15 responsibility is to have -- make sure that we only accept  
16 valid data, and that was invalid data, so the machine  
17 should have rejected that right away. It took a lot of  
18 work from, both, Fulton County and Kennesaw to track down  
19 what that problem is. So the machines will accept invalid  
20 votes.

21 We've -- there's also been a variety of situations for  
22 a lot of folks. Right here in Bibb County in 2004, two  
23 machines lost over 200 votes and they simply just could not  
24 accumulate their results. Director Carr at the time and  
25 her staff -- there was nothing that they could do to -- to

1 fix the problem. So we just lost 200 votes back then.

2 In 2005, we had another situation that might have been  
3 lost votes. Over in Cobb County, we had a SPL0ST that was  
4 decided by 114 votes, but there were 285 blank-voted  
5 ballots. So how do you have a blank-voted ballot when  
6 there's only one race on the ballot? And this is -- you  
7 know, a SPL0ST is -- operates by itself. There's no other  
8 county -- there's no other elections on there.

9 When we asked that question, we were told that the  
10 voters probably waited in line, drove to the poll, got  
11 their card and then went and stuck it in the machine and  
12 then just decided not to vote. We found that not a  
13 plausible explanation, but that -- the same thing happened  
14 again in 2011 when an election was decided by less votes  
15 than the actual number of blank-voted ballots.

16 So the question comes down to, Did you lose votes  
17 there? We don't know for sure but what we do know is that  
18 a billion dollars of taxes were assigned and assessed  
19 against the people of Cobb County over these votes and they  
20 could have been lost.

21 In addition, just recently, we noticed in the last  
22 election in 2018 the Georgia Lieutenant Governor's race had  
23 a 4 percent under-vote rate, which is unheard of, and we --  
24 we really do not know why that happened. It's not  
25 consistent with history and it's not consistent with the

1 all of this from back in 2008.

2 Two more things I wanted to mention about the  
3 machines and then we're going to move to the new system.  
4 The machines will accept negative votes. We know this from  
5 Florida when the exact same machine types that we have  
6 accepted 16,000 negative votes. Again, the elections  
7 officials always catch these errors, typically, and correct  
8 them but the machines, for some reason, accept negative  
9 votes and no one has ever cast a negative vote in the  
10 history of American elections, so the question is why do  
11 they allow that.

12 The same situation with fractional voting. We have  
13 determined that the machines do accept fractional voting,  
14 which we don't implement this in Georgia but the machines  
15 are set up to do that. So no one has ever cast a  
16 fractional vote in the history of Georgia elections as  
17 well.

18 So we bring all of this to the commission's attention  
19 because we would like for you to consider -- and I'm sorry  
20 this last part of the slide is broken off. We'd like for  
21 you to consider requirements that will prevent these kinds  
22 of problems in the future if you should decide, in fact,  
23 that they are problems. We believe that they are.

24 So, at this point in time, I'm going to run to the  
25 handout summary --

1 lower-down ballot races which, typically, have a 1 percent  
2 or less under-vote rate.

3 So there's the potential there that we may have lost  
4 90,000 votes but we just don't know. So if you -- I think  
5 we will probably hear later on that the reason the machines  
6 came into Georgia was we were trying to -- to solve an  
7 under-vote problem back in the 2000 presidential race. We  
8 were very, very concerned about it. There were about  
9 90,000 under votes back then that seemed to be suspect.

10 But I want to mention this though because -- and we've  
11 gone 16 years later and we still have the same problems  
12 with the machines. We still have lost under votes that we  
13 are not really sure about why -- you know, what happened to  
14 them.

15 Just a few more things I wanted to mention to you. We  
16 also had a situation of altered votes. We -- in -- in the  
17 server level. We believe that the system can be altered  
18 without an audit trail. This happened in 2008 out in  
19 Douglas County where the chairman and the sheriff-elect  
20 went to bed thinking that they had won their race. A board  
21 member took the -- this is a county board member -- took  
22 the results home in a spreadsheet and then went to enter  
23 them in the next morning and the results changed and those  
24 two individuals lost their races. How do we know this? We  
25 have the inspector general's report from -- that explains

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold --

2 MR. FAVORITO: -- which you-all --

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, hold on just a  
4 second, Garland.

5 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm sorry.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to -- you're about to  
7 switch gears, so I want to see if any of the --

8 MR. FAVORITO: All right.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- members of the panel have  
10 any questions or comments about what you just covered. I  
11 know some of them did because I heard them say -- talking  
12 about it while you were talking.

13 MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I just want to see if they  
15 want to say it out loud. Yes, sure, Amy?

16 MS. HOWELL: Yes. Could you explain what a fractional  
17 vote is?

18 AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you use the microphone,  
19 please?

20 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. So the question was, what -- the  
21 question was, what is a fractional vote. We don't know, to  
22 be honest with you. We'll go back here. We know that the  
23 machine, it records votes -- or it has the ability to  
24 record votes in -- in decimal places, two digits at least.  
25 So why they have that ability? We don't know. Because,

1 as I was saying, no one's ever casted a fractional vote  
2 that we know of in the history of American elections. Now,  
3 this is not implemented in Georgia but these machines we --  
4 that are of the same type do have that capability. That's  
5 what we were -- that's what I was mentioning there.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else?

7 MS. BOREN: I had a question, Nancy Boren, about what  
8 is a negative vote?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah, a great -- great question. There  
10 -- as I was saying before, no one has ever cast a negative  
11 vote in the history of American elections, and we don't  
12 know that it's happened in Georgia, but the machines will  
13 allow negative votes because we know that the same machine  
14 type allowed that 16,000 negative votes in Florida in the  
15 2000 presidential election.

16 So the question is why do they even have -- accept  
17 that -- a negative vote to begin with? So these are the  
18 things that you probably ought to -- I think you would need  
19 to look at and prevent with your requirements for future  
20 machines.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Anybody else? Yes, I'm  
22 sorry. You're sitting in the wrong spot.

23 MS. ROSS: I'm sorry.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're in my blind spot.

25 MS. ROSS: It's okay.

1 difference. So an under vote is always legitimate. There  
2 is no problem with under votes. The -- when we talk about  
3 the lost votes here, the entire ballots were lost in Bibb  
4 County. And, here, there was only one race on the ballot  
5 in Cobb and the entire ballot was lost.

6 So when I say, Lost votes, then that's what I'm really  
7 talking about, is the -- the entire ballot was not counted,  
8 not just an under vote of the race. An under vote's always  
9 legitimate.

10 MS. ROSS: Thank you.

11 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for clarifying that for me.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Just to make a comment -- Darin McCoy,  
14 Evans County. I witnessed many mail-in ballots in this  
15 election where the only race that was voted on was the  
16 governor's race and, also, I have experienced where voters  
17 sent back the mail-in ballots blank and did not vote for  
18 anyone.

19 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. And, now, there is one thing I  
20 can add to that. So in the particular -- in the case of  
21 the lieutenant governor's race, the down-ballot races --  
22 the agriculture commissioner, the Secretary of State's race  
23 -- typically had about a one percent under vote and the  
24 lieutenant governor's race had a 4 percent under vote.

25 There's no logical explanation for that that we can

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

2 MS. ROSS: And I believe I can speak loud. Under lost  
3 votes, that you're asking us to prohibit lost votes, are  
4 you considering those voters that have the right to not  
5 vote for a race?

6 MR. FAVORITO: Oh --

7 MS. ROSS: So that would be a blank vote.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Yes. No, I -- I'm -- I'm sorry. Thank  
9 you. Roger -- roger that for that question. Right --  
10 right, we do not mean under votes at all. No, an under  
11 vote is a legitimate under vote, so if I -- I -- if I am  
12 voting and I get down to the agriculture commissioner's  
13 race and I don't know either one of the candidates, so I  
14 decide to skip that -- that race, that's a legitimate under  
15 vote. That's not what I'm talking about at all. When I'm  
16 saying lost votes, what I -- what we're talking about here  
17 is completely lost ballots for the most part or, in the one  
18 case of the lieutenant governor's race, possibly an under  
19 vote.

20 MS. ROSS: So what would be your suggestion for us to  
21 determine what's a under vote and a blank vote? Because,  
22 in our current system, it's the same number. It has the  
23 same meaning in the current system that we have. So how  
24 would you ask that we decipher the difference?

25 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. So, yes, how do we decipher the

1 find out -- that we can think of offhand. Maybe y'all have  
2 one, but it seems -- in fact, there was actually a lawsuit  
3 filed over this. We don't really know why they would be so  
4 dramatically different in that particular race, both from a  
5 historical perspective and from that current election and  
6 the down-ballot races.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

8 MS. ROSS: Would you recommend -- are you recommending  
9 that all under votes be explained?

10 MR. FAVORITO: No.

11 MS. ROSS: Or is any unexplained under vote, in your  
12 opinion, automatically suspect? Meaning, do you want the  
13 voter to say --

14 MR. FAVORITO: Yes.

15 MS. ROSS: -- I'm under voting and I really mean it?

16 MR. FAVORITO: Great -- great question. No, no, we're  
17 not asking for anything to do -- anything to happen that's  
18 not happening now. What -- as you look at it even from a  
19 historical perspective, there's a -- typically -- an under  
20 vote typically runs from about a quarter of a percent to a  
21 one percent. That's your typical under vote.

22 And it -- it goes down as you go down the ballot, as  
23 -- as Director McCoy said, you know, people -- less people  
24 vote as you go down the ballot. We don't see -- I mean, an  
25 under vote is always a legitimate vote and we don't really

1 know why this particular race was that dramatically  
2 different, and I don't know that I even have a solution for  
3 you as to why -- how you would prevent that from -- from  
4 happening.

5 But the problem is that the machine -- you -- you  
6 don't have any way to go back and check what the machine  
7 did. So if you had a normal audit trail, then you wouldn't  
8 have this kind of -- of -- of strange situation.

9 You can go back to the actual physical ballots and --  
10 if you had paper ballots, and then you could see, Okay,  
11 yeah, it was legitimately under voted. But there's no  
12 audit -- there's no way to audit the machine. So if the  
13 machine said the -- the race was under voted by 4 percent,  
14 we don't have any way to know whether or not the machine is  
15 telling you the correct information or not.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

17 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey out  
18 of Richmond County. The blank ballots you spoke of out of  
19 Cobb County, do you by chance know the origin of those  
20 ballots? Were they generated on an electronic voting  
21 device or --

22 MR. FAVORITO: Oh, absolutely.

23 MS. BAILEY: -- either on paper or do you know?

24 MR. FAVORITO: No. These were -- the blank-voted  
25 ballots were all off of the electronic voting machines

1 either from early voting or from election-day voting.

2 MS. BAILEY: So there were no mail-in paper ballots  
3 considered in the numbers that we see up here?

4 MR. FAVORITO: That's exactly right. There was no  
5 mail-in ballots considered in those, and about 40,000 total  
6 ballots cast in those races.

7 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

8 MR. FAVORITO: Thank you.

9 MS. ROSS: Can I get a point of clarification?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

11 MS. ROSS: Just a point of clarification: For Bibb  
12 County where it stated that over 200 ballots -- votes were  
13 lost, lost votes -- isn't it true that, based on the system  
14 that we have now, the votes are stored on the voting unit  
15 as well as on a memory card and that we have procedures  
16 that -- when we have a memory card that goes bad, that we  
17 do have procedures on where we can retrieve those votes  
18 from the unit itself and download it to another memory  
19 card, and that we know how many votes that we're looking  
20 for.

21 MR. FAVORITO: So I'm -- I don't think I'm aware of  
22 the votes being stored anywhere other than the memory card  
23 itself.

24 MS. ROSS: They are on the voting unit, too.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: That is incorrect.

1 MS. ROSS: Yes, they are on the voting unit and  
2 they're also on the memory card. So, if we have a memory  
3 card that goes bad, we have procedures of how to internally  
4 re-download those votes to another memory card.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Monds?

6 MR. MONDS: Just a point of clarification: When you  
7 talked about this negative vote, what -- what was the  
8 16,000 -- what did that represent in Florida?

9 MR. FAVORITO: Yeah. So, in Florida, what happened  
10 was somebody apparently put a memory card in with 16,000  
11 negative votes. I don't know if it was a --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Was it in Broward County?

13 MR. FAVORITO: It was in Volusia County, I believe.  
14 That's a good question. It -- yeah, so somebody put 16,000  
15 votes -- negative votes in the memory card and it was  
16 accumulated into the results. The elections officials  
17 realized that there was something wrong. They tracked it  
18 back and fixed it. They found the card and they corrected  
19 the problem. But the -- the point was that the machine  
20 allowed that to happen.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Garland.  
22 Garland, go ahead and move along with the rest of your  
23 presentation.

24 MR. FAVORITO: Okay. I'm just going to -- flip over  
25 to your handout. I've just got about three or four slides

1 left that I want to leave you with.

2 You're going to be looking for disabled voters; I'm  
3 sure you're going to be looking at ballot-marking devices.

4 The thing that I -- we want to make sure that you  
5 understand -- and I think everybody knows that ballot-  
6 marking devices are touchscreen and you can print the  
7 selections on paper and then you can scan that and tabulate  
8 it.

9 But the thing that we want to mention here is there  
10 are three types of ballot-marking devices, and these -- I'm  
11 just using my own terms. The first one I call the  
12 unverifiable barcoded ballot mark, and that is it puts the  
13 votes into a barcode and then tabulates the barcode. Well,  
14 we consider that to be unverifiable just like it was 16  
15 years ago because the voter can't verify and see what's on  
16 the barcode.

17 So we think that those are not just -- should not be  
18 purchased for Georgia, but probably really should be  
19 outlawed. And the senate tended to agree with us, but we  
20 never got the language quite -- in the -- in the last  
21 session to do that.

22 There's what I call a verifiable barcode that has a  
23 human-readable verifiable vote that's scanned, and that's -  
24 - that's a good thing, but they still have a barcode for  
25 things like election ID, precinct ID and so on. And

1 that's an increased security risk because there could be  
2 nefarious instructions transferred from the ballot-marking  
3 machine to the tabulator. So it's better than the -- the  
4 non-verifiable, but still not -- not the perfect solution.

5 A better solution would be the clear ballot marker,  
6 which has no barcodes at all. However, those are very,  
7 very rare. There's only one or two vendors out there that  
8 have that. So we bring this to the attention of the  
9 commission just to ask you to legally ban unverifiable  
10 ballot-marking devices. We're asking you to make that  
11 recommendation.

12 So what are your alternatives to consider from a  
13 systems perspective? Basically, they are -- you could  
14 replace all of the DREs with what they call VVPAT DREs;  
15 that would be Option Number 1. But what we found out about  
16 those is -- those actually put the votes into barcodes as  
17 well. So they're called -- they're called voter-verified  
18 electronic voting machines but, yet, they actually don't  
19 really have a voter-verified paper audit trail in most  
20 cases. You might be able to find one out there. I haven't  
21 -- haven't found one yet, but there could be one out there.

22 The other option you have is to replace all of your  
23 DREs with ballot-marking devices. Two issues with this:  
24 Voters tend -- there's a study, I think, from Rice  
25 University that shows that about 30 percent of voters don't

1 voting system but generally speaking. Here's what we would  
2 suggest that -- we think is important:

3 The first thing would be to standardize the ballot.  
4 We should have an official ballot that's a durable paper.  
5 It should be the same ballot that vote -- is voted on for  
6 everybody: mail in, early voting, election day, provisional  
7 and disabled voters. And that's particularly important for  
8 disabled voters because it helps them to maintain their  
9 ballot secrecy. We don't -- we don't record that manual  
10 disabled vote, so they -- if they vote on the same ballot,  
11 then their voter anonymity is better.

12 Tabulators. We talked about this. The -- the  
13 tabulators can tabulate human-readable vote marks that can  
14 be verified by the voter and anything else should not be  
15 allowed in Georgia.

16 Election-prep security. This is another issue that we  
17 think is really important that we want the commission to  
18 consider. Decentralization versus centralization. Even in  
19 a hand-marked solution, you still have to prep those  
20 tabulators.

21 So how do you secure that? Should you let the  
22 counties do their own prepping or can you give the counties  
23 better security so that they can ensure that whatever  
24 information they get from the centralized source is, in  
25 fact, secure.

1 properly verify the interpreted ballot. And so, therefore,  
2 it -- it's not the best verifiability. But most important  
3 probably, for your consideration, is that the cost is going  
4 to be tripled because you're going to need 30 -- over a  
5 hand-marked paper-ballot solution because you're going to  
6 need 30,000 ballot markers to replace all of the DREs that  
7 we have now.

8 The third option that we will probably be considering  
9 is hand-marked paper ballot -- sorry that's a little bit  
10 off the screen. Those -- that's the cheapest solution.  
11 You only need one scanner for each precinct, so about 3,000  
12 scanners you'll probably be needing. It saves a lot on  
13 logistics, maintenance and testing.

14 It does have a higher cost of preprinted ballots. You  
15 have to -- you know, that's more expensive but you can use  
16 -- couple that with an on-demand ballot printer, which I  
17 know a lot of elections directors like, and that means that  
18 the -- the -- when the voter comes into the precinct, they  
19 get that ballot right there printed off, so you don't have  
20 to worry about how many ballots you need to print ahead of  
21 time and throwing away all of the wasted paper. So that's  
22 less administrative issues for the elections directors.

23 So I want to kind of talk about the -- what we -- we'd  
24 like you to look at the seven problems that we need to --  
25 we think you need to solve logistically, not just on the

1 Auditing. You have to verify the tabulators with  
2 random audits either by RLA procedures or precinct-level  
3 procedures. That's critical. Hand tallies are critical  
4 there for a selective percentage of -- of the total votes  
5 cast.

6 Recounts. Recounts you don't -- currently, today,  
7 you -- let's take the mail-in, for example. If you recount  
8 them, you just take the ballots and you run them through  
9 the scanner a second time. So if the tabulator was counted  
10 incorrectly on election day, it would still be counted  
11 incorrectly for the recount and you would never know. So  
12 you have to hand tally the -- the recounts to make sure  
13 that the tabulator is -- is tabulating correctly.

14 And, finally, ballot-inspection transparency. The  
15 public is not allowed to see these ballots; they're sealed  
16 up permanently. We had a candidate who tried to see his --  
17 his -- his votes and he could not see the votes that were  
18 cast in his election, sues for that right and the judge  
19 said that he had no compelling reason to look at his -- at  
20 his own ballots. So we don't think that's acceptable. So  
21 there should be a procedure to allow the public to inspect  
22 these ballots under the control of the ballot custodian,  
23 which would be the elections directors in the county.

24 So I would -- the final thing I'd like to leave you  
25 with is that all of this -- to restore the trust in Georgia

elections, it's going to require some additional work on the counties. In -- in order to do this, you have to be able to audit, recount and make sure that we have transparency in the election process.

This is going to be an increased burden on the county elections directors. It's going to require a little bit more cost, and a little bit more funding and a little bit more resources mostly at the county level. So we just want to bring that to your attention because I think the Secretary of State's office needs to work with the county commissions in making sure that they understand this when we move to a new system, assuming we're going to implement auditing, recounting and transparency.

So what are the next steps? We think that -- we would like to suggest that you refine the objectives that we've given you and see exactly what you really think we need to do and we think that you need to define the requirements, basically, to each of these objectives and then prepare legislation to -- for each of those objectives as well.

So that's a big task. I know maybe that everyone would like to know how to do that, so what we've done is we have this VoterGA SAFE Commission recommendation report. Susan's holding up a copy of that. I was planning not to release this until Friday because I wanted to get some feedback from the commission as to what you thought about

but you save all of this administrative work for the elections directors by having to try to anticipate how many ballots they need ahead of time and then, if they don't have enough, then there's a big scramble.

So there's two -- there's two cost aspects there, and that would be the -- just the paper cost alone and then the administrative. I think those two would offset the cost of putting a ballot printer into -- at each precinct, but I don't have the numbers to -- prepared. Great question. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This commission is tasked with secure and accessible elections. Sir, do you have an opinion about vote by mail?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, yes, sir. So the -- you know, any -- there could be potential fraud anywhere. So, vote by mail, you -- the voter gets a -- has an actual physical ballot that they scan, so there's a system of record with that ballot.

So we actually recommend that people vote by mail given the current -- the current situation with these machines. So no particular mail in -- no -- no type of election is basically foolproof and no particular voting type is foolproof, but we do recommend vote by mail right now, you know, in -- in lieu of voting machines.

the presentation and then I was going to make some adjustments and release that on Friday, but I am prepared to talk about it in case there any questions.

And, with that, I'm done. I wanted to make sure I stayed on my time. And so, thank you so much, and I'd be glad to take any other questions about the new system as well.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Represent Beverly?

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a quick question for you around the idea of on-demand printed ballots. There's a cost associated with the preprinted ballots that are wasted --

MR. FAVORITO: Absolutely.

REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: -- because they're not used. Is there -- have you guys run a cost analysis on -- you know, if we sort of looked at the amount of preprinted ballots that are wasted, the savings we would have by going to a printed ballot and what would that number be?

MR. FAVORITO: Right. That's a good question, and we -- we don't have cost figures on that but, as -- as we've explained, the -- the cost is -- is -- not only is it the cost savings, but -- see, all you really need is one -- one on-demand ballot printer in each precinct, so there's not -- that's not a tremendous amount of cost.

And then it's -- not only do you save the paper cost,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Garland, thank you so much. We appreciate you being here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate you. Thank you for having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next, we'll ask Kevin Rayburn, Secretary of State's office. Kevin, good to see you today.

MR. RAYBURN: Thank you. I think we're going to get mic'd up and then we'll start. Check. Can everyone hear me okay?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yep.

MR. RAYBURN: All right. My name is Kevin Rayburn. I'm the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the Georgia Secretary of State's office. I had the honor of previously presenting to you on our first commission meeting, so thank you for letting me come back. And the topic I'm going to talk about today is postelection audits.

Postelection audits are something that we currently don't do in Georgia. It's something that, when we move to a new system that has a voter-verified paper record, we will be able to do. It's something that most states do, so it's something that you may want to include in the recommendations of this commission as you deliberate that later today and something for the legislature and our state

election board to really work with in the future.

So we'll start with, what is an audit? One definition is you're trying to independently re-create and verify your results using the same underlying data. So, in our world, the underlying data is the cast votes. And so, you're trying to independently re-create that tabulated results, looking back at the cast votes.

What an audit can do is it can check out the equipment and the procedures used to count the votes worked correctly, that the votes were counted as cast and that the election yielded the correct result.

What an audit is not is it is not a recount. What a recount is, is when you count every single vote for a particular race. So when you recount a house district, you count every vote that was cast for that house district.

What an audit is, is it counts a portion, a sample, a subset of the total vote for a particular race and that can give you confidence that those votes were counted correctly the first time. Whereas, a recount, since the full re-creation, you will know what the results is.

So it sounds like there has been a consensus so far that the next system will have a voter-verifiable vote record. So why would you audit once you have that? What's the importance of that? Well, the reason is that no voting system is perfect. People are not perfect and computers

aren't always perfect and without risk. So even if you had a hundred percent hand-counted election, the practice would be to have an audit of that to make sure that people who hand-counted did that correctly and that their procedures worked.

So same thing if you have a computer-tabulated election where you're scanning in paper ballots. You are going to want to make sure that the computer was programmed correctly and that it calculated the correct vote tally.

So the benefits of a audit are that you can find errors, whether those were intentional errors or accidental errors, it can help you have data and information so that you can improve the process for future elections; you can iterate on what you've learned after doing that review.

It serves as a fraud deterrent. Just like you are probably less likely to rob a bank if you know there is a armed guard at the door. If you know that there are audits going to be done after an election, you know that they are going to dig in and review those results, look at the ballots, that is going to be a deterrent for election fraud. And, finally, and maybe most importantly, it helps build public confidence in the election and the outcome of an election.

So I'm going to describe the three main categories or types of postelection tabulation audits that currently

exist. They are the fixed-percentage audit, the tiered-percentage audit and the statistically-based audit. Most states -- 30 states have a fixed-percentage audit. What this means is there is a predetermined percentage of usually precincts -- it could be voting machines, but you know ahead of time what percentage of precincts you are going to need to go back and re-tabulate, recount.

Usually, you see 1 percent, 2 percent, 3 percent, 5 percent or 10 percent. Those are usually the categories of the percentages that you would go back and review. The advantage of doing that is you know ahead of time kind of the scope of your audit, you know what percentage of precincts you would have to look at and that makes it easier to budget when you know ahead of time what kind of a scope.

The downside of a fixed-percentage audit is it doesn't change and fluctuate based on how close the election is. I think, intuitively, if you have an election that is a blowout, there's a huge margin between the candidates, you would feel comfortable reviewing fewer ballots than if it was a very tight election. Under the fixed-percentage audit, it's fixed.

So, whether it's a close election or -- or a blowout, you're not going to know beforehand but you're going to have that fixed percentage set. And so, that's a downside.

It -- it doesn't fluctuate or change based on how close the election is.

But, like I said, 30 states have that as a requirement in their law today, is a fixed percentage. Now, a tiered percentage is being done by two states right now, and what that is, is it has buckets essentially that changes how many precincts you will check based on how close the election is.

So we might say if there is a 10 percent margin, you review 1 percent of the precincts but if the margin between the candidates is 5 percent, you review two and, if it's 2 percent -- it's a close election -- you review 5 percent of the precincts. So it has, you know, clear buckets, not many, but everyone can see it ahead of time and, that way, it does adjust based on how close the election is.

And then the third type that we're seeing, and it's the newest type that's been developed, it -- it's the statistical-based audits. Now, you may have heard of a risk-limiting audit and there's even, more recently, a Bazine audit has been developed, and all of these use advanced statistical methods to try to reduce the number of ballots you have to review in an effort to save cost and, at the same time, have assurances that, to a certain degree of certainty, you will know whether you will catch an



1 audit.

2 So, for example, that's called a risk limit. So, with  
3 a statistical audit, you would set a risk limit ahead of  
4 time and -- for example, you set the risk limit at 10  
5 percent. What that means is there is a 10 percent chance  
6 that if the announced result is wrong that you will not  
7 catch it and that there's a 90 percent chance then that if  
8 the announced result is wrong, you would find out. And so,  
9 you adjust your risk limit to what you're comfortable doing  
10 and that would dictate, along with how close the election  
11 is, how many ballots you would have to review.

12 So far, there's only one state that has done this at a  
13 statewide level, and that is Colorado. It took them 10  
14 years to get to where they are today. So it's been a long  
15 journey; they did a lot of test runs and pilots with  
16 elections to try to -- to get comfortable and, in 2017,  
17 they did their first statewide risk-limiting audit.

18 There are two other states, I believe Rhode Island and  
19 Virginia, recently passed laws requiring risk-limiting  
20 audits and they just, this year, did pilots for some  
21 smaller elections. So they're working their way into being  
22 able to do that statewide. But that is still not many.

23 To talk a little bit more about -- there are two types  
24 of risk-limiting audits: There's the single-ballot  
25 comparison and the ballot-polling audit, and I'm not going

1 figure out how many you would need and then, with  
2 statistics and the large numbers, if you have a good  
3 sample, that should be representative of the whole.

4 So kind of like if you -- if you dig your hand into a  
5 jar of jellybeans, if you did a good job and got a good  
6 sample and you counted those, that should be the  
7 distribution of the whole jar. The risk is that that's not  
8 always true, and there's always a chance you will be  
9 unlucky.

10 You could have the most perfect election where every  
11 single vote is tabulated correctly, the voter intent is  
12 clear but there's always a risk with a risk-limiting audit  
13 that you might have to do a full manual recount of every  
14 vote cast. So most elections, it might be cheaper; in some  
15 elections, it might be way more expensive. So, once again,  
16 risk/reward. So that's the -- that's the third type, the  
17 statistically-based audit.

18 So, if Georgia decides to do audits, there are a  
19 number of questions that will need to be answered to figure  
20 out. All right, what type of audit are we going to do, how  
21 would we actually put this into place, and I'm going to go  
22 through those questions. I won't provide answers; I don't  
23 have them, but it's important to start thinking about what  
24 -- what decisions will need to be made, what -- whether you  
25 include some of these in recommendations; the legislature

1 to go into too much detail unless I get questions about it,  
2 but the difference is, with a single-ballot comparison, you  
3 actually look for a specific ballot.

4 So the computer has, basically, all of the ballots  
5 cast, it -- it says we know that this ballot had these  
6 choices. And so, you would randomly select a ballot and  
7 then you have to find that ballot. You have to go find  
8 that physical ballot. Now, that sounds like finding a  
9 needle in a haystack when you're thinking about 4 million  
10 votes.

11 And so, that is the big challenge with risk-limiting  
12 audits in the comparison model is having amazing foresight  
13 and planning and making sure that ballots are stacked  
14 properly and you have a ballot manifest so that you can  
15 either pick maybe Box 234 and then dig down 24 ballots  
16 deep, that's the ballot you need to find. That's the kind  
17 of detail you have to do to do a risk-limiting audit at the  
18 comparison level, and that takes a lot of work.

19 And, if you mix up those ballots, you kind of can't do  
20 that type of audit. But the advantage is you can do an  
21 incredibly small amount of ballots. So it's kind of high  
22 risk, high reward there.

23 The ballot-polling model is -- is probably more  
24 intuitive -- like an exit poll. You randomly sample a  
25 number of ballots and -- and you -- the algorithms help you

1 might want to speak to that or maybe a rule-making body  
2 would.

3 So first is, what election will we audit? Are we  
4 going to audit just the general elections? What about the  
5 primaries? What about runoffs? We are about to have  
6 several special elections due to vacancies that were  
7 created in the past couple of months and we'll probably see  
8 several more here in 2019. Do you audit all of those?  
9 That's a fundamental question you have to ask, and -- and  
10 that, obviously, would impact the cost of audits. Many  
11 states just do the general elections or general elections  
12 and primaries.

13 Another question is what races do you audit? So, even  
14 after you select the election, well -- as you saw with your  
15 general-election ballot, there were a lot of races on  
16 there. Which ones do you do? How many do you do?

17 Many states choose top of the ticket. So, in a  
18 presidential year, we'll audit the presidential race; for a  
19 governor's election, you audit governor; sometimes you  
20 randomly select from the ballot; sometimes you pick one  
21 statewide, pick a district then. So there's options there,  
22 and the more races would increase complexity and cost.

23 Who should conduct the audit? Should it be county  
24 officials? Should it be a new county board of audits in  
25 each county? Should state officials do it? Should third-

1 party auditors do it? Those are questions that need to be  
2 answered.

3 How many ballots? We already talked about the  
4 different types of audits, which dictates how many -- how  
5 many precincts. That would dictate how many ballots, and  
6 there's a cost. The costs that I've seen is usually 15 to  
7 30 cents a ballot, is the cost to recount a single vote.  
8 So the more votes, the more expensive your audit will be.

9 An interesting dilemma that Georgia will have -- be  
10 faced with that many states don't have is we have a lot of  
11 counties, as our county election officials know all too  
12 well. So if you said one precinct per county, that's 159  
13 precincts. And if we have about 2300 precincts, one  
14 precinct per county is about 7 percent of all of our  
15 precincts. That, potentially, is 7 percent of the votes  
16 cast. So you can kind of get an idea of how big even just  
17 one precinct per county -- how big that audit would be.

18 Another big question that is sometimes controversial  
19 is when you audit. Do you audit before certification of an  
20 election or do you audit after certification? If you audit  
21 after the certification, the results are set. The winner  
22 has been chosen; they're going to be sworn in. But some  
23 states choose to do it after certification and it's  
24 basically just to learn from the election. It won't impact  
25 the outcome of the election that you're going to audit, but

1 of what you audit might dictate how you audit.

2 For example, Maryland did a pilot in 2016 and they did  
3 a risk-limiting audit, they did a fixed percentage, you  
4 know, X number of precincts, and then they took all of the  
5 ballot images and gave it to another vendor. They picked  
6 a different election vendor than that actually ran their  
7 election, and they say, Here are all of the ballot images;  
8 tabulate all of the results from the bottom, every single  
9 race, and then we're going to compare what you tabulated  
10 with what our machines tabulated, what our, you know,  
11 results were. And so, that's an audit.

12 Their legislature just codified, basically, that plus  
13 a hand-to-eye manual review, so they're going to do both.  
14 So that's -- that's an interesting choice and something  
15 we're going to have to decide if we choose to do audits  
16 here in Georgia.

17 I talked about cost, you know, maybe 15 to 30 cents  
18 per ballot, 90 to 100 percent of the cost is labor. So the  
19 more ballots you view, the -- the more the costs will be.  
20 Who's going to pay that cost? In most states, the county  
21 officials are the ones doing the audit. Are they going to  
22 bear the burden? Is the state going to pay a portion?  
23 That's got -- that needs to be decided.

24 Finally, with other states, 15 states currently don't  
25 have audits. Like I said, 30 states do a traditional fixed

1 it's to learn from it so that, future elections, you might  
2 make changes.

3 If you do a precertification, now you're talking about  
4 potentially changing results. You might be creating  
5 records that could be used for a contest. If an audit  
6 fails or shows discrepancies, you might need to do a  
7 recount. So there are going to be consequences to the  
8 election you are auditing if you do it before  
9 certification. And the states are mixed. Some states do  
10 it pre, some states do it after certification.

11 And then, possibly the most controversial question  
12 that has to be answered is, what do you review when you  
13 audit? Do you review the actual, original paper record or  
14 do you review the digital image of the paper?

15 The current systems that you are -- were presented to  
16 you at the previous meetings and submitted RFI responses,  
17 they basically digitize and create an image of every  
18 single ballot cast, and with current cryptographic  
19 technology and methods that have been implemented in many  
20 of these systems, they can digitally sign those images;  
21 they can create a hash value, which basically says, We are  
22 pretty certain no one has modified these images.

23 So, if we have that in Georgia, how comfortable would  
24 we be with maybe reviewing the images instead of opening up  
25 ballot boxes or maybe looking at both? And that -- so kind

1 audit, two states do tiered, three states have requirements  
2 for risk-limited audits.

3 So to close it out, the kind of takeaways: It's, you  
4 know, very exciting that we will potentially have a voter-  
5 verified paper trail. Audits can be used to -- to add  
6 confidence, to help us audit and check to make sure that  
7 any computer system and humans involved in the process  
8 worked correctly.

9 You know, it's going to be difficult to implement a  
10 new system in 2020 and also do audits, but I think that  
11 makes sense. We may want to consider whether we do --  
12 overtime we, you know, iterate, and improve and expand our  
13 audit. So maybe start with a -- a easier audit and then,  
14 as we get more confidence and we develop best practices,  
15 we can maybe audit more races, audit more precincts. So do  
16 audits, start small, and then expand over time.

17 And then, as I've talked to experts who talk about  
18 audits, the one thing they say is don't over legislate the  
19 audit. Certainly, require an audit, that's perfectly fine,  
20 but as I've -- and I'm sure many of you might be bored to  
21 death from what I've talked about.

22 There's a lot of details involved and there's a lot of  
23 brilliant academics and practitioners who -- this is their  
24 life. They -- they focus on audits. We should hear from  
25 them; we should listen to them. Sometimes that's hard to

1 do in the legislative process. Sometimes it's easier with  
2 a rulemaking process. There's more flexibility there. So  
3 maybe have the legislature make basic requirements and have  
4 the state election board or some other body really get into  
5 details of how to do an audit. So, with that, I thank you  
6 for your time and attention.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, are you suggesting the  
8 legislature over legislates sometimes?

9 MR. RAYBURN: I would never suggest that. I would  
10 hate to see that happens.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It happens, and it's usually  
12 Representative Beverly's fault.

13 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Most of the time.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Now, along that point though,  
15 I find it very interesting that you talked about -- was it  
16 Kentucky that -- there was one state you mentioned. I know  
17 you mentioned Colorado, but there's one other state you  
18 mentioned that -- that enacted statutory preventions on  
19 auditing and --

20 MR. RAYBURN: You mean Maryland.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Maryland, Maryland. So I  
22 don't want to -- I want to make sure I understood that.  
23 They -- they got a system, they developed an audit and then  
24 the legislature came in and codified the audit procedure  
25 after it had been developed; is that right?

1 something there? Does that sound right?

2 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's right. I think once we  
3 know what system we will have, what it's capabilities are,  
4 then we can really define what type of audit makes sense  
5 with that system.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Through -- through trial and  
7 error, and the testing and whatnot, too, I would assume.

8 MR. RAYBURN: Yes.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Questions from the panel?  
10 Counsel?

11 MR. RUSSO: Thank you. Vincent Russo. How long does  
12 the audit process typically take? I realize it -- it  
13 depends on the size of the audit -- size of the election  
14 being audited and the race, but say an election of 100,000  
15 total votes being cast.

16 MR. RAYBURN: From what I read, it seems like it's  
17 usually a few days. It's kind of like with a -- you know,  
18 we just saw a recount in Florida. You can kind of get an  
19 idea how long that took. They had multiple stages. They  
20 did a machine count and a hand count. So depending on the  
21 scope -- you know, just the recounting itself, assuming you  
22 did all of the prep work and all of that, it would take a  
23 couple of days and then you would have to develop your  
24 report to report back to the state.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

1 MR. RAYBURN: Sure. They did -- they did kind of  
2 three different audits of the same election to try to see  
3 how it works, what one did we like more, what gave us more  
4 confidence, what -- what was the cost associated and then  
5 they -- they legislated after that.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, just thinking through  
7 this timeline, the legislature meets in January. We  
8 usually can get through sometime at the end of March,  
9 sometime early April. If the legislature appropriated and  
10 authorized a process and -- and directed towards certain  
11 types of requirements for whatever voting system we have  
12 next, I assume that would be an RFP process probably that  
13 the Secretary of State's office would carry out.

14 But you really -- as -- as I'm listening to you, I'm  
15 thinking this through. We -- we finish let's say end of  
16 March, y'all procure a system after that. It's after you  
17 know exactly what kind of system you have that you actually  
18 need to think about codifying audits; right?

19 MR. RAYBURN: I think that's correct. There's --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So --

21 MR. RAYBURN: -- the system --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So this legislative session,  
23 if we authorize the purchase of a new system, it would  
24 probably be another legislative session where we actually  
25 codify an audit procedure. Is that -- am I missing

1 MR. RUSSO: In your opinion, would it make sense to  
2 start the audit process -- assuming that's the route that  
3 the legislature goes, would -- in your opinion, would it  
4 make sense to start with, say, off-year elections like odd-  
5 number year elections?

6 MR. RAYBURN: Yeah. When you look at states that are  
7 introducing audits to their -- their systems, you often see  
8 pilots or, you know, test runs with -- with real elections.  
9 And so, you're auditing a real election but it's -- it's  
10 localized. It might be a city election; it might be a  
11 handful of county elections. It's a big step going from a  
12 county election to a statewide election. And so, you --  
13 you've got to work your way up, you build your confidence,  
14 you see what processes, what paperwork, what instructions  
15 work with your people and you build your way up.

16 MR. RUSSO: Thanks.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

18 MR. JABLONSKI: I have a concern with the legislature  
19 mandating a type of audit. I think -- I think an audit is  
20 absolutely necessary, but I think you can cut the time  
21 period down by having the legislature authorize and fund a  
22 new machine system but also, at the same time, mandating an  
23 audit but leave it up to the state election board to  
24 determine the type of audit, at least on an experimental  
25 basis, until they can come back with some experience and --

1 and have it reviewed by the legislature if necessary.

2 But I don't think it's -- I -- I think it's a mistake  
3 to put it into the legislation and then we're stuck with  
4 it. It would be awfully hard to change as our experience  
5 with new machines change and as experience and theory on --  
6 on doing audits improves. We ought to be able to take  
7 advantage of those improvements.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's kind of what I was  
9 referring to, Michael, was the timeline. Yeah, is how it  
10 flows. Other questions? Dr. Lee?

11 DR. LEE: So I just want to clarify. So for the  
12 percentage-based audit plan, so you said it's -- you set a  
13 percentage of the precincts to do audits. Therefore, those  
14 precincts, do you hand count every single vote or do you  
15 also do a percentage?

16 MR. RAYBURN: You would -- so you would count every  
17 vote in the precinct. So, in Georgia, we know, at the  
18 precinct level, what are the results for the races. So  
19 then you would recount just that precinct and then you have  
20 your -- your audited result and you compare that to the  
21 original result.

22 DR. LEE: So would it be better off if we do the  
23 percentage across all precincts? So let's say each  
24 precinct, they do 5 percent -- basically hand count 5  
25 percent of the votes and we have people then study to say

1 which one's better?

2 MR. RAYBURN: So I think if we had a statistician to  
3 work -- help us work through that and -- and the people  
4 felt they were comfortable with a percentage of a precinct,  
5 that definitely would cut down on the number of ballots you  
6 would have to review.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Lynn?

8 MS. BAILEY: Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Speaking  
9 off of Mr. Russo's comments about the certification period,  
10 we talked about this before in the senate and house race  
11 that we held during the last session, and one of the things  
12 we discussed with the -- with any type of postelection  
13 audit that's being proposed, if we're going to do a  
14 precertification -- which I would think we would do a  
15 precertification -- there's no doubt that local officials  
16 will need more time built into the timeline to get that  
17 done.

18 You know, there are important things going on in that  
19 three- or four-day period that we have to certify now, like  
20 looking and adjudicating provisional ballots as one  
21 example. So we do definitely need to look at that.

22 And, also, I think it's important that we distinguish  
23 ourselves from states like Colorado who have refined this  
24 process over 10 years and who, at this point, have mostly  
25 mail-in ballots, so all paper ballots, and they're mostly,

1 if not exclusively, centrally counted and that affords them  
2 the opportunity to keep these ballots in order and in -- in  
3 a sequential manner so you can go in and identify a  
4 particular 5 percent, or 1 percent or whatever the number  
5 is, to find out.

6 But, as was mentioned earlier for Georgia, we have a  
7 precinct-based system. It would, I think, indeed be like  
8 trying to find a needle in a haystack to go to that level  
9 of an audit. Certainly, a precinct-based type of recount  
10 based on the percentage done completely at random; we have  
11 no knowledge ahead of time which precincts are going to be  
12 identified, would seem to work better, perhaps, in our  
13 environment. Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Coming around.

15 MS. ROSS: I have a question.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Ross?

17 MS. ROSS: Yes. Are you aware of any of the states  
18 that already have an audit system in place that mandate by  
19 state law that the audit can change the election results?

20 MR. RAYBURN: Yes. So some states basically -- you  
21 usually see two things: You either have an authority with  
22 a secretary of state or a -- you know, chief election  
23 official that, if there are discrepancies, they could order  
24 a recount, and then the recount would be the new result.

25 The other thing we see is if, when you compared your

1 audited result to the original result, if the difference is  
2 greater than a threshold, maybe half of 1 percent  
3 difference, then that would trigger a recount. But the  
4 recount, usually, is what you would rely on if you wanted  
5 to recertify a result.

6 MS. ROSS: Okay. So it's not like it can flip an  
7 election; it's just going to order a recount or order a do  
8 over. You see what I'm saying?

9 MR. RAYBURN: It -- it could order a -- and it depends  
10 on how you do it. Some states, you know, you just give us  
11 a report and learn from it. But, if you do a  
12 precertification and you do a recount, it could flip the  
13 results depending on how close that election is. If you  
14 have a five-vote election, your recount -- recount gets  
15 switched by 20 votes and then it flipped.

16 MS. ROSS: Right. But it -- but it will order a  
17 recount, not a do over, is my question.

18 MR. RAYBURN: Well, that gets into election contests  
19 and -- and what was the discrepancy. And so, it would -- I  
20 would say, if the results flipped in a recount, you're  
21 going to have a contest and you might have a judge order a  
22 new election.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It will become evidence in  
24 the case if someone tried to order -- have a new election  
25 ordered. Senator?

1 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, in  
2 this case, you want the audit to be precertification. And  
3 you would think the audit must be precertification but, if  
4 you audit after you certify, it really doesn't mean  
5 anything; correct?

6 MR. RAYBURN: That is -- well, I will not say it  
7 wouldn't mean anything. It's -- it -- you get different  
8 value from it, and we have to decide how does it work with  
9 Georgia because, with runoff elections, we don't have a lot  
10 of time. And so, we've got to weigh our runoff system, a  
11 majority-vote system, with how we're going to fit an audit  
12 in there. And so, that's -- it's just complex.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one other  
15 follow-up question. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. Kevin,  
16 you were talking about the -- an example of an audit that's  
17 done after certification. And you mentioned the counties  
18 that -- or the states that do that -- do that more auditing  
19 procedures and making sure that the local officials, I  
20 guess -- I mean the state officials did their jobs  
21 properly, and more of the learning experience, or the recap  
22 or a review of an election [sic]; is that correct?

23 MR. RAYBURN: That's right. They -- they still do  
24 the -- the re-tabulate though. So they still actually  
25 count votes. It's just after the period of contest, after

1 -- and help highlight data that's in there.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Kevin, good job. Thank you.

3 MR. RAYBURN: Thank you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Our  
5 last speaker before lunch is former Secretary of State  
6 Cathy Cox, who I see there in the back. Currently, dean of  
7 the Mercer School of Law, right here in Macon.

8 Dean Cox, it's good to have you today. We'll let her  
9 get mic'd up. Dean, good to see you.

10 MS. COX: Good afternoon.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Welcome.

12 PLAINTIFF: Thank you.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, I know, got her  
14 great training for all of the great things that she's done  
15 in the House of Representatives; did you not?

16 MS. COX: That's exactly right.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Where I believe your  
18 father --

19 MS. COX: Trial by fire.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Your father also served  
21 there; did he not? Representing --

22 MS. COX: That's right.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- the Bainbridge area;  
24 right?

25 MS. COX: That's right.

1 certification. So, after a decision has been made, let's  
2 learn from it.

3 And three examples are Florida, Michigan and Maryland  
4 do that. In Florida, each county would send a report to  
5 the state saying, This was our accuracy of our audit, these  
6 were any problems or discrepancies we've found, this is the  
7 likely cause of those problems or discrepancies and this is  
8 how we can prevent that in the future.

9 So it's actual items that the state could then figure  
10 out, All right, do we need to change out equipment, change  
11 software, change procedures, instructions? But it wouldn't  
12 impact the actual results of the election. It wouldn't  
13 change who won. So that's what some states have done.

14 MS. BAILEY: Okay.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Representative  
16 Beverly?

17 REPRESENTATIVE BEVERLY: Do you happen to have any  
18 statistics on when Maryland took the digitized copy and  
19 sent it to this place, what was the difference between what  
20 they counted and what that digitized company counted? Do  
21 you know what that percentage was or if it was a percentage  
22 difference at all?

23 MR. RAYBURN: I'm not -- I just don't know what it is.  
24 I can distribute the report that Maryland did after that  
25 pilot -- those three pilots to the full commission and then

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. How long were  
2 you there, dean?

3 MS. COX: I -- I had two terms in the House --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two terms in the house.

5 MS. COX: -- and I was the Secretary of State.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And Secretary of State. And  
7 then, after that, at some point, you were president of  
8 Young Harris.

9 MS. COX: That's right.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And have been the dean of  
11 Mercer Law School for how long now?

12 MS. COX: I'm in my second year.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Second year. How are things  
14 at the law school?

15 MS. COX: We're in the middle of final exams, so  
16 there's a big cloud over Macon right now --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No tension whatsoever; right?

18 MS. COX: -- which is probably the stress coming from  
19 the law school.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I  
21 remember those days, not fondly.

22 MS. COX: Exactly.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Dean, we certainly do  
24 appreciate you being here today. It's obvious that the  
25 last time Georgia had a major change in their voting

1 system, I'll say in the state, you were an integral part of  
2 that and we appreciate you coming today to talk about that  
3 and, of course, anything else that is on your mind. And  
4 I'm sure that the panel members would have questions for  
5 you.

6 I think you know, but this is the third meeting of --  
7 of this panel that Secretary Kemp, now Governor-elect Kemp,  
8 put together to consider, you know, where do we go from  
9 here with our voting system in the state of Georgia.

10 And, as I mentioned to them earlier, we anticipate  
11 probably having one more meeting and then try to come to  
12 some conclusions or recommendations for the legislature to  
13 consider this next session. So, once again, thank you so  
14 much for coming and we appreciate you being here today.

15 MS. COX: Thank you. It's great to see you again, and  
16 I appreciate the invitation of Secretary Crittenden.  
17 Congratulations to Secretary Raffensperger. Great to see  
18 so many of you again and I appreciate the opportunity to  
19 have a few minutes with you today.

20 The -- the perspective that I wanted to bring to you  
21 today that I felt very strongly I should bring to you today  
22 starts really with the old adage, that, Those who don't  
23 remember history, are doomed to repeat it. So if you'll  
24 give me just a few minutes to take you back to how we got  
25 to where we are today.

1 going on in Georgia at the time of 2000.

2 The under votes that equated to those lost 95,000  
3 votes happened for a variety of reasons. Those mechanical  
4 refrigerator-sized machines often malfunctioned just from  
5 the mechanical wheels that would freeze up, or fall off or  
6 whatever could happen.

7 They literally -- counties had to cannibalize old  
8 machines to keep them working, so everybody knew those  
9 needed to go out. The punch cards, everybody knows from  
10 the Florida experience why the punch cards were obsolete;  
11 paper ballots were just unwieldy for a state the size of  
12 Georgia, but people thought, Well, optical scan.

13 The counties that had moved to optical scan thought,  
14 surely, they were doing the right things but, much to our  
15 surprise, some of the highest error rates that we found  
16 came from counties that were using optical-scan ballots,  
17 and we -- over the years that I had been in the Secretary  
18 of State's office, had already had some issues with  
19 optical-scan ballots.

20 At one election, we had had a county that called us in  
21 a panic on election night from an optical-scan county  
22 because they were starting to count ballots and no ballots  
23 would register in the whole county that night because,  
24 obviously, the pen or pencil that they had provided in the  
25 voting booths would not read in the scanner. So we found

1 For Georgia, it really started with the notorious 2000  
2 presidential election, and when -- you-all have your own  
3 memories of what was happening at the time and how the  
4 world focused on Florida, and when Florida started their  
5 recount of the hanging chads and the focus of the world  
6 shifted to Florida.

7 I was serving as Secretary of State at the time. And  
8 so, we decided we better study and figure out what had  
9 happened on our own watch. And so, we engaged in a -- a  
10 pretty deep dive into Georgia elections at the time and  
11 were horrified to find out that we, in that election, had  
12 lost almost 95,000 votes.

13 We, at the time, had a hodgepodge of election systems.  
14 Every county at the time got to have their own voting  
15 system, got to do whatever they wanted to do; they were  
16 really left to their own devices and decisions to run  
17 elections in the way that they wanted to.

18 We had everything from the old refrigerator-sized  
19 lever machines that had not been manufactured in more than  
20 50 years, to several counties that had thought they were  
21 moving ahead and had bought optical-scan systems, to some  
22 of our larger counties that were using the punch card  
23 system with the hanging chads, to two counties that were  
24 actually still using the bedsheet-sized paper ballot from  
25 the 1800s. So we had all four of those types of balloting

1 out that many systems were dependent on the type of ink  
2 that you used on the type of ballot.

3 We also found out through that study that a lot  
4 of voters had not had the educational experience with  
5 standardized ballot -- or standardized testing. And so, we  
6 saw ballots where voters would circle the name of the  
7 candidate instead of filling in a bubble, or putting an X  
8 or -- or anything out beside their name.

9 We saw all sorts of voter errors where they would over  
10 vote, put too many marks out beside and it would throw out  
11 the -- the vote on a name. You name it. There were just  
12 enormous opportunities for voters to make mistakes on the  
13 optical-scan ballot.

14 We also found, interestingly, within the same  
15 counties, when we drilled down into the precinct level of  
16 optical-scan counties, a wide disparity between majority-  
17 black and majority-white precincts using optical-scan  
18 ballots with, quite frequently, majority-black precincts  
19 having much higher error rates on optical-scan ballots than  
20 majority-white precincts within the same county.

21 We didn't have the expertise and resources to drill  
22 further into why that was, whether it was an educational  
23 level, experience level or whatever, but we saw it in a  
24 number of the counties that were using optical-scan  
25 ballots, that disparity between majority black and white

precincts in the same county on optical-scan ballots.

So, for all of these reasons, we were able to tabulate these lost votes and we took that original study -- which should be in the state archives -- we took that study to the legislature and said, We need to really do something on our watch before we have the next election cycle.

So that was when the Georgia General Assembly authorized the creation of the 21st Century Voting Commission, a completely bipartisan voting commission that was put together -- I think Lynn Bailey served on the commission, several others of you might have, but we had a combination, as your commission is composed, of local election officials and legislators that studied for a full year. We took the study we had done internally of what had happened in Georgia and went out to study what existed in the world in a way that we could improve the systems.

So we went out and -- and did an exhaustive study of all of the voting equipment that then existed back in 2001 -- 2000 to 2001, to figure out where we ought to go in Georgia.

And it was a result of that study that led us into deciding to unify all of our voting systems in Georgia and to move, for the first time, into a system where every county would use the same voting equipment so that we could do massive voter education for all voters across the state,

probably be voting on the Internet by now. You know, the technology would come so far so fast. We really couldn't even envision the things that are happening today in technology or the threats that are happening today to technology back in the day when we put this equipment in -- in place.

I think we also envisioned that there would be a continuous study of election equipment over the years and that there would be continuous need to purchase additional equipment as counties grew and we would keep up with the growth of -- for counties and to keep lines from becoming long in polling places. Some of that has happened; some of that hasn't happened, obviously, over the years to bring us to where we are today.

But one of the main -- a couple of the main points that I wanted to bring to your attention as you make a decision for making a change today is to be mindful that, yes, I do think it is probably time for a change and an upgrade in technology because nobody is using technology they used in 2000. And our system has pieces of equipment that are hard to replace now, hard to -- hard to repair; things that just, by virtue of -- of age, need to be replaced and upgraded.

So that, in and of itself, I think is a great reason for the state to be considering a new voting technology.

that the Secretary of State could do training for all county election officials and then to help the poll-worker training piece go hand in hand with that on a unified basis across the state, that the state would then, whatever equipment we decided to purchase, would purchase it for the counties and, at least on the first round, make that purchase for all of the counties because we had a disparity of counties who were able or not able to afford to purchase new equipment. And so, that was the result of how we got into the system we have now.

We had a discussion at the time of whether moving into electronic voting -- whether we could have implemented some type of a paper-trail mechanism at the time, but I think -- my recollection was there was maybe one vendor at the time that had some type of a paper-trail mechanism and we really didn't like the system. We didn't think it was really usable or affordable. And so, we didn't go with that model.

We ultimately, as a commission, decided on a type of equipment that we put into place but we did -- we liked that paper-trail option. It just really wasn't -- the technology wasn't there at the time.

Honestly, I think that our commission thought back in 2000, 2001, that, surely, over the next decade or two, technology would advance in such rapid pace that we'd

The hacking and the threat issues that have come about in -- in recent years certainly is something to consider, but your charge, I think, is not only to provide a secure voting system but not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and you have to provide a system that is secure but that also -- you understand the voter interface with technology.

We were very fortunate when we bought this equipment in 2001 that Congress was also mortified about that 2000 presidential election and put enormous amounts of money on the table for all of the states to upgrade their voting equipment. We were able, after successfully lobbying congress and -- and my spending a lot of time on the Hill in DC of working with our congressional delegation and others, to be able to get an appropriation of over \$50 million for Georgia to pay for virtually all of the equipment that we purchased.

In fact, the only money that the state ended up putting into the purchase was really the voter-education piece, and that is a very important piece because we felt like any change you ever make in a voting system has got to go hand in hand with a massive voter-education piece to make sure that voters are never turned away from voting because they don't want to show up in a polling place and be embarrassed because they don't know how to use a piece

1 of technology or don't feel comfortable having to ask  
2 somebody to show them how to use a piece of voter  
3 technology.

4 So we hired a whole team of voter-education  
5 specialists to take the current equipment out across the  
6 state of Georgia. We went from senior centers, to civic  
7 clubs, to churches, to pharmacies -- personally, I hauled  
8 around one of those pieces of equipment wherever two or  
9 more were gathered. I was there to talk about voting and  
10 to show people how you could use the voting equipment. It  
11 was just that important.

12 And whatever you decide to do is going to require  
13 that kind of voter-education effort to make sure that all  
14 Georgia voters of all walks of life and all ages and  
15 backgrounds are just as comfortable with any kind of new  
16 change in voting equipment.

17 But be mindful that just having a secure system --  
18 like, I've heard a lot of discussion about optical scan.  
19 Sounds great on the surface, but we had a lot of problems  
20 with optical scan and was -- and that was the primary  
21 reason we did not go with an optical-scan ballot back in  
22 2001.

23 Now, I understand that some of the technology in  
24 optical scan may have improved so that a voter might be  
25 able to review their ballot before it is cast or put into a

1 along with that, the costs that go along with that if  
2 Georgia or any particular locale, county or precinct,  
3 should be required to print ballots in a different  
4 language, there would be minimal costs to do it on an  
5 electronic system; a lot of cost to do it on a paper-based  
6 system, not to mention the cost of having to print ballots  
7 in different languages.

8 But think about some of the issues that came out of  
9 this election and some of the chaos that you've heard about  
10 in 2018 of people not having enough provisional ballots in  
11 a precinct; think about the different ballot styles that  
12 have to exist in a county. Right now, you don't have to  
13 worry about that because, when you go into a precinct, you  
14 just show them your driver's license and you get programmed  
15 for the ballot style that suits your particular living  
16 residence.

17 It's -- it lines you up with the people you're  
18 supposed to vote for for the legislature, for the county  
19 commission, for all of your local districts but, if  
20 you're on a paper-based system, you might have to have 20  
21 different versions of paper ballots within a single  
22 precinct.

23 So you've got to find a way to keep all of those secure,  
24 you've got to find a way to keep all of those from getting  
25 mixed up, you've got to find a way to keep 20 different

1 ballot box. And I -- I can't say that I have kept up with  
2 enough of the technology, but it will be very important for  
3 you to consider voters with disability.

4 One of the most heartening parts of putting in the  
5 equipment that we have today was being able to work with  
6 voters who had visual disabilities and having a married  
7 couple with a -- a -- a wife, I remember, who had -- who  
8 had a visual impairment and she said she'd always had to  
9 rely on her husband to cast her vote, but -- she trusted  
10 him but, then again, maybe he marked the ballot like she  
11 asked, maybe not.

12 But to go to our current equipment where she could put  
13 in an earpiece and have her choices read back to her gave  
14 her a level of voting independence that she had never had  
15 in her entire life, and that was a moving, moving moment  
16 to know that we, as a state, had given that kind of  
17 independence to voters who had disabilities.

18 On our current equipment, as you know, it can enlarge  
19 the type, it can read the voters' choices back to them and,  
20 another factor to keep in mind, is that it can be  
21 programmed to be printed in other languages, which is  
22 currently a federal requirement in areas that have certain  
23 portions of population that speak different languages.

24 And so, when you think about going to a paper-based  
25 system, you have to think about all of the issues that go

1 ballot styles in correct proportion, and give them out to  
2 the right people, and make sure they get the right ballot  
3 and that they all get in the right place to be counted.  
4 You add enormous complexity with paper ballots --  
5 complexity and cost and potential chaos that, right now,  
6 you don't have to consider.

7 The local election officials know this and remember  
8 some of this from the days of paper balloting. So it's --  
9 you have a lot of expertise sitting at this table that I  
10 hope you will rely on when you make a decision for a  
11 change, but we were able to solve a lot of those problems  
12 by going to an electronic-based system that took away a lot  
13 of that cost and complexity by the sake of having it  
14 programmed around.

15 But, more than anything, being mindful of the voter's  
16 experience and the need for a type of equipment that can  
17 give the voter the opportunity to review their ballot.  
18 That is considered one of the best practices recommended --  
19 excuse me -- by the federal voting election commissions and  
20 very important.

21 And we felt like one of the best selling points of the  
22 system we have now is that you can review your ballot and  
23 the choices that you have made before you push that button  
24 to cast your ballot. When you vote on a pure -- at least  
25 simplified optical-scan system, you can put it into a box



1 right now with the simple systems. There is not an  
2 opportunity for the voter to review their system, to know  
3 whether their ink is going to scan, to know whether they  
4 properly circled -- filled in a bubble or marked an X that  
5 will register. If there are some systems that give the  
6 voter that review, then maybe that's another option to  
7 consider.

8 But you have to consider not just the security, which  
9 a lot of the computer experts I'm sure you've heard from  
10 are focused on, but you have the double opportunity and  
11 requirement to consider how well the voters can interface  
12 with this and how their experience is going to be to assure  
13 that their intent is going to actually be captured and they  
14 get to review that before they turn that piece of paper  
15 over to someone else, and that we don't go back to the  
16 history of Georgia, of voting fraud that happens with paper  
17 ballots.

18 Even in the years that I was Secretary of State, we  
19 had boxes full of paper or optical-scan ballots that  
20 disappeared between election night and recount time. From  
21 locked probate-judge vaults -- you know, you can go back in  
22 history and find the times when ballot boxes ended up in  
23 the bottom of lakes.

24 We have a rich and tawdry history of paper-ballot  
25 fraud in Georgia, so we don't want to go solve -- try to

1 solve one problem by re-creating the history that we have  
2 in Georgia with a lot of other problems, which makes your  
3 task a lot more complex than a lot of people understand on  
4 the surface.

5 But you have a big charge ahead of you and a lot of  
6 expertise at the table, and I'm glad that you are here  
7 studying these issues and I appreciate the opportunity to  
8 bring these points back to the table today. So thank you  
9 very much. I'm happy to answer any questions you might  
10 have.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean Cox, as -- just as I  
12 expected, a excellent review for us of how we got to where  
13 we are and all of the thought that went into getting to  
14 where we are, and I'm sure there will be, potentially, some  
15 questions and comments here for you.

16 Just a -- a scheduling note, if -- if I may, very  
17 quickly, just for our audience so that we all know when  
18 we're going to start and finish: When we get through  
19 visiting with -- with Dean Cox here, we do plan, around  
20 noon, to -- to break for lunch.

21 As I mentioned early on, we have provided, for the  
22 commission members, a lunch. There will be a room pass at  
23 the check-in station that the staff will direct you toward.  
24 Our goal is to get in there at about noon and come back  
25 here at about 12:30 to begin our presentations again.

1 I wanted to mention that now to the people in the  
2 audience in case -- we'd love for you to stay, but if you  
3 need to slip out because you want to grab a bite and get  
4 back in time, I just wanted to let you know what our  
5 schedule may be.

6 Having said that, however, though, let me go ahead and  
7 look around the table. And, Dr. Lee, did you indicate you  
8 had a question or comment?

9 DR. LEE: So, I mean, I appreciate you coming. So, I  
10 mean, first comments that -- I mean, obviously, between  
11 2000 and now, we've had several lifetimes in computer  
12 technologies. So we actually, indeed, have seen vendors  
13 presenting the latest optical scanners that would actually  
14 indicate to voters, that, Hey, look, you marked the -- you  
15 marked the -- marked it wrong and we can get back to the  
16 voter to say, Do it again.

17 So I think that concern should be -- should not be  
18 there anymore. And the second -- second thing is that I  
19 think people talk about a lot of cost associated with  
20 printed ballots. I mean, I -- I think the latest vendors  
21 that we've studied -- first of all, they have very good  
22 interface to design custom ballots.

23 You know, on the -- on kind of a browser window that  
24 you can actually see before you print it out, and then you  
25 can also print it out. So you don't have to, like, print

1 out boxes of ballots and worry about, you know, somebody  
2 would -- would steal them.

3 And then -- then, of course, I understand that  
4 whenever we change technologies, right?, there's a lot of  
5 costs associated with voter education, also training the  
6 polling-station workers. So my question to you is that, in  
7 your experience as the Secretary -- Secretary of State,  
8 what's your estimate of the cost when you make the switch?

9 MS. COX: I -- I have no concept of what equipment  
10 today costs, so I --

11 DR. LEE: I'm talking about your experience in, let's  
12 say, 2000 when you made the switch. So you said you spent  
13 a lot of money doing voter education --

14 MS. COX: My recollection was that the state  
15 appropriated about 2 to 3 million dollars --

16 DR. LEE: Okay.

17 MS. COX: -- for the voter-education piece --

18 DR. LEE: Okay.

19 MS. COX: -- on top of the 54 million or so that we  
20 spent on equipment.

21 DR. LEE: Okay.

22 MS. COX: And we hired -- I believe we hired a team of  
23 about a dozen voter-education specialists --

24 DR. LEE: Right.

25 MS. COX: -- who spent the year, you know, making

1 contact with local organizations all over the state, and I  
2 think they were assigned to regions of the state so they  
3 could really blanket the state in voter education. So that  
4 was my top-of-the-head recollection of our budget for voter  
5 education.

6 DR. LEE: Okay. And do you also budget for polling-  
7 station worker training?

8 MS. COX: Yes.

9 DR. LEE: And that's also included in that \$2 million?

10 MS. COX: I think so, yes.

11 DR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Senator Jackson?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe  
14 Dr. Lee answered -- we had the same question. Dean Cox,  
15 thank you for being here.

16 MS. COX: Thank you.

17 SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned that we received 50  
18 million dollars from the feds for our last voting machine  
19 and it cost the state 2 million dollars -- 2 to 3 million  
20 dollars for voter education. My question is really to you,  
21 Mr. Chairman: Do you have an anticipated cost of this new  
22 voting machine?

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell me which one and I'll  
24 tell you the anticipated costs. But -- but -- but, in all  
25 seriousness, you know, I think -- it's -- it's -- the

1 estimations have been anywhere from a paper-based system,  
2 which is -- is cheaper on the front end, and then we have  
3 to get into the cost of the printers and all for the local  
4 governments on the other end, can be low as in the less  
5 than 50 million range to some of the ballot-marking systems  
6 that are a little more complicated and -- and it's a bigger  
7 front end purchase to 150 million dollar range.

8 So that's a -- that's a, you know, just an estimate.  
9 I'm sure that it can go above or even below. Does that  
10 answer what you were thinking --

11 SENATOR JACKSON: So -- so --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir?

13 SENATOR JACKSON: So we go through a training phase,  
14 so -- and this would be all state -- this would be all  
15 state money --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: If we follow the last  
17 model, most of the expense was picked up by the state,  
18 understanding that the counties had a lot of expenses, as  
19 the years went on, to replace machines, and for the  
20 training, and so forth and so on.

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And that's my question. I --  
22 I just want everybody to know that this will not only be a  
23 state fee, but there would be a huge cost to most of the  
24 counties also.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There's always going to be --

1 there's currently costs in the machines that they maintain,  
2 and the boards that they train, and the people that they  
3 upkeep and there will certainly be continuing costs with  
4 whatever system we get, understanding that, depending on  
5 that system, some's going to be more, some's going to be  
6 less and then the component the state kicks in will modify  
7 that. Complicated answer, good question. Yeah. Yes, sir,  
8 Michael?

9 MR. JABLONSKI: Dean Cox, I remember very well the --  
10 when we revolutionized the voting system in 2000. When the  
11 Secretary of State's office did the report on problems with  
12 elections prior to that, was there any discussion at that  
13 time about performing audits? And then, secondly, when we  
14 purchased the new machines or when we decided to do that,  
15 was there any discussion of implementing audit procedures  
16 at that time?

17 MS. COX: We -- in the -- when we did the internal  
18 study, we were just studying what the problems were, to  
19 start with, with the existing old equipment. When the 21st  
20 Century Commission surveyed all of the then existing  
21 equipment, we -- my recollection is that we did talk about  
22 auditing, but that's when it always gets around to your  
23 definition of auditing.

24 You know, and that's when going from the time we  
25 purchased the equipment through the state election board,

1 we worked on a lot of the processes that we put in place,  
2 the checks and balances of how everything from the voter's  
3 list to the -- how many tapes you ran off of each  
4 individual voting machine, pasting those on the window of a  
5 polling place, wrapping those around the memory card, and  
6 transporting that to the central election office and  
7 balancing all of that out with numbered list of voters.

8 So there was that kind of an audit-trail mechanism put  
9 in place as much through state election board rules and  
10 regulations than through equipment-type audits.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Just a couple of comments. It's good to  
13 see you again.

14 MS. COX: Hey, judge.

15 JUDGE MCCOY: One thing I want to bring up that has  
16 not been mentioned today, during your tenure, we visited  
17 some other states who were using optical-scan ballots and  
18 also giving paper receipts and the one thing that has not  
19 been mentioned is climate control and how that affects your  
20 paper ballots.

21 Just in the November general election just held, a  
22 couple of jurisdictions in North Carolina that were using  
23 -- that switched to optical-scan ballots, their -- none of  
24 their ballots would scan because they were dealing with  
25 high humidity on election day and the ballots were --

1 absorbed enough dampness that they would not scan.

2 The same thing with paper receipts from voting  
3 machines. When you start dealing with paper and, thinking  
4 about South Georgia, you've got to consider our humidity  
5 and how that affects the paper and how we count that.

6 MS. COX: We had an incident -- I remember an incident  
7 prior to the new equipment being put in place where a  
8 county with an optical scan called us at one point and they  
9 had that humidity issue and our recommendation was to send  
10 everybody home to get hairdryers and bring out the  
11 hairdryers --

12 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

13 MS. COX: -- and dry the ballots. And -- and it  
14 helped. I mean --

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

16 MS. COX: -- it was make do with whatever you can do,  
17 but that was -- that is a symptom with humid climates.

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And those of you who have  
19 not witnessed elections in South Georgia should visit us on  
20 election day and see some of the rural precincts and places  
21 where we conduct elections and -- and how we deal with not  
22 only humidity but other issues. But -- but that is  
23 definitely something that we need to consider with -- with  
24 paper receipts, with -- with, you know, ballots that we  
25 verify is, you know, dealing with weather conditions.

1 So I think we saw some actual, at least anecdotal,  
2 experiences of voters who -- who just didn't go through the  
3 trouble of voting because they couldn't vote independently  
4 and didn't have a trusted person to help them. But then,  
5 even those who had trusted voters [sic] always had a little  
6 tinge of doubt that their ballot got marked as they wished  
7 and just loved, loved, the experience of having that  
8 independence of knowing their voice really, finally, was  
9 heard.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Welch?

11 MS. WELCH: Good morning, Dean, and good to see you  
12 again.

13 MS. COX: Good morning, you too.

14 MS. WELCH: I just want to make one statement. When  
15 we talk about having a ballot printer at the precinct,  
16 there's no way that we would be able to function with just  
17 one ballot printer. That would definitely create long  
18 lines. It would become ballot stations, and we would need  
19 at least 7 to 10 ballot stations, and you would need a  
20 printer on each station. If you think about the concept of  
21 one ballot printer, if you have a technical issue, you just  
22 created long lines.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

24 MS. WELCH: And so, you would need stations rather  
25 than a one-ballot printer in a precinct. So I want to make

1 And, also, one other comment on costs to the counties  
2 and all: A lot of people do not realize that the costs of  
3 conducting state and federal elections on the county level,  
4 the county pays for all of that cost. Poll workers,  
5 printing ballots -- everything. There -- there is no  
6 funding from the state or federal government to our  
7 counties for conducting elections when, many times, there's  
8 not even a county race on the ballot, such as our recent  
9 statewide runoff.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Amy?

11 MS. HOWELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,  
12 Dean Cox. I wanted to thank you for highlighting the  
13 importance around access for individuals with disability  
14 and the ability to independently cast their vote and  
15 privately. Historically, do you feel that the lack of  
16 access had a chilling effect on participation in the voting  
17 process for people with disabilities?

18 MS. COX: I do believe that because we heard that from  
19 voters. We worked with a lot of disability organizations  
20 when we were sort of pilot testing this equipment and  
21 different types of equipment to ask voters to try it out  
22 and we heard from voters who said either they didn't trust  
23 a poll worker or -- to help them at a polling place if they  
24 didn't have someone in their family they trusted, so they  
25 just didn't vote.

1 sure that everybody understood that. Thank you.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Yes. Dean Cox, you mentioned  
4 earlier that when we -- when we switched to the new machine  
5 in 2002, there was a discrepancy in -- in -- in voter  
6 participation -- well, maybe not voter participation, but  
7 black voters and white voters. There was a huge learning  
8 curve. Could you talk a little bit more about that and --  
9 and why you think that occurred?

10 MS. COX: I -- I don't know that I can give you the  
11 reason of why, but we saw -- we saw a margin of difference  
12 that sometime exceeded 20 percent difference in under votes  
13 between majority-black and majority-white precincts within  
14 the same county. So the under vote rate was far greater in  
15 some majority-black precincts than majority-white precincts  
16 using optical-scan ballots.

17 We didn't have the time or resources to drill down and  
18 look at the average age of voters, for example, because it  
19 just sort of stands to reason that perhaps older voters who  
20 didn't grow up in a school system at a time when they were  
21 using standardized testing might not be familiar with an  
22 optical-scan ballot, so they might not know how to fill in  
23 that bubble or mark the X.

24 We also -- at the time, there was one system, now that  
25 I think about it, that was -- there were three different

1 types of optical-scan systems. There were some that you  
2 marked with an X, some you filled in with a bubble; there  
3 was one really horrible type that, out beside the  
4 candidate's name, there was a picture of an arrow and the  
5 middle part of the arrow was blank and the way you voted  
6 was that you had to draw a bar to connect -- to make a line  
7 of the arrow complete.

8 Now, if that sounds weird to you, it -- it defied  
9 logic. Nobody understood that system. So people would put  
10 an X in that blank space that didn't connect the lines --  
11 the ends of the arrow, so we had all kinds of errors on  
12 that system, so we knew that was a bad system.

13 But even on the other systems that were more  
14 conventional optical scan, we just -- we saw this  
15 discrepancy. It could be from a single digit to  
16 significant double-digit differences in majority black  
17 and white precincts. So you just know there's something  
18 else there that social scientists or political scientists  
19 needed to drill down further to know there's a -- there's a  
20 problem here in voter discrepancy that is not good and not  
21 -- not equitable in a voting system that we should be very  
22 mindful of in putting into place.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean --

24 SENATOR JACKSON: And --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead, Senator, yes?

1 easily.

2 But the same with an optical-scan ballot. I think --  
3 with massive voter education, I think you could probably  
4 overcome it, but don't minimize the need for that.

5 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dean, do you remember by any  
7 chance what year -- was it in the 80s or 90s when we did  
8 away with straight-ticket voting in Georgia?

9 MS. COX: I think that was still in place when I was  
10 in the legislature, so I think --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 90s?

12 MS. COX: -- it was probably in the 90s.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did we see an increase -- I  
14 would assume -- in under voting when we did away with the  
15 straight party --

16 MS. COX: Yes.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

18 MS. COX: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: The last year was '92.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: '92. Okay. Interesting.  
22 Yes? Nancy, did you have --

23 MS. BOREN: I did. Dean Cox, good to see you again.

24 MS. COX: You, too.

25 MS. BOREN: I was the county -- Muscogee County that

1 SENATOR JACKSON: So is it of your opinion that we  
2 must look at putting more educational dollars into those  
3 areas of our great state so that everybody has a chance to  
4 understand how to vote and -- and that everyone has an  
5 opportunity to -- to vote?

6 MS. COX: Without question. If -- if you should  
7 select a system like that -- and that's why I say any  
8 system where maybe all of us who grew up in an era of using  
9 standardized tests might say, Oh, everybody knows how to do  
10 it. Trust me: Everybody does not know how to use it and  
11 everybody does not feel comfortable with it.

12 So the county election officials around the table  
13 fully understand this, so that they need to help you know  
14 how to educate voters but it -- it will take more than a  
15 one time show people. It will take massive media campaigns  
16 and hands on, letting voters touch and feel it and  
17 experiment with it to say -- in a safe, comfortable  
18 environment before they go to a polling place because,  
19 the last thing -- I mean, it's human nature.

20 People don't want to go out in public and be  
21 embarrassed, so they'll stay away from something that might  
22 put them in that situation, and that's what we feared with  
23 electronics. But we -- you know, because we knew how many  
24 older voters didn't understand computer technology, so we  
25 wanted them to see, It's easy; you can do this really

1 had the arrow that you had to complete. And so, I'm --  
2 I'm very familiar with that type of voting system. We  
3 implemented that in Muscogee County in the -- in the early  
4 90s and we went back and we reviewed those ballots from  
5 2000 that you were speaking about in -- in our county  
6 and -- and what we saw were the results of over votes.

7 So the -- the voters would try to complete the arrow,  
8 but then they would write the same candidates name in the  
9 write-in box, which then created an over vote, which then  
10 rejected that ballot. Even though there intent was clear  
11 for the candidate that they wanted to vote, we couldn't  
12 count that ballot.

13 We lobbied the legislature and, of course, that was  
14 changed and now we have the vote-review panel that allows  
15 the vote-review panel to look at that -- that ballot and we  
16 can count it.

17 As far as voter education -- and I'm sure my election  
18 colleagues around the table remember that we went every  
19 place. Like you, we kept one in our car any time anyone  
20 asked us, in a gathering of two or more, to educate on that  
21 equipment. We did that. I even went to unsavory places  
22 often to go and demonstrate that equipment. But the voter-  
23 education component is definitely very important for all of  
24 the voters to understand how to use it.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: Another equally important fact is part of the training money was allocated to train poll workers, because uneducated poll workers do not help voters. And -- and you need to realize these are temporary workers that only work two or three elections every other year.

And I remember there was money put regionally into the technical schools and we loaded them up in vans and buses and carried them and they were taught how to operate the equipment, and -- and that's definitely something that needs to be done, is the funding to educate our poll workers on how to use -- properly use and show the voters how to use the equipment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

MS. BAILEY: Just a quick comment. Lynn Bailey, Richmond County. It's so good to see you. I wanted to underscore, just like many others have around the table, the importance of the educational component and my -- that comment is more related to the judge's comments about training poll workers.

Yeah, that's the -- that's where the rubber meets the road, is with the poll workers, and it's so important that they feel comfortable with it equally or perhaps, more important, is that the voters feel comfortable with it. Even to this day, we have voters come in who are hesitant to use voting equipment because -- and I don't think it

solutions that we were coming up with and, when we ultimately put this on the floor of the House, my recollection is that this passed by something like 158 to 2. The late Bobby Franklin was still living. And so, you know, he voted against everything but God rest his soul.

But -- but it was a -- it was -- there was strong bipartisan support for this, so I -- you know, I think there was a real effort by democrats and republicans to understand the problem and to try to fix it for Georgia.

You know, I regret that we didn't have perfect technology, but I don't think we ever will. I don't think whatever you choose today is going to be perfect. That's why you've got to balance it out with a lot of voter education and a lot of understanding of how you keep the voter interface part of it into the discussion as well as the security piece. It's not one or the other and they -- they've got to be equally considered in your decision-making.

And the other piece that I guess I want to put out for the legislature is that we didn't -- maybe this is my regret, but we didn't do enough to help the legislature understand that this would be an ongoing need to study and to keep up with changes in technology and to help the counties.

We -- we knew there would be growth and we put that

would matter what it is. It's just -- perhaps they're just uncomfortable with the entire process.

So the more at ease we can make voters feel by getting their hands on whatever it is Georgia goes with, I would certainly be a huge proponent of that and I'm sure that all of us around the table could at least agree on that.

JUDGE MCCOY: And, as you've stated, some are just too proud to ask for help.

MS. BAILEY: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Ms. Ross?

MS. ROSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dean Cox. Just thank you for your providing the history to us and I like to learn from history as well, so I'm feeling the pressure of having to make a new decision. What could you tell us would be your biggest regret being at the helm almost two decades ago of making the decision that you made and how can we learn from your experience?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And don't say working with the legislature.

MS. COX: I mean, no, I -- I've often used, as an example, in this day of partisanship that this was -- this was such a bipartisan effort. The -- the 21st Century Voting Commission was 50-50 bipartisan. The -- the legislative -- both Democrats and Republicans welcomed me into their caucuses to explain both the problems and the

burden on the counties, and some counties were able to keep up and buy new equipment just like -- getting back to where we were in 2000, some counties have not had the resources to keep up and that has led to some of the longer lines that we experienced in this election cycle because counties -- of course, right now, all of the counties, I think, understood we're probably heading into something new so they -- even if they had money, they maybe were not buying additional equipment.

But since the state moved into this arena, unified the state, the state probably ought to keep an ongoing allocation of funds so that whatever -- however you allocate new equipment, one ballot station per X number of voters, that the state continue to appropriate funding to the counties so that we can keep up that level playing field for all counties, not just the wealthy counties versus the lesser well-to-do counties who can't afford to buy new equipment in the years to come.

We didn't do that, and that's been to the detriment of the voting public. So I think an ongoing commitment by the state would really help voters everywhere.

MS. ROSS: Thank you.

JUDGE MCCOY: Can I add, just off of what she just said, once the original warranty on this voting equipment expired, the state required the counties to fund the

1 maintenance contract on this equipment and a majority of  
2 the counties, including mine -- my county commissioners  
3 denied the funding to renew the maintenance contract on  
4 that equipment as well as many others. So that is  
5 definitely something that -- that the legislature needs to  
6 look at, is maintaining whatever equipment that -- that we  
7 choose.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Dean, thank you so  
9 much again for --

10 MS. COX: Just one --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, please.

12 MS. COX: -- other thing that I wanted to add, and it  
13 goes back to the reason we set up Kennesaw State, which  
14 Secretary Kemp brought into his office: There will always  
15 be a need for that level of expertise if you were using  
16 equipment.

17 What Kennesaw State -- the staff at Kennesaw State  
18 brought to the table was -- that people don't necessarily  
19 understand, was the fact that no piece of voting equipment  
20 ever showed up in a polling place that didn't come into the  
21 state and get tested first at Kennesaw State to make sure  
22 there was no malware introduced to it from a vendor, or  
23 from somebody who had gotten their hands on it before it  
24 got to the county level and got introduced into the voting  
25 population.

1 Chris, if you would, remind us of -- all of us of your  
2 position with the Secretary of State's office, and we'd  
3 love to hear from you.

4 MR. HARVEY: Sure, Mr. Chairman. Members of the SAFE  
5 Commission, again, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the  
6 election director with the Georgia Secretary of State's  
7 office.

8 AUDIENCE MEMBER: No mic.

9 MR. HARVEY: Test, test, test, test, test.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold on just a second, Chris.  
11 We'll give them a moment to see if we can get the mic.  
12 Candace, do we have somebody checking on that for us?

13 MS. BROCHE: Yes.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Hold on just a second,  
15 Chris.

16 MR. HARVEY: Test, test.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Affirmative response.)

18 MR. HARVEY: All right. Are you ready?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Uh-huh.

20 MR. HARVEY: All right. Again, members of the SAFE  
21 Commission, my name is Chris Harvey. I'm the election  
22 director with the Georgia Secretary of State's office.  
23 I had the -- the privilege of addressing you guys in the  
24 first meeting talking about our current voting system.

25 I was asked today to give a very brief election recap

1 And so, you're always going to -- the Secretary of  
2 State's office is always going to need that level of  
3 staffing and expertise somewhere, whether it's on a  
4 university campus or in-house, to be able to test equipment  
5 that is purchased new.

6 You can't just rely on what you buy off a shelf and  
7 think it matches up with every other piece of equipment in  
8 the state. You've got to have some in-house expertise to  
9 provide you that level of confidence that all of your  
10 equipment is running on the same systems, the same code,  
11 the same software -- everything's got to be just right  
12 based on your own staff knowing how that works.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Great. Dean, thank you so  
14 much.

15 MS. COX: Thank you very much.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Excellent presentation.

17 MS. COX: Thank you.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here  
19 today. Thank you. We'll stand adjourned for lunch.

20 (A recess was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 12:49 p.m.)

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. If commission members  
22 would come on back and grab your seat. We're going to get  
23 started. First up, we have a general-election recap.  
24 Chris Harvey with our Secretary of State's office is going  
25 to provide that to us. Chris, do you want to come on up?

1 of the general election in November of this year. And so,  
2 I'm going to do that. It's not, by any stretch of the  
3 imagine (ph) -- meant to be exhaustive. I'm going to hit  
4 the highlights and talk about some things and then there  
5 will be, I'm sure, a lot continued to be written and  
6 figured out about the election.

7 But I want to start with, as we came into preparations  
8 for 2018, about a week before advanced voting began, we had  
9 a very unusual event. We had a hurricane come through  
10 Georgia in a most-unexpected place. Usually, we expect  
11 hurricanes to come in from Savannah and come -- which that  
12 happened in 2016. This year, we had a hurricane come up  
13 through Seminole County, and Early County, and Miller  
14 County, and Grady County and Decatur County.

15 A week before advanced voting, Hurricane Michael came  
16 through and brought tremendous damage through Southwest  
17 Georgia, an area that doesn't have a tremendous amount of  
18 infrastructure to begin with. Our office stayed in  
19 constant contact with those counties -- and, frankly, the  
20 damage extended -- the shortages extended almost up here to  
21 Macon and -- and areas even a little bit north of here.

22 On the Saturday before advanced voting was to begin, I  
23 and then Secretary, Kemp, and the chief investigator,  
24 Russell Lewis, flew down to Southwest Georgia, to help  
25 survey the damage and see what was going on. We went to

1 five counties and talked to election officials and  
2 registrars in that county and those counties and found out  
3 that throughout Southwest Georgia, the local election  
4 officials performed absolutely heroically in getting ready  
5 for advanced voting.

6 These are -- these are folks that had their -- their  
7 houses, in some cases, damaged, their businesses damaged,  
8 their -- their neighborhoods damaged, their families'  
9 houses damaged. Every single one of them was back at work  
10 almost the day after the hurricane hit getting ready for  
11 advanced voting.

12 The devastation in Seminole County was -- was  
13 tremendous. We went down there and met with the probate  
14 judge and we walked outside of the courthouse and looked up  
15 and the -- the clock had been sucked out of the facade of  
16 the courthouse. I asked him -- I said, Has that clock been  
17 gone long? He didn't realize it had been gone. It was  
18 literally sucked out of the facade of the courthouse.  
19 Glass everywhere, trees down, no power.

20 With the exception of Seminole and Miller Counties,  
21 every county was able to begin advanced voting on the first  
22 day of advanced voting, and Seminole and Miller Counties  
23 began the next day -- they began that Tuesday and they made  
24 up the eight hours that they missed in the following week.

25 So what started as a very challenging situation for

1 elections, was actually turned around by the dedication of  
2 the folks in Southwest Georgia that, frankly, don't often  
3 get a lot of attention, don't get a lot of -- of press and  
4 coverage, but I have to tell you how fantastically they  
5 performed and how proud I am of what they were doing for  
6 the voters in Southwest Georgia.

7 Advanced voting this year was incredibly successful.  
8 Almost 2 -- over 2 million votes were cast during advanced  
9 voting, absentee and in person. I won't forget -- I think  
10 it was a Tuesday of advanced voting, Ms. Holden called me  
11 from -- from Paulding County and said, We had 1700 people  
12 vote in advanced voting on the first day of advanced  
13 voting, or a number similar to that. I got calls from all  
14 around the state from election officials that were giddy  
15 with the number of people doing advanced voting.

16 Nothing makes an election director happier than seeing  
17 people voting. You know, people talk about lines, people  
18 talk about pressure, people -- people talk about  
19 interactions with voters. My experience is that nothing  
20 makes an election official happier than seeing people come  
21 in to vote.

22 And so, advanced voting went off very well, and it  
23 went off -- we had -- again, you had counties in Southwest  
24 Georgia that had generator power, that had temporary  
25 buildings that were working around temporary offices and

1 their poll workers -- everybody sacrificed to make sure  
2 advanced voting went well, and we had almost 2.1 million  
3 people vote in advanced voting.

4 By comparison, in the 2014 general election, there  
5 were less than a million or about 800,000 votes cast during  
6 advanced voting. So we had more than double the amount of  
7 advanced voting in this election.

8 We spent some time in court leading up to this  
9 election and through the election, and Mr. Germany is going  
10 to talk after I do specifically about litigation, but the  
11 litigation we dealt with in this time period primarily had  
12 to do with absentee ballots, provisional ballots,  
13 citizenship verification at the polls -- they were  
14 essentially enhancements or clarifications of practices  
15 that county election officials had been doing.

16 And, again, I have to give some credit to the local  
17 county officials. As we got orders, as we got amendments,  
18 as we got changes, we pushed those out to the counties.  
19 And, for a county election official, that amounts to -- to  
20 changing the rules in the middle of the game.

21 And, again, throughout the state, the county election  
22 officials responded tremendously well to the changes we put  
23 on them. They had to change some procedures with absentee  
24 ballots, their -- some of their timetables were changed,  
25 some of the procedures, some of the practices that they'd

1 done in the past had been altered.

2 But, again, every county responded. They provided  
3 what we needed, they communicated with us -- we did our --  
4 our very best to communicate with them and with the public,  
5 as much as possible, when these changes came up and, again,  
6 I think it was -- despite the difficulty of having to go  
7 through some of that stuff, I think it was executed very  
8 successfully at the county level.

9 On election day, almost 2 million ballots were cast.  
10 And election day went about as well as you can expect.  
11 Now, nothing ever happens perfectly on election day, but  
12 there were no systematic -- systemic or systematic issues  
13 that happened on election day.

14 You had localized problems that came up, you had some  
15 -- some polling places in Gwinnett County where they had  
16 problems with the ExpressPoll -- not the voting machines  
17 but the ExpressPoll -- that delayed voting.

18 We noticed, when we looked at the numbers, the  
19 heaviest volume of voting time on election day was 7  
20 o'clock. I mean, they were lined up out of the gate, ready  
21 to vote on election day, which is fantastic but, as a lot  
22 of processes begin, you know, getting the kinks out and  
23 working out the -- the kinks early is difficult and it --  
24 it really puts the pressure on the poll managers and the  
25 poll workers to get it done quickly, and if there are any

1 problems or hiccups, it's going to stack up problems  
2 exponentially.

3 So Gwinnett County had a couple of polling places.  
4 Fulton County had a couple of places where the -- the  
5 election director, Rick Barron, admitted he just -- he made  
6 a mistake in calculating some polling places and he ended  
7 up with some polling places that didn't have the number of  
8 DREs that they should have had, and they made corrections  
9 on the fly.

10 In those cases, people went to court, they got judges  
11 to issue orders extending poll hours, so there was -- you  
12 know, there were opportunities for voters to make up that  
13 lost time. Again, no real systematic issues that took  
14 place throughout the state.

15 There were issues with lines that people raised. You  
16 know, lines are problematic in -- in a couple of ways, but  
17 they're also evidence of something, that they're evidence  
18 of people out voting. And, again, that's what makes the --  
19 the election officials happy.

20 The polls were something that were relatively new. We  
21 hadn't really -- I'm sorry. Lines were something that were  
22 relatively new. We hadn't seen a ton of lines in earlier  
23 elections. So we did some research recently with local  
24 election officials. We asked them some questions about  
25 polls and we wanted to see what poll -- I'm sorry, lines --

1 everyone here voted that you may have remembered when you  
2 voted, is the ballot was exceptionally long and complex  
3 this year.

4 There were multiple referenda, there were multiple  
5 constitutional amendments that had long questions; it took  
6 some time to work your way through it; they were written in  
7 -- in, you know, legal language that the average voter may  
8 have a hard time working through -- you had a lot of stuff  
9 on the ballot. So that's one reason. You had an  
10 exceptionally long ballot with complex questions.

11 You had some counties, especially in the metro area,  
12 that had some DREs that were sequestered due to litigation,  
13 so they weren't able to deploy the total number of DREs  
14 that they would have liked to.

15 You know, keep in mind that people in line voting is  
16 -- is an indication of a good thing. The peak times had  
17 high numbers. I mentioned 7 o'clock in the morning, people  
18 lined up ready to go. Any problems, any hiccups, are going  
19 to exacerbate problems. As the day went on, the voting  
20 lines tended to decrease.

21 And some counties reported that they had some  
22 difficulty getting enough poll workers. The poll workers,  
23 as Judge McCoy mentioned, you know, they're temporary,  
24 seasonal employees and -- and they're -- they're just hard  
25 to come by in some places.

1 what lines looked like throughout the state.

2 And so, we -- we did some -- some questioning and, in  
3 terms of advanced voting, 75 percent of election -- county  
4 election directors said that there were no -- there were  
5 not lines longer than 30 minutes during advanced voting.  
6 About 25 percent of the counties said there were some lines  
7 that were longer than 30 minutes -- not in every location,  
8 but in some locations.

9 Compared to advanced voting in 2016, about 57 percent  
10 said the lines were about the same in 2016 for advanced  
11 voting, 17 percent said the lines were longer in 2016 and  
12 about 25 percent said they were a little bit longer in  
13 2018.

14 We asked if polling places on election day had lines  
15 longer than 30 minutes, which is the -- the -- sort of the  
16 gold standard. 83 percent of the counties said no, they  
17 did not have lines longer than 30 minutes on election day,  
18 about 17 percent said, in some cases, they did. And,  
19 again, that's not everywhere. And then, in the comparison  
20 to the 2016 election, about 59 percent said the lines were  
21 about the same, 17 percent said they were longer in 2016  
22 and about 23 percent said they were longer this year.

23 There are a couple of reasons for lines. When you  
24 look at lines, you have to -- to look at a bunch of  
25 dynamics. One thing that was -- as -- as I imagine,

1 So counties make an effort to staff their polling  
2 places as much as possible, but that was one of the issues  
3 that was reported, they just didn't have as many people as  
4 they would have liked. And, frankly, I'm not sure that --  
5 that everyone throughout the state anticipated the amount  
6 of turn out we were going to have, which, again, is a good  
7 thing. That's a -- that's a -- that's an okay problem to  
8 have, is people out voting. But, again, for a typical  
9 midterm election, this was atypical.

10 We -- as I mentioned before, there were some court  
11 orders that extended polling hours in locations where  
12 problems were reported. So, even where you had problems,  
13 opportunities were -- were made to correct them and get  
14 people the opportunity to vote.

15 Again, due to some court orders, we certified the  
16 election on November 10th and then we resulted in two state  
17 -- statewide runoffs that happened just last week. We  
18 anticipate certifying that later this week.

19 In terms of the -- the only -- I won't say only. The  
20 primary issues that we dealt with from a -- from a  
21 complaint point of view was some counties were overwhelmed  
22 by the request for absentee ballots. Absentee ballots sort  
23 of came roaring back in this election after being a little  
24 bit on the -- on the -- the wane and counties did their  
25 best to respond to absentee ballots. But we did get some



1 complaints along those lines. Our office is investigating  
2 those.

3 And the second issue, we got individual, localized  
4 reports from people where, when they interacted with the  
5 voting machine and they would select one -- one candidate,  
6 somebody else -- it would -- it would select the other  
7 candidate. Again, those were individually reported; they  
8 were not localized in any county, in any precinct, in any  
9 area. They were self-reported by the voters sometimes  
10 after they had voted, sometimes days after they had voted.

11 If they were able to talk to the poll officer,  
12 which we always encourage people to do if -- if anybody  
13 encounters a difficulty, get somebody's attention and let  
14 the poll worker or the poll manager, you know, walk  
15 somebody through and correct any errors or mistakes.

16 Lots of reasons that could have happened. Again, not  
17 a systematic issue -- not a systemic issue, but something  
18 that -- that does get reported and, frankly, gets reported  
19 in every election. There is an element of human  
20 interaction and human interface with these devices that,  
21 sometimes, proves problematic in individual cases.

22 So that's a very, very brief rundown of what happened  
23 in 2018 in November, and I'll be happy to answer any  
24 questions that members of the commission have regarding any  
25 of this stuff.

1 second. I didn't -- I didn't choose this. You can always  
2 go back and correct it.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. So you're saying -- if I can,  
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

6 SENATOR JACKSON: So you're saying there probably was  
7 a difficulty with certain machines that was calibrated  
8 wrong or...?

9 MR. HARVEY: We -- because we -- if -- if we had  
10 gotten multiple complaints from the same place -- from the  
11 same polling place or the same poll manager, that would be  
12 an indication that maybe the machine wasn't calibrated  
13 properly. When that doesn't happen, it's usually an  
14 indication that the individual voter had some type of -- of  
15 difficulty interfacing with the machine.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

17 MR. RUSSO: He answered my question.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Any other questions  
19 for Chris as I go around the table? Okay. Chris, thank  
20 you so much. We appreciate it. Thank you.

21 All right. Next we have Ryan Germany, general counsel  
22 to the Secretary of State's office, and Ryan will give us a  
23 -- a legal update on some of the cases that went on during  
24 the election process. Ryan, thank you.

25 MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. Questions?  
2 Senator Jackson.

3 SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you  
4 for being here today. You mentioned the voting machines,  
5 how they voted for one candidate and it popped up another  
6 candidate. Is there a reason for that or...?

7 MR. HARVEY: There could be a number of reasons for  
8 that. When you -- when you interact with the screen, you  
9 know, you're -- you're pressing an area. The screens are  
10 calibrated to reflect a registered pressure on a specific  
11 grid. It's a -- it's, essentially, a grid itself, and, if  
12 you were to touch it above or below an area, it can be  
13 ambiguous or, if you hit a couple of times, you could, you  
14 know, bounce around.

15 These devices are older. They don't operate quite as  
16 fast as an iPhone 8 or an iPad or something like that where  
17 you touch and get an immediate reaction. It could be that  
18 people are touching multiple times and bouncing their  
19 finger around.

20 It could be that, when they're interacting with the  
21 screen on a tilt, if they just have -- have some kind of  
22 spatial difficulty, if they're wearing glasses or reading  
23 glasses -- any of those things could happen, but they're  
24 always correctable. You had a summary screen that would  
25 show you in case you got to the end and say, Hey, wait a

1 commission, Madam Secretary. My name is Ryan Germany. I  
2 am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office.

3 I want to give you guys a very brief update on litigation  
4 -- not all litigation that we are facing in the Secretary  
5 of State's office, but some that I think is relevant to  
6 y'all's charge here.

7 It's meant to be very brief and high level. There are  
8 some plaintiffs in the lawsuits I'm about to talk about  
9 here, so I don't want to -- you know, I'll say I'm not  
10 meaning to characterize anything a certain way so, if I do  
11 so, I apologize. It's meant to be very -- just a general  
12 kind of FYI to the commission.

13 The point I want to get across is there is ongoing  
14 litigation about our current system and -- and, in my view,  
15 that litigation will continue until we move to a new  
16 system. And, frankly, if we don't move to a new system  
17 prior to the next election, we'll probably -- we'll  
18 probably see even -- even more litigation about it.  
19 So time is of the essence as y'all consider your  
20 recommendations.

21 So the questions in front of you are complicated, and  
22 the point I want to get across is one that I think,  
23 unfortunately, makes it even more complicated. We have a  
24 complicated issue that we need to solve and we need to  
25 solve it quickly.

1 We need to get a -- make a recommendation, get it  
2 through the legislature and implement a system with all  
3 deliberate speed. And, if we are not able to do that, I  
4 think the state will see legal consequences in terms of  
5 continuing current litigation but probably additional  
6 litigation going forward.

7 The two claims I want -- the two cases I wanted to  
8 give you a brief overview on are, essentially, about the  
9 election machines. One of them is called Curling v. Kemp  
10 -- Curling v. Crittenden now that'll soon be Curling v.  
11 Raffensperger, but it's a constitutional challenge to the  
12 use of the DRE machines, and the plaintiffs allege that the  
13 lack of a paper trial is a violation of the 14th amendment.

14 That case is in front of Judge Totenberg in the  
15 Northern District of Georgia. Currently, it is on appeal  
16 in the 11th Circuit and oral argument in that case is set  
17 for January 28th.

18 Judge Totenberg issued a opinion prior to it going to  
19 the 11th Circuit, indicating that she found a lot of the  
20 plaintiff's claims credible. So that means, if the case  
21 goes back to Judge Totenberg, you know, she's given us a  
22 pretty clear indication of how -- of how she intends to  
23 rule.

24 The next case is the case that Mr. Favorito mentioned  
25 briefly. There's an election contest over the lieutenant

1 governor's race. And, again, that's -- that's called  
2 Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden. It's in  
3 Fulton County Superior Court, and that's an election  
4 challenge talking about the number of under votes in the  
5 lieutenant governor's race. So that's the other one  
6 involving -- involving our machines.

7 One other thing I want to speak to very briefly is  
8 there's litigation -- there's the machine cases, the DRE  
9 cases. One thing that we are not currently dealing with in  
10 Georgia but we have seen in other states is there are  
11 lawsuits about accessibility under the -- the Americans  
12 with Disability Act. I know both Ohio and Maryland are  
13 seeing lawsuits to that -- in that.

14 The gist of those cases is that the voter experience  
15 for disabled voters should match as close as possible to  
16 voter experience for nondisabled voters. Currently, we  
17 have a system where those do match very well. In some  
18 states, they do not.

19 So I think that's something to keep in mind as y'all  
20 consider your recommendations or if we move to something  
21 where those get further part, the experience for  
22 nondisabled and disabled voters in terms of voting, then we  
23 probably will see some of those lawsuits as well.

24 And, again, I know we're -- that's -- that's all I  
25 had. It was meant to be very high level, so I don't want

1 to get into sort of the specifics of litigation right now,  
2 but I am happy to take any questions if members of the  
3 commission have any.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ryan. Questions  
5 from members of the commission? Ms. Bailey.

6 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lynn Bailey,  
7 Richmond County. You were talking about the timeframe for  
8 implementation of a new system. Are we still looking at a  
9 -- having something in place prior to or at least at the  
10 time of the presidential primary for 2020 or is that a  
11 decision that is yet still to be made?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, I think -- I think it  
13 is a decision yet to be made because all of that depends on  
14 the legislature acting this session, and what we put into  
15 the law and working with the governor and the Secretary of  
16 State.

17 However, most of the discussions I think I have heard  
18 have said that it would be great if we could possibly even  
19 in the municipal elections of '19 -- maybe statewide, maybe  
20 not -- have some test runs with new equipment at that point  
21 and then that gets you closer to being ready, potentially,  
22 for the presidential-preference primaries.

23 However, the best laid plans of mice and men -- I have  
24 said before, you know, you -- you try to set a goal there,  
25 and that is an ambitious schedule and -- and the people at

1 this table represent several of the 159 folks across the  
2 state that would have to do a lot of that work along with  
3 the Secretary of State's office.

4 So the -- the short answer is nobody is sure yet; the  
5 even shorter answer is that it would be a good goal in --  
6 in my opinion, but I'm welcome for my fellow legislators to  
7 chime in if they -- they think this differently.

8 MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

9 MR. GERMANY: I would just add that I think, Lynn,  
10 that that's exactly right. It is something that I think  
11 this commission can issue a recommendation on. The 2020  
12 election cycle is -- is an aggressive goal, but I think  
13 it's the correct goal and I think even -- you know, there's  
14 an opportunity in November of this year with municipal  
15 elections to, hopefully, have something in place that will  
16 allow for, you know, more of a test run and a -- and a soft  
17 launch in municipal elections.

18 And the point that I was trying to get across is, if  
19 we don't have something in place by 2020, I think it's very  
20 likely that a federal court may take this matter into --  
21 into their own hands. So I think -- I think that is the  
22 right goal, but it -- it is aggressive.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other questions of  
24 Mr. Germany? Ryan, thank you so much. We appreciate what  
25 you do.

MR. GERMANY: Thanks for being here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Commission members, we're now going to move to the portion of our agenda that deals with public comment. I know there are some sign-up sheets. If those could go ahead and be brought to me, I would appreciate that. I think I was told about 20 some-odd individuals had signed up.

Is there anybody out there who wants to sign up that hasn't signed up on the sheet? Because if you're not on the sheet once we start, we're -- we're going to stick to it. Okay. Going once, going twice, gone.

All right. Here we go. Okay. Here's what I'd like to do, just to make sure we all have a clear understanding of how we're going to handle this. I'm not asking you to move yet because I'm going to call your name when you come up to the -- to the mic, but just so I kind of get a feel for where everybody is, everybody who's on the sign-up sheet, I want you to stand up where you are. Just right where you are, stand up.

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. So it's -- it's most of the folks in the room. All right. So here's how we're going to handle this, and -- no, no, stay standing up, stay standing up.

Here's how we're going to handle this, and -- and I

recognize a lot of the faces from our previous meetings, I think. All of you that I recognize have conducted yourself very well in our past meetings and I want to say thank you for that.

What I would ask of you now is, is to understand clearly the ground rules for how we're going to handle this. There is 2 minutes for everyone. As you have seen before, I tried to be generous with that. If you're making a statement, I tried to let you wrap it up, but I am going to ask you to stick to that.

Members of the audience, if you approve or disapprove of what somebody else says, please keep that to yourself. If I make a good joke, you can laugh. Okay? But, generally speaking, please keep that to yourself and be respectful of the people that are trying to -- to speak as well.

So -- and I ask you once again -- everybody has been a -- has done a good job of being civil with their comments, making their point but making it in such a way that it's not offensive. I'll -- I'll leave it that way. So -- so thank you for that in the past.

Is there anyone who does not understand the ground rules? Is there anybody who is not going to follow those ground rules? Okay. Everybody sit down and I'll start going down the list, and thank you so much.

Okay. Sara Tindall, Democratic Party of Georgia. Sara? Sara, good to have you today. Welcome. Sara, please tell us where you're from, and we'd love to hear from you.

MS. TINDALL: Hi, my name is Sara Tindall Ghazal, and I am a registered voter in Cobb County. I am also the voter-protection director for the Democratic Party of Georgia. In that capacity, I work with the state party, county-party committees and election officials. I also oversee our voter-protection hotline and our poll-watching program.

Over the course of this election season, our voter-protection hotline logged 73,449 calls from voters through December 10th. Through the day of the general election, we received 30,295 calls since November 6th. After November 6th, we received 43,154 additional calls. We also had observers on the ground, nearly 600 poll watchers across the state on election day, 168 during the runoff and hundreds more during the early voting periods.

Throughout these -- from these calls and reports, we recorded 723 separate reports of machine problems during the general election and the -- and the runoff. Hundreds of these were of vote slippage or vote flipping where a voter would make a selection only to have the machine reflect a different result.

In many cases, these voters were assisted by poll workers and the machines were still malfunctioning. There was one voter who reported having to change her vote five times before it correctly reflected her choice. In another case, in Gwinnett County, the voter had to go to three separate machines before they could find a machine that would correctly reflect that -- that choice.

We also received multiple reports of races not appearing on the electronic ballots for both the general election and the runoff. In many cases, the voters were unable to correct the machine mistake and the vote was recorded that did not reflect that voter's choice.

Problems weren't limited to the election machines. There were many problems with the registration system. We had multiple voters willing to swear affidavits that they voted and they have witnesses attesting to the fact that they voted but their votes do not appear on MVP.

We have other cases where voters found their registrations online, they had printed registration cards; they did not appear on the lists when they appeared at the -- at the polling booths.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, you -- you've passed your 2 minutes, but I do want to let you wrap up.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

MS. TINDALL: It's going to take a lot of time to research these problems. I would like to share them with each county as we go through so that we can look at them and figure out what happened and where the system broke down for these voters, but the bottom line is there is a crisis of confidence right now in the voting system, and in the officials and the administration of the system.

What's critical now is that this body develop a set of standards against which the decisions that -- on a system will be made. You have to have standards that you establish here because if we don't set a baseline that includes making sure that the voters are able to create and confirm their own votes, that the system reflects 2018 electronic and cyber-security standards, and that these votes are auditable independently without any intervention by a computer, that this crisis of confidence will simply continue.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today.

MS. TINDALL: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Jen Nelson? Jen? Jen, did I pronounce your name right?

MS. NELSON: Yes.

Professor Halderman, who was present in Judge Totenberg's courtroom with the Curling versus Kemp hearing and showed us the vulnerability that had nothing to do with whether the machines were clicked in and had nothing to do with a physical presence being in the secure room at KSU or any central database.

So decentralizing for sure would be -- would be helpful, but I believe that hand-marked paper ballots are the only way to be able to have an auditable, verifiable postelection secure system, and I wanted to speak a little bit to the disabilities concerns.

I am differently abled; I have a lot of friends that are differently abled and we heard at a postelection where little people showed up to their polling places and were not given stools or chairs, left without casting their vote. People were not provided wheelchairs, or access or even heights to the screens or discrepancies with their access to cast their vote.

So, right now, we are already facing a lot of disability issues and, completely understandably, with handwritten ballots, we would need to take all of the considerations for disabled and differently-abled people.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jen, thank you for being here today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Come on up. Good to have you today.

MS. NELSON: Thank you. Thank you so much for --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you --

MS. NELSON: -- having me.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for being here. We'd love to hear from you. Tell us where you're from.

MS. NELSON: Sure. I am from Fulton County. I'm a registered voter, just a community advocate and I'm not with any particular organization. I really appreciate your time.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Volume. We can't hear you.

MS. NELSON: Oh, sorry.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: We can't hear.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That microphone's --

MS. NELSON: This one?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Try that one, yeah, a little closer.

MS. NELSON: Yeah. So I am a -- just a concerned citizen and not with any particular organization and I appreciate your time.

So I am concerned particularly with any electronic system, as has been proven by experts that there's no system known out there right now that is completely secure from hacking and is not vulnerable. Particularly,

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate hearing from you. Heidi Natkin? Heidi, come on up. Welcome. Good to have you today. Heidi, did I pronounce your last name right?

MS. NATKIN: Yep, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm not going to try again. I'm just going to say Heidi. Okay? All right.

MS. NATKIN: You did a good job. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from.

MS. NATKIN: Yeah. My name's Heidi Natkin; I live in Atlanta, Georgia. I'm here as a private citizen, but I spent the last several months working as a field organizer for the Democratic Party of Georgia.

And I can tell you that, of the thousands of voters that I spoke to over the course of -- of the last three months, a very significant number of folks expressed a lot of concern about whether their ballots were actually cast. The trust in the election system has degraded significantly.

There was a lot of concern and I -- I believe that there is only one way to be able to rebuild that trust, which is to be able to provide voters with a way to verify that they actually vote -- the votes that they actually made were registered in the way that they intended. And,

1 therefore, hand-marked paper ballots is the best way to  
2 make sure that that happens.

3 They need to be able to know, and see and feel that  
4 they're actually submitting a ballot that gets entered into  
5 the system exactly as they've expressed and, without an  
6 audible -- an audible paper trail, that confidence can't be  
7 restored. So I really hope that you take that into  
8 consideration since the voter confidence is -- is so  
9 critical to the success and the stability of our election  
10 system.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you so much,  
12 Heidi. We appreciate you being here today.  
13 Ms. Blassingame? And I want to -- okay. I'll try the  
14 first name since you're not responding. Simonia  
15 Blassingame?

16 Okay. Next would be Eric Weir. Eric? Did I  
17 pronounce your last name right, Eric?

18 MR. WEIR: Yep.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Welcome, Eric, good to  
20 have you and please tell us where you're from.

21 MR. WEIR: Thank you. I'm from Decatur. I'm here  
22 just as a concerned citizen. I came mainly to learn. This  
23 is a whole new set of issues for me, and what I know I've  
24 learned from talks on media and I've learned a lot today.

25 I've been pleasantly surprised with one exception:

1 And maybe all I will say -- the thing that I -- I was  
2 delighted that the first word that I heard was trust, and  
3 it seems to me, pretty clear, that that is a really  
4 critical issue.

5 As we all know, we live in a time of polarization,  
6 of distress in our institutions and this set of issues is  
7 not a partisan thing. Republicans, democrats,  
8 independents, libertarians, all want safe, accessible,  
9 fair elections. So I hope you will give that the highest  
10 priority.

11 You know, as -- as I said, I'm just learning. It  
12 sounds to me like what I've learned -- what I've heard is  
13 that the gold standard internationally is paper -- hand-  
14 marked paper ballots and -- but, you know, I'm just  
15 learning. So that's it. Anyway, thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Eric. We  
17 appreciate you coming today. Tom Ellington? Tom? Is Tom  
18 Ellington here? Tom Ellington? Okay. Janine Dufort?  
19 Janine? Janine, I remember seeing you in August, and I  
20 think I mispronounced your name the first time. Did I  
21 mispronounce it this time?

22 MS. DUFORT: Yes, you're consistent, which is --

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me --

24 MS. DUFORT: -- what we want in elections.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can't blame me for being

1 good. Okay. All right.

2 MS. DUFORT: I'm -- I'm Jeanne Dufort.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne Dufort. Okay.

4 MS. DUFORT: It's the French spelling, and I'm from --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Jeanne,  
6 welcome --

7 MS. DUFORT: -- Madison, from Morgan County, Georgia.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good.

9 MS. DUFORT: And -- and I want to brag: We have the  
10 best election board and we have the best election director  
11 other than those of you who are election directors sitting  
12 here, who are also fabulous but we should brag.

13 And -- and that's important because in this day of  
14 lack of trust, it is important for you to hear that I have  
15 experienced voting this year in a county that gets it  
16 right, that works hard to get it right and -- and worked  
17 hard to take the rules and make sure voters can vote.

18 We literally got down to only one advanced paper  
19 ballot submitted that couldn't be counted and that was  
20 because we worked with private citizens, worked with our  
21 election director to reach people to solve problems, so  
22 you can work with the rules without disenfranchising  
23 voters.

24 I am also -- full disclosure, I'm party to the  
25 Gwinnett lawsuit which is proof positive you can

1 disenfranchise people with -- with paper ballots if you  
2 choose to, and that's why I joined that suit because I just  
3 think that's not right that you can live in Georgia and be  
4 treated one way if you're elderly and your handwriting is  
5 shaky in one county and be treated another way if you're  
6 elderly and your handwriting is shaky in another county.  
7 That's not right, and that's why I joined that suit.

8 Hand-marked paper ballots with well-designed  
9 postelection audits are clearly the advice of your cyber  
10 expert here, of other cyber experts of everything you've  
11 read so that should not be in dispute that that is what  
12 the experts are saying.

13 As to how you count them, I would consider it's not a  
14 surprise that Chris Harvey said 3 out of 4 counties didn't  
15 have problems with lines. 3 out of 4 counties in Georgia  
16 don't have 10 stop lights in them. You would be hard  
17 pressed to have a line in those counties if you tried.

18 Our largest precinct in Morgan County is maybe 7 --  
19 800 voters on election day over 12 hours. Right? So it  
20 would be hard to have three- or four-hour lines unless your  
21 equipment was down, so don't be confused by those  
22 statistics. Actually look at, you know, how many people  
23 had real fundamental problems.

24 So I'll wrap it up but what I would say is this: You  
25 need to consider implementing some of the smart-scanning

1 stuff, optical scanners. There's some really smart  
2 equipment that -- that we saw last time in Augusta that  
3 speeds up your review of those problems, and that could be  
4 useful in counties that have to process a lot.

5 And, yet, you might not have to make that investment  
6 in counties where you're processing 7 or 800 votes at most  
7 in a precinct on election day. So think about scale as you  
8 think about the right resolutions. Thank you very much.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jeanne, thank you. We  
10 appreciate you being here today.

11 Randall Savage, WMAZ? Randall? Randall? Okay.  
12 Krista Brewer with ProGeorgia. Krista? Welcome.

13 MS. BREWER: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you're from.  
15 We'd love to hear from you.

16 MS. BREWER: My name, again, is Krista -- Krista  
17 Brewer.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krista Brewer. Okay.

19 MS. BREWER: I'm a native of DeKalb County, Georgia,  
20 and I come here today as -- serving on the board of  
21 ProGeorgia, which is a collaboration of 501(c)(3)  
22 nonpartisan organizations that work in the civic-engagement  
23 space. All of the groups have a variety of different  
24 missions, but part of their missions is voter registration,  
25 voter education and voter mobilization, and all of these

1 groups have worked very hard in many elections over the  
2 years to help voters get access to the polls and vote  
3 effectively.

4 The groups came together -- several of these groups  
5 came together over the summer and fall and agreed on a  
6 couple of principles that we wanted to share with your  
7 commission. The groups are Women Engaged, which focuses on  
8 engaging primarily African-American women in the electoral  
9 process, then the League of Women Voters, Common Cause  
10 Georgia, the League of Women Voters of Georgia, ACLU of  
11 Georgia and the Georgia Coalition for People's Agenda.  
12 Most of those you have heard of.

13 Georgia's -- and -- and so, we have this set of  
14 principles that I handed out at the beginning of the  
15 program, and I'll just highlight the basic points.

16 We advocate for a system that is secure, a system that  
17 is accurate, that is recountable, that is accessible and is  
18 transparent. We advocate for a voter-verified paper trail;  
19 we advocate for a sophisticated risk-limiting type audit,  
20 an audit that is based on ballots that are conducted using  
21 human-verifiable data.

22 We advocate for a system of maintaining custody -- a  
23 chain of custody for ballots, for oversight of elections  
24 and audits that include citizenship participation and  
25 monitoring and -- and really very importantly, we feel a

1 real asset that we have here in Georgia is that our  
2 election system is uniform around the state and we don't  
3 want to lose that.

4 So we present these principles and characteristics as  
5 guides for -- for elected officials, for this commission,  
6 for the elections board and for elections supervisors as  
7 you go about this very tough decision about what type of  
8 equipment and the accompanying overall system for our  
9 elections. So --

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Brewer.

11 MS. BREWER: -- thank you very much.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
13 today. Toni Reid?

14 MS. REID: I'll pass.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You'll pass. Okay. And  
16 anybody else can pass if they want to. Thank you, Toni.  
17 Vicki Krugman? Vicki?

18 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Krugman?

20 MS. KRUGMAN: Krugman.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vicki, good to have you with  
22 us today.

23 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for coming. Tell  
25 us where you're from. We'd love to hear from you.

1 MS. KRUGMAN: Vicki Krugman from Oconee County in  
2 Georgia. I was a poll watcher this year for the first  
3 time. I learned a lot. I've been following your group and  
4 what you've been doing since the inception of this group.  
5 I'm happy to know that we have this group and hope that you  
6 will be able to convey what voters want in this state to  
7 regain the trust that we need in Georgia both locally and  
8 nationally in our elections.

9 I did a lot of campaigning this year and a lot of  
10 talking to voters and I learned a lot about how people are  
11 saying, My vote won't count, they won't include me, I don't  
12 want to sign up, I'm not getting involved, and I learned  
13 that because people have lost trust in Georgia's voting  
14 system. And so, your job is very -- very, very serious.  
15 It's got to follow a timeline.

16 I feel really -- that, once you started, you've met a  
17 couple of times and you've been very diligent in terms of  
18 running a long meeting and making things happen, but we  
19 have a timeline that is short. I concur with your lawyer,  
20 your counsel, that says, These problems are going to  
21 continue with our voters until this is changed.

22 So please -- I must say consider the timelines of what  
23 has to be done and expedite this so we can take this burden  
24 off the voters of Georgia and put in really effective and  
25 supportable ways for people to be good citizens and to have

1 a good democracy represented in our state.

2 In closing, I would like to make a couple of things --  
3 statements. I -- I believe that we need handmade -- or  
4 hand-marked ballots. It's the only verifiable -- and if  
5 people are saying, Well, we're going back and we're  
6 going... but, right now, we're in the era of some very  
7 serious problems with hacking, and they're not going away  
8 and they get better every day.

9 So the easier it is for a voter to come in, as  
10 Kathy Cox shared with us, to take a piece of paper, hand-  
11 mark it, see what they did, run it through a scanner -- the  
12 scanner can tell them if there's something they can't read  
13 and then let it be corrected. We're going to regain trust.

14 So I really implore you to look at that hand-mark  
15 system. I think we need to mandate manual risk-limiting  
16 audits after every election -- all elections -- because we  
17 know elections make big decisions for our counties and our  
18 communities and for the entire state.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vicki. We  
20 appreciate you being with us today.

21 MS. KRUGMAN: Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much. Okay.  
23 Robert Covi? Robert, did I pronounce your last name right?

24 MR. COVI: Correct.

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Robert, thanks for

1 coming today, love to hear from you. Please tell us where  
2 you're from.

3 MR. COVI: I'm from the metropolis of Bogart, Georgia,  
4 and I came here because I was concerned about this  
5 important decision that you have to make.

6 First of all, I've been on enough committees to know  
7 that it's a lot more work than people think it is. And so,  
8 I -- I appreciate the efforts that you've put in and I know  
9 that all of you think it's important as well as people out  
10 here.

11 I was going to actually ask a different question,  
12 but it turned to me after Dean Cox was talking that there  
13 were a lot of problems that have to be dealt with more so  
14 than I even imagined, and I thought, I hope you really  
15 consider the use of mail-in ballots because I think it does  
16 solve a number of problems that otherwise would have  
17 difficulty getting fixed [sic].

18 But several states, as you know -- Oregon is one which  
19 I have looked at very carefully, seems to have done a  
20 really good job of fixing their problems, and they've been  
21 doing this actually since 1982. Can I ask a question?

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Nonverbal response.)

23 MR. COVI: The question is: Are you seriously  
24 considering the use of mail-in ballots or is that -- is  
25 that on the table?

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We'll -- we'll have a  
2 discussion period later and -- and the members can bring  
3 that up if they'd like at that time.

4 MR. COVI: All right. Well, that's all I needed to  
5 say. Thank you very much.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank -- thank you, Robert.  
7 We appreciate you coming today. Cameron Pennybacker?  
8 Cameron? Cameron, good to have you today. Did I pronounce  
9 your last name right?

10 MR. PENNYBACKER: Yes, sir.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. Well, tell us where  
12 you're from. Good to have you.

13 MR. PENNYBACKER: Thank you. I'm a Macon-Bibb  
14 resident, a Georgia citizen, and a voter since 1998. Thank  
15 you for taking public comment seriously as a factor in your  
16 decision making in this detail-rich electoral process, a  
17 lot is riding on your conclusions. Setting the broadest  
18 electoral goal, our primary civic purpose, with clarity and  
19 conviction is essential.

20 It is my understanding that security -- voting  
21 security is a minimal standard to be achieved, a critical  
22 feature of any worthy system we adopt. The central  
23 hallmark of our voting system is broadening citizen  
24 participation. Boldly stated, moving toward a more  
25 perfect union is predicated upon improved inclusion.

1 Inclusion is a constitutionally-supported American  
2 democratic core value, one of-age citizen, one vote. What  
3 voting system meets this first mark? Attaining lesser  
4 goals will not be an adequate substitute for the primacy of  
5 inclusion. Obtaining a misplaced primary goal will not  
6 advance our standard of fair representation.

7 My fear, Mr. Chairman, is that we are tempted -- and  
8 co-chair -- is that we are tempted to center our needed  
9 electoral-reform focus tangentially based upon slim  
10 anecdotes that miss the mark of greater citizen inclusion.

11 The security of our voting system is, indeed,  
12 essential. Security, however, is not antithetical to the  
13 larger goal of greater inclusion. It seems to me security  
14 is a means to fairness, not an end unto itself. Security  
15 and inclusion are not opposing forces as we seek a system  
16 that pursues the full participation of all Georgia  
17 citizens.

18 Here before us is an opportunity for nonpartisanship,  
19 across-the-aisle work that moves from -- moves Georgia from  
20 a lagging to a leading state. Let us take the time and due  
21 diligence to get it right, to lower barriers while  
22 insisting on security and inclusion.

23 In conclusion, the task of fuller citizen  
24 participation is the primary -- is primarily a political  
25 act of courage, not a technical-capacity question. In

1 this way, I respectfully urge the commission to prioritize  
2 citizen/voter inclusion as our state's hallmark. We can do  
3 better by one another.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cameron, thank you for coming  
5 today, and we appreciate you being here. Joseph Kirk?  
6 Joseph Kirk? Joseph, welcome. Thanks for coming today.  
7 Please tell us where you're from.

8 MR. KIRK: Hello. My name is Joseph Kirk. I'm the  
9 elections supervisor in Bartow County, Georgia. I hold a  
10 degree -- a degree in computer science from the University  
11 of Georgia; I've been involved in elections since 2002,  
12 including voting technology in two different states. I've  
13 held my current position since 2007.

14 I am an advocate for ballot-marking devices for all  
15 voters, increased uniform-voting experience, guides voters  
16 through the process and keeps the ongoing costs lower on  
17 local jurisdictions.

18 We need to have meaningful audits before  
19 certification. We -- if -- I never want to tell someone,  
20 I'm sorry, I -- I've audited it and I can see that you  
21 lost, but you're out of luck. So we need it before  
22 certification and I'm completely okay with the use of  
23 barcodes as the primary method of tabulation because, if  
24 we're doing a meaningful audit, we're going to test  
25 whatever the form of tabulation is and make sure that it

1 voter input and ballot production.

2 I want to go ahead and put on record that I graduated  
3 last night from KSU from their IT program. I've been a  
4 cyber-security risk manager for years. I would like to ask  
5 all of you to put your hats -- your project-manager hats on  
6 for just a second.

7 One of the reasons that we've had so many problems is  
8 that we introduced, in 2002, technology to counties which  
9 they fundamentally did not understand and it created a  
10 dysfunctional relationship to their vendor.

11 Kathy Cox said it very eloquently: You had to have  
12 a Kennesaw, a state university, you had to have a  
13 intermediary to actually go in and check all of those  
14 inputs. If you guys really want to get an election system  
15 in by 2020, you're going to have to do it in such a way  
16 that you match the skills that you have out in your  
17 counties and, if you do it with paper, the then computer  
18 system starts at the optical scanner.

19 Not only that, your costs are going to come way down  
20 because you don't have to have all of that skill on the  
21 front end of collecting the input. Your costs are going to  
22 become -- extraordinarily come down and you're going to  
23 have a whole lot more in terms of a functional relationship  
24 to your vendor.

25 Because, right now, the only way that you're going to

1 was accurate.

2 So whatever the form is, whether it's hand-marked  
3 paper ballots or a thing that was printed off of a ballot-  
4 marking device with a barcode on it, we're going to verify  
5 it. We do this every day at the stores as we shop. We see  
6 what the price is, scans the barcode [sic] -- that barcode  
7 is not associated with the price, it's associated with  
8 evidence (ph), and then it comes back and, when we get our  
9 receipt, we audit that. So I don't see why this should be  
10 any different. Thank you very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you, Joseph. We  
12 appreciate you coming. Smythe DuVal? Mr. DuVal? Thanks  
13 for coming today. Good to have you again.

14 MR. DUVAL: Hi, thank you.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're  
16 from.

17 MR. DUVAL: All right. Smythe DuVal. I'm from Cobb  
18 County and I was a former libertarian candidate for the  
19 Georgia Secretary of State, and it looks like I'm also  
20 representing the libertarian party today. They did ask me  
21 to address you guys.

22 The libertarian party has passed a resolution on --  
23 that we only support a voting system that is designed  
24 and guaranteed to be safe and secure from hacking and  
25 alterations and does not use any computer interface between

1 be able to run an election in 2020 is to be extremely  
2 dependent on your vendor. Notice how dependent you guys  
3 are on your vendor now to tell you what's actually going  
4 on.

5 So with the closing remarks: The Libertarian Party  
6 of Georgia, we want hand-marked paper ballots, postelection  
7 audits -- and we are doing this not only because of  
8 integrity of the election but because it is the best value,  
9 the best security, for the state of Georgia. Thank you  
10 very much.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you for being here  
12 today. We appreciate you being here. Sara Henderson?  
13 Sara? Sara, welcome. Good to have you today. Please tell  
14 us where you're from.

15 MS. HENDERSON: Thank you. I'm Sara Henderson. I am  
16 executive director of Common Cause Georgia. I am here  
17 today to talk to you --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And where do you live, Sara?

19 MS. HENDERSON: I'm sorry.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What county are you from?

21 MS. HENDERSON: Oh, I live in Fayette County.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fayette County.

23 MS. HENDERSON: Yes.

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Go ahead.

25 MS. HENDERSON: You're very welcome. I'm here today



1 to -- to remind you-all of the -- if you don't already  
2 know, about the federal lawsuit that we filed on November  
3 6th of this year, and we filed that lawsuit around our  
4 voter databases.

5 We basically said that you have to count provisional  
6 ballots if they're related to voter-registration issues.  
7 Now, why -- we -- the federal court sided with us and said  
8 there are serious security issues here. Mind you, this is  
9 the same court that, a month prior, had sided with the  
10 state.

11 There are serious issues with our machinery. There  
12 are serious issues with our voter-registration databases.  
13 We have got to address these problems. And why do groups  
14 like mine have to sue to get these problems addressed? Why  
15 do we have to spend taxpayer money and our own resources to  
16 do that? Not to mention the fact that we have to use our  
17 resources in order to educate the public because that's  
18 something that the Secretary of State's office has not done  
19 in several years.

20 So we come to ask you: Paper ballots, hand-marked  
21 paper ballots. That's what we need to have in the state of  
22 Georgia, and it's so, so, so important to listen to the  
23 election-integrity activists, to Garland Favorito that's  
24 sitting behind me, and understand that we have worked on  
25 this for decades. We know what we're talking about; we

1 than you've had the time to go through yet.

2 What we need to know from -- from this commission  
3 is the types of policies and the verifiability of the  
4 elections that the voters need. The only way that we are  
5 going to get verifiable elections, auditable elections in  
6 Georgia, is with hand-marked paper ballots. It is the only  
7 verifiable system.

8 The types of ballot-marking device systems that you-  
9 all have been looking at have proven to be not auditable,  
10 not verifiable, and it's time to quit calling them  
11 verifiable. And it's going to take this commission a while  
12 to come back to the basic principles and I urge you to do  
13 that. To make another mistake by buying electronic voting  
14 systems will be a huge mistake for Georgia, an expensive  
15 one both financially and in terms of the integrity of the  
16 elections.

17 I heard, earlier today, that there's some thought of  
18 you'll determine what the audit requirements will be after  
19 you determine what kind of equipment you bought. I almost  
20 set my hair on fire. No. We have to figure out how  
21 Georgia's elections can be audited, to what level they  
22 need to be audited, what the people are looking for in  
23 terms of total verifiability and then work backwards to  
24 what kind of equipment is needed. It's obvious what kind  
25 of equipment is needed: hand-marked paper ballots, the only

1 want to be an ally to the Secretary of State's office and  
2 to this commission and we call upon you-all to make the  
3 right decision and use paper, don't saddle the taxpayers  
4 with 400 million dollars in debt.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Marilyn Marks? Marilyn.  
7 Marilyn, good to have you today.

8 (Alarm chiming.)

9 MS. MARKS: Already?

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You're done. Bye-bye.

11 MS. MARKS: It was quieter than I thought it would be.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

13 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you. Please  
15 tell us where you live.

16 MS. MARKS: Thank you. I'm Marilyn Marks. I'm with  
17 -- the executive director of Coalition for Good Governance.  
18 I'm here today representing our Georgia-based members.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you live --  
20 which county you live in.

21 MS. MARKS: I -- I live in Charlotte, North Carolina.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: North Carolina. Thank you.

23 MS. MARKS: Yes. And I'm here to urge you to take the  
24 time to study the real issues here and what the state's  
25 voters need from you, and it's a more thoughtful process

1 type of system that's -- that is auditable.

2 I hear the second bell, and I'll just end by saying  
3 that the types of electronic voting problems you heard Sara  
4 Ghazal talk about and including the 100,000 missing votes  
5 from the lieutenant governor's race, same types of problems  
6 will happen with electronic ballot-marking devices. Only  
7 hand-marked paper ballots will solve that problem.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank --

9 MS. MARKS: Thank you.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn. We  
11 appreciate you coming today. Chris Chan. Chris? Welcome,  
12 Chris. Good to see you.

13 MR. CHAN: Thank you.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Love to hear from you. Tell  
15 us where you're from.

16 MR. CHAN: Yep. My name is Chris Chan. I'm a  
17 registered voter in Fulton County. I want to thank the  
18 commission for their time serving our great state and  
19 hearing the citizens' views on this important issue. I'm  
20 here to speak on my personal capacity and my views are my  
21 own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my law firm  
22 or any organization I am affiliated with.

23 I am a past president and current board member of  
24 GAPABA, the Georgia Asian-Pacific American Bar Association,  
25 which represent the interests of over 500 Asian-American

1 lawyers and law students here in Georgia. I'm a third-  
2 generation born Chinese-American and have lived in Georgia  
3 for 34 years. I voted for almost 30 years. I'm a lawyer,  
4 a Georgia Tech grad engineer and I now practice patent law  
5 in my hometown of Atlanta.

6 The issues before this commission are a matter of  
7 dollars and sense, common sense. Even though we rely on  
8 technology for many conveniences in life, I am smart enough  
9 to know and you should be smart enough to know that we  
10 should not rely solely on technology and machines. To do  
11 so is to introduce the risk of computer and software error  
12 and, in some instances, a risk of hacking into the system.

13 A more common sense solution is to rely on the  
14 combination of computer technology and humans to create an  
15 auditable verifiable paper trail of the electorates votes  
16 and to preserve a paper record of their votes.

17 This issue is vitally important to -- to the citizens  
18 of Georgia because of the nationwide attention paid to  
19 Georgia's voting process in the past election cycle, and  
20 given the small window of time with the relatively short  
21 legislative session and the upcoming 2020 presidential,  
22 federal and state elections.

23 Corporations, which are seeking to move their  
24 headquarters here to Georgia and bring jobs to Georgia are  
25 also watching us. They want to know that our state's

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're  
2 from.

3 MS. ASHLING: My name is Cam Ashling. I'm from Fulton  
4 County. I'm like a 1988 refugee from the post-Vietnam War.

5 I am now the founder and president of the Georgia  
6 Advancing Progress PAC who mostly work in the Asian-  
7 American community in Gwinnett County.

8 You know, the right to vote is so important in our  
9 democracy, and I -- you saw that with Vietnam and other  
10 countries. If we don't protect it, it will, you know, go  
11 to the wayside and God knows what kind of leadership we  
12 would have.

13 And, you know, as a PAC, we work very hard to get all  
14 Americans to vote, new Americans -- you know, newly-  
15 naturalized Americans to vote, younger Americans to vote,  
16 elderly Americans to vote, Americans with limited English  
17 to vote, and it's a huge problem for us to get voter  
18 turnout if we can't convincingly tell people that your vote  
19 will get counted.

20 So, you know, as a investment professional, as a CFP,  
21 we usually make these tough decisions based on a risk-and-  
22 reward method; right? So if we look at this choice and --  
23 and think of what's the greatest risk per unit -- what's  
24 the greatest reward per unit of risk, and we say that cost  
25 and error is our measure of risk and accuracy, voter

1 infrastructure is state of the art in the treatment of its  
2 citizenry is fair and just.

3 Our state is way behind the curve on the state-of-the-  
4 art voting technology and election procedures. Let's not  
5 continue to be the laughingstock of other states due to our  
6 voting equipment and procedures. I, again, emphasize the  
7 importance of the task ahead of you.

8 Like never before, our democracy is under attack by  
9 foreign powers who may not support our nation's values and  
10 would like to do nothing more than to sow discord and  
11 confusion and topple one of the pillars of our democratic  
12 values, the ability to cast a ballot, verifiable vote, to  
13 elect our own leaders.

14 And I'll finish up. Do not kick the can down the  
15 road. Please make a common sense recommendation benefiting  
16 all citizens of Georgia, to instruct the legislature to  
17 spend the money necessary to update Georgia's voting  
18 equipment and to implement an auditable, verifiable paper  
19 trail of the electorates' votes and preserve a paper record  
20 of their votes. Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Chris. We  
22 appreciate you coming today. Cam Ashling? Cam? Welcome,  
23 Cam. Good to see you. Did I pronounce that right, by the  
24 way?

25 MS. ASHLING: Yes, yes.

1 confidence, auditable transparency is our measure of  
2 reward, how do we come to the most logical conclusion free  
3 of bias and be bipartisan?

4 So far, it seems to me that, you know, paper ballot --  
5 the optical scanners, would be like the lowest risk in --  
6 in cost. If it's 50 million up to 150 million, that's like  
7 huge. You know, and it's more free of computer errors than  
8 -- that can impact hundreds of votes instantly without  
9 detection versus human errors. That's a isolated -- and,  
10 with more voter education, we can turn that around, so why  
11 don't we do that and fix it?

12 Paper ballots seem to be the most -- the gold standard  
13 for voting integrity. Most states use them, why is Georgia  
14 so behind? And, you know, with us trying to engage more  
15 younger voters, they're going to be very turned off by  
16 unauditale (ph), nontransparent voting system.

17 So how do we get the voter engaged? If we can tell  
18 them that it's safe and secure and your vote will count,  
19 they'll come out but, if people don't trust the system,  
20 they just won't.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cam, I'm going to allow you  
22 to wrap up.

23 MS. ASHLING: Okay, sir. Sorry. Thanks. And I also  
24 would like the board to consider the cost of future  
25 litigation as a cost to taxpayers.

Two points from, you know, Voter GA, the question you had regarding the fractional votes: It's like half a vote.

So when we vote, it's one; right? But the computer is showing half, like .5 of a vote. That doesn't happen. So that's a computer error we can fix with paper ballots.

And then your other question, Ms. Nancy, regarding the negative vote. So -- so a negative vote would take away somebody else's vote. So, instead of me being plus one, I'm going to take your vote out and I'm going to be negative one and subtract from your total.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Cam.

MS. ASHLING: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today. Thank you very much. Ann Nettles? Ann? Ann, thank you for coming today.

MS. NETTLES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. NETTLES: I am from Macon.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You came a long way.

MS. NETTLES: I know, a short commute. I am just here representing myself. I've been a voter since 1972 and, first off, I am very concerned about the cyber security, not only Kennesaw State but also Secretary of State's office. We've had intrusions and I feel like the

hear from you.

MS. MARTIN: Okay. My name is Rhonda Martin. I'm a Georgia voter and a resident of Fulton County. The foundation of our democracy is the right of the people to vote, to have their votes counted and, when counted, to have their votes represent their intentions.

It is imperative that the new voting system that you recommend provide voters with reliable means to make their voices heard on election day. In our recent election, there were reports of problems with the DREs showing erroneous ballots and flipping votes.

I am concerned that any continued use of touchscreen technology, that with any continued use of touchscreen technology these problems will persist. They can be avoided entirely, however, by providing voters with paper ballots where they hand mark their selections. Surprise; right? With the DREs with no paper trail, there was no way to really know if the recorded votes accurately represented the rule of the voter.

I understand that the ballot marketing -- marking -- marking devices that you are considering will produce a paper-ballot summary. Unfortunately, if the ballot summary includes a barcode, we remain in a situation of not knowing if the voters' intentions are being accurately captured and recorded.

-- we've -- that really needs to be strengthened.

And the other issue is, is that I'm totally opposed to any type of voting equipment that manufacturers a barcode that's not readable. I don't know about you. I look at a barcode and it's just a bunch of lines. And so, I am in favor of hand-marked paper ballots and, you know, upgraded scanners that can handle the humidity.

And perhaps we do need to consider mail-in paper ballots. I lived in Colorado for 10 years and that was never a problem. Also, there is no humidity there. Without it, you know, that's a plus out there.

But -- and one other thing that I don't think anybody's touched on is I -- I'm -- as a citizen, I feel like the Secretary of State's office should be the guiding office to encourage all citizens to register to vote, and how to vote, and -- and I really think that that's -- if it's not in your job description, I think it should be.

And that's -- that's about all I've got to say. But I think the lowest-tech type of voting system is by far the most reliable and the last thing we need to do is cast any doubt for anyone, for any reason, that their vote was not taken in and recorded as they desired. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ann. Rhonda Martin? Rhonda? Rhonda, thanks for joining us today, and please tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to

Let me be clear: Ballot-marking devices are not the answer. The paper trail that electronic ballot-marking devices offer is not a paper trail that can be audited. I cannot verify barcodes. Can you? Nor could I memorize the touchscreen ballot content at the level needed to verify a ballot card for accuracy and completeness.

In fact, limitations of human short-term memory make it impossible for voters to recognize errors and omissions when they have been introduced to their ballots prior to the verification steps. If votes are cast on paper ballots marked by the voters themselves, there is no need for the separate verification step and issues of human limitations become moot.

Computer scientists and cyber-security experts agree that, today, the use of hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners and audited in a statistically-valid audit is the best available method for conducting elections. I implore you to carefully consider and take to heart the recommendations of the experts.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Rhonda, we --

MS. MARTIN: Thank you for your time, consideration and service to the voters of Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Rhonda. We appreciate you coming today. John Fortuin? John? John, good to -- good to have you today, and please tell us where

1 you're from and we'll be happy to hear from you.

2 MR. FORTUIN: Hi, my name is John Fortuin. I'm from  
3 Athens, Georgia. I've been a nonpartisan advocate for  
4 restoring integrity to Georgia's voting system since 2004  
5 and have been trying to debunk misinformation provided by  
6 the vendor of our current system and parroted by election  
7 officials since that time despite that information being  
8 thoroughly debunked by scientists.

9 The vast majority of computer-programming analysts  
10 and security professionals want to minimize the amount  
11 of computer technology involved in our election process.  
12 They know that if they have access to the system at any  
13 point, especially at the level of the Kennesaw State  
14 University database or the -- and now the Secretary of  
15 State's database, that they can manipulate our election  
16 statewide.

17 So science -- scientists, scientific organizations,  
18 professional organizations, have written a slew of papers  
19 supporting hand-marked paper ballots. For instance, the  
20 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine  
21 this August released a paper titled, Securing the Vote:  
22 Protecting American Democracy, that's called for minimizing  
23 the technology involved in our election system.

24 And I -- I will actually -- I do want to credit the  
25 Secretary of State's office for, in their electronic

1 Forsyth County. I ran for office this year, so I had a  
2 heightened sense of need for every single vote to count,  
3 and I knocked on a lot of doors and --

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us --

5 MS. TUCKER: -- I talked to a lot of people.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us what office you ran  
7 for.

8 MS. TUCKER: I ran for House -- House of  
9 Representatives, District 25.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

11 MS. TUCKER: Do you want to know how I did?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Only if you want to tell us.

13 MS. TUCKER: Well, I'm actually -- I didn't win, but I  
14 am very proud to say that, in Forsyth County, I got 36  
15 percent of the vote, which is pretty good for Forsyth  
16 County. Yeah, I ran as a democrat.

17 But my point is that of all of the people I talked to  
18 -- and I knocked on a lot of doors -- everybody's concern  
19 -- they -- My vote's not really going to count, and I can  
20 tell you the experience -- I personally do an absentee  
21 ballot because I did not trust our voting system and I felt  
22 like my vote probably counted because I did that.

23 But I think that the experience of being able to see  
24 that your vote really did go the way you wanted it to vote  
25 and that it really did count will increase voter

1 request for information, the -- under Section 3(4) Method  
2 1, that they are requesting for proposals for hand-marked  
3 paper ballots that are optically scanned in the precinct.  
4 I strongly suggest, for the security of our election  
5 system, that you review only these methods and relegate the  
6 ballot-marking devices only to for folks with disabilities.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, I'm going to allow you  
8 to wrap up.

9 MR. FORTUIN: All right. So, also, the ballot-marking  
10 devices are in violation of the KISS principle. They can  
11 be replaced by pens and pencils for the average voter at a  
12 mere fraction of the cost, and every piece of technology  
13 that's in our voting system is a potential bottleneck if  
14 there is any sort of power failure or -- and -- and so,  
15 hand-marking paper ballots will minimize wait times at  
16 precincts here as it has done in many other states that  
17 have gone to this system.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John, thank you for coming  
19 today.

20 MR. FORTUIN: Thank you.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate having you.  
22 Anita Tucker? Anita? Good afternoon, Anita. Good to have  
23 you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MS. TUCKER: Hi. I'm Anita Tucker and I am from

1 participation and excitement. I think it is something that  
2 we desperately need, is to be able for voters to walk away  
3 from the voting booth and go, Yeah, I did vote and it did  
4 count. Thank you.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Anita. We  
6 appreciate you coming today. Susan Gambell (ph) --  
7 Gambell. Did I pronounce that right, Susan?

8 MS. GAMBLE: Las Vegas.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Gamble.

10 MS. GAMBLE: Thank you.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan Gamble. Susan, good to  
12 have you. Please tell us where you're from. We'd be happy  
13 to hear from you.

14 MS. GAMBLE: I'm from Gwinnett County, and I'm here  
15 just as a citizen. I personally also would like hand-  
16 marked paper ballots to have a hard copy representing my  
17 voter intent that is auditable. And somebody else can have  
18 my time. I've saved my time.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I like you. John  
20 Askins? John Askins?

21 MR. ASKINS: Right here.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. John, good to have you  
23 with us. Tell us where you're from and we'd be happy to  
24 hear from you.

25 MR. ASKINS: My name is John Askins. I'm from DeKalb

County. I want to -- could I -- could I have Susan's time since she offered?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: No.

MR. ASKINS: Had to ask. I got to retire from the news business a few years back after a long career both in national news and state-local news in another part of the country. I've also grew up in politics. My father was an elected official. I've seen and covered dozens of elections, both good and some -- with those missing ballot boxes we were talking about.

So I understand that any system can be hacked, any system is fallible; shenanigans are always possible -- not that that's ever happened to any of the elected officials here, but you've all heard about it.

And that's why I think we need -- the KISS principle, suggesting the KISS principle I think puts it perfectly. We need to keep it as simple as possible for us, for the voters -- for everybody, and that's -- that's paper ballots. That's hand-marked paper ballots.

I love the idea that we can print them on demand. That's -- that's a huge cost factor. I realize there's a lot of -- this is kind of labor intensive. I had the honor of being an observer at DeKalb County for the absentee ballots -- for the absentee-ballot count and saw the herculean effort that went into doing that. But, my

-- I am retired from the healthcare industry and -- and, having taken care of sick folk for 45 years, I -- I have a pension for accurate, reliable data.

And I'm no expert in politics or on voting, but I will tell you that my experience since we have had electronic voting here in Georgia has been whenever I hand that little yellow card to the poll worker, I find myself offering a little prayer that what is -- what I -- what I think I put on there is actually what's going to get counted. I've never quite trusted it.

We've been using that system for years and years and lots of people, as you've heard, don't trust it. And we kind of were a -- a little bit of a laughingstock in the USA during this last election because of the -- the lack of trust.

Today, I heard about fractional ballots so I'm wondering, Okay, did my vote count for 1 or .7 or .3 or a negative ballot, maybe negative 1. So I -- you know, that's kind of -- that kind of takes my breath away.

I think what I want to see is that everyone gets -- everyone who is a qualified voter gets a vote of one accurately counted for whomever they voted for or whatever they voted for, that they can have documentation that their vote went through as they intended and that those votes can be audited.

goodness, it's worth it because this is our democracy that's at stake.

As been said many times today -- and I've heard over and over since I got involved with this issue, which I didn't really plan on until the 2016 election, of getting involved in this stuff, is people are afraid their vote will not count. Think about that. American citizens are afraid their vote will not count.

If you're afraid your vote's not going to count, you're going to stop voting; you stop voting, democracy goes away. Is that what we want? I don't. I don't think anyone here does, and I think we need to get this -- get a handle on this, and I think the paper ballot is the way to go. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, John. Marjory Timmer? Marjory? Marjory, good to have you today.

MS. TIMMER: Why, thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thanks for coming.

MS. TIMMER: I'm from DeKalb County, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity to speak and thank you for the work you're doing on this committee on behalf of the people of Georgia.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Closer to the mic, please.

MS. TIMMER: Oh, yes. I usually have a really big voice, so I don't even think about a microphone. So I had

And I think the optical-mark recognition system, the paper ballots, is the only way to accomplish that. As you're -- just one last thing. As you're making your decision, if you find yourself leaning toward this electronic system that we have, remember the definition of insanity: It is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marjory.

MS. TIMMER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. So down to the top 5 now. Susan McWealthy? (ph)

MS. MCWETHY: McWethy.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: McWethy.

MS. MCWETHY: Susan McWethy, yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's a hard one, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Well, you've said it correctly in the past.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Well, I'm just not as good as I used to be.

MS. MCWETHY: Anyway, thank you to the SAFE Commission for allowing us to speak here.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us, once again, where you're from, Susan.

MS. MCWETHY: Oh, I'm from Decatur --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. MCWETHY: And I'm -- I've been an activist for years about voting; I'm a poll worker, so... But my question is -- it's kind of a repeat of what's been stated here already. It's a rhetorical question, but why don't we just listen to the IT experts?

And Georgia is blessed with some really smart people here. This morning we heard from Mr. Favorito. He had really -- a really informative summary of the IT concerns; we have Mr. Lee on the commission here, and I'd like to quote you, if I may. In October 8th, a paper entitled, Basic Security Requirements for Voting Systems, quote: The best approach is to require the voters to hand-mark paper ballots that are then scanned and tallied by cyber system, but also dropped into a safe box.

And not much has been said about what happens to these paper ballots, but we've heard about losing ballots and we've heard about -- we -- we have heard, over the years, about stuffing ballot boxes. I think this would eliminate that problem. These would be attached to the optical scanners in some of the models that I have seen and the voter introduces it and it just drops down into a secure place. So I think that solves that one problem.

We also have -- he's still here. Mr. DeMillo back there. He's a distinguished professor of computing at Georgia Tech and his -- he recently did some research with

a team about voter behavior -- use in verifying -- verifying vote behavior. Half of the voters didn't inspect their ballot cards; the other half inspected them for an average of 3.9 seconds.

When you're given a summary that you have to check, human beings just don't do a good job at that. So please listen to the IT experts. I think they have the best advice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Susan.  
Liz Throp (ph)? Liz?

MS. THROOP: Hi, it's Throop, Liz Throop.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Throop, T --

MS. THROOP: Hi. I live in DeKalb County --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Hold -- hold -- hold on a second now. T-H-R --

MS. THROOP: Yeah.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- 0-0-P.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. The H is silent.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, okay. There we go. Throop. All right.

MS. THROOP: Good.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Like Troop County.

MS. THROOP: It's pronounced the same.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There we go. Thank you, Liz.

MS. THROOP: Yeah. So I -- we heard a lot of good presentations this morning and have had a lot of good discussions. Obviously, hand-marked paper ballots are a very popular choice among public commenters, but I think it's important to be very specific with these things.

So hand-marked paper ballots could conceivably still involve barcodes or QR codes. One of the more important things I've heard this morning from Garland Favorito was that the barcodes -- that even -- are supposed to be signifying something as simple as the precinct number could introduce malware into a digital system. And -- and, for that reason, I think it's very important that we get proposals from vendors where it's unambiguous that there are no barcodes on the ballots.

It's been a little while since I've looked at those proposals, but it was very hard for me to discern exactly what some of those ballots were going to look like. And it -- and it brings me back to the idea that this excellent set of presentations we heard today should have happened at the first meeting. I -- I would be very sorry if anyone were to vote today on a proposal where they don't know what those ballots are going to look like.

And I know that it's -- everyone's tired of the DREs, they're very old; we -- we want to move ahead but it's important to get this stuff right, especially now that we

are the focus of national press attention as one of the worst states for voting integrity.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to go ahead and allow you to wrap up, Liz.

MS. THROOP: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Liz. Okay. Kathy Lynne Sanderson? Kathy Lynne? Welcome. Good to have you.

MS. SANDERSON: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please tell us where you're from.

MS. SANDERSON: I'm Kathy Lynne Sanderson from Athens-Clarke County, and I just want to talk about one thing really quickly.

The goal here is for the voters to have confidence in the -- the voting system and we can't have confidence unless there's an auditing system that's mandated that they have confidence in also. And I feel very strongly that, at the same time the voting system is voted on by the legislature -- at that same time, they have to decide on the auditing system. They can't push it off until the next session or something because you know how hard that is, that things don't get done that way.

And as one speaker said: You don't have to deal -- detail the exact system; you -- you detail the standards,

1 that this is what we want the auditing system to  
2 accomplish, and that should all be done in one package when  
3 the legislature decides on the system.

4 And I also wanted to say, as somebody else did, that  
5 the auditing has to be done precertification, that people  
6 aren't going to have confidence in a system that says, Oh,  
7 guess what? We did an audit and we found out the wrong guy  
8 got elected. That's -- that's not going to build  
9 confidence, so that's all I have to say.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you very much.  
11 George Ballbona (ph)?

12 MR. BALBONA: Close enough.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close enough. All right,  
14 George.

15 MR. BALBONA: Balbona.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Balbona. George, thank you  
17 for being here today.

18 MR. BALBONA: I'm from Georgia, a concerned citizen; I  
19 live in Cobb County.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.

21 MR. BALBONA: Most people think barcodes are just  
22 those lines that tell you what things cost at the store,  
23 but that isn't entirely accurate. Barcodes never tell  
24 anyone what something costs; barcodes tell machines what  
25 something costs.

1 Georgia elections remain unverifiable. Setzler then  
2 stated, The paper is the ballot. Then why the hell do we  
3 need to force an entirely superfluous and ridiculously  
4 expensive step upon Georgians with these barcode voting  
5 machines?

6 Senator Bruce Thompson's main comment was, quote,  
7 Don't let the pursuit of greatness -- and this -- be  
8 derailed for the demand for perfect, unquote. There is no  
9 chance of this occurring since the only greatness achieved  
10 by this system is its level of unverifiability (ph) and the  
11 amount it sucks. As for perfect, this is a perfect scam  
12 against the citizens of Georgia.

13 Lastly, why would other elected officials -- machines  
14 -- want the voting machines that cannot be verifiable  
15 [sic]? Two words: job security. And, lastly, you have the  
16 brazen hypocrisy to name this commission SAFE, but I'd like  
17 to know safe for whom? Because it sure isn't Georgia  
18 voters.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, George.  
20 Jacqueline Elsnor? Jacqueline? Jacqueline, thanks for  
21 coming today.

22 MS. ELSNER: Thank you.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good -- good to have you.

24 MS. ELSNER: I'm from Clarke County, and -- and I want  
25 to be civil, but make it cheap, make it paper. It's --

1 No person can read a barcode. That is an empirical  
2 fact and the reason why these machines are not verifiable.  
3 Anything else you hear is barcode snake oil, and the cost  
4 of those proposed voting machines are not merely 100 or 150  
5 million dollars, they will cost us our democracy itself.

6 This is not a partisan issue. The most important  
7 issue here is the sanctity of our votes. And if these  
8 politicians don't believe in getting the votes we cast  
9 accurately, transparently and verifiably, then, quite  
10 simply, these politicians should not be our political  
11 representatives anymore.

12 A barcode also tells a machine what an item is. If  
13 you didn't know whether you put -- in your coffee this  
14 morning was sugar or rat poison, you wouldn't drink it  
15 [sic], and with the barcode voting system, that is exactly  
16 the situation it will give us.

17 Ed Setzler, Chairman of the House of Science and  
18 Technology Committee, an architect, assured the government  
19 affairs committee -- Barry, you were there -- quote, If  
20 there's a discrepancy between the electronic information  
21 and a ballot, the manual tally ballot would be the  
22 preeminent expression of voter intention for official  
23 elections in this state, unquote.

24 However, how would we ever know that a discrepancy  
25 exists? This is more political maneuvering to ensure that

1 it's the least expensive option. And everybody's saying --  
2 Hello, Mr. Lee. You're the dude who says it's  
3 scientifically and computerized, the safest thing.

4 Georgia doesn't have the money to throw a whole -- you  
5 know, an extra 100 million dollars into some machines that  
6 y'all are sitting here listening that aren't really going  
7 to do the job. And you already know that your county  
8 boards of elections, they don't have the money to roll out  
9 all kinds of extra training and -- and somehow upgrade  
10 things and, all of a sudden, three -- four years from now,  
11 it needs upgrading.

12 But Georgia simply doesn't have that kind of money.  
13 They don't do that. They say, You are now mandated to  
14 update your thing and it is now your financial  
15 responsibility to do it, and this is what happens.

16 So I'm just saying I've listened to all of this. I  
17 came in thinking, Okay, the paper ballot. It -- that's the  
18 way it needs to go. You can afford that. You could even  
19 tell the legislature, We selected the most economical,  
20 trustworthy thing we could present to you. By jingo. We  
21 saved you 100 million dollars right now. Thank you.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you. Commission  
23 members, we are going to take a 5-minute break and, at  
24 about 2:30, I'm going to ask you to return promptly and  
25 we'll begin the discussion portion of our meeting and the

1 final portion. Okay? We'll stand in recess for 5 minutes.  
2 Thank you.

3 (A recess is taken from 2:25 p.m. to 2:35 p.m.)

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. As our commission  
5 members come back to the -- to the front, we will begin the  
6 final segment of our discussion today as -- as a panel.  
7 I certainly do appreciate all of you coming today,  
8 and showing your interest here and -- and we had a very  
9 good public-input section of our meeting.

10 I would ask you, as you have done at every meeting and  
11 -- and have done today, I would appreciate your respecting  
12 the conversations here now as we have them at this table.  
13 I do want you to be able to hear and I do want everybody  
14 here at the table to be able to hear each other. So you  
15 may approve, you may disapprove, you may want to yell, you  
16 may want to clap and jump up and down when somebody makes a  
17 comment, but I'm going to ask you to please refrain from  
18 doing that. But you've done a good job so far, and I want  
19 to thank you for your public participation.

20 Members of the commission, I certainly do intend for  
21 this to be a free-flowing discussion as we move forward.  
22 There is an awful lot of expertise and experience at this  
23 table and we certainly want to tap into that.

24 As I mentioned when we started today, I think a good  
25 goal for us to think about would be the possibility of

1 having one more meeting before the legislature goes into  
2 session. The legislature starts relatively late this year  
3 as far as the scheduling normally goes. We don't start  
4 until mid-January on the 14th. That's the day that we're  
5 all sworn in so we can then be sworn at, and the governor  
6 is inaugurated.

7 And so, we'll have a couple of weeks before that. Not  
8 two full weeks, but I'm thinking probably that first week  
9 in January might be a time that we're looking for a  
10 meeting. Although it has not been set in stone yet, I  
11 would think that that may be in Atlanta at the Capitol.  
12 There are some meeting rooms there that are very available  
13 and can accommodate people this size.

14 Folks will already be coming to Atlanta at that time  
15 period anyway. We will get back to you on that as we have  
16 every time we put one of these meetings together.  
17 Secretary Crittenden and I have had this discussion and  
18 agreed upon some of those general thoughts. We would  
19 certainly welcome your input on that as well.

20 However, what I think I'd like to do is I'd like to  
21 throw out maybe five or six questions and -- and just give  
22 you those all at once and then go back to the start and  
23 move through them so that you'll know what's coming in the  
24 discussion. Once again, not limiting any input that you  
25 would want to give on any of those, and I'm sure that I

1 will have -- we will have missed something. Madam  
2 Secretary and I, like I said, kind of put our heads  
3 together on some of these questions, but you feel free to  
4 jump in as -- as you will.

5 Some of the -- the -- the things though that I would  
6 like for us to cover -- and, of course, the goal being for  
7 us to be able to bring a recommendation back to this table,  
8 have a final discussion on that, whatever input we think we  
9 might need to have and -- and probably, ultimately, have a  
10 vote so that we, as a -- as a commission, could make a  
11 recommendation to the legislature.

12 And, of course, that's all it will be, is a  
13 recommendation. The four of us members of the legislature  
14 that have been here today will be four of 180 on the House  
15 side and 56 on the Senate side and, of course, the governor  
16 gets the final say-so because he has to sign the bill.

17 So all it is is going to be a recommendation, but I  
18 think the kind of input and discussion -- I know it's been  
19 valuable to me to be able to go back to my colleagues, when  
20 we debate this and discuss this, as to how would be the  
21 best way to move forward.

22 Those questions that I've mentioned to throw out to  
23 you, to think about: Should Georgia put in place a new  
24 voting system? We -- we've taken for granted that, but I  
25 -- but I think we should at least pass through that

1 thought. Should the new system provide a paper-vote record  
2 when -- and when should we seek to have it in place?

3 Should Georgia remain a uniform state? And, of  
4 course, that term -- we've almost glossed over that because  
5 you've heard Secretary -- former Secretary of State earlier  
6 this morning, Kathy Cox, tell us that we were not at one  
7 time.

8 Whatever system we recommend, should the state include  
9 funding through a comprehensive education for voters, and  
10 county election officials and poll workers? I think that's  
11 an assumption that we make, but it would be good to hear  
12 from our election officials on how important that could be.

13 Should we be looking for a fully-integrated system?  
14 In other words, should we be looking to update electronic  
15 poll books, scanners, in addition to vote-casting devices  
16 if that's the kind of system that we were to choose. In  
17 other words, top-to-bottom replacement of the whole system.

18 Of course, one of the most important questions that we  
19 have asked and has been focused on a lot: What should be  
20 the primary means of vote casting in the new system?  
21 Should it be primarily utilized ballot-marking devices or  
22 should it be hand-marked paper ballots? A lot of  
23 discussion has been here today on that.

24 Should Georgia require postelection audits? And, if  
25 we do that, how are we going to implement that given our



1 traditional timeframes for certifying elections? And when  
2 should that be done? What level should it -- at which  
3 should it be done? State board of elections, legislators  
4 writing it into code or not.

5 And -- and, finally, what other procedures in the  
6 election code and/or state election board rules should  
7 Georgia look at when we update this new system? We are  
8 going to have to open up the code section, as we refer in  
9 the legislature, on this issue.

10 And, while we have it open, what else should we do  
11 there? Have we learned lessons from several years of  
12 elections -- not just this past election -- for potential  
13 changes which we might be able to make? Just -- just some  
14 thoughts on my discussions with the Secretary of State as  
15 to the summary that we need to begin to work toward our  
16 discussions.

17 So, with those things in mind, now what I will do is  
18 I'm going to go back through and repeat those questions and  
19 invite you to begin this discussion, which I said I'm happy  
20 to be free-flowing.

21 The threshold question though that I mentioned  
22 initially: Should Georgia put in place a new voting  
23 system? Should the new voting system provide a paper-vote  
24 record of some sort and when should we seek to have them in  
25 place? Pretty -- pretty easy question; right? Comments?

1 of trust that I've heard today, honestly. I've never  
2 doubted, when I handed my card, my vote was counted. Maybe  
3 it's because it's the only thing I've ever known.

4 But I can't help but obviously note there is a lack of  
5 trust, and I think it's important that we go to a system  
6 that has the ability to be audited. And how that -- what  
7 that looks like, I don't know the answer; what that system  
8 looks like, I don't know the answer.

9 But I think it's important that we start, in my mind,  
10 with the idea of an audit because that helps us to gain  
11 that trust and regain that trust to have a system we all  
12 can believe in.

13 But I hope that -- the thing I've been most proud with  
14 this commission, in the middle of a very contentious  
15 election year, I love that we are a nonpartisan group that  
16 all have the exact same goal in mind, and that's to make  
17 sure that we have a -- a safe, secure and trustworthy  
18 election process where every single person's vote is  
19 counted.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Senator. We  
21 caught the fact that you're bragging that you're young.

22 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Yes, sir.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: He didn't tell us he was  
24 good-looking, but that's coming later I bet. No, we -- we  
25 appreciate your comments. I think they're dead on. Other

1 I'll open it to the floor. Senator?

2 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I -- I think  
3 that we do need a new voting system. I think that a voting  
4 system should be in place by 2020. I think that we should  
5 have some sort of hand-marked paper ballot system but, even  
6 before then, I think we should have a -- a test run or a  
7 trial run in some local-election entity to make sure it  
8 actually works and -- and -- and how it works.

9 I think the test should not just be -- I think the  
10 test should be an actual municipal or local election to  
11 make sure before we implement a statewide system to see how  
12 it works and -- and -- and how it benefits us as a state.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, senator. Senator?

14 SENATOR STRICKLAND: As the other senator here, I  
15 would have to agree with my colleague. We sit on different  
16 sides of the aisle. What I hope is that we have a  
17 consensus with this commission that's -- that's nonpartisan  
18 and then hope, as someone said earlier today, that what the  
19 legislature does is also not partisan because it's  
20 important that we all can trust what we come up with as a  
21 plan together.

22 I'll say this: I don't remember if -- for the first  
23 time I voted, I think it was with these systems. I think  
24 I'd be the only person that may have always voted with this  
25 same system my whole life. And so, I don't share the lack

1 comments from the commission? Lynn?

2 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. Lynn Bailey out  
3 of Richmond County. I agree with what I've heard. I think  
4 Georgia does need a new system. The system that we have  
5 now is -- is -- without a doubt, has a lot of age on it.  
6 As local election officials, we're finding it impossible to  
7 replace them without buying from a secondhand market from  
8 previously-owned units in other states and other  
9 jurisdictions around the country and that's -- you know,  
10 it's worked okay, but it's not something that we can  
11 sustain or continue.

12 Based on what we've heard, I think as a community,  
13 over the last year, year and a half or so in particular,  
14 voter trust is something that we need to reestablish and I  
15 concur wholeheartedly that a good audit pre-election --  
16 good testing pre-election and a postelection audit is the  
17 way to achieve that or at least it certainly sets us on the  
18 right path.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other comments?  
20 Senator?

21 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Certainly.

23 SENATOR JACKSON: -- along with the comments, I -- and  
24 -- and -- and my colleague from -- from the Senate [sic], I  
25 think an audit should be pre-certified. I think that the

1 audit should be done before we certify the general  
2 election.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

4 MS. BOREN: Concur.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely.

6 MS. BOREN: We agree.

7 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So, along those lines -- very  
8 -- very good point, you -- those of you who, back in the  
9 counties, run these elections, tell me what that does to  
10 the date you certify on?

11 Because here's my -- here's my -- there's a pro and  
12 con to everything you discuss, and there's no doubt they're  
13 great ideas. If they didn't have any cons to them, we'd  
14 implement them all. But -- but there's something to be  
15 said for the fact that when the elections had it certified  
16 fairly quickly, I think that's a confidence-building thing.

17 The audit sounds like a great idea, but won't it slow down  
18 that certification and how much?

19 MS. BAILEY: Most certainly.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: You know, just -- if I may.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please.

23 MS. BAILEY: Just with this election we had this past  
24 November, just in our jurisdiction, we had nearly 300  
25 provisional ballots to consider, and that's important work.

1 have, I guess, four working days to certify the election  
2 but that does build in a weekend which is good. So, if we  
3 had another four working days in addition to that, it's --  
4 it's possible that we could get it done depending on how  
5 the audit is structured.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, ma'am?

7 MS. WELCH: When we talk about after the election,  
8 what election officials do, there are three things that  
9 we have to do before we reach the certification process:

10 Number 1 is a reconciliation of the votes. Although  
11 we count votes on election night, the next day, we  
12 reconcile those votes; we reconcile the number of votes to  
13 the number of people that voted. We also have to account  
14 for those unused ballots. You know, you hear about ballots  
15 found in the trash and so forth -- we have to account for  
16 those unused ballots.

17 The second thing that we have going on is we are  
18 validating provisional ballots and, from there, we're --  
19 we're still waiting on the UOCAVA ballots by that Friday.  
20 So if we now add auditing in, we have to talk about at what  
21 time, at what period that we do this auditing, because are  
22 we going to wait until we validated provisionals?

23 Are we going to also include the ballots -- military  
24 ballots that we receive on Friday? So does that auditing  
25 process start after that period? And, if that's the case,

1 It's not something that needs to be rushed or hurried.

2 The audit would also be important work not to be  
3 rushed or hurried but to be done in an adequate amount of  
4 time. Now, it's easy to sit here and say or contemplate  
5 that but, when you consider Georgia's election schedule and  
6 the fact that we have runoffs just like we had this past  
7 November, a mere four weeks later, our window really is  
8 tight. And so, all of that needs to be taken into  
9 consideration.

10 I don't know exactly what the answer is, but -- and  
11 I've never been involved intimately with a postelection  
12 audit. I've -- I've read a lot about them; I know that  
13 they take time; I know that they can take as much time as  
14 you want them to depending on how far you want to go down  
15 that path.

16 But, you know, I would say we would need at least a  
17 three- or four-day window in addition to what we have now  
18 in order to accurately perform an audit that we can have  
19 any faith in. And, again, it depends on the parameters of  
20 it.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: See, I like the sound of  
22 three or four days. I mean, I -- I worry about you -- you  
23 were going to say weeks.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: No.

25 MS. BAILEY: No. I think -- you know, right now, we

1 we're definitely going to need four or five -- maybe six  
2 days to do an audit. So it -- the law would need to be  
3 very clear as to when we start the auditing process and  
4 does that include all ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think -- I think those are  
6 good points, and you mentioned something early in that that  
7 made me think of what we refer to in -- in legal cases as  
8 chain of custody.

9 When we go from a system like we have now to one where  
10 paper could be involved, then who touches that paper and  
11 when becomes extremely important in confidence of the  
12 system, and we don't really, I guess, have as much of a  
13 focus on that now as we would need to if we change the type  
14 system that we have to something that dealt with more  
15 paper.

16 So I would think that, you know, some rules and  
17 guidelines on the chain of custody of those ballots to keep  
18 them from popping up out of a closet somewhere is exactly  
19 something that would need to be focused on and thought  
20 about as well. Judge?

21 JUDGE MCCOY: I just want to focus on what my  
22 colleague in Rockdale County was saying because we were  
23 obviously thinking on the same line. As she was saying  
24 that, I had thought about the audits auditing what had  
25 happened on election day and with what we had counted prior

1 to provisionals.

2 Because, generally, they are not thousands, and  
3 thousands and thousands of provisionals and UOCAVA ballots,  
4 and if -- I think we should consider the audit covering  
5 what we do through election night and at -- at that point,  
6 we know there's 200 -- 300 ballots and provisionals and we  
7 know how many we count at that point and then just review  
8 the figures to make sure that everything balances when we  
9 add the provisional in but the audit focus on what is done  
10 from election night prior -- all the way back to the start  
11 of voting.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Other thoughts?

13 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Can I add something?

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, Madam Secretary.

15 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Thank you.

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I don't think it stretches.

17 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: That's all right. I think --

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Oh, hold on. There it goes,  
19 there it goes. (Provides microphone.)

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Oh, okay. I know we're going  
21 to talk about audits a little more later on, but I just  
22 wanted to make sure we're also thinking about exactly which  
23 races we would be auditing and whether we would audit all  
24 of them each time and -- and how that would work, because  
25 that's an additional amount of time to add.

1 because our -- our -- you know, we might be putting one  
2 type of litigation aside by having the most secure voting  
3 system out there, but we're just inviting another -- other  
4 types of lawsuits.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Because there are basically,  
6 generally speaking, federal requirements for having that  
7 access of a -- the most similar ballot possible for all  
8 people, whether or not they're -- they have disabilities or  
9 not. Is that a general statement that's correct?

10 MR. RUSSO: Well, I would say from both a disability  
11 standpoint and, you know, any racial groups or, you know,  
12 groups with -- that speak different languages, what have  
13 you. I think that there are a number of different reasons  
14 why a paper ballot could possibly have a discriminatory  
15 impact on certain voters versus others.

16 And that is something, I think, that's -- that -- that  
17 we just need to be cognizant of because a 100-percent  
18 secure voting system that has a disproportionate effect on  
19 certain groups is not necessarily -- is not going to be the  
20 best voting system for the state of Georgia. So I think we  
21 need to keep that -- keep that in mind.

22 And -- and, you know, I don't think we've heard from  
23 any -- any of the groups -- we have not heard from the  
24 NAACP or any other groups that might have an interest in  
25 that aspect of the -- of our review and the new system.

1 Also, I believe when Kevin presented, he mentioned the  
2 possibility of having someone external come in and do the  
3 audits and whether they would be being done by the  
4 elections staff or whether we would have somebody external.  
5 And so, there's really a couple of different kinds of  
6 audits to think about as we're doing this.

7 With -- with the machines and -- and with the optical  
8 -- with the -- not the optical, but with the scanning of  
9 the audits -- of the ballots, there's a certain amount of  
10 auditing that can take place right there but then, if you  
11 want to do more in depth audits, you may want to consider  
12 having a third party come in to do that. So we just need  
13 to keep that in mind.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

15 MR. RUSSO: Yeah. Thank you, sir. You know, we've --  
16 I think we've focused a lot on security and having a  
17 verifiable -- a verifiable voting system; I think that's  
18 important. I think the other half though that -- I heard  
19 at least one gentleman speak about, during public comment,  
20 use the phrase security and inclusion.

21 And, from my perspective, I think we'll -- we're not  
22 discussing what's been left out of -- out of a number of  
23 the presentations was how -- how is a paper ballot -- will  
24 a paper-ballot system disenfranchise any particular groups  
25 of voters. And I think we need to be cognizant of that

1 So -- and also, with regard to audits, I think that  
2 some -- some level of audit prior to certification is --  
3 is fine, so long as it doesn't hold up the process.  
4 Obviously, getting absentee ballots out to voters if  
5 there's a runoff election and getting early voting started  
6 for runoff elections is extremely important and -- and, if  
7 that -- if that process doesn't start in a timely manner,  
8 we're just -- again, we're inviting additional litigation  
9 upon us.

10 You know, regarding whether an audit is going to make  
11 sure we have the -- the right person, the person who  
12 actually won, as the -- you know, determined, you know,  
13 there's still going to be a process for an election  
14 contest, and some of the audit -- you know, maybe a deeper-  
15 dive audit is something that could come out in an election  
16 contest if there are irregularities. I don't think the  
17 state's initial audit though needs to be the equivalent of  
18 an election-contest proceeding.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Vincent. Yes,  
20 sir, Michael?

21 MR. JABLONSKI: In fact, following up on Vincent's  
22 comments, it seems to me that there are several different  
23 things that can trigger a level -- should be different  
24 things that trigger specific levels of auditing. One of  
25 which could be, if there is an election contest, one of the

remedies of that contest would be to allow the court to order a deeper-dive audit.

But it -- it seems to me that most elections in the state, there's no -- no real question as to the -- as to the outcome. In those cases, there still should be an audit but it doesn't need to be as big an audit or as deep an audit as something that's relatively close.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when you win by -- by 73 percent, there's a difference --

MR. JABLONSKI: Exactly.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- than winning by, you know, 51.1 percent. Yeah, yeah.

JUDGE MCCOY: You know, we may --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: We may want to think about -- now, under current law for a recount, a candidate has to lose -- you know, there has to be less than 1 percent, but there's also discretion in the law for recounts and for challenges where the elections superintendent, on their own motion, when they suspect an irregularity, can call for these things.

And, you know, there may be some thought that we need to put into -- to the auditing to leave some discretion about the superintendent calling on particular races or whatever where they've -- where there could be a discrepancy or something.

MS. BOREN: Pre-certification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Who --

JUDGE MCCOY: Precertification.

SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Precertification.  
(Crosstalk.)

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes.

DR. LEE: What are we certifying?

MS. BOREN: The election.

JUDGE MCCOY: We're certifying the election.  
(Crosstalk.)

DR. LEE: But what I heard pre -- pre-election or precertification.

COMMISSION MEMBERS: (Collective.) Precertification.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Precertification.

JUDGE MCCOY: Yes. Before we certify, we conduct the audit.

DR. LEE: Yeah. So I just want to add one comment, that I don't think we can audit anything if there's no -- there's no paper, so that everybody's on the same page; right?

Because, when you go back to the system, if everything is kept -- kept on a computer, if the system has been hacked, the malware now can just go away and we won't -- won't be able to find any evidence whatsoever one way or the other; right? So it's -- I want to make sure we

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and, speaking of runoffs and the rush for the primary or whatever: For a runoff, seriously, maybe we need to reconsider our runoff laws in the state. You know, municipalities have the discretion to put in their charter that they don't have runoffs. Some do and some don't, but -- in our law for -- for city elections, the charter is what governs whether there has to be a runoff. And, personally, I really think we should review our laws on -- on runoffs.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: Two things: What are we going to do if the audit shows that it doesn't match, and is there a margin of error that will be allowed and will that need to be determined? And then, secondly, I'm like Darin, I think runoffs need to be revisited. I -- I don't know if rank-choice voting is anything that could ever happen in the state of Georgia, but there are other solutions other than a runoff and, perhaps, we should look at some of those other solutions.

DR. LEE: Mr. Chairman?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: Can -- can someone explain to me what the pre-election audit means? Are we just certifying the system --

understand that if we're doing one audit, we want to have a paper trail.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Nancy?

MS. BOREN: But you do have to test it prior to putting it in the field, and I think that's what some of us are talking about with the pre-audit --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MS. BOREN: -- is that you test the equipment to ensure that it operates and functions as you -- as you intend it to do in the field. And perhaps that was the pre-audit that you heard that we have to do prior to the field.

DR. LEE: Okay. All right.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And, if it's a electronic system like we have now, you test the machine; if it's a paper-based system, you test the scanner, I would think --

JUDGE MCCOY: Correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- for example.

JUDGE MCCOY: That's correct.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MS. BOREN: We test everything.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and might I add that all of this is done in public and it's publicly advertised, and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: People can come watch, is

1 your point.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Absolutely. And I don't know whether  
3 everybody in my county just trusts me or -- but nobody  
4 shows up to these public things and then you hear these  
5 stories about the distrust and, you know, that makes you  
6 wonder if -- if -- if there's so much distrust, why are  
7 the people -- the voters not showing up to observe what  
8 we're doing pre-election and postelection?

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

10 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: I had a question, Dr. Lee.  
11 Under -- I know there's been a lot of discussion about  
12 ballot-marking devices, but I just want to clarify: With a  
13 ballot-marking device, there are systems that still produce  
14 a piece of paper; correct?

15 DR. LEE: Yes.

16 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: And then the voter can look at  
17 the piece of paper and see if it accurately reflects how  
18 they voted --

19 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No.

20 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: -- and then that would be  
21 auditable. No?

22 DR. LEE: So --

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Because you said there are no  
24 papers --

25 DR. LEE: No, so -- so, I mean, I think you're

1 forcing yourself to hand-mark forces you to verify, Hey,  
2 that's me, my vote.

3 So -- so that's really the subtle difference, but it's  
4 very critical. So my point is that, when you audit, you  
5 want to audit based on data that's already accurate.  
6 Otherwise, you'll -- your auditing result will not be  
7 accurate.

8 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Okay. Thank you.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: If we provide the voter with a paper  
11 ballot of what they've done and they don't take the time to  
12 look at that and verify, there's really nothing we can do.

13 That's the voter's responsibility. If we provide them  
14 with -- with a receipt or with paper as to what they've  
15 done and, if they don't want to take the time to do that  
16 and just drop it in the box, we -- we can't help that.

17 AUDIENCE MEMBERS: No, no, no.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Hold -- hold on.  
19 Stop. Now, you've been pretty good so far, but I do -- I  
20 want to stress to you this is not the last meeting that  
21 we'll have; there will be other chances for public input,  
22 but I do not want to end up having to ask someone to leave  
23 this room.

24 So I'm going to ask you -- once again, this discussion  
25 that's taking place now is among the members on the panel,

1 correct. So I think if the ballot-marking devices print --  
2 prints out a paper ballot. So -- so, in order for that to  
3 be auditable, it depends on several conditions; right?

4 One is that it has to clearly print out every single  
5 vote as the voter has -- has cast; right? And then we also  
6 have to rely on the fact that the voter -- the voter also  
7 has to verify every single vote on the paper ballot.

8 And so, to me, one of the major discomforts that I had  
9 with this kind of solution is that there's no proof,  
10 there's no sort of a study that suggests that the majority  
11 of the voters would do that.

12 So that's the major concern, is that -- the point is  
13 that if the voter believes their printout does not really  
14 accurately reflect the vote, what's the point of auditing?  
15 You could be auditing the wrong -- kind of wrong votes.

16 Because, you know, if the printout has been wrong, has  
17 not been verified by voters, your audit doesn't mean  
18 anything. So that's my main concern. I mean, so that's  
19 the major -- I mean, as -- as I said in my report, that's  
20 the major difference, is between paper hand-marked ballot  
21 versus printout ballot.

22 Because, you know, a hand-marked ballot -- I mean, as  
23 -- as -- as those of us who have taken a standardized test,  
24 you -- you mark and you -- you verify and then you pass  
25 basically, because you actually -- the -- the act of hand

1 and I'm going to ask you to be respectful toward their  
2 discussion just like they listened to you when you had your  
3 chance to talk and they didn't interrupt you. Okay?

4 Nobody made catcalls, nobody hollered no on this panel  
5 when you were having the discussion that you had with us,  
6 so I want you -- to ask to have the same respect up here.  
7 Okay? Thank you very much. John?

8 MR. MONDS: I want to make a comment on the lack of  
9 confidence and -- versus distrust or -- the being a  
10 difference. For example, just as a layperson, you know,  
11 I've never really had confidence in the system that we have  
12 right now.

13 And -- but I do -- I do trust my election officials,  
14 you know, locally, and I think they do a wonderful job.  
15 But there's just something about not having that -- that --  
16 that paper, you know, trail after I vote that just makes me  
17 question, you know, whether my vote is recorded accurately.

18 And -- and I think, from a lot of what we've heard,  
19 there's a lot of people, you know, with that sentiment that  
20 -- they're not necessarily saying that there's something  
21 wrong, that it's not being done, but it's just not really  
22 feeling confident in knowing.

23 So I think, from what I have definitely learned, we do  
24 need a new system. I -- I think we can concur on that, you  
25 know. And -- and, what it entails definitely some type of

1 hand-marked paper ballot, and we spoke in a previous  
2 meeting about being able to accommodate those who are  
3 disabled and making sure, whatever the system is, has to --  
4 to be able to accommodate everyone.

5 So, you know, what that entails, I guess we have to,  
6 you know, get in -- in the details of that, but a new  
7 system, hand-marked paper ballots -- and -- and then  
8 the audit process. It was very interesting, with the  
9 discussion that was had earlier about, you know, how do you  
10 go about and what level of audit do you include.

11 So, you know, there's definitely more, I guess,  
12 information that I would need, you know, to try to find out  
13 -- we know that, you know, a large number of states are  
14 doing this type of audit, and then there's some new things  
15 out there that states are trying and, you know, we just  
16 have to -- you know, personally, I have to look at that a  
17 little bit closer to say, Hey, you know, what -- what's  
18 going to be best for Georgia?

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the other -- one of  
20 the questions that I -- I mentioned to you probably goes  
21 without saying that is needed, and that's voter-education  
22 training and whatnot. I would envision that I certainly  
23 would make the argument to my colleagues in the legislature  
24 that there be a budget just like there was last time for  
25 whatever system that we go to for training.

1 And, you know, as we -- as we get within that two-  
2 month-or-so window prior to the election, that's going to  
3 be more or less a blackout period for the election  
4 officials, because that's when we're in the trenches doing  
5 the other important work. So we need to have the education  
6 component fairly well buttoned up at that point.

7 But it does need to be well-funded; we're going to  
8 need some help with it. You know, we're -- we're  
9 fortunate. In my jurisdiction, our League of Women Voters  
10 has re-banded after being disbanded for years and they're  
11 very eager to help. I hope that that's true across the  
12 other places in Georgia as well, that there are volunteer  
13 groups out there that are ready to help.

14 I know that it was federally funded in -- with the  
15 implementation of the system in 2002. But, no, I agree  
16 completely. It's a very important part, it needs to be  
17 funded and it needs to be a part of any legislation or any  
18 report that we come up with.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: Agree.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: John?

21 MR. MONDS: I think maintaining uniformity is  
22 important also. Dean Cox in -- in her presentation just  
23 talked about, you know, how it was like when -- when  
24 systems are different all over the place.

25 So, if you look at education, we have educating the

1 If it is very similar to the current system, you  
2 obviously don't have as much voter education; if it's very  
3 different, you obviously have a whole lot more. Any kind  
4 of new system though, particularly for those of you who run  
5 elections, will require training of the people that work  
6 for you to -- to use that new system.

7 But maybe just a few comments on the importance of  
8 that component of whatever we do, the training and  
9 education, whether it be voters or workers. Thoughts?  
10 Lynn?

11 MS. BAILEY: Thank you, Mr. Co-chair. I -- you know,  
12 I said it earlier and I'll -- I'll stand by that comment:  
13 I think education is one of the most critical components to  
14 the whole thing, and we're talking about implementing a  
15 system just prior to the beginning or at the beginning of a  
16 major presidential-election year which, no doubt, will be a  
17 very controversial election in the best of situations.

18 If we're going to change voting systems in Georgia --  
19 and it, you know, looks like we are -- we need to get out  
20 ahead of that. The presidential primary will be the first  
21 week in March of 2020 and, if it is our intention to roll  
22 out a statewide system to implement for that election, you  
23 know, we would need to get on that, I would think like  
24 November -- by November, which is when we're talking about  
25 piloting.

1 poll workers and then educating the voters and, with  
2 uniformity, if -- if a voter, you know, lived in south  
3 Georgia where I live and moved, you know, to north Georgia,  
4 you know, it wouldn't -- we wouldn't have to learn  
5 something new or do something different.

6 And the same thing with a poll worker. You know, if  
7 they were working in one precinct in one county and moved  
8 and they wanted to continue their service, they would have  
9 to relearn, you know, some different type of system. So I  
10 think uniformity is -- is definitely important.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and, John, you touched  
12 directly on the third thing that I threw out there for us  
13 to talk about. Most of our conversations have made the  
14 assumption that uniformity -- we're a uniform state now; we  
15 were not before the current system was rolled out, but that  
16 we would maintain this uniformity.

17 So it may be worth a -- a comment, or more or two on  
18 that one before we move past it. I will throw out one  
19 thing: You talked about different parts of the state and  
20 all using the same system. I've heard several times, from  
21 the Secretary of State's staff, it's so much easier for  
22 them to help when particularly smaller counties call with  
23 problems. Lynn, you're surrounded by much smaller  
24 jurisdictions. I know they call you regularly for help.

25 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's just as helpful for us --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

2 MS. BAILEY: -- to feel like we can -- we can share  
3 procedures and processes. And, as John said, the voters --  
4 there's continuity where ever they move in the state for  
5 poll workers --

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, and -- and -- and  
7 probably one of the best examples was the hurricane that  
8 hit southwest Georgia. I am told that -- that those  
9 jurisdictions reached out to some of the unaffected places  
10 and got help in all kind of ways and, because you're all  
11 using the same machines, the same procedures, it was easy  
12 to help. Is that a fair statement?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

14 MS. BAILEY: Yes.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

18 JUDGE MCCOY: Prior to 2002, there was absolutely no  
19 way that there could be statewide poll-worker training or  
20 voter-education training because of the mixed systems that  
21 the state used prior to '02.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Madam Secretary?

23 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yeah, I think that's going to  
24 be really key to -- to rolling out the system and being  
25 able to roll it out quickly, is -- is having the uniform

1 to be uniform in their voting equipment. And that --  
2 that's something that needs to be considered whenever we  
3 go to rewrite the code.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And -- and -- and that might  
5 be a good question. In our -- in our state structure,  
6 counties are creatures of the state. There is a direct  
7 connection there between the responsibility of the state  
8 and the county and what is required.

9 Cities are a little different. They are created by  
10 the legislature, but they are created specifically with the  
11 idea of more independence in a lot of different ways.  
12 Their terms can be different, when they have their  
13 elections can be different, not having runoffs can be  
14 different and they do have the ability to choose to use  
15 different voting methods if they so desire.

16 I -- I do have a question, and maybe some folks in  
17 our Secretary of State's office could shed light on this:  
18 Most of the municipalities I am familiar with do contract  
19 with their counties to use the voting machines so they are  
20 using the same system. Is -- is that a true statement? I  
21 think it's an overwhelming amount; isn't that true? It is  
22 very few cities that do something different.

23 MR. HARVEY: I think --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Chris?

25 MR. HARVEY: I think it's -- a large number do. I

1 system because of the whole education piece which several  
2 of you mentioned already.

3 But it's -- it's -- in order for us, at the Secretary  
4 of State's office, to be able to really assist and provide  
5 the necessary training, the system really has to be the  
6 same every place. And then that also recognizes that, when  
7 you go around the state, Georgia's a large state and  
8 different areas have different resources. And -- and so,  
9 making sure that everything is consistent and the same, I  
10 -- I think adds to the integrity of the election itself, so  
11 thank you.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Yes, Michael?

13 MR. JABLONSKI: While we're talking about uniformity,  
14 let me throw in another perspective, and that is for the  
15 people outside the system. I think Sara told you we deploy  
16 hundreds of poll watchers. There is no way you can train  
17 poll watchers if it was a different election in every  
18 county, and I think part of the integrity in the system is  
19 based upon the fact that it is uniform.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Good. I don't think  
21 there's much disagreement on that issue. Judge?

22 JUDGE MCCOY: Being we're on the uniformity  
23 discussion, let me throw out that the municipalities were  
24 able to dodge the legislation, and the current legislation  
25 -- the current laws do not require the municipalities to --

1 don't know that it -- that I'd say it's a super majority.

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

3 MR. HARVEY: There's still a number of cities that use  
4 their own staff and use paper or use something like that.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Particularly, smaller  
6 cities with very small votes.

7 MR. HARVEY: (Nonverbal response.)

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Okay. All right.

9 JUDGE MCCOY: None of my four municipalities use the  
10 county equipment.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: And -- and the main reason is cost.

13 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cost, because the county  
14 requires them to be reimbursed for the use of that  
15 equipment?

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Well, no -- no, there's no charge for  
17 the use of the equipment, but the cost is -- is much  
18 greater when you consider the programming of the DREs and  
19 the optical-scan units. The printing of the optical-scan  
20 ballots compared to the printing of regular paper ballots  
21 and just ballot strips for machines.

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Early voting and absentee  
23 issue then is what that sounds like. Yeah, not day or  
24 early in person. Yeah. Okay.

25 JUDGE MCCOY: Because, I mean, they basically vote on

1 hand-counted paper ballots that are counted by people --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

3 JUDGE MCCOY: -- for early voting and -- have a team  
4 counting ballots and then let the other team count behind  
5 them and see if the numbers were the same.

6 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Most folks don't  
7 realize, but we have somewhere at 4 to 500 cities in  
8 Georgia, many of them very small. And -- and so, has that  
9 been a problem in your county with those cities doing that?

10 JUDGE MCCOY: (Nonverbal response.)

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: They -- they've done fine.

12 JUDGE MCCOY: They -- they've done fine. Now, they  
13 contract with me to be the supervisor over their old  
14 equipment.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So they can blame you if  
16 something goes wrong?

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

18 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: But, I mean, I have two cities that only  
20 have 100 registered voters each.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

22 JUDGE MCCOY: So...

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good. All right. The -- one  
24 of the other things that I threw out there early on I'll  
25 bring to your attention now. I asked the question: Should

1 that poll book, not a part-time temporary poll worker. And  
2 that person registers you to vote -- that works at the  
3 courthouse every day -- determines what district you live  
4 in for legislative purposes, for county commission, for  
5 school board and you are programmed into that poll book so  
6 you are given the correct ballot.

7 That's what the yellow card is -- you're handed. That  
8 card tells the machine which ballots you use. That is the  
9 only data that is used on that yellow card, is for the  
10 machine to give you the correct ballot. And I -- I am very  
11 much for some sort of system similar to that to continue.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: How about the scanners that  
13 we currently use? No matter what system we go to, even if  
14 it's similar to the current one, the scanners that we use  
15 now are a little dated -- are they?

16 MS. BAILEY: Well, they --

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: -- seem to be working fine, quite  
19 frankly. They're just a --

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

21 MS. BAILEY: -- barcode scanner. And you're talking  
22 about the little handheld barcode scanner that sits up  
23 beside the poll book that scans the driver's license? Is  
24 that what you're talking about?

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell -- tell me about that.

1 we be looking for a fully-integrated system? In other  
2 words, should we be looking to update electronic poll books  
3 and scanners in addition to vote-casting devices?

4 In other words, when -- when the layperson thinks  
5 quite often of voting, they think of the machine they go  
6 touch now or they -- the absentee vote -- the ballot they  
7 fill out, but there's a bunch of other things that go into  
8 making that system work. When they walk in there and I  
9 say, I'm Barry Fleming, they have to look up and see am I  
10 in the right place, and that means me being registered.

11 So comments on other parts of the system besides that  
12 machine, quote, unquote, that needs to be replaced. Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I am very much for the electronic -- the  
14 Express Poll like what we use today.

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Flesh that out for -- for --  
16 for us.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: The Express Poll is -- is the term for  
18 our electronic poll book, and --

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When -- when I walk in there,  
20 that's where my name is --

21 JUDGE MCCOY: That's where --

22 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- to know I'm in the right  
23 place.

24 JUDGE MCCOY: -- where your card is encoded and a  
25 full-time county registrar's work is -- is what is shown in

1 MS. BAILEY: Well, it's a -- it's just an attachment,  
2 a critical attachment to the electronic poll book.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

4 MS. BAILEY: But, you know, that scanner, there's  
5 nothing particularly sophisticated about it; it's a barcode  
6 reader, but it does read the barcode on a Georgia driver's  
7 license, and the benefit of that is it helps the voters  
8 very accurately get the right voter their proper ballot  
9 rather than having to depend on the manual list, as judge  
10 said.

11 So, you know, back in the day, before we had the  
12 electronic poll books, which were not all that long ago,  
13 you know, I'm sure many of us sat there and were tortured  
14 by poll workers looking down the list when we could see  
15 upside down where our name was. So that's an important --  
16 an important thing to keep included in the system.

17 Another important aspect of it, in my opinion, is to  
18 have -- is to make sure that our system continues to  
19 communicate with the election-night reporting system so we  
20 can facilitate efficient and quick election results. Right  
21 now, those -- those systems all talk amongst each other;  
22 they communicate with each other.

23 They're separate. You know, we -- we take information  
24 from the tabulation system to the election-night reporting  
25 system. It's done in a secure manner. There is an air gap



1 there, so there's no direct connection between the server  
2 that tabulates votes and the server that releases votes.  
3 They're two different -- two different pieces of equipment,  
4 and that should certainly stay in place as well.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

6 MR. JABLONSKI: I want to point out that the state is  
7 required to maintain a centralized database of everybody  
8 who's registered to vote because that is a requirement when  
9 there's a federal candidate on the -- on the ballot  
10 pursuant to the Help America Vote Act. And that's why we  
11 -- we moved away from the paper system onto the electronic  
12 express vote system. I don't think we can do away with  
13 that.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

15 JUDGE MCCOY: Just as important with -- with this  
16 system is the system determines the right ballot for the  
17 voter --

18 MR. JABLONSKI: Right.

19 JUDGE MCCOY: -- and you remove the high percentage of  
20 human error of that poll worker, who's part time who  
21 doesn't work very often, of giving the voter the wrong  
22 ballot.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael?

24 MR. JABLONSKI: The problem with the database has been  
25 that there are a lot of people -- a lot of voters we've

1 encountered, particularly in the last election, who -- you  
2 know, they were issued a precinct card and were told on the  
3 system that they were entitled to vote but then, when they  
4 actually showed up, they could not be found.

5 Frankly, I don't know how that could happen, and  
6 that's something somebody is going to have to look into  
7 actually fairly quickly. But that -- the fact that there  
8 is that problem means that maybe there -- you know, there  
9 should be greater reliance on a paper backup system or some  
10 way to immediately appeal any failure to appear on the --

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: So -- so if the state does go  
12 out for an RFP on a -- on a -- some sort of new system, all  
13 of these things -- security requirements, how these systems  
14 are going to work with one another, how do you patch them,  
15 how do you update them going forward, regular testing of  
16 them, the encryption that goes on between these systems --  
17 all of these things have to be taken into account, I would  
18 think, when we go out there to any vendor for any type of  
19 new system to say, How is this all going to work together.

20 Doctor -- well, hold on a second. Senator Jackson and  
21 then I'll come back to Dr. Lee.

22 SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make  
23 a comment about the voting ID system. Currently, we mostly  
24 assume that everybody gives a driver's license, you know,  
25 so it certifies who you are. There are a number of people

1 who don't drive and that require a ID card and, usually,  
2 it's a state-issued ID card.

3 I think that we should consider that we, somehow,  
4 disenfranchise a number of voters because that ID card you  
5 go to the driver's license places to get, costs \$30 and I  
6 think some people may be disenfranchised to pay \$30 to get  
7 a ID card.

8 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The voting ID is free.  
9 (Crosstalk.)

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It's free.

11 SENATOR JACKSON: It's free?

12 MS. BOREN: Yes.

13 JUDGE MCCOY: There is legislation where they can go  
14 to the voter-registration office and be provided a voter ID  
15 card for purposes of voting at no charge.

16 SENATOR JACKSON: At no charge. Okay.

17 JUDGE MCCOY: Right, correct.

18 SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

19 MS. BOREN: There's also a state election board rule  
20 that provides if a person signs that they are indigent or  
21 cannot afford the ID card from the Georgia State Department  
22 of Driver Services, but they can get for voting purposes --  
23 they can also get that one free.

24 SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. I had some complaints --

25 MS. BOREN: It's an opportunity that --

1 SENATOR JACKSON: -- that -- that they -- they didn't  
2 want to vote because they had to pay \$30. Okay. Thank  
3 you.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

5 DR. LEE: So --

6 JUDGE MCCOY: We can work that in the education part.

7 DR. LEE: So I don't know -- I don't know if we need  
8 the new system for the voter registration and the poll book  
9 because my experience of checking myself online or going to  
10 polling stations seem to be working fine, but I -- I just  
11 want to say that --

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You know how to work that  
13 computer, I bet.

14 DR. LEE: Yes. But -- but I want to make sure that,  
15 you know, if we don't have it already, I think we should  
16 recommend to the legislature that we need to have a line-  
17 item budget to maintain the cyber security and reliability  
18 of these systems because we have heard reports about, you  
19 know, these systems may not be as secure as -- as they  
20 should be, so...

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- the funding is an  
22 annual thing because of all of the changes that occur  
23 regularly. Yeah, I think that's what you were saying  
24 basically. Yeah.

25 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Mr. Co-chair, do we --

1 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely.

2 SENATOR STRICKLAND: Do we have any idea about what  
3 the cost of new poll books would be? I don't think those  
4 poll books are very -- very old. The scanners --

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: It -- now -- now, y'all  
6 correct me if I'm mistaken. When we have talked to  
7 different vendors about all sorts of systems, when we've  
8 asked them for potential costs, we will be asking them for  
9 an integrated system; right? It's -- it's top to bottom;  
10 right? Is that correct? So -- so -- yes, go ahead, Kevin.

11 MR. RAYBURN: So, from the RFI responses we received,  
12 the range for like one single poll book was 900 to maybe  
13 \$1300. So you've got to figure out how many you need. It  
14 might be, you know, about -- it could be a 10 million  
15 dollar procurement to get, statewide, new poll books.

16 MR. RUSSO: We have, what, about 3500 precincts?

17 MR. RAYBURN: I think we have about 23 -- 2300  
18 precincts.

19 MR. HARVEY: And at least two per precinct, so about  
20 7,000.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. But -- but what Brian  
22 and I were discussing is, if we get a new system, then  
23 those new poll books will have to come with it. So it  
24 could be inside the cost of the whole system but,  
25 certainly, a significant component of it. Judge?

1 involved assessment, and testing and input from all kinds  
2 of individuals to get to the point where they are now, and  
3 I would expect the same could be true for the state of  
4 Georgia.

5 I think, you know, we also, as I said earlier, need to  
6 be very mindful of the fact that Georgia is -- is a  
7 precinct-count based system, meaning we're not collecting  
8 all of the ballots at one location to scan them through.  
9 They're being scanned at 2300 locations around the state at  
10 the same time.

11 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I watched with interest  
12 Arizona in the last elections and it -- a week later, they  
13 were still telling us that somebody had pulled ahead and  
14 somebody was behind --

15 MS. BAILEY: Because --

16 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- because batches of things  
17 came in from the counties and were all being counted, it  
18 seemed like, in once place. Is that...?

19 MS. BAILEY: Well, I -- I can't speak to Arizona.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah.

21 MS. BAILEY: I'm not familiar with that. But, you  
22 know, there are -- there are states out there that are  
23 all-mail jurisdictions, and the ballots come into one  
24 central --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: M-A-I-L --

1 JUDGE MCCOY: And, Mr. Chairman, that was included in  
2 our information from the vendors. Some vendors can provide  
3 us with the poll book and the voting equipment and then  
4 some vendors -- we would have to deal with two vendors  
5 depending on who -- who we choose. Some had it all; some,  
6 we may have to deal with more than one vendor, but the  
7 specs were all included in -- into the information we were  
8 presented.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The -- one of the other  
10 things that we spent a lot of time talking about was  
11 audits, and it seems to me a consensus -- and I'm -- I'm  
12 quickly to be corrected by you if I'm wrong that -- that an  
13 audit is a good thing; it just depends on -- the devil's in  
14 the details. How often, when, where and can it be done in  
15 such a fashion that it's meaningful because you could  
16 actually do it in a timely fashion. Thoughts on audits in  
17 the discussions that we've had? Lynn?

18 MS. BAILEY: Just a quick thought. The point was not  
19 lost on me earlier when someone said that Georgia needs to  
20 define its own audit and not to make the legislation so  
21 restricted that -- that we can't have it be an evolving  
22 system.

23 We heard earlier -- and I'm -- I'm going to use  
24 Colorado again as an example. It took Colorado 10 years to  
25 get to where they are now through an evolving process that

1 MS. BAILEY: -- location --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- mail, right?

3 MS. BAILEY: Yes, yes.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I knew what you were talking  
5 about. Yeah.

6 MS. BAILEY: So we just need to be mindful of that as  
7 we -- as we contemplate legislation. There's no doubt that  
8 we need it; we just need to figure out what's going to work  
9 best for Georgia and not let the legislation drive that,  
10 but let us figure out a way that's going to work for  
11 Georgia.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Judge?

13 JUDGE MCCOY: I think it was said earlier that the  
14 legislation could require an audit and leave the  
15 particulars on when and how the audit was conducted to the  
16 state election board to put into rules, and -- and that may  
17 be the -- the best move to require it and then not have to  
18 pass legislation every time, wait a year to change it.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm sure my senators can --  
20 can weigh in here, but that is something that we struggle  
21 to deal with, contemplate, all of the time at the  
22 legislative level: How specific do we get in the code with  
23 the instructions that we give to whoever we're regulating  
24 at that time?

25 And -- and the goal is to be specific enough to

1 accomplish the task, but not so specific that you  
2 micromanage it into difficulty. And where that line is, is  
3 always a hard thing for us to decide, but it's a very  
4 important part. Judge?

5 JUDGE MCCOY: My office deals with vital records also,  
6 and a lot of the legislation that is geared toward vital  
7 records refers to as rules passed by DPH. And -- and you  
8 -- that's just something that we need to consider, maybe  
9 look at, to model.

10 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We've talked about -- focused  
11 on a lot of discussions here about the machine, or the  
12 paper or the -- the books and whatnot but, as was given to  
13 us -- touched on with the -- with the update on the legal  
14 aspect of it, several of the -- the lawsuits that pop up  
15 that we want to try to avoid as much as possible going  
16 forward, deal with other things.

17 Are there other things in our election process that  
18 we're going to need to update when we do this somewhat  
19 major overhaul of the election system besides just talking  
20 about machines and audits? Dr. Lee?

21 DR. LEE: So I'm trying to discuss something outside  
22 of my comfort zone and say something that may be completely  
23 -- doesn't make any sense, so --

24 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You would be qualified to be  
25 in the legislature if you did that.

1 to raise the taxes are best at making sure the money is  
2 spent wisely.

3 So this relationship between the state and the county  
4 on many levels, not just voting, where we require the  
5 counties to have skin in the game because they fund part of  
6 it, quite often results in a second watchdog making sure  
7 the taxpayers' fund are spent wisely because those  
8 commissioners will holler loudly to you when you require  
9 them to do something that doesn't make sense in their  
10 jurisdiction.

11 So I hear what you're saying and -- but that is the  
12 tension that we constantly deal with, this idea that good  
13 government quite often is the government that's most local  
14 to you, and we have to have some uniformity to make the  
15 system work, but we also want the local input.

16 And, when the commissioners have to, in their county,  
17 fund the board of elections, I think we probably get a lot  
18 more feedback on different ways to build better mousetraps.

19 So it's -- it's a balancing act with many things. It's  
20 not so simple that just the state pay for everything.  
21 Nancy?

22 MS. BOREN: And just a little bit of an example of  
23 expense, since you brought it up: We went to ballot-on-  
24 demand printing about six years ago, so we print them on  
25 demand. But, in a primary, our typical ballot cost -- and

1 DR. LEE: So -- so, I mean, hearing some of the  
2 concerns from the county election directors saying that,  
3 when we move to a new system, their concern is that their  
4 costs is going to go up. So I just don't know whether, you  
5 know, the state would reconsider the funding model.

6 Like, for example, we go -- go into a -- a particular  
7 uniform system, can the state essentially fund everything?

8 Like, for example, the county has been saying that, Okay,  
9 they have to pay the cost of paper. I don't know how much  
10 paper costs but, suppose it be -- I don't know, tens of  
11 millions of dollars, I doubt it, but can the -- can the  
12 state actually fund it instead of having to burden the  
13 counties individually to -- to fund some of these  
14 operations?

15 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: When my -- when my -- my son  
16 is now 17 but, when he was -- I don't know -- five, you  
17 know, we -- we started trying to teach him how to manage  
18 money and we gave him some money that he could spend how he  
19 wanted to. And every time we went near McDonald's, he  
20 wanted to get a Happy Meal. And, when I started making him  
21 pay the difference in the cost of the Happy Meal versus  
22 just a hamburger and fries, he stopped wanting the Happy  
23 Meal quite as much because, now, he was spending his money.

24 So one of the things that we struggle with at the  
25 state level is that, quite often, the people who are having

1 this is just for mail out, and absentee and provisional  
2 ballots -- is about \$25,000 per primary. The reason it's  
3 so expensive for our primaries, you have to have  
4 republican, democratic and non-partisan ballots.

5 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Three ballots.

6 MS. BOREN: Correct. And you're supposed to have a  
7 ballot in each precinct for whatever a voter may choose  
8 since we don't register by party in Georgia.

9 So a primary was extremely expensive for us. When we  
10 went to ballot-on-demand, we reduced our ballot cost --  
11 again, just for absentees, and provisionals and challenge  
12 -- from 25,000 to about 3 or \$4,000 in that first primary.

13 So it was a huge savings for us to go to ballot on demand  
14 in a primary. So I can only imagine, if we were printing  
15 ballots for the entire election to be a paper election, how  
16 expensive that would be unless we have some kind of ballot-  
17 on-demand component --

18 JUDGE MCCOY: What --

19 MS. BOREN: -- especially in the primary.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: What was the cost of the equipment --  
21 the ballot-on-demand equipment?

22 MS. BOREN: The ballot-on-demand equipment was  
23 \$25,000, but we saved it in that first year in a primary.  
24 We implemented it in a primary and our net expense, based  
25 on previous years' expenses from primary printing, it was

1 equal. And, now, all we've done is save money.

2 JUDGE MCCOY: Exactly.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Ms. Bailey?

4 MS. BAILEY: I'm just piggybacking on Nancy's  
5 comments. We've had a very similar experience with ballot  
6 on demand. It -- it really kept us from having to print so  
7 many -- so many unneeded ballots.

8 But the one thing that this group should think about  
9 and just chew on between now and the next time we meet, is  
10 advanced voting and how we can successfully administer  
11 making sure that voters get their correct ballot.

12 Just in Richmond County -- and we're a medium-sized  
13 county -- we have 68 different precincts in -- in our  
14 county. You times that times three in a primary and you've  
15 got 200 or so ballot styles out there, and we're depended  
16 upon, right now, not having ballot -- if we didn't have  
17 ballot on demand, we would be depended upon poll workers to  
18 dig through thousands of ballots, pick the right one for  
19 each and every one of the thousands and thousands that come  
20 through. I see that as being a big problem.

21 Using ballot-marking devices would, of course,  
22 alleviate that because you would have an electronic ballot  
23 on some type of an access card that would bring up the  
24 right ballot every time.

25 Even if we had ballot on demand, we would have to

1 ensure that it did more than just print a ballot. It would  
2 almost need to have the voter's name on a detachable stub  
3 or some -- some way that you could be assured that the  
4 voter was going to get their correct ballot, and that's --  
5 I think that's something we need to give a lot of thought  
6 to.

7 Coming from a county that formerly administered punch  
8 card back in the day, I know. Even in -- on a -- even on  
9 election day when you may only have three ballot styles and  
10 even those they're color-coded by party, still, poll  
11 workers are -- I mean, I can't say it was an overriding  
12 problem, but it happened even in the most -- in a situation  
13 where you couldn't conceive that somebody could make a  
14 mistake like that, it's still made.

15 And, certainly, if they're digging through generic  
16 pieces of paper that are all the same size, and the only  
17 differential between any of them is a small, little code  
18 that's down at the bottom of the card, it's fraught for  
19 mistakes.

20 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Some of the issues that we  
21 heard after the election, absentee-ballot processing,  
22 provisional-ballot processing. Things that we heard before  
23 and after the session that the -- the HAVA match system;  
24 all of these were things that -- that brought controversy  
25 and, sometimes, lawsuits.

1 And -- and the -- you know, what could be or may be  
2 done to try to eliminate some of those problems going  
3 forward to the extent that they could be, I think is also  
4 something that -- that we should -- we should think about.  
5 Madam Secretary?

6 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Yes. Thank you. I know our  
7 discussion today has -- has centered very much about the  
8 equipment, but we've had a lot of discussion on some other  
9 issues as well. And whatever is chosen, how -- whatever  
10 way we go, they'll need to be some changes in terms of the  
11 code and SEB procedures and things.

12 So with the commission's okay, I'd like our team, as  
13 we're working on putting these recommendations together, to  
14 also take a look at some of the law changes that are  
15 necessary while, at the same time, addressing some of what  
16 you were mentioning in terms of some areas that we had some  
17 issues with -- with the recounts, with the absentee ballots  
18 -- making sure that we're staying compliant with federal  
19 laws, we're looking at things -- all of those kinds of  
20 things that need to go into this and we can take a look at  
21 it when we meet again and look at the recommendation so  
22 that we're looking at everything.

23 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

24 JUDGE MCCOY: Mr. Chairman, just food for thought:  
25 There -- it's a house or a senate race had been ordered

1 to --

2 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Two votes separate out of  
3 7,000 or something.

4 SECRETARY CRITTENDEN: Uh-huh.

5 JUDGE MCCOY: And there were voters that were given  
6 the wrong ballot that could have made the difference in the  
7 outcome and, because the voters were given the wrong  
8 ballot, that whole house race is about to be re-held.

9 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. And it was -- okay.  
10 You're talking about -- it was re-held.

11 JUDGE MCCOY: It was?

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now there's two votes' --  
13 (Crosstalk.)

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- difference between the  
15 two.

16 JUDGE MCCOY: Oh, wow.

17 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And now -- and there are  
18 additional, now, talk about people having been given the  
19 wrong ballot.

20 JUDGE MCCOY: So it may have to be re-held again.

21 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We don't -- we -- we don't --  
22 we don't know. We don't know.

23 JUDGE MCCOY: These are the things that we lay awake  
24 at night worrying about --

25 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right. Absolutely.

JUDGE MCCOY: -- and that's why we speak of them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Of course, the -- the last question that I'll -- I'll focus us back along, which is one of the ones I brought out earlier: What should the primary means of vote casting in the new system be? Should it be primary ballot-marking devices or should it be hand-marked paper ballots?

Most of the discussion amongst the public particularly that have participated and -- has been on that -- that central issue that affects many of the other questions that we're talking about. Your thoughts on that big question?

MS. ROSS: Can I start with a question?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely, Ms. Ross.

MS. ROSS: How long do we anticipate this change that the General Assembly approves, let's say, presumably, next session? How long do we envision using the system that we decide upon?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Very -- very good question. I mean, obviously, the system that was used before the current one evolved from paper ballots, to punch hanging chads, to -- to optical scans, to lever machines in there.

This system's been in place now since the 2002 --

JUDGE MCCOY: 16 years.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: 16 years, so hard -- hard to say. Technology's changing faster than it used to.

MS. ROSS: Because when we think about the future and disenfranchising voters -- potential voters, I mean, if it -- it lasts as long as the current system that we have, that means a child born two years from now will be voting on a system that we decide on today.

And that is -- not expressing an opinion one way or the other on paper versus machines, and I understand the cyber-security angle, but we do -- we must balance security with disenfranchising citizens and I don't know a single child -- so we're talking about children. Children today will be using the system that we are deciding upon.

Who -- who uses paper? I mean, they take all of their tests on computers. Our little toddler already knows how to use an iPad or an iPhone, and I'm not saying one way or another. I just think we need to consider that if this system is going to last as long as the last system has lasted us. We're talking 16 to 18 years. I think we need to maximize the flexibility, and that's why I was asking Dean Cox, you know, what is your biggest regret.

I think if we can envision -- and we may be looking for a unicorn, but we need to envision flexibility for our future because the majority of the voters, if this system lasts around 16 -- 18 years, will be young people who vote very differently, take tests very differently, do things very differently than most of the people in this room.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. RUSSO: Yeah, I'll --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Counsel?

MR. RUSSO: I'll add just a comment. You know, for -- we -- we obviously have a lot of folks here that do not trust electronic voting systems. I hear from -- from people all of the time that say, If I had to put it on paper, I would not trust that system.

So I think we're going to get -- there's always going to be someone out there who's not going to necessarily trust the system we're looking at, which is why it is -- or, excuse me, the system that we're voting on. So -- so that's why there's an important balance here.

And I do think, you know, between the -- the administration of the election, for election officials, but also the -- the voter experience -- and, you know, at -- at the end of the day, we do have a difficult decision here to make in terms of what we're recommending, but I think we also just have to keep in mind that there's not going to be a perfect system.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: So I just want to say that the -- I mean, the system that I recommended, as I documented in the -- in the report I sent around -- so -- so it was, as you can see, a consensus from the computer scientists and cyber-

security experts that hand-marked paper ballot, you know, is the best available approach right now.

And I also want to say that I didn't -- I didn't take that at wholesale value when it was assigned to -- when I was asked to serve on this commission. I actually took my time to actually digest the study and talked to a lot of computer scientists and cyber-security experts to arrive -- to arrive at the same conclusion; right?

So what I'm saying is that, from a cyber-security point of view, that's the best available solution. Now, if you say we don't want that, we want to justify why; right?

Justify and answer the concerns from the citizens. So that's -- so that's my -- my number one comment.

I think the second one, I think I -- I echo what Sheila just said, is that I don't think we should -- with any solution, even the solution that I had recommended, I don't think we should have to find a solution and then use it for the next 15 -- 20 years because that would be several generations of -- several lifetimes of computer technologies.

I really think that we should -- we should have this ongoing basis every couple of years to review what's available, and what has been working for us, and what needs to be improved and then have a new round of selection of new systems.

1 So that may add prudence to -- to us, but I think  
2 that's a cost that we should -- we should take. I mean --  
3 in fact, in the -- in IT -- you know, and anybody who was  
4 in IT will tell you that not very rarely do we buy --  
5 actually sign a contract to buy a system. It's all based  
6 on leasing; right? Subscription.

7 I think that's something that we should also consider,  
8 you know, maybe work with the legislation process and, say,  
9 instead of buying something and spending 150 million  
10 dollars -- when you spend that much money, you are -- you  
11 are more inclined to get stuck with it; right?

12 Whereas, if we say, Hey, we're going to spend a little  
13 bit of money, just lease it, and then, a couple of years  
14 later, maybe the consideration -- all of the factors will  
15 change, our calculators would change, and then say, You  
16 know what? Let's select something that's a little bit -- a  
17 little bit better. So that would be my -- my second  
18 comment.

19 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I think that the leasing  
20 thought is a good one. The -- the complexity of doing  
21 anything with the government is the limitations upon our  
22 flexibility to be flexible.

23 And -- and when we make, quite often, large purchases  
24 at the state level, we bond them and we could easily, with  
25 the senators' help, do away with the requirement that --

1 actual hack that actually results -- you know, now it's  
2 actually proved that somebody hacked the system and then  
3 the outcome of the election is changed, then what do we do?

4 You -- we're stuck with this 150 million dollars system  
5 that we cannot back out, then we're screwed for the next 10  
6 years.

7 I -- I don't think we should restrain ourselves in  
8 that situation; right? So, bottom line, either we go with  
9 the best solution possible that we know from the consensus  
10 of the -- of the computer scientists or we lease so that we  
11 can back out in a couple of years.

12 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other thoughts on paper, and  
13 machines and differences? Lynn?

14 MS. BAILEY: I have a quick thought, and I would like  
15 to go to advanced voting real fast. Yeah, I've talked  
16 about the need or the concern about inaccurate ballot  
17 styles being deployed and talked about using ballot-marking  
18 devices at a minimum, at least for that part of the  
19 process, to ensure an accurate ballot is issued.

20 We know that every precinct in the state of Georgia,  
21 by law and rightly so, would be equipped with a ballot-  
22 marking device to accommodate voters with disabilities.  
23 The way the ballot-marking devices work are different from  
24 the equipment that we have now.

25 The ballot-marking devices that are engineered and

1 that we not lease something when we bond it at the state  
2 level.

3 But there's a bigger, more complicated picture  
4 involved in that Georgia has one of the best bond ratings  
5 in the nation. In other words, when we have to borrow  
6 money to build roads, and bridges and -- and whatnot for  
7 taxpayers, we get an incredibly good rate because we follow  
8 the best practices of bonding.

9 And the best practices of bonding in the nation, to  
10 oversimplify it, is -- is that you don't bond things, you  
11 lease. And so -- and so, that's one of the things that  
12 we'd have to -- we need to be thinking about. Because, I  
13 agree with you, this concept of leasing is very -- I've  
14 leased vehicles before for -- for some of the reasons that  
15 you've just discussed, so -- Dr. Lee?

16 DR. LEE: So then a follow up. So, I mean, if leasing  
17 is not a viable option, you know, particularly speaking,  
18 then I think we should really just go with the safest --  
19 safest solution possible because we cannot afford to have  
20 -- to -- you know, we should should err on the safe side;  
21 right?

22 You know, even if we have a solution that we're going  
23 to get stuck with the next 20 years, I want the most secure  
24 solution possible because there's no way out.

25 You know, what if, five years from now, there was a

1 produced now don't record votes. They're just a blank  
2 slate. They put the ballot up there, you mark it, it  
3 prints something -- whether that's a ballot or a -- or a  
4 sheet of paper, whatever it is, it prints something and it  
5 doesn't retain any votes.

6 And so, those same machines that we've used for  
7 election day that we're required to have anyway, we could  
8 easily use during advanced voting and then deploy them on  
9 election day, and that would be a way to use that equipment  
10 in multiple ways -- that very expensive equipment in  
11 multiple ways.

12 So, as I look down the options, you know, Option 3 has  
13 an appeal to me, Option 3 being using ballot-marking  
14 devices during advanced voting with paper being used for  
15 mail ballots, of course; provisional ballots, of course,  
16 and possibly even on election day. But for those voters  
17 who may not like to vote using paper on election day, give  
18 them the option of using the ballot-marking device if they  
19 would like to do that.

20 We heard from disability groups earlier that they had  
21 a concern of their privacy of their vote. If you have --  
22 if the only person who uses a ballot-marking device-marked  
23 ballot is a disabled or sight-impaired voter, and that's  
24 the only ballot then in that ballot box that looks like  
25 that, then, you know, they've lost a degree of privacy with

1 that. And so, you would want multiple votes in the box  
2 that looked -- with -- you know, that looked different so  
3 that one doesn't stand out among the others.

4 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Cynthia?

5 MS. WELCH: Thank you. As -- as being one of the --  
6 well, the only county that has tested and piloted a ballot-  
7 marking system in Rockdale -- we did it for the City of  
8 Conyers. Although it was a small city election, we also  
9 elected to allow those voters that did not reside in the  
10 city, we -- we set up demo units for them to also test out  
11 the system, so it was a demo ballot.

12 And I can tell you that the feedback that I received  
13 from the voters, the feedback that I received from the poll  
14 workers, the feedback that I received from my staff, all  
15 loved the system. The only drawback that we had, in which  
16 we have already heard, is about the barcode that's on the  
17 ballot. The voter actually made their choice on a ballot-  
18 marking system which did not record anything on the ballot-  
19 marking system.

20 It just electronically marked their ballot. It fed  
21 the ballot -- marked ballot back to the voter. The voter  
22 was able to verify the ballot. If they did not vote for a  
23 race, it -- it indicated no selection. So, if the voter  
24 wanted to go back and vote for a particular race, they  
25 could get a new ballot and go back and vote for the race.

1 to see us move to a ballot-marking system where all voters  
2 would use the same system.

3 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: The Chair's intention is to  
4 -- is to begin to end this thing as we get close to the 4  
5 o'clock hour. Although, I'm not going to stick close to  
6 that if you're talkative, but that's my thoughts. But  
7 let's continue. So, if you want to get something in, now's  
8 the time to do it. Judge?

9 JUDGE MCCOY: I believe we were told at a previous  
10 meeting that some states did lease the voting equipment,  
11 and I think if we were able to obtain that information from  
12 the other states that would be helpful to this commission  
13 and the legislature.

14 REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I agree, yeah. Other  
15 thoughts from members of the commission? Okay. You have  
16 been here and now it's your third meeting.

17 As I mentioned, I anticipate that we have asked the  
18 Secretary of State's staff to begin to put together some  
19 conclusions and possible recommendations from us based upon  
20 the discussions that we have heard here today and at the  
21 previous meetings so that we can return sometime probably  
22 that first week in January -- not the first full week, but  
23 maybe the first week. We'll get back to you on that date  
24 exactly. Not in stone yet, but the Secretary and I have  
25 discussed the possibility of maybe doing it at the Capitol.

1 The tabulation side was really, really easy. We were  
2 -- we was really nervous about the tabulation side because  
3 that was our responsibility, but it was such a easy  
4 transition for us. This was a system that was able to be  
5 used by any voter -- a blind voter, a person that could not  
6 read, as well as a regular voter.

7 So if you ask me what my vote would be today, I would  
8 like to see us move to a ballot-marking system, but -- and  
9 it -- and it actually was a voter-verifiable paper receipt  
10 that they received. The difference is it had the barcodes  
11 on it which, I believe, that's what the talk is, about  
12 them.

13 I'm not sure if that's something that can change --  
14 that the vendors would change. However, in the testing  
15 that we did with the system prior to using the system for  
16 early voting on election day, we tested that system and the  
17 results came out just as we intended those test results to  
18 come out. So on -- on election day and for early voting,  
19 we felt comfortable with the results.

20 We talk about cyber security of the system. This is a  
21 system, again, that has no connection whatsoever to the  
22 Internet. We were still able to use poll books; we were  
23 still able to use a lot of the equipment -- as the -- the  
24 Express Polls that we have now, we was able to actually use  
25 those with this system. So I think, for me, I would like

1 There are large rooms set up there that would very well  
2 accommodate this.

3 The -- as you have more thoughts as we go through this  
4 process, please don't hesitate to communicate with the  
5 Secretary and her staff. I know a lot of good thought has  
6 gone into where we are now and we all want to do the same  
7 thing, and that is make the best recommendation possible to  
8 the legislature because they and the governor will have to  
9 make -- and the next Secretary of State -- some big  
10 decisions about how we're going to vote going forward in  
11 Georgia.

12 Thank you again to the members of the public that have  
13 come and participated in this. I never wonder if you care.

14 I know you feel strongly about this and -- and I can tell  
15 you right now: If all citizens cared as much about the  
16 workings of our government as I have seen expressed here,  
17 we would have far less problems than we do. So thank you  
18 for caring enough to be here today.

19 Once again, to the members of the commission, thank  
20 you for your input and we look forward to talking with you  
21 again. We stand adjourned.

22  
23  
24  
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:54 p.m.)

## C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 9th day of \_ \_ January \_\_\_, 2019.

Patrick Stephens  
PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR  
CERTIFICATE NO. 4672-1141-4562-4064



A				
<b>ability</b> 21:23,25 83:14 143:12 172:6 196:14 <b>able</b> 5:14 30:20 34:3 37:22 42:22 54:6 66:2 67:8,8 69:12,15 70:25 71:5 73:11 84:16 93:1 95:4 98:21 104:13 106:11 110:3 118:12 120:9 121:22,23 122:3 129:6 137:1 152:23 153:2 166:13,14 168:7 168:19 170:13 184:24 190:2,4 194:25 195:4,24 226:22 227:4,22 227:23,24 228:11 <b>abled</b> 120:12,13 <b>above-entitled</b> 1:7 230:7 <b>absentee</b> 99:9 100:12,23 105:22 105:22,25 152:20 154:23 181:4 197:22 199:6 213:1 216:17 <b>absentees</b> 213:11 <b>absentee-ballot</b> 154:24 215:21 <b>absolutely</b> 26:22 35:13 52:25 53:20 61:20 82:12,15,18 84:23 88:18 98:4 174:3,5 186:2 194:18 206:1 217:25 218:13 <b>absorbed</b> 82:1 <b>academics</b> 49:23 <b>Academy</b> 150:20 <b>accept</b> 17:15,19 20:4,8,13 22:16 <b>acceptable</b> 33:20 <b>accepted</b> 17:7 20:6 <b>access</b> 13:25 14:12 14:18 83:13,16 120:16,18 127:2	150:12 180:7 214:23 <b>accessibility</b> 111:11 <b>accessible</b> 1:1 2:4 36:13 123:8 127:17 230:8 <b>accidental</b> 39:11 <b>accidentally</b> 17:11 <b>accommodate</b> 167:13 190:2,4 224:22 229:2 <b>accompanying</b> 128:8 <b>accomplish</b> 157:2 162:2 210:1 <b>account</b> 176:13,15 203:17 <b>accumulate</b> 17:24 <b>accumulated</b> 28:16 <b>accuracy</b> 14:2 16:4 16:19 59:5 144:25 149:6 <b>accurate</b> 4:2 127:17 135:1 156:3 162:23 188:5,7 224:19 <b>accurately</b> 6:12,16 148:18,24 156:22 163:9 175:18 186:17 187:14 189:17 201:8 <b>achieve</b> 173:17 <b>achieved</b> 132:21 164:9 <b>ACLU</b> 127:10 <b>across-the-aisle</b> 133:19 <b>act</b> 111:12 133:25 187:25 202:10 212:19 <b>acting</b> 112:14 <b>activist</b> 158:1 <b>activists</b> 138:23 <b>actual</b> 18:15 26:9 36:17 47:13 59:9 59:12 84:1 171:10 224:1 <b>adage</b> 62:22 <b>add</b> 24:20 49:5 73:4 93:23 94:12	113:9 176:20 178:9,13,25 184:17 185:23 220:4 222:1 <b>addition</b> 18:21 169:15 175:17 176:3 199:3 <b>additional</b> 34:1 68:9 93:9 110:5 116:16 178:25 181:8 217:18 <b>address</b> 135:21 138:13 <b>addressed</b> 138:14 <b>addressing</b> 96:23 216:15 <b>adds</b> 195:10 <b>adequate</b> 133:4 175:3 <b>adjourned</b> 95:19 229:21 <b>adjudicating</b> 55:20 <b>adjust</b> 7:2 41:15 42:9 <b>adjustments</b> 35:2 <b>administer</b> 214:10 <b>administered</b> 215:7 <b>administration</b> 118:7 220:15 <b>administrative</b> 31:22 36:1,7 <b>admit</b> 11:3 <b>admitted</b> 102:5 <b>adopt</b> 132:22 <b>advance</b> 67:25 133:6 <b>advanced</b> 41:22 97:8,15,22 98:5 98:11,21,22 99:7 99:8,10,12,12,15 99:22 100:2,3,6,7 103:3,5,9,10 124:18 214:10 224:15 225:8,14 <b>Advancing</b> 144:6 <b>advantage</b> 40:11 43:20 54:7 <b>advertised</b> 185:24 <b>advice</b> 125:9 159:8 <b>advocate</b> 119:9	127:16,18,19,22 134:14 150:3 <b>advocates</b> 13:19 14:6 <b>affairs</b> 163:19 <b>affidavits</b> 117:15 <b>affiliated</b> 141:22 <b>Affirmative</b> 10:12 96:17 <b>afford</b> 67:8 93:17 165:18 204:21 223:19 <b>affordable</b> 67:17 <b>affords</b> 56:1 <b>afraid</b> 155:6,8,9 <b>African-American</b> 127:8 <b>afternoon</b> 60:10 151:22 <b>age</b> 68:22 85:18 173:5 <b>agenda</b> 4:22 5:6,8 6:17,24 114:4 127:11 <b>ages</b> 70:14 <b>aggressive</b> 113:12 113:22 <b>ago</b> 29:15 91:16 201:12 212:24 <b>agree</b> 29:19 91:6 149:14 171:15 173:3 174:6 192:15,19 223:13 228:14 <b>agreed</b> 16:16 127:5 167:18 <b>agriculture</b> 23:12 24:22 <b>ahead</b> 7:17 10:4 23:1 28:22 31:20 36:3 40:6,11,14 41:14 42:3 56:11 63:21 75:5 76:6 86:25 114:5 136:2 137:24 143:7 152:10 160:24 161:3 191:20 206:10 208:13 <b>air</b> 201:25 <b>aisle</b> 171:16	<b>Alarm</b> 139:8 <b>algorithms</b> 43:25 <b>allege</b> 110:12 <b>allegiance</b> 2:19,21 <b>alleviate</b> 214:22 <b>allocate</b> 93:13 <b>allocated</b> 90:2 <b>allocation</b> 93:12 <b>allow</b> 20:11 22:13 33:21 113:16 145:21 151:7 161:4 182:1 226:9 <b>allowed</b> 22:14 28:20 32:15 33:15 183:14 <b>allowing</b> 155:20 157:21 <b>allows</b> 89:14 <b>ally</b> 139:1 <b>all-mail</b> 208:23 <b>all-volunteer</b> 10:20 <b>alterations</b> 135:25 <b>altered</b> 19:16,17 101:1 <b>alternatives</b> 11:12 30:12 <b>amazing</b> 43:12 <b>ambiguous</b> 107:13 <b>ambitious</b> 112:25 <b>amendment</b> 110:13 <b>amendments</b> 100:17 104:5 <b>America</b> 2:22 202:10 <b>American</b> 20:10 22:2,11 133:1 141:24 144:7 150:22 155:7 <b>Americans</b> 111:11 144:14,14,15,15 144:16,16 <b>amount</b> 35:16,24 43:21 97:17 100:6 105:5 150:10 164:11 175:3 178:25 179:9 196:21 <b>amounts</b> 69:10 100:19 <b>Amy</b> 21:15 83:10

<b>analysis</b> 35:15 <b>analysts</b> 150:9 <b>analyze</b> 11:9 <b>and/or</b> 14:16 170:6 <b>anecdotal</b> 84:1 <b>anecdotes</b> 133:10 <b>angle</b> 219:8 <b>Anita</b> 151:22,22,22 151:25 153:5 <b>Ann</b> 146:14,14,14 147:23 <b>announce</b> 7:13 <b>announced</b> 42:6,8 <b>annual</b> 205:22 <b>anonymity</b> 32:11 <b>answer</b> 75:9 79:10 80:7 106:23 113:4 113:5 149:2 172:7 172:8 175:10 221:12 <b>answered</b> 44:19 46:2 47:12 78:14 108:17 <b>answers</b> 44:22 <b>anticipate</b> 36:2 62:10 105:18 218:14 228:17 <b>anticipated</b> 78:21 78:24 105:5 <b>anticipation</b> 7:12 <b>antithetical</b> 133:12 <b>anybody</b> 5:25 7:23 22:6,21 106:12 114:8 115:23 128:16 222:3 <b>anybody's</b> 147:13 <b>anymore</b> 76:18 163:11 <b>anyway</b> 14:2 123:15 157:20 167:15 225:7 <b>apologize</b> 109:11 <b>apparently</b> 28:10 <b>appeal</b> 110:15 203:10 225:13 <b>appear</b> 117:17,20 203:10 <b>appeared</b> 117:20 <b>appearing</b> 117:9 <b>appointed</b> 2:7	<b>appreciate</b> 5:15 9:21 10:6 37:2,3 61:24 62:2,14,16 62:18 75:7 76:9 95:18 108:20 113:24 114:6 118:20 119:10,21 121:1 122:12 123:17 126:10 130:20 131:8 132:7 134:5 135:12 137:12 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13 149:24 151:21 153:6 166:7,11 172:25 <b>approach</b> 158:12 221:2 <b>appropriate</b> 16:23 93:14 <b>appropriated</b> 51:9 77:15 <b>appropriation</b> 69:15 <b>approve</b> 115:11 166:15 <b>approves</b> 218:15 <b>April</b> 51:9 <b>architect</b> 163:18 <b>archives</b> 66:4 <b>area</b> 60:23 97:17 104:11 106:9 107:9,12 <b>areas</b> 2:14 71:22 87:3 97:21 195:8 216:16 <b>arena</b> 93:10 <b>aren't</b> 6:20,21 162:6 165:6 <b>argument</b> 110:16 190:23 <b>arguments</b> 13:21 <b>Arizona</b> 208:12,19 <b>armed</b> 39:17 <b>arrive</b> 221:7,8 <b>arrow</b> 86:4,5,7,11 89:1,7 <b>art</b> 4:5 143:1,4 <b>Ashling</b> 143:22,25	144:3,3 145:23 146:12 <b>Asian</b> 144:6 <b>Asian-American</b> 141:25 <b>Asian-Pacific</b> 141:24 <b>aside</b> 4:11 180:2 <b>asked</b> 18:9 71:11 89:20 96:25 98:16 102:24 103:14 169:19 198:25 206:8 221:5 228:17 <b>asking</b> 23:3 25:17 30:10 114:14 206:8 219:18 <b>Askins</b> 153:20,20 153:21,25,25 154:4 <b>aspect</b> 4:3 180:25 201:17 210:14 <b>aspects</b> 36:5 <b>Assembly</b> 4:15 66:7 218:15 <b>assessed</b> 18:18 <b>assessment</b> 208:1 <b>asset</b> 128:1 <b>assigned</b> 18:18 78:2 221:4 <b>assist</b> 195:4 <b>assistant</b> 37:13 <b>assisted</b> 117:1 <b>associated</b> 35:11 51:4 76:19 77:5 135:7,7 <b>Association</b> 141:24 <b>assume</b> 51:12 52:7 88:14 203:24 <b>assuming</b> 34:12 52:21 53:2 <b>assumption</b> 169:11 193:14 <b>assurances</b> 41:24 <b>assure</b> 74:12 <b>assured</b> 163:18 215:3 <b>Athens</b> 150:3 161:12 <b>Atlanta</b> 121:12	142:5 167:11,14 <b>attached</b> 158:19 230:13 <b>attachment</b> 201:1,2 <b>attack</b> 14:25,25 15:11,22 143:8 <b>attacker</b> 13:25 <b>Attaining</b> 133:3 <b>attendees</b> 3:19 <b>attention</b> 12:7 13:16 15:17 16:21 20:18 30:8 34:9 50:6 68:16 99:3 106:13 142:18 161:1 198:25 <b>attesting</b> 117:16 <b>attorney</b> 6:8 <b>atypical</b> 105:9 <b>audible</b> 122:6,6 <b>audience</b> 5:10 6:14 9:7,11,13,14,18 10:9,10,12,14,16 21:18 37:11 75:17 76:2 96:8,17 114:20 115:11 119:12,14 155:23 186:19 188:17 <b>audit</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 13:2,2,6 16:22,23 19:18 26:7,12,12 30:19 34:3 38:2,8,12,16 38:23 39:3,10 40:1,2,2,3,12,16 40:22 41:20,21 42:1,3,17,25 43:17,20 44:12,17 44:20 45:3,4,8,13 45:18,19,23 46:8 46:17,19,19,20,20 46:25 47:5,13 48:1,1,3,11,21 49:1,6,13,13,15 49:15,19,19 50:5 50:23,24 51:25 52:4,12,13 53:2 53:19,19,23,24 54:12 55:13 56:9 56:18,19 58:2,3,4 58:11,16 59:5	80:15 127:19,20 134:24 135:9 140:18 149:17 162:7 172:10 173:15,16,25 174:1,17 175:2,12 175:18 176:5 177:2 178:4,9,23 181:2,10,14,15,17 182:2,6,6,7 183:13,24 184:16 184:18 185:1 187:17 188:4,5 190:8,10,14 207:13,20 209:14 209:15 <b>auditable</b> 12:10 13:17 118:15 120:9 140:5,9 141:1 142:15 143:18 145:1 153:17 186:21 187:3 <b>audited</b> 12:20 52:14 54:20 57:1 134:20 140:21,22 149:3,16 156:25 172:6 <b>auditing</b> 33:1 34:13 47:8 50:19 53:9 58:18 80:22,23 161:17,21 162:1,5 176:20,21,24 177:3,24 178:23 179:10 181:24 182:22 187:14,15 188:6 <b>auditors</b> 46:1 <b>audits</b> 33:2 37:18 37:19 39:17,25 41:19 42:20,24 43:12 44:18 45:10 45:24 46:4 48:15 48:25 49:2,5,10 49:16,18,24 51:2 51:18 53:7 54:6 54:13 80:13 81:10 125:9 127:24 130:16 134:18 137:7 169:24
--	--	--	--	---

177:24 178:21 179:3,6,9,11 181:1 207:11,16 210:20 <b>audit-trail</b> 81:8 <b>August</b> 123:19 150:21 <b>Augusta</b> 126:2 <b>authority</b> 56:21 <b>authorize</b> 51:23 53:21 <b>authorized</b> 51:10 66:8 <b>automatically</b> 25:12 <b>available</b> 149:17 167:12 221:2,10 221:23 <b>average</b> 85:18 104:7 151:11 159:4 <b>avoid</b> 210:15 <b>avoided</b> 148:15 <b>awake</b> 217:23 <b>aware</b> 27:21 56:17 <b>awful</b> 166:22 <b>awfully</b> 54:4 <b>a.m</b> 1:9 2:1	174:8 178:10 184:21 201:11 203:21 215:8 218:3 224:5,11 226:21,24,25 228:23 <b>backgrounds</b> 70:15 <b>backup</b> 203:9 <b>backwards</b> 140:23 <b>bad</b> 27:16 28:3 86:12 <b>Bailey</b> 26:16,17,17 26:23 27:2,7 55:8 55:8 58:14,15 59:14 66:10 90:14 90:14 91:9 112:5 112:6,6 113:8 173:2,2 174:19,21 174:23 175:25 191:11 193:25 194:2,14 200:16 200:18,21 201:1,4 207:18 208:15,19 208:21 209:1,3,6 214:3,4 224:14 <b>Bainbridge</b> 60:23 <b>balance</b> 92:13 219:8 220:13 <b>balances</b> 81:2 178:8 <b>balancing</b> 81:7 212:19 <b>Balbona</b> 162:12,15 162:15,16,18,21 <b>Ballbona</b> 162:11 <b>ballot</b> 15:4 18:5,6 19:1 24:4,5,7 25:22,24 29:5,12 30:5 31:1,6,9,16 31:19 32:3,4,5,9 32:10 33:22 35:18 35:23 36:8,18,19 43:3,5,6,7,8,14,16 45:15,20 46:7 47:18,25 48:5,7 48:18 63:24 65:2 65:5,13 70:21,25 71:1,10 72:11,15 73:1,2,17,22,24 74:22 83:8 84:6	84:15,17,18,19,21 85:22 88:2 89:10 89:12,15 93:13 104:2,9,10 122:4 124:19 135:3 136:1 143:12 145:4 148:20,22 149:5,6 152:21 154:9 155:13 156:18 158:18 159:3 163:21,21 164:2 165:17 171:5 179:23 180:7,14 187:2,7 187:20,21,22 188:11 190:1 197:21 199:6 200:6,10 201:8 202:9,16,22 212:25 213:7,10 213:13,16 214:5 214:11,15,16,17 214:22,24,25 215:1,4,9 217:6,8 217:19 221:1 224:16,19,21 225:2,3,23,24,24 226:6,11,17,17,18 226:20,21,21,22 226:25 <b>balloting</b> 63:25 73:8 <b>ballots</b> 18:5,15 23:17 24:3,14,17 26:9,10,18,20,25 27:2,5,6,12 31:14 31:20 33:8,15,20 33:22 35:11,12,17 36:3 39:7,20 40:21 41:23 42:11 43:4,13,15,19,21 43:25 46:3,5 48:19 55:5,20,25 55:25 56:2 64:11 64:16,19,22,22 65:6,18,19,25 66:1 72:3,6,10,21 73:4 74:17,19 76:20,22 77:1 81:17,20,23,24,25	82:13,24 83:5 85:16 89:4 100:12 100:12,24 101:9 105:22,22,25 117:9 120:8,21 121:18 122:1 123:14 125:1,8 127:20,23 130:4 131:15,24 135:3 137:6 138:6,20,21 140:6,25 141:7 145:12 146:5 147:6,9 148:11,16 149:9,10,15 150:19 151:3,15 153:16 154:19,19 154:24 156:16 157:2 158:13,16 158:16 160:3,6,14 160:17,22 169:22 174:25 176:14,14 176:16,18,19,23 176:24 177:4,17 178:3,6 179:9 181:4 190:7 197:20,20 198:1,4 200:8 208:8,23 213:2,4,5,15 214:7,18 216:17 218:7,20 225:15 225:15 <b>ballot-building</b> 15:10,14 <b>ballot-inspection</b> 33:14 <b>ballot-marking</b> 29:3,10 30:2,10 30:23 79:5 134:14 140:8 141:6 149:1 149:2 151:6,9 169:21 186:12,13 187:1 214:21 218:6 224:17,23 224:25 225:13,18 225:22 227:8 228:1 <b>ballot-on</b> 212:23 <b>ballot-on-demand</b> 213:10,21,22 <b>ballot-polling</b>	42:25 43:23 <b>ban</b> 30:9 <b>bank</b> 39:16 <b>bar</b> 86:6 141:24 <b>barcode</b> 29:13,13 29:16,22,24 135:4 135:6,6 147:3,5 148:23 163:1,3,12 163:15 164:4 200:21,22 201:5,6 226:16 <b>barcoded</b> 29:12 <b>barcodes</b> 30:6,16 134:23 149:4 160:7,9,14 162:21 162:23,24 227:10 <b>barriers</b> 133:21 <b>Barron</b> 102:5 <b>Barry</b> 4:21 163:19 199:9 <b>Bartow</b> 134:9 <b>based</b> 27:13 40:17 41:1,7,15 56:10 95:12 127:20 133:9 144:21 173:12 188:5 195:19 208:7 213:24 222:5 228:19 <b>baseline</b> 118:11 <b>basic</b> 50:3 127:15 140:12 158:11 <b>basically</b> 7:18 11:6 30:13 34:18 36:23 43:4 46:24 47:17 47:21 48:12 54:24 56:20 138:5 180:5 187:25 197:25 205:24 <b>basis</b> 53:25 67:3 221:22 <b>batches</b> 208:16 <b>bathwater</b> 69:5 <b>Bazine</b> 41:21 <b>bear</b> 48:22 <b>becoming</b> 68:11 <b>bed</b> 19:20 <b>bedsheet-sized</b> 63:24 <b>began</b> 3:22 97:8
--	--	---	--	--

<p>98:23,23  <b>beginning</b> 127:14  191:15,15  <b>begins</b> 4:14  <b>behalf</b> 155:21  <b>behavior</b> 159:1,2  <b>beings</b> 159:6  <b>believe</b> 16:13 19:17  20:23 23:2 28:13  42:18 60:17 77:22  78:13 83:18 120:8  121:21 130:3  163:8 172:12  179:1 227:11  228:9  <b>believed</b> 12:14  <b>believes</b> 187:13  <b>bell</b> 141:2  <b>benefit</b> 201:7  <b>benefiting</b> 143:15  <b>benefits</b> 39:10  171:12  <b>best</b> 7:19 8:4 31:2  49:14 73:18,21  101:4 105:25  112:23 122:1  124:10,10 137:8,9  149:17 158:12  159:7 168:21  180:20 190:18  191:17 194:7  209:9,17 212:1  221:2,10 223:4,8  223:9 224:9 229:7  <b>bet</b> 172:24 205:13  <b>better</b> 9:4,10,12,16  30:3,5 32:11,23  54:22 55:1 56:12  63:8 130:8 134:3  212:18 222:17  <b>Beverly</b> 35:8,9,14  50:13 59:16,17  <b>Beverly's</b> 50:12  <b>bias</b> 145:3  <b>Bibb</b> 17:22 24:3  27:11  <b>big</b> 11:8 17:9 34:20  36:4 43:11 46:16  46:17,18 53:11  61:16 75:5 130:17</p>	<p>155:24 182:6  214:20 218:11  229:9  <b>bigger</b> 79:6 223:3  <b>biggest</b> 91:15  219:19  <b>bill</b> 168:16  <b>billion</b> 18:18  <b>bipartisan</b> 66:9  91:22,23 92:7  145:3  <b>bit</b> 6:23 9:2,14 10:7  31:9 34:6,7,7  42:23 85:8 97:21  103:12 105:24  120:11 156:13  190:17 212:22  222:13,16,17  <b>bite</b> 76:3  <b>black</b> 65:17,25 85:7  86:16  <b>blackout</b> 192:3  <b>blame</b> 123:23,25  198:15  <b>blank</b> 23:7,21  24:17 26:18 86:5  86:10 225:1  <b>blanket</b> 78:3  <b>blank-voted</b> 18:4,5  18:15 26:24  <b>Blassingame</b>  122:13,15  <b>blessed</b> 158:6  <b>blind</b> 22:24 227:5  <b>blowout</b> 40:19,23  <b>board</b> 19:20,21  38:1 45:24 50:4  53:23 80:25 81:9  124:10 126:20  128:6 141:23  145:24 170:3,6  200:5 204:19  209:16 212:17  <b>boards</b> 1:11 80:2  165:8  <b>Bobby</b> 92:4  <b>body</b> 45:1 50:4  118:8  <b>Bogart</b> 131:3  <b>Boldly</b> 132:24</p>	<p><b>bond</b> 222:24 223:1  223:4,10  <b>bonding</b> 223:8,9  <b>book</b> 199:18 200:1  200:5,23 201:2  205:8 206:12  207:3  <b>books</b> 169:15 199:2  201:12 206:3,4,15  206:23 210:12  227:22  <b>boost</b> 9:2  <b>booth</b> 153:3  <b>booths</b> 64:25  117:21  <b>bored</b> 49:20  <b>Boren</b> 22:7,7 88:23  88:25 174:4,6  183:12 184:1,8  185:4,8,21 204:12  204:19,25 212:22  213:6,19,22  <b>born</b> 142:2 219:4  <b>borrow</b> 223:5  <b>bottleneck</b> 151:13  <b>bottom</b> 15:19 48:8  74:23 118:5 206:9  215:18 224:8  <b>bought</b> 63:21 69:8  140:19  <b>bounce</b> 107:14  <b>bouncing</b> 107:18  <b>box</b> 43:15 71:1  73:25 89:9 158:14  188:16 225:24  226:1  <b>boxes</b> 47:25 74:19  74:22 77:1 154:10  158:18  <b>Brad</b> 3:6  <b>brag</b> 124:9,12  <b>bragging</b> 172:21  <b>brazen</b> 164:16  <b>break</b> 7:1 75:20  165:23  <b>breath</b> 156:19  <b>Brewer</b> 126:12,13  126:16,17,18,19  128:10,11  <b>Brian</b> 206:21</p>	<p><b>bridges</b> 223:6  <b>brief</b> 96:25 106:22  109:3,7 110:8  <b>briefly</b> 110:25  111:7  <b>brilliant</b> 49:23  <b>bring</b> 12:7 13:15  15:17 16:21 20:18  30:8 34:9 62:20  62:21 68:13,16  75:8 81:15 82:10  132:2 142:24  168:7 198:25  214:23  <b>brings</b> 160:18  <b>broadening</b> 132:23  <b>broadest</b> 132:17  <b>BROCHE</b> 96:13  <b>broke</b> 118:4  <b>broken</b> 11:17 20:20  <b>brought</b> 7:4 94:14  94:18 97:16 114:6  212:23 215:24  218:4  <b>Broward</b> 28:12  <b>browser</b> 76:23  <b>Bruce</b> 164:6  <b>bubble</b> 65:7 74:4  85:23 86:2  <b>buckets</b> 41:6,14  <b>budget</b> 40:14 78:4  78:6 190:24  205:17  <b>build</b> 39:22 53:13  53:15 162:8 176:2  212:18 223:6  <b>building</b> 15:4  <b>buildings</b> 99:25  <b>built</b> 55:16  <b>bunch</b> 103:24  147:5 199:7  <b>burden</b> 15:23 34:5  48:22 93:1 129:23  211:12  <b>buses</b> 90:7  <b>business</b> 11:3 154:5  <b>businesses</b> 98:7  <b>button</b> 73:23  <b>buttoned</b> 192:6  <b>buy</b> 93:2,18 95:6</p>	<p>222:4,5  <b>buying</b> 93:8 140:13  173:7 222:9  <b>Bye-bye</b> 139:10</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>C</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>C</b> 2:1 230:1,1  <b>calculated</b> 39:9  <b>calculating</b> 102:6  <b>calculators</b> 222:15  <b>calibrated</b> 107:10  108:7,12  <b>call</b> 5:25 14:24  29:11,22 30:14  114:15 139:2  182:20 193:22,24  <b>called</b> 11:5 30:17  30:17 42:2 64:20  82:8 99:10 110:9  111:1 150:22  <b>calling</b> 140:10  182:23  <b>calls</b> 99:13 116:13  116:15,16,20  <b>Cam</b> 143:22,22,23  144:3 145:21  146:11  <b>Cameron</b> 132:7,8,8  134:4  <b>campaigning</b> 129:9  <b>campaigns</b> 87:15  <b>campus</b> 95:4  <b>Candace</b> 96:12  <b>candidate</b> 33:16  65:7 89:11 106:5  106:7 107:5,6  135:18 182:16  202:9  <b>candidates</b> 23:13  40:20 41:11 89:8  <b>candidate's</b> 86:4  <b>cannibalize</b> 64:7  <b>can't</b> 8:20,23 10:10  15:19 29:15 43:19  71:1 95:6 119:12  119:14 122:6  123:23 130:12  144:18 161:16,21  172:4 188:16  208:19 215:11</p>
---	--	---	---	---

<b>capabilities</b> 52:3	83:14 99:8 100:5	46:20,21,23 47:9	77:4 100:23 117:3	<b>choose</b> 45:17 46:23
<b>capability</b> 22:4	101:9 120:18	47:10 55:9 58:17	177:13 191:18	48:15 92:12 94:7
<b>capacity</b> 2:10 116:8	121:18 143:12	59:1 134:19,22	209:18 218:14	108:1 125:2
141:20	147:20 149:10	174:18 176:9	222:15,15 227:13	169:16 196:14
<b>Capitol</b> 167:11	163:8 187:5	181:2 230:9	227:14	207:5 213:7
228:25	<b>casted</b> 22:1	<b>certified</b> 1:8 17:4	<b>changed</b> 19:23	<b>chosen</b> 46:22 216:9
<b>captured</b> 74:13	<b>casting</b> 120:15	105:15 174:15	89:14 100:24	<b>Chris</b> 95:24,25
148:24	169:20 218:5	230:6,12	129:21 224:3	96:1,5,10,15,21
<b>car</b> 89:19	<b>cast-ballot</b> 12:23	<b>certifies</b> 203:25	<b>changes</b> 41:6 47:2	107:1 108:19,19
<b>card</b> 17:12 18:11	<b>catcalls</b> 189:4	<b>certify</b> 13:3 55:19	92:23 100:18,22	125:14 141:11,11
27:15,16,19,22	<b>catch</b> 20:7 41:25	58:4 174:1,10	101:5 170:13	141:12,16 143:21
28:2,3,4,10,15,18	42:7	176:1 184:15	205:22 216:10,14	196:24
63:22 81:5 149:6	<b>categories</b> 39:24	230:5	<b>changing</b> 47:4	<b>Christmas</b> 5:2
156:7 172:2	40:9	<b>certifying</b> 105:18	100:20 218:25	<b>churches</b> 70:7
199:24 200:7,8,9	<b>Cathy</b> 60:6	170:1 183:24	<b>chaos</b> 72:9 73:5	<b>circle</b> 65:6
203:2 204:1,2,4,7	<b>caucuses</b> 91:25	184:7,9	<b>characteristics</b>	<b>circled</b> 74:4
204:15,21 214:23	<b>caught</b> 17:5,14	<b>CFP</b> 144:20	128:4	<b>Circuit</b> 110:16,19
215:8,18	172:21	<b>chads</b> 63:5,23	<b>characterize</b>	<b>circulating</b> 5:10
<b>cards</b> 12:15 64:9,10	<b>cause</b> 59:7 127:9	218:21	109:10	<b>cities</b> 196:9,22
117:19 159:3	137:16	<b>chain</b> 127:23 177:8	<b>charge</b> 69:3 75:5	197:3,6 198:7,9
<b>care</b> 156:2 229:13	<b>CCR</b> 230:18	177:17	109:6 197:16	198:19
<b>cared</b> 229:15	<b>center</b> 15:3 133:8	<b>chairman</b> 8:5 10:5	204:15,16	<b>citizen</b> 119:20
<b>career</b> 2:12 154:5	<b>centered</b> 216:7	19:19 26:17 35:9	<b>Charlotte</b> 139:21	121:12 122:22
<b>careful</b> 6:15	<b>centers</b> 70:6	36:12 37:3 58:1	<b>charter</b> 183:6,8	132:14,23 133:2
<b>carefully</b> 131:19	<b>central</b> 16:3 81:6	58:14 78:13,21	<b>cheap</b> 164:25	133:10,23 147:13
149:18	120:6 132:22	83:11 91:11 96:4	<b>cheaper</b> 44:14 79:2	153:15 162:18
<b>caring</b> 229:18	208:24 218:10	107:3 108:4,25	<b>cheapest</b> 31:10	<b>citizenry</b> 143:2
<b>Carolina</b> 81:22	<b>centralization</b>	112:6 133:7	<b>check</b> 9:6,6 10:1	<b>citizens</b> 5:19
139:21,22	15:20 32:18	163:17 171:2	26:6 37:9 38:8	124:20 129:25
<b>Carr</b> 17:24	<b>centralized</b> 14:23	173:21 183:21	41:7 49:6 136:13	133:17 141:19
<b>carried</b> 90:8	15:25 32:24 202:7	203:22 207:1	159:5	142:17 143:16
<b>carry</b> 3:7 51:13	<b>centrally</b> 56:1	216:24	<b>checking</b> 96:12	147:15 155:7
<b>case</b> 23:18 24:20	<b>cents</b> 46:7 48:17	<b>chairs</b> 8:13 120:15	205:9	164:12 219:9
35:3 57:24 58:2	<b>Century</b> 66:8 80:20	<b>Chair's</b> 228:3	<b>checks</b> 81:2	221:12 229:15
76:2 107:25	91:22	<b>challenge</b> 43:11	<b>check-in</b> 75:23	<b>citizenship</b> 100:13
110:14,16,20,24	<b>certain</b> 41:24 47:22	110:11 111:4	<b>chew</b> 214:9	127:24
110:24 117:5	51:10 71:22 108:7	213:11	<b>chief</b> 56:22 97:23	<b>citizen/voter</b> 134:2
176:25	109:10 179:9	<b>challenges</b> 182:18	<b>child</b> 219:4,10	<b>city</b> 53:10 183:7
<b>cases</b> 30:20 98:7	180:15,19	<b>challenging</b> 98:25	<b>children</b> 219:10,10	226:7,8,10
102:10 103:18	<b>certainly</b> 5:7 49:19	<b>Chan</b> 141:11,13,16	<b>chilling</b> 83:16	<b>civic</b> 70:6 132:18
106:21 108:23	56:9 61:23 69:2	141:16	<b>chime</b> 113:7	<b>civic-engagement</b>
110:7 111:8,9,14	80:3 91:5 166:7	<b>chance</b> 26:19 42:5	<b>chiming</b> 139:8	126:22
117:1,10,18 177:7	166:20,23 167:19	42:7 44:8 87:3	<b>Chinese-American</b>	<b>civil</b> 5:21 6:1
182:5	173:17,22 174:19	88:7 164:9 189:3	142:2	115:18 164:25
<b>cast</b> 11:21 20:9,15	190:22 202:4	<b>chances</b> 188:21	<b>choice</b> 48:14 117:4	<b>claims</b> 110:7,20
22:10 27:6 33:5	206:25 215:15	<b>change</b> 40:17 41:1	117:7,12 144:22	<b>clap</b> 166:16
33:18 38:5,7,10	<b>certainty</b> 41:25	54:4,5 56:19	160:4 183:17	<b>clarification</b> 1:18
38:15 43:5 44:14	<b>CERTIFICATE</b>	59:10,10,11,13	226:17	27:9,11 28:6
46:16 47:18 52:15	230:19	61:25 68:17,18	<b>choices</b> 43:6 71:13	<b>clarifications</b>
70:25 71:9 73:24	<b>certification</b> 46:19	69:21 70:16 73:11	71:19 73:23	100:14

<b>clarify</b> 54:11 186:12	<b>collaboration</b> 126:21	153:6 155:18 164:21 166:7 167:14,23 172:24 215:7	<b>commissioners</b> 94:2 212:8,16	<b>complexity</b> 45:22 73:4,5,13 222:20
<b>clarifying</b> 24:11	<b>colleague</b> 171:15 173:24 177:22		<b>commissioner's</b> 23:12	<b>compliance</b> 2:11
<b>clarity</b> 132:18	<b>colleagues</b> 89:18 168:19 190:23	<b>commencing</b> 1:9	<b>commissions</b> 34:11 73:19	<b>compliant</b> 216:18
<b>Clarke</b> 161:13 164:24	<b>collecting</b> 136:21 208:7	<b>comment</b> 3:2 5:9 7:8 24:13 76:8 83:1 90:14,18 114:4 132:15 164:6 166:17 179:19 184:17 189:8 191:12 193:17 203:23 220:4 221:13 222:18	<b>commission's</b> 13:15 20:18	<b>complicated</b> 79:6 80:7 109:21,23,24 223:3
<b>clean</b> 4:2	<b>Collective</b> 2:20 184:13		<b>commission's</b> 4:17 216:12	<b>Complies</b> 114:20
<b>clear</b> 30:5 41:13 44:12 89:10 110:22 114:13 123:3 149:1 177:3	<b>Colorado</b> 42:13 50:17 55:23 147:9 207:24,24		<b>commitment</b> 93:20	<b>component</b> 4:4 80:6 89:23 90:17 191:8 192:6 206:25 213:17
<b>clearly</b> 115:6 125:9 187:4	<b>color-coded</b> 215:10		<b>committee</b> 155:21 163:18,19	<b>components</b> 191:13
<b>clever</b> 16:12	<b>combination</b> 66:12 142:14	<b>commenters</b> 160:4	<b>committees</b> 116:9 131:6	<b>composed</b> 66:12
<b>clicked</b> 120:4	<b>come</b> 7:1 8:2,2 10:6 37:16 53:25 62:11 68:2 69:1 75:24 90:24 93:18 94:20 95:22,25 97:9,11 97:11,12 99:20 104:25 114:15 119:1 121:2 126:20 130:9 136:19,22 138:20 140:12 145:2,19 166:5 171:20 179:2,12 181:15 185:25 192:18 203:21 206:23 208:23 214:19 227:18 229:13	<b>comments</b> 3:11 5:22 7:6 21:10 55:9 75:15 76:10 81:12 90:18 115:18 170:25 172:25 173:1,19 173:23 181:22 191:7 199:11 214:5	<b>common</b> 127:9 137:16 142:7,13 143:15	<b>comprehensive</b> 169:9
<b>climate</b> 81:19		<b>commission</b> 1:1,7 2:5,15 3:18 7:4,9 7:22 12:8 15:18 16:22 30:9 32:17 34:22,25 36:13 37:16,24 59:25 66:9,9,11,12 67:19,23 72:19 75:22 80:20 91:23 95:21 96:5,21 106:24 109:1,12 112:3,5 113:11 114:2 127:7 128:5 134:1 139:2 140:2 140:11 141:18 142:6 157:20 158:9 164:16 165:22 166:4,20 168:10 171:17 172:14 173:1 184:13 200:4 221:5 228:12,15 229:19 230:8	<b>communicate</b> 101:4 201:19,22 229:4	<b>compromise</b> 15:1
<b>climates</b> 82:17			<b>communicated</b> 101:3	<b>compromised</b> 15:10
<b>clock</b> 98:15,16			<b>communities</b> 130:18	<b>computer</b> 8:8 14:6 39:8 43:4 49:7 74:9 76:11 87:24 118:16 134:10 135:25 136:17 142:11,14 145:7 146:3,5 149:14 150:11 184:22 205:13 220:25 221:7,19 224:10
<b>close</b> 40:17,23 41:1 41:7,12,15 42:10 49:3 57:13 111:15 162:12,13 182:7 228:4,5	<b>comes</b> 18:16 31:18 135:8		<b>community</b> 119:9 144:7 173:12	<b>computerized</b> 165:3
<b>closer</b> 9:1 112:21 119:18 155:23 190:17	<b>comfort</b> 210:22		<b>commute</b> 146:21	<b>computers</b> 38:25 219:13
<b>closet</b> 177:18	<b>comfortable</b> 40:20 42:9,16 47:23 55:4 70:1,15 87:11,17 90:22,23 227:19		<b>company</b> 59:20	<b>computer-progr...</b> 150:9
<b>closing</b> 130:2 137:5			<b>compare</b> 48:9 54:20	<b>computer-tabula...</b> 39:6
<b>cloud</b> 61:16	<b>coming</b> 2:13 5:15 9:21 56:14 61:18 62:2,14 76:9 92:1 123:17 128:24 131:1 132:7 134:4 134:6 135:12,13 139:6 141:11 143:22 146:13,15 149:24 151:18		<b>compared</b> 56:25 103:9 197:20	<b>computing</b> 158:24
<b>clubs</b> 70:7			<b>comparison</b> 42:25 43:2,12,18 100:4 103:19	<b>con</b> 174:12
<b>Coalition</b> 111:2 127:11 139:17			<b>compelling</b> 33:19	<b>conceivably</b> 15:1 160:6
<b>Cobb</b> 17:4,5 18:3 18:19 24:5 26:19 116:6 135:17 162:19			<b>complaint</b> 105:21	<b>conceive</b> 215:13
<b>code</b> 95:10 170:4,6 170:8 196:3 209:22 215:17 216:11			<b>complaints</b> 106:1 108:10 204:24	<b>concept</b> 77:9 84:20 223:13
<b>codes</b> 160:7			<b>complete</b> 1:19 4:6 86:7 89:1,7 230:7	<b>concern</b> 15:15 53:18 76:17 121:18,21 152:18 187:12,18 211:3 224:16 225:21
<b>codified</b> 48:12 50:24			<b>completely</b> 23:17 56:10 66:9 119:24 120:20 134:22 192:16 210:22	<b>concerned</b> 14:20
<b>codify</b> 51:25			<b>completeness</b> 149:6	
<b>codifying</b> 51:18			<b>completion</b> 4:16	
<b>coffee</b> 163:13		<b>commissioner</b> 2:16 24:22	<b>complex</b> 58:12 75:3 104:2,10	
<b>cofounder</b> 10:8,19				
<b>cognizant</b> 179:25 180:17				
<b>Coliseum</b> 1:12				

14:21 19:8 119:19 119:22 122:22 131:4 146:23 148:12 162:18 <b>concerns</b> 120:11 158:8 211:2 221:12 <b>concluded</b> 229:25 <b>conclusion</b> 133:23 145:2 221:8 <b>conclusions</b> 62:12 132:17 228:19 <b>concur</b> 129:19 173:15 174:4 189:24 <b>condensed</b> 13:21 <b>conditions</b> 82:25 187:3 <b>conduct</b> 45:23 82:21 184:15 <b>conducted</b> 115:2 127:20 209:15 <b>conducting</b> 83:3,7 149:17 <b>confidence</b> 38:18 39:22 49:6,14 51:4 53:13 95:9 118:6,16 122:6,8 145:1 161:15,16 161:18 162:6,9 177:11 189:9,11 <b>confidence-build...</b> 174:16 <b>confident</b> 189:22 <b>confirm</b> 118:13 <b>confused</b> 125:21 <b>confusion</b> 143:11 <b>Congratulations</b> 62:17 <b>congress</b> 69:9,13 <b>congressional</b> 69:14 <b>connect</b> 86:6,10 <b>connected</b> 13:23 14:14,17 <b>connection</b> 196:7 202:1 227:21 <b>cons</b> 174:13 <b>consensus</b> 38:21 171:17 207:11	220:25 224:9 <b>consequences</b> 47:7 110:4 <b>consider</b> 12:16 15:20 17:2 20:19 20:21 29:14 30:12 32:18 49:11 62:8 62:13 69:2 71:3 73:6 74:7,8,11 82:4,23 109:19 111:20 125:13,25 129:22 131:15 145:24 147:8 149:18 174:25 175:5 178:4 179:11 197:18 204:3 210:8 219:15 222:7 <b>consideration</b> 31:3 122:8 149:21 175:9 222:14 <b>considerations</b> 120:22 <b>considered</b> 27:3,5 73:18 92:17 196:2 <b>considering</b> 23:4 31:8 68:25 131:24 148:21 <b>consistent</b> 18:25,25 123:22 195:9 <b>constant</b> 97:19 <b>constantly</b> 212:12 <b>constitutional</b> 104:5 110:11 <b>constitutionally-s...</b> 133:1 <b>contact</b> 78:1 97:19 <b>contemplate</b> 175:4 209:7,21 <b>contend</b> 12:19 <b>content</b> 149:5 <b>contentious</b> 172:14 <b>contest</b> 47:5 57:21 58:25 110:25 181:14,16,25 182:1 <b>contests</b> 57:18 <b>continue</b> 3:3 15:25 93:14 109:15 118:17 129:21	143:5 173:11 193:8 200:11 228:7 <b>continued</b> 97:5 148:12,13 <b>continues</b> 201:18 <b>continuing</b> 3:7 80:3 110:5 <b>continuity</b> 194:4 <b>continuous</b> 68:8,9 <b>contract</b> 12:4 94:1 94:3 196:18 198:13 222:5 <b>control</b> 33:22 81:19 <b>controversial</b> 46:18 47:11 191:17 <b>controversy</b> 215:24 <b>conveniences</b> 142:8 <b>conventional</b> 86:14 <b>conversations</b> 166:12 193:13 <b>convey</b> 129:6 <b>conviction</b> 132:19 <b>convincingly</b> 144:18 <b>Conyers</b> 226:8 <b>copies</b> 5:7 <b>copy</b> 34:23 59:18 153:16 <b>core</b> 133:2 <b>Corporations</b> 142:23 <b>correct</b> 13:7 16:13 20:7 26:15 38:11 39:9 51:19 58:5 58:22 73:1 105:13 106:15 108:2 113:13 117:11 130:24 180:9 185:17,19 186:14 187:1 200:6,10 204:17 206:6,10 213:6 214:11 215:4 230:7 <b>correctable</b> 107:24 <b>corrected</b> 28:18 130:13 207:12 <b>corrections</b> 102:8 <b>correctly</b> 33:13 38:10,18 39:4,9	44:11 49:8 117:4 117:7 157:16 <b>cost</b> 31:3,14 34:7 35:11,15,20,21,22 35:24,25 36:5,6,7 41:23 45:10,22 46:6,7 48:17,18 48:20 51:4 72:5,6 73:5,13 76:19 77:8 78:19,21 79:3,23 83:4 144:24 145:6,24 145:25 151:12 154:21 162:22 163:3,5 197:12,13 197:17 206:3,24 211:9,21 212:25 213:10,20 222:2 <b>costs</b> 46:6 48:19 72:1,4 77:5,10 78:24 80:1,3 83:1 83:2 134:16 136:19,21 162:24 162:25 204:5 206:8 211:4,10 <b>couldn't</b> 84:3 89:11 215:13 <b>counsel</b> 37:14 52:10 108:21 109:2 129:20 220:3 <b>count</b> 16:10,18 38:9,13,15 52:20 52:20 54:14,16,24 58:25 64:22 82:5 89:12,16 125:13 129:11 138:5 145:18 152:2,19 152:25 153:4 154:24 155:7,8,9 156:17 176:11 178:7 198:4 <b>counted</b> 24:7 33:9 33:10 38:10,18 44:6 56:1 59:20 59:20 73:3 124:19 144:19 148:5,5 149:15 152:22 156:9,22 172:2,19 177:25 198:1	208:17 <b>counties</b> 14:1 15:24 16:2 32:22,22 34:2 46:11 58:17 63:20,22,23 64:7 64:13,16 65:15,16 65:24 67:6,7,8 68:10,11 79:18,24 83:1,7 92:24 93:1 93:1,3,5,6,15,16 93:16,17,25 94:2 97:19 98:1,2,20 98:22 99:23 100:18 103:6,16 104:11,21 105:1 105:21,24 125:14 125:15,17 126:4,6 130:17 136:8,17 174:9 193:22 196:6,19 208:17 211:13 212:5 <b>counting</b> 198:4 <b>countries</b> 144:10 <b>country</b> 154:7 173:9 <b>counts</b> 38:16 <b>county</b> 14:8,15 15:5,8 17:4,5,8,11 17:18,22 18:3,8 18:19 19:19,21 24:4,14 26:18,19 27:12 28:12,13 33:23 34:5,8,10 45:23,24,25 46:11 46:12,14,17 48:20 53:11,12 55:8 58:15 59:4 63:14 64:20,21,23 65:20 66:1,24 67:2 72:2 72:12,18 82:8 83:3,4,8 85:14 87:12 88:25,25 89:3,5 90:15 94:2 94:24 97:13,13,14 97:14,14 98:2,12 98:21 99:11 100:15,17,19,21 101:2,8,15 102:3 102:4 103:3 106:8 111:3 112:7 116:6
---	--	---	---	--

117:5 118:3 119:8 124:7,15 125:5,6 125:18 126:19 129:1 134:9 135:18 137:20,21 137:22 139:20 141:17 144:4,7 148:3 152:1,14,16 153:14 154:1,23 155:19 159:13,22 161:13 162:19 164:24 165:7 169:10 173:3 177:22 186:3 193:7 195:18 196:8 197:10,13 198:9 199:25 200:4 211:2,8 212:3,16 214:12 214:13,14 215:7 226:6 230:3 <b>county-party</b> 116:9 <b>couple</b> 31:16 45:7 52:23 68:15 71:7 81:12,22 102:3,4 102:16 103:23 107:13 127:6 129:17 130:2 167:7 179:5 221:22 222:13 224:11 <b>courage</b> 133:25 <b>course</b> 6:13 13:25 15:15 62:3 77:3 89:13 93:6 116:12 121:16 168:6,12 168:15 169:4,18 214:21 218:2 225:15,15 <b>court</b> 1:8 6:4,8,10 100:8 102:10 105:10,15 111:3 113:20 138:7,9 182:1 230:6,12 <b>courthouse</b> 98:14 98:16,18 200:3 <b>courtroom</b> 120:2 <b>cover</b> 168:6 <b>coverage</b> 99:4 <b>covered</b> 21:10	154:8 <b>covering</b> 6:6 178:4 <b>Covi</b> 130:23,24 131:3,23 132:4 <b>Cox</b> 60:6,8,10,13 60:16,19,22,25 61:3,5,9,12,15,18 61:22 62:15 75:11 75:19 77:9,14,17 77:19,22,25 78:8 78:10,14,16 80:9 80:17 81:14 82:6 82:13,16 83:12,18 84:13 85:3,10 87:6 88:9,12,16 88:18,23,24 91:12 91:20 94:10,12 95:15,17 130:10 131:12 136:11 169:6 192:22 219:19 <b>co-chair</b> 3:17 133:8 173:2 191:11 205:25 <b>create</b> 47:17,21 84:17 118:12 142:14 <b>created</b> 45:7 84:22 89:9 136:9 196:9 196:10 <b>creating</b> 47:4 <b>creation</b> 66:8 <b>creatures</b> 196:6 <b>credible</b> 110:20 <b>credit</b> 100:16 150:24 <b>crimes</b> 14:4 <b>crisis</b> 118:6,16 <b>critical</b> 3:6 4:18 33:3,3 118:8 122:9 123:4 132:21 188:4 191:13 201:2 <b>Crittenden</b> 2:2,6 3:13,15,17,20 4:20 62:16 110:10 111:2 167:17 178:13,15,17,20 184:4 186:10,16 186:20,23 188:8	194:23 216:6 217:4 <b>Crittenden's</b> 5:12 <b>Crosstalk</b> 9:13 184:5,10 204:9 217:13 <b>cryptographic</b> 47:18 <b>Curling</b> 110:9,10 110:10 120:2 <b>current</b> 10:22 11:10,13 23:22,23 25:5 36:21,21 47:15,18 70:5 71:12,18 96:24 109:14 110:5 134:13 141:23 150:6 182:16 191:1 193:15 195:24,25 200:14 218:20 219:3 <b>currently</b> 33:6 37:19 39:25 48:24 60:6 71:22 80:1 110:15 111:9,16 200:13 203:23 <b>curve</b> 85:8 143:3 <b>custodian</b> 33:22 <b>custody</b> 127:22,23 177:8,17 <b>custom</b> 76:22 <b>cut</b> 53:20 55:5 <b>CVR</b> 230:18 <b>cyber</b> 125:9,10 146:23 158:13 205:17 220:25 227:20 <b>cyber-security</b> 118:14 136:4 149:14 219:8 221:7,9 <b>cycle</b> 66:6 93:5 113:12 142:19 <b>cycles</b> 11:6 <b>Cynthia</b> 226:4	<b>damaged</b> 98:7,7,8 98:9 <b>dampness</b> 82:1 <b>Darin</b> 24:13 183:15 <b>data</b> 17:16,16 38:4 38:5 39:12 60:1 127:21 156:3 188:5 200:9 <b>database</b> 15:5 120:6 150:14,15 202:7,24 <b>databases</b> 138:4,12 <b>date</b> 174:10 228:23 <b>dated</b> 200:15 <b>dates</b> 11:4 <b>day</b> 1:10 14:19 16:9 32:6 33:10 68:5 81:25 82:20 90:24 91:21 98:10,22,23 99:12 101:9,10,11 101:13,19,21 103:14,17 104:19 116:14,18 124:13 125:19 126:7 130:8 135:5 148:9 167:4 176:11 177:25 197:23 200:3 201:11 215:8,9 220:17 225:7,9,16,17 227:16,18 230:15 <b>days</b> 52:17,23 61:21 73:8 106:10 175:22 176:1,3 177:2 <b>DC</b> 69:14 <b>dead</b> 172:25 <b>deal</b> 2:7 3:3 82:21 161:24 207:4,6 209:21 210:16 212:12 <b>dealing</b> 81:24 82:3 82:25 111:9 <b>deals</b> 114:4 210:5 <b>dealt</b> 100:11 105:20 131:13 177:14 <b>dean</b> 60:6,8,9,13 61:2,10,23 75:11 75:19 78:14 80:9	83:12 84:11 85:3 86:23 88:6,23 91:12 94:8 95:13 131:12 192:22 219:19 <b>dear</b> 6:8 <b>death</b> 49:21 <b>debate</b> 168:20 <b>debt</b> 139:4 <b>debunk</b> 150:5 <b>debunked</b> 150:8 <b>decade</b> 4:7 67:24 <b>decades</b> 91:16 138:25 <b>Decatur</b> 97:14 122:21 157:24 <b>deceive</b> 16:12 <b>December</b> 1:10 116:14 <b>decentralization</b> 15:20,21 32:18 <b>decentralizing</b> 120:7 <b>decide</b> 20:22 23:14 48:15 58:8 70:12 161:20 210:3 218:17 219:5 <b>decided</b> 18:4,12,14 48:23 63:8 67:5 67:19 80:14 <b>decides</b> 44:18 162:3 <b>deciding</b> 66:22 219:11 <b>decimal</b> 21:24 <b>decipher</b> 23:24,25 <b>decision</b> 59:1 68:17 73:10 91:14,16 92:17 112:11,13 128:7 131:5 132:16 139:3 157:4 220:18 <b>decisions</b> 44:24 63:16 118:9 130:17 144:21 229:10 <b>decrease</b> 104:20 <b>dedication</b> 99:1 <b>deep</b> 43:16 63:10 182:6
---	--	---	---	---

## D

**D** 2:1  
**damage** 97:16,20  
97:25



<b>deeper</b> 181:14	137:2,2	<b>devices</b> 29:3,6,10	214:13 224:23	<b>disabled</b> 29:2 32:7
<b>deeper-dive</b> 182:2	<b>depending</b> 52:20	30:10,23 63:16	226:2	32:8,10 111:15,22
<b>defied</b> 86:8	57:13 80:4 175:14	106:20 107:15	<b>differential</b> 215:17	120:22 190:3
<b>define</b> 11:10 34:17	176:4 207:5	134:14 141:6	<b>differently</b> 16:10	225:23
52:4 207:20	<b>depends</b> 52:13 57:9	148:21 149:1,3	16:18 113:7	<b>disagreement</b>
<b>defining</b> 11:15	112:13 175:19	151:6,10 169:15	120:12,13 219:24	195:21
<b>definitely</b> 55:5,21	187:3 207:13	169:21 186:12	219:24,25	<b>disappeared</b> 74:20
82:23 84:17 89:23	<b>deploy</b> 104:13	187:1 199:3	<b>differently-abled</b>	<b>disapprove</b> 115:11
90:9 94:5 177:1	195:15 225:8	214:21 218:6	120:22	166:15
189:23,25 190:11	<b>deployed</b> 224:17	224:18,23,25	<b>difficult</b> 49:9	<b>disassembly</b> 230:10
193:10	<b>depth</b> 179:11	225:14	101:23 220:17	230:11
<b>definition</b> 38:2	<b>deputy</b> 37:13	<b>device-marked</b>	<b>difficulty</b> 101:6	<b>disbanded</b> 192:10
80:23 157:5	<b>derailed</b> 164:8	225:22	104:22 106:13	<b>discern</b> 160:16
<b>degraded</b> 121:19	<b>describe</b> 39:24	<b>devil's</b> 207:13	107:22 108:7,15	<b>disclosure</b> 124:24
<b>degree</b> 41:24	<b>description</b> 147:17	<b>dictate</b> 42:10 46:5	131:17 210:2	<b>discomforts</b> 187:8
134:10,10 225:25	<b>design</b> 76:22	48:1	<b>dig</b> 39:19 43:15	<b>discord</b> 143:10
<b>DeKalb</b> 126:19	<b>designed</b> 16:12	<b>dictates</b> 46:4	44:4 214:18	<b>discrepancies</b> 47:6
153:25 154:23	135:23	<b>didn't</b> 67:16 83:24	<b>digest</b> 221:6	56:23 59:6,7
155:19 159:13	<b>desire</b> 196:15	83:25 84:2 87:24	<b>digging</b> 215:15	120:17
<b>delay</b> 17:9	<b>desired</b> 147:22	92:20 98:17 102:7	<b>digit</b> 86:15	<b>discrepancy</b> 57:19
<b>delayed</b> 101:17	<b>desperately</b> 153:2	105:3 108:1,1	<b>digital</b> 47:14	85:5 86:15,20
<b>delegation</b> 69:14	<b>despite</b> 101:6 150:7	125:14 155:5	160:11	163:20,24 182:25
<b>deliberate</b> 37:24	<b>detachable</b> 215:2	159:2 172:23	<b>digitally</b> 47:20	<b>discretion</b> 182:18
110:3	<b>detail</b> 43:1,17	174:13 189:3	<b>digitize</b> 47:17	182:22 183:5
<b>delighted</b> 123:2	161:25,25	221:3,3	<b>digitized</b> 59:18,20	<b>discriminatory</b>
<b>demand</b> 154:20	<b>details</b> 49:22 50:5	<b>difference</b> 23:24	<b>digits</b> 21:24	180:14
164:8 212:24,25	190:6 207:14	24:1 43:2 57:1,3	<b>dilemma</b> 46:9	<b>discuss</b> 168:20
213:13 214:6,17	<b>detail-rich</b> 132:16	59:19,22 85:11,12	<b>diligence</b> 133:21	174:12 210:21
214:25	<b>detect</b> 12:10 14:2	182:9 187:20	<b>diligent</b> 129:17	<b>discussed</b> 55:12
<b>demands</b> 3:23	16:6,17	188:3 189:10	<b>direct</b> 75:23 196:6	223:15 228:25
<b>DeMillo</b> 158:23	<b>detection</b> 145:9	211:21 217:6,14	202:1	<b>discussing</b> 179:22
<b>demo</b> 226:10,11	<b>determine</b> 16:10	227:10	<b>directed</b> 51:10	206:22
<b>democracy</b> 130:1	23:21 53:24	<b>differences</b> 86:16	<b>directly</b> 193:12	<b>discussion</b> 3:4 7:8
143:8 144:9 148:4	140:18,19	224:13	<b>director</b> 17:24	67:11 70:18 80:12
150:22 155:1,10	<b>determined</b> 20:13	<b>different</b> 2:14 3:1	25:23 37:13 96:6	80:15 92:15 132:2
163:5	181:12 183:15	10:7 25:4 26:2	96:22 99:16 102:5	165:25 166:6,21
<b>democrat</b> 152:16	<b>determines</b> 200:3	46:4 48:6 51:2	116:7 124:10,21	167:17,24 168:8
<b>democratic</b> 116:1,7	202:16	58:7 71:23 72:3,7	137:16 139:17	168:18 169:23
121:14 133:2	<b>deterrent</b> 39:15,20	72:11,21,25 83:21	<b>directors</b> 14:8	170:19 186:11
143:11 213:4	<b>detriment</b> 93:19	85:25 116:25	31:17,22 33:23	188:24 189:2,5
<b>democrats</b> 91:24	<b>devastation</b> 98:12	126:23 131:11	34:6 36:2 103:4	190:9 195:23
92:8 123:7	<b>develop</b> 49:14	134:12 135:10	124:11 211:2	216:7,8 218:8
<b>demonstrate</b> 89:22	52:23 118:8	157:7 171:15	<b>disabilities</b> 71:6,17	<b>discussions</b> 6:14
<b>denied</b> 94:3 230:9	<b>developed</b> 41:18,21	179:5 180:12,13	83:17 120:11	112:17 160:3
<b>department</b> 2:17	50:23,25	181:22,23 191:3	151:6 180:8	170:14,16 207:17
4:15 204:21	<b>development</b> 11:6	192:24 193:5,9,19	224:22	210:11 228:20
<b>depend</b> 201:9	<b>device</b> 15:7 26:21	195:8,8,17 196:9	<b>disability</b> 71:3	<b>disenfranchise</b>
<b>depended</b> 214:15	135:4 140:8	196:11,12,13,14	83:13,19 111:12	125:1 179:24
214:17	186:13 224:22	196:15,22 202:3,3	120:20 180:10	204:4
<b>dependent</b> 65:1	225:18	206:7 212:18	225:20	<b>disenfranchised</b>

204:6	165:5,21 211:11	78:9,11,14 183:21	<b>E</b>	<b>efficient</b> 201:20
<b>disenfranchising</b>	222:10 224:4	183:22,23 184:7	<b>E</b> 2:1,1 230:1,1	<b>effort</b> 4:19 41:23
124:22 219:2,9	<b>don't</b> 5:11 9:5 12:8	184:11,17 185:7	<b>eager</b> 192:11	70:13 91:22 92:8
<b>disparity</b> 65:16,25	13:5,10 20:14	185:13 186:10,15	<b>earlier</b> 7:7 56:6	105:1 154:25
67:7	21:25 23:13 25:3	186:22,25 203:21	62:10 85:4 102:22	<b>efforts</b> 3:7 131:8
<b>disproportionate</b>	25:24,25 26:2,14	205:4,5,7,14	140:17 169:5	<b>eight</b> 98:24
180:18	28:11 30:18 32:9	210:20,21 211:1	171:18 190:9	<b>either</b> 23:13 26:23
<b>dispute</b> 125:11	32:9 33:6 36:9	220:21,22 223:15	191:12 207:19,23	27:1 33:2 43:15
<b>distinguish</b> 55:22	44:22 49:18 50:22	223:16	208:5 209:13	56:21 83:22 224:8
<b>distinguished</b>	58:9 59:23 70:1	<b>dramatically</b> 25:4	218:4 225:20	<b>elderly</b> 125:4,6
158:24	72:12 76:25 87:20	26:1	<b>early</b> 7:14 14:19	144:16
<b>distress</b> 123:6	88:4 90:25 99:2,3	<b>draw</b> 86:6	16:9 27:1 32:6	<b>elect</b> 143:13
<b>distribute</b> 59:24	109:9 111:25	<b>drawback</b> 226:15	51:9 75:21 89:3	<b>elected</b> 128:5 154:8
<b>distribution</b> 44:7	113:19 125:16	<b>DRE</b> 110:12 111:8	97:13 101:23	154:13 162:8
<b>district</b> 38:14,15	129:11 135:9	<b>DREs</b> 13:10 30:14	116:19 177:6	164:13 226:9
45:21 110:15	138:1 147:12	30:14,23 31:6	181:5 197:22,24	<b>election</b> 4:3 10:7
152:9 200:3	155:11,25 156:12	102:8 104:12,13	198:3,24 227:16	13:1 14:19 15:1,3
<b>districts</b> 72:19	160:21 164:7	148:10,17 160:23	227:18	16:8,9,11,18
<b>distrust</b> 186:5,6	165:8 167:3	197:18	<b>earpiece</b> 71:13	18:14,22 22:15
189:9	171:22,25 177:12	<b>drill</b> 65:21 85:17	<b>ease</b> 91:3	24:15 25:5 29:25
<b>dive</b> 63:10 181:15	178:16 183:6,7,16	86:19	<b>easier</b> 40:14 49:13	32:6 33:10,18
<b>Division</b> 1:11 2:3	184:18 186:2	<b>drilled</b> 65:15	50:1 130:9 193:21	34:4 36:23 38:1
<b>Doctor</b> 203:20	195:20 197:1	<b>drink</b> 163:14	<b>easily</b> 88:1 222:24	38:11 39:2,7,18
<b>documentation</b>	198:6 202:12	<b>drive</b> 1:12 204:1	225:8	39:20,22,23 40:18
156:23	204:1 205:7,7,15	209:9	<b>easy</b> 87:25 170:25	40:19,21,23 41:2
<b>documented</b>	206:3 211:9,10,16	<b>Driver</b> 204:22	175:4 194:11	41:8,12,16 42:10
220:23	213:8 217:21,22	<b>driver's</b> 201:6	227:1,3	44:10 45:3,14,19
<b>dodge</b> 195:24	217:22 221:11,17	<b>driver's</b> 72:14	<b>eat</b> 7:5	46:11,20,24,25
<b>doesn't</b> 40:17 41:1	223:10 224:7	200:23 203:24	<b>echo</b> 221:14	47:8 48:6,7 50:4
97:17 108:13	<b>doomed</b> 62:23	204:5	<b>economical</b> 165:19	51:2 52:13,14
146:4 187:17	<b>door</b> 39:17	<b>drop</b> 188:16	<b>Ed</b> 163:17	53:9,10,12,12,23
202:21 225:5	<b>doors</b> 152:3,18	<b>dropped</b> 158:14	<b>educate</b> 87:14	56:19,22 57:7,13
226:3	<b>double</b> 74:10 100:6	<b>drops</b> 158:21	89:20 90:10	57:14,18,22,24
<b>doing</b> 5:3 13:12	<b>double-digit</b> 86:16	<b>drove</b> 18:10	138:17	58:22 59:12 63:2
39:14 40:11 42:9	<b>doubt</b> 55:15 84:6	<b>dry</b> 82:13	<b>educating</b> 192:25	63:11,13 64:20,21
48:21 54:6 64:14	147:21 173:5	<b>dude</b> 165:2	193:1	66:6,13 67:2 68:8
77:13 99:5,15	174:12 191:16	<b>due</b> 45:6 104:12	<b>education</b> 66:25	69:10 72:9 73:7
100:15 129:4	209:7 211:11	105:15 133:20	77:5,13 78:3,5,20	73:19 74:20 80:25
131:21 134:24	<b>doubted</b> 172:2	143:5	88:3 89:17,23	81:6,9,21,25
137:7 154:25	<b>Douglas</b> 19:19	<b>due's</b> 10:21	92:14 126:25	82:20 87:12 89:17
155:21 157:6	<b>download</b> 27:18	<b>Dufort</b> 123:18,22	145:10 169:9	93:5 96:6,21,25
166:18 179:6	<b>downside</b> 40:16,25	123:24 124:2,2,3	191:2,9,13 192:5	97:1,6 98:1,3
185:1 186:8	<b>down-ballot</b> 24:21	124:4,7,9	192:25 195:1	99:14,16,20 100:4
190:14 192:4	25:6	<b>durable</b> 32:4	205:6	100:7,9,9,15,19
198:9 222:20	<b>dozen</b> 77:23	<b>DuVal</b> 135:12,12	<b>educational</b> 65:4	100:21 101:9,10
228:25	<b>dozens</b> 154:8	135:14,17,17	65:22 87:2 90:17	101:11,13,19,21
<b>dollar</b> 79:7 206:15	<b>DPH</b> 210:7	<b>dynamics</b> 103:25	<b>effect</b> 12:4 83:16	102:5,19,24 103:3
<b>dollars</b> 18:18 77:15	<b>Dr</b> 54:10,11,22	<b>dysfunctional</b>	180:18	103:4,14,17,20
78:18,19,20 87:2	76:7,9 77:11,16	136:10	<b>effective</b> 129:24	105:9,16,23
139:4 142:7 163:5	77:18,21,24 78:6		<b>effectively</b> 127:3	106:19 108:24

111:3 113:12 116:9,12,14,18,22 117:10,13 121:19 122:9 124:10,10 124:11,21 125:19 126:7 128:2 130:16 136:14 137:1,8 142:19 143:4 148:9,9 150:6,11,15,23 151:4 155:5 156:14 169:10,12 170:6,6,12 171:10 172:15,18 173:6 174:2,23 175:5 176:1,7,8,11 177:25 178:5,10 181:5,13,15,25 184:8,9 189:13 191:17,22 192:2,3 195:10,17 201:20 203:1 204:19 209:16 210:17,19 211:2 213:15,15 215:9,21 220:15 220:15 224:3 225:7,9,16,17 226:8 227:16,18 <b>elections</b> 1:1 2:5 4:1,2 11:17 13:3 14:8 15:5 17:5 18:8 20:6,10,16 22:2,11 28:16 31:17,22 33:23 34:1,6 36:2,13 37:13 39:13 42:16 42:21 44:14,15 45:4,6,11,11 47:1 53:4,5,8,11 58:9 63:10,17 80:12 82:19,21 83:3,7 90:5 99:1 102:23 112:19 113:15,17 123:9,24 127:1,23 128:6,6,9 129:8 130:16,17 134:9 134:11 140:4,5,5 140:16,21 142:22 149:18 154:9 163:23 164:1	165:8 170:1,3,12 174:9,15 179:4 181:6 182:3,19 183:7 191:5 196:13 208:12 212:17 230:8 <b>election-contest</b> 181:18 <b>election-day</b> 16:24 27:1 <b>election-integrity</b> 12:19 13:19 14:6 138:23 <b>election-night</b> 201:19,24 <b>Election-prep</b> 32:16 <b>electoral</b> 127:8 132:16,18 <b>electoral-reform</b> 133:9 <b>electorates</b> 142:15 143:19 <b>electronic</b> 26:20,25 30:18 67:12 72:5 117:9 118:14 119:22 140:13 141:3,6 149:2 150:25 156:5 157:5 163:20 169:14 185:14 199:2,13,18 201:2 201:12 202:11 214:22 220:6 <b>electronically</b> 226:20 <b>electronics</b> 87:23 <b>electronic-based</b> 73:12 <b>element</b> 106:19 <b>eliminate</b> 158:18 216:2 <b>Ellington</b> 123:17 123:18,18 <b>eloquently</b> 136:11 <b>else's</b> 146:8 <b>Elsner</b> 164:20,22 164:24 <b>embarrassed</b> 69:25 87:21	<b>emphasize</b> 143:6 <b>empirical</b> 163:1 <b>employees</b> 104:24 <b>enacted</b> 50:18 <b>encoded</b> 199:24 <b>encountered</b> 203:1 <b>encounters</b> 106:13 <b>encourage</b> 106:12 147:15 <b>encryption</b> 203:16 <b>ended</b> 69:18 74:22 102:6 <b>ends</b> 86:11 <b>engage</b> 145:14 <b>engaged</b> 63:9 127:7 145:17 <b>engaging</b> 127:8 <b>engineer</b> 142:4 <b>engineered</b> 224:25 <b>Engineering</b> 150:20 <b>English</b> 144:16 <b>enhancements</b> 100:14 <b>enlarge</b> 71:18 <b>enormous</b> 65:12 69:10 73:4 <b>ensure</b> 13:16 16:22 32:23 163:25 185:9 215:1 224:19 <b>entails</b> 189:25 190:5 <b>enter</b> 19:22 <b>entered</b> 122:4 <b>entire</b> 24:3,5,7 71:15 91:2 130:18 213:15 <b>entirely</b> 148:15 162:23 164:3 <b>entitled</b> 158:10 203:3 <b>entity</b> 171:7 <b>environment</b> 56:13 87:18 <b>envision</b> 68:3 190:22 218:16 219:20,21 <b>envisioned</b> 68:7 <b>equal</b> 214:1	<b>equally</b> 90:1,22 92:17 <b>equated</b> 64:2 <b>equipment</b> 38:8 59:10 66:18,24 67:5,9,20 68:5,8 68:10,20 69:8,12 69:17 70:5,8,10 70:16 71:5,12,18 73:16 77:9,20 80:19,21,25 82:7 83:20,21 89:21,22 90:9,12,25 93:2,9 93:13,18,24 94:1 94:4,6,16,19 95:4 95:7,10 112:20 125:21 126:2 128:8 140:19,24 140:25 143:6,18 147:3 185:8 196:1 197:10,15,17 198:14 202:3 207:3 213:20,21 213:22 216:8 224:24 225:9,10 227:23 228:10 <b>equipment-type</b> 81:10 <b>equipped</b> 224:21 <b>equitable</b> 86:21 <b>equivalent</b> 181:17 <b>era</b> 87:8 130:6 <b>Eric</b> 122:16,16,17 122:19 123:16 <b>err</b> 223:20 <b>erroneous</b> 148:11 <b>error</b> 17:5,13,14 52:7 64:15 65:19 142:11 144:25 146:5 183:14 202:20 <b>errors</b> 13:15 20:7 39:11,11,12 65:9 86:11 106:15 145:7,9 149:8 <b>especially</b> 104:11 150:13 160:25 213:19 <b>essence</b> 109:19 <b>essential</b> 132:19	133:12 <b>essentially</b> 13:12 41:6 100:14 107:11 110:8 211:7 <b>establish</b> 118:11 <b>estimate</b> 77:8 79:8 <b>estimations</b> 79:1 <b>evaluate</b> 11:11,20 <b>evaluation</b> 11:25 <b>Evans</b> 24:14 <b>event</b> 97:9 <b>everybody</b> 29:5 32:6 64:8,9 79:22 82:10 85:1 87:3,9 87:10,11 100:1 114:17,17 115:17 115:24 154:18 166:13 186:3 202:7 203:24 <b>everybody's</b> 165:1 <b>everybody's</b> 152:18 184:19 <b>everyone's</b> 160:23 <b>everything's</b> 95:11 <b>evidence</b> 57:23 102:17,17 135:8 184:24 <b>evolved</b> 218:20 <b>evolving</b> 207:21,25 <b>exacerbate</b> 104:19 <b>exact</b> 20:5 161:25 172:16 <b>exactly</b> 27:4 34:16 51:17 60:16 61:22 113:10 122:5 160:16 163:15 175:10 177:18 178:22 182:10 194:13 198:17 214:2 228:24 <b>example</b> 33:7 42:2 42:4 48:2 55:21 58:16 85:18 91:21 185:18 189:10 207:24 211:6,8 212:22 <b>examples</b> 59:3 194:7 <b>exams</b> 61:15
--	--	---	--	---

<b>exceeded</b> 85:12 <b>excellent</b> 75:12 95:16 160:18 <b>exception</b> 98:20 122:25 <b>exceptionally</b> 104:2 104:10 <b>excited</b> 3:3 <b>excitement</b> 153:1 <b>exciting</b> 49:4 <b>exclusively</b> 56:1 <b>excuse</b> 73:19 220:12 <b>executed</b> 101:7 <b>executive</b> 137:16 139:17 <b>exhaustive</b> 66:17 97:3 <b>exist</b> 40:1 72:12 <b>existed</b> 66:15,18 <b>existing</b> 80:19,20 <b>exists</b> 163:25 <b>exit</b> 43:24 <b>expand</b> 49:12,16 <b>expect</b> 97:10 101:10 208:3 <b>expected</b> 75:12 <b>expecting</b> 157:7 <b>expedite</b> 129:23 <b>expense</b> 79:17 212:23 213:24 <b>expenses</b> 79:18 213:25 <b>expensive</b> 31:15 44:15 46:8 140:14 164:4 165:1 213:3 213:9,16 225:10 <b>experience</b> 53:25 54:4,5 58:21 64:10 65:4,23 73:16 74:12 77:7 77:11 84:7 91:17 99:19 111:14,16 111:21 134:15 152:20,23 156:5 166:22 205:9 214:5 220:16 <b>experienced</b> 24:16 93:5 124:15 <b>experiences</b> 84:2	<b>experiment</b> 87:17 <b>experimental</b> 53:24 <b>expert</b> 125:10 156:4 <b>expertise</b> 65:21 73:9 75:6 94:15 95:3,8 166:22 <b>experts</b> 14:24 16:15 49:17 74:9 119:23 125:10,12 149:14,19 158:5 159:7 221:1,7 <b>expired</b> 93:25 <b>explain</b> 21:16 91:25 183:23 <b>explained</b> 25:9 35:21 <b>explains</b> 19:25 <b>explanation</b> 18:13 24:25 <b>exponentially</b> 102:2 <b>exposed</b> 15:13 <b>express</b> 199:14,17 202:12 227:24 <b>expressed</b> 121:17 122:5 229:16 <b>expressing</b> 219:6 <b>expression</b> 163:22 <b>expressly</b> 230:9 <b>ExpressPoll</b> 101:16 101:17 <b>extended</b> 97:20,20 105:11 <b>extending</b> 102:11 <b>extensive</b> 14:1 <b>extent</b> 216:3 <b>external</b> 13:24 179:2,4 <b>extra</b> 165:5,9 <b>extraordinarily</b> 136:22 <b>extremely</b> 137:1 177:11 181:6 213:9	<b>faced</b> 46:10 <b>faces</b> 5:18 9:19 115:1 <b>facilitate</b> 201:20 <b>facing</b> 109:4 120:19 <b>fact</b> 13:6 15:12 16:3 20:22 25:2 32:25 69:18 90:1 94:19 117:16 138:16 149:7 163:2 172:21 174:15 175:6 181:21 187:6 195:19 203:7 208:6 222:3 <b>factor</b> 71:20 132:15 154:21 <b>factors</b> 222:14 <b>fails</b> 47:6 <b>failure</b> 151:14 203:10 <b>fair</b> 1:1 2:5 123:9 133:6 143:2 194:12 230:8 <b>fairly</b> 174:16 192:6 203:7 <b>fairness</b> 133:14 <b>faith</b> 175:19 <b>fall</b> 64:5 127:5 <b>fallible</b> 154:12 <b>familiar</b> 9:18 85:21 89:2 196:18 208:21 <b>families</b> 98:8 <b>family</b> 83:24 <b>fantastic</b> 101:21 <b>fantastically</b> 99:4 <b>far</b> 6:1 7:16 38:21 42:12 68:2 85:14 89:17 145:4 147:19 166:18 167:3 175:14 188:19 229:17 <b>fashion</b> 207:15,16 <b>fast</b> 10:24 16:25 68:2 107:16 224:15 <b>faster</b> 4:10 218:25 <b>father</b> 60:18,20	154:7 <b>fault</b> 50:12 <b>favor</b> 147:6 <b>Favorito</b> 7:25 8:1,5 8:7,12,15 9:5,8,12 9:15,23 10:1,4,11 10:13,15 21:2,5,8 21:13,20 22:9 23:6,8,25 24:11 24:19 25:10,14,16 26:22,24 27:4,8 27:21 28:9,13,24 35:13,19 36:15 37:3 110:24 138:23 158:7 160:8 <b>Fayette</b> 137:21,22 <b>fear</b> 133:7 <b>feared</b> 87:22 <b>feature</b> 132:22 <b>fed</b> 226:20 <b>federal</b> 71:22 73:19 83:3,6 113:20 138:2,7 142:22 180:6 202:9 216:18 <b>federally</b> 192:14 <b>feds</b> 78:18 <b>fee</b> 79:23 <b>feedback</b> 6:18 9:7,8 34:25 212:18 226:12,13,14 <b>feel</b> 40:20 70:1 83:15 87:11,16 90:22,23 91:3 114:16 122:3 127:25 129:16 146:25 147:13 161:18 168:3 194:2 229:14 <b>feeling</b> 91:13 189:22 <b>fellow</b> 113:6 <b>felt</b> 55:4 62:21 69:20 73:21 152:21 227:19 <b>fess</b> 11:5 <b>fewer</b> 40:20 <b>field</b> 93:16 121:13 185:5,10,12	<b>figure</b> 44:1,19 59:9 63:8 66:19 118:4 140:20 206:13 209:8,10 <b>figured</b> 97:6 <b>figures</b> 35:20 178:8 <b>filed</b> 25:3 138:2,3 <b>fill</b> 2:7 85:22 199:7 <b>filled</b> 74:4 86:2 <b>filling</b> 65:7 <b>final</b> 33:24 61:15 166:1,6 168:8,16 <b>finally</b> 16:25 33:14 39:21 48:24 84:8 170:5 <b>Finance</b> 2:15 <b>financial</b> 165:14 <b>financially</b> 140:15 <b>find</b> 5:11 16:1 25:1 30:20 39:10 42:8 43:7,7,16 50:15 56:5,8 63:11 72:23,24,25 74:22 117:6 156:7 157:4 184:24 190:12 221:17 <b>finding</b> 43:8 173:6 <b>fine</b> 3:15 14:17 49:19 181:3 198:11,12 200:18 205:10 <b>finger</b> 107:19 <b>finish</b> 51:15 75:18 143:14 <b>fire</b> 60:19 140:20 <b>firm</b> 141:21 <b>first</b> 6:7 10:5 14:10 29:11 32:3 37:15 38:19 42:17 45:3 66:23 67:6 76:10 76:21 94:21 95:23 96:24 98:21 99:12 122:14 123:2,20 129:2 131:6 133:3 146:23 160:20 167:8 171:22 191:20 213:12,23 228:22,22,23 <b>fit</b> 58:11 <b>five</b> 98:1 117:3
--	--	--	---	---

167:21 177:1 211:16 223:25 <b>five-vote</b> 57:14 <b>fix</b> 18:1 92:9 145:11 146:5 <b>fixed</b> 17:6 28:18 40:22,25 41:4 48:3,25 131:17 <b>fixed-percentage</b> 40:1,3,16,22 <b>fixing</b> 131:20 <b>flag</b> 2:21 <b>Fleming</b> 3:17 4:22 4:24 6:21 8:2,6,10 8:13,17,22,25 9:16,24 10:2 21:1 21:3,6,9,14 22:6 22:21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8 36:11 37:1,5 50:7,11,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 60:2,4,11,13,17 60:20,23 61:1,4,6 61:10,13,17,20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16,25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11,13,17,19 88:21 89:25 90:13 91:10,18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:10,12,15,19 128:21,24 130:19	130:22,25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19 192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:9 199:15,19,22 200:12,17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15	213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>Flesh</b> 199:15 <b>flew</b> 97:24 <b>flexibility</b> 50:2 219:18,21 222:22 <b>flexible</b> 222:22 <b>flip</b> 28:24 57:6,12 <b>flipped</b> 57:15,20 <b>flipping</b> 116:23 148:11 <b>floor</b> 92:2 171:1 <b>Florida</b> 20:5 22:14 28:8,9 52:18 59:3 59:4 63:4,4,6 64:10 <b>flows</b> 54:10 <b>fluctuate</b> 40:17 41:1 <b>fly</b> 102:9 <b>focal</b> 4:1 <b>focus</b> 2:10 49:24 63:5 133:9 161:1 177:13,21 178:9 218:3 <b>focused</b> 63:4 74:10 169:19 177:19 179:16 210:10 <b>focuses</b> 127:7 <b>folk</b> 156:2 <b>folks</b> 10:16 17:22 98:6 99:2 113:1 114:22 121:17 151:6 167:14 196:16 198:6 220:5 <b>follow</b> 79:16 115:23 129:15 223:7,16 <b>following</b> 2:8,9 9:21 98:24 129:3 181:21 <b>follow-up</b> 58:15 <b>fondly</b> 61:21	<b>food</b> 216:24 <b>foolproof</b> 36:23,24 <b>foot</b> 11:18 <b>force</b> 164:3 <b>forces</b> 133:15 188:1 <b>forcing</b> 188:1 <b>foregoing</b> 230:5,10 <b>foreign</b> 143:9 <b>foresight</b> 43:12 <b>forget</b> 99:9 <b>form</b> 1:20 134:25 135:2 <b>formalize</b> 7:15 <b>former</b> 60:5 135:18 169:5 <b>formerly</b> 215:7 <b>formulate</b> 7:10 <b>Forsyth</b> 152:1,14 152:15 <b>forth</b> 79:20 176:15 <b>Fortuin</b> 149:24 150:2,2 151:9,20 <b>fortunate</b> 69:8 192:9 <b>forward</b> 3:7 4:16 110:6 166:21 168:21 203:15 210:16 216:3 229:10,20 <b>found</b> 18:12 28:18 30:15,21 59:6 64:15,25 65:3,14 98:2 110:19 117:18 162:7 176:15 203:4 <b>foundation</b> 148:4 <b>founder</b> 144:5 <b>four</b> 13:22 28:25 63:25 165:10 168:13,14 175:7 175:22 176:1,3 177:1 197:9 <b>four-day</b> 55:19 175:17 <b>four-hour</b> 125:20 <b>fraction</b> 151:12 <b>fractional</b> 20:12,13 20:16 21:16,21 22:1 146:2 156:16 <b>framework</b> 11:14	<b>franchise</b> 4:1 <b>Franklin</b> 92:4 <b>frankly</b> 97:19 99:2 105:4 106:18 109:16 200:19 203:5 <b>fraud</b> 12:11 13:14 36:16 39:15,21 74:16,25 <b>fraught</b> 215:18 <b>free</b> 4:2 10:21 145:2,7 168:3 204:8,10,11,23 <b>freeze</b> 64:5 <b>free-flowing</b> 166:21 170:20 <b>French</b> 124:4 <b>frequently</b> 65:18 <b>Friday</b> 34:24 35:2 176:19,24 <b>friends</b> 120:12 <b>fries</b> 211:22 <b>front</b> 9:1 79:2,7 109:21 110:14 136:21 166:5 <b>full</b> 38:19 44:13 59:25 66:13 74:19 124:24 133:16 167:8 228:22 <b>fuller</b> 133:23 <b>fully</b> 87:13 <b>fully-integrated</b> 169:13 199:1 <b>full-time</b> 199:25 <b>Fulton</b> 17:11,18 102:4 111:3 119:8 141:17 144:3 148:3 <b>function</b> 84:16 <b>functional</b> 136:23 <b>functions</b> 185:9 <b>fund</b> 53:21 93:25 211:7,12,13 212:5 212:7,17 <b>fundamental</b> 45:9 125:23 <b>fundamentally</b> 136:9 <b>funded</b> 192:14,17 <b>funding</b> 34:7 83:6
--	---	---	---	--

90:10 93:14 94:3 169:9 205:21 211:5 <b>funds</b> 93:12 <b>further</b> 65:22 86:19 111:21 <b>future</b> 20:22 22:19 38:1 39:13 47:1 59:8 145:24 219:1 219:22 <b>FYI</b> 109:12	<b>gently</b> 5:23 <b>George</b> 162:11,14 162:16,20 164:19 <b>Georgia</b> 1:2,9,12 2:15 5:4 7:17 11:1,16,22 13:9 14:22 16:16 17:1 18:22 19:6 20:14 20:16 22:3,12 29:18 32:15 33:25 37:14,20 44:18 46:9 47:23 48:16 54:17 56:6 58:9 61:25 62:9 63:1 63:10 64:1,12 66:7,15,20,22 69:16 70:6,14 72:2 74:16,25 75:2 82:4,19 88:8 91:4 92:9 96:6,22 97:10,17,24 98:3 99:2,6,24 110:15 111:10 116:1,8 121:12,14 124:7 125:3,15 126:19 127:10,10,11,11 128:1 129:2,7,24 131:3 132:14 133:16,19 134:9 134:11 135:19 137:6,9,16 138:22 140:6,14 141:24 142:1,2,4,18,24 142:24 143:16 144:5 145:13 148:3 149:22 150:3 155:22 156:6 158:6,25 162:18 164:1,12 164:17 165:4,12 168:23 169:3,24 170:7,22 173:4 180:20 183:18 190:18 191:18 192:12 193:3,3 194:8 198:8 201:6 204:21 207:19 208:4,6 209:9,11 213:8 223:4 224:20 229:11	230:2 <b>Georgians</b> 16:24 164:4 <b>Georgia's</b> 129:13 142:19 150:4 175:5 <b>Georgia-based</b> 139:18 <b>Georgia's</b> 127:13 140:21 143:17 195:7 <b>Germany</b> 100:9 108:21,25 109:1 113:9,24 114:1 <b>getting</b> 6:17 15:6 72:24 75:13 91:3 93:2 98:4,10 101:22 104:22 129:12 131:17 155:5 163:8 181:4 181:5 <b>Ghazal</b> 116:5 141:4 <b>giddy</b> 99:14 <b>gist</b> 111:14 <b>give</b> 3:11 10:7 13:17 32:22 38:18 57:10 62:24 73:1 73:17 74:5 85:10 96:11,25 100:16 108:22 109:3 110:8 123:9 163:16 167:21,25 200:10 209:23 215:5 225:17 <b>given</b> 3:24 15:1 34:16 36:21 71:16 110:21 120:15 142:20 159:5 169:25 200:6 210:12 217:5,7,18 <b>gives</b> 15:4 203:24 <b>giving</b> 81:18 202:21 <b>glad</b> 35:6 75:6 <b>Glass</b> 98:19 <b>glasses</b> 107:22,23 <b>glossed</b> 169:4 <b>go</b> 6:22 10:4 11:7 21:22 23:1 25:22 25:24 26:6,9	28:22 40:7,10 43:1,7 44:21 56:3 56:8 62:8 64:9 66:19 67:3,17 69:22 70:21 71:12 71:25 72:1,13 74:15,21,25 76:6 79:9,13 84:2 86:25 87:18,20 89:22 101:6 104:18 108:2,19 114:5,12 117:5 118:3 124:5 128:7 136:2,13 137:24 140:1 144:10 152:10,24 153:3 155:14 159:19,24 161:3 165:18 167:22 168:19 170:18 172:5 175:14 177:9 184:21,23 190:10 190:25 195:7 196:3 199:5,7 200:13 203:11,18 204:5,13 206:10 211:4,6,6 213:13 216:10,20 223:18 224:8,15 226:24 226:25 229:3 <b>goal</b> 5:25 75:24 112:24 113:5,12 113:13,22 132:18 133:5,13 161:15 166:25 168:6 172:16 209:25 <b>goals</b> 133:4 <b>God</b> 2:23 92:5 144:11 <b>goes</b> 7:20 25:22 27:16 28:3 53:3 91:4 94:13 110:21 155:11 167:1,3 178:18,19 190:20 198:16 203:16 <b>going</b> 3:6 4:21,22 5:8 7:24 8:7,8,10 9:17 10:23 11:4 12:9 15:25 20:3 20:24 28:24 29:2	29:3 31:3,4,5 34:1 34:5,6,12 35:1,17 37:8,17 39:8,18 39:19,20,24 40:7 40:24,24 42:25 44:20,21 45:4 46:22,25 47:7 48:9,13,15,20,21 48:22 49:9 53:11 55:13,18 56:11 57:7,21 58:11 64:1 70:12 71:24 73:12 74:3,12,13 75:18 79:25 80:5 80:5,24 92:12 95:1,2,22,24 97:2 97:3,25 100:9 102:1 104:18 105:6 110:6,18 114:3,10,11,11,14 114:15,23,25 115:6,9,23,25 118:1 121:6,7 129:20 130:5,6,7 130:13 131:11 134:24 135:4 136:15,19,21,22 136:25 137:3 140:5,11 145:15 145:21 146:9,9 151:7 152:19 155:9,10 156:9 160:17,22 161:3 162:6,8 165:6,23 165:24 166:17 168:17 169:25 170:8,18 175:23 176:17,22,23 177:1 178:20 180:19 181:10,13 183:12 188:24 189:1 190:18 191:18 192:2,7 194:23 203:6,14 203:15,19 205:9 207:23 209:8,10 210:15,18 211:4 215:4 216:2 219:16 220:9,9,10 220:20 222:12
<b>G</b>				
<b>G</b> 2:1 <b>GA</b> 10:8,19 146:1 <b>gain</b> 172:10 <b>Gambell</b> 153:6,7 <b>Gamble</b> 153:8,9,10 153:11,14 <b>game</b> 100:20 212:5 <b>gap</b> 14:5,9 201:25 <b>GAPABA</b> 141:24 <b>Garland</b> 7:24 10:2 21:1,3,4 28:21,22 37:1 138:23 160:8 <b>gate</b> 101:20 <b>gathered</b> 70:9 <b>gathering</b> 89:20 <b>geared</b> 210:6 <b>gears</b> 21:7 <b>general</b> 4:15 37:13 45:4,11,11 66:7 81:21 97:1 100:4 108:21 109:2,11 116:14,22 117:9 167:18 174:1 180:9 218:15 <b>generally</b> 32:1 115:14 178:2 180:6 <b>general's</b> 19:25 <b>general-election</b> 45:15 95:23 <b>generated</b> 26:20 <b>generation</b> 142:2 <b>generations</b> 221:19 <b>generator</b> 99:24 <b>generic</b> 215:15 <b>generous</b> 115:8 <b>gentleman</b> 179:19				

223:22 228:5 229:10,10 <b>gold</b> 103:16 123:13 145:12 <b>good</b> 2:2 3:14 4:25 4:25 5:17 8:2 9:20,22 10:13,15 28:14 29:24 35:19 37:6 44:2,5,5 56:14 60:2,8,9,10 61:1 76:21 80:7 81:12 84:11,11,13 86:20 88:23 90:15 91:11 104:16 105:6 111:2 113:5 115:13,18 116:2 119:1 121:2,8 122:19,19 124:1,8 128:21 129:25 130:1 131:20 132:8,11,12 135:13 137:13 139:7,14,17 141:12 143:23 149:25,25 151:22 151:22 152:15 153:11,22 154:9 155:16 157:19 159:6,21 160:2,3 161:7 164:23,23 166:9,18,24 169:11 173:15,16 174:8 176:2 177:6 188:19 195:20 196:5 198:23 207:13 212:12 218:18 222:20 223:7 229:5 <b>goodness</b> 155:1 <b>good-looking</b> 172:24 <b>gotten</b> 94:23 108:10 <b>Governance</b> 111:2 139:17 <b>government</b> 2:14 83:6 163:18 212:13,13 222:21 229:16 <b>governments</b> 79:4	<b>governor</b> 2:7 7:16 45:19 112:15 167:5 168:15 229:8 <b>governor's</b> 18:22 24:16,21,24 111:1 111:5 <b>Governor-elect</b> 2:8 3:9 62:7 <b>governor's</b> 23:18 45:19 141:5 <b>governs</b> 183:8 <b>grab</b> 76:3 95:22 <b>gracious</b> 3:21 <b>grad</b> 142:4 <b>graduated</b> 136:2 <b>Grady</b> 97:14 <b>granted</b> 168:24 <b>grateful</b> 3:24 <b>great</b> 3:3 11:18,21 11:21 15:15 22:9 22:9 25:16,16 36:9 60:14,14 62:15,17 68:24 70:19 87:3 95:13 112:18 141:18 174:13,17 <b>greater</b> 57:2 85:14 133:10,13 197:18 203:9 <b>greatest</b> 144:23,24 <b>greatness</b> 164:7,9 <b>grew</b> 68:10 87:8 154:7 <b>grid</b> 107:11,11 <b>ground</b> 115:6,22,24 116:17 <b>group</b> 3:1 10:21 129:3,4,5 172:15 214:8 <b>groups</b> 3:1 126:23 127:1,4,4,7 138:13 179:24 180:11,12,19,23 180:24 192:13 225:20 <b>grow</b> 85:20 <b>growth</b> 68:11 92:25 <b>guaranteed</b> 135:24 <b>guard</b> 39:17	<b>guess</b> 58:20 92:19 162:7 176:1 177:12 190:5,11 <b>guidelines</b> 177:17 <b>guides</b> 128:5 134:15 <b>guiding</b> 147:14 <b>guy</b> 11:2 162:7 <b>guys</b> 35:15 96:23 109:3 135:21 136:14 137:2 <b>Gwinnett</b> 101:15 102:3 117:5 124:25 144:7 153:14 230:3 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>H</b> 159:18 <b>hack</b> 14:1,2 16:6,12 224:1 <b>hacked</b> 154:11 184:23 224:2 <b>hacker</b> 14:12 <b>hacking</b> 13:24 14:11 69:1 119:25 130:7 135:24 142:12 <b>hadn't</b> 102:21,22 <b>hair</b> 140:20 <b>hairdryers</b> 82:10 82:11 <b>Halderman</b> 120:1 <b>half</b> 57:2 146:2,4 159:2,3 173:13 179:18 <b>hallmark</b> 132:23 134:2 <b>hamburger</b> 211:22 <b>hand</b> 33:3,12 44:4 52:20 54:14,24 67:3,3 69:22,22 123:13 130:10 148:16 153:15 156:6 187:25 <b>handed</b> 127:14 172:2 200:7 <b>handful</b> 53:11 <b>handheld</b> 200:22 <b>handle</b> 114:14,23 114:25 115:6	147:7 155:13 <b>handmade</b> 130:3 <b>handout</b> 20:25 28:25 <b>hands</b> 87:16 91:4 94:23 113:21 <b>handwriting</b> 125:4 125:6 <b>handwritten</b> 120:21 <b>hand-counted</b> 39:2 39:4 198:1 <b>hand-mark</b> 130:14 158:12 188:1 <b>hand-marked</b> 31:5 31:9 32:19 120:8 122:1 125:8 130:4 135:2 137:6 138:20 140:6,25 141:7 147:6 149:15 150:19 151:2 154:19 160:3,6 169:22 171:5 187:20,22 190:1,7 218:7 221:1 <b>hand-marking</b> 151:15 <b>hand-to-eye</b> 48:13 <b>hanging</b> 63:5,23 218:20 <b>happen</b> 15:13 25:17 28:20 59:17 64:6 107:23 108:13 129:18 141:6 146:4 183:17 203:5 <b>happened</b> 6:1 17:8 18:13,24 19:13,18 22:12 28:9 63:9 64:3 66:15 68:12 68:13 97:12 101:13 105:17 106:16,22 118:4 154:13 160:19 177:25 215:12 <b>happening</b> 12:24 25:18 26:4 63:3 68:3,4 <b>happens</b> 15:9 50:10	50:11 74:16 101:11 122:2 158:15 165:15 <b>happier</b> 99:16,20 <b>happy</b> 75:9 102:19 106:23 112:2 129:5 147:25 150:1 151:23 153:12,23 170:19 211:20,21,22 <b>hard</b> 49:25 54:4 68:21,21,21 104:8 104:24 124:16,17 125:16,20 127:1 144:13 153:16 157:15 160:16 161:22 210:3 218:24,24 <b>Harris</b> 61:8 <b>Harvey</b> 95:24 96:4 96:5,9,16,18,20 96:21 107:7 108:9 125:14 196:23,25 197:3,7 206:19 <b>hash</b> 47:21 <b>hasn't</b> 6:1 114:9 <b>hate</b> 11:3 50:10 <b>hats</b> 136:5,5 <b>hailed</b> 70:7 <b>HAVA</b> 215:23 <b>haven't</b> 14:3 30:21 <b>haystack</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>heading</b> 93:7 <b>headquarters</b> 142:24 <b>heads</b> 168:2 <b>healthcare</b> 156:1 <b>hear</b> 8:21,23,24 9:9 9:14,25 10:9,10 13:21,22 19:5 37:9 49:24 96:3 116:3 119:7,12,14 124:14 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:2,14 148:1 150:1 151:24 153:13,24 163:3 166:13,14 169:11 176:14 186:4 212:11 220:6
---	---	---	---	--

<b>heard</b> 3:1 13:24 21:11 41:19 70:18 72:9 74:9 83:18 83:22 84:9 112:17 120:13 123:2,12 127:12 140:17 141:3 148:9 154:14 155:3 156:12,16 158:7 158:16,17,17 160:1,8,19 169:5 172:1 173:3,12 179:18 180:22,23 184:11 185:11 189:18 193:20 205:18 207:23 215:21,22 225:20 226:16 228:20	137:15,15,19,21 137:23,25 <b>herculean</b> 154:25 <b>here's</b> 114:12,22,25 174:11,11 <b>heroically</b> 98:4 <b>hesitant</b> 90:24 <b>hesitate</b> 229:4 <b>Hey</b> 76:14 81:14 107:25 188:1 190:17 222:12 <b>he's</b> 4:22 6:6 158:23,24 <b>Hi</b> 116:5 135:14 150:2 151:25 159:11,13 <b>hiccups</b> 102:1 104:18 <b>high</b> 43:21,22 81:25 104:17 109:7 111:25 202:19 <b>higher</b> 31:14 65:19 <b>highest</b> 64:15 123:9 <b>highlight</b> 60:1 127:15 <b>highlighting</b> 83:12 <b>highlights</b> 97:4 <b>Hill</b> 69:13 <b>hired</b> 70:4 77:22,22 <b>historical</b> 25:5,19 <b>Historically</b> 83:15 <b>history</b> 18:25 20:10 20:16 22:2,11 62:23 74:16,22,24 75:1 91:12,13 <b>hit</b> 97:3 98:10 107:13 194:8 <b>hodgepodge</b> 63:13 <b>hold</b> 9:9 21:1,3 96:10,14 134:9 159:14,14,14 178:18 181:3 188:18,18 203:20 <b>Holden</b> 99:10 <b>holding</b> 34:23 <b>holler</b> 212:8 <b>hollered</b> 189:4 <b>home</b> 19:22 82:10 <b>hometown</b> 142:5	<b>honest</b> 21:22 <b>honestly</b> 67:23 172:1 <b>honor</b> 10:17 37:15 154:22 <b>honored</b> 2:9 <b>hope</b> 6:7 7:10 13:16 73:10 122:7 123:9 129:5 131:14 171:16,18 172:13 192:11 <b>hopefully</b> 7:15 8:18 113:15 <b>horrible</b> 86:3 <b>horrified</b> 63:11 <b>hotline</b> 116:10,13 <b>hour</b> 7:2 228:5 <b>hours</b> 98:24 102:11 105:11 125:19 <b>house</b> 38:14,15 55:10 60:15 61:3 61:4 92:2 152:8,8 163:17 168:14 216:25 217:8 <b>houses</b> 98:7,9 <b>HOWELL</b> 21:16 83:11 <b>huge</b> 14:5 40:19 79:23 85:7 91:5 140:14 144:17 145:7 154:21 213:13 <b>human</b> 2:17 17:13 87:19 106:19,20 145:9 149:7,12 159:6 202:20 <b>humans</b> 49:7 142:14 <b>human-readable</b> 29:23 32:13 <b>human-verifiable</b> 127:21 <b>humid</b> 82:17 <b>humidity</b> 81:25 82:4,9,22 147:7 147:10 <b>hundred</b> 39:2 <b>hundreds</b> 116:19 116:22 145:8 195:16	<b>hurricane</b> 97:9,12 97:15 98:10 194:7 <b>hurricanes</b> 97:11 <b>hurried</b> 175:1,3 <b>husband</b> 71:9 <b>hypocrisy</b> 164:16 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>ID</b> 29:25,25 203:23 204:1,2,4,7,8,14 204:21 <b>idea</b> 35:10 46:16 52:19 154:20 160:18 172:10 174:17 196:11 206:2 212:12 <b>ideas</b> 174:13 <b>identified</b> 56:12 <b>identify</b> 11:13 56:3 <b>image</b> 47:14,17 <b>images</b> 47:20,22,24 48:5,7 <b>imagine</b> 97:3 103:25 213:14 <b>imagined</b> 131:14 <b>immediate</b> 107:17 <b>immediately</b> 203:10 <b>impact</b> 45:10 46:24 59:12 145:8 180:15 <b>impairment</b> 71:8 <b>imperative</b> 4:6 148:7 <b>implement</b> 20:14 34:12 49:9 110:2 143:18 169:25 171:11 174:14 191:22 <b>implementation</b> 3:8 14:4 112:8 192:15 <b>implemented</b> 12:13 22:3 47:19 67:12 89:3 213:24 <b>implementing</b> 80:15 125:25 191:14 <b>implore</b> 130:14 149:18	<b>importance</b> 38:24 83:13 90:17 143:7 191:7 <b>important</b> 3:4 4:17 5:4 8:15 31:2 32:2,7,17 44:23 55:18,22 69:20 70:11 71:2 73:20 89:23 90:1,21,23 124:13,14 131:5,9 138:22 141:19 142:17 144:8 160:5,7,12,25 163:6 169:12,18 171:20 172:5,9 174:25 175:2 177:11 179:18 181:6 192:5,16,22 193:10 201:15,16 201:17 202:15 210:4 220:13 <b>importantly</b> 39:21 127:25 <b>impossible</b> 149:8 173:6 <b>improve</b> 39:13 49:12 66:16 <b>improved</b> 70:24 132:25 221:24 <b>improvement</b> 10:22 11:10,13 <b>improvements</b> 54:7 <b>improves</b> 54:6 <b>inaccurate</b> 224:16 <b>inaugurated</b> 167:6 <b>inception</b> 129:4 <b>incident</b> 82:6,6 <b>inclined</b> 222:11 <b>include</b> 37:23 44:25 127:24 129:11 169:8 176:23 177:4 190:10 <b>included</b> 17:4 78:9 201:16 207:1,7 <b>includes</b> 118:12 148:23 <b>including</b> 2:15 94:2 134:12 141:4 <b>inclusion</b> 132:25
---	---	--	--	--



133:1,5,10,13,15 133:22 134:2 179:20 <b>incorrect</b> 27:25 <b>incorrectly</b> 33:10 33:11 <b>increase</b> 45:22 88:13 152:25 <b>increased</b> 30:1 34:5 134:15 <b>incredibly</b> 43:21 99:7 223:7 <b>independence</b> 71:14,17 84:8 196:11 <b>independent</b> 11:20 12:1 <b>independently</b> 38:3 38:6 83:14 84:3 118:15 <b>independents</b> 123:8 <b>indicate</b> 76:7,14 <b>indicated</b> 226:23 <b>indicating</b> 110:19 <b>indication</b> 104:16 108:12,14 110:22 <b>indigent</b> 204:20 <b>individual</b> 81:4 106:3,21 108:14 <b>individually</b> 106:7 211:13 <b>individuals</b> 19:24 83:13 114:7 208:2 <b>indivisible</b> 2:23 <b>industry</b> 156:1 <b>information</b> 16:2 26:15 32:24 39:12 150:7 151:1 163:20 190:12 201:23 207:2,7 228:11 <b>informative</b> 158:8 <b>infrastructure</b> 97:18 143:1 <b>initial</b> 181:17 <b>initially</b> 5:24 170:22 <b>ink</b> 65:1 74:3 <b>input</b> 136:1,21	167:19,24 168:8 168:18 188:21 208:1 212:15 229:20 <b>inputs</b> 136:14 <b>insanity</b> 157:6 <b>inside</b> 12:25 206:24 <b>insisting</b> 133:22 <b>inspect</b> 33:21 159:2 <b>inspected</b> 159:3 <b>inspector</b> 19:25 <b>instance</b> 150:19 <b>instances</b> 142:12 <b>instantly</b> 145:8 <b>institutions</b> 123:6 <b>instruct</b> 143:16 <b>instructions</b> 30:2 53:14 59:11 209:23 <b>integral</b> 62:1 <b>integrated</b> 206:9 <b>integrity</b> 2:10 10:8 137:8 140:15 145:13 150:4 161:2 195:10,18 <b>intend</b> 166:20 185:10 <b>intended</b> 121:25 156:24 227:17 <b>intends</b> 110:22 <b>intensive</b> 154:22 <b>intent</b> 44:11 74:13 89:10 153:17 <b>intention</b> 163:22 191:21 228:3 <b>intentional</b> 39:11 <b>intentionally</b> 16:12 <b>intentions</b> 148:6,24 <b>interact</b> 107:8 <b>interacted</b> 106:4 <b>interacting</b> 107:20 <b>interaction</b> 106:20 <b>interactions</b> 99:19 <b>interest</b> 5:16 166:8 180:24 208:11 <b>interesting</b> 46:9 48:14 50:15 88:21 190:8 <b>interestingly</b> 65:14 <b>interests</b> 141:25	<b>interface</b> 69:6 74:11 76:22 92:15 106:20 135:25 <b>interfacing</b> 108:15 <b>Interjection</b> 1:18 <b>intermediary</b> 136:13 <b>internal</b> 80:17 <b>internally</b> 28:3 66:14 <b>internationally</b> 123:13 <b>Internet</b> 13:23 14:11,15,18 15:7 15:14 68:1 227:22 <b>interpreted</b> 31:1 <b>interrupt</b> 189:3 <b>Interruption</b> 1:18 <b>intervention</b> 118:15 <b>intimately</b> 175:11 <b>introduce</b> 142:11 160:11 <b>introduced</b> 94:22 94:24 136:8 149:9 <b>introduces</b> 158:21 <b>introducing</b> 53:7 <b>intrusions</b> 146:25 <b>intuitive</b> 43:24 <b>intuitively</b> 40:18 <b>invalid</b> 17:3,7,16 17:19 <b>investigating</b> 106:1 <b>investigator</b> 97:23 <b>investment</b> 126:5 144:20 <b>invitation</b> 62:16 <b>invite</b> 170:19 <b>inviting</b> 180:3 181:8 <b>involve</b> 160:7 <b>involved</b> 49:7,22 129:12 134:11 150:11,23 155:4,6 175:11 177:10 208:1 223:4 <b>involving</b> 111:6,6 <b>in-house</b> 95:4,8 <b>iPad</b> 107:16 219:14 <b>iPhone</b> 107:16	219:14 <b>irregularities</b> 181:16 <b>irregularity</b> 182:20 <b>Island</b> 42:18 <b>isn't</b> 27:13 164:17 196:21 <b>isolated</b> 145:9 <b>issue</b> 32:16 82:9 84:21 102:11 106:3,17,17 109:24 113:11 123:4 141:19 142:17 147:2 155:4 163:6,7 170:9 195:21 197:23 218:10 <b>issued</b> 110:18 203:2 224:19 <b>issues</b> 14:10 30:23 31:22 64:18 69:1 71:25 72:8 75:7 82:22 101:12 102:13,15 105:2 105:20 120:20 122:23 123:6 138:6,8,11,12 139:24 142:6 149:12 215:20 216:9,17 <b>item</b> 163:12 205:17 <b>items</b> 59:9 <b>iterate</b> 39:14 49:12 <b>it'll</b> 8:18 <b>it's</b> 2:8 4:25,25 10:17 14:15,15,17 16:10,18 18:24 22:12,25 23:22 30:3 31:2 34:1,6 35:25 37:20,22,23 40:22,23 41:12,12 41:17,18 43:21 44:23 46:23 47:1 49:3,9 50:1,11 51:16 52:3,17 53:9,9,11 54:2,2 54:12 57:6,7 58:7 58:12,25 59:9 60:8 61:24 62:15 72:17 73:8 78:25	78:25 79:6 81:12 87:19,25 90:21 91:1 92:16 97:2 102:1 107:11,11 108:13 109:7,11 110:11 111:2 113:13 114:21,21 115:19 118:1 124:4 125:13 129:15 130:4 131:7,9 135:2,7 138:22 139:25 140:10,11 144:17 145:6,7 146:2 147:5,17 155:1 158:3,4 159:11,23 160:5,12,13,23,24 164:25 165:1,2 168:18 171:19 172:3,3,9 173:10 173:10 175:1,4 176:3,4 184:25 185:14,15,24 188:3 189:21 191:2 192:16 193:21,25 195:3,3 196:21,25 197:1 200:14 201:1,1,5 204:2,10,11,25 206:9,9 207:15 210:3 212:19,19 212:19 213:2 215:14,18 216:25 222:5 224:1 228:16 <b>I'd</b> 2:18 33:24 35:5 114:12 164:16 167:20,20 171:24 197:1 203:22 216:12 <b>I'll</b> 62:1 109:9 115:20,20,24 122:13 127:15 171:1,22 191:12 191:12 198:24 203:21 218:3,3 220:2,4 <b>I'm</b> 2:6 3:23 8:7 9:20 10:8,19,23 11:2,4 20:24 21:5
---	--	---	---	---

22:21,23 23:8 24:6 27:21 28:24 29:2,10 35:4 37:13,17 42:25 44:21 49:20 51:14 51:14 57:8 59:23 61:12 62:4 74:9 75:9,14 77:11 79:9 89:1,2,17 91:5,13 96:5,21 97:2,3,5 102:21 102:25 109:8,9 113:6 114:14,15 119:8,9 121:6,7 121:12 122:21,21 123:11,14 124:2,2 124:4,24 126:19 129:5,12 131:3 132:13 134:8,22 135:17,19 137:15 137:19,25 139:16 139:16,18,23 141:16,19 142:1,3 144:3,4 145:21 146:9,9 147:2,13 148:2 150:2 151:7 151:25 152:13 153:14,14,25 155:19 156:4,16 157:18,24 158:1,2 161:3,12 164:24 165:16,24 166:17 167:8,25 170:18 170:19 183:15 188:24 199:9,22 206:6 207:11,11 207:12,23,23 208:21 210:21 214:4 219:14 221:9 227:13 228:5 <b>I've</b> 11:2 28:25 46:6 49:17,20,21 70:18 91:20 122:23,24,25 123:12,12 129:3 131:6 134:11,12 134:20 146:22 147:18 150:3 153:18 154:7,8	155:3 158:1 160:8 165:16 168:22 172:1,1,3,13 173:3 175:12,12 189:11 193:20 223:13 224:15 <hr/> <b>J</b> <b>JABLONSKI</b> 53:18 80:9 181:21 182:10 195:13 202:6,18,24 <b>Jackson</b> 8:20,24 36:11,12 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11 79:13,21 85:2,3 86:24 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 171:2 173:21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1 <b>Jacqueline</b> 164:20 164:20,20 <b>Janine</b> 123:18,19 123:19 <b>January</b> 4:14 7:13 7:14 51:7 110:17 167:9 228:22 230:15 <b>jar</b> 44:5,7 <b>Jeanne</b> 124:2,3,5 126:9 <b>jellybeans</b> 44:5 <b>Jen</b> 118:24,24,24 120:23 <b>jingo</b> 165:20 <b>job</b> 44:5 60:2 115:18 121:8 129:14 131:20 147:17 159:6 164:15 165:7 166:18 189:14 <b>jobs</b> 58:20 142:24 <b>John</b> 149:24,24,24 150:2 151:7,18 153:19,20,22,25 155:15 189:7 192:20 193:11 194:3	<b>join</b> 2:19 <b>joined</b> 3:5 125:2,7 <b>joining</b> 147:24 <b>joke</b> 115:13 <b>Joseph</b> 134:5,6,6,8 135:11 <b>journey</b> 42:15 <b>judge</b> 24:12,13 27:25 33:18 57:21 81:11,12,14,15 82:12,15,18 88:20 89:25 90:1 91:7 93:23 98:14 104:23 110:14,18 110:21 120:1 174:3,5 175:24 177:20,21 182:13 182:14,15 183:2 184:3,6,9,15 185:17,19,23 186:2 188:9,10 192:19 194:13,16 194:17,18 195:21 195:22 197:9,12 197:16,25 198:3 198:10,12,17,19 198:22 199:12,13 199:17,21,24 201:9 202:14,15 202:19 204:13,17 205:6 206:25 207:1 209:12,13 210:4,5 213:18,20 214:2 216:23,24 217:5,11,16,20,23 218:1,23 228:8,9 <b>judges</b> 102:10 <b>judge's</b> 90:18 <b>jump</b> 166:16 168:4 <b>jurisdiction</b> 174:24 192:9 212:10 <b>jurisdictions</b> 81:22 134:17 173:9 193:24 194:9 208:23 <b>justice</b> 2:24 <b>justify</b> 221:11,12 <hr/> <b>K</b> <b>Kathy</b> 130:10	136:11 161:7,7,12 169:6 <b>keep</b> 5:25 6:2 56:2 64:8 68:10,11 71:20 72:23,24,25 92:14,23 93:1,4 93:11,15 104:15 111:19 115:12,14 154:17 177:17 179:13 180:21,21 201:16 220:19 <b>keeps</b> 134:16 <b>Kemp</b> 3:9 62:7,7 94:14 97:23 110:9 120:2 <b>Kemp's</b> 2:8 <b>Kennesaw</b> 15:2,13 17:18 94:13,17,17 94:21 136:12 146:24 150:13 <b>Kentucky</b> 50:16 <b>kept</b> 71:1 89:19 184:22,22 214:6 <b>Kevin</b> 37:5,6,12 50:7 58:15 60:2 179:1 206:10 <b>key</b> 4:4 194:24 <b>kick</b> 143:14 <b>kicks</b> 80:6 <b>kind</b> 11:4 26:8 31:23 40:11,14 43:16,19,21 44:4 46:16 47:25 49:3 51:1,17 52:17,18 54:8 70:13,15 71:16 76:23 81:8 107:21 109:12 114:16 140:19,24 140:24 144:11 154:22 156:13,19 156:19 158:3 165:12 168:2,18 169:16 187:9,15 191:3 194:10 213:16 <b>kinds</b> 20:21 86:11 165:9 179:5 208:1 216:19 <b>kinks</b> 101:22,23 <b>Kirk</b> 134:5,6,8,8	<b>KISS</b> 151:10 154:15,16 <b>knew</b> 64:8 86:12 87:23 92:25 209:4 <b>knocked</b> 152:3,18 <b>know</b> 3:25 4:15 5:6 5:9,18,19 6:14 8:3 10:19 11:2 13:1,9 18:7,17,17,24 19:4,13,24 20:4 21:11,21,22,25 22:2,12,13 23:13 25:3,23 26:1,2,14 26:19,23 27:19 28:11 31:15,17 33:11 34:20,21 35:16 36:15,25 38:20 39:16,17,18 40:6,11,12,14,24 41:13,25 43:5 46:11 48:4,10,17 49:4,9,12 50:16 51:17 52:3,17,21 53:8 54:17 55:18 56:22 57:10 59:21 59:23 60:13 62:6 62:8 68:1 69:25 71:16,18 73:7 74:2,3,21 75:17 76:4,23 77:1,25 78:25 79:8,22 80:24 82:24,25 85:10,22 86:17,19 87:10,13,23 92:5 92:7,10 99:17 101:22 102:12,16 104:7,15,23 106:14 107:9,14 109:9 110:21 111:12,24 112:24 113:13,16 114:4 122:3,23 123:5,11 123:14 125:22 129:5 130:17 131:6,8,18 138:2 138:25 140:2 142:9,9,25 144:8 144:10,13,14,20 145:4,7,14 146:1 146:21 147:4,6,11
---	---	---	---	--

148:18 150:12	128:18,18,19,20	111:23 180:4	211:1 220:21,22	54:23 59:1 77:11
152:11 156:18	128:20,23 129:1,1	210:14 215:25	223:15,16	143:4 218:15
160:21,23 161:22	130:21	<b>lawyer</b> 129:19	<b>left</b> 5:13 29:1 63:16	228:7
163:13,24 164:17	<b>KSU</b> 120:5 136:3	142:3	120:15 179:22	<b>level</b> 19:17 34:8
165:5,7 167:23	<b>L</b>	<b>lawyers</b> 142:1	<b>legal</b> 104:7 108:23	42:13 43:18 54:18
168:18 172:7,8	<b>labor</b> 48:18 154:22	<b>lay</b> 217:23	110:4 177:7	56:8 65:15,23,23
173:9 174:21	<b>lack</b> 83:15 110:13	<b>layperson</b> 189:10	210:13	71:14 83:3 93:15
175:10,12,13,16	124:14 156:14	199:4	<b>legalize</b> 12:10	94:15,24 95:2,9
175:25 176:14	171:25 172:4	<b>lead</b> 2:18	<b>legally</b> 30:9	101:8 109:7
177:16 178:6,7,20	189:8	<b>leaders</b> 143:13	<b>LEGEND</b> 1:17	111:25 140:21
179:15 180:1,11	<b>lagging</b> 133:20	<b>leadership</b> 144:11	<b>legislate</b> 49:18	149:5 150:13
180:11,22 181:10	<b>laid</b> 7:20 112:23	<b>leading</b> 100:8	<b>legislated</b> 51:5	164:10 170:2
181:12,12,14	<b>lakes</b> 74:23	133:20	<b>legislates</b> 50:8	181:2,23 190:10
182:11,13,17,21	<b>language</b> 29:20	<b>League</b> 127:9,10	<b>legislation</b> 34:19	209:22 211:25
183:5,16 186:2,5	72:4 104:7	192:9	54:3 192:17	222:24 223:2
186:11 187:16,22	<b>languages</b> 71:21,23	<b>leaning</b> 157:4	195:24,24 204:13	<b>levels</b> 181:24 212:4
189:10,14,16,17	72:7 180:12	<b>learn</b> 46:24 47:1	207:20 209:7,9,14	<b>lever</b> 63:19 218:21
189:19,25 190:5,6	<b>large</b> 44:2 190:13	57:11 59:2 91:13	209:18 210:6	<b>Lewis</b> 97:24
190:9,11,12,13,13	195:7 196:25	91:17 122:22	222:8	<b>libertarian</b> 135:18
190:15,16,17	222:23 229:1	193:4	<b>legislative</b> 4:14	135:20,22 137:5
191:11,19,23	<b>larger</b> 63:22	<b>learned</b> 15:12	50:1 51:22,24	<b>libertarians</b> 123:8
192:1,8,14,23	133:13	39:14 122:24,24	91:24 142:21	<b>liberty</b> 2:23
193:2,3,4,6,9,24	<b>largest</b> 125:18	123:12 129:3,10	200:4 209:22	<b>license</b> 72:14
197:1 199:22	<b>Las</b> 153:8	129:12 170:11	<b>legislators</b> 66:13	200:23 201:7
201:4,11,13,23	<b>lasted</b> 219:17	189:23	113:6 170:3	203:24 204:5
203:2,5,8,24	<b>lastly</b> 13:8 164:13	<b>learning</b> 58:21 85:7	<b>legislature</b> 3:8 7:14	<b>Licensing</b> 1:11 2:3
205:7,7,12,15,19	164:15	123:11,15	7:16 12:3 37:25	<b>lieu</b> 36:25
206:14 208:5,22	<b>lasts</b> 219:3,23	<b>lease</b> 222:13 223:1	44:25 48:12 50:3	<b>lieutenant</b> 18:22
211:4,5,9,10,16	<b>late</b> 92:4 167:2	223:11 224:10	50:8,24 51:7,9	23:18 24:21,24
211:17 215:8	<b>latest</b> 76:13,20	228:10	53:3,18,21 54:1	110:25 111:5
216:1,6 217:22,22	<b>laugh</b> 115:13	<b>leased</b> 223:14	62:12 66:5 72:18	141:5
219:9,19 220:4,14	<b>laughingstock</b>	<b>leasing</b> 222:6,19	88:10 89:13 91:19	<b>life</b> 11:6 49:24
220:16 221:1	143:5 156:13	223:13,16	92:20,21 94:5	70:14 71:15 142:8
222:3,8,16 223:17	<b>launch</b> 113:17	<b>leave</b> 29:1 33:24	110:2 112:14	171:25
223:20,22,25	<b>law</b> 2:11 11:19,21	53:23 115:20	143:16 161:20	<b>lifetimes</b> 76:11
224:1,9,20 225:12	11:24 12:2,3	182:22 188:22	162:3 165:19	221:19
225:25 226:2	13:11 41:4 56:19	209:14	167:1,2 168:11,13	<b>light</b> 196:17
229:5,14	60:7 61:11,14,19	<b>leaves</b> 13:14 14:23	170:9 171:19	<b>lights</b> 125:16
<b>knowing</b> 84:8	112:15 141:21	16:20	190:23 196:10	<b>liked</b> 67:20 104:14
95:12 148:23	142:1,4 177:2	<b>led</b> 66:21 93:4	205:16 210:25	105:4
189:22	182:16,18 183:7	<b>Lee</b> 54:10,11,22	228:13 229:8	<b>limit</b> 42:2,3,4,9
<b>knowledge</b> 56:11	216:14 224:21	76:7,9 77:11,16	<b>legitimate</b> 23:11,14	<b>limitations</b> 149:7
<b>known</b> 119:24	<b>laws</b> 42:19 183:4	77:18,21,24 78:6	24:1,9 25:25	149:12 222:21
172:3	183:10 195:25	78:9,11,14 158:9	<b>legitimately</b> 26:11	<b>limited</b> 117:13
<b>knows</b> 29:5 64:9	216:19	165:2 183:21,22	<b>lesser</b> 93:17 133:3	144:16
87:9 144:11	<b>lawsuit</b> 25:2 124:25	183:23 184:7,11	<b>lessons</b> 170:11	<b>limiting</b> 167:24
219:13	138:2,3	184:17 185:7,13	<b>letting</b> 37:16 87:16	<b>limits</b> 5:23
<b>Krista</b> 126:12,12	<b>lawsuits</b> 16:15	186:10,15,22,25	<b>let's</b> 7:24 14:8	<b>line</b> 4:10 18:10 86:6
126:16,16,18	109:8 111:11,13	203:21 205:4,5,7	222:16	104:15 118:5
<b>Krugman</b> 128:17		205:14 210:20,21	<b>let's</b> 6:2 33:7 51:15	125:17 177:23

205:16 210:2 224:8 <b>lined</b> 101:20 104:18 <b>lines</b> 68:11 72:17 84:18,22 86:10 93:4 99:17 102:15 102:16,21,22,25 103:1,5,6,10,11 103:14,17,20,23 103:24 104:20 106:1 125:15,20 147:5 162:22 174:7 <b>list</b> 81:3,7 115:25 201:9,14 <b>listen</b> 49:25 138:22 158:5 159:7 <b>listened</b> 165:16 189:2 <b>listening</b> 51:14 165:6 <b>lists</b> 117:20 <b>literally</b> 64:7 98:18 124:18 <b>litigation</b> 100:10,11 104:12 109:3,4,14 109:15,18 110:5,6 111:8 112:1 145:25 180:2 181:8 <b>little</b> 6:18,23 9:2,4 9:14 10:7 31:9 34:6,7,7 42:23 79:6 84:5 85:8 97:21 103:12 105:23 119:17 120:10,14 156:6,8 156:13 160:15 178:21 190:17 196:9 200:15,22 212:22 215:17 219:13 222:12,16 222:17 <b>live</b> 121:11 123:5 125:3 137:18,21 139:15,19,20,21 159:13 162:19 193:3 200:3 <b>lived</b> 142:2 147:9	193:2 <b>living</b> 72:15 92:4 <b>Liz</b> 159:10,10,11,25 161:4,6 <b>loaded</b> 90:7 <b>lobbied</b> 89:13 <b>lobbying</b> 69:12 <b>local</b> 55:15 58:19 66:12 72:19 73:7 78:1 79:3 98:3 100:16 102:23 134:17 171:10 173:6 212:13,15 <b>locale</b> 72:2 <b>localized</b> 53:10 101:14 106:3,8 <b>locally</b> 129:7 189:14 <b>local-election</b> 171:7 <b>location</b> 103:7 208:8 209:1 <b>locations</b> 103:8 105:11 208:9 <b>locked</b> 15:9 74:21 <b>logged</b> 116:13 <b>logic</b> 14:2 16:4,19 86:9 <b>logical</b> 24:25 145:2 <b>logistically</b> 31:25 <b>logistics</b> 31:13 <b>long</b> 42:14 52:11,19 61:1,11 68:12 84:17,22 98:17 104:2,5,10 129:18 146:20 154:5 181:3 201:12 218:14,16 219:3 219:16 <b>longer</b> 93:4 103:5,7 103:11,12,15,17 103:21,22 <b>look</b> 14:8 22:19 25:18 31:24 33:19 39:19 40:13 43:3 53:6 55:21 76:7 76:14 85:18 87:2 89:15 94:6 103:24 103:24 118:3 125:22 130:14 144:22 147:4	160:17,22 170:7 183:19 186:16 188:12 190:16 192:25 199:9 203:6 210:9 216:14,20,21 225:12 229:20 <b>looked</b> 35:16 98:14 101:18 103:1 131:19 160:15 226:2,2 <b>looking</b> 4:16 27:19 29:2,3 38:7 47:25 55:20 112:8 140:9 140:22 167:9 169:13,14 199:1,2 201:14 216:19,22 219:20 220:11 <b>looks</b> 135:19 172:7 172:8 191:19 225:24 <b>lose</b> 18:16 128:3 182:16 <b>losing</b> 158:16 <b>lost</b> 17:23 18:1,3,20 19:3,12,24 23:2,3 23:16,17 24:3,3,5 24:6 27:13,13 63:12 64:2 66:3 102:13 129:13 134:21 207:19 225:25 <b>lot</b> 5:18 8:20,22 9:18 15:16 17:3 17:17,22 31:12,17 42:15 43:18 45:15 46:10 49:22,22 58:9 65:3 69:13 70:18,19 72:5 73:9,11,12 74:9 75:2,3,3,5 76:19 77:4,13 79:18 81:1 83:2,19 92:13,14 97:5 99:3,3 101:21 104:8 110:19 113:2 115:1 118:1 120:12,19 121:17 121:21 122:24 126:4 129:3,9,9	129:10 131:7,13 132:17 136:23 152:3,5,18 154:22 160:1,2 166:22 169:19,22 173:5 175:12 179:16 186:11 189:18,19 191:3 196:11 202:25,25 207:10 210:6,11 212:17 215:5 216:8 220:5 221:6 227:23 229:5 <b>lots</b> 106:16 156:12 <b>loud</b> 21:15 23:2 <b>loudly</b> 212:8 <b>love</b> 76:2 96:3 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 131:1 141:14 154:20 172:15 <b>loved</b> 84:7,7 226:15 <b>low</b> 79:4 <b>lower</b> 133:21 134:16 <b>lower-down</b> 19:1 <b>lowest</b> 145:5 <b>lowest-tech</b> 147:19 <b>Lowndes</b> 17:8 <b>luck</b> 134:21 <b>lunch</b> 7:1,4 60:5 75:20,22 95:19 <b>Lynn</b> 26:17 55:7,8 58:13,15 66:10 90:13,14 112:6 113:9 173:1,2 191:10 193:23 200:17 207:17 224:13 <b>Lynne</b> 161:7,7,12	108:15 111:8 116:21,24 117:6 117:11 163:12 185:15 199:5,12 200:8,10 210:11 <b>machinery</b> 138:11 <b>machines</b> 4:5,5,13 7:17 12:2 13:23 16:7 17:7,13,19 17:23 19:5,12 20:3,4,8,13,14 22:3,12,20 26:25 30:18 36:22,25 40:5 48:10 54:5 63:19 64:4,8 79:19 80:1,14 82:3 101:16 107:4 108:7 110:9,12 111:6 117:2,6,13 120:4 142:10 162:24 163:2,4 164:5,13,14 165:5 179:7 194:11 196:19 197:21 210:20 218:21 219:7 224:13 225:6 <b>Macon</b> 1:12 2:4 60:7 61:16 97:21 146:19 <b>Macon-Bibb</b> 132:13 <b>mad</b> 6:10 <b>Madam</b> 4:24 109:1 168:1 178:14 186:9 194:22 216:5 <b>Madison</b> 124:7 <b>mail</b> 15:6 32:6 36:14,17,20,22,24 209:2 213:1 225:15 <b>mail-in</b> 24:14,17 27:2,5 33:7 55:25 131:15,24 147:8 <b>main</b> 39:24 68:15 68:15 164:6 187:18 197:12 <b>maintain</b> 32:8 80:1 193:16 202:7
---	--	---	--	--

205:17	<b>manual</b> 32:9 44:13	142:6 200:13	208:7	184:13 186:19
<b>maintaining</b> 94:6	48:13 130:15	<b>maximize</b> 219:18	<b>meaningful</b> 134:18	188:17,25 228:15
127:22 192:21	163:21 201:9	<b>ma'am</b> 176:6	134:24 207:15	229:12,19
<b>maintenance</b> 31:13	<b>manufactured</b>	<b>McCoy</b> 24:13,13	<b>means</b> 31:17 40:4	<b>memories</b> 63:3
94:1,3	63:19	25:23 27:25 81:12	42:5 110:20	<b>memorize</b> 149:4
<b>major</b> 61:25 187:8	<b>manufacturers</b>	81:15 82:12,15,18	133:14 148:8	<b>memory</b> 27:15,16
187:12,19,20	147:3	88:20 90:1 91:7	169:20 183:24	27:18,22 28:2,2,4
191:16 210:19	<b>March</b> 51:8,16	93:23 104:23	199:10 203:8	28:10,15 81:5
<b>majority</b> 65:16,25	191:21	174:3,5 175:24	218:5 219:4	149:7
86:16 94:1 150:9	<b>margin</b> 40:19 41:9	177:21 182:13,15	<b>meant</b> 97:3 109:7	<b>men</b> 7:20 112:23
187:10 197:1	41:10 85:11	183:2 184:3,6,9	109:11 111:25	<b>mention</b> 19:10,15
219:22	183:14	184:15 185:17,19	<b>measure</b> 144:25	20:2 29:9 72:6
<b>majority-black</b>	<b>Marilyn</b> 139:6,6,7	185:23 186:2	145:1	76:1 138:16
65:18 85:13,15	139:12,16 141:10	188:10 192:19	<b>mechanical</b> 64:3,5	<b>mentioned</b> 7:7
<b>majority-vote</b>	<b>Marjory</b> 155:15,16	194:13,16,18	<b>mechanism</b> 67:13	50:16,17,18 56:6
58:11	155:16 157:8	195:22 197:9,12	67:15 81:8	58:17 62:10 75:21
<b>majority-white</b>	<b>mark</b> 29:12 85:23	197:16,25 198:3	<b>media</b> 87:15	78:17 81:16,19
65:17,20 85:13,15	130:11 133:3,10	198:10,12,17,19	122:24	85:3 104:17,23
<b>making</b> 34:11	148:16 187:24	198:22 199:13,17	<b>Medicine</b> 150:20	105:10 107:4
43:13 58:19 68:17	225:2	199:21,24 202:15	<b>medium-sized</b>	110:24 166:24
77:25 91:16 92:18	<b>marked</b> 71:10 74:4	202:19 204:13,17	214:12	168:22 170:21
115:8,19,19	76:14,15,15 84:6	205:6 207:1	<b>meet</b> 214:9 216:21	177:6 179:1
118:12 129:18	86:2 123:14	209:13 210:5	<b>meeting</b> 1:7 2:5	190:20 195:2
132:16 157:3	149:11 153:16	213:18,20 214:2	4:21 7:8,13 37:16	228:17
190:3 195:9 199:8	226:20,21	216:24 217:5,11	62:6,11 96:24	<b>mentioning</b> 22:5
211:20 212:1,6	<b>marker</b> 30:5	217:16,20,23	129:18 160:20	216:16
214:11 216:18	<b>markers</b> 31:6	218:1,23 228:9	165:25 166:9,10	<b>Mercer</b> 60:7 61:11
<b>malfunctioned</b>	<b>market</b> 173:7	<b>McDonald's</b>	167:1,10,12	<b>mere</b> 151:12 175:7
64:4	<b>marketing</b> 148:20	211:19	188:20 190:2	<b>merely</b> 163:4
<b>malfunctioning</b>	<b>marking</b> 29:6	<b>McWealthy</b> 157:11	228:10,16 230:8	<b>met</b> 6:7 11:24
117:2	135:4 148:20,21	<b>McWethy</b> 157:12	<b>meetings</b> 5:18	98:13 129:16
<b>malware</b> 16:24	224:22 226:7,18	157:12,13,14,14	47:16 115:1,3	<b>method</b> 134:23
94:22 160:11	226:19	157:16,20,24	167:16 228:21	144:22 149:17
184:23	<b>marks</b> 32:13 65:10	158:1	<b>meets</b> 7:14 51:7	151:1
<b>manage</b> 211:17	139:6,9,11,13,16	<b>Meal</b> 211:20,21,23	90:20 133:3	<b>methods</b> 41:22
<b>manager</b> 106:14	139:16,21,23	<b>mean</b> 12:18,21	<b>member</b> 6:19 9:7	47:19 151:5
108:11 136:4	141:9	17:14 23:10 25:15	9:14 10:9,10,21	196:15
<b>managers</b> 101:24	<b>married</b> 71:6	25:24 50:20 58:4	19:21,21 21:18	<b>metro</b> 104:11
<b>mandate</b> 56:18	<b>Martin</b> 147:24	58:7,20 76:9,10	37:11 96:8 119:12	<b>metropolis</b> 131:3
130:15	148:2,2 149:21	76:10,20 82:14	119:14 141:23	<b>mic</b> 9:24 10:2 96:8
<b>mandated</b> 161:17	<b>Maryland</b> 48:2	87:19 91:20	155:23	96:11 114:16
165:13	50:20,21,21 59:3	101:20 175:22	<b>members</b> 3:18 6:13	155:23
<b>mandating</b> 53:19	59:18,24 111:12	186:25 187:17,18	7:4,9,22 10:12,14	<b>mice</b> 7:20 112:23
53:22	<b>massive</b> 66:25	187:19,22 197:25	21:9 62:4 75:22	<b>Michael</b> 54:9 80:8
<b>maneuvering</b>	69:22 87:15 88:3	198:19 211:1	95:21 96:4,17,20	97:15 181:20
163:25	<b>match</b> 111:15,17	215:11 218:19	106:24 108:25	195:12 202:5,23
<b>manifest</b> 43:14	136:16 183:13	219:2,12 220:22	112:2,5 114:3,20	<b>Michigan</b> 59:3
<b>manipulate</b> 150:15	215:23	222:2 223:16	115:11 132:2	<b>micromanage</b>
<b>manner</b> 56:3 181:7	<b>matches</b> 95:7	<b>meaning</b> 23:23	139:18 165:23	210:2
201:25	<b>matter</b> 91:1 113:20	25:12 109:10	166:5,20 168:13	<b>microphone</b> 8:3,18

9:3 21:18 155:25 178:19 <b>microphones</b> 6:19 <b>microphone's</b> 119:15 <b>mic'd</b> 37:9 60:9 <b>middle</b> 61:15 86:5 100:20 172:14 <b>midterm</b> 105:9 <b>mid-January</b> 167:4 <b>military</b> 176:23 <b>Miller</b> 97:13 98:20 98:22 <b>million</b> 43:9 69:16 77:15,19 78:9,18 78:19,19 79:5,7 99:8 100:2,5 101:9 139:4 145:6 145:6 163:5 165:5 165:21 206:14 222:9 224:4 <b>millions</b> 211:11 <b>mind</b> 6:3 62:3 71:20 104:15 111:19 138:8 170:17 172:9,16 179:13 180:21 220:19 <b>mindful</b> 68:17 70:17 73:15 86:22 208:6 209:6 <b>mine</b> 94:2 138:14 <b>minimal</b> 72:4 132:21 <b>minimize</b> 88:4 150:10 151:15 <b>minimizing</b> 150:22 <b>minimum</b> 224:18 <b>minutes</b> 10:21 62:19,24 103:5,7 103:15,17 115:7 117:23 166:1 <b>misinformation</b> 150:5 <b>misplaced</b> 133:5 <b>mispronounce</b> 123:21 <b>mispronounced</b> 123:20 <b>missed</b> 98:24 168:1	<b>missing</b> 51:25 141:4 154:9 <b>missions</b> 126:24,24 <b>mistake</b> 12:9 54:2 102:6 117:11 140:13,14 215:14 <b>mistaken</b> 206:6 <b>mistakes</b> 65:12 106:15 215:19 <b>mix</b> 43:19 <b>mixed</b> 47:9 72:25 194:20 <b>mobilization</b> 126:25 <b>mode</b> 16:7,8,10,11 16:11,17,18,19 <b>model</b> 43:12,23 67:18 79:17 210:9 211:5 <b>models</b> 158:20 <b>modified</b> 47:22 <b>modify</b> 80:6 <b>moment</b> 71:15 96:11 <b>Monds</b> 28:5,6 189:8 192:21 <b>money</b> 69:10,18 77:13 79:15 90:2 90:6 93:8 138:15 143:17 165:4,8,12 211:18,18,23 212:1 214:1 222:10,13 223:6 <b>monitoring</b> 127:25 <b>month</b> 2:7 138:9 <b>months</b> 45:7 121:13,17 <b>month-or-so</b> 192:2 <b>moot</b> 149:13 <b>Morgan</b> 124:7 125:18 <b>morning</b> 2:2 4:25 5:6 6:17 19:23 84:11,13 91:11 104:17 158:7 160:2,8 163:14 169:6 <b>mortified</b> 69:9 <b>most-unexpected</b> 97:10	<b>motion</b> 182:19 <b>mousetraps</b> 212:18 <b>mouth</b> 6:6 <b>move</b> 9:1 20:3 28:22 34:12 37:20 66:23 109:15,16 111:20 114:3,15 142:23 160:24 166:21 167:23 168:21 193:18 194:4 209:17 211:3 227:8 228:1 <b>moved</b> 64:13 93:10 193:3,7 202:11 <b>moves</b> 4:10 133:19 133:19 <b>moving</b> 7:17 63:21 67:11 71:15,15 132:24 <b>multiple</b> 52:19 104:4,4 107:18 108:10 117:8,15 225:10,11 226:1 <b>municipal</b> 112:19 113:14,17 171:10 <b>municipalities</b> 183:5 195:23,25 196:18 197:9 <b>Muscogee</b> 88:25 89:3 <b>MVP</b> 117:17 <b>M-A-I-L</b> 208:25 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>N</b> 2:1 <b>NAACP</b> 180:24 <b>name</b> 37:12 65:6,8 65:11,11 86:4 89:8 96:5,21 109:1 114:15 116:5 118:24 121:3 122:14,17 123:20 126:16 130:23 132:9 134:8 141:16 144:3 148:2 150:2 153:25 164:16 199:20 201:15 215:2 <b>name's</b> 121:11	<b>Nancy</b> 22:7 88:22 146:6 183:11 185:3 212:21 <b>Nancy's</b> 214:4 <b>nation</b> 2:23 17:10 223:5,9 <b>national</b> 150:20 154:6 161:1 <b>nationally</b> 129:8 <b>nationwide</b> 142:18 <b>nation's</b> 143:9 <b>native</b> 126:19 <b>Natkin</b> 121:2,5,8 121:11,11 <b>naturalized</b> 144:15 <b>nature</b> 87:19 <b>near</b> 211:19 <b>nearly</b> 116:17 174:24 <b>necessarily</b> 14:20 94:18 141:21 180:19 189:20 220:10 <b>necessary</b> 53:20 54:1 143:17 195:5 216:15 <b>need</b> 4:8 5:11 7:3 14:12 16:1 17:2 22:18 31:4,6,11 31:20,24,25 34:16 34:17 35:22 36:3 40:7 43:16 44:1 44:19,24 46:1 47:6 51:18 55:16 55:21 59:10 66:5 68:9,22 73:16 76:3 82:23 84:18 84:19,24 87:13 88:4 90:4 92:22 94:15 95:2 109:24 109:24 110:1 120:21 122:3 125:25 129:7 130:3,15 134:18 134:21 138:21 139:25 140:2,4,22 147:8,20 149:11 152:2 153:2 154:15,17 155:12 164:3 168:9	170:15 171:3 173:4,14 175:16 177:1,2,13,19 179:12,25 180:17 180:21 182:6,21 183:4,14,16 189:24 190:12 191:19,23 192:5,7 192:8 205:7,16 206:13 208:5 209:6,8,8 210:8 210:18 215:2,5 216:10,20 219:15 219:17,21 223:12 224:16 <b>needed</b> 64:9 86:19 101:3 132:4 133:8 140:24,25 149:5 190:21 <b>needing</b> 31:12 <b>needle</b> 43:9 56:8 <b>needs</b> 13:25 34:10 48:23 90:10 94:5 147:1 165:11,18 175:1,8 181:17 192:16,17 196:2 199:12 207:19 221:23 <b>nefarious</b> 30:2 <b>negates</b> 16:19 <b>negative</b> 20:4,6,8,9 22:8,10,13,14,17 28:7,11,15 146:7 146:7,10 156:18 156:18 <b>neighborhoods</b> 98:8 <b>Nelson</b> 118:24,25 119:3,5,8,13,16 119:19 120:25 <b>nervous</b> 227:2 <b>net</b> 213:24 <b>Nettles</b> 146:14,16 146:19,21 <b>never</b> 29:20 33:11 50:9 69:23 71:14 134:19 143:8 147:10 156:10 162:23 172:1 175:11 189:11
--	--	--	---	--

229:13	<b>north</b> 81:22 97:21	177:23 181:4	137:21 155:24	93:24 114:10,11
<b>new</b> 10:23 11:11	139:21,22 193:3	191:2,3 218:19	157:24 159:19	115:17 129:16
12:13 20:3 34:12	<b>Northern</b> 110:15	220:5	162:6 178:18,20	157:22 167:22,24
35:6 37:21 45:24	<b>note</b> 75:16 172:4	<b>occur</b> 205:22	217:16	188:24 208:18
49:10 51:23 53:22	<b>Notice</b> 137:2	<b>occurred</b> 85:9	<b>Ohio</b> 111:12	229:19
54:5 56:24 57:22	<b>noticed</b> 18:21	<b>occurring</b> 164:9	<b>oil</b> 163:3	<b>ones</b> 6:21 45:16
57:24 67:9 68:25	101:18	<b>Oconee</b> 129:1	<b>okay</b> 8:10,14 9:3,15	48:21 218:4
70:15 78:21 80:14	<b>notorious</b> 63:1	<b>October</b> 158:10	10:4,11,15 14:12	<b>one-ballot</b> 84:25
82:7 85:4 91:14	<b>November</b> 81:21	<b>odd</b> 53:4	21:5 22:25 23:25	<b>one's</b> 9:5 22:1 55:1
93:2,7,13,18 95:5	97:1 105:16	<b>offensive</b> 115:20	24:19 26:10 28:24	<b>ongoing</b> 92:22
102:20,22 109:15	106:23 113:14	<b>offer</b> 149:3	37:10 57:6 59:14	93:11,20 109:13
109:16 112:8,20	116:15,15 138:2	<b>offered</b> 154:2	59:15 61:1 77:16	134:16 221:22
122:23 144:14	174:24 175:7	<b>offering</b> 4:18 156:7	77:18,21 78:6,11	<b>online</b> 117:19
148:7 168:23	191:24,24	<b>offhand</b> 25:1	78:12 79:21 88:17	205:9
169:1,20 170:7,22	<b>now's</b> 228:7	<b>office</b> 2:4,13 3:22	88:21 91:10 94:8	<b>on-demand</b> 31:16
170:23 171:3	<b>number</b> 18:15	3:25 34:10 37:6	95:21 96:14 105:7	35:10,23 213:17
173:4 180:25	23:22 30:15 35:18	37:14 51:13 64:18	108:3,18,19	<b>open</b> 13:14 170:8
189:24 190:6,14	41:22 43:25 44:19	80:11 81:6 94:14	113:23 114:11,12	170:10 171:1
191:4,6 193:5	48:4 53:5 55:5	95:2,24 96:2,7,22	115:13,24 116:1	<b>opening</b> 47:24
203:12,19 205:8	56:4 65:24 93:13	97:18 106:1	121:7 122:11,13	<b>operate</b> 16:7 90:8
206:3,15,22,23	99:13,15 102:7	108:22 109:2,5	122:16 123:18	107:15
211:3 218:5	104:13 107:7	113:3 138:18	124:1,3 126:11,18	<b>operated</b> 15:2
221:24,25 226:25	111:4 121:17	139:1 146:25	128:15 130:22,25	<b>operates</b> 18:7
<b>newest</b> 41:18	131:16 160:10	147:14,15 150:25	134:22 135:11	185:9
<b>newly</b> 144:14	176:10,12,13	152:1,6 195:4	145:23 148:2	<b>operations</b> 211:14
<b>news</b> 154:5,6,6	179:22 180:13	196:17 204:14	149:20 153:22	<b>opinion</b> 25:12
<b>next-generation</b>	190:13 196:25	210:5	156:17 157:10,18	36:14 53:1,3 87:1
4:13	197:3 203:25	<b>officer</b> 106:11	159:19 161:6	110:18 113:6
<b>night</b> 64:21,23	204:4 221:13	<b>offices</b> 14:16 99:25	165:17 166:1,4	201:17 219:6
74:20 136:3	<b>numbered</b> 81:7	<b>official</b> 32:4 56:23	173:10,19 176:6	<b>opportunities</b>
176:11 178:5,10	<b>numbers</b> 27:3 36:9	99:20 100:19	178:12,20 183:1	10:22 11:10,14
217:24	44:2 101:18	154:8 163:22	185:7,13,20 186:9	65:12 102:12
<b>noble</b> 4:19	104:17 198:5	<b>officials</b> 13:1 20:7	188:8 189:3,7	105:13
<b>nondisabled</b>		28:16 45:24,25	194:15,22 195:12	<b>opportunity</b> 3:18
111:16,22	<b>O</b>	46:11 48:21 55:15	195:20 197:2,8,11	10:6,17 56:2
<b>nonpartisan</b> 10:20	<b>O</b> 2:1	58:19,20 66:13	197:24 198:18	62:18 73:17 74:2
126:22 150:3	<b>objective</b> 10:25	67:2 73:7 87:12	200:20 201:3	74:10 75:7 87:5
171:17 172:15	<b>objectives</b> 11:15	98:1,4 99:14	202:14 204:16,24	105:14 113:14
<b>nonpartisanship</b>	34:15,18,19	100:15,17,22	205:2 206:21	133:18 155:20
133:18	<b>observe</b> 186:7	102:19,24 116:9	211:8 216:12,23	204:25
<b>nonprofit</b> 10:20	<b>observer</b> 154:23	118:7 128:5 150:7	217:9 220:1	<b>opposed</b> 147:2
<b>nontransparent</b>	<b>observers</b> 116:17	154:13 164:13	228:15	<b>opposing</b> 133:15
145:16	<b>obsolete</b> 64:10	169:10,12 173:6	<b>old</b> 62:22 63:18	<b>optical</b> 64:12,13
<b>Nonverbal</b> 131:22	<b>obtain</b> 228:11	176:8 189:13	64:7 80:19 160:24	70:18,20,24 76:13
197:7 198:10	<b>Obtaining</b> 133:5	192:4 220:15	198:13 206:4	82:8 86:14 126:1
<b>non-partisan</b> 213:4	<b>obvious</b> 61:24	<b>offset</b> 36:7	<b>older</b> 85:19 87:24	136:18 145:5
<b>non-verifiable</b> 30:4	140:24	<b>off-year</b> 53:4	107:15	149:16 158:19
<b>noon</b> 6:25 75:20,24	<b>obviously</b> 4:4 5:13	<b>of-age</b> 133:2	<b>omissions</b> 149:8	179:7,8 218:21
<b>normal</b> 26:7	45:10 64:24 68:13	<b>Oh</b> 23:6 26:22 87:9	<b>once</b> 5:3 7:21 38:23	<b>optically</b> 151:3
<b>normally</b> 167:3	76:10 160:3 172:4	88:18 119:13	44:15 52:2 62:13	<b>optical-mark</b> 157:1

<b>optical-scan</b> 12:15 63:21 64:16,19,21 65:13,16,17,19,24 66:1 70:21 73:25 74:19 81:17,23 85:16,22 86:1 88:2 197:19,19 <b>option</b> 30:15,22 31:8 67:21 74:6 165:1 223:17 225:12,13,18 <b>options</b> 45:21 225:12 <b>oral</b> 110:16 <b>order</b> 5:25 12:2 34:2 56:2,23 57:7 57:7,9,16,21,24 138:17 175:18 182:2 187:2 195:3 <b>ordered</b> 57:25 216:25 <b>orders</b> 100:17 102:11 105:11,15 <b>Oregon</b> 131:18 <b>organization</b> 10:20 119:10,20 141:22 <b>organizations</b> 78:1 83:19 126:22 150:17,18 <b>organizer</b> 121:13 <b>origin</b> 26:19 <b>original</b> 1:20 47:13 54:21 57:1 66:3 93:24 230:12 <b>ought</b> 22:18 54:6 66:19 93:11 <b>outcome</b> 4:12 39:22 46:25 182:5 217:7 224:3 <b>outlawed</b> 29:19 <b>outline</b> 7:19 <b>outside</b> 98:14 195:15 210:21 <b>overall</b> 128:8 <b>overcome</b> 88:4 <b>overhaul</b> 210:19 <b>overriding</b> 215:11 <b>oversee</b> 3:8 116:10 <b>oversight</b> 127:23 <b>oversimplify</b>	223:10 <b>overtime</b> 49:12 <b>overview</b> 110:8 <b>overwhelmed</b> 105:21 <b>overwhelming</b> 196:21 <b>o'clock</b> 7:2 101:20 <b>O-O-P</b> 159:17 <b>o'clock</b> 104:17 228:5 <hr/> <b>P</b> <b>P</b> 2:1 <b>PAC</b> 144:6,13 <b>pace</b> 67:25 <b>package</b> 162:2 <b>page</b> 184:19 <b>paid</b> 142:18 <b>panel</b> 6:13 21:9 52:9 62:4,7 89:14 89:15 166:6 188:25 189:4 <b>panic</b> 64:21 <b>paper</b> 4:9 26:10,23 27:2 29:7 30:19 31:9,21 32:4 35:25 36:6 37:21 39:7 47:13,14 49:5 55:25 63:24 64:11 72:21 73:4 73:8 74:14,16,19 81:18,20 82:2,3,5 82:24 110:13 120:8 122:1,6 123:13,14 124:18 125:1,8 127:18 130:10 135:3 136:17 137:6 138:20,21 139:3 140:6,25 141:7 142:15,16 143:18 143:19 145:4,12 146:5 147:6,8 148:15,17 149:2,3 149:10,15 150:19 150:21 151:3,15 153:16 154:18,19 155:13 157:2 158:10,12,16	160:3,6 164:2,25 165:17 169:22 171:5 177:10,10 177:15 179:23 180:14 184:19 185:2 186:14,17 187:2,7,20 188:10 188:14 189:16 190:1,7 197:4,20 198:1 202:11 203:9 210:12 211:9,10 213:15 215:16 218:7,20 219:7,12 220:8 221:1 224:12 225:4,14,17 227:9 <b>papers</b> 150:18 186:24 <b>paperwork</b> 53:14 <b>paper-ballot</b> 31:5 74:24 148:22 179:24 <b>paper-based</b> 71:24 72:5,20 79:1 185:16 <b>paper-trail</b> 67:13 67:15,21 <b>paper-vote</b> 169:1 170:23 <b>parameters</b> 175:19 <b>parroted</b> 150:6 <b>part</b> 11:25 14:21 20:20 23:17 62:1 86:5 90:1 92:15 111:21 126:24 154:6 192:16,17 195:18 202:20 205:6 210:4 212:5 224:18 <b>partial</b> 13:11 <b>participated</b> 218:9 229:13 <b>participation</b> 5:17 83:16 85:6,6 127:24 132:24 133:16,24 153:1 166:19 <b>particular</b> 24:20 25:4 26:1 36:22 36:23 38:14,17	56:4 72:2,15 119:10,20 173:13 179:24 182:23 211:6 226:24 <b>particularly</b> 32:7 119:22,25 191:4 193:22 197:5 201:5 203:1 218:8 223:17 <b>particulars</b> 209:15 <b>partisan</b> 123:7 163:6 171:19 <b>partisanship</b> 91:21 <b>parts</b> 71:4 193:19 199:11 <b>party</b> 46:1 88:15 116:1,7,8 121:14 124:24 135:20,22 137:5 179:12 213:8 215:10 <b>part-time</b> 200:1 <b>pass</b> 75:22 128:14 128:15,16 168:25 187:24 209:18 <b>passed</b> 42:19 92:3 117:22 135:22 210:7 <b>pasting</b> 81:4 <b>patch</b> 203:14 <b>patent</b> 142:4 <b>path</b> 173:18 175:15 <b>Patrick</b> 1:8 6:5,7 230:5,18,18 <b>Paulding</b> 99:11 <b>pay</b> 48:20,22 69:16 204:6 205:2 211:9 211:21 212:20 <b>pays</b> 83:4 <b>peak</b> 104:16 <b>pen</b> 64:24 <b>pencil</b> 64:24 <b>pencils</b> 151:11 <b>Pennybacker</b> 132:7 132:10,13 <b>pens</b> 151:11 <b>pension</b> 156:3 <b>people</b> 6:9 8:20,22 17:5 18:19 25:23 25:23 36:20 38:25 39:3 53:15 54:25	55:3 64:12 70:10 72:10,17 73:2 75:3 76:1,19 80:2 83:2,17 86:9 87:15,20 94:18 99:11,15,17,17,17 99:18,18,20 100:3 102:10,15,18 104:15,17 105:3,8 105:14 106:4,12 107:18 112:25 115:15 120:14,16 120:22 124:21 125:1,22 129:10 129:13,25 130:5 131:7,9 140:22 144:18 145:19 148:4 152:5,17 155:6,21 156:12 158:6 162:5,21 167:13 176:13 180:8 185:25 186:7 189:19 191:5 195:15 198:1 202:25 203:25 204:6 211:25 217:18 219:23,25 220:7 <b>People's</b> 127:11 <b>percent</b> 12:14,16 18:23 19:1 24:23 24:24 25:20,21 26:13 30:25 39:2 40:8,8,8,9,9 41:9 41:10,11,12,13 42:5,5,7 46:14,15 48:18 54:24,25 56:4,4 57:2 85:12 103:3,6,9,11,12 103:16,18,20,21 103:22 152:15 182:9,12,17 <b>percentage</b> 33:4 40:2,4,6,12,25 41:4,5 48:3 54:13 54:15,23 55:4 56:10 59:21,21 202:19 <b>percentages</b> 40:10 <b>percentage-based</b>
--	---	--	--	--



54:12	14:12,18 26:9	75:19 155:5	90:19,21 100:1	154:12,17 176:4
<b>perfect</b> 30:4 38:25	36:17 43:8 120:5	171:21	101:24,25 102:11	180:7 210:15
38:25 39:1 44:10	<b>pick</b> 43:15 45:20,21	<b>planning</b> 3:22	102:25 104:22,22	223:19,24 224:9
92:10,12 132:25	214:18	34:23 43:13	106:11,14,14	228:19 229:7
164:8,11,11	<b>picked</b> 48:5 79:17	<b>plans</b> 112:23	108:11 116:17	<b>possibly</b> 23:18
220:20	<b>picture</b> 86:4 223:3	<b>plausible</b> 18:13	117:1 129:2 156:7	47:11 112:18
<b>perfectly</b> 49:19	<b>piece</b> 67:3 69:20,20	<b>playing</b> 93:15	158:2 169:10,15	180:14 225:16
101:11 154:16	69:22,25 70:2	<b>pleasantly</b> 122:25	193:1,6 194:5	<b>postelection</b> 37:18
<b>perform</b> 14:1	74:14 77:17 92:16	<b>please</b> 5:22 12:9	195:16,17 199:2	37:19 39:25 55:12
175:18	92:19 94:19 95:7	21:19 94:11 108:5	199:14,17,18	120:10,13 125:9
<b>performed</b> 98:4	130:10 151:12	115:12,14 116:3	200:1,1,5,23	137:6 169:24
99:5	186:14,17 195:1	122:20 129:22	201:2,12,14	173:16 175:11
<b>performing</b> 80:13	<b>pieces</b> 68:20 70:8	131:1 134:7	202:20 205:8	186:8
<b>period</b> 53:21 55:9	202:3 215:16	135:15 137:13	206:3,4,12,15,23	<b>post-Vietnam</b>
55:19 58:25	<b>piggybacking</b>	139:14 143:15	207:3 214:17	144:4
100:11 132:2	214:4	146:17 147:25	215:10 226:13	<b>potential</b> 19:3
167:15 176:21,25	<b>pillars</b> 143:11	149:25 151:23	227:22	36:16 73:5 151:13
192:3	<b>pilot</b> 11:20,23 48:2	153:12 155:23	<b>polling</b> 68:12 69:24	170:12 206:8
<b>periods</b> 116:19	59:25 83:20	159:6 161:10	78:6 81:5 83:23	219:2
<b>permanently</b> 33:16	<b>piloted</b> 226:6	166:17 174:22	87:18 94:20	<b>potentially</b> 13:15
<b>persist</b> 148:14	<b>piloting</b> 191:25	229:4	101:15 102:3,6,7	46:15 47:4 49:4
<b>person</b> 17:14 84:4	<b>pilots</b> 42:15,20 53:8	<b>pledge</b> 2:18,20,21	103:14 105:1,11	75:14 112:21
99:9 163:1 171:24	59:25	<b>plus</b> 48:12 146:8	108:11 117:21	<b>power</b> 98:19 99:24
181:11,11 197:24	<b>place</b> 11:23 13:2	147:11	120:14 205:10	151:14
200:2 204:20	44:21 56:18 59:19	<b>point</b> 4:1 14:24,25	<b>polling-station</b>	<b>powers</b> 143:9
225:22 227:5	67:20 68:6 69:24	15:11,22 20:24	77:6	<b>practice</b> 39:2 142:4
<b>personal</b> 141:20	73:3 81:1,5,9 82:7	27:9,11 28:6,19	<b>polls</b> 100:13 102:20	<b>practices</b> 49:14
<b>personally</b> 3:20	83:23 86:22 87:18	50:14 55:24 61:7	102:25 127:2	73:18 100:14,25
70:7 152:20	88:9 89:19 94:20	82:8 105:21	227:24	223:8,9
153:15 183:9	97:10 102:14	109:13,22 112:20	<b>poll-watching</b>	<b>practitioners</b> 49:23
190:16	108:10,11 112:9	113:18 115:19	116:10	<b>prayer</b> 156:8
<b>person's</b> 172:18	113:15,19 158:22	150:13 152:17	<b>poll-worker</b> 67:2	<b>pre</b> 47:10 184:11
<b>perspective</b> 10:7,8	168:23 169:2	174:8 178:5,7	194:19	<b>precertification</b>
12:20 13:20,20	170:22,25 171:4	186:1 187:12,14	<b>pop</b> 210:14	47:3 55:14,15
14:5 15:5,8 25:5	179:10 188:25	188:4 192:6 202:6	<b>popped</b> 107:5	57:12 58:2,3
25:19 30:13 62:20	192:24 195:6	207:18 208:2	<b>popping</b> 177:18	162:5 184:3,4,12
179:21 195:14	199:10,23 202:4	221:10	<b>popular</b> 160:4	184:13,14
<b>ph</b> 1:19 97:3 135:8	208:18 218:22	<b>points</b> 68:15 73:21	<b>population</b> 71:23	<b>precinct</b> 29:25
145:16 153:6	<b>places</b> 21:24 68:12	75:8 127:15 146:1	94:25	31:11,18 35:23
157:11 159:10	82:20 89:21	177:6	<b>portion</b> 38:16	36:8 46:12,14,17
162:11 164:10	101:15 102:3,4,6	<b>poison</b> 163:14	48:22 114:3	54:17,18,19,24
<b>pharmacies</b> 70:7	102:7 103:14	<b>polarization</b> 123:5	165:25 166:1	55:4 65:15 72:2
<b>phase</b> 79:13	104:25 105:2	<b>policies</b> 140:3	<b>portions</b> 71:23	72:11,13,22 84:15
<b>phases</b> 11:7	120:14 192:12	<b>political</b> 86:18	<b>position</b> 96:2	84:25 106:8
<b>phone</b> 9:20	194:9 204:5	133:24 163:10,25	134:13	125:18 126:7
<b>Phonetically</b> 1:19	<b>PLAINTIFF</b> 60:12	<b>politicians</b> 163:8	<b>positive</b> 124:25	151:3 160:10
<b>photocopying</b>	<b>plaintiffs</b> 109:8	163:10	<b>possibility</b> 166:25	193:7 203:2
230:10	110:12	<b>politics</b> 154:7 156:4	179:2 228:25	206:19 213:7
<b>phrase</b> 179:20	<b>plaintiff's</b> 110:20	<b>poll</b> 18:10 43:24	<b>possible</b> 101:5	224:20
<b>physical</b> 13:25	<b>plan</b> 7:20 54:12	83:4,23 90:2,3,10	105:2 111:15	<b>precincts</b> 14:16

40:5,6,13 41:7,10 41:13 46:5,13,13 46:15 48:4 49:15 54:13,14,23 56:11 65:17,18,20 66:1 82:20 85:13,15,15 86:17 151:16 206:16,18 214:13	<b>presidential-pref...</b> 112:22 <b>press</b> 99:3 161:1 <b>pressed</b> 125:17 <b>pressing</b> 107:9 <b>pressure</b> 91:14 99:18 101:24 107:10 <b>presumably</b> 218:15 <b>pretty</b> 47:22 63:10 110:22 123:3 152:15 170:25,25 188:19 <b>prevent</b> 20:21 22:19 26:3 59:8 <b>preventions</b> 50:18 <b>previous</b> 47:16 115:1 190:1 213:25 228:9,21 <b>previously</b> 13:13 37:15 <b>previously-owned</b> 173:8 <b>pre-audit</b> 185:6,11 <b>Pre-certification</b> 184:1 <b>pre-certified</b> 173:25 <b>pre-election</b> 173:15 173:16 183:24 184:11 186:8 <b>price</b> 135:6,7 <b>priceless</b> 4:1 <b>primacy</b> 133:4 <b>primaries</b> 45:5,12 112:22 213:3 <b>primarily</b> 100:11 127:8 133:24 169:21 <b>primary</b> 70:20 105:20 112:10 132:18 133:5,24 134:23 169:20 183:3 191:20 212:25 213:2,9,12 213:14,19,23,24 213:25 214:14 218:5,6 <b>principle</b> 151:10 154:15,16	<b>principles</b> 127:6,14 128:4 140:12 <b>print</b> 29:6 31:20 72:3,6 76:24,25 76:25 154:20 187:1,4 212:24 214:6 215:1 <b>printed</b> 31:19 35:11,18 71:21 76:20 117:19 135:3 <b>printer</b> 12:15 31:16 35:23 36:8 84:15 84:17,20,21,25 <b>printers</b> 79:3 <b>printing</b> 83:5 197:19,20 212:24 213:14,25 <b>printout</b> 187:13,16 187:21 <b>prints</b> 187:2 225:3 225:4 <b>prior</b> 2:13 5:17 80:12 82:7 109:17 110:18 112:9 138:9 149:9 177:25 178:10 181:2 185:4,11 191:15 192:2 194:16,18,21 227:15 <b>prioritize</b> 134:1 <b>priority</b> 123:10 <b>privacy</b> 225:21,25 <b>private</b> 121:12 124:20 <b>privately</b> 83:15 <b>privilege</b> 96:23 <b>pro</b> 174:11 <b>probably</b> 7:1,12 8:8 18:10 19:5 22:18 29:18 31:3 31:8,12 39:16 43:23 45:7 51:12 51:24 61:18 62:11 68:1,18 88:3,12 93:7,11 108:6 109:17,18 110:5 111:23 152:22 167:8 168:9	190:20 194:7 212:17 228:21 <b>probate</b> 98:13 <b>probate-judge</b> 74:21 <b>problem</b> 17:19 18:1 19:7 24:2 26:5 28:19 75:1 86:20 92:9 105:7 141:7 144:17 147:10 158:19,22 198:9 202:24 203:8 214:20 215:12 <b>problematic</b> 102:16 106:21 <b>problems</b> 17:1,2 19:11 20:22,23 31:24 59:6,7 70:19 73:11 75:2 80:11,18 91:25 101:14,16 102:1,1 104:18,19 105:12 105:12 116:21 117:13,14 118:2 124:21 125:15,23 126:3 129:20 130:7 131:13,16 131:20 136:7 138:13,14 141:3,5 148:10,14 193:23 216:2 229:17 <b>procedure</b> 33:21 50:24 51:25 <b>procedures</b> 13:2 16:22,23 27:15,17 28:3 33:2,3 38:9 39:4 58:19 59:11 80:15 100:23,25 143:4,6 170:5 194:3,11 216:11 <b>proceeding</b> 181:18 <b>proceedings</b> 5:16 229:25 230:11 <b>process</b> 4:3 14:21 14:22,23 16:1 34:4 39:13 49:7 50:1,2 51:10,12 52:12 53:2 55:24 83:17 91:2 108:24	126:4 127:9 132:16 134:16 139:25 142:19 150:11 172:18 176:9,25 177:3 181:3,7,13 190:8 207:25 210:17 222:8 224:19 229:4 <b>processes</b> 53:14 81:1 101:22 194:3 <b>processing</b> 126:6 215:21,22 <b>procure</b> 51:16 <b>procurement</b> 206:15 <b>produce</b> 148:21 186:13 <b>produced</b> 225:1 <b>production</b> 136:1 <b>productive</b> 7:6 <b>professional</b> 1:11 2:3 144:20 150:18 <b>professionals</b> 150:10 <b>professor</b> 120:1 158:24 <b>ProGeorgia</b> 126:12 126:21 <b>program</b> 7:23 116:11 127:15 136:3 <b>programmed</b> 39:8 71:21 72:14 73:14 200:5 <b>programming</b> 197:18 <b>progress</b> 3:3 144:6 <b>prohibit</b> 23:3 <b>project</b> 11:8 <b>project-manager</b> 136:5 <b>promptly</b> 165:24 <b>pronounce</b> 118:24 121:3 122:17 130:23 132:8 143:23 153:7 <b>pronounced</b> 159:23 <b>proof</b> 124:25 187:9 <b>proper</b> 201:8
---	---	---	--	---

<p><b>properly</b> 12:21 31:1 43:14 58:21 74:4 90:11 108:13</p> <p><b>proponent</b> 91:5</p> <p><b>proportion</b> 73:1</p> <p><b>proposal</b> 160:21</p> <p><b>proposals</b> 151:2 160:13,16</p> <p><b>proposed</b> 55:13 163:4</p> <p><b>protect</b> 16:23 144:10</p> <p><b>Protecting</b> 150:22</p> <p><b>protection</b> 11:22 116:13</p> <p><b>protects</b> 15:22</p> <p><b>proud</b> 91:8 99:5 152:14 172:13</p> <p><b>prove</b> 13:6</p> <p><b>proved</b> 224:2</p> <p><b>proven</b> 119:23 140:9</p> <p><b>proves</b> 106:21</p> <p><b>provide</b> 44:22 69:3 69:5 95:9,25 121:23 148:8 169:1 170:23 188:10,13 195:4 207:2</p> <p><b>provided</b> 64:24 75:21 101:2 120:16 150:5 204:14</p> <p><b>provides</b> 178:19 204:20</p> <p><b>providing</b> 91:12 148:15</p> <p><b>provisional</b> 32:6 55:20 72:10 100:12 138:5 174:25 176:18 178:9 213:1 225:15</p> <p><b>provisionals</b> 176:22 178:1,3,6 213:11</p> <p><b>provisional-ballot</b> 215:22</p> <p><b>prudence</b> 222:1</p> <p><b>public</b> 2:12 3:2 5:9</p>	<p>5:17 7:7 33:15,21 39:22 87:20 93:20 101:4 114:4 132:15 138:17 160:4 166:19 179:19 185:24 186:4 188:21 218:8 229:12</p> <p><b>publicity</b> 15:16</p> <p><b>publicly</b> 185:24</p> <p><b>public-input</b> 166:9</p> <p><b>pulled</b> 208:13</p> <p><b>punch</b> 12:15 63:22 64:9,10 215:7 218:20</p> <p><b>purchase</b> 51:23 67:5,5,7,8 68:9 69:19 79:7</p> <p><b>purchased</b> 12:5,5 29:18 69:17 80:14 80:25 95:5</p> <p><b>purchases</b> 222:23</p> <p><b>pure</b> 73:24</p> <p><b>purpose</b> 11:12 132:18</p> <p><b>purposes</b> 200:4 204:15,22</p> <p><b>pursuant</b> 202:10</p> <p><b>pursues</b> 133:16</p> <p><b>pursuit</b> 164:7</p> <p><b>push</b> 73:23 161:21</p> <p><b>pushed</b> 100:18</p> <p><b>put</b> 9:19 16:8 17:11 28:10,14 30:16 44:21 54:3 62:8 65:10 66:10 67:20 68:5 69:10 70:25 71:12 73:25 81:1 81:8 82:7 86:9 87:22 90:6 92:2 92:19,25 100:22 112:14 129:24 131:8 136:2,5 156:8 163:13 167:16 168:2,23 170:22 182:22 183:5 209:16 220:7 225:2 228:18</p> <p><b>puts</b> 15:23 29:12</p>	<p>101:24 154:16</p> <p><b>putting</b> 13:4 36:8 65:7 69:19 71:4 86:22 87:2 180:1 185:5 216:13</p> <p><b>p.m</b> 95:20,20 166:3 166:3 229:25</p> <hr/> <p><b>Q</b></p> <p><b>QR</b> 160:7</p> <p><b>qualified</b> 156:21 210:24</p> <p><b>quarter</b> 25:20</p> <p><b>question</b> 18:9,16 20:10 21:20,21 22:7,9,16 23:9 25:16 28:14 35:10 35:19 36:9 45:9 45:13 46:18 47:11 56:15 57:17 58:15 76:8 77:6 78:14 78:20 79:21 80:7 87:6 108:17 131:11,21,23 133:25 146:1,6 158:3,4 170:21,25 182:4 186:10 189:17 196:5,16 198:25 218:3,11 218:12,18</p> <p><b>questioning</b> 103:2</p> <p><b>questions</b> 7:11,22 21:10 35:3,6 43:1 44:19,22 46:1 52:9 54:10 58:13 62:4 75:9,15 102:24 104:5,10 106:24 107:1 108:18 109:21 112:2,4 113:23 167:21 168:3,22 169:18 170:18 190:20 218:10</p> <p><b>quick</b> 35:10 90:14 201:20 207:18 224:14</p> <p><b>quickly</b> 16:25 75:17 101:25 109:25 161:14 174:16 194:25</p>	<p>203:7 207:12</p> <p><b>quieter</b> 139:11</p> <p><b>quit</b> 140:10</p> <p><b>quite</b> 13:21 15:19 17:2 29:20 65:18 107:15 156:10 163:9 199:5 200:18 211:23,25 212:6,13 222:23</p> <p><b>quote</b> 158:10,11 163:19 164:6 199:12</p> <hr/> <p><b>R</b></p> <p><b>R</b> 2:1 230:1</p> <p><b>race</b> 17:10 18:6,22 19:7,20 23:5,13 23:14,18 24:4,8 24:15,16,21,22,24 25:4 26:1,13 38:14,17 45:18 48:9 52:14 55:10 83:8 111:1,5 141:5 216:25 217:8 226:23,24 226:25</p> <p><b>races</b> 19:1,24 24:21 25:6 27:6 45:13 45:15,22 49:15 54:18 117:8 178:23 182:23</p> <p><b>racial</b> 180:11</p> <p><b>Raffensperger</b> 3:6 3:10,12,14,16 62:17 110:11</p> <p><b>raise</b> 212:1</p> <p><b>raised</b> 102:15 230:13</p> <p><b>ran</b> 48:6 81:3 152:1 152:6,8,16</p> <p><b>Randall</b> 126:11,11 126:11</p> <p><b>random</b> 33:2 56:10</p> <p><b>randomly</b> 43:6,24 45:20</p> <p><b>range</b> 79:5,7 206:12</p> <p><b>rank</b> 183:16</p> <p><b>rapid</b> 67:25</p> <p><b>rare</b> 30:7</p>	<p><b>rarely</b> 222:4</p> <p><b>rat</b> 163:14</p> <p><b>rate</b> 18:23 19:2 85:14 223:7</p> <p><b>rates</b> 64:15 65:19</p> <p><b>ratings</b> 223:4</p> <p><b>Rayburn</b> 37:6,8,12 37:12 50:9,20 51:1,19,21 52:2,8 52:16 53:6 54:16 55:2 56:20 57:9 57:18 58:6,23 59:23 60:3 206:11 206:17</p> <p><b>reach</b> 124:21 176:9</p> <p><b>reached</b> 194:9</p> <p><b>reaction</b> 107:17</p> <p><b>read</b> 52:16 64:25 71:13,19 125:11 130:12 163:1 175:12 201:6 227:6</p> <p><b>readable</b> 147:4</p> <p><b>reader</b> 201:6</p> <p><b>reading</b> 107:22</p> <p><b>ready</b> 96:18 98:4 98:10 101:20 104:18 112:21 192:13</p> <p><b>real</b> 53:8,9 92:8 102:13 125:23 128:1 139:24 182:4 224:15</p> <p><b>realize</b> 3:23 52:12 83:2 90:4 98:17 154:21 198:7</p> <p><b>realized</b> 28:17</p> <p><b>really</b> 10:6,24 13:5 13:11,11 14:3,21 16:6 18:24 19:13 24:6 25:3,15,25 29:18 30:19 32:17 34:16 35:22 38:1 50:4 51:14 52:4 58:4 62:22 63:1 63:16 66:5 67:15 67:16,21 68:2 69:19 78:3,20 84:8 86:3 87:25 93:21 101:24</p>
---	--	--	---	--

102:21 119:10 122:7 123:3 126:1 127:25 129:16,24 130:14 131:14,20 136:14 147:1,16 148:18 152:19,24 152:25 155:5,24 158:6,8,8 161:14 165:6 175:7 177:12 179:5 183:9 187:13 188:3,12 189:11 189:21 194:24 195:4,5 214:6 221:21 223:18 227:1,1,2 <b>reason</b> 5:11 12:7 16:21 19:5 20:8 33:19 38:24 68:24 70:21 85:11,19 94:13 104:9 107:6 147:21 160:12 163:2 197:12 213:2 <b>reasons</b> 64:3 66:2 103:23 106:16 107:7 136:7 180:13 223:14 <b>rebuild</b> 121:22 <b>recanvas</b> 13:9 <b>recap</b> 58:21 95:23 96:25 <b>receipt</b> 135:9 188:14 227:9 <b>receipts</b> 81:18 82:2 82:24 <b>receive</b> 16:3 176:24 <b>received</b> 78:17 116:15,16 117:8 206:11 226:12,13 226:14 227:10 <b>recertify</b> 57:5 <b>recess</b> 95:20 166:1 166:3 <b>recognition</b> 157:1 <b>recognize</b> 5:18,22 115:1,2 149:8 <b>recognizes</b> 195:6 <b>recollection</b> 67:14 77:14 78:4 80:21	92:3 <b>recommend</b> 25:8 36:20,24 148:8 169:8 205:16 <b>recommendation</b> 7:15 30:11 34:22 82:9 110:1 113:11 143:15 168:7,11 168:13,17 216:21 229:7 <b>recommendations</b> 4:16 12:12 37:24 44:25 62:12 109:20 111:20 149:19 216:13 228:19 <b>recommended</b> 73:18 220:23 221:16 <b>recommending</b> 25:8 220:18 <b>reconcile</b> 176:12,12 <b>reconciliation</b> 176:10 <b>reconsider</b> 183:4 211:5 <b>record</b> 21:24 32:9 36:18 37:21 38:23 47:13 136:2 142:16 143:19 169:1 170:24 225:1 226:18 230:6,7 <b>recorded</b> 116:21 117:12 147:22 148:18,25 189:17 <b>records</b> 21:23 47:5 210:5,7 <b>recount</b> 13:8,10,11 33:7,11 34:3 38:12,13,14,19 40:7 44:13 46:7 47:7 52:18 54:19 56:9,24,24 57:3,4 57:7,12,14,14,17 57:20 63:5 74:20 182:16 <b>recountable</b> 127:17 <b>recounted</b> 12:21 <b>recounting</b> 34:13	52:21 <b>recounts</b> 33:6,6,12 182:18 216:17 <b>reduce</b> 4:11 41:22 <b>reduced</b> 213:10 <b>reestablish</b> 173:14 <b>refer</b> 170:8 177:7 <b>referenda</b> 104:4 <b>referring</b> 54:9 <b>refers</b> 210:7 <b>refine</b> 34:15 <b>refined</b> 55:23 <b>reflect</b> 107:10 116:25 117:7,12 141:21 187:14 <b>reflected</b> 117:4 <b>reflects</b> 118:13 186:17 <b>refrain</b> 166:17 <b>refrigerator-sized</b> 63:18 64:4 <b>refugee</b> 144:4 <b>regain</b> 129:7 130:13 172:11 <b>regard</b> 181:1 <b>regarding</b> 106:24 146:2,6 181:10 <b>regionally</b> 90:6 <b>regions</b> 78:2 <b>register</b> 64:23 74:5 147:15 213:8 <b>registered</b> 107:10 116:6 119:9 121:25 141:17 198:20 199:10 202:8 <b>registers</b> 200:2 <b>registrars</b> 98:2 <b>registrar's</b> 199:25 <b>registration</b> 117:14 117:19 126:24 205:8 <b>registrations</b> 117:19 <b>regret</b> 91:15 92:10 92:21 219:19 <b>regular</b> 5:2 197:20 203:15 227:6 <b>regularly</b> 193:24 205:23	<b>regulating</b> 209:23 <b>regulations</b> 81:10 <b>Reid</b> 128:13,14 <b>reimbursed</b> 197:14 <b>rejected</b> 17:17 89:10 <b>related</b> 90:18 138:6 <b>relationship</b> 136:10 136:23 212:3 <b>relatively</b> 102:20 102:22 142:20 167:2 182:7 <b>relearn</b> 193:9 <b>release</b> 34:24 35:2 <b>released</b> 150:21 <b>releases</b> 202:2 <b>relegate</b> 151:5 <b>relevant</b> 109:5 <b>reliability</b> 205:17 <b>reliable</b> 147:20 148:8 156:3 <b>reliance</b> 203:9 <b>rely</b> 57:4 71:9 73:10 95:6 142:7 142:10,13 187:6 <b>remain</b> 148:23 164:1 169:3 <b>remainder</b> 2:8 <b>remarks</b> 137:5 <b>remedies</b> 182:1 <b>remember</b> 17:9 61:21 62:23 71:7 73:7 80:9 82:6 88:6 89:18 90:6 123:19 157:5 171:22 <b>remembered</b> 104:1 <b>remind</b> 5:24 6:13 96:1 138:1 <b>remove</b> 202:19 <b>renew</b> 94:3 <b>repair</b> 68:21 <b>repeal</b> 12:3 <b>repealed</b> 12:3 <b>repeat</b> 62:23 158:3 170:18 <b>repeating</b> 6:6 <b>replace</b> 30:14,22 31:6 68:21 79:19 173:7	<b>replaced</b> 68:23 151:11 199:12 <b>replacement</b> 169:17 <b>report</b> 19:25 34:22 52:24,24 57:11 59:4,24 80:11 187:19 192:18 220:24 <b>reported</b> 14:3 104:21 105:3,12 106:7,18,18 117:3 <b>reporter</b> 1:8 6:4,8 6:10 230:6,12 <b>reporting</b> 201:19 201:24 <b>reports</b> 106:4 116:20,21 117:8 148:10 205:18 <b>REPRENSETA...</b> 128:10 <b>represent</b> 28:8 35:8 113:1 141:25 148:6 <b>representation</b> 133:6 <b>representative</b> 3:5 3:10 4:21,24 6:21 8:2,6,10,13,17,22 8:25 9:16,19,24 10:2 21:1,3,6,9,14 22:6,21,24 23:1 24:12 25:7 26:16 27:10 28:5,12,21 35:8,9,14 36:11 37:1,5 44:3 50:7 50:11,12,13,14,21 51:6,20,22 52:6,9 52:25 53:17 54:8 55:7 56:14,16 57:23 58:13 59:15 59:15,17 60:2,4 60:11,13,17,20,23 61:1,4,6,10,13,17 61:20,23 75:11 78:12,23 79:12,16 79:25 81:11 83:10 84:10,23 85:2 86:23,25 88:6,11 88:13,17,19,21
---	---	--	--	---

89:25 90:13 91:10 91:18 94:8,11 95:13,16,18,21 96:10,14,19 107:1 108:5,16,18 112:4 112:12 113:23 114:2,21 117:22 117:25 118:18,20 118:23 119:1,4,6 119:15,17 120:23 121:1,6,9 122:11 122:19 123:16,23 123:25 124:3,5,8 126:9,14,18 128:12,15,19,21 128:24 130:19,22 130:25 131:22 132:1,6,11 134:4 135:11,15 137:11 137:18,20,22,24 139:5,10,12,14,19 139:22 141:8,10 141:14 143:21 144:1 145:21 146:11,13,17,20 147:23 149:20,23 151:7,18,21 152:4 152:6,10,12 153:5 153:9,11,19,22 154:3 155:15,18 157:8,10,13,15,18 157:22,25 159:9 159:12,14,17,19 159:22,24 161:3,6 161:10 162:10,13 162:16,20 164:19 164:23 165:22 166:4 171:13 172:20,23 173:19 173:22 174:7,20 174:22 175:21 176:6 177:5 178:12,14,16,18 179:14 180:5 181:19 182:8,11 182:14 183:1,11 183:22 184:2,14 185:3,14,18,20,22 185:25 186:9 188:9,18 190:19	192:20 193:11 194:1,6,15,17,22 195:12,20 196:4 196:24 197:2,5,8 197:11,13,22 198:2,6,11,15,18 198:21,23 199:15 199:19,22 200:12 200:17,20,25 201:3 202:5,14,23 203:11 204:8,10 205:4,12,21 206:1 206:5,21 207:9 208:11,16,20,25 209:2,4,12,19 210:10,24 211:15 213:5 214:3 215:20 216:23 217:2,9,12,14,17 217:21,25 218:2 218:13,18,24 220:1,3,21 222:19 224:12 226:4 228:3,14 <b>representatives</b> 60:15 152:9 163:11 <b>represented</b> 130:1 148:18 <b>representing</b> 60:21 135:20 139:18 146:22 153:16 <b>reprinting</b> 13:13 <b>Republic</b> 2:22 <b>republican</b> 213:4 <b>republicans</b> 91:24 92:8 123:7 <b>request</b> 105:22 114:20 151:1 <b>requesting</b> 151:2 <b>require</b> 34:1,6 49:19 70:12 158:12 169:24 191:5 195:25 204:1 209:14,17 212:4,8 <b>required</b> 72:3 93:25 196:8 202:7 225:7 <b>requirement</b> 11:24	41:3 71:22 74:11 202:8 222:25 <b>requirements</b> 10:23 11:11,15 20:21 22:19 34:17 49:1 50:3 51:11 140:18 158:11 180:6 203:13 <b>requires</b> 4:2 13:12 197:14 <b>requiring</b> 42:19 <b>research</b> 4:6 102:23 118:2 158:25 <b>reside</b> 226:9 <b>residence</b> 72:16 <b>resident</b> 132:14 148:3 <b>resignation</b> 2:9 <b>resolution</b> 135:22 <b>resolutions</b> 126:8 <b>resources</b> 34:8 65:21 85:17 93:3 138:15,17 195:8 <b>respect</b> 189:6 <b>respectful</b> 115:15 189:1 <b>respectfully</b> 134:1 <b>respecting</b> 166:11 <b>respond</b> 105:25 <b>responded</b> 100:22 101:2 <b>responding</b> 122:14 <b>response</b> 96:17 131:22 197:7 198:10 <b>responses</b> 10:12 47:16 206:11 <b>responsibility</b> 17:15 165:15 188:13 196:7 227:3 <b>rest</b> 28:22 92:5 <b>restore</b> 10:25 33:25 <b>restored</b> 122:7 <b>restoring</b> 11:16 150:4 <b>restrain</b> 224:7 <b>restricted</b> 207:21 <b>result</b> 38:11 42:6,8	54:20,21 56:24 57:1,1,5 66:21 67:9 116:25 188:6 <b>resulted</b> 105:16 <b>results</b> 13:3,7,13 17:4,12,24 19:22 19:23 28:16 38:4 38:6,20 39:19 46:21 47:4 48:8 48:11 54:18 56:19 57:13,20 59:12 89:6 157:7 201:20 212:6 224:1 227:17,17,19 <b>retain</b> 225:5 <b>retire</b> 154:4 <b>retired</b> 156:1 <b>retrieve</b> 27:17 <b>return</b> 165:24 228:21 <b>review</b> 39:14,19 40:10 41:10,11,12 41:23 42:11 47:12 47:13,14 48:13 55:6 58:22 70:25 73:17,22 74:2,6 74:14 75:12 126:3 151:5 178:7 180:25 183:9 221:22 <b>reviewed</b> 54:1 89:4 <b>reviewing</b> 40:20 47:24 <b>revisited</b> 183:16 <b>revolutionized</b> 80:10 <b>reward</b> 43:22 144:22,24 145:2 <b>rewrite</b> 196:3 <b>re-banded</b> 192:10 <b>re-countable</b> 13:17 <b>re-create</b> 38:3,6 <b>re-creating</b> 75:1 <b>re-creation</b> 38:20 <b>re-download</b> 28:4 <b>re-held</b> 217:8,10,20 <b>re-tabulate</b> 40:7 58:24 <b>RFI</b> 47:16 206:11 <b>RFP</b> 51:12 203:12	<b>rhetorical</b> 158:4 <b>Rhode</b> 42:18 <b>Rhonda</b> 147:23,24 147:24 148:2 149:20,23 <b>Rice</b> 30:24 <b>rich</b> 74:24 <b>Richmond</b> 26:18 55:8 58:15 90:15 112:7 173:3 214:12 <b>Rick</b> 102:5 <b>ridiculously</b> 164:3 <b>riding</b> 132:17 <b>right</b> 5:7,12 6:5,23 7:24,25 8:3,11,17 8:25 10:3 17:6,17 17:22 21:8,13 23:4,9,10 27:4 31:19 33:18 35:19 36:24 37:12 41:5 44:20 50:25 51:18 52:1,2 57:16 58:23 59:10 60:7 60:16,22,24,25 61:9,16,17 64:14 72:12 73:2,2,3,5 74:1 77:4,24 78:11 93:6 95:11 96:18,20 108:21 112:1 113:10,22 114:2,12,18,21,22 118:6,24 119:24 120:19 121:4,7 122:17 124:1,16 124:16 125:3,7,19 126:8 130:6,23 132:4,9 133:21 135:17 136:25 139:3 143:23 144:8,22 146:3 148:4,17 151:9 153:7,21 159:20 160:25 161:5 162:13 165:21 170:25 173:18 175:25 178:17 179:10 181:11 184:20,25 185:13 185:22 187:3,5
---	--	---	--	--

188:18 189:12 197:5,8 198:18,23 199:10,22 201:8 201:20 202:16,18 204:17,18 206:9 206:10 209:2 214:16,18,24 217:9,25 221:2,8 221:11 222:6,11 223:21 224:8 229:15 <b>rightly</b> 224:21 <b>right-hand</b> 14:13 <b>risk</b> 13:24 15:11 30:1 39:1 42:2,3,4 42:9 43:22 44:7 44:12 136:4 142:11,12 144:23 144:24,25 145:5 <b>risk-and</b> 144:21 <b>risk-limited</b> 49:2 <b>risk-limiting</b> 41:20 42:17,19,24 43:11 43:17 44:12 48:3 127:19 130:15 <b>risk/reward</b> 44:16 <b>RLA</b> 33:2 <b>road</b> 90:21 143:15 <b>roads</b> 223:6 <b>roaring</b> 105:23 <b>rob</b> 39:16 <b>Robert</b> 130:23,23 130:25 132:6 <b>Robyn</b> 2:6 <b>Rockdale</b> 177:22 226:7 <b>roger</b> 23:9,9 <b>roll</b> 165:8 191:21 194:25 <b>rolled</b> 193:15 <b>rolling</b> 194:24 <b>room</b> 75:22 114:22 120:5 188:23 219:25 <b>rooms</b> 167:12 229:1 <b>Ross</b> 22:23,25 23:2 23:7,20 24:10 25:7,8,11,15 27:9 27:10,11,24 28:1	56:15,16,17 57:6 57:16 91:10,11 93:22 218:12,13 218:14 219:1 <b>Roswell</b> 17:12 <b>round</b> 67:6 221:24 <b>route</b> 53:2 <b>rubber</b> 90:20 <b>rule</b> 110:23 148:19 204:19 <b>rulemaking</b> 50:2 <b>rules</b> 6:3 81:9 100:20 115:6,23 115:24 124:17,22 170:6 177:16 209:16 210:7 <b>rule-making</b> 45:1 <b>run</b> 20:24 33:8 35:15 63:16 113:16 130:11 137:1 171:6,7 174:9 191:4 <b>rundown</b> 106:22 <b>running</b> 10:24 95:10 129:18 <b>runoff</b> 17:12 58:9 58:10 83:9 116:18 116:22 117:10 181:5,6 183:3,4,9 183:19 <b>runoffs</b> 45:5 105:17 175:6 183:2,6,10,16 196:13 <b>runs</b> 14:22 25:20 42:15 53:8 112:20 <b>rural</b> 82:20 <b>rush</b> 183:3 <b>rushed</b> 175:1,3 <b>Russell</b> 97:24 <b>Russo</b> 52:11,11 53:1,16 108:16,17 179:14,15 180:10 206:16 220:2,4 <b>Russo's</b> 55:9 <b>Ryan</b> 108:21,22,24 109:1 112:4 113:24	<b>S</b> 2:1 <b>sacrificed</b> 100:1 <b>saddle</b> 139:3 <b>safe</b> 1:7 2:5 34:22 87:17 96:4,20 123:8 135:24 145:18 157:20 158:14 164:16,17 172:17 223:20 <b>safest</b> 165:3 223:18 223:19 <b>sake</b> 73:13 <b>Sam</b> 9:19,20 <b>sample</b> 38:16 43:24 44:3,6 <b>sanctity</b> 163:7 <b>Sanderson</b> 161:7,9 161:12,12 <b>Sara</b> 116:1,2,2,2,5 117:22 118:18 137:12,13,13,15 137:18 139:5 141:3 195:15 <b>sat</b> 201:13 <b>Saturday</b> 97:22 <b>Savage</b> 126:11 <b>Savannah</b> 97:11 <b>save</b> 35:25 36:1 41:23 214:1 <b>saved</b> 153:18 165:21 213:23 <b>saves</b> 31:12 <b>savings</b> 35:17,22 213:13 <b>saw</b> 9:18 45:14 52:18 65:6,9,23 84:1 85:11,11 86:14 89:6 126:2 144:9 154:24 <b>saying</b> 22:1,10 23:16 57:8 59:5 108:3,6 125:12 129:11 130:5 141:2 165:1,16 177:22,23 189:20 190:21 205:23 211:2,8 212:11 219:14 221:9 <b>says</b> 43:5 47:21 115:12 129:20	162:6 165:2 <b>say-so</b> 168:16 <b>scale</b> 126:7 <b>scam</b> 164:11 <b>scan</b> 29:7 36:18 64:12,13 70:18,20 70:24 74:3 81:24 82:1,8 86:14 208:8 <b>scanned</b> 29:23 151:3 158:13 208:9 <b>scanner</b> 31:11 33:9 64:25 130:11,12 136:18 185:16 200:21,22 201:4 <b>scanners</b> 31:12 76:13 126:1 145:5 147:7 149:16 158:20 169:15 199:3 200:12,14 206:4 <b>scanning</b> 39:7 179:8 <b>scans</b> 135:6 200:23 218:21 <b>schedule</b> 76:5 112:25 175:5 <b>schedules</b> 5:2 <b>scheduling</b> 75:16 167:3 <b>school</b> 60:7 61:11 61:14,19 85:20 200:5 <b>schools</b> 90:7 <b>science</b> 134:10 150:17 163:17 <b>Sciences</b> 150:20 <b>scientific</b> 150:17 <b>scientifically</b> 165:3 <b>scientists</b> 14:6 86:18,18 149:14 150:8,17 220:25 221:7 224:10 <b>scope</b> 40:12,15 52:21 <b>scramble</b> 36:4 <b>screen</b> 12:24 31:10 107:8,21,24 <b>screens</b> 107:9	120:17 <b>screwed</b> 224:5 <b>seal</b> 230:13 <b>sealed</b> 33:15 <b>season</b> 116:12 <b>seasonal</b> 104:24 <b>seat</b> 95:22 <b>SEB</b> 216:11 <b>second</b> 9:1 21:4 33:9 61:12,13 76:18,18 96:10,14 106:3 108:1 136:6 141:2 159:15 176:17 203:20 212:6 221:14 222:17 <b>secondhand</b> 173:7 <b>secondly</b> 80:13 183:15 <b>seconds</b> 159:4 <b>secrecy</b> 32:9 <b>secretary</b> 1:10 2:2 2:3,6,13 3:12,13 3:14,15,16,16,20 3:21,25 4:20,24 5:12 24:22 34:10 37:6,14 51:13 56:22 60:5 61:5,6 62:7,16,17 63:7 64:17 67:1 74:18 77:7,7 80:11 94:14 95:1,24 96:2,6,22 97:23 108:22 109:1,2,4 112:15 113:3 135:19 138:18 139:1 146:24 147:14 150:14,25 167:17 168:2 169:5,5 170:14 178:13,14,15,17 178:20 184:4 186:9,10,16,20,23 188:8 193:21 194:22,23 195:3 196:17 216:5,6 217:4 228:18,24 229:5,9 <b>Secretary's</b> 7:11 <b>section</b> 151:1 166:9
--	--	---	--	--

170:8 <b>secure</b> 1:1 2:4 4:4,8 14:15 15:4,21 16:3 32:21,25 36:13 69:3,5 70:17 72:23 119:24 120:5,10 127:16 135:24 145:18 158:21 172:17 180:2,18 201:25 205:19 223:23 230:8 <b>Securing</b> 150:21 <b>security</b> 4:7 14:24 15:6 30:1 32:16 32:23 74:8 92:16 132:20,21 133:11 133:12,13,14,22 137:9 138:8 146:24 150:10 151:4 158:11 164:15 179:16,20 203:13 205:17 219:8 221:1 227:20 <b>see</b> 4:25 6:17,24 7:20 8:3,8,16 9:2 9:19,20,22 12:24 14:13 15:19 21:7 21:14 25:24 26:10 27:3 29:15 33:15 33:16,17 34:16 35:22 37:6 40:8 41:14 45:7 50:10 51:2 53:7,14 56:21,25 57:8 60:6,9 62:15,17 76:24 81:13 82:20 84:11 87:25 88:13 88:23 90:15 96:11 97:25 102:25 109:18 110:4 111:23 122:3 130:11 134:20 135:5,9 141:12 143:23 152:23 156:20 171:11 175:21 186:17 198:5 199:9 201:14 214:20	220:25 227:8 228:1 <b>seeing</b> 41:17 99:16 99:20 111:13 123:19 <b>seek</b> 133:15 169:2 170:24 <b>seeking</b> 142:23 <b>seen</b> 46:6 76:12 102:22 111:10 115:7 154:8 158:20 229:16 <b>segment</b> 166:6 <b>select</b> 43:6 45:14,20 87:7 106:5,6 222:16 <b>selected</b> 165:19 <b>selection</b> 116:24 221:24 226:23 <b>selections</b> 12:23 29:7 148:16 <b>selective</b> 33:4 <b>self-reported</b> 106:9 <b>selling</b> 73:21 <b>Seminole</b> 97:13 98:12,20,22 <b>senate</b> 29:19 55:10 168:15 173:24 216:25 <b>senator</b> 8:19,20,24 36:11,12 57:25 58:1 78:12,13,17 79:11,13,21 85:2 85:3 86:24,25 87:1 88:5 107:2,3 108:3,6 164:6 171:1,2,13,13,14 171:14 172:20,22 173:20,21,23 203:20,22 204:11 204:16,18,24 205:1,25 206:2 <b>senators</b> 209:19 222:25 <b>send</b> 59:4 82:9 <b>senior</b> 70:6 <b>sense</b> 49:11 52:4 53:1,4 142:7,7,13 143:15 152:2 210:23 212:9	<b>sent</b> 24:17 59:19 220:24 <b>sentiment</b> 189:19 <b>separate</b> 116:21 117:6 149:12 201:23 217:2 <b>sequential</b> 56:3 <b>sequestered</b> 104:12 <b>serious</b> 129:14 130:7 138:8,11,12 <b>seriously</b> 131:23 132:15 183:3 <b>seriousness</b> 78:25 <b>serve</b> 2:10 221:5 <b>served</b> 60:20 66:10 <b>server</b> 15:10,10,14 19:17 202:1,2 <b>serves</b> 39:15 <b>service</b> 2:12 4:18 149:22 193:8 <b>Services</b> 2:17 204:22 <b>serving</b> 2:16 63:7 126:20 141:18 <b>session</b> 4:14 29:21 51:22,24 55:11 62:13 112:14 142:21 161:22 167:2 215:23 218:16 <b>set</b> 11:14 20:15 40:25 42:3,4 46:21 54:12 94:13 110:16 112:24 118:8,11 122:23 123:6 127:13 140:20 160:19 167:10 226:10 229:1 <b>sets</b> 173:17 <b>Setting</b> 132:17 <b>Setzler</b> 163:17 164:1 <b>seven</b> 11:24 31:24 <b>shaky</b> 125:5,6 <b>share</b> 118:2 127:6 171:25 194:2 <b>shared</b> 130:10 <b>shed</b> 196:17 <b>sheet</b> 5:12 114:9,10	114:18 225:4 <b>sheets</b> 5:9 114:5 <b>Sheila</b> 221:15 <b>shelf</b> 95:6 <b>shenanigans</b> 154:12 <b>sheriff-elect</b> 19:19 <b>she'd</b> 71:8 <b>she's</b> 60:14 110:21 <b>shifted</b> 63:6 <b>shop</b> 135:5 <b>shopping</b> 5:2 <b>short</b> 113:4 129:19 142:20 146:21 <b>shortages</b> 97:20 <b>shorter</b> 113:5 <b>short-term</b> 149:7 <b>show</b> 69:24 70:2,10 72:14 87:15 90:11 107:25 <b>showed</b> 94:20 120:2,14 203:4 <b>showing</b> 146:4 148:10 166:8 186:7 <b>shown</b> 199:25 <b>shows</b> 30:25 47:6 183:13 186:4 <b>sic</b> 1:20 16:9 58:22 84:5 131:17 135:6 163:15 164:15 173:24 <b>sick</b> 156:2 <b>side</b> 14:13 168:15 168:15 223:20 227:1,2 <b>sided</b> 138:7,9 <b>sides</b> 171:16 <b>sight-impaired</b> 225:23 <b>sign</b> 5:11 47:20 114:8 129:12 168:16 222:5 <b>signature</b> 230:13 <b>signed</b> 114:7,9 <b>significant</b> 86:16 121:17 206:25 <b>significantly</b> 121:20 <b>signifying</b> 160:10	<b>signs</b> 204:20 <b>sign-up</b> 5:9 114:5 114:17 <b>silent</b> 159:18 <b>similar</b> 99:13 180:7 191:1 200:11,14 214:5 <b>Simonia</b> 122:14 <b>simple</b> 74:1 154:17 160:10 212:20 <b>simplified</b> 73:25 <b>simply</b> 17:23 118:16 163:10 165:12 <b>single</b> 14:24,25 15:11,22 38:13 44:11 46:7 47:18 48:8 54:14 72:21 86:15 98:9 152:2 172:18 187:4,7 206:12 219:9 <b>single-ballot</b> 42:24 43:2 <b>sir</b> 8:1 36:14,15 53:17 79:12 80:7 132:10 145:23 172:22 179:15 181:20 <b>sit</b> 115:24 171:15 175:4 <b>sits</b> 200:22 <b>sitting</b> 22:22 73:9 124:11 138:24 165:6 <b>situation</b> 13:9 18:2 19:16 20:12 26:8 36:21 87:22 98:25 148:23 163:16 215:12 224:8 <b>situations</b> 17:21 191:17 <b>six</b> 167:21 177:1 212:24 <b>sixth-district</b> 17:10 17:12 <b>size</b> 52:13,13 64:11 167:13 215:16 <b>skill</b> 136:20 <b>skills</b> 136:16 <b>skin</b> 212:5
--	---	---	--	---

<b>skip</b> 23:14 <b>slate</b> 225:2 <b>slew</b> 150:18 <b>slide</b> 15:19 20:20 <b>slides</b> 8:9,15 10:24 28:25 <b>slim</b> 133:9 <b>slip</b> 76:3 <b>slippage</b> 116:23 <b>slow</b> 174:17 <b>small</b> 43:21 49:16 142:20 197:6 198:8 215:17 226:8 <b>smaller</b> 42:21 193:22,23 197:5 <b>smart</b> 126:1 142:8 142:9 158:6 <b>smart-scanning</b> 125:25 <b>Smythe</b> 135:12,17 <b>snake</b> 163:3 <b>social</b> 86:18 <b>soft</b> 113:16 <b>software</b> 16:9,17 59:11 95:11 142:11 <b>solely</b> 142:10 <b>solution</b> 26:2 30:4 30:5 31:5,10 32:19 142:13 187:9 221:10,16 221:16,17 223:19 223:22,24 224:9 <b>solutions</b> 92:1 183:18,20 <b>solve</b> 19:6 31:25 73:11 74:25 75:1 109:24,25 124:21 131:16 141:7 <b>solves</b> 158:22 <b>somebody</b> 28:10,14 70:2 77:1 94:23 96:12 106:6,15 115:12 146:8 153:17 162:4 166:16 179:4 203:6 208:13,14 215:13 224:2 <b>somebody's</b> 106:13	<b>somewhat</b> 210:18 <b>some-odd</b> 114:7 <b>some's</b> 80:5,5 <b>son</b> 211:15 <b>soon</b> 110:10 <b>sophisticated</b> 127:19 201:5 <b>sorry</b> 20:19 21:5 22:22,23 23:8 31:9 102:21,25 119:13 134:20 137:19 145:23 160:20 <b>sort</b> 35:16 83:20 85:19 103:15 105:22 112:1 151:14 170:24 171:5 187:10 200:11 203:12 <b>sorts</b> 65:9 206:7 <b>soul</b> 92:5 <b>sound</b> 52:1 175:21 <b>sounds</b> 38:21 43:8 70:19 86:8 123:12 174:17 197:23 <b>source</b> 16:3 32:24 <b>south</b> 82:4,19 193:2 <b>southwest</b> 97:16,24 98:3 99:2,6,23 194:8 <b>sow</b> 143:10 <b>space</b> 86:10 126:23 <b>spatial</b> 107:22 <b>speak</b> 3:18 6:9 10:3 23:2 45:1 71:23 111:7 115:15 120:10 141:20 155:20 157:21 179:19 180:12 208:19 218:1 <b>speaker</b> 60:5 161:24 <b>speaking</b> 32:1 55:8 89:5 115:14 180:6 183:2 223:17 <b>special</b> 45:6 <b>specialists</b> 70:5 77:23 <b>specific</b> 43:3 107:10 160:5	181:24 209:22,25 210:1 <b>specifically</b> 100:10 196:10 <b>specifics</b> 112:1 <b>specs</b> 207:7 <b>speed</b> 110:3 <b>speeds</b> 126:3 <b>spelling</b> 124:4 <b>spend</b> 10:21 138:15 143:17 211:18 222:10,12 <b>spending</b> 69:13 211:23 222:9 <b>spent</b> 2:14 77:12,20 77:25 100:8 121:13 207:10 212:2,7 <b>SPLOST</b> 18:3,7 <b>spoke</b> 26:18 121:16 190:1 <b>spot</b> 22:22,24 <b>spreadsheet</b> 19:22 <b>stability</b> 122:9 <b>stack</b> 102:1 <b>stacked</b> 43:13 <b>staff</b> 5:12 6:19 7:11 9:2 17:25 75:23 94:17 95:12 105:1 179:4 193:21 197:4 226:14 228:18 229:5 <b>staffing</b> 95:3 <b>stages</b> 52:19 <b>stake</b> 155:2 <b>stakeholders</b> 3:2 <b>stand</b> 2:19 95:19 114:18,19 166:1 191:12 226:3 229:21 <b>standard</b> 103:16 123:13 132:21 133:6 145:12 <b>standardize</b> 32:3 <b>standardized</b> 65:5 65:5 85:21 87:9 187:23 <b>standards</b> 118:9,10 118:14 161:25 <b>standing</b> 114:23,24	<b>standpoint</b> 180:11 <b>stands</b> 2:23 85:19 <b>start</b> 10:4 37:9 38:2 44:23 49:13,16 53:2,4 75:18 80:19 82:3 97:7 114:10 115:24 167:3,22 172:9 176:25 177:3 178:10 181:7 218:12 <b>started</b> 7:23 11:18 63:1,4 95:23 98:25 129:16 166:24 181:5 211:17,20 <b>starting</b> 6:25 17:3 64:22 <b>starts</b> 62:22 136:18 167:2 <b>state</b> 1:2,9 2:6,14 4:5 5:5,12 15:2,13 16:16 37:25 42:12 45:25 48:22 50:4 50:16,17 52:24 53:23 56:19,22 58:20 59:5,9 60:5 61:5,6 62:1,9 63:7 64:11 66:4,25 67:1,4,4 68:25 69:18 70:6 71:16 74:18 77:7,14 78:1,2,3,19 79:14 79:15,17,23 80:6 80:25 81:9 83:3,6 87:3 93:10,11,11 93:14,21,25 94:13 94:17,17,21,21 95:8 99:14 100:21 102:14 103:1 105:5,16 110:4 112:16 113:2 116:8,18 128:2 129:6 130:1,18 133:20 135:19 136:12 137:9 138:10,21 141:18 142:22 143:1,3 146:24 150:13 163:23 169:3,5,8	170:3,6,14 171:12 180:20 182:4 183:4,18 193:14 193:19 194:4,21 195:7,7 196:5,6,7 202:6 203:11 204:19,21 208:3,9 209:16 211:5,7,12 211:25 212:3,20 222:24 223:1 224:20 229:9 230:2 <b>stated</b> 27:12 91:7 132:24 158:3 164:2 <b>statement</b> 84:14 115:9 180:9 194:12 196:20 <b>statements</b> 130:3 <b>states</b> 2:22 14:7 37:22 40:3,3 41:3 41:5 42:18 45:11 45:17 46:10,23 47:9,9,10 48:20 48:24,24,25 49:1 49:1 53:6 55:23 56:17,20 57:10 58:18 59:13 69:11 81:17 111:10,18 131:18 134:12 143:5 145:13 151:16 161:2 173:8 190:13,15 208:22 228:10,12 <b>statewide</b> 42:13,17 42:22 45:21 53:12 83:9 105:17 112:19 150:16 171:11 191:22 194:19 206:15 <b>state's</b> 2:13 34:10 64:18 80:11 95:2 95:24 96:2,6,22 109:2,5 138:18 139:1 142:25 146:25 147:14 150:25 195:4 196:17 <b>state-issued</b> 204:2 <b>state-local</b> 154:6
--	---	---	--	---



<b>state-of-the</b> 143:3	<b>straight-ticket</b> 88:8	<b>success</b> 122:9	91:5 94:21 96:4	51:11,16,17,21,23
<b>state's</b> 1:11 2:3 3:4	<b>strange</b> 26:8	<b>successful</b> 99:7	97:5 100:1 105:4	52:3,5 53:22 56:7
3:22,25 13:20	<b>strengthened</b> 147:1	<b>successfully</b> 69:12	113:4 114:13	56:18 58:10,11
24:22 37:6,14	<b>stress</b> 61:18 188:20	101:8 214:10	118:12 119:8	62:1,9 63:15,23
51:13 108:22	<b>stretch</b> 97:2	<b>sucked</b> 98:15,18	120:7 122:2	66:23 67:10,16
113:3 134:2	<b>stretches</b> 178:16	<b>sucks</b> 164:11	124:17 134:25	68:20 69:4,5,21
139:24 150:15	<b>STRICKLAND</b>	<b>sudden</b> 165:10	164:17 167:25	70:17 71:25 72:5
181:17 193:21	171:14 205:25	<b>sue</b> 138:14	171:7,11 172:17	72:6,20 73:12,22
228:18	206:2	<b>sues</b> 33:18	178:8,22 181:11	73:25 74:2 79:1
<b>station</b> 75:23 78:7	<b>strips</b> 197:21	<b>sugar</b> 163:14	184:25 190:3	80:4,5,10 85:20
84:20 93:13	<b>strong</b> 92:6	<b>suggest</b> 32:2 34:15	195:9 201:13,18	85:24 86:9,12,12
<b>stations</b> 84:18,19	<b>strongly</b> 62:21	50:9 151:4	205:14 209:19	86:21 87:7,8 89:2
84:24 205:10	151:4 161:18	<b>suggesting</b> 50:7	212:1,6 214:11	96:24 109:14,16
<b>statistical</b> 41:22	229:14	154:16	216:18 227:13	109:16 110:2
42:3	<b>structure</b> 196:5	<b>suggestion</b> 23:20	<b>surely</b> 64:14 67:24	111:17 112:8
<b>statistically-based</b>	<b>structured</b> 176:5	<b>suggestions</b> 8:25	<b>surface</b> 70:19 75:4	117:14 118:4,6,7
40:2 44:17	<b>struggle</b> 209:20	<b>suggests</b> 187:10	<b>surprise</b> 64:15	118:9,13 119:23
<b>statistically-valid</b>	211:24	<b>suit</b> 125:2,7	125:14 148:16	119:24 120:10
149:16	<b>stub</b> 215:2	<b>suits</b> 72:15	<b>surprised</b> 122:25	121:19 122:5,10
<b>statistical-based</b>	<b>stuck</b> 18:11 54:3	<b>summary</b> 20:25	<b>surrounded</b> 193:23	127:16,16,22
41:19	222:11 223:23	107:24 148:22,22	<b>survey</b> 97:25	128:2,8 129:14
<b>statistician</b> 55:2	224:4	158:8 159:5	<b>surveyed</b> 9:18	130:15 132:22,23
<b>statistics</b> 44:2	<b>Student</b> 2:15	170:15	80:20	133:3,11,15
59:18 125:22	<b>students</b> 142:1	<b>summer</b> 127:5	<b>Susan</b> 153:6,7,11	135:23 136:14,18
<b>statutory</b> 50:18	<b>studied</b> 66:13	<b>super</b> 197:1	153:11,19 157:11	140:7 141:1
<b>stay</b> 76:2 87:21	76:21	<b>superfluous</b> 164:3	157:14,15,23	142:12 145:16,19
114:23,24 202:4	<b>study</b> 30:24 54:25	<b>superintendent</b>	159:9	147:19 148:7
<b>stayed</b> 35:5 97:18	63:8 65:3 66:3,4	182:19,23	<b>Susan's</b> 34:23	150:4,6,12,23
<b>staying</b> 216:18	66:14,15,17,21	<b>Superior</b> 111:3	154:1	151:5,13,17
<b>steal</b> 77:2	68:8 80:18 92:22	<b>supervisor</b> 134:9	<b>suspect</b> 19:9 25:12	152:21 154:11,12
<b>step</b> 53:11 149:12	139:24 187:10	198:13	182:20	156:11 157:1,5
164:4	221:6	<b>supervisors</b> 128:6	<b>sustain</b> 173:11	158:13 160:11
<b>Stephens</b> 1:8 6:5	<b>studying</b> 75:7	<b>supply</b> 12:1	<b>swapping</b> 16:24	161:16,17,19,21
230:5,18,18	80:18	<b>support</b> 3:24 92:7	<b>swear</b> 117:15	161:25 162:1,3,6
<b>steps</b> 34:14 149:10	<b>stuff</b> 101:7 104:8	135:23 143:9	<b>switch</b> 21:7 77:8,12	163:15 164:10
<b>stick</b> 5:8 114:10	106:25 126:1	<b>supportable</b> 129:25	<b>switched</b> 57:15	168:24 169:1,8,13
115:10 228:5	155:6 160:25	<b>supporting</b> 150:19	81:23 85:4	169:16,17,20
<b>STICKLAND</b>	<b>stuffing</b> 158:18	<b>suppose</b> 211:10	<b>sworn</b> 46:22 167:5	170:7,23,23 171:3
172:22	<b>style</b> 72:15	<b>supposed</b> 72:18	167:5	171:4,5,11,25
<b>stone</b> 167:10	<b>styles</b> 72:11 73:1	160:9 213:6	<b>symptom</b> 82:17	172:5,7,11 173:4
228:24	214:15 215:9	<b>sure</b> 3:12 12:11	<b>system</b> 3:4 4:10,12	173:4 177:9,12,14
<b>stools</b> 120:15	224:17	16:1 17:15 18:17	9:3,25 10:22,23	179:17,24 180:3
<b>stop</b> 125:16 155:10	<b>submitted</b> 47:16	19:13 21:15 29:3	11:10,11,13,25	180:18,20,25
155:10 188:19	124:19	29:4 33:12 34:3	12:5,13,17,18,22	183:25 184:21,22
<b>stopped</b> 211:22	<b>submitting</b> 122:4	34:11 35:4 39:3,8	13:4,7,18 14:11	185:15,16 189:11
<b>store</b> 162:22	<b>Subscription</b> 222:6	43:13 49:6,20	19:17 20:3 23:22	189:24 190:3,7,25
<b>stored</b> 27:14,22	<b>subset</b> 38:17	50:22 51:1 58:19	23:23 27:13 32:1	191:1,4,6,15,22
<b>stores</b> 135:5	<b>substitute</b> 133:4	62:4 69:23 70:13	34:12 35:6 36:18	192:15 193:9,15
<b>stories</b> 186:5	<b>subtle</b> 188:3	73:2 74:9 75:14	37:21 38:22,25	193:20 194:24
<b>straight</b> 88:15	<b>subtract</b> 146:10	79:9 85:1 89:17	49:7,10 50:23	195:1,5,15,18

196:20 199:1,8,11 200:11,13 201:16 201:18,19,24,25 202:11,12,16,16 203:3,9,12,19,23 205:8 206:9,22,24 207:22 208:7 210:19 211:3,7 212:15 215:23 218:5,16,19 219:3 219:5,11,16,16,22 220:8,11,12,20,23 222:5 224:2,4 226:7,11,15,18,19 227:4,8,15,15,16 227:20,21,25 228:1,2 <b>systematic</b> 101:12 101:12 102:13 106:17 <b>systemic</b> 101:12 106:17 <b>systems</b> 11:5,19,24 15:3 30:13 47:15 47:20 53:7 63:13 63:21 65:1 66:16 66:22 74:1,5 79:5 86:1,13 95:10 140:8,14 158:11 171:23 186:13 191:18 192:24 194:20 201:21 203:13,16 205:18 205:19 206:7 220:6 221:25 <b>system's</b> 218:22	48:9,10 <b>tabulates</b> 29:13 202:2 <b>tabulating</b> 33:13 <b>tabulation</b> 39:25 134:23,25 201:24 227:1,2 <b>tabulator</b> 30:3 33:9 33:13 <b>tabulators</b> 32:12 32:13,20 33:1 <b>take</b> 6:11 12:4 14:10 16:14 33:7 33:8 35:6 52:12 52:22 54:6 62:24 70:5 87:14,15 112:2 113:20 118:1 120:21 122:7 124:17 129:23 130:10 133:20 139:23 140:11 146:7,9 149:18 165:23 175:13,13 179:10 188:11,15 201:23 216:14,20 219:12 219:24 221:3 222:2 <b>takeaways</b> 49:3 <b>taken</b> 6:16 95:20 147:22 156:2 166:3 168:24 175:8 187:23 203:17 230:6 <b>takes</b> 43:18 156:19 <b>talk</b> 5:4 6:15 9:4 11:17 17:1 24:2 31:23 35:3 37:17 42:23 49:17 62:2 70:9 76:19 80:21 84:15 85:8 97:4 99:17,18,18 100:10 106:11 109:8 137:17 141:4 161:13 176:7,20 178:21 189:3 193:13 201:21 217:18 227:11,20 <b>talkative</b> 228:6	<b>talked</b> 28:7 32:12 46:3 48:17 49:17 49:21 50:15 55:10 98:1 152:5,17 192:23 193:19 206:6 210:10 221:6 224:15,17 <b>talking</b> 9:20 21:11 21:12 23:15,16 24:7 47:3 58:16 77:11 96:24 111:4 112:7 129:10 131:12 138:25 154:10 185:6 191:14,24 195:13 200:21,24 207:10 209:4 210:19 217:10 218:11 219:10,17 229:20 <b>talks</b> 122:24 <b>tallied</b> 158:13 <b>tallies</b> 33:3 <b>tally</b> 33:12 39:9 163:21 <b>tangentially</b> 133:9 <b>tap</b> 166:23 <b>tapes</b> 81:3 <b>task</b> 34:20 75:3 133:23 143:7 210:1 <b>tasked</b> 36:13 <b>tasks</b> 11:7 <b>taught</b> 90:8 <b>tawdry</b> 74:24 <b>taxes</b> 18:18 212:1 <b>taxpayer</b> 138:15 <b>taxpayers</b> 139:3 145:25 212:7 223:7 <b>teach</b> 211:17 <b>team</b> 70:4 77:22 159:1 198:3,4 216:12 <b>Teasley</b> 9:19 <b>Tech</b> 142:4 158:25 <b>technical</b> 84:21 90:7 <b>technical-capacity</b> 133:25 <b>technologies</b> 76:12	77:4 221:20 <b>technology</b> 4:7,9 47:19 67:22,25 68:2,4,5,19,19,25 69:7 70:1,3,23 71:2 87:24 92:11 92:23 134:12 136:8 142:8,10,14 143:4 148:13,14 150:11,23 151:12 163:18 <b>Technology's</b> 218:25 <b>tell</b> 78:23,24 91:15 99:4 116:3 119:7 121:9,15 122:20 126:14 128:24 130:12 131:1 132:11 134:7,19 135:15 137:3,13 139:15,19 141:14 144:1,18 145:17 146:17 147:25 149:25 151:23 152:4,6,12,20 153:12,23 156:5 157:22 161:10 162:22,23,24 165:19 169:6 172:23 174:9 200:25,25 222:4 226:12 229:14 <b>telling</b> 26:15 208:13 <b>tells</b> 11:7 163:12 200:8 <b>temporary</b> 90:4 99:24,25 104:23 200:1 <b>tempted</b> 133:7,8 <b>tend</b> 30:24 <b>tended</b> 29:19 104:20 <b>tens</b> 211:10 <b>tension</b> 61:17 212:12 <b>tentative</b> 7:19 <b>tenure</b> 81:16 <b>term</b> 2:8 169:4 199:17	<b>terms</b> 29:11 61:3,4 103:3 105:19 110:4 111:22 129:17 136:23 140:15,23 196:12 216:10,16 220:18 <b>test</b> 16:7,11,18 17:4 42:15 53:8 95:4 96:9,9,9,9,16,16 112:20 113:16 134:24 171:6,9,10 185:4,8,15,16,21 187:23 226:10 227:17 <b>tested</b> 94:21 226:6 227:16 <b>tester</b> 16:13 <b>testing</b> 9:6,6,8,8,23 9:23 10:1,1,11 16:4,8,20 31:13 52:7 65:5 83:20 85:21 173:16 203:15 208:1 227:14 <b>tests</b> 87:9 219:13 219:24 <b>thank</b> 2:25 3:10,16 3:17,20 4:17,20 4:24 5:1,19 6:2 7:21 10:5,15,15 10:16 21:13 23:8 24:10,11 26:17 27:7,8 28:21 35:5 35:9 36:10,12 37:1,3,4,8,16 50:5 52:11 56:13 58:1 58:14 60:2,3,4,12 62:13,15 75:8 78:11,13,15,16 83:11,11,12 85:1 88:5 91:11,12 93:22 94:8 95:13 95:15,17,19 107:1 107:3,3 108:19,20 108:24,25 112:4,6 113:8,24 115:3,21 115:25 117:24 118:18,19,22,23 119:3,3,4 120:23 120:25 121:5,8
---	---	--	---	---

## T

**T** 159:12 230:1,1  
**table** 69:11 73:9  
75:6,8 76:7 87:12  
89:18 90:16 91:6  
94:18 108:19  
113:1 131:25  
166:12,14,23  
168:7  
**tabulate** 29:7 32:13  
48:8 66:2  
**tabulated** 12:22  
13:5 38:6 44:11

122:11,21 123:15 123:16 126:8,9,13 128:10,11,12,16 128:23,24 130:19 130:21,22 132:5,6 132:6,13,14 134:4 135:10,11,14 137:9,11,15,24 139:5,12,13,16,22 141:8,9,10,13,17 143:20,21 146:11 146:12,14,15,16 147:22,23 149:21 149:23 151:18,20 153:4,5,10 155:14 155:15,17,19,20 157:8,9,20,25 159:9,24 161:5,6 161:9 162:10,16 162:20 164:19,22 165:21,22 166:2 166:19 171:13 172:20 173:2 178:15 179:15 181:19 188:8 189:7 191:11 195:11 204:18 205:2 216:6 226:5 229:12,17,19 <b>Thanking</b> 4:17 <b>thanks</b> 53:16 114:1 130:25 134:6 135:12 145:23 147:24 155:18 164:20 <b>that'll</b> 110:10 <b>that's</b> 3:15 7:19,19 13:19 14:20 22:4 22:5 24:6 25:17 25:21 29:23,23,24 30:1 31:9,10,15 31:21 32:4,7 35:24 40:25 41:18 42:2 43:16 44:16 44:16 45:9 46:12 48:14,23 53:2 54:8 55:13 58:12 58:16 59:13 60:1 60:16,22,25 61:9 74:6 78:9 79:8,8	79:21 87:7,22 90:9,20 93:19 102:18 103:19 104:9 105:7,7 111:1,1,3,24,24 123:15 125:2,3 138:17,21,23 141:1 146:5 147:4 147:16 150:22 151:13 154:13,15 154:18,18,19,21 154:21 155:2 156:19 157:15 161:17 162:8,8,9 167:4 169:16 171:17,17 172:16 172:24 173:9 174:16,25 176:25 178:17,25 180:9 180:16 185:5,19 187:12,18,18,19 188:3,5,13,25 190:21 192:2,4,11 194:23 199:20,21 201:15 202:10 203:6 205:23 209:10 210:8 212:13 215:4,5,18 218:1 219:18 220:13 221:10,13 221:13 222:2,7 223:11 225:3,23 227:11,13 228:6 <b>theory</b> 54:5 <b>thereto</b> 230:13 <b>there's</b> 8:17 14:3 18:6,8 25:19 26:12 29:22 36:5 36:18 40:19 41:20 42:7,24 46:6 49:22,22 50:17 51:19 61:16 80:1 86:19 110:25 111:8 113:13 119:23 130:12 154:21 161:17 163:20 174:11,12 174:14 181:13 182:4,9,17 184:18 184:19 186:11	187:9,10 190:11 190:14 194:4 197:3,16 201:4 202:9 204:19 209:7 217:12 220:9,13,19 223:3 223:24 <b>they'd</b> 100:25 <b>they'd</b> 132:3 <b>they'll</b> 87:21 145:19 216:10 <b>they're</b> 28:2 30:17 30:17 33:15 35:14 42:21 48:13 55:25 91:1 102:17,17 104:23,24,24 107:20,22,23 122:4 130:7 138:6 145:15 160:24 172:25 180:8 200:19 201:23 202:3 208:9 215:10,15 <b>they've</b> 92:17 122:5 182:24 188:11 198:11 225:25 <b>thing</b> 6:5 18:13 24:19 29:4,9,24 32:3 33:24 39:6 49:18 56:25 76:18 81:15,18 82:2 87:19 94:12 103:25 104:16 105:7 111:7,9 123:1,7 135:3 147:12,20 157:3,6 161:13 165:3,14 165:20 172:3,13 174:16 176:17 191:14 193:6,12 193:19 201:16 205:22 207:13 210:3 214:8 228:4 229:7 <b>things</b> 19:15 20:2 22:18 29:25 55:11 55:18 56:21 60:14 61:13 64:14 68:3 68:22 97:4 107:23	129:18 130:2 160:5,8 161:23 162:22 165:10 168:5 170:17 176:8 181:23,24 182:20 183:12 186:4 190:14 198:24 199:7 203:13,17 207:10 208:16 210:16,17 211:24 212:19 215:22,24 216:11 216:19,20 217:23 219:24 223:10,11 <b>think</b> 8:15 9:5 11:2 19:4 22:18 25:1 27:21 29:5,17 30:24 31:25 32:2 32:17 33:20 34:9 34:14,16,17 36:7 37:8 40:18 49:10 51:18,19 52:2,2 53:19,19,20 54:2 54:2 55:2,14,22 56:7 58:3 62:6 66:10 67:13,16,23 68:7,18,24 69:3 71:24,25 72:8,11 76:17,19,20 78:2 78:10,25 84:1,20 85:9,25 88:2,3,9 88:10 90:25 92:7 92:11,11 93:6,20 95:7 99:9 101:6,7 109:5,22 110:4 111:19 112:12,12 112:17 113:7,9,10 113:12,13,19,21 113:21 114:6 115:2 123:20 125:3 126:7,8 130:15 131:7,9,15 144:23 147:12,16 147:17,19 152:23 153:1 154:15,16 155:7,11,12,13,25 156:8,20 157:1 158:18,22 159:7 160:5,12 162:21 166:24,25 167:11	167:20 168:8,18 168:23,25 169:10 171:2,3,4,6,9,9,23 171:23 172:5,9,25 173:3,12,25,25 174:16 175:25 177:5,5,7,16 178:4,16,17 179:6 179:16,17,18,21 179:25 180:13,16 180:20,22 181:1 181:16 182:15 183:9,15 184:18 185:5,16 186:25 187:1 189:14,18 189:23,24 191:13 191:23 192:21 193:10 194:23 195:10,15,18,20 196:21,23,25 199:5 202:12 203:18 204:3,6 205:15,23 206:3 206:17 208:5 209:13 212:17 214:8 215:5 216:3 216:4 219:1,15,17 219:20 220:9,14 220:19 221:14,14 221:15,17,21 222:1,7,19 223:18 224:7 227:25 228:11 <b>thinking</b> 19:20 43:9 44:23 51:6 51:15 79:10 82:3 165:17 167:8 177:23 178:22 223:12 <b>thinks</b> 199:4 <b>third</b> 2:4 31:8 41:17 44:16 45:25 62:6 142:1 179:12 193:12 228:16 <b>Thompson's</b> 164:6 <b>thoroughly</b> 150:8 <b>thought</b> 1:18,18,19 34:25 63:20 64:12 64:13 67:23 75:13 131:14 139:11
--	---	---	---	---

140:17 169:1 177:19,24 182:21 207:18 215:5 216:24 222:20 224:14 229:5 <b>thoughtful</b> 139:25 <b>thoughts</b> 7:10,16 167:18 170:14 178:12 191:9 207:16 218:11 224:12 228:6,15 229:3 <b>thousands</b> 121:15 178:2,3,3 214:18 214:19,19 <b>threat</b> 69:1 <b>threats</b> 68:4 <b>three</b> 6:25 28:25 29:10 39:24 49:1 51:2 55:19 59:3 59:25 85:25 90:5 117:6 121:16 125:20 165:10 175:17,22 176:8 213:5 214:14 215:9 <b>threshold</b> 57:2 170:21 <b>threw</b> 193:12 198:24 <b>Throop</b> 159:11,11 159:11,12,13,16 159:18,20,21,23 160:1 161:5 <b>Throp</b> 159:10 <b>throw</b> 65:10 69:4 165:4 167:21 168:22 193:18 195:14,23 <b>throwing</b> 31:21 <b>ticket</b> 45:17 <b>tiered</b> 40:1 41:4 49:1 <b>tight</b> 15:8 40:21 175:8 <b>tilt</b> 107:21 <b>time</b> 2:14,18 3:23 4:20 5:1,8,23 7:6 7:7 15:23 17:24 20:24 31:21 33:9	35:5 36:3 38:19 40:6,11,14 41:14 41:24 42:4 49:16 50:6,13 53:20,22 55:16 56:11 58:10 61:25 63:3,7,10 63:13,14 64:1 66:23 67:11,13,14 67:22 68:18 69:13 74:20 76:4 80:13 80:16,24 85:17,20 85:24 87:15 89:19 100:8,11 101:19 102:13 104:6,8 109:19 112:10 118:1 119:11,21 123:5,20,21 126:2 129:3 132:3 133:20 139:24 140:1,10 141:18 142:20 149:21 150:7 153:18,18 154:1 161:19,20 167:9,14,16 169:7 171:23 175:4,13 175:13 176:21 178:24,25 188:11 188:15 190:24 202:20 207:10 208:10 209:18,21 209:24 211:19 214:9,24 216:15 220:7 221:6 228:8 <b>timeframe</b> 112:7 <b>timeframes</b> 170:1 <b>timeline</b> 51:7 54:9 55:16 129:15,19 <b>timelines</b> 129:22 <b>timely</b> 181:7 207:16 <b>times</b> 4:11 74:22 83:7 104:16 107:13,18 117:4 129:17 151:15 155:3 193:20 214:14,14 <b>timetables</b> 100:24 <b>Timmer</b> 155:16,17 155:19,24 157:9 <b>Tindall</b> 116:1,5,5	117:24 118:1,19 118:22 <b>tinge</b> 84:6 <b>tired</b> 160:23 <b>titled</b> 150:21 <b>today</b> 3:5 4:6,23 5:16,23 6:4 7:20 9:21 10:6,18 11:12 12:17 13:2 33:6 37:2,7,17,25 41:4 42:14 60:8 61:24 62:2,14,19 62:21,21,25 68:3 68:4,14,17 71:5 75:8 77:10 81:16 92:12 95:19 96:25 107:4 116:2 118:21 119:2 120:24 121:3 122:12,24 123:17 126:10,20 128:13 128:22 130:20 131:1 132:7,8 134:5,6 135:13,20 137:12,13,17,25 139:6,7,18 140:17 141:11 143:22 146:14,15 147:24 149:15,24,25 151:19 153:6 155:3,16 156:16 160:19,21 162:17 164:21 166:6,7,11 166:24 168:14 169:23 171:18 172:1 199:14 216:7 219:5,10 227:7 228:20 229:18 <b>toddler</b> 219:13 <b>told</b> 6:7 13:4,7 18:9 114:6 194:8 195:15 203:2 228:9 <b>Tom</b> 123:17,17,17 123:18 <b>ton</b> 102:22 <b>Toni</b> 128:13,16 <b>top</b> 45:17 77:19 157:10 206:9	<b>topic</b> 37:17 <b>topple</b> 143:11 <b>top-of-the-head</b> 78:4 <b>top-to-bottom</b> 169:17 <b>tortured</b> 201:13 <b>total</b> 27:5 33:4 38:17 52:15 104:13 140:23 146:10 <b>totally</b> 147:2 <b>Totenberg</b> 110:14 110:18,21 <b>Totenberg's</b> 120:1 <b>touch</b> 87:16 107:12 107:17 199:6 <b>touched</b> 147:13 193:11 210:13 <b>touches</b> 177:10 <b>touching</b> 107:18 <b>touchscreen</b> 29:6 148:12,13 149:5 <b>tough</b> 128:7 144:21 <b>track</b> 17:18 <b>tracked</b> 28:17 <b>traditional</b> 48:25 170:1 <b>trail</b> 4:9 11:21 12:1 19:18 26:7 30:19 49:5 122:6 127:18 142:15 148:17 149:2,3 185:2 189:16 <b>Trailing</b> 1:19 <b>train</b> 80:2 90:2 195:16 <b>trained</b> 6:9 <b>training</b> 60:14 67:1 67:3 77:5 78:7 79:13,20 90:2,19 165:9 190:22,25 191:5,8 194:19,20 195:5 <b>transcript</b> 1:17 6:16 <b>transferred</b> 30:2 <b>transition</b> 3:22 227:4 <b>transparency</b> 2:11	33:14 34:4,13 145:1 <b>transparent</b> 127:18 <b>transparently</b> 163:9 <b>transporting</b> 81:6 <b>trash</b> 176:15 <b>treated</b> 125:4,5 <b>treatment</b> 143:1 <b>trees</b> 98:19 <b>tremendous</b> 11:19 35:24 97:16,17 98:13 <b>tremendously</b> 100:22 <b>trenches</b> 192:4 <b>trial</b> 52:6 60:19 110:13 143:19 171:7 <b>tried</b> 33:16 57:24 115:8,9 125:17 <b>trigger</b> 57:3 181:23 181:24 <b>tripled</b> 31:4 <b>Troop</b> 159:22 <b>trouble</b> 84:3 <b>true</b> 10:17 16:17 27:13 44:8 192:11 196:20,21 208:3 230:7 <b>trust</b> 11:1,16,17 33:25 83:22 87:10 121:19,22 123:2 124:14 129:7,13 130:13 145:19 152:21 156:12,15 171:20 172:1,5,11 172:11 173:14 189:13 220:6,8,11 <b>trusted</b> 71:9 83:24 84:4,5 156:10 <b>trusts</b> 186:3 <b>trustworthy</b> 165:20 172:17 <b>try</b> 5:8 6:19 9:3 36:2 41:22 42:16 51:2 62:11 74:25 83:21 89:7 92:9 112:24 119:17 121:6 122:13
---	--	--	---	--

<p>190:12 210:15 216:2 <b>trying</b> 6:11 19:6 38:3,6 56:8 113:18 115:15 145:14 150:5 190:15 210:21 211:17 <b>Tucker</b> 151:22,25 151:25 152:5,8,11 152:13 <b>Tuesday</b> 98:23 99:10 <b>turn</b> 4:21 6:21 8:13 15:4 74:14 105:6 145:10 <b>turned</b> 17:6,11 69:23 99:1 131:12 145:15 <b>turning</b> 6:19 <b>turnout</b> 144:18 <b>twice</b> 114:11 <b>two</b> 8:25 14:10,10 14:12 17:22 19:24 20:2 21:24 30:7 30:23 36:5,5,7 41:5,11 42:18,23 49:1 56:21 61:3,4 63:23 67:24 70:8 89:20 90:5 91:16 105:16 110:7,7 134:12 146:1 164:15 167:8 183:12 192:1 193:17 198:19 202:3,3 206:19 207:4 217:2,12,15 219:4 <b>type</b> 22:4,14 36:22 36:24 41:17,18 43:20 44:16,20 52:4 53:19,24 55:12 56:9 65:1,2 67:13,15,19 71:19 73:16 86:3 89:2 108:14 127:19 128:7 141:1 147:3 147:19 177:13 180:2 189:25 190:14 193:9</p>	<p>203:18 214:23 <b>types</b> 20:5 29:10 39:25 42:23 46:4 51:11 63:25 83:21 86:1 140:3,8 141:3,5 180:4 <b>typical</b> 25:21 105:8 212:25 <b>typically</b> 11:9 15:6 19:1 20:7 24:23 25:19,20 52:12 <b>T-H-R</b> 159:15</p> <hr/> <p><b>U</b></p> <p><b>Uh-huh</b> 96:19 217:4 <b>ultimately</b> 67:19 92:2 168:9 <b>unable</b> 117:11 <b>unaffected</b> 194:9 <b>unambiguous</b> 160:13 <b>unauditable</b> 145:16 <b>uncomfortable</b> 91:2 <b>underlying</b> 38:4,5 <b>underscore</b> 90:16 <b>undersigning</b> 230:12 <b>understand</b> 2:25 29:5 34:11 69:6 70:23 75:3 77:3 87:4,13,24 89:24 92:9,22 94:19 115:5,22 136:9 138:24 148:20 154:11 185:1 219:7 <b>understandably</b> 120:20 <b>understanding</b> 79:18 80:4 92:14 114:13 132:20 <b>understood</b> 50:22 85:1 86:9 93:7 <b>under-vote</b> 18:23 19:2,7 <b>uneducated</b> 90:3 <b>unexplained</b> 25:11 <b>unfortunately</b></p>	<p>109:23 148:22 <b>unheard</b> 18:23 <b>unicorn</b> 219:21 <b>unified</b> 67:3 93:10 <b>uniform</b> 128:2 169:3 193:14 194:25 195:19 196:1 211:7 <b>uniformity</b> 192:21 193:2,10,14,16 195:13,22 212:14 <b>uniform-voting</b> 134:15 <b>unify</b> 66:22 <b>union</b> 132:25 <b>unit</b> 27:14,18,24 28:1 144:23,24 <b>United</b> 2:21 <b>units</b> 173:8 197:19 226:10 <b>university</b> 30:25 95:4 134:10 136:12 150:14 <b>unlucky</b> 44:9 <b>unneeded</b> 214:7 <b>unquote</b> 163:23 164:8 199:12 <b>unsavory</b> 89:21 <b>unused</b> 176:14,16 <b>unusual</b> 97:9 <b>unverifiability</b> 164:10 <b>unverifiable</b> 12:16 12:18 13:13 29:12 29:14 30:9 164:1 <b>unwieldy</b> 64:11 <b>UOCAVA</b> 176:19 178:3 <b>upcoming</b> 142:21 <b>update</b> 108:23 109:3 143:17 165:14 169:14 170:7 199:2 203:15 210:13,18 <b>updated</b> 4:8 <b>upgrade</b> 68:19 69:11 165:9 <b>upgraded</b> 68:23 147:6 <b>upgrading</b> 165:11</p>	<p><b>upkeep</b> 80:3 <b>upside</b> 201:15 <b>urge</b> 134:1 139:23 140:12 <b>USA</b> 156:14 <b>usable</b> 67:17 <b>use</b> 11:5 21:18 31:15 41:21 66:24 69:25 70:2,10 87:10 89:24 90:11 90:11,12,25 110:12 131:15,24 134:22 135:25 138:16 139:3 145:13 148:12,13 149:15 159:1 179:20 191:6 196:14,19 197:3,4 197:4,9,14,17 199:14 200:8,13 200:14 207:23 219:14 221:17 225:8,9 227:22,23 227:24 228:2 <b>useful</b> 126:4 <b>uses</b> 219:12 225:22 <b>usually</b> 40:5,8,9 46:6 50:11 51:8 52:17 56:21 57:4 97:10 108:13 144:21 155:24 204:1 <b>utilized</b> 169:21</p> <hr/> <p><b>V</b></p> <p><b>v</b> 110:9,10,10 111:2 <b>vacancies</b> 45:6 <b>valid</b> 17:16 <b>validated</b> 176:22 <b>validating</b> 176:18 <b>valuable</b> 168:19 <b>value</b> 47:21 58:8 133:2 137:8 221:4 <b>values</b> 143:9,12 <b>vans</b> 90:7 <b>variety</b> 17:21 64:3 126:23 <b>vast</b> 150:9 <b>vaults</b> 74:21 <b>Vegas</b> 153:8</p>	<p><b>vehicles</b> 223:14 <b>vendor</b> 4:12 48:5,6 67:14 94:22 136:10,24 137:2,3 150:6 203:18 207:6 <b>vendors</b> 30:7 76:12 76:20 160:13 206:7 207:2,2,4,4 227:14 <b>verifiability</b> 12:15 31:2 140:3,23 <b>verifiable</b> 4:9 12:10 13:17 29:22,23 120:9 130:4 140:5 140:7,10,11 142:15 143:12,18 163:2 164:14 179:17,17 <b>verifiably</b> 163:9 <b>verification</b> 100:13 149:10,12 <b>verified</b> 12:20 32:14 49:5 187:17 <b>verify</b> 12:22 16:2 29:15 31:1 33:1 38:3 82:25 121:23 135:4 149:4,5 187:7,24 188:1,12 226:22 <b>verifying</b> 159:1,2 <b>versions</b> 72:21 <b>versus</b> 15:20 32:18 93:17 120:2 145:9 180:15 187:21 189:9 211:21 219:7 <b>viable</b> 223:17 <b>Vicki</b> 128:17,17,21 129:1 130:19 <b>Vietnam</b> 144:9 <b>view</b> 48:19 105:21 109:14 221:10 <b>views</b> 141:19,20,21 <b>Vincent</b> 52:11 181:19 <b>Vincent's</b> 181:21 <b>violation</b> 110:13 151:10 <b>Virginia</b> 42:19</p>
--	---	--	--	--

<b>virtually</b> 16:15 69:16 <b>virtue</b> 68:22 <b>visit</b> 82:19 <b>visited</b> 81:16 <b>visiting</b> 75:19 <b>visual</b> 71:6,8 <b>vital</b> 210:5,6 <b>vitally</b> 142:17 <b>voice</b> 84:8 155:25 <b>voices</b> 148:9 <b>volume</b> 9:2 101:19 119:12 <b>volunteer</b> 192:12 <b>Volusia</b> 28:13 <b>vote</b> 4:2 11:21 16:24 18:12 20:9 20:16 21:17,21 22:1,8,11,17 23:5 23:7,11,11,15,19 23:21,21 24:1,8 24:17,23,24 25:11 25:20,21,24,25,25 28:7 29:23 32:5 32:10,10,13 36:14 36:16,20,24 38:13 38:15,17,22 39:9 44:11,14 46:7 54:14,17 65:10,11 71:9 72:18 73:24 83:14,25 84:3 85:14 87:4,5 89:9 89:11 99:12,21 100:3 101:21 105:14 116:23,23 117:3,11 120:16 120:18 121:24 124:17 127:2 129:11 133:2 143:12 144:8,14 144:15,15,16,17 144:18 145:18 146:2,3,4,7,7,8,9 147:15,16,21 148:5 150:21 152:2,15,22,24,24 153:3 155:6,8 156:17,21,24 159:2 160:21 168:10 169:20	172:2,18 187:5,7 187:14 188:2 189:16,17 197:25 199:6 200:2 202:8 202:10,12 203:3 205:2 218:5 219:23 225:17,21 226:22,24,25 227:7 229:10 <b>voted</b> 24:15 26:11 26:13 32:5 86:5 92:5 104:1,2 106:10,10 107:5 117:16,17 142:3 156:22,23 161:19 171:23,24 176:13 186:18 <b>voter</b> 10:8,19 12:22 25:13 29:15 31:18 32:11,14 36:17 44:11 49:4 65:9 66:25 69:6 70:2 70:24 73:17 74:2 74:6 76:16 77:5 77:13 78:3,4,20 85:5,6 86:20 88:3 89:17,22 92:13,15 104:7 108:14 111:14,16 116:6 116:12,24 117:3,5 119:9 122:8 126:24,25,25 130:9 132:14 136:1 138:4 141:17 144:17,25 145:10,17 146:1 146:22 148:3,19 151:11 152:25 153:17 156:21 158:21 159:1 163:22 173:14 186:16 187:5,6,6 187:13 188:10 191:2 193:2 201:8 202:17,21 204:14 205:8 213:7 215:4 220:16 225:23 226:17,21,21,23 227:5,5,6 <b>VoterGA</b> 34:22	<b>voters</b> 4:10 11:22 18:10 23:4 24:16 29:2 30:24,25 32:7,8 65:4,6,12 66:25 69:23 70:14 71:3,6,17,19 74:11 76:14 81:7 83:19,21,22 84:2 84:5 85:7,7,18,19 87:14,16,24 89:7 89:24 90:3,11,23 90:24 91:3 93:14 93:21 99:6,19 102:12 106:9 111:15,16,22 116:13 117:1,10 117:15,18 118:5 118:12 121:15,23 124:17,23 125:19 127:2,9,10 129:6 129:10,21,24 134:15,15 139:25 140:4 145:15 148:8,15,24 149:8 149:11,22 153:2 154:18 158:12 159:2 161:15 164:18 169:9 179:25 180:15 181:4 186:7 187:11,17 191:9 192:9 193:1 194:3 198:20 201:7 202:25 204:4 214:11 217:5,7 219:2,2,22 224:22 225:16 226:9,13 228:1 <b>voter-education</b> 69:19,22 70:4,13 77:17,23 190:21 194:20 <b>voter-protection</b> 116:7,10 <b>voter-registration</b> 138:6,12 204:14 <b>voter-verifiable</b> 38:22 227:9 <b>voter-verified</b> 30:17,19 37:21	127:18 <b>voter's</b> 73:15 81:2 117:12 188:13 215:2 <b>votes</b> 12:20,23 13:10 17:3,4,7,20 17:23 18:1,3,4,14 18:16,19 19:4,9 19:12,16 20:4,6,9 21:23,24 22:13,14 23:3,3,10,16 24:2 24:3,6 25:9 27:12 27:13,14,17,19,22 28:4,11,15,15 29:13 30:16 33:4 33:17,17 38:5,7,9 38:10,18 43:10 46:8,15 52:15 54:25 57:15 58:25 63:12 64:2,3 66:3 85:12 89:6 99:8 100:5 111:4 117:17 118:13,15 121:24 126:6 141:4 142:15,16 143:19,20 145:8 146:2 148:5,6,11 148:18 149:10 156:24 163:7,8 176:10,11,12,12 187:15 197:6 202:2,2 217:2,12 225:1,5 226:1 <b>vote-casting</b> 169:15 199:3 <b>vote-review</b> 89:14 89:15 <b>vote's</b> 24:8 152:19 155:9 <b>voting</b> 3:4 4:4,9,13 5:5 7:17 11:1,19 12:10,18 14:13,14 14:20 16:7,9 17:1 20:12,13 23:12 25:15 26:20,25 27:1,1,14,24 28:1 30:18 32:1,6 36:23,25 38:24 40:5 51:11 61:25 62:9 63:14 64:25	66:8,9,18,22,24 67:12 68:1,25 69:4,11,21,23 70:9,10,16 71:14 73:19 74:16 78:18 78:22 80:10 81:4 82:2 83:16 84:3 86:21 88:8,14 89:2 90:25 91:23 93:20,24 94:19,24 96:24 97:8,15,22 98:5,11,21,22 99:7,9,10,12,13 99:15,17,22 100:2 100:3,6,7 101:16 101:17,19 102:18 103:3,5,9,11 104:15,19 105:8 106:5 107:4 111:22 116:19 118:6 124:15 129:13 132:20,23 133:3,11 134:12 135:23 140:13 141:3 142:19 143:4,6,17 145:13 145:16 147:3,19 148:7 150:4 151:13 152:21 153:3 155:10,10 156:4,6 158:2,11 161:2,16,19 163:4 163:15 164:4,14 168:24 170:22,23 171:3,3 178:11 179:17 180:2,18 180:20 181:5 183:17 191:18 196:1,15,19 197:22 198:3 199:5 203:23 204:8,15,22 207:3 212:4 214:10 219:4 220:6,12 224:15 225:8,14 227:16,18 228:10 <b>vulnerability</b> 120:3 <b>vulnerable</b> 14:11 14:11,24 16:20 119:25
---	--	---	---	--

<b>VVPAT</b> 30:14	220:22 221:3,11 221:11 223:23 226:1 228:7 229:6	209:10 215:3 216:10 219:6,14 223:24 224:23 225:9	96:11 <b>we're</b> 3:5 178:20 <b>we've</b> 5:16 76:21 169:4 189:18	19:10 34:15,21 35:20 58:10 59:6 76:11 136:7 146:25 147:1 156:11 158:16,17 168:24 173:12 179:15,16 180:22 202:25 206:7 207:17 210:10 214:1,5 216:8 225:6
<b>W</b>			<b>we'd</b> 20:20 31:23 67:25 76:2 96:2 116:3 119:6 126:15 128:25 147:25 151:23 153:12,23 174:13 223:12	<b>whatnot</b> 52:7 190:22 210:12 223:6
<b>wait</b> 4:11 107:25 151:15 176:22 209:18	<b>wanted</b> 19:15 20:2 34:24 35:4 57:4 62:20 63:15,17 68:16 76:1,4 83:12 87:25 89:11 90:15 94:12 102:25 110:7 120:10 127:6 152:24 162:4 178:22 193:8 211:19,20 226:24	<b>ways</b> 102:16 129:25 194:10 196:11 212:18 225:10,11	<b>we'll</b> 6:24 7:2,5,8 7:20 9:3 10:4 16:23 21:22 37:5 37:9 38:2 45:7,18 95:19 109:17,17 132:1,1 150:1 165:25 166:1 167:7 179:21 188:21 228:23	<b>whatsoever</b> 61:17 184:24 227:21
<b>waited</b> 18:10		<b>wayside</b> 144:11	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>what's</b> 12:24 23:21 38:23 77:8 118:8 137:3 144:23,23 156:9 167:23 179:22 187:14 190:17 209:8 221:22
<b>waiting</b> 9:17 176:19	<b>wanting</b> 211:22	<b>weeks</b> 167:7,8 175:7,23	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheelchairs</b> 120:16
<b>walk</b> 4:22 106:14 153:2 199:8,19	<b>wants</b> 114:8	<b>weigh</b> 58:10 209:20	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wheels</b> 64:5
<b>walked</b> 98:14	<b>War</b> 144:4	<b>weir</b> 122:16,18,21	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>white</b> 65:25 85:7 86:17
<b>walks</b> 70:14	<b>warranty</b> 93:24	<b>weird</b> 86:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholeheartedly</b> 173:15
<b>wane</b> 105:24	<b>wasn't</b> 67:21,22 108:12	<b>Welch</b> 84:10,11,14 84:24 176:7 226:5	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wholesale</b> 221:4
<b>want</b> 6:15 7:11,25 8:8,12 10:5,16,21 12:8,11 14:10 15:19 16:25 19:10 21:6,7,14,15 25:12 29:1,4,9 31:23 32:17 34:8 37:23 39:8 45:1 49:11 50:22,22 54:11 58:2 69:24 74:25 76:3 79:22 81:15 84:14,25 87:20 92:19 95:25 97:7 109:3,9,13 109:22 110:7 111:7,25 114:18 115:3 117:23 122:13 123:8,24 124:9 128:3,16 129:6,12 134:19 136:2,14 137:6 139:1 141:17 142:25 150:10,24 152:11,12 154:1 155:11 156:20 160:24 161:13 162:1 164:14,24 166:13,13,15,16 166:18,23 167:25 175:14,14 177:21 179:11,11 182:15 184:17,25 185:1 186:12 188:5,15 188:20,22 189:6,8 202:6 205:2,11,14 210:15 212:15	<b>wasted</b> 31:21 35:12 35:17	<b>welcomed</b> 91:24	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>who's</b> 48:20 114:17 202:8,20 220:10
	<b>watch</b> 63:9 66:6 185:25	<b>welcomes</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wide</b> 65:16
	<b>watchdog</b> 212:6	<b>well-designed</b> 125:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wife</b> 6:8 71:7
	<b>watched</b> 208:11	<b>well-funded</b> 192:7	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>willing</b> 117:15
	<b>watcher</b> 129:2	<b>well-intended</b> 5:19	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>win</b> 152:13 182:8
	<b>watchers</b> 116:17 195:16,17	<b>well-to-do</b> 93:17	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>window</b> 76:23 81:4 142:20 175:7,17 192:2
	<b>watching</b> 17:10 142:25	<b>went</b> 12:14 18:11 19:20,22 66:15,17 70:6 75:13 79:19 89:4,18,21 97:25 98:13 99:22,23 100:2 101:10 102:10 104:19 108:23 154:25 156:24 211:19 212:23 213:10	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winner</b> 46:21
	<b>way</b> 5:7 13:5 14:19 16:1 26:6,12,14 41:15 42:21 44:15 53:13,15 63:17 66:16 72:23,24,25 84:16 86:5 104:6 109:10 115:19,20 120:9 121:22,23 121:25 122:1 125:4,5 134:1 136:15,19,25 140:4 143:3,24 146:20 148:17 152:24 155:13 157:2 161:23 165:18 168:21 173:17 178:10 184:24 194:19 195:16 203:10	<b>weren't</b> 104:13 117:13	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>winning</b> 182:11
		<b>we'll</b> 7:1 9:1 60:8	<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wisely</b> 212:2,7
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>wished</b> 84:6
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>withdrawn</b> 230:9
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130:13 134:24,24 135:4 138:25 167:4,9 173:6 176:18,19 177:1 178:22 179:6,21 180:3 181:8,8 184:9 185:1 186:8 191:14,18,24 192:4,7,8,8 193:14 195:13,22 208:7 209:23 210:18 214:12,15 216:13,18,19,22 218:11 219:10,17 220:9,11,12,18 222:12 223:22 224:4,5 225:7 229:10	<b>witnessed</b> 24:14 82:19
			<b>we're</b> 3:5 5:7 9:17 12:9 14:20,21 15:25 20:3 23:16 25:16 27:19 30:10 34:12 37:8 41:17 48:9,15 54:3 55:13 58:11 61:15 75:18 93:7 95:22 111:24 114:3,10 114:10,14,23,25 115:6 130:5,5,6 130	

<b>won</b> 19:20 59:13 181:12	10:2 42:21 64:8 69:14 91:18 99:25	61:20 80:7 88:19 90:20 117:25	<b>you-all</b> 21:2 63:2 138:1 139:2	<b>\$</b>
<b>wonder</b> 186:6 229:13	101:23 104:8 112:15 121:13	119:17,19 121:11 152:16 153:3	<b>you'll</b> 31:12 62:23 128:15 140:18	<b>\$1300</b> 206:13
<b>wonderful</b> 189:14	176:1,3 193:7	159:16,18 160:1	167:23 188:6	<b>\$2</b> 78:9
<b>wondering</b> 156:17	200:18 205:10	174:20 179:15	<b>you're</b> 8:8,10 15:5 21:6 22:22,24	<b>\$25,000</b> 213:2,23
<b>won't</b> 44:22 46:24 99:9 105:19	216:13 221:23	182:12,12 184:17	23:3 29:2,3 31:4,5	<b>\$30</b> 204:5,6 205:2
145:20 174:17	<b>workings</b> 229:16	194:1,23 197:8,23	38:3,5 39:7 40:24	<b>\$4,000</b> 213:12
184:23,24	<b>works</b> 14:19 51:3 95:12 124:16	197:24 198:2,6,21	40:24 42:9 43:9	<b>\$50</b> 69:15
<b>word</b> 16:14 123:2	171:8,8,12 200:2	205:23,24 208:20	46:25 57:20 95:1	<b>0</b>
<b>words</b> 164:15 169:14,17 199:2,4	<b>world</b> 38:4 63:4,5 66:16	209:5 220:2	107:9,9 108:3,6	<b>02</b> 194:21
223:5	<b>worry</b> 31:20 72:13 77:1 175:22	224:15 228:14	114:9 115:8 116:3	<b>1</b>
<b>work</b> 3:8 4:17 7:12 17:18 34:1,10	<b>worrying</b> 217:24	<b>year</b> 42:20 45:18 53:5 61:12,13	121:9 122:14,20	<b>1</b> 7:2 19:1 30:15
36:1 38:1 43:18	<b>worst</b> 161:2	66:14 77:25 88:7	123:22 125:4,5	40:8 41:10 56:4
52:22 53:13,15	<b>worth</b> 155:1 193:17	88:20 90:5 97:1	126:6,14 128:25	57:2 151:2 156:17
55:3,3 56:12 58:8	<b>worthy</b> 132:22	97:12 99:7 103:22	132:12 134:7,21	156:18 176:10
71:5 90:5 98:9	<b>wouldn't</b> 16:6 26:7 58:7 59:11,12	104:3 113:14	135:15 136:15,25	182:17
104:6 113:2 116:8	163:14 193:4,4	124:15 129:2,9	137:14,25 139:10	<b>10</b> 10:23 40:9 41:9
124:22 126:22	<b>wow</b> 217:16	138:3 152:1 167:2	141:15 144:1	42:4,5,13 55:24
131:7 133:19	<b>wrap</b> 115:9 117:23 125:24 145:22	172:15 173:13,13	146:17 147:25	84:19 125:16
140:23 144:6,13	151:8 161:4	191:16 209:18	150:1 151:23	147:9 206:14
155:21 170:15	<b>wrapping</b> 81:5	213:23	153:12,23 155:9	207:24 224:5
174:25 175:2	<b>write</b> 89:8	<b>years</b> 11:3 15:2 19:11 29:15 42:14	155:10,21 157:3,3	<b>10th</b> 105:16 116:14
178:24 191:5	<b>write-in</b> 89:9	55:24 63:20 64:17	157:23 165:2	<b>10:00</b> 1:9 2:1
192:5 199:8,25	<b>writing</b> 170:4	68:8,13 69:2	172:21,21 186:25	<b>100</b> 48:18 163:4
202:21 203:14,19	<b>written</b> 97:5 104:6 150:18	74:18 79:19 93:18	193:23 194:10	165:5,21 198:20
205:6,12 209:8,10	<b>wrong</b> 22:22 28:17 42:6,8 76:15	127:2 136:4	200:7,21,24	<b>100,000</b> 52:14
212:15 222:8	108:8 162:7	138:19 142:3,3	212:11 228:6	141:4
224:23	187:15,15,16	147:9 154:5 156:2	<b>you've</b> 3:24 39:14	<b>100-percent</b> 180:17
<b>worked</b> 38:9 39:5 49:8 81:1 83:19	189:21 198:16	156:11,11 158:2	53:13 72:9,23,24	<b>11th</b> 110:16,19
124:16,20,20	202:21 207:12	158:17 165:10	72:25 91:7 92:13	<b>114</b> 18:4
127:1 138:24	217:6,7,19	170:11 192:10	95:8 117:22	<b>12</b> 125:19
173:10		207:24 212:24	125:10 129:4,16	<b>12th</b> 1:10
<b>worker</b> 78:7 83:23 106:14 156:7		213:25 218:23,24	129:17 131:8	<b>12:11</b> 95:20
158:2 193:6 200:1		219:4,17,23	140:1 154:14	<b>12:30</b> 75:25
202:20		221:18,22 222:13	157:16 166:18	<b>12:49</b> 95:20
<b>workers</b> 77:6 83:4 90:2,3,4,11,19,21	<b>X</b>	223:23,25 224:6	169:5 188:19	<b>14th</b> 4:14 110:13
100:1 101:25	<b>X</b> 48:4 65:7 74:4 85:23 86:2,10	224:11	206:13 214:14	167:4
104:22,22 117:2	93:13	<b>yell</b> 166:15	223:15	<b>15</b> 10:21 46:6 48:17
169:10 191:9	<b>Y</b>	<b>yellow</b> 156:7 200:7 200:9	<b>y'all</b> 9:9 10:19 25:1 51:16 109:19	48:24 221:18
193:1 194:5	<b>yeah</b> 3:13,15 8:6 9:11,14,16 22:9	<b>Yep</b> 37:11 121:5 122:18 141:16	111:19 165:6	<b>150</b> 79:7 145:6
201:14 214:17	26:11 28:9,14	<b>yielded</b> 38:11	206:5	163:4 222:9 224:4
215:11 226:14	53:6 54:9 61:20	<b>young</b> 61:8 172:21 219:23	<b>y'all's</b> 109:6	<b>158</b> 92:3
<b>working</b> 2:15 9:24		<b>younger</b> 144:15 145:15	<b>Z</b>	<b>159</b> 46:12 113:1
			<b>zero</b> 12:16	<b>16</b> 19:11 29:14
			<b>zone</b> 210:22	218:23,24 219:17
				219:23
				<b>16,000</b> 20:6 22:14
				28:8,10,14
				<b>168</b> 116:18




<b>17</b> 103:11,18,21 211:16 <b>1700</b> 99:11 <b>18</b> 219:17,23 <b>180</b> 168:14 <b>1800s</b> 63:25 <b>19</b> 112:19 <b>1972</b> 146:22 <b>1982</b> 131:21 <b>1988</b> 144:4 <b>1998</b> 132:14 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 40:8 41:12 77:15 78:19,19 92:4 99:8,8 101:9 115:7 117:23 <b>2.1</b> 100:2 <b>2:25</b> 166:3 <b>2:30</b> 165:24 <b>2:35</b> 166:3 <b>20</b> 57:15 72:20,25 85:12 114:7 221:18 223:23 <b>200</b> 17:23 18:1 27:12 178:6 214:15 <b>2000</b> 19:7 22:15 63:1 64:1 66:19 67:24 68:20 69:9 76:11 77:12 80:10 89:5 93:3 <b>2001</b> 11:18 66:18 66:19 67:24 69:9 70:22 <b>2002</b> 4:5 12:3,6,14 14:4 17:3 85:5 134:11 136:8 192:15 194:18 218:22 <b>2004</b> 17:22 150:4 <b>2005</b> 18:2 <b>2007</b> 134:13 <b>2008</b> 17:8 19:18 20:1 <b>2011</b> 18:14 <b>2014</b> 100:4 <b>2016</b> 48:2 97:12 103:9,10,11,20,21 155:5	<b>2017</b> 15:12 17:9 42:16 <b>2018</b> 1:10 18:22 72:10 97:8 103:13 106:23 118:13 <b>2019</b> 45:8 230:15 <b>2020</b> 49:10 112:10 113:11,19 136:15 137:1 142:21 171:4 191:21 <b>21st</b> 66:8 80:19 91:22 <b>23</b> 103:22 206:17 <b>2300</b> 46:13 206:17 208:9 <b>234</b> 43:15 <b>237</b> 1:12 <b>24</b> 43:15 <b>25</b> 103:6,12 152:9 <b>25,000</b> 213:12 <b>28th</b> 110:17 <b>285</b> 18:4 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 40:8 77:15 78:19 125:14,15 156:17 213:12 225:12,13 <b>3(4)</b> 151:1 <b>3,000</b> 31:11 <b>3.9</b> 159:4 <b>3:54</b> 229:25 <b>30</b> 30:25 31:4 40:3 41:3 46:7 48:17 48:25 103:5,7,15 103:17 142:3 <b>30,000</b> 31:6 <b>30,295</b> 116:15 <b>300</b> 174:24 178:6 <b>31217</b> 1:12 <b>3256</b> 17:4 <b>34</b> 142:3 <b>3500</b> 206:16 <b>36</b> 152:14 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 18:23 24:24 26:13 43:9 125:14,15 198:7 228:4 <b>4th</b> 12:6 <b>40</b> 11:3	<b>40,000</b> 27:5 <b>400</b> 139:4 <b>43,154</b> 116:16 <b>45</b> 156:2 <b>4672-1141-4562-...</b> 230:19 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 40:8 41:11,12 54:24,24 56:4 146:4 157:10 166:1 <b>5-minute</b> 165:23 <b>50</b> 63:20 78:17 79:5 145:6 <b>50-50</b> 91:23 <b>500</b> 141:25 198:7 <b>501(c)(3)</b> 126:21 <b>51.1</b> 182:12 <b>54</b> 77:19 <b>56</b> 168:15 <b>57</b> 103:9 <b>59</b> 103:20 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6th</b> 116:15,16 138:3 <b>600</b> 116:17 <b>68</b> 214:13 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 46:14,15 84:19 101:19 104:17 125:18 126:6 156:17 <b>7,000</b> 206:20 217:3 <b>723</b> 116:21 <b>73</b> 182:9 <b>73,449</b> 116:13 <b>75</b> 103:3 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 107:16 <b>8th</b> 158:10 <b>80s</b> 88:7 <b>800</b> 125:19 126:6 <b>800,000</b> 100:5 <b>83</b> 12:14 103:16 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9th</b> 230:15	<b>90</b> 42:7 48:18 <b>90s</b> 88:7,11,12 89:4 <b>90,000</b> 19:4,9 <b>900</b> 206:12 <b>92</b> 88:20,21 <b>95,000</b> 63:12 64:2
--	---	--	---

---

**From:** Critical Mention <do-not-reply@criticalmention.com>  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 07, 2019 12:19 PM  
**To:** Fuchs, Jordan  
**Subject:** [BULK] Critical Mention: Tess Hammock shared the report "Quoted - March 6"  
**Attachments:** logo

**EXTERNAL EMAIL:** Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.



You're always on it with Critical Mention.

## ***Tess Hammock* has shared a report with you!**

**From** Tess Hammock (thammock@sos.ga.gov)

This is Aaron's interview from yesterday as well.

<https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/congress-opens-probe-of-2018-election-questions-in-georgia-1/928031952>

**Direct Link Report**

**Quoted - March 6**

**Total Number of Clips** 63

 **Total Online + Print Audience** 117,054,395

**Total Online + Print Publicity** \$2,334,776

1 The Latest: GA Senate committee approves  
new voting machines



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 4:28 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Bismarck Tribune

**Author** Bob Andres

**Market** Dickinson, ND

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 17,573

**Est. Publicity** \$1,294

FILE - In this Feb. 26, 2019 file photo, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger answers questions after the Georgia House passed a bill to buy a new election system that includes a paper ballot. But opponents to the bill, including many Democrats, say it would still leave Georgia's elections vulnerable to hacking and tampering. In letters dated Wednesday, March 6, 2019,...

2 US House Oversight Committee Demands Documents





**Date Collected** Mar 7, 2019 10:59 AM EST

**Category** Consumer

**Source** [Essence Magazine](#)

**Author** Breanna Edwards

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 118,328

**Est. Publicity** \$1,476

...current Gov. Brian Kemp's status as a then-candidate in the gubernatorial race as well as the then Secretary of State, who is tasked with overseeing elections; and documents concerning a Nov. 3, 2018 allegation that Democrats tried to hack Georgia's voter registration system.

According to the report, current Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger promised to cooperate with the committee probe, stating, "I think that when we get the information to them, they'll see that Georgia has been doing a great job in so many areas."

However, Kemp, around whom much of...

[3 US House Oversight Committee Opens Investigation of Georgia Elections R. Robin McDonald |March 06, 2019 U.S. House Oversight Committee Chairman Elijah Cummings has asked the state to turn over hundreds, and possibly thousands,](#)





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 11:09 PM EST

**Category** Trade

**Source** [Daily Report Online](#)

**Author** R. Robin McDonald

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 105,440

**Est. Publicity** \$1,245


Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (left) and Gov. Brian Kemp  
The U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform has opened an investigation into the conduct of Georgia's 2018 midterm elections, calling into question practices already under fire in multiple ongoing lawsuits here.

...

#### 4 House Oversight Committee launches investigation into alleged voter suppression in Georgia



Copyright 2019 The Washington Post All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 4:31 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** [Washington Post Blogs](#)

**Author** Felicia Sonmez/Vanessa Williams

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 9,763,008


**Est. Publicity** \$121,279

...will pursue investigations into a range of issues, from President Trump's business dealings to the Trump administration's policy of separating migrant families at the border. The oversight panel's chairman, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings (D-Md.), and civil rights subcommittee chairman, Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), said in letters to Kemp and Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger on Wednesday that they are "investigating recent reports of serious problems with voter registration, voter access, and other matters affecting the ability of people in Georgia to exercise their right to vote."

"The Committee is particularly concerned by reports that..

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

## 5 U.S. House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 7, 2019 11:32 AM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Philadelphia Tribune](#)

**Author** Ben Nadler

**Market** Philadelphia, PA

**Language** English


**Est. Audience** 15,621

...announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see...

## 6 Georgia's 2018 Midterm Elections Draw Inquiry From US House Oversight Committee



**Date Collected** Mar 7, 2019 8:40 AM EST

**Category** National

**Source** WABE

**Author** Johnny Kauffman

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 13,668

**Est. Publicity** \$303

...relief funding to Georgia following Hurricane Michael.

introduced legislation to address the issue.

Secretary of State Raffensperger confirmed his office received the letter from the U.S. House committee.


"Our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process," said Raffensperger in a written statement.

Kemp was Raffensperger's predecessor as the state's top election official. He stayed in office throughout the 2018 midterms when he was running for governor, attracting accusations that he had intentionally made it...

## 7 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 7, 2019 12:42 AM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Source** AP The Associated Press (Embargoed Data)

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 322,179

**Est. Publicity** \$3,551

...to Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections



Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."


The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

### 8 House oversight committee launches probe into claims of voter suppression in Georgia's bitterly-contested governor race



Copyright 2019 Associated Newspapers Ltd. All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 7, 2019 12:11 AM EST

**Category** National

**Source** [Mail Online UK](#)

**Author** Associated Press

**Market** United Kingdom

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 11,117,339

**Est. Publicity** \$138,008


...to Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he 'looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process.'

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

## 9 US House Oversight Committee Opens Investigation of Georgia Elections



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 8:33 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** [Yahoo! Finance](#)

**Author** ALM Media

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 7,740,924


**Est. Publicity** \$59,204

...Systems & Software, which is currently seeking the state contract to replace its obsolete electronic voting machines.

Asked about Cummings' letter at a news conference on Wednesday, Kemp said, "My reaction to that is they need to quit playing politics up there."

Rep. Doug Collins, R-Georgia—ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee—also issued a statement slamming Cummings' letters to Kemp and Raffensperger. "Democrats are bringing out their full arsenal of weapons to relitigate November's election in preparation for an upcoming election,"...

## 10 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 7:45 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [madison.com - RSS Results in news' of type article](#)

**Author** By BEN NADLER Associated Press

**Language** English


...to Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

## 11 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 7:37 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [kdlrnews.com - RSS Results in news.news/" of type article](#)

**Author** By BEN NADLER Associated Press

**Language** English


**Est. Audience** 7,810

**Est. Publicity** \$72

...Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern. Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

## 12 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:58 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [bismarcktribune.com - RSS Results in news/national of type article](#)

**Author** By BEN NADLER Associated Press

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 17,573


**Est. Publicity** \$163

...offered no evidence to support that concern.

Subscribe to Breaking News Sign up! \* I understand and agree that registration on or use of this site constitutes agreement to its user agreement and privacy policy. Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

### 13 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:57 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [OnlineAthens](#)

**Author** Ben Nadler

**Market** Athens, GA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 12,497

**Est. Publicity** \$150

...Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. Ho


Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see...

14 Stacey Abrams: Congress launches voter suppression investigation in Georgia, demanding answers from Brian Kemp: Investigation arrives after thousands of voters described voting issues during 2018 midterms



Copyright 2019 Independent Digital News and Media Limited All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:56 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** The Independent

**Author** Chris Riotta

**Market** United Kingdom

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 7,744,371

**Est. Publicity** \$287,894

...last-minute polling place changes, missing or incorrect voter registration records and malfunctioning machines, among other issues.

"playing politics".


Support free-thinking journalism and subscribe to Independent Minds

Mr Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The Associated Press contributed to this..

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

## 15 US House panel seeks records on state election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:50 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [OnlineAthens](#)

**Author** Ben Nadler

**Market** Athens, GA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 12,497

**Est. Publicity** \$150

...Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

dialogue and a thorough process.”

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see...

### 16 House Democrats to Probe Voter Suppression in Georgia



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:47 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [courthousenews.com](http://courthousenews.com)

**Author** KAYLA GOGGIN

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 32,413

**Est. Publicity** \$300

...gubernatorial election. He faced sharp criticism for his decision to continue to serve as Georgia's top election official during his campaign. Kemp and Raffensperger have until March 20 to submit the documents. In a statement via his spokesperson, Raffensperger confirmed receiving the request. "Our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process," he said. A representative for Kemp did not immediately respond to a request for comment. In a statement released Wednesday, Georgia Democratic Party Chairwoman Nikema Williams said the party is grateful for the investigation into the "unprecedented challenges" faced...

### 17 House Democrats have launched an investigation







**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:29 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [Vox - All](#)

**Author** P.R. Lockhart

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 2,854,703

**Est. Publicity** \$26,406

...during the election, was criticized for overseeing an election he ran in. Lawmakers requested that Kemp and Raffensperger turn over all relevant materials by March 20. In a statement provided to Vox, Raffensperger's office acknowledged that it had received the letter, adding that "our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

Kemp's office referred Vox to comments made by the governor during a signing ceremony earlier Wednesday. In those comments, Kemp said that Democrats "need to quit playing politics."

Voting rights were a huge issue in Georgia's 2018 election

The investigation —...

## 18 House Panel Launches Probe of Voter Suppression in Georgia



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:27 PM EST

**Source** Courthouse News Service

**Author** KAYLA GOGGIN

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 32,413

**Est. Publicity** \$453

...November 2018 gubernatorial election. He faced sharp criticism for his decision to continue to serve as Georgia's top election official during his campaign.

Kemp and Raffensperger have until March 20 to submit the documents. In a statement via his spokesperson, Raffensperger confirmed receiving the request.

"Our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process," he said.

A representative for Kemp did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

In a statement released Wednesday, Georgia Democratic Party Chairwoman Nikema Williams said the party is grateful for the investigation into the "unprecedented challenges" faced by Georgia...

19 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:23 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Author** By BEN NADLER Associated Press

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 29,289


**Est. Publicity** \$271

...offered no evidence to support that concern.

Subscribe to Breaking News Sign up! " I understand and agree that registration on or use of this site constitutes agreement to its user agreement and privacy policy. Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a ..

## 20 House Democrats to Probe Voter Suppression in Georgia



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 6:00 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** Courthouse News Service

**Author** KAYLA GOGGIN

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 32,413

**Est. Publicity** \$453

election. He faced sharp criticism for his decision to continue to serve as Georgia's top election official during his campaign.


Kemp and Raffensperger have until March 20 to submit the documents. In a statement via his spokesperson, Raffensperger confirmed receiving the request.

"Our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process," he said.

A representative for Kemp did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

In a statement released Wednesday, Georgia Democratic Party Chairwoman Nikema Williams said the party is grateful for the investigation into the "unprecedented challenges" faced by Georgia...

## 21 House Dems Launch Georgia Voting Probe With Doc Request To Gov. Kemp



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:49 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [Talking Points Memo](#)

**Author** Tierney Sneed

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 511,796

**Est. Publicity** \$4.734

...for compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The committee additionally seeks documents related to the sequestration of voting machines that prompted extremely long Election Day lines in three counties in the state. Raffensperger, in a statement via his spokesperson, confirmed receiving the letter. "Our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process," he said. A spokesperson for Kemp did not immediately respond to TPM's inquiry.

## 22 House Democrats have launched an investigation into voter suppression in Georgia



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:42 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [VOX.com](https://www.vox.com)

**Author** P.R. Lockhart

**Market** Washington, DC

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 2,854,703

**Est. Publicity** \$23,874


...the election, was criticized for overseeing an election he ran in

Lawmakers requested that Kemp and Raffensperger turn over all relevant materials by March 20. In a statement provided to Vox, Raffensperger's office acknowledged that it had received the letter, adding that "our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

Kemp's office referred Vox to comments made by the governor during a signing ceremony earlier Wednesday. In those comments, Kemp said that Democrats "need to quit playing politics."

The investigation — which comes months after the...

## 23 Georgia Governor Brian Kemp Faces Investigation by House Panel



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:33 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** New York Times

**Author** MAGGIE ASTOR

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 20,736,628

**Est. Publicity** \$292,065

...to lose their farm." He said nothing about the substance of the allegations or the document requests, and his spokesman did not respond to a follow-up email.

Mr. Raffensperger, the current secretary of state, said that he had received his own letter and that his office "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

Mr. Cummings and Mr. Raskin, the Democratic committee leaders, were not immediately available for interviews on Wednesday. But their decision to open the investigation was more evidence that House Democrats, newly empowered by the November election, intend to act aggressively...

## 24 US House seeks records on Georgia's 2018 election





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:25 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Gainesville Times](#)

**Market** Gainesville, GA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 7,420

**Est. Publicity** \$88

...Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see...

## 25 Georgia Governor Brian Kemp Faces Investigation by House Panel



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:18 PM EST

**Source** New York Times

**Author** MAGGIE ASTOR

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 20,736,628

**Est. Publicity** \$292,065

...to lose their farm." He said nothing about the substance of the allegations or the document requests, and his spokesman did not respond to a follow-up email.

Mr. Raffensperger, the current secretary of state, said that he had received his own letter and that his office "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

Mr. Cummings and Mr. Raskin, the Democratic committee leaders, were not immediately available for interviews on Wednesday. But their decision to open the investigation was more evidence that House Democrats, newly empowered by the November election, intend to act aggressively...

26 Stacey Abrams: Congress launches voter suppression investigation in Georgia, demanding answers from Brian Kemp



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:08 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** The Independent

**Author** Chris Riotta

**Market** United Kingdom

**Language** English




**Est. Publicity** \$249,015

...voters who experienced long lines, last-minute polling place changes, missing or incorrect voter registration records and malfunctioning machines, among other issues. Mr. Kemp brushed off the new investigation on Wednesday, saying Democrats need to stop "playing politics". Mr. Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process." The Associated Press contributed to this report. We'll tell you what's true. You can form your own view. At The Independent, no one tells us what to write. That's why, in an era of political lies and Brexit bias,...

27 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:06 PM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Source** AP The Associated Press (Embargoed Data)

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 322,179

**Est. Publicity** \$3,551

...to Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."


The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

## 28 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 5:06 PM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Source** [AP Associated Press State & Regional Wires \(Embargoed Data\)](#)

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 322,179

**Est. Publicity** \$3,551


...to Kemp's announcement just ahead of the election that the Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Raffensperger said in a statement emailed to the AP that he "looks forward to an open

The letters came the same day that a state Senate committee gave the green light to a wide-ranging elections bill that would move Georgia to new touchscreen voting machines that print a paper ballot. The legislation could quickly see a...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

## 29 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 4:16 PM EST

**Category** Blog

**Source** [blsmarcktribune.com - RSS Results of type article](#)

**Author** By BEN NADLER Associated Press

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 17,573

**Est. Publicity** \$163

...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

Subscribe to Breaking News Sign up! \* I understand and agree that registration on or use of this site constitutes agreement to its user agreement and privacy policy.

## Request To Gov. Kemp



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:49 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Talking Points Memo

**Author** Tierney Sneed

**Market** Washington, DC

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 511,796


**Est. Publicity** \$11,823

...the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The committee additionally seeks documents related to the sequestration of voting machines that prompted extremely long Election Day lines in three counties in the state.

Raffensperger, in a statement via his spokesperson, confirmed receiving the letter. "Our office looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process," he said. A spokesperson for Kemp did not immediately respond to TPM's inquiry.

## 31 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Category** Local

**Source** [American Press](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Lake Charles, LA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 3,280

**Est. Publicity** \$82

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 32 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:47 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Daily Progress](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Charlottesville, VA

**Language** English


**Est. Publicity** \$744

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 33 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:45 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Roanoke Times

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Roanoke, VA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 58,578

**Est. Publicity** \$1,469

...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 34 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:43 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Omaha World-Herald

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Washington, DC

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 121,061

**Est. Publicity** \$3,037


...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 35 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:40 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Greensboro.com](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Greensboro, NC

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 28,899

**Est. Publicity** \$725

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reflensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 36 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:39 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Savannah Morning News](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER



**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 16,011

**Est. Publicity** \$389

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.


Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 37 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:37 PM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Source** AP Associated Press State & Regional Wires (Embargoed Data)

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 322,179

**Est. Publicity** \$7,346

the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.


Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

### 38 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:37 PM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Source** [AP The Associated Press \(Embargoed Data\)](#)

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 322,179

**Est. Publicity** \$7,346


...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

thorough...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

### 39 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:37 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [WAND TV](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Decatur, IL

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 18,354

**Est. Publicity** \$460

...being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 40 U.S. House Panel Seeks Records On Georgia Election





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:35 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** WABE

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 13,668

**Est. Publicity** \$385

...was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

The post appeared first on 90.1 FM WABE .

#### 41 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:32 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Lynchburg, VA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 12,497


**Est. Publicity** \$313

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

#### 42 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 3:15 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Ledger-Enquirer

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Columbus, GA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 20,307


**Est. Publicity** \$511

...was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

### 43 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:52 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Your HomeTown Lima Stations

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Lima, OH

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 5,467

**Est. Publicity** \$137

...being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a

44 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election  
'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:45 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Gazette Extra!

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Janesville, WI

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 11,325


**Est. Publicity** \$284

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

45 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election  
'problems'



**Category** Local

**Source** [Clay Center Dispatch](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Clay Center, KS


**Language** English

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

#### 46 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:43 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Bristol Herald Courier](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Bristol, VA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 16,792

**Est. Publicity** \$403



system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

#### 47 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:41 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Washington Times

**Author** BEN NADLER - - Wednesday, March

**Market** Washington, DC

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 527,202

**Est. Publicity** \$17,006

...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

#### 48 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:40 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Herald Dispatch](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Huntington, WV

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 13,668

**Est. Publicity** \$342

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.


Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

#### 49 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:37 PM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 322,179

**Est. Publicity** \$7,346

...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.


Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

50 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



Copyright 2019 Associated Press All Rights Reserved



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:37 PM EST

**Category** Press Wire

**Source** AP The Associated Press (Embargoed Data)

**Author** By BEN NADLER

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Publicity** \$7,346


...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

[LexisNexis Terms & Conditions](#) | [Privacy Policy](#) | © 2019 LexisNexis.

## 51 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:33 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [KHQ Right Now](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Spokane, WA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 23,822

**Est. Publicity** \$597

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

## 52 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election

'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:28 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Herald-Zeitung

**Market** New Braunfels, TX

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 1,835

**Est. Publicity** \$46

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

## 53 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:24 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Bluefield Daily Telegraph](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Bluefield, WV

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 6,248

**Est. Publicity** \$147


...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

#inform-video-player-3 .inform-embed { margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom:...

## 54 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:22 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Mankato, MN

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 5,858

**Est. Publicity** \$138


...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

#inform-video-player-3 .inform-embed { margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom:...

## 55 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:21 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** NWI Times

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Munster, IN

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 54,673

**Est. Publicity** \$1,347

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

More video from this...

## 56 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election

'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:17 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [The Annus-Press](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Owosso, MI

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 1,367

**Est. Publicity** \$34


...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.



thorough...

57 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election  
'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:16 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Quincy Herald-Whig](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Quincy, IL

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 10,154

**Est. Publicity** \$254


...was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

58 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election  
'problems'





**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:15 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [Richmond.com](#)

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Richmond, VA

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 113,251

**Est. Publicity** \$2,841

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

## 59 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:14 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [New Jersey Herald](#)

**Market** Newton, NJ

**Est. Audience** 21,088


**Est. Publicity** \$529

...was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

## 60 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election 'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:12 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** Killeen Daily Herald

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Killeen, TX

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 7,810

**Est. Publicity** \$184

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

#inform-video-player-3 inform-embed { margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom:...

## 61 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election

'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:12 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** [NewsOK.com](https://newsok.com)

**Market** Oklahoma City, OK

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 123,404

**Est. Publicity** \$3,096

...Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email. Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

## 62 US House Panel Seeks Records on Georgia Election



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:06 PM EST

**Category** National

**Source** New York Times

**Market** United States

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 20,736,628


**Est. Publicity** \$745,921

...Democratic Party of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough...

63 US House panel seeks records on Georgia election  
'problems'



**Date Collected** Mar 6, 2019 2:03 PM EST

**Category** Local

**Source** KULR 8

**Author** BEN NADLER

**Market** Jamestown, NY

**Language** English

**Est. Audience** 7,420

**Est. Publicity** \$183

...of Georgia was being investigated in an alleged hacking attempt on the state elections system. He offered no evidence to support that concern.

Kemp spokeswoman Candice Broce did not reply to a text message, call and an email.

Reffensperger said in a statement that he "looks forward to an open dialogue and a thorough process."

More from this...

[View Full Report](#)

Critical Mention allows users to search global TV, radio, online news & social from the United States, Canada, and Europe, watch video, edit and share coverage, receive real-time email alerts, build reports, and analyze coverage through word clouds and graphs.

Want to learn more about Critical Mention? Sign up for a demo [here](#).

*Copyright © 2019 Critical Mention. All rights reserved.*

**Our mailing address is:**

Critical Mention  
521 5 Avenue  
16th Fl  
New York, NY 10175